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[PATCH] resource,kexec: walk_system_ram_res_rev must retain resource flags

by Gregory Price

walk_system_ram_res_rev() erroneously discards resource flags when passing the information to the callback. This causes systems with IORESOURCE_SYSRAM_DRIVER_MANAGED memory to have these resources selected during kexec to store kexec buffers if that memory happens to be at placed above normal system ram. This leads to undefined behavior after reboot. If the kexec buffer is never touched, nothing happens. If the kexec buffer is touched, it could lead to a crash (like below) or undefined behavior. Tested on a system with CXL memory expanders with driver managed memory, TPM enabled, and CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC=y. Adding printk's showed the flags were being discarded and as a result the check for IORESOURCE_SYSRAM_DRIVER_MANAGED passes. find_next_iomem_res: name(System RAM (kmem)) start(10000000000) end(1034fffffff) flags(83000200) locate_mem_hole_top_down: start(10000000000) end(1034fffffff) flags(0) [.] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff89834ffff000 [.] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [.] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [.] PGD c04c8bf067 P4D c04c8bf067 PUD c04c8be067 PMD 0 [.] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP [.] RIP: 0010:ima_restore_measurement_list+0x95/0x4b0 [.] RSP: 0018:ffffc900000d3a80 EFLAGS: 00010286 [.] RAX: 0000000000001000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff89834ffff000 [.] RDX: 0000000000000018 RSI: ffff89834ffff000 RDI: ffff89834ffff018 [.] RBP: ffffc900000d3ba0 R08: 0000000000000020 R09: ffff888132b8a900 [.] R10: 4000000000000000 R11: 000000003a616d69 R12: 0000000000000000 [.] R13: ffffffff8404ac28 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff89834ffff000 [.] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff893d44640000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [.] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [.] ata5: SATA link down (SStatus 0 SControl 300) [.] CR2: ffff89834ffff000 CR3: 000001034d00f001 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 [.] PKRU: 55555554 [.] Call Trace: [.] <TASK> [.] ? __die+0x78/0xc0 [.] ? page_fault_oops+0x2a8/0x3a0 [.] ? exc_page_fault+0x84/0x130 [.] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 [.] ? ima_restore_measurement_list+0x95/0x4b0 [.] ? template_desc_init_fields+0x317/0x410 [.] ? crypto_alloc_tfm_node+0x9c/0xc0 [.] ? init_ima_lsm+0x30/0x30 [.] ima_load_kexec_buffer+0x72/0xa0 [.] ima_init+0x44/0xa0 [.] __initstub__kmod_ima__373_1201_init_ima7+0x1e/0xb0 [.] ? init_ima_lsm+0x30/0x30 [.] do_one_initcall+0xad/0x200 [.] ? idr_alloc_cyclic+0xaa/0x110 [.] ? new_slab+0x12c/0x420 [.] ? new_slab+0x12c/0x420 [.] ? number+0x12a/0x430 [.] ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xa/0x80 [.] ? asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16/0x20 [.] ? parse_args+0xd4/0x380 [.] ? parse_args+0x14b/0x380 [.] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c1/0x2b0 [.] ? rest_init+0xb0/0xb0 [.] kernel_init+0x16/0x1a0 [.] ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x40 [.] ? rest_init+0xb0/0xb0 [.] ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 [.] </TASK> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231114091658.228030-1-bhe@redhat.com/ Fixes: 7acf164b259d ("resource: add walk_system_ram_res_rev()") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gregory Price <gourry(a)gourry.net> --- kernel/resource.c | 4 +--- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/resource.c b/kernel/resource.c index b730bd28b422..4101016e8b20 100644 --- a/kernel/resource.c +++ b/kernel/resource.c @@ -459,9 +459,7 @@ int walk_system_ram_res_rev(u64 start, u64 end, void *arg, rams_size += 16; } - rams[i].start = res.start; - rams[i++].end = res.end; - + rams[i++] = res; start = res.end + 1; } -- 2.43.0

9 hours

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[PATCH 6.6.y 0/4] mptcp: fix recent failed backports

by Matthieu Baerts (NGI0)

Greg recently reported 2 patches that could not be applied without conflict in v6.6: - 4dabcdf58121 ("tcp: fix mptcp DSS corruption due to large pmtu xmit") - 5afca7e996c4 ("selftests: mptcp: join: test for prohibited MPC to port-based endp") Conflicts have been resolved, and documented in each patch. Note that there are two extra patches: - 8c6f6b4bb53a ("selftests: mptcp: join: change capture/checksum as bool"): to avoid some conflicts - "selftests: mptcp: remove duplicated variables": a dedicated patch for v6.6, to fix some previous backport issues. Geliang Tang (1): selftests: mptcp: join: change capture/checksum as bool Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) (1): selftests: mptcp: remove duplicated variables Paolo Abeni (2): tcp: fix mptcp DSS corruption due to large pmtu xmit selftests: mptcp: join: test for prohibited MPC to port-based endp net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 4 +- .../testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_join.sh | 135 ++++++++++++------ .../testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_lib.sh | 11 -- 3 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-) -- 2.45.2

9 hours, 1 minute

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[RFC][PATCH] mm: Split locks in remap_file_pages()

by Roberto Sassu

From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov(a)linux.intel.com> Commit ea7e2d5e49c0 ("mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages()") fixed a security issue, it added an LSM check when trying to remap file pages, so that LSMs have the opportunity to evaluate such action like for other memory operations such as mmap() and mprotect(). However, that commit called security_mmap_file() inside the mmap_lock lock, while the other calls do it before taking the lock, after commit 8b3ec6814c83 ("take security_mmap_file() outside of ->mmap_sem"). This caused lock inversion issue with IMA which was taking the mmap_lock and i_mutex lock in the opposite way when the remap_file_pages() system call was called. Solve the issue by splitting the critical region in remap_file_pages() in two regions: the first takes a read lock of mmap_lock and retrieves the VMA and the file associated, and calculate the 'prot' and 'flags' variable; the second takes a write lock on mmap_lock, checks that the VMA flags and the VMA file descriptor are the same as the ones obtained in the first critical region (otherwise the system call fails), and calls do_mmap(). In between, after releasing the read lock and taking the write lock, call security_mmap_file(), and solve the lock inversion issue. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: ea7e2d5e49c0 ("mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages()") Reported-by: syzbot+91ae49e1c1a2634d20c0(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/66f7b10e.050a0220.46d20.0036.… Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu(a)huawei.com> (Calculate prot and flags earlier) Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov(a)linux.intel.com> --- mm/mmap.c | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 45 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c index 9c0fb43064b5..762944427e03 100644 --- a/mm/mmap.c +++ b/mm/mmap.c @@ -1640,6 +1640,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(remap_file_pages, unsigned long, start, unsigned long, size, unsigned long populate = 0; unsigned long ret = -EINVAL; struct file *file; + vm_flags_t vm_flags; pr_warn_once("%s (%d) uses deprecated remap_file_pages() syscall. See Documentation/mm/remap_file_pages.rst.\n", current->comm, current->pid); @@ -1656,12 +1657,53 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(remap_file_pages, unsigned long, start, unsigned long, size, if (pgoff + (size >> PAGE_SHIFT) < pgoff) return ret; - if (mmap_write_lock_killable(mm)) + if (mmap_read_lock_killable(mm)) + return -EINTR; + + vma = vma_lookup(mm, start); + + if (!vma || !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED)) { + mmap_read_unlock(mm); + return -EINVAL; + } + + prot |= vma->vm_flags & VM_READ ? PROT_READ : 0; + prot |= vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE ? PROT_WRITE : 0; + prot |= vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC ? PROT_EXEC : 0; + + flags &= MAP_NONBLOCK; + flags |= MAP_SHARED | MAP_FIXED | MAP_POPULATE; + if (vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED) + flags |= MAP_LOCKED; + + /* Save vm_flags used to calculate prot and flags, and recheck later. */ + vm_flags = vma->vm_flags; + file = get_file(vma->vm_file); + + mmap_read_unlock(mm); + + ret = security_mmap_file(file, prot, flags); + if (ret) { + fput(file); + return ret; + } + + ret = -EINVAL; + + if (mmap_write_lock_killable(mm)) { + fput(file); return -EINTR; + } vma = vma_lookup(mm, start); - if (!vma || !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED)) + if (!vma) + goto out; + + if (vma->vm_flags != vm_flags) + goto out; + + if (vma->vm_file != file) goto out; if (start + size > vma->vm_end) { @@ -1689,25 +1731,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(remap_file_pages, unsigned long, start, unsigned long, size, goto out; } - prot |= vma->vm_flags & VM_READ ? PROT_READ : 0; - prot |= vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE ? PROT_WRITE : 0; - prot |= vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC ? PROT_EXEC : 0; - - flags &= MAP_NONBLOCK; - flags |= MAP_SHARED | MAP_FIXED | MAP_POPULATE; - if (vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED) - flags |= MAP_LOCKED; - - file = get_file(vma->vm_file); - ret = security_mmap_file(vma->vm_file, prot, flags); - if (ret) - goto out_fput; ret = do_mmap(vma->vm_file, start, size, prot, flags, 0, pgoff, &populate, NULL); -out_fput: - fput(file); out: mmap_write_unlock(mm); + fput(file); if (populate) mm_populate(ret, populate); if (!IS_ERR_VALUE(ret)) -- 2.34.1

9 hours, 8 minutes

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[PATCH v2] drm/bridge: Fix assignment of the of_node of the parent to aux bridge

by Abel Vesa

The assignment of the of_node to the aux bridge needs to mark the of_node as reused as well, otherwise resource providers like pinctrl will report a gpio as already requested by a different device when both pinconf and gpios property are present. Fix that by using the device_set_of_node_from_dev() helper instead. Fixes: 6914968a0b52 ("drm/bridge: properly refcount DT nodes in aux bridge drivers") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 6.8 Cc: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Abel Vesa <abel.vesa(a)linaro.org> --- Changes in v2: - Re-worded commit to be more explicit of what it fixes, as Johan suggested - Used device_set_of_node_from_dev() helper, as per Johan's suggestion - Added Fixes tag and cc'ed stable - Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241017-drm-aux-bridge-mark-of-node-reused-v1-1-… --- drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/aux-bridge.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/aux-bridge.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/aux-bridge.c index b29980f95379ec7af873ed6e0fb79a9abb663c7b..295e9d031e2dc86cbfd2a7350718fca181c99487 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/aux-bridge.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/aux-bridge.c @@ -58,9 +58,10 @@ int drm_aux_bridge_register(struct device *parent) adev->id = ret; adev->name = "aux_bridge"; adev->dev.parent = parent; - adev->dev.of_node = of_node_get(parent->of_node); adev->dev.release = drm_aux_bridge_release; + device_set_of_node_from_dev(&adev->dev, parent); + ret = auxiliary_device_init(adev); if (ret) { ida_free(&drm_aux_bridge_ida, adev->id); --- base-commit: d61a00525464bfc5fe92c6ad713350988e492b88 change-id: 20241017-drm-aux-bridge-mark-of-node-reused-5c2ee740ff19 Best regards, -- Abel Vesa <abel.vesa(a)linaro.org>

9 hours, 15 minutes

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[PATCH v3] comedi: Flush partial mappings in error case

by Jann Horn

If some remap_pfn_range() calls succeeded before one failed, we still have buffer pages mapped into the userspace page tables when we drop the buffer reference with comedi_buf_map_put(bm). The userspace mappings are only cleaned up later in the mmap error path. Fix it by explicitly flushing all mappings in our VMA on the error path. See commit 79a61cc3fc04 ("mm: avoid leaving partial pfn mappings around in error case"). Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: ed9eccbe8970 ("Staging: add comedi core") Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> --- Note: compile-tested only; I don't actually have comedi hardware, and I don't know anything about comedi. --- Changes in v3: - gate zapping ptes on CONFIG_MMU (Intel kernel test robot) - Link to v2: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241015-comedi-tlb-v2-1-cafb0e27dd9a@google.com Changes in v2: - only do the zapping in the pfnmap path (Ian Abbott) - use zap_vma_ptes() instead of zap_page_range_single() (Ian Abbott) - Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241014-comedi-tlb-v1-1-4b699144b438@google.com --- drivers/comedi/comedi_fops.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/comedi/comedi_fops.c b/drivers/comedi/comedi_fops.c index 1b481731df96..b9df9b19d4bd 100644 --- a/drivers/comedi/comedi_fops.c +++ b/drivers/comedi/comedi_fops.c @@ -2407,6 +2407,18 @@ static int comedi_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) start += PAGE_SIZE; } + +#ifdef CONFIG_MMU + /* + * Leaving behind a partial mapping of a buffer we're about to + * drop is unsafe, see remap_pfn_range_notrack(). + * We need to zap the range here ourselves instead of relying + * on the automatic zapping in remap_pfn_range() because we call + * remap_pfn_range() in a loop. + */ + if (retval) + zap_vma_ptes(vma, vma->vm_start, size); +#endif } if (retval == 0) { --- base-commit: 6485cf5ea253d40d507cd71253c9568c5470cd27 change-id: 20241014-comedi-tlb-400246505961 -- Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com>

9 hours, 24 minutes

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[PATCH RESEND] vdpa: solidrun: Fix UB bug with devres

by Philipp Stanner

In psnet_open_pf_bar() and snet_open_vf_bar() a string later passed to pcim_iomap_regions() is placed on the stack. Neither pcim_iomap_regions() nor the functions it calls copy that string. Should the string later ever be used, this, consequently, causes undefined behavior since the stack frame will by then have disappeared. Fix the bug by allocating the strings on the heap through devm_kasprintf(). Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.3 Fixes: 51a8f9d7f587 ("virtio: vdpa: new SolidNET DPU driver.") Reported-by: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet(a)wanadoo.fr> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/74e9109a-ac59-49e2-9b1d-d825c9c9f891@wanadoo.fr/ Suggested-by: Andy Shevchenko <andy(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Philipp Stanner <pstanner(a)redhat.com> --- drivers/vdpa/solidrun/snet_main.c | 14 ++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/vdpa/solidrun/snet_main.c b/drivers/vdpa/solidrun/snet_main.c index 99428a04068d..c8b74980dbd1 100644 --- a/drivers/vdpa/solidrun/snet_main.c +++ b/drivers/vdpa/solidrun/snet_main.c @@ -555,7 +555,7 @@ static const struct vdpa_config_ops snet_config_ops = { static int psnet_open_pf_bar(struct pci_dev *pdev, struct psnet *psnet) { - char name[50]; + char *name; int ret, i, mask = 0; /* We don't know which BAR will be used to communicate.. * We will map every bar with len > 0. @@ -573,7 +573,10 @@ static int psnet_open_pf_bar(struct pci_dev *pdev, struct psnet *psnet) return -ENODEV; } - snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "psnet[%s]-bars", pci_name(pdev)); + name = devm_kasprintf(&pdev->dev, GFP_KERNEL, "psnet[%s]-bars", pci_name(pdev)); + if (!name) + return -ENOMEM; + ret = pcim_iomap_regions(pdev, mask, name); if (ret) { SNET_ERR(pdev, "Failed to request and map PCI BARs\n"); @@ -590,10 +593,13 @@ static int psnet_open_pf_bar(struct pci_dev *pdev, struct psnet *psnet) static int snet_open_vf_bar(struct pci_dev *pdev, struct snet *snet) { - char name[50]; + char *name; int ret; - snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "snet[%s]-bar", pci_name(pdev)); + name = devm_kasprintf(&pdev->dev, GFP_KERNEL, "snet[%s]-bars", pci_name(pdev)); + if (!name) + return -ENOMEM; + /* Request and map BAR */ ret = pcim_iomap_regions(pdev, BIT(snet->psnet->cfg.vf_bar), name); if (ret) { -- 2.46.1

10 hours, 9 minutes

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] KVM: s390: gaccess: Check if guest address is in memslot" failed to apply to 4.19-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.19-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-4.19.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x e8061f06185be0a06a73760d6526b8b0feadfe52 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024101827-implosion-twilight-c8e1@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 4.19.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From e8061f06185be0a06a73760d6526b8b0feadfe52 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nico Boehr <nrb(a)linux.ibm.com> Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2024 17:18:33 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] KVM: s390: gaccess: Check if guest address is in memslot Previously, access_guest_page() did not check whether the given guest address is inside of a memslot. This is not a problem, since kvm_write_guest_page/kvm_read_guest_page return -EFAULT in this case. However, -EFAULT is also returned when copy_to/from_user fails. When emulating a guest instruction, the address being outside a memslot usually means that an addressing exception should be injected into the guest. Failure in copy_to/from_user however indicates that something is wrong in userspace and hence should be handled there. To be able to distinguish these two cases, return PGM_ADDRESSING in access_guest_page() when the guest address is outside guest memory. In access_guest_real(), populate vcpu->arch.pgm.code such that kvm_s390_inject_prog_cond() can be used in the caller for injecting into the guest (if applicable). Since this adds a new return value to access_guest_page(), we need to make sure that other callers are not confused by the new positive return value. There are the following users of access_guest_page(): - access_guest_with_key() does the checking itself (in guest_range_to_gpas()), so this case should never happen. Even if, the handling is set up properly. - access_guest_real() just passes the return code to its callers, which are: - read_guest_real() - see below - write_guest_real() - see below There are the following users of read_guest_real(): - ar_translation() in gaccess.c which already returns PGM_* - setup_apcb10(), setup_apcb00(), setup_apcb11() in vsie.c which always return -EFAULT on read_guest_read() nonzero return - no change - shadow_crycb(), handle_stfle() always present this as validity, this could be handled better but doesn't change current behaviour - no change There are the following users of write_guest_real(): - kvm_s390_store_status_unloaded() always returns -EFAULT on write_guest_real() failure. Fixes: 2293897805c2 ("KVM: s390: add architecture compliant guest access functions") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Nico Boehr <nrb(a)linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <hca(a)linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240917151904.74314-2-nrb@linux.ibm.com Acked-by: Janosch Frank <frankja(a)linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca(a)linux.ibm.com> diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.c b/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.c index e65f597e3044..a688351f4ab5 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.c +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.c @@ -828,6 +828,8 @@ static int access_guest_page(struct kvm *kvm, enum gacc_mode mode, gpa_t gpa, const gfn_t gfn = gpa_to_gfn(gpa); int rc; + if (!gfn_to_memslot(kvm, gfn)) + return PGM_ADDRESSING; if (mode == GACC_STORE) rc = kvm_write_guest_page(kvm, gfn, data, offset, len); else @@ -985,6 +987,8 @@ int access_guest_real(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long gra, gra += fragment_len; data += fragment_len; } + if (rc > 0) + vcpu->arch.pgm.code = rc; return rc; } diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.h b/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.h index b320d12aa049..3fde45a151f2 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.h +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.h @@ -405,11 +405,12 @@ int read_guest_abs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long gpa, void *data, * @len: number of bytes to copy * * Copy @len bytes from @data (kernel space) to @gra (guest real address). - * It is up to the caller to ensure that the entire guest memory range is - * valid memory before calling this function. * Guest low address and key protection are not checked. * - * Returns zero on success or -EFAULT on error. + * Returns zero on success, -EFAULT when copying from @data failed, or + * PGM_ADRESSING in case @gra is outside a memslot. In this case, pgm check info + * is also stored to allow injecting into the guest (if applicable) using + * kvm_s390_inject_prog_cond(). * * If an error occurs data may have been copied partially to guest memory. */ @@ -428,11 +429,12 @@ int write_guest_real(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long gra, void *data, * @len: number of bytes to copy * * Copy @len bytes from @gra (guest real address) to @data (kernel space). - * It is up to the caller to ensure that the entire guest memory range is - * valid memory before calling this function. * Guest key protection is not checked. * - * Returns zero on success or -EFAULT on error. + * Returns zero on success, -EFAULT when copying to @data failed, or + * PGM_ADRESSING in case @gra is outside a memslot. In this case, pgm check info + * is also stored to allow injecting into the guest (if applicable) using + * kvm_s390_inject_prog_cond(). * * If an error occurs data may have been copied partially to kernel space. */

10 hours, 25 minutes

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] KVM: s390: gaccess: Check if guest address is in memslot" failed to apply to 5.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.4-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.4.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x e8061f06185be0a06a73760d6526b8b0feadfe52 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024101826-gracious-singer-816f@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.4.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From e8061f06185be0a06a73760d6526b8b0feadfe52 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nico Boehr <nrb(a)linux.ibm.com> Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2024 17:18:33 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] KVM: s390: gaccess: Check if guest address is in memslot Previously, access_guest_page() did not check whether the given guest address is inside of a memslot. This is not a problem, since kvm_write_guest_page/kvm_read_guest_page return -EFAULT in this case. However, -EFAULT is also returned when copy_to/from_user fails. When emulating a guest instruction, the address being outside a memslot usually means that an addressing exception should be injected into the guest. Failure in copy_to/from_user however indicates that something is wrong in userspace and hence should be handled there. To be able to distinguish these two cases, return PGM_ADDRESSING in access_guest_page() when the guest address is outside guest memory. In access_guest_real(), populate vcpu->arch.pgm.code such that kvm_s390_inject_prog_cond() can be used in the caller for injecting into the guest (if applicable). Since this adds a new return value to access_guest_page(), we need to make sure that other callers are not confused by the new positive return value. There are the following users of access_guest_page(): - access_guest_with_key() does the checking itself (in guest_range_to_gpas()), so this case should never happen. Even if, the handling is set up properly. - access_guest_real() just passes the return code to its callers, which are: - read_guest_real() - see below - write_guest_real() - see below There are the following users of read_guest_real(): - ar_translation() in gaccess.c which already returns PGM_* - setup_apcb10(), setup_apcb00(), setup_apcb11() in vsie.c which always return -EFAULT on read_guest_read() nonzero return - no change - shadow_crycb(), handle_stfle() always present this as validity, this could be handled better but doesn't change current behaviour - no change There are the following users of write_guest_real(): - kvm_s390_store_status_unloaded() always returns -EFAULT on write_guest_real() failure. Fixes: 2293897805c2 ("KVM: s390: add architecture compliant guest access functions") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Nico Boehr <nrb(a)linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <hca(a)linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240917151904.74314-2-nrb@linux.ibm.com Acked-by: Janosch Frank <frankja(a)linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca(a)linux.ibm.com> diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.c b/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.c index e65f597e3044..a688351f4ab5 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.c +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.c @@ -828,6 +828,8 @@ static int access_guest_page(struct kvm *kvm, enum gacc_mode mode, gpa_t gpa, const gfn_t gfn = gpa_to_gfn(gpa); int rc; + if (!gfn_to_memslot(kvm, gfn)) + return PGM_ADDRESSING; if (mode == GACC_STORE) rc = kvm_write_guest_page(kvm, gfn, data, offset, len); else @@ -985,6 +987,8 @@ int access_guest_real(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long gra, gra += fragment_len; data += fragment_len; } + if (rc > 0) + vcpu->arch.pgm.code = rc; return rc; } diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.h b/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.h index b320d12aa049..3fde45a151f2 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.h +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.h @@ -405,11 +405,12 @@ int read_guest_abs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long gpa, void *data, * @len: number of bytes to copy * * Copy @len bytes from @data (kernel space) to @gra (guest real address). - * It is up to the caller to ensure that the entire guest memory range is - * valid memory before calling this function. * Guest low address and key protection are not checked. * - * Returns zero on success or -EFAULT on error. + * Returns zero on success, -EFAULT when copying from @data failed, or + * PGM_ADRESSING in case @gra is outside a memslot. In this case, pgm check info + * is also stored to allow injecting into the guest (if applicable) using + * kvm_s390_inject_prog_cond(). * * If an error occurs data may have been copied partially to guest memory. */ @@ -428,11 +429,12 @@ int write_guest_real(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long gra, void *data, * @len: number of bytes to copy * * Copy @len bytes from @gra (guest real address) to @data (kernel space). - * It is up to the caller to ensure that the entire guest memory range is - * valid memory before calling this function. * Guest key protection is not checked. * - * Returns zero on success or -EFAULT on error. + * Returns zero on success, -EFAULT when copying to @data failed, or + * PGM_ADRESSING in case @gra is outside a memslot. In this case, pgm check info + * is also stored to allow injecting into the guest (if applicable) using + * kvm_s390_inject_prog_cond(). * * If an error occurs data may have been copied partially to kernel space. */

10 hours, 25 minutes

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] KVM: s390: gaccess: Check if guest address is in memslot" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x e8061f06185be0a06a73760d6526b8b0feadfe52 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024101824-departure-oversight-aa1e@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From e8061f06185be0a06a73760d6526b8b0feadfe52 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nico Boehr <nrb(a)linux.ibm.com> Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2024 17:18:33 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] KVM: s390: gaccess: Check if guest address is in memslot Previously, access_guest_page() did not check whether the given guest address is inside of a memslot. This is not a problem, since kvm_write_guest_page/kvm_read_guest_page return -EFAULT in this case. However, -EFAULT is also returned when copy_to/from_user fails. When emulating a guest instruction, the address being outside a memslot usually means that an addressing exception should be injected into the guest. Failure in copy_to/from_user however indicates that something is wrong in userspace and hence should be handled there. To be able to distinguish these two cases, return PGM_ADDRESSING in access_guest_page() when the guest address is outside guest memory. In access_guest_real(), populate vcpu->arch.pgm.code such that kvm_s390_inject_prog_cond() can be used in the caller for injecting into the guest (if applicable). Since this adds a new return value to access_guest_page(), we need to make sure that other callers are not confused by the new positive return value. There are the following users of access_guest_page(): - access_guest_with_key() does the checking itself (in guest_range_to_gpas()), so this case should never happen. Even if, the handling is set up properly. - access_guest_real() just passes the return code to its callers, which are: - read_guest_real() - see below - write_guest_real() - see below There are the following users of read_guest_real(): - ar_translation() in gaccess.c which already returns PGM_* - setup_apcb10(), setup_apcb00(), setup_apcb11() in vsie.c which always return -EFAULT on read_guest_read() nonzero return - no change - shadow_crycb(), handle_stfle() always present this as validity, this could be handled better but doesn't change current behaviour - no change There are the following users of write_guest_real(): - kvm_s390_store_status_unloaded() always returns -EFAULT on write_guest_real() failure. Fixes: 2293897805c2 ("KVM: s390: add architecture compliant guest access functions") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Nico Boehr <nrb(a)linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <hca(a)linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240917151904.74314-2-nrb@linux.ibm.com Acked-by: Janosch Frank <frankja(a)linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca(a)linux.ibm.com> diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.c b/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.c index e65f597e3044..a688351f4ab5 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.c +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.c @@ -828,6 +828,8 @@ static int access_guest_page(struct kvm *kvm, enum gacc_mode mode, gpa_t gpa, const gfn_t gfn = gpa_to_gfn(gpa); int rc; + if (!gfn_to_memslot(kvm, gfn)) + return PGM_ADDRESSING; if (mode == GACC_STORE) rc = kvm_write_guest_page(kvm, gfn, data, offset, len); else @@ -985,6 +987,8 @@ int access_guest_real(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long gra, gra += fragment_len; data += fragment_len; } + if (rc > 0) + vcpu->arch.pgm.code = rc; return rc; } diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.h b/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.h index b320d12aa049..3fde45a151f2 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.h +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.h @@ -405,11 +405,12 @@ int read_guest_abs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long gpa, void *data, * @len: number of bytes to copy * * Copy @len bytes from @data (kernel space) to @gra (guest real address). - * It is up to the caller to ensure that the entire guest memory range is - * valid memory before calling this function. * Guest low address and key protection are not checked. * - * Returns zero on success or -EFAULT on error. + * Returns zero on success, -EFAULT when copying from @data failed, or + * PGM_ADRESSING in case @gra is outside a memslot. In this case, pgm check info + * is also stored to allow injecting into the guest (if applicable) using + * kvm_s390_inject_prog_cond(). * * If an error occurs data may have been copied partially to guest memory. */ @@ -428,11 +429,12 @@ int write_guest_real(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long gra, void *data, * @len: number of bytes to copy * * Copy @len bytes from @gra (guest real address) to @data (kernel space). - * It is up to the caller to ensure that the entire guest memory range is - * valid memory before calling this function. * Guest key protection is not checked. * - * Returns zero on success or -EFAULT on error. + * Returns zero on success, -EFAULT when copying to @data failed, or + * PGM_ADRESSING in case @gra is outside a memslot. In this case, pgm check info + * is also stored to allow injecting into the guest (if applicable) using + * kvm_s390_inject_prog_cond(). * * If an error occurs data may have been copied partially to kernel space. */

10 hours, 25 minutes

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] KVM: s390: gaccess: Check if guest address is in memslot" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x e8061f06185be0a06a73760d6526b8b0feadfe52 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024101823-tractor-twitter-a318@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From e8061f06185be0a06a73760d6526b8b0feadfe52 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nico Boehr <nrb(a)linux.ibm.com> Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2024 17:18:33 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] KVM: s390: gaccess: Check if guest address is in memslot Previously, access_guest_page() did not check whether the given guest address is inside of a memslot. This is not a problem, since kvm_write_guest_page/kvm_read_guest_page return -EFAULT in this case. However, -EFAULT is also returned when copy_to/from_user fails. When emulating a guest instruction, the address being outside a memslot usually means that an addressing exception should be injected into the guest. Failure in copy_to/from_user however indicates that something is wrong in userspace and hence should be handled there. To be able to distinguish these two cases, return PGM_ADDRESSING in access_guest_page() when the guest address is outside guest memory. In access_guest_real(), populate vcpu->arch.pgm.code such that kvm_s390_inject_prog_cond() can be used in the caller for injecting into the guest (if applicable). Since this adds a new return value to access_guest_page(), we need to make sure that other callers are not confused by the new positive return value. There are the following users of access_guest_page(): - access_guest_with_key() does the checking itself (in guest_range_to_gpas()), so this case should never happen. Even if, the handling is set up properly. - access_guest_real() just passes the return code to its callers, which are: - read_guest_real() - see below - write_guest_real() - see below There are the following users of read_guest_real(): - ar_translation() in gaccess.c which already returns PGM_* - setup_apcb10(), setup_apcb00(), setup_apcb11() in vsie.c which always return -EFAULT on read_guest_read() nonzero return - no change - shadow_crycb(), handle_stfle() always present this as validity, this could be handled better but doesn't change current behaviour - no change There are the following users of write_guest_real(): - kvm_s390_store_status_unloaded() always returns -EFAULT on write_guest_real() failure. Fixes: 2293897805c2 ("KVM: s390: add architecture compliant guest access functions") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Nico Boehr <nrb(a)linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <hca(a)linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240917151904.74314-2-nrb@linux.ibm.com Acked-by: Janosch Frank <frankja(a)linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca(a)linux.ibm.com> diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.c b/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.c index e65f597e3044..a688351f4ab5 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.c +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.c @@ -828,6 +828,8 @@ static int access_guest_page(struct kvm *kvm, enum gacc_mode mode, gpa_t gpa, const gfn_t gfn = gpa_to_gfn(gpa); int rc; + if (!gfn_to_memslot(kvm, gfn)) + return PGM_ADDRESSING; if (mode == GACC_STORE) rc = kvm_write_guest_page(kvm, gfn, data, offset, len); else @@ -985,6 +987,8 @@ int access_guest_real(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long gra, gra += fragment_len; data += fragment_len; } + if (rc > 0) + vcpu->arch.pgm.code = rc; return rc; } diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.h b/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.h index b320d12aa049..3fde45a151f2 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.h +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.h @@ -405,11 +405,12 @@ int read_guest_abs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long gpa, void *data, * @len: number of bytes to copy * * Copy @len bytes from @data (kernel space) to @gra (guest real address). - * It is up to the caller to ensure that the entire guest memory range is - * valid memory before calling this function. * Guest low address and key protection are not checked. * - * Returns zero on success or -EFAULT on error. + * Returns zero on success, -EFAULT when copying from @data failed, or + * PGM_ADRESSING in case @gra is outside a memslot. In this case, pgm check info + * is also stored to allow injecting into the guest (if applicable) using + * kvm_s390_inject_prog_cond(). * * If an error occurs data may have been copied partially to guest memory. */ @@ -428,11 +429,12 @@ int write_guest_real(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long gra, void *data, * @len: number of bytes to copy * * Copy @len bytes from @gra (guest real address) to @data (kernel space). - * It is up to the caller to ensure that the entire guest memory range is - * valid memory before calling this function. * Guest key protection is not checked. * - * Returns zero on success or -EFAULT on error. + * Returns zero on success, -EFAULT when copying to @data failed, or + * PGM_ADRESSING in case @gra is outside a memslot. In this case, pgm check info + * is also stored to allow injecting into the guest (if applicable) using + * kvm_s390_inject_prog_cond(). * * If an error occurs data may have been copied partially to kernel space. */

10 hours, 25 minutes

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0 0

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