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+ x86-kexec-add-a-sanity-check-on-previous-kernels-ima-kexec-buffer.patch added to mm-nonmm-unstable branch

by Andrew Morton

The patch titled Subject: x86/kexec: add a sanity check on previous kernel's ima kexec buffer has been added to the -mm mm-nonmm-unstable branch. Its filename is x86-kexec-add-a-sanity-check-on-previous-kernels-ima-kexec-buffer.patch This patch will shortly appear at https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche… This patch will later appear in the mm-nonmm-unstable branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm Before you just go and hit "reply", please: a) Consider who else should be cc'ed b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's *** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code *** The -mm tree is included into linux-next via various branches at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm and is updated there most days ------------------------------------------------------ From: Harshit Mogalapalli <harshit.m.mogalapalli(a)oracle.com> Subject: x86/kexec: add a sanity check on previous kernel's ima kexec buffer Date: Mon, 29 Dec 2025 00:15:23 -0800 When the second-stage kernel is booted via kexec with a limiting command line such as "mem=<size>", the physical range that contains the carried over IMA measurement list may fall outside the truncated RAM leading to a kernel panic. BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff97793ff47000 RIP: ima_restore_measurement_list+0xdc/0x45a #PF: error_code(0x0000) �� not-present page Other architectures already validate the range with page_is_ram(), as done in commit cbf9c4b9617b ("of: check previous kernel's ima-kexec-buffer against memory bounds") do a similar check on x86. Without carrying the measurement list across kexec, the attestation would fail. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251229081523.622515-4-harshit.m.mogalapalli@ora… Fixes: b69a2afd5afc ("x86/kexec: Carry forward IMA measurement log on kexec") Signed-off-by: Harshit Mogalapalli <harshit.m.mogalapalli(a)oracle.com> Reported-by: Paul Webb <paul.x.webb(a)oracle.com> Cc: Alexander Graf <graf(a)amazon.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb(a)kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Betkov <bp(a)alien8.de> Cc: guoweikang <guoweikang.kernel(a)gmail.com> Cc: Henry Willard <henry.willard(a)oracle.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa(a)zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Bohac <jbohac(a)suse.cz> Cc: Joel Granados <joel.granados(a)kernel.org> Cc: Jonathan McDowell <noodles(a)fb.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt(a)kernel.org> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar(a)linux.ibm.com> Cc: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta(a)intel.com> Cc: Sourabh Jain <sourabhjain(a)linux.ibm.com> Cc: Thomas Gleinxer <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: Yifei Liu <yifei.l.liu(a)oracle.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) --- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c~x86-kexec-add-a-sanity-check-on-previous-kernels-ima-kexec-buffer +++ a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c @@ -439,9 +439,15 @@ int __init ima_free_kexec_buffer(void) int __init ima_get_kexec_buffer(void **addr, size_t *size) { + int ret; + if (!ima_kexec_buffer_size) return -ENOENT; + ret = ima_validate_range(ima_kexec_buffer_phys, ima_kexec_buffer_size); + if (ret) + return ret; + *addr = __va(ima_kexec_buffer_phys); *size = ima_kexec_buffer_size; _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from harshit.m.mogalapalli(a)oracle.com are ima-add-ima_validate_range-for-previous-kernel-ima-buffer.patch of-kexec-refactor-ima_get_kexec_buffer-to-use-ima_validate_range.patch x86-kexec-add-a-sanity-check-on-previous-kernels-ima-kexec-buffer.patch

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+ of-kexec-refactor-ima_get_kexec_buffer-to-use-ima_validate_range.patch added to mm-nonmm-unstable branch

by Andrew Morton

The patch titled Subject: of/kexec: refactor ima_get_kexec_buffer() to use ima_validate_range() has been added to the -mm mm-nonmm-unstable branch. Its filename is of-kexec-refactor-ima_get_kexec_buffer-to-use-ima_validate_range.patch This patch will shortly appear at https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche… This patch will later appear in the mm-nonmm-unstable branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm Before you just go and hit "reply", please: a) Consider who else should be cc'ed b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's *** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code *** The -mm tree is included into linux-next via various branches at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm and is updated there most days ------------------------------------------------------ From: Harshit Mogalapalli <harshit.m.mogalapalli(a)oracle.com> Subject: of/kexec: refactor ima_get_kexec_buffer() to use ima_validate_range() Date: Mon, 29 Dec 2025 00:15:22 -0800 Refactor the OF/DT ima_get_kexec_buffer() to use a generic helper to validate the address range. No functional change intended. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251229081523.622515-3-harshit.m.mogalapalli@ora… Fixes: b69a2afd5afc ("x86/kexec: Carry forward IMA measurement log on kexec") Signed-off-by: Harshit Mogalapalli <harshit.m.mogalapalli(a)oracle.com> Cc: Alexander Graf <graf(a)amazon.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb(a)kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Betkov <bp(a)alien8.de> Cc: guoweikang <guoweikang.kernel(a)gmail.com> Cc: Henry Willard <henry.willard(a)oracle.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa(a)zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Bohac <jbohac(a)suse.cz> Cc: Joel Granados <joel.granados(a)kernel.org> Cc: Jonathan McDowell <noodles(a)fb.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt(a)kernel.org> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar(a)linux.ibm.com> Cc: Paul Webb <paul.x.webb(a)oracle.com> Cc: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta(a)intel.com> Cc: Sourabh Jain <sourabhjain(a)linux.ibm.com> Cc: Thomas Gleinxer <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: Yifei Liu <yifei.l.liu(a)oracle.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- drivers/of/kexec.c | 15 +++------------ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) --- a/drivers/of/kexec.c~of-kexec-refactor-ima_get_kexec_buffer-to-use-ima_validate_range +++ a/drivers/of/kexec.c @@ -128,7 +128,6 @@ int __init ima_get_kexec_buffer(void **a { int ret, len; unsigned long tmp_addr; - unsigned long start_pfn, end_pfn; size_t tmp_size; const void *prop; @@ -144,17 +143,9 @@ int __init ima_get_kexec_buffer(void **a if (!tmp_size) return -ENOENT; - /* - * Calculate the PFNs for the buffer and ensure - * they are with in addressable memory. - */ - start_pfn = PHYS_PFN(tmp_addr); - end_pfn = PHYS_PFN(tmp_addr + tmp_size - 1); - if (!page_is_ram(start_pfn) || !page_is_ram(end_pfn)) { - pr_warn("IMA buffer at 0x%lx, size = 0x%zx beyond memory\n", - tmp_addr, tmp_size); - return -EINVAL; - } + ret = ima_validate_range(tmp_addr, tmp_size); + if (ret) + return ret; *addr = __va(tmp_addr); *size = tmp_size; _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from harshit.m.mogalapalli(a)oracle.com are ima-add-ima_validate_range-for-previous-kernel-ima-buffer.patch of-kexec-refactor-ima_get_kexec_buffer-to-use-ima_validate_range.patch x86-kexec-add-a-sanity-check-on-previous-kernels-ima-kexec-buffer.patch

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+ ima-add-ima_validate_range-for-previous-kernel-ima-buffer.patch added to mm-nonmm-unstable branch

by Andrew Morton

The patch titled Subject: ima: add ima_validate_range() for previous kernel IMA buffer has been added to the -mm mm-nonmm-unstable branch. Its filename is ima-add-ima_validate_range-for-previous-kernel-ima-buffer.patch This patch will shortly appear at https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche… This patch will later appear in the mm-nonmm-unstable branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm Before you just go and hit "reply", please: a) Consider who else should be cc'ed b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's *** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code *** The -mm tree is included into linux-next via various branches at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm and is updated there most days ------------------------------------------------------ From: Harshit Mogalapalli <harshit.m.mogalapalli(a)oracle.com> Subject: ima: add ima_validate_range() for previous kernel IMA buffer Date: Mon, 29 Dec 2025 00:15:21 -0800 Patch series "Address page fault in ima_restore_measurement_list()", v2. When the second-stage kernel is booted via kexec with a limiting command line such as "mem=<size>" we observe a pafe fault that happens. BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff97793ff47000 RIP: ima_restore_measurement_list+0xdc/0x45a #PF: error_code(0x0000) not-present page This happens on x86_64 only, as this is already fixed in aarch64 in commit: cbf9c4b9617b ("of: check previous kernel's ima-kexec-buffer against memory bounds") This patch (of 3): When the second-stage kernel is booted with a limiting command line (e.g. "mem=<size>"), the IMA measurement buffer handed over from the previous kernel may fall outside the addressable RAM of the new kernel. Accessing such a buffer can fault during early restore. Introduce a small generic helper, ima_validate_range(), which verifies that a physical [start, end] range for the previous-kernel IMA buffer lies within addressable memory: - On x86, use pfn_range_is_mapped(). - On OF based architectures, use page_is_ram(). Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251229081523.622515-1-harshit.m.mogalapalli@ora… Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251229081523.622515-2-harshit.m.mogalapalli@ora… Fixes: b69a2afd5afc ("x86/kexec: Carry forward IMA measurement log on kexec") Signed-off-by: Harshit Mogalapalli <harshit.m.mogalapalli(a)oracle.com> Cc: Alexander Graf <graf(a)amazon.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb(a)kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Betkov <bp(a)alien8.de> Cc: guoweikang <guoweikang.kernel(a)gmail.com> Cc: Henry Willard <henry.willard(a)oracle.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa(a)zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Bohac <jbohac(a)suse.cz> Cc: Joel Granados <joel.granados(a)kernel.org> Cc: Jonathan McDowell <noodles(a)fb.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt(a)kernel.org> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar(a)linux.ibm.com> Cc: Paul Webb <paul.x.webb(a)oracle.com> Cc: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta(a)intel.com> Cc: Sourabh Jain <sourabhjain(a)linux.ibm.com> Cc: Thomas Gleinxer <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: Yifei Liu <yifei.l.liu(a)oracle.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- include/linux/ima.h | 1 security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+) --- a/include/linux/ima.h~ima-add-ima_validate_range-for-previous-kernel-ima-buffer +++ a/include/linux/ima.h @@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ static inline int ima_measure_critical_d #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC int __init ima_free_kexec_buffer(void); int __init ima_get_kexec_buffer(void **addr, size_t *size); +int ima_validate_range(phys_addr_t phys, size_t size); #endif #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c~ima-add-ima_validate_range-for-previous-kernel-ima-buffer +++ a/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c @@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ #include <linux/kexec.h> #include <linux/of.h> #include <linux/ima.h> +#include <linux/mm.h> +#include <linux/overflow.h> #include <linux/reboot.h> #include <asm/page.h> #include "ima.h" @@ -294,3 +296,36 @@ void __init ima_load_kexec_buffer(void) pr_debug("Error restoring the measurement list: %d\n", rc); } } + +/* + * ima_validate_range - verify a physical buffer lies in addressable RAM + * @phys: physical start address of the buffer from previous kernel + * @size: size of the buffer + * + * On success return 0. On failure returns -EINVAL so callers can skip + * restoring. + */ +int ima_validate_range(phys_addr_t phys, size_t size) +{ + unsigned long start_pfn, end_pfn; + phys_addr_t end_phys; + + if (check_add_overflow(phys, (phys_addr_t)size - 1, &end_phys)) + return -EINVAL; + + start_pfn = PHYS_PFN(phys); + end_pfn = PHYS_PFN(end_phys); + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86 + if (!pfn_range_is_mapped(start_pfn, end_pfn)) +#else + if (!page_is_ram(start_pfn) || !page_is_ram(end_pfn)) +#endif + { + pr_warn("IMA: previous kernel measurement buffer %pa (size 0x%zx) lies outside available memory\n", + &phys, size); + return -EINVAL; + } + + return 0; +} _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from harshit.m.mogalapalli(a)oracle.com are ima-add-ima_validate_range-for-previous-kernel-ima-buffer.patch of-kexec-refactor-ima_get_kexec_buffer-to-use-ima_validate_range.patch x86-kexec-add-a-sanity-check-on-previous-kernels-ima-kexec-buffer.patch

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[to-be-updated] x86-kexec-add-a-sanity-check-on-previous-kernels-ima-kexec-buffer.patch removed from -mm tree

by Andrew Morton

The quilt patch titled Subject: x86/kexec: add a sanity check on previous kernel's ima kexec buffer has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was x86-kexec-add-a-sanity-check-on-previous-kernels-ima-kexec-buffer.patch This patch was dropped because an updated version will be issued ------------------------------------------------------ From: Harshit Mogalapalli <harshit.m.mogalapalli(a)oracle.com> Subject: x86/kexec: add a sanity check on previous kernel's ima kexec buffer Date: Wed, 12 Nov 2025 11:30:02 -0800 When the second-stage kernel is booted via kexec with a limiting command line such as "mem=<size>", the physical range that contains the carried over IMA measurement list may fall outside the truncated RAM leading to a kernel panic. BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff97793ff47000 RIP: ima_restore_measurement_list+0xdc/0x45a #PF: error_code(0x0000) �� not-present page Other architectures already validate the range with page_is_ram(), as done in commit: cbf9c4b9617b ("of: check previous kernel's ima-kexec-buffer against memory bounds") do a similar check on x86. [akpm(a)linux-foundation.org: fix comment typo] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251112193005.3772542-1-harshit.m.mogalapalli@or… Fixes: b69a2afd5afc ("x86/kexec: Carry forward IMA measurement log on kexec") Signed-off-by: Harshit Mogalapalli <harshit.m.mogalapalli(a)oracle.com> Reported-by: Paul Webb <paul.x.webb(a)oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Jonathan McDowell <noodles(a)meta.com> Tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar(a)linux.ibm.com> Cc: Alexander Graf <graf(a)amazon.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb(a)kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Betkov <bp(a)alien8.de> Cc: guoweikang <guoweikang.kernel(a)gmail.com> Cc: Henry Willard <henry.willard(a)oracle.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa(a)zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Bohac <jbohac(a)suse.cz> Cc: Joel Granados <joel.granados(a)kernel.org> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt(a)kernel.org> Cc: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta(a)intel.com> Cc: Sourabh Jain <sourabhjain(a)linux.ibm.com> Cc: Thomas Gleinxer <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: Yifei Liu <yifei.l.liu(a)oracle.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+) --- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c~x86-kexec-add-a-sanity-check-on-previous-kernels-ima-kexec-buffer +++ a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c @@ -439,9 +439,23 @@ int __init ima_free_kexec_buffer(void) int __init ima_get_kexec_buffer(void **addr, size_t *size) { + unsigned long start_pfn, end_pfn; + if (!ima_kexec_buffer_size) return -ENOENT; + /* + * Calculate the PFNs for the buffer and ensure + * they are within addressable memory. + */ + start_pfn = PFN_DOWN(ima_kexec_buffer_phys); + end_pfn = PFN_DOWN(ima_kexec_buffer_phys + ima_kexec_buffer_size - 1); + if (!pfn_range_is_mapped(start_pfn, end_pfn)) { + pr_warn("IMA buffer at 0x%llx, size = 0x%zx beyond memory\n", + ima_kexec_buffer_phys, ima_kexec_buffer_size); + return -EINVAL; + } + *addr = __va(ima_kexec_buffer_phys); *size = ima_kexec_buffer_size; _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from harshit.m.mogalapalli(a)oracle.com are

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[PATCH v2 0/3] Address page fault in ima_restore_measurement_list()

by Harshit Mogalapalli

On x86_64: When the second-stage kernel is booted via kexec with a limiting command line such as "mem=<size>" we observe a pafe fault that happens. BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff97793ff47000 RIP: ima_restore_measurement_list+0xdc/0x45a #PF: error_code(0x0000) – not-present page This happens on x86_64 only, as this is already fixed in aarch64 in commit: cbf9c4b9617b ("of: check previous kernel's ima-kexec-buffer against memory bounds") V1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251112193005.3772542-1-harshit.m.mogalapalli@… V1 attempted to do a similar sanity check in x86_64. Borislav suggested to add a generic helper ima_validate_range() which could then be used for both OF based and x86_64. Testing information: -------------------- On x86_64: With latest 6.19-rc2 based, we could reproduce the issue, and patched kernel works fine. (with mem=8G on a 16G memory machine) Thanks for the reviews on V1. V1 -> V2: - Patch 1: Add a generic helper "ima_validate_range()" - Patch 2: Use this new helper in drivers/of/kexec.c -> No functional change. - Patch 3: Fix the page fault by doing sanity check with "ima_validate_range()" Thanks, Harshit Harshit Mogalapalli (3): ima: Add ima_validate_range() for previous kernel IMA buffer of/kexec: refactor ima_get_kexec_buffer() to use ima_validate_range() x86/kexec: Add a sanity check on previous kernel's ima kexec buffer arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 6 +++++ drivers/of/kexec.c | 15 +++---------- include/linux/ima.h | 1 + security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) -- 2.50.1

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] f2fs: fix to detect recoverable inode during dryrun of" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 68d05693f8c031257a0822464366e1c2a239a512 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025122953-federal-handclasp-1d09@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 68d05693f8c031257a0822464366e1c2a239a512 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chao Yu <chao(a)kernel.org> Date: Wed, 5 Nov 2025 14:50:23 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] f2fs: fix to detect recoverable inode during dryrun of find_fsync_dnodes() mkfs.f2fs -f /dev/vdd mount /dev/vdd /mnt/f2fs touch /mnt/f2fs/foo sync # avoid CP_UMOUNT_FLAG in last f2fs_checkpoint.ckpt_flags touch /mnt/f2fs/bar f2fs_io fsync /mnt/f2fs/bar f2fs_io shutdown 2 /mnt/f2fs umount /mnt/f2fs blockdev --setro /dev/vdd mount /dev/vdd /mnt/f2fs mount: /mnt/f2fs: WARNING: source write-protected, mounted read-only. For the case if we create and fsync a new inode before sudden power-cut, without norecovery or disable_roll_forward mount option, the following mount will succeed w/o recovering last fsynced inode. The problem here is that we only check inode_list list after find_fsync_dnodes() in f2fs_recover_fsync_data() to find out whether there is recoverable data in the iamge, but there is a missed case, if last fsynced inode is not existing in last checkpoint, then, we will fail to get its inode due to nat of inode node is not existing in last checkpoint, so the inode won't be linked in inode_list. Let's detect such case in dyrun mode to fix this issue. After this change, mount will fail as expected below: mount: /mnt/f2fs: cannot mount /dev/vdd read-only. dmesg(1) may have more information after failed mount system call. demsg: F2FS-fs (vdd): Need to recover fsync data, but write access unavailable, please try mount w/ disable_roll_forward or norecovery Cc: stable(a)kernel.org Fixes: 6781eabba1bd ("f2fs: give -EINVAL for norecovery and rw mount") Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk(a)kernel.org> diff --git a/fs/f2fs/recovery.c b/fs/f2fs/recovery.c index 215e442db72c..d7faebaa3c6b 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/recovery.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/recovery.c @@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ static int sanity_check_node_chain(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, block_t blkaddr, } static int find_fsync_dnodes(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, struct list_head *head, - bool check_only) + bool check_only, bool *new_inode) { struct curseg_info *curseg; block_t blkaddr, blkaddr_fast; @@ -447,16 +447,19 @@ static int find_fsync_dnodes(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, struct list_head *head, quota_inode = true; } - /* - * CP | dnode(F) | inode(DF) - * For this case, we should not give up now. - */ entry = add_fsync_inode(sbi, head, ino_of_node(folio), quota_inode); if (IS_ERR(entry)) { err = PTR_ERR(entry); - if (err == -ENOENT) + /* + * CP | dnode(F) | inode(DF) + * For this case, we should not give up now. + */ + if (err == -ENOENT) { + if (check_only) + *new_inode = true; goto next; + } f2fs_folio_put(folio, true); break; } @@ -875,6 +878,7 @@ int f2fs_recover_fsync_data(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, bool check_only) int ret = 0; unsigned long s_flags = sbi->sb->s_flags; bool need_writecp = false; + bool new_inode = false; f2fs_notice(sbi, "f2fs_recover_fsync_data: recovery fsync data, " "check_only: %d", check_only); @@ -890,8 +894,8 @@ int f2fs_recover_fsync_data(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, bool check_only) f2fs_down_write(&sbi->cp_global_sem); /* step #1: find fsynced inode numbers */ - err = find_fsync_dnodes(sbi, &inode_list, check_only); - if (err || list_empty(&inode_list)) + err = find_fsync_dnodes(sbi, &inode_list, check_only, &new_inode); + if (err < 0 || (list_empty(&inode_list) && (!check_only || !new_inode))) goto skip; if (check_only) {

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] f2fs: fix to detect recoverable inode during dryrun of" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 68d05693f8c031257a0822464366e1c2a239a512 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025122953-length-breeding-7553@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 68d05693f8c031257a0822464366e1c2a239a512 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chao Yu <chao(a)kernel.org> Date: Wed, 5 Nov 2025 14:50:23 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] f2fs: fix to detect recoverable inode during dryrun of find_fsync_dnodes() mkfs.f2fs -f /dev/vdd mount /dev/vdd /mnt/f2fs touch /mnt/f2fs/foo sync # avoid CP_UMOUNT_FLAG in last f2fs_checkpoint.ckpt_flags touch /mnt/f2fs/bar f2fs_io fsync /mnt/f2fs/bar f2fs_io shutdown 2 /mnt/f2fs umount /mnt/f2fs blockdev --setro /dev/vdd mount /dev/vdd /mnt/f2fs mount: /mnt/f2fs: WARNING: source write-protected, mounted read-only. For the case if we create and fsync a new inode before sudden power-cut, without norecovery or disable_roll_forward mount option, the following mount will succeed w/o recovering last fsynced inode. The problem here is that we only check inode_list list after find_fsync_dnodes() in f2fs_recover_fsync_data() to find out whether there is recoverable data in the iamge, but there is a missed case, if last fsynced inode is not existing in last checkpoint, then, we will fail to get its inode due to nat of inode node is not existing in last checkpoint, so the inode won't be linked in inode_list. Let's detect such case in dyrun mode to fix this issue. After this change, mount will fail as expected below: mount: /mnt/f2fs: cannot mount /dev/vdd read-only. dmesg(1) may have more information after failed mount system call. demsg: F2FS-fs (vdd): Need to recover fsync data, but write access unavailable, please try mount w/ disable_roll_forward or norecovery Cc: stable(a)kernel.org Fixes: 6781eabba1bd ("f2fs: give -EINVAL for norecovery and rw mount") Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk(a)kernel.org> diff --git a/fs/f2fs/recovery.c b/fs/f2fs/recovery.c index 215e442db72c..d7faebaa3c6b 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/recovery.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/recovery.c @@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ static int sanity_check_node_chain(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, block_t blkaddr, } static int find_fsync_dnodes(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, struct list_head *head, - bool check_only) + bool check_only, bool *new_inode) { struct curseg_info *curseg; block_t blkaddr, blkaddr_fast; @@ -447,16 +447,19 @@ static int find_fsync_dnodes(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, struct list_head *head, quota_inode = true; } - /* - * CP | dnode(F) | inode(DF) - * For this case, we should not give up now. - */ entry = add_fsync_inode(sbi, head, ino_of_node(folio), quota_inode); if (IS_ERR(entry)) { err = PTR_ERR(entry); - if (err == -ENOENT) + /* + * CP | dnode(F) | inode(DF) + * For this case, we should not give up now. + */ + if (err == -ENOENT) { + if (check_only) + *new_inode = true; goto next; + } f2fs_folio_put(folio, true); break; } @@ -875,6 +878,7 @@ int f2fs_recover_fsync_data(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, bool check_only) int ret = 0; unsigned long s_flags = sbi->sb->s_flags; bool need_writecp = false; + bool new_inode = false; f2fs_notice(sbi, "f2fs_recover_fsync_data: recovery fsync data, " "check_only: %d", check_only); @@ -890,8 +894,8 @@ int f2fs_recover_fsync_data(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, bool check_only) f2fs_down_write(&sbi->cp_global_sem); /* step #1: find fsynced inode numbers */ - err = find_fsync_dnodes(sbi, &inode_list, check_only); - if (err || list_empty(&inode_list)) + err = find_fsync_dnodes(sbi, &inode_list, check_only, &new_inode); + if (err < 0 || (list_empty(&inode_list) && (!check_only || !new_inode))) goto skip; if (check_only) {

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[PATCH] riscv: boot: Always make Image from vmlinux, not vmlinux.unstripped

by Vivian Wang

Since commit 4b47a3aefb29 ("kbuild: Restore pattern to avoid stripping .rela.dyn from vmlinux") vmlinux has .rel*.dyn preserved. Therefore, use vmlinux to produce Image, not vmlinux.unstripped. Doing so fixes booting a RELOCATABLE=y Image with kexec. The problem is caused by this chain of events: - Since commit 3e86e4d74c04 ("kbuild: keep .modinfo section in vmlinux.unstripped"), vmlinux.unstripped gets a .modinfo section. - The .modinfo section has SHF_ALLOC, so it ends up in Image, at the end of it. - The Image header's image_size field does not expect to include .modinfo and does not account for it, since it should not be in Image. - If .modinfo is large enough, the file size of Image ends up larger than image_size, which eventually leads to it failing sanity_check_segment_list(). Using vmlinux instead of vmlinux.unstripped means that the unexpected .modinfo section is gone from Image, fixing the file size problem. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 3e86e4d74c04 ("kbuild: keep .modinfo section in vmlinux.unstripped") Signed-off-by: Vivian Wang <wangruikang(a)iscas.ac.cn> --- arch/riscv/boot/Makefile | 4 ---- 1 file changed, 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/riscv/boot/Makefile b/arch/riscv/boot/Makefile index bfc3d0b75b9b..5301adf5f3f5 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/boot/Makefile +++ b/arch/riscv/boot/Makefile @@ -31,11 +31,7 @@ $(obj)/xipImage: vmlinux FORCE endif -ifdef CONFIG_RELOCATABLE -$(obj)/Image: vmlinux.unstripped FORCE -else $(obj)/Image: vmlinux FORCE -endif $(call if_changed,objcopy) $(obj)/Image.gz: $(obj)/Image FORCE --- base-commit: 8f0b4cce4481fb22653697cced8d0d04027cb1e8 change-id: 20251230-riscv-vmlinux-not-unstripped-30ec0c930fd2 Best regards, -- Vivian "dramforever" Wang

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] f2fs: use global inline_xattr_slab instead of per-sb slab" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 1f27ef42bb0b7c0740c5616ec577ec188b8a1d05 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025122923-untie-obscure-aaff@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 1f27ef42bb0b7c0740c5616ec577ec188b8a1d05 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chao Yu <chao(a)kernel.org> Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2025 11:48:56 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] f2fs: use global inline_xattr_slab instead of per-sb slab cache MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit As Hong Yun reported in mailing list: loop7: detected capacity change from 0 to 131072 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kmem_cache of name 'f2fs_xattr_entry-7:7' already exists WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 24426 at mm/slab_common.c:110 kmem_cache_sanity_check mm/slab_common.c:109 [inline] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 24426 at mm/slab_common.c:110 __kmem_cache_create_args+0xa6/0x320 mm/slab_common.c:307 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 24426 Comm: syz.7.1370 Not tainted 6.17.0-rc4 #1 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:kmem_cache_sanity_check mm/slab_common.c:109 [inline] RIP: 0010:__kmem_cache_create_args+0xa6/0x320 mm/slab_common.c:307 Call Trace: __kmem_cache_create include/linux/slab.h:353 [inline] f2fs_kmem_cache_create fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2943 [inline] f2fs_init_xattr_caches+0xa5/0xe0 fs/f2fs/xattr.c:843 f2fs_fill_super+0x1645/0x2620 fs/f2fs/super.c:4918 get_tree_bdev_flags+0x1fb/0x260 fs/super.c:1692 vfs_get_tree+0x43/0x140 fs/super.c:1815 do_new_mount+0x201/0x550 fs/namespace.c:3808 do_mount fs/namespace.c:4136 [inline] __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4347 [inline] __se_sys_mount+0x298/0x2f0 fs/namespace.c:4324 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x3a0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e The bug can be reproduced w/ below scripts: - mount /dev/vdb /mnt1 - mount /dev/vdc /mnt2 - umount /mnt1 - mounnt /dev/vdb /mnt1 The reason is if we created two slab caches, named f2fs_xattr_entry-7:3 and f2fs_xattr_entry-7:7, and they have the same slab size. Actually, slab system will only create one slab cache core structure which has slab name of "f2fs_xattr_entry-7:3", and two slab caches share the same structure and cache address. So, if we destroy f2fs_xattr_entry-7:3 cache w/ cache address, it will decrease reference count of slab cache, rather than release slab cache entirely, since there is one more user has referenced the cache. Then, if we try to create slab cache w/ name "f2fs_xattr_entry-7:3" again, slab system will find that there is existed cache which has the same name and trigger the warning. Let's changes to use global inline_xattr_slab instead of per-sb slab cache for fixing. Fixes: a999150f4fe3 ("f2fs: use kmem_cache pool during inline xattr lookups") Cc: stable(a)kernel.org Reported-by: Hong Yun <yhong(a)link.cuhk.edu.hk> Tested-by: Hong Yun <yhong(a)link.cuhk.edu.hk> Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk(a)kernel.org> diff --git a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h index e69b01c1173a..9ca2124aac84 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h +++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h @@ -1885,9 +1885,6 @@ struct f2fs_sb_info { spinlock_t error_lock; /* protect errors/stop_reason array */ bool error_dirty; /* errors of sb is dirty */ - struct kmem_cache *inline_xattr_slab; /* inline xattr entry */ - unsigned int inline_xattr_slab_size; /* default inline xattr slab size */ - /* For reclaimed segs statistics per each GC mode */ unsigned int gc_segment_mode; /* GC state for reclaimed segments */ unsigned int gc_reclaimed_segs[MAX_GC_MODE]; /* Reclaimed segs for each mode */ diff --git a/fs/f2fs/super.c b/fs/f2fs/super.c index d0b5791a1f8c..f76ba2b08be0 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/super.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/super.c @@ -2027,7 +2027,6 @@ static void f2fs_put_super(struct super_block *sb) kfree(sbi->raw_super); f2fs_destroy_page_array_cache(sbi); - f2fs_destroy_xattr_caches(sbi); #ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA for (i = 0; i < MAXQUOTAS; i++) kfree(F2FS_OPTION(sbi).s_qf_names[i]); @@ -4975,13 +4974,9 @@ static int f2fs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc) if (err) goto free_iostat; - /* init per sbi slab cache */ - err = f2fs_init_xattr_caches(sbi); - if (err) - goto free_percpu; err = f2fs_init_page_array_cache(sbi); if (err) - goto free_xattr_cache; + goto free_percpu; /* get an inode for meta space */ sbi->meta_inode = f2fs_iget(sb, F2FS_META_INO(sbi)); @@ -5310,8 +5305,6 @@ static int f2fs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc) sbi->meta_inode = NULL; free_page_array_cache: f2fs_destroy_page_array_cache(sbi); -free_xattr_cache: - f2fs_destroy_xattr_caches(sbi); free_percpu: destroy_percpu_info(sbi); free_iostat: @@ -5514,10 +5507,15 @@ static int __init init_f2fs_fs(void) err = f2fs_create_casefold_cache(); if (err) goto free_compress_cache; - err = register_filesystem(&f2fs_fs_type); + err = f2fs_init_xattr_cache(); if (err) goto free_casefold_cache; + err = register_filesystem(&f2fs_fs_type); + if (err) + goto free_xattr_cache; return 0; +free_xattr_cache: + f2fs_destroy_xattr_cache(); free_casefold_cache: f2fs_destroy_casefold_cache(); free_compress_cache: @@ -5558,6 +5556,7 @@ static int __init init_f2fs_fs(void) static void __exit exit_f2fs_fs(void) { unregister_filesystem(&f2fs_fs_type); + f2fs_destroy_xattr_cache(); f2fs_destroy_casefold_cache(); f2fs_destroy_compress_cache(); f2fs_destroy_compress_mempool(); diff --git a/fs/f2fs/xattr.c b/fs/f2fs/xattr.c index 58632a2b6613..b4e5c406632f 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/xattr.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/xattr.c @@ -23,11 +23,12 @@ #include "xattr.h" #include "segment.h" +static struct kmem_cache *inline_xattr_slab; static void *xattr_alloc(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, int size, bool *is_inline) { - if (likely(size == sbi->inline_xattr_slab_size)) { + if (likely(size == DEFAULT_XATTR_SLAB_SIZE)) { *is_inline = true; - return f2fs_kmem_cache_alloc(sbi->inline_xattr_slab, + return f2fs_kmem_cache_alloc(inline_xattr_slab, GFP_F2FS_ZERO, false, sbi); } *is_inline = false; @@ -38,7 +39,7 @@ static void xattr_free(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, void *xattr_addr, bool is_inline) { if (is_inline) - kmem_cache_free(sbi->inline_xattr_slab, xattr_addr); + kmem_cache_free(inline_xattr_slab, xattr_addr); else kfree(xattr_addr); } @@ -830,25 +831,14 @@ int f2fs_setxattr(struct inode *inode, int index, const char *name, return err; } -int f2fs_init_xattr_caches(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi) +int __init f2fs_init_xattr_cache(void) { - dev_t dev = sbi->sb->s_bdev->bd_dev; - char slab_name[32]; - - sprintf(slab_name, "f2fs_xattr_entry-%u:%u", MAJOR(dev), MINOR(dev)); - - sbi->inline_xattr_slab_size = F2FS_OPTION(sbi).inline_xattr_size * - sizeof(__le32) + XATTR_PADDING_SIZE; - - sbi->inline_xattr_slab = f2fs_kmem_cache_create(slab_name, - sbi->inline_xattr_slab_size); - if (!sbi->inline_xattr_slab) - return -ENOMEM; - - return 0; + inline_xattr_slab = f2fs_kmem_cache_create("f2fs_xattr_entry", + DEFAULT_XATTR_SLAB_SIZE); + return inline_xattr_slab ? 0 : -ENOMEM; } -void f2fs_destroy_xattr_caches(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi) +void f2fs_destroy_xattr_cache(void) { - kmem_cache_destroy(sbi->inline_xattr_slab); -} + kmem_cache_destroy(inline_xattr_slab); +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/fs/f2fs/xattr.h b/fs/f2fs/xattr.h index 4fc0b2305fbd..bce3d93e4755 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/xattr.h +++ b/fs/f2fs/xattr.h @@ -89,6 +89,8 @@ struct f2fs_xattr_entry { F2FS_TOTAL_EXTRA_ATTR_SIZE / sizeof(__le32) - \ DEF_INLINE_RESERVED_SIZE - \ MIN_INLINE_DENTRY_SIZE / sizeof(__le32)) +#define DEFAULT_XATTR_SLAB_SIZE (DEFAULT_INLINE_XATTR_ADDRS * \ + sizeof(__le32) + XATTR_PADDING_SIZE) /* * On-disk structure of f2fs_xattr @@ -132,8 +134,8 @@ int f2fs_setxattr(struct inode *, int, const char *, const void *, int f2fs_getxattr(struct inode *, int, const char *, void *, size_t, struct folio *); ssize_t f2fs_listxattr(struct dentry *, char *, size_t); -int f2fs_init_xattr_caches(struct f2fs_sb_info *); -void f2fs_destroy_xattr_caches(struct f2fs_sb_info *); +int __init f2fs_init_xattr_cache(void); +void f2fs_destroy_xattr_cache(void); #else #define f2fs_xattr_handlers NULL @@ -150,8 +152,8 @@ static inline int f2fs_getxattr(struct inode *inode, int index, { return -EOPNOTSUPP; } -static inline int f2fs_init_xattr_caches(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi) { return 0; } -static inline void f2fs_destroy_xattr_caches(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi) { } +static inline int __init f2fs_init_xattr_cache(void) { return 0; } +static inline void f2fs_destroy_xattr_cache(void) { } #endif #ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FS_SECURITY

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] f2fs: fix to detect recoverable inode during dryrun of" failed to apply to 6.1-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.1-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.1.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 68d05693f8c031257a0822464366e1c2a239a512 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025122952-earlobe-rework-7c0d@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.1.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 68d05693f8c031257a0822464366e1c2a239a512 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chao Yu <chao(a)kernel.org> Date: Wed, 5 Nov 2025 14:50:23 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] f2fs: fix to detect recoverable inode during dryrun of find_fsync_dnodes() mkfs.f2fs -f /dev/vdd mount /dev/vdd /mnt/f2fs touch /mnt/f2fs/foo sync # avoid CP_UMOUNT_FLAG in last f2fs_checkpoint.ckpt_flags touch /mnt/f2fs/bar f2fs_io fsync /mnt/f2fs/bar f2fs_io shutdown 2 /mnt/f2fs umount /mnt/f2fs blockdev --setro /dev/vdd mount /dev/vdd /mnt/f2fs mount: /mnt/f2fs: WARNING: source write-protected, mounted read-only. For the case if we create and fsync a new inode before sudden power-cut, without norecovery or disable_roll_forward mount option, the following mount will succeed w/o recovering last fsynced inode. The problem here is that we only check inode_list list after find_fsync_dnodes() in f2fs_recover_fsync_data() to find out whether there is recoverable data in the iamge, but there is a missed case, if last fsynced inode is not existing in last checkpoint, then, we will fail to get its inode due to nat of inode node is not existing in last checkpoint, so the inode won't be linked in inode_list. Let's detect such case in dyrun mode to fix this issue. After this change, mount will fail as expected below: mount: /mnt/f2fs: cannot mount /dev/vdd read-only. dmesg(1) may have more information after failed mount system call. demsg: F2FS-fs (vdd): Need to recover fsync data, but write access unavailable, please try mount w/ disable_roll_forward or norecovery Cc: stable(a)kernel.org Fixes: 6781eabba1bd ("f2fs: give -EINVAL for norecovery and rw mount") Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk(a)kernel.org> diff --git a/fs/f2fs/recovery.c b/fs/f2fs/recovery.c index 215e442db72c..d7faebaa3c6b 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/recovery.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/recovery.c @@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ static int sanity_check_node_chain(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, block_t blkaddr, } static int find_fsync_dnodes(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, struct list_head *head, - bool check_only) + bool check_only, bool *new_inode) { struct curseg_info *curseg; block_t blkaddr, blkaddr_fast; @@ -447,16 +447,19 @@ static int find_fsync_dnodes(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, struct list_head *head, quota_inode = true; } - /* - * CP | dnode(F) | inode(DF) - * For this case, we should not give up now. - */ entry = add_fsync_inode(sbi, head, ino_of_node(folio), quota_inode); if (IS_ERR(entry)) { err = PTR_ERR(entry); - if (err == -ENOENT) + /* + * CP | dnode(F) | inode(DF) + * For this case, we should not give up now. + */ + if (err == -ENOENT) { + if (check_only) + *new_inode = true; goto next; + } f2fs_folio_put(folio, true); break; } @@ -875,6 +878,7 @@ int f2fs_recover_fsync_data(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, bool check_only) int ret = 0; unsigned long s_flags = sbi->sb->s_flags; bool need_writecp = false; + bool new_inode = false; f2fs_notice(sbi, "f2fs_recover_fsync_data: recovery fsync data, " "check_only: %d", check_only); @@ -890,8 +894,8 @@ int f2fs_recover_fsync_data(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, bool check_only) f2fs_down_write(&sbi->cp_global_sem); /* step #1: find fsynced inode numbers */ - err = find_fsync_dnodes(sbi, &inode_list, check_only); - if (err || list_empty(&inode_list)) + err = find_fsync_dnodes(sbi, &inode_list, check_only, &new_inode); + if (err < 0 || (list_empty(&inode_list) && (!check_only || !new_inode))) goto skip; if (check_only) {

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