Since kernel 6.17 display stack needs to reset the hardware properly to
ensure that we don't run into issues with the hardware configured by the
bootloader. MDSS reset is necessary to have working display when the
bootloader has already initialized it for the boot splash screen.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Minnekhanov <alexeymin(a)postmarketos.org>
---
Changes in v2:
- Added "Fixes" tag, pointing to commit which is the root cause for
exposing this "bug", which is only present since 6.17
- Extended commit messages
- Prepared series using correct user.email git setting
- Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251031-sdm660-mdss-reset-v1-0-14cb4e6836f2@post…
---
Alexey Minnekhanov (3):
dt-bindings: clock: mmcc-sdm660: Add missing MDSS reset
clk: qcom: mmcc-sdm660: Add missing MDSS reset
arm64: dts: qcom: sdm630: Add missing MDSS reset
arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/sdm630.dtsi | 1 +
drivers/clk/qcom/mmcc-sdm660.c | 1 +
include/dt-bindings/clock/qcom,mmcc-sdm660.h | 1 +
3 files changed, 3 insertions(+)
---
base-commit: 1cc41c88ef00de0f3216c5f4b9cfab47de1c49d3
change-id: 20251031-sdm660-mdss-reset-015a46a238b5
Best regards,
--
Alexey Minnekhanov <alexeymin(a)postmarketos.org>
From: Andrey Vatoropin <a.vatoropin(a)crpt.ru>
If allocation of cmd->t_task_cdb fails, it remains NULL but is later
dereferenced at the 'err' path.
In case of error reset NULL t_task_cdb value to point at the default
fixed-size buffer.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.
Fixes: 9e95fb805dc0 ("scsi: target: Fix NULL pointer dereference")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrey Vatoropin <a.vatoropin(a)crpt.ru>
---
drivers/target/target_core_transport.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/drivers/target/target_core_transport.c b/drivers/target/target_core_transport.c
index 0a76bdfe5528..88544c911949 100644
--- a/drivers/target/target_core_transport.c
+++ b/drivers/target/target_core_transport.c
@@ -1524,6 +1524,7 @@ target_cmd_init_cdb(struct se_cmd *cmd, unsigned char *cdb, gfp_t gfp)
if (scsi_command_size(cdb) > sizeof(cmd->__t_task_cdb)) {
cmd->t_task_cdb = kzalloc(scsi_command_size(cdb), gfp);
if (!cmd->t_task_cdb) {
+ cmd->t_task_cdb = &cmd->__t_task_cdb[0];
pr_err("Unable to allocate cmd->t_task_cdb"
" %u > sizeof(cmd->__t_task_cdb): %lu ops\n",
scsi_command_size(cdb),
--
2.43.0
impl_list_item_mod.rs calls container_of() without unsafe blocks at a
couple of places. Since container_of() is an unsafe macro / function,
the blocks are strictly necessary.
For unknown reasons, that problem was so far not visible and only gets
visible once one utilizes the list implementation from within the core
crate:
error[E0133]: call to unsafe function `core::ptr::mut_ptr::<impl *mut T>::byte_sub`
is unsafe and requires unsafe block
--> rust/kernel/lib.rs:252:29
|
252 | let container_ptr = field_ptr.byte_sub(offset).cast::<$Container>();
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ call to unsafe function
|
::: rust/kernel/drm/jq.rs:98:1
|
98 | / impl_list_item! {
99 | | impl ListItem<0> for BasicItem { using ListLinks { self.links }; }
100 | | }
| |_- in this macro invocation
|
note: an unsafe function restricts its caller, but its body is safe by default
--> rust/kernel/list/impl_list_item_mod.rs:216:13
|
216 | unsafe fn view_value(me: *mut $crate::list::ListLinks<$num>) -> *const Self {
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
|
::: rust/kernel/drm/jq.rs:98:1
|
98 | / impl_list_item! {
99 | | impl ListItem<0> for BasicItem { using ListLinks { self.links }; }
100 | | }
| |_- in this macro invocation
= note: requested on the command line with `-D unsafe-op-in-unsafe-fn`
= note: this error originates in the macro `$crate::container_of` which comes
from the expansion of the macro `impl_list_item`
Add unsafe blocks to container_of to fix the issue.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.17+
Fixes: c77f85b347dd ("rust: list: remove OFFSET constants")
Suggested-by: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl(a)google.com>
Signed-off-by: Philipp Stanner <phasta(a)kernel.org>
---
Changes in v2:
- Add unsafes to the list implementation instead of container_of
itself. (Alice, Miguel)
- Adjust commit message and Fixes: tag.
- Add stable-kernel for completeness.
---
rust/kernel/list/impl_list_item_mod.rs | 12 ++++++------
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/rust/kernel/list/impl_list_item_mod.rs b/rust/kernel/list/impl_list_item_mod.rs
index 202bc6f97c13..7052095efde5 100644
--- a/rust/kernel/list/impl_list_item_mod.rs
+++ b/rust/kernel/list/impl_list_item_mod.rs
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ unsafe fn view_value(me: *mut $crate::list::ListLinks<$num>) -> *const Self {
// SAFETY: `me` originates from the most recent call to `prepare_to_insert`, so it
// points at the field `$field` in a value of type `Self`. Thus, reversing that
// operation is still in-bounds of the allocation.
- $crate::container_of!(me, Self, $($field).*)
+ unsafe { $crate::container_of!(me, Self, $($field).*) }
}
// GUARANTEES:
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ unsafe fn post_remove(me: *mut $crate::list::ListLinks<$num>) -> *const Self {
// SAFETY: `me` originates from the most recent call to `prepare_to_insert`, so it
// points at the field `$field` in a value of type `Self`. Thus, reversing that
// operation is still in-bounds of the allocation.
- $crate::container_of!(me, Self, $($field).*)
+ unsafe { $crate::container_of!(me, Self, $($field).*) }
}
}
)*};
@@ -270,9 +270,9 @@ unsafe fn prepare_to_insert(me: *const Self) -> *mut $crate::list::ListLinks<$nu
// SAFETY: The caller promises that `me` points at a valid value of type `Self`.
let links_field = unsafe { <Self as $crate::list::ListItem<$num>>::view_links(me) };
- let container = $crate::container_of!(
+ let container = unsafe { $crate::container_of!(
links_field, $crate::list::ListLinksSelfPtr<Self, $num>, inner
- );
+ ) };
// SAFETY: By the same reasoning above, `links_field` is a valid pointer.
let self_ptr = unsafe {
@@ -319,9 +319,9 @@ unsafe fn view_links(me: *const Self) -> *mut $crate::list::ListLinks<$num> {
// `ListArc` containing `Self` until the next call to `post_remove`. The value cannot
// be destroyed while a `ListArc` reference exists.
unsafe fn view_value(links_field: *mut $crate::list::ListLinks<$num>) -> *const Self {
- let container = $crate::container_of!(
+ let container = unsafe { $crate::container_of!(
links_field, $crate::list::ListLinksSelfPtr<Self, $num>, inner
- );
+ ) };
// SAFETY: By the same reasoning above, `links_field` is a valid pointer.
let self_ptr = unsafe {
--
2.49.0
From: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen(a)google.com>
Starting with Rust 1.91.0 (released 2025-10-30), in upstream commit
ab91a63d403b ("Ignore intrinsic calls in cross-crate-inlining cost model")
[1][2], `bindings.o` stops containing DWARF debug information because the
`Default` implementations contained `write_bytes()` calls which are now
ignored in that cost model (note that `CLIPPY=1` does not reproduce it).
This means `gendwarfksyms` complains:
RUSTC L rust/bindings.o
error: gendwarfksyms: process_module: dwarf_get_units failed: no debugging information?
There are several alternatives that would work here: conditionally
skipping in the cases needed (but that is subtle and brittle), forcing
DWARF generation with e.g. a dummy `static` (ugly and we may need to
do it in several crates), skipping the call to the tool in the Kbuild
command when there are no exports (fine) or teaching the tool to do so
itself (simple and clean).
Thus do the last one: don't attempt to process files if we have no symbol
versions to calculate.
[ I used the commit log of my patch linked below since it explained the
root issue and expanded it a bit more to summarize the alternatives.
- Miguel ]
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # Needed in 6.12.y and later (Rust is pinned in older LTSs).
Reported-by: Haiyue Wang <haiyuewa(a)163.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/rust-for-linux/b8c1c73d-bf8b-4bf2-beb1-84ffdcd60547…
Suggested-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda(a)kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/rust-for-linux/CANiq72nKC5r24VHAp9oUPR1HVPqT+=0ab9N…
Link: https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/commit/ab91a63d403b0105cacd72809cd292a729… [1]
Link: https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/pull/145910 [2]
Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen(a)google.com>
Signed-off-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda(a)kernel.org>
---
scripts/gendwarfksyms/gendwarfksyms.c | 3 ++-
scripts/gendwarfksyms/gendwarfksyms.h | 2 +-
scripts/gendwarfksyms/symbols.c | 4 +++-
3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/scripts/gendwarfksyms/gendwarfksyms.c b/scripts/gendwarfksyms/gendwarfksyms.c
index 08ae61eb327e..f5203d1640ee 100644
--- a/scripts/gendwarfksyms/gendwarfksyms.c
+++ b/scripts/gendwarfksyms/gendwarfksyms.c
@@ -138,7 +138,8 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
error("no input files?");
}
- symbol_read_exports(stdin);
+ if (!symbol_read_exports(stdin))
+ return 0;
if (symtypes_file) {
symfile = fopen(symtypes_file, "w");
diff --git a/scripts/gendwarfksyms/gendwarfksyms.h b/scripts/gendwarfksyms/gendwarfksyms.h
index d9c06d2cb1df..32cec8f7695a 100644
--- a/scripts/gendwarfksyms/gendwarfksyms.h
+++ b/scripts/gendwarfksyms/gendwarfksyms.h
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ struct symbol {
typedef void (*symbol_callback_t)(struct symbol *, void *arg);
bool is_symbol_ptr(const char *name);
-void symbol_read_exports(FILE *file);
+int symbol_read_exports(FILE *file);
void symbol_read_symtab(int fd);
struct symbol *symbol_get(const char *name);
void symbol_set_ptr(struct symbol *sym, Dwarf_Die *ptr);
diff --git a/scripts/gendwarfksyms/symbols.c b/scripts/gendwarfksyms/symbols.c
index 35ed594f0749..ecddcb5ffcdf 100644
--- a/scripts/gendwarfksyms/symbols.c
+++ b/scripts/gendwarfksyms/symbols.c
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ static bool is_exported(const char *name)
return for_each(name, NULL, NULL) > 0;
}
-void symbol_read_exports(FILE *file)
+int symbol_read_exports(FILE *file)
{
struct symbol *sym;
char *line = NULL;
@@ -159,6 +159,8 @@ void symbol_read_exports(FILE *file)
free(line);
debug("%d exported symbols", nsym);
+
+ return nsym;
}
static void get_symbol(struct symbol *sym, void *arg)
base-commit: e9a6fb0bcdd7609be6969112f3fbfcce3b1d4a7c
--
2.51.2
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From: Łukasz Bartosik <ukaszb(a)chromium.org>
When DbC is disconnected then xhci_dbc_tty_unregister_device()
is called. However if there is any user space process blocked
on write to DbC terminal device then it will never be signalled
and thus stay blocked indifinitely.
This fix adds a tty_hangup() call in xhci_dbc_tty_unregister_device().
The tty_hangup() wakes up any blocked writers and causes subsequent
write attempts to DbC terminal device to fail.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: dfba2174dc42 ("usb: xhci: Add DbC support in xHCI driver")
Signed-off-by: Łukasz Bartosik <ukaszb(a)chromium.org>
---
drivers/usb/host/xhci-dbgtty.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-dbgtty.c b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-dbgtty.c
index d894081d8d15..6ea31af576c7 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-dbgtty.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-dbgtty.c
@@ -535,6 +535,13 @@ static void xhci_dbc_tty_unregister_device(struct xhci_dbc *dbc)
if (!port->registered)
return;
+ /*
+ * Hang up the TTY. This wakes up any blocked
+ * writers and causes subsequent writes to fail.
+ */
+ if (port->port.tty)
+ tty_hangup(port->port.tty);
+
tty_unregister_device(dbc_tty_driver, port->minor);
xhci_dbc_tty_exit_port(port);
port->registered = false;
--
2.52.0.rc1.455.g30608eb744-goog
impl_list_item_mod.rs calls container_of() without unsafe blocks at a
couple of places. Since container_of() is an unsafe macro / function,
the blocks are strictly necessary.
For unknown reasons, that problem was so far not visible and only gets
visible once one utilizes the list implementation from within the core
crate:
error[E0133]: call to unsafe function `core::ptr::mut_ptr::<impl *mut T>::byte_sub`
is unsafe and requires unsafe block
--> rust/kernel/lib.rs:252:29
|
252 | let container_ptr = field_ptr.byte_sub(offset).cast::<$Container>();
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ call to unsafe function
|
::: rust/kernel/drm/jq.rs:98:1
|
98 | / impl_list_item! {
99 | | impl ListItem<0> for BasicItem { using ListLinks { self.links }; }
100 | | }
| |_- in this macro invocation
|
note: an unsafe function restricts its caller, but its body is safe by default
--> rust/kernel/list/impl_list_item_mod.rs:216:13
|
216 | unsafe fn view_value(me: *mut $crate::list::ListLinks<$num>) -> *const Self {
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
|
::: rust/kernel/drm/jq.rs:98:1
|
98 | / impl_list_item! {
99 | | impl ListItem<0> for BasicItem { using ListLinks { self.links }; }
100 | | }
| |_- in this macro invocation
= note: requested on the command line with `-D unsafe-op-in-unsafe-fn`
= note: this error originates in the macro `$crate::container_of` which comes
from the expansion of the macro `impl_list_item`
Add unsafe blocks to container_of to fix the issue.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.17+
Fixes: c77f85b347dd ("rust: list: remove OFFSET constants")
Suggested-by: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl(a)google.com>
Signed-off-by: Philipp Stanner <phasta(a)kernel.org>
---
rust/kernel/list/impl_list_item_mod.rs | 12 ++++++------
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/rust/kernel/list/impl_list_item_mod.rs b/rust/kernel/list/impl_list_item_mod.rs
index 202bc6f97c13..7052095efde5 100644
--- a/rust/kernel/list/impl_list_item_mod.rs
+++ b/rust/kernel/list/impl_list_item_mod.rs
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ unsafe fn view_value(me: *mut $crate::list::ListLinks<$num>) -> *const Self {
// SAFETY: `me` originates from the most recent call to `prepare_to_insert`, so it
// points at the field `$field` in a value of type `Self`. Thus, reversing that
// operation is still in-bounds of the allocation.
- $crate::container_of!(me, Self, $($field).*)
+ unsafe { $crate::container_of!(me, Self, $($field).*) }
}
// GUARANTEES:
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ unsafe fn post_remove(me: *mut $crate::list::ListLinks<$num>) -> *const Self {
// SAFETY: `me` originates from the most recent call to `prepare_to_insert`, so it
// points at the field `$field` in a value of type `Self`. Thus, reversing that
// operation is still in-bounds of the allocation.
- $crate::container_of!(me, Self, $($field).*)
+ unsafe { $crate::container_of!(me, Self, $($field).*) }
}
}
)*};
@@ -270,9 +270,9 @@ unsafe fn prepare_to_insert(me: *const Self) -> *mut $crate::list::ListLinks<$nu
// SAFETY: The caller promises that `me` points at a valid value of type `Self`.
let links_field = unsafe { <Self as $crate::list::ListItem<$num>>::view_links(me) };
- let container = $crate::container_of!(
+ let container = unsafe { $crate::container_of!(
links_field, $crate::list::ListLinksSelfPtr<Self, $num>, inner
- );
+ ) };
// SAFETY: By the same reasoning above, `links_field` is a valid pointer.
let self_ptr = unsafe {
@@ -319,9 +319,9 @@ unsafe fn view_links(me: *const Self) -> *mut $crate::list::ListLinks<$num> {
// `ListArc` containing `Self` until the next call to `post_remove`. The value cannot
// be destroyed while a `ListArc` reference exists.
unsafe fn view_value(links_field: *mut $crate::list::ListLinks<$num>) -> *const Self {
- let container = $crate::container_of!(
+ let container = unsafe { $crate::container_of!(
links_field, $crate::list::ListLinksSelfPtr<Self, $num>, inner
- );
+ ) };
// SAFETY: By the same reasoning above, `links_field` is a valid pointer.
let self_ptr = unsafe {
--
2.49.0
From: "Mario Limonciello (AMD)" <superm1(a)kernel.org>
During the suspend sequence VPE is already going to be power gated
as part of vpe_suspend(). It's unnecessary to call during calls to
amdgpu_device_set_pg_state().
It actually can expose a race condition with the firmware if s0i3
sequence starts as well. Drop these calls.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: Peyton.Lee(a)amd.com
Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello(a)amd.com>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_device.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_device.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_device.c
index 81587f8d66c2..22db0e4154e4 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_device.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_device.c
@@ -3419,10 +3419,11 @@ int amdgpu_device_set_pg_state(struct amdgpu_device *adev,
(adev->ip_blocks[i].version->type == AMD_IP_BLOCK_TYPE_GFX ||
adev->ip_blocks[i].version->type == AMD_IP_BLOCK_TYPE_SDMA))
continue;
- /* skip CG for VCE/UVD, it's handled specially */
+ /* skip CG for VCE/UVD/VPE, it's handled specially */
if (adev->ip_blocks[i].version->type != AMD_IP_BLOCK_TYPE_UVD &&
adev->ip_blocks[i].version->type != AMD_IP_BLOCK_TYPE_VCE &&
adev->ip_blocks[i].version->type != AMD_IP_BLOCK_TYPE_VCN &&
+ adev->ip_blocks[i].version->type != AMD_IP_BLOCK_TYPE_VPE &&
adev->ip_blocks[i].version->type != AMD_IP_BLOCK_TYPE_JPEG &&
adev->ip_blocks[i].version->funcs->set_powergating_state) {
/* enable powergating to save power */
--
2.51.2
