The patch below does not apply to the 6.6-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.6.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 103e17aac09cdd358133f9e00998b75d6c1f1518
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025112429-pasture-geometry-591b@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.6.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 103e17aac09cdd358133f9e00998b75d6c1f1518 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sebastian Ene <sebastianene(a)google.com>
Date: Fri, 17 Oct 2025 07:57:10 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] KVM: arm64: Check the untrusted offset in FF-A memory share
Verify the offset to prevent OOB access in the hypervisor
FF-A buffer in case an untrusted large enough value
[U32_MAX - sizeof(struct ffa_composite_mem_region) + 1, U32_MAX]
is set from the host kernel.
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Ene <sebastianene(a)google.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will(a)kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251017075710.2605118-1-sebastianene@google.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz(a)kernel.org>
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/ffa.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/ffa.c
index 4e16f9b96f63..58b7d0c477d7 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/ffa.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/ffa.c
@@ -479,7 +479,7 @@ static void __do_ffa_mem_xfer(const u64 func_id,
struct ffa_mem_region_attributes *ep_mem_access;
struct ffa_composite_mem_region *reg;
struct ffa_mem_region *buf;
- u32 offset, nr_ranges;
+ u32 offset, nr_ranges, checked_offset;
int ret = 0;
if (addr_mbz || npages_mbz || fraglen > len ||
@@ -516,7 +516,12 @@ static void __do_ffa_mem_xfer(const u64 func_id,
goto out_unlock;
}
- if (fraglen < offset + sizeof(struct ffa_composite_mem_region)) {
+ if (check_add_overflow(offset, sizeof(struct ffa_composite_mem_region), &checked_offset)) {
+ ret = FFA_RET_INVALID_PARAMETERS;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ if (fraglen < checked_offset) {
ret = FFA_RET_INVALID_PARAMETERS;
goto out_unlock;
}
On an EPT violation, bit 7 of the exit qualification is set if the
guest linear-address is valid. The derived page fault error code
should not be checked for this bit.
Fixes: f3009482512e ("KVM: VMX: Set PFERR_GUEST_{FINAL,PAGE}_MASK if and only if the GVA is valid")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sukrit Bhatnagar <Sukrit.Bhatnagar(a)sony.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li(a)intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251106052853.3071088-1-Sukrit.Bhatnagar@sony.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com>
(cherry picked from commit d0164c161923ac303bd843e04ebe95cfd03c6e19)
Signed-off-by: Sukrit Bhatnagar <Sukrit.Bhatnagar(a)sony.com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 6c185a260c5b..d0387f543107 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -5810,7 +5810,7 @@ static int handle_ept_violation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
error_code |= (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_RWX_MASK)
? PFERR_PRESENT_MASK : 0;
- if (error_code & EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID)
+ if (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID)
error_code |= (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED) ?
PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK : PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK;
--
2.43.0
The patch below does not apply to the 6.17-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.17.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 8d7bba1e8314013ecc817a91624104ceb9352ddc
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025110942-language-suspect-13bc@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.17.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 8d7bba1e8314013ecc817a91624104ceb9352ddc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong(a)kernel.org>
Date: Tue, 4 Nov 2025 16:15:38 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] xfs: fix various problems in xfs_atomic_write_cow_iomap_begin
I think there are several things wrong with this function:
A) xfs_bmapi_write can return a much larger unwritten mapping than what
the caller asked for. We convert part of that range to written, but
return the entire written mapping to iomap even though that's
inaccurate.
B) The arguments to xfs_reflink_convert_cow_locked are wrong -- an
unwritten mapping could be *smaller* than the write range (or even
the hole range). In this case, we convert too much file range to
written state because we then return a smaller mapping to iomap.
C) It doesn't handle delalloc mappings. This I covered in the patch
that I already sent to the list.
D) Reassigning count_fsb to handle the hole means that if the second
cmap lookup attempt succeeds (due to racing with someone else) we
trim the mapping more than is strictly necessary. The changing
meaning of count_fsb makes this harder to notice.
E) The tracepoint is kinda wrong because @length is mutated. That makes
it harder to chase the data flows through this function because you
can't just grep on the pos/bytecount strings.
F) We don't actually check that the br_state = XFS_EXT_NORM assignment
is accurate, i.e that the cow fork actually contains a written
mapping for the range we're interested in
G) Somewhat inadequate documentation of why we need to xfs_trim_extent
so aggressively in this function.
H) Not sure why xfs_iomap_end_fsb is used here, the vfs already clamped
the write range to s_maxbytes.
Fix these issues, and then the atomic writes regressions in generic/760,
generic/617, generic/091, generic/263, and generic/521 all go away for
me.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.16
Fixes: bd1d2c21d5d249 ("xfs: add xfs_atomic_write_cow_iomap_begin()")
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong(a)kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: John Garry <john.g.garry(a)oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cem(a)kernel.org>
diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_iomap.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_iomap.c
index 788bfdce608a..490e12cb99be 100644
--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_iomap.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_iomap.c
@@ -1091,6 +1091,29 @@ const struct iomap_ops xfs_zoned_direct_write_iomap_ops = {
};
#endif /* CONFIG_XFS_RT */
+#ifdef DEBUG
+static void
+xfs_check_atomic_cow_conversion(
+ struct xfs_inode *ip,
+ xfs_fileoff_t offset_fsb,
+ xfs_filblks_t count_fsb,
+ const struct xfs_bmbt_irec *cmap)
+{
+ struct xfs_iext_cursor icur;
+ struct xfs_bmbt_irec cmap2 = { };
+
+ if (xfs_iext_lookup_extent(ip, ip->i_cowfp, offset_fsb, &icur, &cmap2))
+ xfs_trim_extent(&cmap2, offset_fsb, count_fsb);
+
+ ASSERT(cmap2.br_startoff == cmap->br_startoff);
+ ASSERT(cmap2.br_blockcount == cmap->br_blockcount);
+ ASSERT(cmap2.br_startblock == cmap->br_startblock);
+ ASSERT(cmap2.br_state == cmap->br_state);
+}
+#else
+# define xfs_check_atomic_cow_conversion(...) ((void)0)
+#endif
+
static int
xfs_atomic_write_cow_iomap_begin(
struct inode *inode,
@@ -1102,9 +1125,10 @@ xfs_atomic_write_cow_iomap_begin(
{
struct xfs_inode *ip = XFS_I(inode);
struct xfs_mount *mp = ip->i_mount;
- const xfs_fileoff_t offset_fsb = XFS_B_TO_FSBT(mp, offset);
- xfs_fileoff_t end_fsb = xfs_iomap_end_fsb(mp, offset, length);
- xfs_filblks_t count_fsb = end_fsb - offset_fsb;
+ const xfs_fileoff_t offset_fsb = XFS_B_TO_FSBT(mp, offset);
+ const xfs_fileoff_t end_fsb = XFS_B_TO_FSB(mp, offset + length);
+ const xfs_filblks_t count_fsb = end_fsb - offset_fsb;
+ xfs_filblks_t hole_count_fsb;
int nmaps = 1;
xfs_filblks_t resaligned;
struct xfs_bmbt_irec cmap;
@@ -1143,14 +1167,20 @@ xfs_atomic_write_cow_iomap_begin(
if (cmap.br_startoff <= offset_fsb) {
if (isnullstartblock(cmap.br_startblock))
goto convert_delay;
+
+ /*
+ * cmap could extend outside the write range due to previous
+ * speculative preallocations. We must trim cmap to the write
+ * range because the cow fork treats written mappings to mean
+ * "write in progress".
+ */
xfs_trim_extent(&cmap, offset_fsb, count_fsb);
goto found;
}
- end_fsb = cmap.br_startoff;
- count_fsb = end_fsb - offset_fsb;
+ hole_count_fsb = cmap.br_startoff - offset_fsb;
- resaligned = xfs_aligned_fsb_count(offset_fsb, count_fsb,
+ resaligned = xfs_aligned_fsb_count(offset_fsb, hole_count_fsb,
xfs_get_cowextsz_hint(ip));
xfs_iunlock(ip, XFS_ILOCK_EXCL);
@@ -1186,7 +1216,7 @@ xfs_atomic_write_cow_iomap_begin(
* atomic writes to that same range will be aligned (and don't require
* this COW-based method).
*/
- error = xfs_bmapi_write(tp, ip, offset_fsb, count_fsb,
+ error = xfs_bmapi_write(tp, ip, offset_fsb, hole_count_fsb,
XFS_BMAPI_COWFORK | XFS_BMAPI_PREALLOC |
XFS_BMAPI_EXTSZALIGN, 0, &cmap, &nmaps);
if (error) {
@@ -1199,17 +1229,26 @@ xfs_atomic_write_cow_iomap_begin(
if (error)
goto out_unlock;
+ /*
+ * cmap could map more blocks than the range we passed into bmapi_write
+ * because of EXTSZALIGN or adjacent pre-existing unwritten mappings
+ * that were merged. Trim cmap to the original write range so that we
+ * don't convert more than we were asked to do for this write.
+ */
+ xfs_trim_extent(&cmap, offset_fsb, count_fsb);
+
found:
if (cmap.br_state != XFS_EXT_NORM) {
- error = xfs_reflink_convert_cow_locked(ip, offset_fsb,
- count_fsb);
+ error = xfs_reflink_convert_cow_locked(ip, cmap.br_startoff,
+ cmap.br_blockcount);
if (error)
goto out_unlock;
cmap.br_state = XFS_EXT_NORM;
+ xfs_check_atomic_cow_conversion(ip, offset_fsb, count_fsb,
+ &cmap);
}
- length = XFS_FSB_TO_B(mp, cmap.br_startoff + cmap.br_blockcount);
- trace_xfs_iomap_found(ip, offset, length - offset, XFS_COW_FORK, &cmap);
+ trace_xfs_iomap_found(ip, offset, length, XFS_COW_FORK, &cmap);
seq = xfs_iomap_inode_sequence(ip, IOMAP_F_SHARED);
xfs_iunlock(ip, XFS_ILOCK_EXCL);
return xfs_bmbt_to_iomap(ip, iomap, &cmap, flags, IOMAP_F_SHARED, seq);
The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x fbade4bd08ba52cbc74a71c4e86e736f059f99f7
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025112454-crib-recognize-8675@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From fbade4bd08ba52cbc74a71c4e86e736f059f99f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen(a)linux.dev>
Date: Tue, 11 Nov 2025 14:02:50 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] mptcp: Disallow MPTCP subflows from sockmap
The sockmap feature allows bpf syscall from userspace, or based on bpf
sockops, replacing the sk_prot of sockets during protocol stack processing
with sockmap's custom read/write interfaces.
'''
tcp_rcv_state_process()
subflow_syn_recv_sock()
tcp_init_transfer(BPF_SOCK_OPS_PASSIVE_ESTABLISHED_CB)
bpf_skops_established <== sockops
bpf_sock_map_update(sk) <== call bpf helper
tcp_bpf_update_proto() <== update sk_prot
'''
Consider two scenarios:
1. When the server has MPTCP enabled and the client also requests MPTCP,
the sk passed to the BPF program is a subflow sk. Since subflows only
handle partial data, replacing their sk_prot is meaningless and will
cause traffic disruption.
2. When the server has MPTCP enabled but the client sends a TCP SYN
without MPTCP, subflow_syn_recv_sock() performs a fallback on the
subflow, replacing the subflow sk's sk_prot with the native sk_prot.
'''
subflow_ulp_fallback()
subflow_drop_ctx()
mptcp_subflow_ops_undo_override()
'''
Subsequently, accept::mptcp_stream_accept::mptcp_fallback_tcp_ops()
converts the subflow to plain TCP.
For the first case, we should prevent it from being combined with sockmap
by setting sk_prot->psock_update_sk_prot to NULL, which will be blocked by
sockmap's own flow.
For the second case, since subflow_syn_recv_sock() has already restored
sk_prot to native tcp_prot/tcpv6_prot, no further action is needed.
Fixes: cec37a6e41aa ("mptcp: Handle MP_CAPABLE options for outgoing connections")
Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen(a)linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau(a)kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe(a)kernel.org>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251111060307.194196-2-jiayuan.chen@linux.dev
diff --git a/net/mptcp/subflow.c b/net/mptcp/subflow.c
index e8325890a322..af707ce0f624 100644
--- a/net/mptcp/subflow.c
+++ b/net/mptcp/subflow.c
@@ -2144,6 +2144,10 @@ void __init mptcp_subflow_init(void)
tcp_prot_override = tcp_prot;
tcp_prot_override.release_cb = tcp_release_cb_override;
tcp_prot_override.diag_destroy = tcp_abort_override;
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+ /* Disable sockmap processing for subflows */
+ tcp_prot_override.psock_update_sk_prot = NULL;
+#endif
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MPTCP_IPV6)
/* In struct mptcp_subflow_request_sock, we assume the TCP request sock
@@ -2180,6 +2184,10 @@ void __init mptcp_subflow_init(void)
tcpv6_prot_override = tcpv6_prot;
tcpv6_prot_override.release_cb = tcp_release_cb_override;
tcpv6_prot_override.diag_destroy = tcp_abort_override;
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+ /* Disable sockmap processing for subflows */
+ tcpv6_prot_override.psock_update_sk_prot = NULL;
+#endif
#endif
mptcp_diag_subflow_init(&subflow_ulp_ops);
The patch below does not apply to the 6.1-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.1.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 4d3a13afa8b64dc49293b3eab3e7beac11072c12
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025112405-dispense-dealing-3eec@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.1.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 4d3a13afa8b64dc49293b3eab3e7beac11072c12 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Mario Limonciello (AMD)" <superm1(a)kernel.org>
Date: Mon, 20 Oct 2025 10:50:42 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] HID: amd_sfh: Stop sensor before starting
Titas reports that the accelerometer sensor on their laptop only
works after a warm boot or unloading/reloading the amd-sfh kernel
module.
Presumably the sensor is in a bad state on cold boot and failing to
start, so explicitly stop it before starting.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 93ce5e0231d79 ("HID: amd_sfh: Implement SFH1.1 functionality")
Reported-by: Titas <novatitas366(a)gmail.com>
Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=220670
Tested-by: Titas <novatitas366(a)gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello (AMD) <superm1(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina(a)suse.com>
diff --git a/drivers/hid/amd-sfh-hid/sfh1_1/amd_sfh_init.c b/drivers/hid/amd-sfh-hid/sfh1_1/amd_sfh_init.c
index 0a9b44ce4904..b0bab2a1ddcc 100644
--- a/drivers/hid/amd-sfh-hid/sfh1_1/amd_sfh_init.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/amd-sfh-hid/sfh1_1/amd_sfh_init.c
@@ -194,6 +194,8 @@ static int amd_sfh1_1_hid_client_init(struct amd_mp2_dev *privdata)
if (rc)
goto cleanup;
+ mp2_ops->stop(privdata, cl_data->sensor_idx[i]);
+ amd_sfh_wait_for_response(privdata, cl_data->sensor_idx[i], DISABLE_SENSOR);
writel(0, privdata->mmio + amd_get_p2c_val(privdata, 0));
mp2_ops->start(privdata, info);
status = amd_sfh_wait_for_response
In the driver code for the MV‑based queue variant (struct hpt_iopmu_mv of the
hptiop driver), the field "inbound_head" is read from the hardware register
and used as an index into the array "inbound_q[MVIOP_QUEUE_LEN]". For example:
u32 inbound_head = readl(&hba->u.mv.mu->inbound_head);
/* ... */
memcpy_toio(&hba->u.mv.mu->inbound_q[inbound_head], &p, 8);
The code then increments head and wraps it to zero when it equals MVIOP_QUEUE_LEN.
However, the driver does *not* check that the initial value of "inbound_head"
is strictly less than "MVIOP_QUEUE_LEN". If the hardware (or attacker‑controlled
firmware/hardware device) writes a malicious value into the inbound_head register
(which could be ≥ MVIOP_QUEUE_LEN), then subsequent "memcpy_toio" will write
past the end of "inbound_q", leading to an out‑of‑bounds write condition.
Since inbound_q is allocated with exactly MVIOP_QUEUE_LEN entries (see:
__le64 inbound_q[MVIOP_QUEUE_LEN]; /* MVIOP_QUEUE_LEN == 512 */
), indexing at e.g. "inbound_head == 512" or greater results in undefined memory access
and potential corruption of adjacent fields or memory regions.
This issue is particularly concerning in scenarios where an attacker has control
or influence over the hardware/firmware on the adapter card (for example a malicious
or compromised controller), because they could deliberately set "inbound_head" to
a value outside the expected [0, MVIOP_QUEUE_LEN‑1] range, thus forcing the driver
to write arbitrary data beyond the queue bounds.
To mitigate this issue, we add a check to validate the value of "inbound_head"
before it is used as an index. If "inbound_head" is found to be out of bounds (≥ MVIOP_QUEUE_LEN),
the head will be reset to 0, and "head" will be set to 1 to ensure that a valid entry is written to
the queue. The resetting of "inbound_head" to 0 ensures that the queue processing can continue
safely and predictably, while the adjustment of "head = 1" ensures that the next valid index is used
for subsequent writes.
This prevents any out-of-bounds writes and ensures that the queue continues to operate safely
even if the hardware is compromised.
Fixes: 00f5970193e22 ("[SCSI] hptiop: add more adapter models and other fixes")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Guangshuo Li <lgs201920130244(a)gmail.com>
---
drivers/scsi/hptiop.c | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/hptiop.c b/drivers/scsi/hptiop.c
index c01370893a81..a1a3840e6ea8 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/hptiop.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/hptiop.c
@@ -166,6 +166,14 @@ static void mv_inbound_write(u64 p, struct hptiop_hba *hba)
if (head == MVIOP_QUEUE_LEN)
head = 0;
+ if (inbound_head >= MVIOP_QUEUE_LEN) {
+ dev_err(&hba->pdev->dev,
+ "hptiop: inbound_head out of range (%u)\n",
+ inbound_head);
+ inbound_head = 0;
+ head = 1;
+ }
+
memcpy_toio(&hba->u.mv.mu->inbound_q[inbound_head], &p, 8);
writel(head, &hba->u.mv.mu->inbound_head);
writel(MVIOP_MU_INBOUND_INT_POSTQUEUE,
--
2.43.0
The patch below does not apply to the 6.6-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.6.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 4d3a13afa8b64dc49293b3eab3e7beac11072c12
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025112405-canine-herbal-25c6@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.6.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 4d3a13afa8b64dc49293b3eab3e7beac11072c12 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Mario Limonciello (AMD)" <superm1(a)kernel.org>
Date: Mon, 20 Oct 2025 10:50:42 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] HID: amd_sfh: Stop sensor before starting
Titas reports that the accelerometer sensor on their laptop only
works after a warm boot or unloading/reloading the amd-sfh kernel
module.
Presumably the sensor is in a bad state on cold boot and failing to
start, so explicitly stop it before starting.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 93ce5e0231d79 ("HID: amd_sfh: Implement SFH1.1 functionality")
Reported-by: Titas <novatitas366(a)gmail.com>
Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=220670
Tested-by: Titas <novatitas366(a)gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello (AMD) <superm1(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina(a)suse.com>
diff --git a/drivers/hid/amd-sfh-hid/sfh1_1/amd_sfh_init.c b/drivers/hid/amd-sfh-hid/sfh1_1/amd_sfh_init.c
index 0a9b44ce4904..b0bab2a1ddcc 100644
--- a/drivers/hid/amd-sfh-hid/sfh1_1/amd_sfh_init.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/amd-sfh-hid/sfh1_1/amd_sfh_init.c
@@ -194,6 +194,8 @@ static int amd_sfh1_1_hid_client_init(struct amd_mp2_dev *privdata)
if (rc)
goto cleanup;
+ mp2_ops->stop(privdata, cl_data->sensor_idx[i]);
+ amd_sfh_wait_for_response(privdata, cl_data->sensor_idx[i], DISABLE_SENSOR);
writel(0, privdata->mmio + amd_get_p2c_val(privdata, 0));
mp2_ops->start(privdata, info);
status = amd_sfh_wait_for_response