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Re: [PATCH] MIPS: Loongson64: dts: fix phy-related definition of LS7A GMAC

by Jiaxun Yang

On Fri, 2 Jan 2026, at 3:52 PM, Icenowy Zheng wrote: > Currently the LS7A GMAC device tree node lacks a proper phy-handle > property pointing to the PHY node. > > In addition, the phy-mode property specifies "rgmii" without any > internal delay information, which means the board trace needs to add 2ns > delay to the RGMII data lines; but that isn't known to happen on any > Loongson board. The ACPI-based initialization codepath, which is used on > LoongArch-based 3A5000 + 7A1000 hardwares, specifies "rgmii-id" phy > mode, which should be the one we are using. > > Add the lacking phy-handle property and set proper phy-mode. > > Tested on a LS3A4000_7A1000_NUC_BOARD_V2.1 board with YT8521S PHY. > > Signed-off-by: Icenowy Zheng <zhengxingda(a)iscas.ac.cn> Good catch! This with fine with realtek phy chips but YT8521S seems to be picky. Reviewed-by: Jiaxun Yang <jiaxun.yang(a)flygoat.com> Also maybe: Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Given those boards rely on built-in DT. Thanks > --- > arch/mips/boot/dts/loongson/ls7a-pch.dtsi | 6 ++++-- > 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/arch/mips/boot/dts/loongson/ls7a-pch.dtsi > b/arch/mips/boot/dts/loongson/ls7a-pch.dtsi > index ee71045883e7e..6dee85909f5a6 100644 > --- a/arch/mips/boot/dts/loongson/ls7a-pch.dtsi > +++ b/arch/mips/boot/dts/loongson/ls7a-pch.dtsi > @@ -199,7 +199,8 @@ gmac@3,0 { > <13 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>; > interrupt-names = "macirq", "eth_lpi"; > interrupt-parent = <&pic>; > - phy-mode = "rgmii"; > + phy-mode = "rgmii-id"; > + phy-handle = <&phy0>; > mdio { > #address-cells = <1>; > #size-cells = <0>; > @@ -222,7 +223,8 @@ gmac@3,1 { > <15 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>; > interrupt-names = "macirq", "eth_lpi"; > interrupt-parent = <&pic>; > - phy-mode = "rgmii"; > + phy-mode = "rgmii-id"; > + phy-handle = <&phy1>; > mdio { > #address-cells = <1>; > #size-cells = <0>; > -- > 2.52.0 -- - Jiaxun

1 week

[PATCH] PCI: j721e: Add config guards for Cadence Host and Endpoint library APIs

by Siddharth Vadapalli

Commit under Fixes enabled loadable module support for the driver under the assumption that it shall be the sole user of the Cadence Host and Endpoint library APIs. This assumption guarantees that we won't end up in a case where the driver is built-in and the library support is built as a loadable module. With the introduction of [1], this assumption is no longer valid. The SG2042 driver could be built as a loadable module, implying that the Cadence Host library is also selected as a loadable module. However, the pci-j721e.c driver could be built-in as indicated by CONFIG_PCI_J721E=y due to which the Cadence Endpoint library is built-in. Despite the library drivers being built as specified by their respective consumers, since the 'pci-j721e.c' driver has references to the Cadence Host library APIs as well, we run into a build error as reported at [0]. Fix this by adding config guards as a temporary workaround. The proper fix is to split the 'pci-j721e.c' driver into independent Host and Endpoint drivers as aligned at [2]. Fixes: a2790bf81f0f ("PCI: j721e: Add support to build as a loadable module") Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp(a)intel.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202511111705.MZ7ls8Hm-lkp@intel.com/ Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> [0]: https://lore.kernel.org/r/202511111705.MZ7ls8Hm-lkp@intel.com/ [1]: commit 1c72774df028 ("PCI: sg2042: Add Sophgo SG2042 PCIe driver") [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/r/37f6f8ce-12b2-44ee-a94c-f21b29c98821@app.fastmail… Suggested-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Siddharth Vadapalli <s-vadapalli(a)ti.com> --- drivers/pci/controller/cadence/pci-j721e.c | 43 +++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/pci/controller/cadence/pci-j721e.c b/drivers/pci/controller/cadence/pci-j721e.c index 5bc5ab20aa6d..67c5e02afccf 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/controller/cadence/pci-j721e.c +++ b/drivers/pci/controller/cadence/pci-j721e.c @@ -628,10 +628,12 @@ static int j721e_pcie_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) gpiod_set_value_cansleep(gpiod, 1); } - ret = cdns_pcie_host_setup(rc); - if (ret < 0) { - clk_disable_unprepare(pcie->refclk); - goto err_pcie_setup; + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PCI_J721E_HOST)) { + ret = cdns_pcie_host_setup(rc); + if (ret < 0) { + clk_disable_unprepare(pcie->refclk); + goto err_pcie_setup; + } } break; @@ -642,9 +644,11 @@ static int j721e_pcie_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) goto err_get_sync; } - ret = cdns_pcie_ep_setup(ep); - if (ret < 0) - goto err_pcie_setup; + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PCI_J721E_EP)) { + ret = cdns_pcie_ep_setup(ep); + if (ret < 0) + goto err_pcie_setup; + } break; } @@ -669,10 +673,11 @@ static void j721e_pcie_remove(struct platform_device *pdev) struct cdns_pcie_ep *ep; struct cdns_pcie_rc *rc; - if (pcie->mode == PCI_MODE_RC) { + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PCI_J721E_HOST) && + pcie->mode == PCI_MODE_RC) { rc = container_of(cdns_pcie, struct cdns_pcie_rc, pcie); cdns_pcie_host_disable(rc); - } else { + } else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PCI_J721E_EP)) { ep = container_of(cdns_pcie, struct cdns_pcie_ep, pcie); cdns_pcie_ep_disable(ep); } @@ -739,10 +744,12 @@ static int j721e_pcie_resume_noirq(struct device *dev) gpiod_set_value_cansleep(pcie->reset_gpio, 1); } - ret = cdns_pcie_host_link_setup(rc); - if (ret < 0) { - clk_disable_unprepare(pcie->refclk); - return ret; + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PCI_J721E_HOST)) { + ret = cdns_pcie_host_link_setup(rc); + if (ret < 0) { + clk_disable_unprepare(pcie->refclk); + return ret; + } } /* @@ -752,10 +759,12 @@ static int j721e_pcie_resume_noirq(struct device *dev) for (enum cdns_pcie_rp_bar bar = RP_BAR0; bar <= RP_NO_BAR; bar++) rc->avail_ib_bar[bar] = true; - ret = cdns_pcie_host_init(rc); - if (ret) { - clk_disable_unprepare(pcie->refclk); - return ret; + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PCI_J721E_HOST)) { + ret = cdns_pcie_host_init(rc); + if (ret) { + clk_disable_unprepare(pcie->refclk); + return ret; + } } } -- 2.51.1

1 week

[PATCH net] bnxt_en: Fix NULL pointer crash in bnxt_ptp_enable during error cleanup

by Breno Leitao

When bnxt_init_one() fails during initialization (e.g., bnxt_init_int_mode returns -ENODEV), the error path calls bnxt_free_hwrm_resources() which destroys the DMA pool and sets bp->hwrm_dma_pool to NULL. Subsequently, bnxt_ptp_clear() is called, which invokes ptp_clock_unregister(). Since commit a60fc3294a37 ("ptp: rework ptp_clock_unregister() to disable events"), ptp_clock_unregister() now calls ptp_disable_all_events(), which in turn invokes the driver's .enable() callback (bnxt_ptp_enable()) to disable PTP events before completing the unregistration. bnxt_ptp_enable() attempts to send HWRM commands via bnxt_ptp_cfg_pin() and bnxt_ptp_cfg_event(), both of which call hwrm_req_init(). This function tries to allocate from bp->hwrm_dma_pool, causing a NULL pointer dereference: bnxt_en 0000:01:00.0 (unnamed net_device) (uninitialized): bnxt_init_int_mode err: ffffffed KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000028-0x000000000000002f] Call Trace: __hwrm_req_init (drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_hwrm.c:72) bnxt_ptp_enable (drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_ptp.c:323 drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_ptp.c:517) ptp_disable_all_events (drivers/ptp/ptp_chardev.c:66) ptp_clock_unregister (drivers/ptp/ptp_clock.c:518) bnxt_ptp_clear (drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_ptp.c:1134) bnxt_init_one (drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c:16889) Lines are against commit f8f9c1f4d0c7 ("Linux 6.19-rc3") Fix this by checking if bp->hwrm_dma_pool is NULL at the start of bnxt_ptp_enable(). During error/cleanup paths when HWRM resources have been freed, return success without attempting to send commands since the hardware is being torn down anyway. During normal operation, the DMA pool is always valid so PTP functionality is unaffected. Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao(a)debian.org> Fixes: a60fc3294a37 ("ptp: rework ptp_clock_unregister() to disable events") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org --- drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_ptp.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_ptp.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_ptp.c index a8a74f07bb54..a749bbfa398e 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_ptp.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_ptp.c @@ -482,6 +482,13 @@ static int bnxt_ptp_enable(struct ptp_clock_info *ptp_info, int pin_id; int rc; + /* Return success if HWRM resources are not available. + * This can happen during error/cleanup paths when DMA pool has been + * freed. + */ + if (!bp->hwrm_dma_pool) + return 0; + switch (rq->type) { case PTP_CLK_REQ_EXTTS: /* Configure an External PPS IN */ --- base-commit: 80380f6ce46f38a0d1200caade2f03de4b6c1d27 change-id: 20251231-bnxt-c54d317d8bfe Best regards, -- Breno Leitao <leitao(a)debian.org>

1 week

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by linux-stable-mirror＠lists.linaro.org

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1 week

[PATCH 0/4] drm: Revert and fix enable/disable sequence

by Tomi Valkeinen

Changing the enable/disable sequence in commit c9b1150a68d9 ("drm/atomic-helper: Re-order bridge chain pre-enable and post-disable") has caused regressions on multiple platforms: R-Car, MCDE, Rockchip. This is an alternate series to Linus' series: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251202-mcde-drm-regression-thirdfix-v6-0-f1bf… This series first reverts the original commit and reverts a fix for mediatek which is no longer needed. It then exposes helper functions from DRM core, and finally implements the new sequence only in the tidss driver. There is one more fix in upstream for the original commit, commit 5d91394f2361 ("drm/exynos: fimd: Guard display clock control with runtime PM calls"), but I have not reverted that one as it looks like a valid patch in its own. I added Cc stable v6.17+ to all patches, but I didn't add Fixes tags, as I wasn't sure what should they point to. But I could perhaps add Fixes: <original commit> to all of these. Signed-off-by: Tomi Valkeinen <tomi.valkeinen(a)ideasonboard.com> --- Linus Walleij (1): drm/atomic-helper: Export and namespace some functions Tomi Valkeinen (3): Revert "drm/atomic-helper: Re-order bridge chain pre-enable and post-disable" Revert "drm/mediatek: dsi: Fix DSI host and panel bridge pre-enable order" drm/tidss: Fix enable/disable order drivers/gpu/drm/drm_atomic_helper.c | 122 ++++++++++++++---- drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_dsi.c | 6 - drivers/gpu/drm/tidss/tidss_kms.c | 30 ++++- include/drm/drm_atomic_helper.h | 22 ++++ include/drm/drm_bridge.h | 249 ++++++++++-------------------------- 5 files changed, 214 insertions(+), 215 deletions(-) --- base-commit: 88e721ab978a86426aa08da520de77430fa7bb84 change-id: 20251205-drm-seq-fix-b4ed1f56604b Best regards, -- Tomi Valkeinen <tomi.valkeinen(a)ideasonboard.com>

1 week

+ mm-zswap-fix-error-pointer-free-in-zswap_cpu_comp_prepare.patch added to mm-hotfixes-unstable branch

by Andrew Morton

The patch titled Subject: mm/zswap: fix error pointer free in zswap_cpu_comp_prepare() has been added to the -mm mm-hotfixes-unstable branch. Its filename is mm-zswap-fix-error-pointer-free-in-zswap_cpu_comp_prepare.patch This patch will shortly appear at https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche… This patch will later appear in the mm-hotfixes-unstable branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm Before you just go and hit "reply", please: a) Consider who else should be cc'ed b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's *** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code *** The -mm tree is included into linux-next via various branches at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm and is updated there most days ------------------------------------------------------ From: Pavel Butsykin <pbutsykin(a)cloudlinux.com> Subject: mm/zswap: fix error pointer free in zswap_cpu_comp_prepare() Date: Wed, 31 Dec 2025 11:46:38 +0400 crypto_alloc_acomp_node() may return ERR_PTR(), but the fail path checks only for NULL and can pass an error pointer to crypto_free_acomp(). Use IS_ERR_OR_NULL() to only free valid acomp instances. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251231074638.2564302-1-pbutsykin@cloudlinux.com Fixes: 779b9955f643 ("mm: zswap: move allocations during CPU init outside the lock") Signed-off-by: Pavel Butsykin <pbutsykin(a)cloudlinux.com> Reviewed-by: SeongJae Park <sj(a)kernel.org> Acked-by: Yosry Ahmed <yosry.ahmed(a)linux.dev> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes(a)cmpxchg.org> Cc: Nhat Pham <nphamcs(a)gmail.com> Cc: Chengming Zhou <chengming.zhou(a)linux.dev> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- mm/zswap.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/mm/zswap.c~mm-zswap-fix-error-pointer-free-in-zswap_cpu_comp_prepare +++ a/mm/zswap.c @@ -787,7 +787,7 @@ static int zswap_cpu_comp_prepare(unsign return 0; fail: - if (acomp) + if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(acomp)) crypto_free_acomp(acomp); kfree(buffer); return ret; _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from pbutsykin(a)cloudlinux.com are mm-zswap-fix-error-pointer-free-in-zswap_cpu_comp_prepare.patch

1 week

+ fs-writeback-skip-as_no_data_integrity-mappings-in-wait_sb_inodes.patch added to mm-hotfixes-unstable branch

by Andrew Morton

The patch titled Subject: fs/writeback: skip AS_NO_DATA_INTEGRITY mappings in wait_sb_inodes() has been added to the -mm mm-hotfixes-unstable branch. Its filename is fs-writeback-skip-as_no_data_integrity-mappings-in-wait_sb_inodes.patch This patch will shortly appear at https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche… This patch will later appear in the mm-hotfixes-unstable branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm Before you just go and hit "reply", please: a) Consider who else should be cc'ed b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's *** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code *** The -mm tree is included into linux-next via various branches at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm and is updated there most days ------------------------------------------------------ From: Joanne Koong <joannelkoong(a)gmail.com> Subject: fs/writeback: skip AS_NO_DATA_INTEGRITY mappings in wait_sb_inodes() Date: Sun, 14 Dec 2025 19:00:43 -0800 Skip waiting on writeback for inodes that belong to mappings that do not have data integrity guarantees (denoted by the AS_NO_DATA_INTEGRITY mapping flag). This restores fuse back to prior behavior where syncs are no-ops. This is needed because otherwise, if a system is running a faulty fuse server that does not reply to issued write requests, this will cause wait_sb_inodes() to wait forever. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251215030043.1431306-2-joannelkoong@gmail.com Fixes: 0c58a97f919c ("fuse: remove tmp folio for writebacks and internal rb tree") Signed-off-by: Joanne Koong <joannelkoong(a)gmail.com> Reported-by: Athul Krishna <athul.krishna.kr(a)protonmail.com> Reported-by: J. Neusch��fer <j.neuschaefer(a)gmx.net> Cc: Bonaccorso Salvatore <carnil(a)debian.org> Cc: Jonathan Neuschaefer <j.neuschaefer(a)gmx.net> Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos(a)szeredi.hu> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner(a)kernel.org> Cc: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz> Cc: "Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)" <willy(a)infradead.org> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david(a)kernel.org> Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes(a)oracle.com> Cc: "Liam R. Howlett" <Liam.Howlett(a)oracle.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka(a)suse.cz> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt(a)kernel.org> Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb(a)google.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko(a)suse.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- fs/fs-writeback.c | 3 ++- fs/fuse/file.c | 4 +++- include/linux/pagemap.h | 11 +++++++++++ 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/fs/fs-writeback.c~fs-writeback-skip-as_no_data_integrity-mappings-in-wait_sb_inodes +++ a/fs/fs-writeback.c @@ -2751,7 +2751,8 @@ static void wait_sb_inodes(struct super_ * do not have the mapping lock. Skip it here, wb completion * will remove it. */ - if (!mapping_tagged(mapping, PAGECACHE_TAG_WRITEBACK)) + if (!mapping_tagged(mapping, PAGECACHE_TAG_WRITEBACK) || + mapping_no_data_integrity(mapping)) continue; spin_unlock_irq(&sb->s_inode_wblist_lock); --- a/fs/fuse/file.c~fs-writeback-skip-as_no_data_integrity-mappings-in-wait_sb_inodes +++ a/fs/fuse/file.c @@ -3200,8 +3200,10 @@ void fuse_init_file_inode(struct inode * inode->i_fop = &fuse_file_operations; inode->i_data.a_ops = &fuse_file_aops; - if (fc->writeback_cache) + if (fc->writeback_cache) { mapping_set_writeback_may_deadlock_on_reclaim(&inode->i_data); + mapping_set_no_data_integrity(&inode->i_data); + } INIT_LIST_HEAD(&fi->write_files); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&fi->queued_writes); --- a/include/linux/pagemap.h~fs-writeback-skip-as_no_data_integrity-mappings-in-wait_sb_inodes +++ a/include/linux/pagemap.h @@ -210,6 +210,7 @@ enum mapping_flags { AS_WRITEBACK_MAY_DEADLOCK_ON_RECLAIM = 9, AS_KERNEL_FILE = 10, /* mapping for a fake kernel file that shouldn't account usage to user cgroups */ + AS_NO_DATA_INTEGRITY = 11, /* no data integrity guarantees */ /* Bits 16-25 are used for FOLIO_ORDER */ AS_FOLIO_ORDER_BITS = 5, AS_FOLIO_ORDER_MIN = 16, @@ -345,6 +346,16 @@ static inline bool mapping_writeback_may return test_bit(AS_WRITEBACK_MAY_DEADLOCK_ON_RECLAIM, &mapping->flags); } +static inline void mapping_set_no_data_integrity(struct address_space *mapping) +{ + set_bit(AS_NO_DATA_INTEGRITY, &mapping->flags); +} + +static inline bool mapping_no_data_integrity(const struct address_space *mapping) +{ + return test_bit(AS_NO_DATA_INTEGRITY, &mapping->flags); +} + static inline gfp_t mapping_gfp_mask(const struct address_space *mapping) { return mapping->gfp_mask; _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from joannelkoong(a)gmail.com are fs-writeback-skip-as_no_data_integrity-mappings-in-wait_sb_inodes.patch

1 week

+ arm64-kernel-initialize-missing-kexec_buf-random-field.patch added to mm-hotfixes-unstable branch

by Andrew Morton

The patch titled Subject: arm64: kernel: initialize missing kexec_buf->random field has been added to the -mm mm-hotfixes-unstable branch. Its filename is arm64-kernel-initialize-missing-kexec_buf-random-field.patch This patch will shortly appear at https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche… This patch will later appear in the mm-hotfixes-unstable branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm Before you just go and hit "reply", please: a) Consider who else should be cc'ed b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's *** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code *** The -mm tree is included into linux-next via various branches at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm and is updated there most days ------------------------------------------------------ From: Yeoreum Yun <yeoreum.yun(a)arm.com> Subject: arm64: kernel: initialize missing kexec_buf->random field Date: Mon, 1 Dec 2025 10:51:18 +0000 Commit bf454ec31add ("kexec_file: allow to place kexec_buf randomly") introduced the kexec_buf->random field to enable random placement of kexec_buf. However, this field was never properly initialized for kexec images that do not need to be placed randomly, leading to the following UBSAN warning: [ +0.364528] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ +0.000019] UBSAN: invalid-load in ./include/linux/kexec.h:210:12 [ +0.000131] load of value 2 is not a valid value for type 'bool' (aka '_Bool') [ +0.000003] CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 927 Comm: kexec Not tainted 6.18.0-rc7+ #3 PREEMPT(full) [ +0.000002] Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 [ +0.000000] Call trace: [ +0.000001] show_stack+0x24/0x40 (C) [ +0.000006] __dump_stack+0x28/0x48 [ +0.000002] dump_stack_lvl+0x7c/0xb0 [ +0.000002] dump_stack+0x18/0x34 [ +0.000001] ubsan_epilogue+0x10/0x50 [ +0.000002] __ubsan_handle_load_invalid_value+0xc8/0xd0 [ +0.000003] locate_mem_hole_callback+0x28c/0x2a0 [ +0.000003] kexec_locate_mem_hole+0xf4/0x2f0 [ +0.000001] kexec_add_buffer+0xa8/0x178 [ +0.000002] image_load+0xf0/0x258 [ +0.000001] __arm64_sys_kexec_file_load+0x510/0x718 [ +0.000002] invoke_syscall+0x68/0xe8 [ +0.000001] el0_svc_common+0xb0/0xf8 [ +0.000002] do_el0_svc+0x28/0x48 [ +0.000001] el0_svc+0x40/0xe8 [ +0.000002] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0x140 [ +0.000002] el0t_64_sync+0x1bc/0x1c0 To address this, initialise kexec_buf->random field properly. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251201105118.2786335-1-yeoreum.yun@arm.com Fixes: bf454ec31add ("kexec_file: allow to place kexec_buf randomly") Signed-off-by: Yeoreum Yun <yeoreum.yun(a)arm.com> Suggested-by: Breno Leitao <leitao(a)debian.org> Reviewed-by: Breno Leitao <leitao(a)debian.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas(a)arm.com> Cc: Coiby Xu <coxu(a)redhat.com> Cc: levi.yun <yeoreum.yun(a)arm.com> Cc: Marc Rutland <mark.rutland(a)arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will(a)kernel.org> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c~arm64-kernel-initialize-missing-kexec_buf-random-field +++ a/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c @@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ static void *image_load(struct kimage *i struct arm64_image_header *h; u64 flags, value; bool be_image, be_kernel; - struct kexec_buf kbuf; + struct kexec_buf kbuf = {}; unsigned long text_offset, kernel_segment_number; struct kexec_segment *kernel_segment; int ret; _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from yeoreum.yun(a)arm.com are arm64-kernel-initialize-missing-kexec_buf-random-field.patch

1 week

[PATCH 0/4] mm/damon/sysfs: free setup failures generated zombie sub-sub dirs

by SeongJae Park

Some DAMON sysfs directory setup functions generates its sub and sub-sub directories. For example, 'monitoring_attrs/' directory setup creates 'intervals/' and 'intervals/intervals_goal/' directories under 'monitoring_attrs/' directory. When such sub-sub directories are successfully made but followup setup is failed, the setup function should recursively clean up the subdirectories. However, such setup functions are only dereferencing sub directory reference counters. As a result, under certain setup failures, the sub-sub directories keep having non-zero reference counters. It means the directories cannot be removed like zombies, and the memory for the directories cannot be freed. The user impact of this issue is limited due to the following reasons. When the issue happens, the zombie directories are still taking the path. Hence attempts to generate the directories again will fail, without additional memory leak. This means the upper bound memory leak is limited. Nonetheless this also implies controlling DAMON with a feature that requires the setup-failed sysfs files will be impossible until the system reboots. Also, the setup operations are quite simple. The certain failures would hence only rarely happen, and are difficult to artificially trigger. SeongJae Park (4): mm/damon/sysfs: cleanup intervals subdirs on attrs dir setup failure mm/damon/sysfs: cleanup attrs subdirs on context dir setup failure mm/damon/sysfs-scheme: cleanup quotas subdirs on scheme dir setup failure mm/damon/sysfs-scheme: cleanup access_pattern subdirs on scheme dir setup failure mm/damon/sysfs-schemes.c | 10 ++++++---- mm/damon/sysfs.c | 9 ++++++--- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) base-commit: 6d039da6a260dd7919bebc70ebb65d250bb9c24e -- 2.47.3

1 week

[PATCH v2] LoongArch: BPF: Zero-extend bpf_tail_call() index

by Aaron Yang

From: Hengqi Chen <hengqi.chen(a)gmail.com> The bpf_tail_call() index should be treated as a u32 value. Let's zero-extend it to avoid calling wrong BPF progs. See similar fixes for x86 [1]) and arm64 ([2]) for more details. [1]: https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/90caccdd8cc0215705f18b92771b449b01… [2]: https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/16338a9b3ac30740d49f5dfed81bac0ffa… Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 5dc615520c4d ("LoongArch: Add BPF JIT support") Signed-off-by: Hengqi Chen <hengqi.chen(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai(a)loongson.cn> --- arch/loongarch/net/bpf_jit.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/loongarch/net/bpf_jit.c b/arch/loongarch/net/bpf_jit.c index 5352d0c30fb2..766ded335fd8 100644 --- a/arch/loongarch/net/bpf_jit.c +++ b/arch/loongarch/net/bpf_jit.c @@ -280,6 +280,8 @@ static int emit_bpf_tail_call(struct jit_ctx *ctx, int insn) * goto out; */ tc_ninsn = insn ? ctx->offset[insn+1] - ctx->offset[insn] : ctx->offset[0]; + emit_zext_32(ctx, a2, true); + off = offsetof(struct bpf_array, map.max_entries); emit_insn(ctx, ldwu, t1, a1, off); /* bgeu $a2, $t1, jmp_offset */ -- 2.43.0

1 week, 1 day

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