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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] mm/memory-failure: fix VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(PagePoisoned(page))" failed to apply to 5.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.4-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.4.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x d613f53c83ec47089c4e25859d5e8e0359f6f8da # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025091332-fool-outflank-732f@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.4.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From d613f53c83ec47089c4e25859d5e8e0359f6f8da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe(a)huawei.com> Date: Thu, 28 Aug 2025 10:46:18 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] mm/memory-failure: fix VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(PagePoisoned(page)) when unpoison memory When I did memory failure tests, below panic occurs: page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(PagePoisoned(page)) kernel BUG at include/linux/page-flags.h:616! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 3 PID: 720 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.10.0-rc1-00195-g148743902568 #40 RIP: 0010:unpoison_memory+0x2f3/0x590 RSP: 0018:ffffa57fc8787d60 EFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: 0000000000000037 RBX: 0000000000000009 RCX: ffff9be25fcdc9c8 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000027 RDI: ffff9be25fcdc9c0 RBP: 0000000000300000 R08: ffffffffb4956f88 R09: 0000000000009ffb R10: 0000000000000284 R11: ffffffffb4926fa0 R12: ffffe6b00c000000 R13: ffff9bdb453dfd00 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: fffffffffffffffe FS: 00007f08f04e4740(0000) GS:ffff9be25fcc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000564787a30410 CR3: 000000010d4e2000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: <TASK> unpoison_memory+0x2f3/0x590 simple_attr_write_xsigned.constprop.0.isra.0+0xb3/0x110 debugfs_attr_write+0x42/0x60 full_proxy_write+0x5b/0x80 vfs_write+0xd5/0x540 ksys_write+0x64/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0xb9/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f08f0314887 RSP: 002b:00007ffece710078 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000009 RCX: 00007f08f0314887 RDX: 0000000000000009 RSI: 0000564787a30410 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 0000564787a30410 R08: 000000000000fefe R09: 000000007fffffff R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000009 R13: 00007f08f041b780 R14: 00007f08f0417600 R15: 00007f08f0416a00 </TASK> Modules linked in: hwpoison_inject ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:unpoison_memory+0x2f3/0x590 RSP: 0018:ffffa57fc8787d60 EFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: 0000000000000037 RBX: 0000000000000009 RCX: ffff9be25fcdc9c8 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000027 RDI: ffff9be25fcdc9c0 RBP: 0000000000300000 R08: ffffffffb4956f88 R09: 0000000000009ffb R10: 0000000000000284 R11: ffffffffb4926fa0 R12: ffffe6b00c000000 R13: ffff9bdb453dfd00 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: fffffffffffffffe FS: 00007f08f04e4740(0000) GS:ffff9be25fcc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000564787a30410 CR3: 000000010d4e2000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Kernel Offset: 0x31c00000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff) ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception ]--- The root cause is that unpoison_memory() tries to check the PG_HWPoison flags of an uninitialized page. So VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(PagePoisoned(page)) is triggered. This can be reproduced by below steps: 1.Offline memory block: echo offline > /sys/devices/system/memory/memory12/state 2.Get offlined memory pfn: page-types -b n -rlN 3.Write pfn to unpoison-pfn echo <pfn> > /sys/kernel/debug/hwpoison/unpoison-pfn This scenario can be identified by pfn_to_online_page() returning NULL. And ZONE_DEVICE pages are never expected, so we can simply fail if pfn_to_online_page() == NULL to fix the bug. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250828024618.1744895-1-linmiaohe@huawei.com Fixes: f1dd2cd13c4b ("mm, memory_hotplug: do not associate hotadded memory to zones until online") Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe(a)huawei.com> Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <nao.horiguchi(a)gmail.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> diff --git a/mm/memory-failure.c b/mm/memory-failure.c index 10b3c281c2ae..df6ee59527dd 100644 --- a/mm/memory-failure.c +++ b/mm/memory-failure.c @@ -2568,10 +2568,9 @@ int unpoison_memory(unsigned long pfn) static DEFINE_RATELIMIT_STATE(unpoison_rs, DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_INTERVAL, DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_BURST); - if (!pfn_valid(pfn)) - return -ENXIO; - - p = pfn_to_page(pfn); + p = pfn_to_online_page(pfn); + if (!p) + return -EIO; folio = page_folio(p); mutex_lock(&mf_mutex);

3 days, 22 hours

2
1
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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] mm/memory-failure: fix VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(PagePoisoned(page))" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x d613f53c83ec47089c4e25859d5e8e0359f6f8da # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025091332-displace-headset-e401@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From d613f53c83ec47089c4e25859d5e8e0359f6f8da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe(a)huawei.com> Date: Thu, 28 Aug 2025 10:46:18 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] mm/memory-failure: fix VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(PagePoisoned(page)) when unpoison memory When I did memory failure tests, below panic occurs: page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(PagePoisoned(page)) kernel BUG at include/linux/page-flags.h:616! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 3 PID: 720 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.10.0-rc1-00195-g148743902568 #40 RIP: 0010:unpoison_memory+0x2f3/0x590 RSP: 0018:ffffa57fc8787d60 EFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: 0000000000000037 RBX: 0000000000000009 RCX: ffff9be25fcdc9c8 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000027 RDI: ffff9be25fcdc9c0 RBP: 0000000000300000 R08: ffffffffb4956f88 R09: 0000000000009ffb R10: 0000000000000284 R11: ffffffffb4926fa0 R12: ffffe6b00c000000 R13: ffff9bdb453dfd00 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: fffffffffffffffe FS: 00007f08f04e4740(0000) GS:ffff9be25fcc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000564787a30410 CR3: 000000010d4e2000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: <TASK> unpoison_memory+0x2f3/0x590 simple_attr_write_xsigned.constprop.0.isra.0+0xb3/0x110 debugfs_attr_write+0x42/0x60 full_proxy_write+0x5b/0x80 vfs_write+0xd5/0x540 ksys_write+0x64/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0xb9/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f08f0314887 RSP: 002b:00007ffece710078 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000009 RCX: 00007f08f0314887 RDX: 0000000000000009 RSI: 0000564787a30410 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 0000564787a30410 R08: 000000000000fefe R09: 000000007fffffff R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000009 R13: 00007f08f041b780 R14: 00007f08f0417600 R15: 00007f08f0416a00 </TASK> Modules linked in: hwpoison_inject ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:unpoison_memory+0x2f3/0x590 RSP: 0018:ffffa57fc8787d60 EFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: 0000000000000037 RBX: 0000000000000009 RCX: ffff9be25fcdc9c8 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000027 RDI: ffff9be25fcdc9c0 RBP: 0000000000300000 R08: ffffffffb4956f88 R09: 0000000000009ffb R10: 0000000000000284 R11: ffffffffb4926fa0 R12: ffffe6b00c000000 R13: ffff9bdb453dfd00 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: fffffffffffffffe FS: 00007f08f04e4740(0000) GS:ffff9be25fcc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000564787a30410 CR3: 000000010d4e2000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Kernel Offset: 0x31c00000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff) ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception ]--- The root cause is that unpoison_memory() tries to check the PG_HWPoison flags of an uninitialized page. So VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(PagePoisoned(page)) is triggered. This can be reproduced by below steps: 1.Offline memory block: echo offline > /sys/devices/system/memory/memory12/state 2.Get offlined memory pfn: page-types -b n -rlN 3.Write pfn to unpoison-pfn echo <pfn> > /sys/kernel/debug/hwpoison/unpoison-pfn This scenario can be identified by pfn_to_online_page() returning NULL. And ZONE_DEVICE pages are never expected, so we can simply fail if pfn_to_online_page() == NULL to fix the bug. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250828024618.1744895-1-linmiaohe@huawei.com Fixes: f1dd2cd13c4b ("mm, memory_hotplug: do not associate hotadded memory to zones until online") Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe(a)huawei.com> Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <nao.horiguchi(a)gmail.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> diff --git a/mm/memory-failure.c b/mm/memory-failure.c index 10b3c281c2ae..df6ee59527dd 100644 --- a/mm/memory-failure.c +++ b/mm/memory-failure.c @@ -2568,10 +2568,9 @@ int unpoison_memory(unsigned long pfn) static DEFINE_RATELIMIT_STATE(unpoison_rs, DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_INTERVAL, DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_BURST); - if (!pfn_valid(pfn)) - return -ENXIO; - - p = pfn_to_page(pfn); + p = pfn_to_online_page(pfn); + if (!p) + return -EIO; folio = page_folio(p); mutex_lock(&mf_mutex);

3 days, 22 hours

2
1
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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] mm/memory-failure: fix VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(PagePoisoned(page))" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x d613f53c83ec47089c4e25859d5e8e0359f6f8da # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025091331-revocable-fountain-3136@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From d613f53c83ec47089c4e25859d5e8e0359f6f8da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe(a)huawei.com> Date: Thu, 28 Aug 2025 10:46:18 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] mm/memory-failure: fix VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(PagePoisoned(page)) when unpoison memory When I did memory failure tests, below panic occurs: page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(PagePoisoned(page)) kernel BUG at include/linux/page-flags.h:616! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 3 PID: 720 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.10.0-rc1-00195-g148743902568 #40 RIP: 0010:unpoison_memory+0x2f3/0x590 RSP: 0018:ffffa57fc8787d60 EFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: 0000000000000037 RBX: 0000000000000009 RCX: ffff9be25fcdc9c8 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000027 RDI: ffff9be25fcdc9c0 RBP: 0000000000300000 R08: ffffffffb4956f88 R09: 0000000000009ffb R10: 0000000000000284 R11: ffffffffb4926fa0 R12: ffffe6b00c000000 R13: ffff9bdb453dfd00 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: fffffffffffffffe FS: 00007f08f04e4740(0000) GS:ffff9be25fcc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000564787a30410 CR3: 000000010d4e2000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: <TASK> unpoison_memory+0x2f3/0x590 simple_attr_write_xsigned.constprop.0.isra.0+0xb3/0x110 debugfs_attr_write+0x42/0x60 full_proxy_write+0x5b/0x80 vfs_write+0xd5/0x540 ksys_write+0x64/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0xb9/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f08f0314887 RSP: 002b:00007ffece710078 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000009 RCX: 00007f08f0314887 RDX: 0000000000000009 RSI: 0000564787a30410 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 0000564787a30410 R08: 000000000000fefe R09: 000000007fffffff R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000009 R13: 00007f08f041b780 R14: 00007f08f0417600 R15: 00007f08f0416a00 </TASK> Modules linked in: hwpoison_inject ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:unpoison_memory+0x2f3/0x590 RSP: 0018:ffffa57fc8787d60 EFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: 0000000000000037 RBX: 0000000000000009 RCX: ffff9be25fcdc9c8 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000027 RDI: ffff9be25fcdc9c0 RBP: 0000000000300000 R08: ffffffffb4956f88 R09: 0000000000009ffb R10: 0000000000000284 R11: ffffffffb4926fa0 R12: ffffe6b00c000000 R13: ffff9bdb453dfd00 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: fffffffffffffffe FS: 00007f08f04e4740(0000) GS:ffff9be25fcc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000564787a30410 CR3: 000000010d4e2000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Kernel Offset: 0x31c00000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff) ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception ]--- The root cause is that unpoison_memory() tries to check the PG_HWPoison flags of an uninitialized page. So VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(PagePoisoned(page)) is triggered. This can be reproduced by below steps: 1.Offline memory block: echo offline > /sys/devices/system/memory/memory12/state 2.Get offlined memory pfn: page-types -b n -rlN 3.Write pfn to unpoison-pfn echo <pfn> > /sys/kernel/debug/hwpoison/unpoison-pfn This scenario can be identified by pfn_to_online_page() returning NULL. And ZONE_DEVICE pages are never expected, so we can simply fail if pfn_to_online_page() == NULL to fix the bug. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250828024618.1744895-1-linmiaohe@huawei.com Fixes: f1dd2cd13c4b ("mm, memory_hotplug: do not associate hotadded memory to zones until online") Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe(a)huawei.com> Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <nao.horiguchi(a)gmail.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> diff --git a/mm/memory-failure.c b/mm/memory-failure.c index 10b3c281c2ae..df6ee59527dd 100644 --- a/mm/memory-failure.c +++ b/mm/memory-failure.c @@ -2568,10 +2568,9 @@ int unpoison_memory(unsigned long pfn) static DEFINE_RATELIMIT_STATE(unpoison_rs, DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_INTERVAL, DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_BURST); - if (!pfn_valid(pfn)) - return -ENXIO; - - p = pfn_to_page(pfn); + p = pfn_to_online_page(pfn); + if (!p) + return -EIO; folio = page_folio(p); mutex_lock(&mf_mutex);

3 days, 22 hours

2
1
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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] mm/memory-failure: fix VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(PagePoisoned(page))" failed to apply to 6.1-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.1-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.1.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x d613f53c83ec47089c4e25859d5e8e0359f6f8da # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025091330-anguished-choosy-4882@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.1.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From d613f53c83ec47089c4e25859d5e8e0359f6f8da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe(a)huawei.com> Date: Thu, 28 Aug 2025 10:46:18 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] mm/memory-failure: fix VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(PagePoisoned(page)) when unpoison memory When I did memory failure tests, below panic occurs: page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(PagePoisoned(page)) kernel BUG at include/linux/page-flags.h:616! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 3 PID: 720 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.10.0-rc1-00195-g148743902568 #40 RIP: 0010:unpoison_memory+0x2f3/0x590 RSP: 0018:ffffa57fc8787d60 EFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: 0000000000000037 RBX: 0000000000000009 RCX: ffff9be25fcdc9c8 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000027 RDI: ffff9be25fcdc9c0 RBP: 0000000000300000 R08: ffffffffb4956f88 R09: 0000000000009ffb R10: 0000000000000284 R11: ffffffffb4926fa0 R12: ffffe6b00c000000 R13: ffff9bdb453dfd00 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: fffffffffffffffe FS: 00007f08f04e4740(0000) GS:ffff9be25fcc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000564787a30410 CR3: 000000010d4e2000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: <TASK> unpoison_memory+0x2f3/0x590 simple_attr_write_xsigned.constprop.0.isra.0+0xb3/0x110 debugfs_attr_write+0x42/0x60 full_proxy_write+0x5b/0x80 vfs_write+0xd5/0x540 ksys_write+0x64/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0xb9/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f08f0314887 RSP: 002b:00007ffece710078 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000009 RCX: 00007f08f0314887 RDX: 0000000000000009 RSI: 0000564787a30410 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 0000564787a30410 R08: 000000000000fefe R09: 000000007fffffff R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000009 R13: 00007f08f041b780 R14: 00007f08f0417600 R15: 00007f08f0416a00 </TASK> Modules linked in: hwpoison_inject ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:unpoison_memory+0x2f3/0x590 RSP: 0018:ffffa57fc8787d60 EFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: 0000000000000037 RBX: 0000000000000009 RCX: ffff9be25fcdc9c8 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000027 RDI: ffff9be25fcdc9c0 RBP: 0000000000300000 R08: ffffffffb4956f88 R09: 0000000000009ffb R10: 0000000000000284 R11: ffffffffb4926fa0 R12: ffffe6b00c000000 R13: ffff9bdb453dfd00 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: fffffffffffffffe FS: 00007f08f04e4740(0000) GS:ffff9be25fcc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000564787a30410 CR3: 000000010d4e2000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Kernel Offset: 0x31c00000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff) ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception ]--- The root cause is that unpoison_memory() tries to check the PG_HWPoison flags of an uninitialized page. So VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(PagePoisoned(page)) is triggered. This can be reproduced by below steps: 1.Offline memory block: echo offline > /sys/devices/system/memory/memory12/state 2.Get offlined memory pfn: page-types -b n -rlN 3.Write pfn to unpoison-pfn echo <pfn> > /sys/kernel/debug/hwpoison/unpoison-pfn This scenario can be identified by pfn_to_online_page() returning NULL. And ZONE_DEVICE pages are never expected, so we can simply fail if pfn_to_online_page() == NULL to fix the bug. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250828024618.1744895-1-linmiaohe@huawei.com Fixes: f1dd2cd13c4b ("mm, memory_hotplug: do not associate hotadded memory to zones until online") Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe(a)huawei.com> Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <nao.horiguchi(a)gmail.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> diff --git a/mm/memory-failure.c b/mm/memory-failure.c index 10b3c281c2ae..df6ee59527dd 100644 --- a/mm/memory-failure.c +++ b/mm/memory-failure.c @@ -2568,10 +2568,9 @@ int unpoison_memory(unsigned long pfn) static DEFINE_RATELIMIT_STATE(unpoison_rs, DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_INTERVAL, DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_BURST); - if (!pfn_valid(pfn)) - return -ENXIO; - - p = pfn_to_page(pfn); + p = pfn_to_online_page(pfn); + if (!p) + return -EIO; folio = page_folio(p); mutex_lock(&mf_mutex);

3 days, 22 hours

2
1
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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] drm/amd/amdgpu: Declare isp firmware binary file" failed to apply to 6.16-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.16-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.16.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 857ccfc19f9be1269716f3d681650c1bd149a656 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025091303-unstaffed-specimen-7319@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.16.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 857ccfc19f9be1269716f3d681650c1bd149a656 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pratap Nirujogi <pratap.nirujogi(a)amd.com> Date: Wed, 3 Sep 2025 16:00:24 -0400 Subject: [PATCH] drm/amd/amdgpu: Declare isp firmware binary file Declare isp firmware file isp_4_1_1.bin required by isp4.1.1 device. Suggested-by: Alexey Zagorodnikov <xglooom(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Pratap Nirujogi <pratap.nirujogi(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com> (cherry picked from commit d97b74a833eba1f4f69f67198fd98ef036c0e5f9) Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/isp_v4_1_1.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/isp_v4_1_1.c index a887df520414..4258d3e0b706 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/isp_v4_1_1.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/isp_v4_1_1.c @@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ #include "amdgpu.h" #include "isp_v4_1_1.h" +MODULE_FIRMWARE("amdgpu/isp_4_1_1.bin"); + #define ISP_PERFORMANCE_STATE_LOW 0 #define ISP_PERFORMANCE_STATE_HIGH 1

3 days, 22 hours

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] kernfs: Fix UAF in polling when open file is released" failed to apply to 6.1-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.1-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.1.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 3c9ba2777d6c86025e1ba4186dc5cd930e40ec5f # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025091423-knapsack-multiple-1d0f@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.1.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 3c9ba2777d6c86025e1ba4186dc5cd930e40ec5f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chen Ridong <chenridong(a)huawei.com> Date: Fri, 22 Aug 2025 07:07:14 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] kernfs: Fix UAF in polling when open file is released A use-after-free (UAF) vulnerability was identified in the PSI (Pressure Stall Information) monitoring mechanism: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in psi_trigger_poll+0x3c/0x140 Read of size 8 at addr ffff3de3d50bd308 by task systemd/1 psi_trigger_poll+0x3c/0x140 cgroup_pressure_poll+0x70/0xa0 cgroup_file_poll+0x8c/0x100 kernfs_fop_poll+0x11c/0x1c0 ep_item_poll.isra.0+0x188/0x2c0 Allocated by task 1: cgroup_file_open+0x88/0x388 kernfs_fop_open+0x73c/0xaf0 do_dentry_open+0x5fc/0x1200 vfs_open+0xa0/0x3f0 do_open+0x7e8/0xd08 path_openat+0x2fc/0x6b0 do_filp_open+0x174/0x368 Freed by task 8462: cgroup_file_release+0x130/0x1f8 kernfs_drain_open_files+0x17c/0x440 kernfs_drain+0x2dc/0x360 kernfs_show+0x1b8/0x288 cgroup_file_show+0x150/0x268 cgroup_pressure_write+0x1dc/0x340 cgroup_file_write+0x274/0x548 Reproduction Steps: 1. Open test/cpu.pressure and establish epoll monitoring 2. Disable monitoring: echo 0 > test/cgroup.pressure 3. Re-enable monitoring: echo 1 > test/cgroup.pressure The race condition occurs because: 1. When cgroup.pressure is disabled (echo 0 > cgroup.pressure), it: - Releases PSI triggers via cgroup_file_release() - Frees of->priv through kernfs_drain_open_files() 2. While epoll still holds reference to the file and continues polling 3. Re-enabling (echo 1 > cgroup.pressure) accesses freed of->priv epolling disable/enable cgroup.pressure fd=open(cpu.pressure) while(1) ... epoll_wait kernfs_fop_poll kernfs_get_active = true echo 0 > cgroup.pressure ... cgroup_file_show kernfs_show // inactive kn kernfs_drain_open_files cft->release(of); kfree(ctx); ... kernfs_get_active = false echo 1 > cgroup.pressure kernfs_show kernfs_activate_one(kn); kernfs_fop_poll kernfs_get_active = true cgroup_file_poll psi_trigger_poll // UAF ... end: close(fd) To address this issue, introduce kernfs_get_active_of() for kernfs open files to obtain active references. This function will fail if the open file has been released. Replace kernfs_get_active() with kernfs_get_active_of() to prevent further operations on released file descriptors. Fixes: 34f26a15611a ("sched/psi: Per-cgroup PSI accounting disable/re-enable interface") Cc: stable <stable(a)kernel.org> Reported-by: Zhang Zhaotian <zhangzhaotian(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Chen Ridong <chenridong(a)huawei.com> Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj(a)kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250822070715.1565236-2-chenridong@huaweicloud.c… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> diff --git a/fs/kernfs/file.c b/fs/kernfs/file.c index a6c692cac616..9adf36e6364b 100644 --- a/fs/kernfs/file.c +++ b/fs/kernfs/file.c @@ -70,6 +70,24 @@ static struct kernfs_open_node *of_on(struct kernfs_open_file *of) !list_empty(&of->list)); } +/* Get active reference to kernfs node for an open file */ +static struct kernfs_open_file *kernfs_get_active_of(struct kernfs_open_file *of) +{ + /* Skip if file was already released */ + if (unlikely(of->released)) + return NULL; + + if (!kernfs_get_active(of->kn)) + return NULL; + + return of; +} + +static void kernfs_put_active_of(struct kernfs_open_file *of) +{ + return kernfs_put_active(of->kn); +} + /** * kernfs_deref_open_node_locked - Get kernfs_open_node corresponding to @kn * @@ -139,7 +157,7 @@ static void kernfs_seq_stop_active(struct seq_file *sf, void *v) if (ops->seq_stop) ops->seq_stop(sf, v); - kernfs_put_active(of->kn); + kernfs_put_active_of(of); } static void *kernfs_seq_start(struct seq_file *sf, loff_t *ppos) @@ -152,7 +170,7 @@ static void *kernfs_seq_start(struct seq_file *sf, loff_t *ppos) * the ops aren't called concurrently for the same open file. */ mutex_lock(&of->mutex); - if (!kernfs_get_active(of->kn)) + if (!kernfs_get_active_of(of)) return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV); ops = kernfs_ops(of->kn); @@ -238,7 +256,7 @@ static ssize_t kernfs_file_read_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter) * the ops aren't called concurrently for the same open file. */ mutex_lock(&of->mutex); - if (!kernfs_get_active(of->kn)) { + if (!kernfs_get_active_of(of)) { len = -ENODEV; mutex_unlock(&of->mutex); goto out_free; @@ -252,7 +270,7 @@ static ssize_t kernfs_file_read_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter) else len = -EINVAL; - kernfs_put_active(of->kn); + kernfs_put_active_of(of); mutex_unlock(&of->mutex); if (len < 0) @@ -323,7 +341,7 @@ static ssize_t kernfs_fop_write_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter) * the ops aren't called concurrently for the same open file. */ mutex_lock(&of->mutex); - if (!kernfs_get_active(of->kn)) { + if (!kernfs_get_active_of(of)) { mutex_unlock(&of->mutex); len = -ENODEV; goto out_free; @@ -335,7 +353,7 @@ static ssize_t kernfs_fop_write_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter) else len = -EINVAL; - kernfs_put_active(of->kn); + kernfs_put_active_of(of); mutex_unlock(&of->mutex); if (len > 0) @@ -357,13 +375,13 @@ static void kernfs_vma_open(struct vm_area_struct *vma) if (!of->vm_ops) return; - if (!kernfs_get_active(of->kn)) + if (!kernfs_get_active_of(of)) return; if (of->vm_ops->open) of->vm_ops->open(vma); - kernfs_put_active(of->kn); + kernfs_put_active_of(of); } static vm_fault_t kernfs_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) @@ -375,14 +393,14 @@ static vm_fault_t kernfs_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) if (!of->vm_ops) return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS; - if (!kernfs_get_active(of->kn)) + if (!kernfs_get_active_of(of)) return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS; ret = VM_FAULT_SIGBUS; if (of->vm_ops->fault) ret = of->vm_ops->fault(vmf); - kernfs_put_active(of->kn); + kernfs_put_active_of(of); return ret; } @@ -395,7 +413,7 @@ static vm_fault_t kernfs_vma_page_mkwrite(struct vm_fault *vmf) if (!of->vm_ops) return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS; - if (!kernfs_get_active(of->kn)) + if (!kernfs_get_active_of(of)) return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS; ret = 0; @@ -404,7 +422,7 @@ static vm_fault_t kernfs_vma_page_mkwrite(struct vm_fault *vmf) else file_update_time(file); - kernfs_put_active(of->kn); + kernfs_put_active_of(of); return ret; } @@ -418,14 +436,14 @@ static int kernfs_vma_access(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr, if (!of->vm_ops) return -EINVAL; - if (!kernfs_get_active(of->kn)) + if (!kernfs_get_active_of(of)) return -EINVAL; ret = -EINVAL; if (of->vm_ops->access) ret = of->vm_ops->access(vma, addr, buf, len, write); - kernfs_put_active(of->kn); + kernfs_put_active_of(of); return ret; } @@ -455,7 +473,7 @@ static int kernfs_fop_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) mutex_lock(&of->mutex); rc = -ENODEV; - if (!kernfs_get_active(of->kn)) + if (!kernfs_get_active_of(of)) goto out_unlock; ops = kernfs_ops(of->kn); @@ -490,7 +508,7 @@ static int kernfs_fop_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) } vma->vm_ops = &kernfs_vm_ops; out_put: - kernfs_put_active(of->kn); + kernfs_put_active_of(of); out_unlock: mutex_unlock(&of->mutex); @@ -852,7 +870,7 @@ static __poll_t kernfs_fop_poll(struct file *filp, poll_table *wait) struct kernfs_node *kn = kernfs_dentry_node(filp->f_path.dentry); __poll_t ret; - if (!kernfs_get_active(kn)) + if (!kernfs_get_active_of(of)) return DEFAULT_POLLMASK|EPOLLERR|EPOLLPRI; if (kn->attr.ops->poll) @@ -860,7 +878,7 @@ static __poll_t kernfs_fop_poll(struct file *filp, poll_table *wait) else ret = kernfs_generic_poll(of, wait); - kernfs_put_active(kn); + kernfs_put_active_of(of); return ret; } @@ -875,7 +893,7 @@ static loff_t kernfs_fop_llseek(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int whence) * the ops aren't called concurrently for the same open file. */ mutex_lock(&of->mutex); - if (!kernfs_get_active(of->kn)) { + if (!kernfs_get_active_of(of)) { mutex_unlock(&of->mutex); return -ENODEV; } @@ -886,7 +904,7 @@ static loff_t kernfs_fop_llseek(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int whence) else ret = generic_file_llseek(file, offset, whence); - kernfs_put_active(of->kn); + kernfs_put_active_of(of); mutex_unlock(&of->mutex); return ret; }

3 days, 23 hours

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] kernfs: Fix UAF in polling when open file is released" failed to apply to 6.6-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.6-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.6.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 3c9ba2777d6c86025e1ba4186dc5cd930e40ec5f # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025091422-proximity-patrol-4fca@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.6.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 3c9ba2777d6c86025e1ba4186dc5cd930e40ec5f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chen Ridong <chenridong(a)huawei.com> Date: Fri, 22 Aug 2025 07:07:14 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] kernfs: Fix UAF in polling when open file is released A use-after-free (UAF) vulnerability was identified in the PSI (Pressure Stall Information) monitoring mechanism: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in psi_trigger_poll+0x3c/0x140 Read of size 8 at addr ffff3de3d50bd308 by task systemd/1 psi_trigger_poll+0x3c/0x140 cgroup_pressure_poll+0x70/0xa0 cgroup_file_poll+0x8c/0x100 kernfs_fop_poll+0x11c/0x1c0 ep_item_poll.isra.0+0x188/0x2c0 Allocated by task 1: cgroup_file_open+0x88/0x388 kernfs_fop_open+0x73c/0xaf0 do_dentry_open+0x5fc/0x1200 vfs_open+0xa0/0x3f0 do_open+0x7e8/0xd08 path_openat+0x2fc/0x6b0 do_filp_open+0x174/0x368 Freed by task 8462: cgroup_file_release+0x130/0x1f8 kernfs_drain_open_files+0x17c/0x440 kernfs_drain+0x2dc/0x360 kernfs_show+0x1b8/0x288 cgroup_file_show+0x150/0x268 cgroup_pressure_write+0x1dc/0x340 cgroup_file_write+0x274/0x548 Reproduction Steps: 1. Open test/cpu.pressure and establish epoll monitoring 2. Disable monitoring: echo 0 > test/cgroup.pressure 3. Re-enable monitoring: echo 1 > test/cgroup.pressure The race condition occurs because: 1. When cgroup.pressure is disabled (echo 0 > cgroup.pressure), it: - Releases PSI triggers via cgroup_file_release() - Frees of->priv through kernfs_drain_open_files() 2. While epoll still holds reference to the file and continues polling 3. Re-enabling (echo 1 > cgroup.pressure) accesses freed of->priv epolling disable/enable cgroup.pressure fd=open(cpu.pressure) while(1) ... epoll_wait kernfs_fop_poll kernfs_get_active = true echo 0 > cgroup.pressure ... cgroup_file_show kernfs_show // inactive kn kernfs_drain_open_files cft->release(of); kfree(ctx); ... kernfs_get_active = false echo 1 > cgroup.pressure kernfs_show kernfs_activate_one(kn); kernfs_fop_poll kernfs_get_active = true cgroup_file_poll psi_trigger_poll // UAF ... end: close(fd) To address this issue, introduce kernfs_get_active_of() for kernfs open files to obtain active references. This function will fail if the open file has been released. Replace kernfs_get_active() with kernfs_get_active_of() to prevent further operations on released file descriptors. Fixes: 34f26a15611a ("sched/psi: Per-cgroup PSI accounting disable/re-enable interface") Cc: stable <stable(a)kernel.org> Reported-by: Zhang Zhaotian <zhangzhaotian(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Chen Ridong <chenridong(a)huawei.com> Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj(a)kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250822070715.1565236-2-chenridong@huaweicloud.c… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> diff --git a/fs/kernfs/file.c b/fs/kernfs/file.c index a6c692cac616..9adf36e6364b 100644 --- a/fs/kernfs/file.c +++ b/fs/kernfs/file.c @@ -70,6 +70,24 @@ static struct kernfs_open_node *of_on(struct kernfs_open_file *of) !list_empty(&of->list)); } +/* Get active reference to kernfs node for an open file */ +static struct kernfs_open_file *kernfs_get_active_of(struct kernfs_open_file *of) +{ + /* Skip if file was already released */ + if (unlikely(of->released)) + return NULL; + + if (!kernfs_get_active(of->kn)) + return NULL; + + return of; +} + +static void kernfs_put_active_of(struct kernfs_open_file *of) +{ + return kernfs_put_active(of->kn); +} + /** * kernfs_deref_open_node_locked - Get kernfs_open_node corresponding to @kn * @@ -139,7 +157,7 @@ static void kernfs_seq_stop_active(struct seq_file *sf, void *v) if (ops->seq_stop) ops->seq_stop(sf, v); - kernfs_put_active(of->kn); + kernfs_put_active_of(of); } static void *kernfs_seq_start(struct seq_file *sf, loff_t *ppos) @@ -152,7 +170,7 @@ static void *kernfs_seq_start(struct seq_file *sf, loff_t *ppos) * the ops aren't called concurrently for the same open file. */ mutex_lock(&of->mutex); - if (!kernfs_get_active(of->kn)) + if (!kernfs_get_active_of(of)) return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV); ops = kernfs_ops(of->kn); @@ -238,7 +256,7 @@ static ssize_t kernfs_file_read_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter) * the ops aren't called concurrently for the same open file. */ mutex_lock(&of->mutex); - if (!kernfs_get_active(of->kn)) { + if (!kernfs_get_active_of(of)) { len = -ENODEV; mutex_unlock(&of->mutex); goto out_free; @@ -252,7 +270,7 @@ static ssize_t kernfs_file_read_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter) else len = -EINVAL; - kernfs_put_active(of->kn); + kernfs_put_active_of(of); mutex_unlock(&of->mutex); if (len < 0) @@ -323,7 +341,7 @@ static ssize_t kernfs_fop_write_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter) * the ops aren't called concurrently for the same open file. */ mutex_lock(&of->mutex); - if (!kernfs_get_active(of->kn)) { + if (!kernfs_get_active_of(of)) { mutex_unlock(&of->mutex); len = -ENODEV; goto out_free; @@ -335,7 +353,7 @@ static ssize_t kernfs_fop_write_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter) else len = -EINVAL; - kernfs_put_active(of->kn); + kernfs_put_active_of(of); mutex_unlock(&of->mutex); if (len > 0) @@ -357,13 +375,13 @@ static void kernfs_vma_open(struct vm_area_struct *vma) if (!of->vm_ops) return; - if (!kernfs_get_active(of->kn)) + if (!kernfs_get_active_of(of)) return; if (of->vm_ops->open) of->vm_ops->open(vma); - kernfs_put_active(of->kn); + kernfs_put_active_of(of); } static vm_fault_t kernfs_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) @@ -375,14 +393,14 @@ static vm_fault_t kernfs_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) if (!of->vm_ops) return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS; - if (!kernfs_get_active(of->kn)) + if (!kernfs_get_active_of(of)) return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS; ret = VM_FAULT_SIGBUS; if (of->vm_ops->fault) ret = of->vm_ops->fault(vmf); - kernfs_put_active(of->kn); + kernfs_put_active_of(of); return ret; } @@ -395,7 +413,7 @@ static vm_fault_t kernfs_vma_page_mkwrite(struct vm_fault *vmf) if (!of->vm_ops) return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS; - if (!kernfs_get_active(of->kn)) + if (!kernfs_get_active_of(of)) return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS; ret = 0; @@ -404,7 +422,7 @@ static vm_fault_t kernfs_vma_page_mkwrite(struct vm_fault *vmf) else file_update_time(file); - kernfs_put_active(of->kn); + kernfs_put_active_of(of); return ret; } @@ -418,14 +436,14 @@ static int kernfs_vma_access(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr, if (!of->vm_ops) return -EINVAL; - if (!kernfs_get_active(of->kn)) + if (!kernfs_get_active_of(of)) return -EINVAL; ret = -EINVAL; if (of->vm_ops->access) ret = of->vm_ops->access(vma, addr, buf, len, write); - kernfs_put_active(of->kn); + kernfs_put_active_of(of); return ret; } @@ -455,7 +473,7 @@ static int kernfs_fop_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) mutex_lock(&of->mutex); rc = -ENODEV; - if (!kernfs_get_active(of->kn)) + if (!kernfs_get_active_of(of)) goto out_unlock; ops = kernfs_ops(of->kn); @@ -490,7 +508,7 @@ static int kernfs_fop_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) } vma->vm_ops = &kernfs_vm_ops; out_put: - kernfs_put_active(of->kn); + kernfs_put_active_of(of); out_unlock: mutex_unlock(&of->mutex); @@ -852,7 +870,7 @@ static __poll_t kernfs_fop_poll(struct file *filp, poll_table *wait) struct kernfs_node *kn = kernfs_dentry_node(filp->f_path.dentry); __poll_t ret; - if (!kernfs_get_active(kn)) + if (!kernfs_get_active_of(of)) return DEFAULT_POLLMASK|EPOLLERR|EPOLLPRI; if (kn->attr.ops->poll) @@ -860,7 +878,7 @@ static __poll_t kernfs_fop_poll(struct file *filp, poll_table *wait) else ret = kernfs_generic_poll(of, wait); - kernfs_put_active(kn); + kernfs_put_active_of(of); return ret; } @@ -875,7 +893,7 @@ static loff_t kernfs_fop_llseek(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int whence) * the ops aren't called concurrently for the same open file. */ mutex_lock(&of->mutex); - if (!kernfs_get_active(of->kn)) { + if (!kernfs_get_active_of(of)) { mutex_unlock(&of->mutex); return -ENODEV; } @@ -886,7 +904,7 @@ static loff_t kernfs_fop_llseek(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int whence) else ret = generic_file_llseek(file, offset, whence); - kernfs_put_active(of->kn); + kernfs_put_active_of(of); mutex_unlock(&of->mutex); return ret; }

3 days, 23 hours

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] drm/amd/display: Drop dm_prepare_suspend() and dm_complete()" failed to apply to 6.16-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.16-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.16.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 60f71f0db7b12f303789ef59949e38ee5838ee8b # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025091312-armful-thus-2400@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.16.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 60f71f0db7b12f303789ef59949e38ee5838ee8b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Mario Limonciello (AMD)" <mario.limonciello(a)amd.com> Date: Fri, 5 Sep 2025 10:36:27 -0500 Subject: [PATCH] drm/amd/display: Drop dm_prepare_suspend() and dm_complete() MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [Why] dm_prepare_suspend() was added in commit 50e0bae34fa6b ("drm/amd/display: Add and use new dm_prepare_suspend() callback") to allow display to turn off earlier in the suspend sequence. This caused a regression that HDMI audio sometimes didn't work properly after resume unless audio was playing during suspend. [How] Drop dm_prepare_suspend() callback. All code in it will still run during dm_suspend(). Also drop unnecessary dm_complete() callback. dm_complete() was used for failed prepare and also for any case of successful resume. The code in it already runs in dm_resume(). This change will introduce more time that the display is turned on during suspend sequence. The compositor can turn it off sooner if desired. Cc: Harry Wentland <harry.wentland(a)amd.com> Reported-by: Przemysław Kopa <prz.kopa(a)gmail.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/amd-gfx/1cea0d56-7739-4ad9-bf8e-c9330faea2bb@kernel… Reported-by: Kalvin <hikaph+oss(a)gmail.com> Closes: https://github.com/alsa-project/alsa-lib/issues/465 Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/pipewire/pipewire/-/issues/4809 Fixes: 50e0bae34fa6b ("drm/amd/display: Add and use new dm_prepare_suspend() callback") Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello(a)amd.com> Acked-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com> (cherry picked from commit 2fd653b9bb5aacec5d4c421ab290905898fe85a2) Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm.c index 7808a647a306..352b3dcd0e0e 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm.c @@ -3127,25 +3127,6 @@ static void dm_destroy_cached_state(struct amdgpu_device *adev) dm->cached_state = NULL; } -static void dm_complete(struct amdgpu_ip_block *ip_block) -{ - struct amdgpu_device *adev = ip_block->adev; - - dm_destroy_cached_state(adev); -} - -static int dm_prepare_suspend(struct amdgpu_ip_block *ip_block) -{ - struct amdgpu_device *adev = ip_block->adev; - - if (amdgpu_in_reset(adev)) - return 0; - - WARN_ON(adev->dm.cached_state); - - return dm_cache_state(adev); -} - static int dm_suspend(struct amdgpu_ip_block *ip_block) { struct amdgpu_device *adev = ip_block->adev; @@ -3571,10 +3552,8 @@ static const struct amd_ip_funcs amdgpu_dm_funcs = { .early_fini = amdgpu_dm_early_fini, .hw_init = dm_hw_init, .hw_fini = dm_hw_fini, - .prepare_suspend = dm_prepare_suspend, .suspend = dm_suspend, .resume = dm_resume, - .complete = dm_complete, .is_idle = dm_is_idle, .wait_for_idle = dm_wait_for_idle, .check_soft_reset = dm_check_soft_reset,

3 days, 23 hours

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[PATCH v2] ACPI: battery: prevent sysfs_add_battery re-entry on rapid events

by GuangFei Luo

v2: - Fix missing mutex_unlock in acpi_battery_update() (Reported-by: kernel test robot) When removing and reinserting the laptop battery, ACPI can trigger two notifications in quick succession: - ACPI_BATTERY_NOTIFY_STATUS (0x80) - ACPI_BATTERY_NOTIFY_INFO (0x81) Both notifications call acpi_battery_update(). Because the events happen very close in time, sysfs_add_battery() can be re-entered before battery->bat is set, causing a duplicate sysfs entry error. This patch ensures that sysfs_add_battery() is not re-entered when battery->bat is already non-NULL, preventing the duplicate sysfs creation and stabilizing battery hotplug handling. [ 476.117945] sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/devices/LNXSYSTM:00/LNXSYBUS:00/PNP0C0A:00/power_supply/BAT1' [ 476.118896] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 185 Comm: kworker/1:4 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.12.38+deb13-amd64 #1 Debian 6.12.38-1 [ 476.118903] Hardware name: Gateway NV44 /SJV40-MV , BIOS V1.3121 04/08/2009 [ 476.118906] Workqueue: kacpi_notify acpi_os_execute_deferred [ 476.118917] Call Trace: [ 476.118922] <TASK> [ 476.118929] dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80 [ 476.118938] sysfs_warn_dup.cold+0x17/0x23 [ 476.118943] sysfs_create_dir_ns+0xce/0xe0 [ 476.118952] kobject_add_internal+0xba/0x250 [ 476.118959] kobject_add+0x96/0xc0 [ 476.118964] ? get_device_parent+0xde/0x1e0 [ 476.118970] device_add+0xe2/0x870 [ 476.118975] __power_supply_register.part.0+0x20f/0x3f0 [ 476.118981] ? wake_up_q+0x4e/0x90 [ 476.118990] sysfs_add_battery+0xa4/0x1d0 [battery] [ 476.118998] acpi_battery_update+0x19e/0x290 [battery] [ 476.119002] acpi_battery_notify+0x50/0x120 [battery] [ 476.119006] acpi_ev_notify_dispatch+0x49/0x70 [ 476.119012] acpi_os_execute_deferred+0x1a/0x30 [ 476.119015] process_one_work+0x177/0x330 [ 476.119022] worker_thread+0x251/0x390 [ 476.119026] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 476.119030] kthread+0xd2/0x100 [ 476.119033] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 476.119035] ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50 [ 476.119040] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 476.119042] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 476.119049] </TASK> [ 476.142552] kobject: kobject_add_internal failed for BAT1 with -EEXIST, don't try to register things with the same name in the same directory. [ 476.415022] ata1.00: unexpected _GTF length (8) [ 476.428076] sd 0:0:0:0: [sda] Starting disk [ 476.835035] ata1.00: unexpected _GTF length (8) [ 476.839720] ata1.00: configured for UDMA/133 [ 491.328831] sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/devices/LNXSYSTM:00/LNXSYBUS:00/PNP0C0A:00/power_supply/BAT1' [ 491.329720] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 185 Comm: kworker/1:4 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.12.38+deb13-amd64 #1 Debian 6.12.38-1 [ 491.329727] Hardware name: Gateway NV44 /SJV40-MV , BIOS V1.3121 04/08/2009 [ 491.329731] Workqueue: kacpi_notify acpi_os_execute_deferred [ 491.329741] Call Trace: [ 491.329745] <TASK> [ 491.329751] dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80 [ 491.329758] sysfs_warn_dup.cold+0x17/0x23 [ 491.329762] sysfs_create_dir_ns+0xce/0xe0 [ 491.329770] kobject_add_internal+0xba/0x250 [ 491.329775] kobject_add+0x96/0xc0 [ 491.329779] ? get_device_parent+0xde/0x1e0 [ 491.329784] device_add+0xe2/0x870 [ 491.329790] __power_supply_register.part.0+0x20f/0x3f0 [ 491.329797] sysfs_add_battery+0xa4/0x1d0 [battery] [ 491.329805] acpi_battery_update+0x19e/0x290 [battery] [ 491.329809] acpi_battery_notify+0x50/0x120 [battery] [ 491.329812] acpi_ev_notify_dispatch+0x49/0x70 [ 491.329817] acpi_os_execute_deferred+0x1a/0x30 [ 491.329820] process_one_work+0x177/0x330 [ 491.329826] worker_thread+0x251/0x390 [ 491.329830] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 491.329833] kthread+0xd2/0x100 [ 491.329836] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 491.329838] ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50 [ 491.329842] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 491.329844] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 491.329850] </TASK> [ 491.329855] kobject: kobject_add_internal failed for BAT1 with -EEXIST, don't try to register things with the same name in the same directory. Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp(a)intel.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/202509101620.yI0HZ5gT-lkp@intel.com/ Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter(a)linaro.org> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/202509101620.yI0HZ5gT-lkp@intel.com/ Fixes: 508df92d1f8d ("ACPI: battery: register power_supply subdevice only when battery is present") Signed-off-by: GuangFei Luo <luogf2025(a)163.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org --- drivers/acpi/battery.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/acpi/battery.c b/drivers/acpi/battery.c index 6905b56bf3e4..649185f7a3b1 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/battery.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/battery.c @@ -1026,11 +1026,15 @@ static int acpi_battery_update(struct acpi_battery *battery, bool resume) return result; acpi_battery_quirks(battery); + mutex_lock(&battery->sysfs_lock); if (!battery->bat) { result = sysfs_add_battery(battery); - if (result) + if (result) { + mutex_unlock(&battery->sysfs_lock); return result; + } } + mutex_unlock(&battery->sysfs_lock); /* * Wakeup the system if battery is critical low -- 2.43.0

4 days

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] mm/damon/lru_sort: avoid divide-by-zero in" failed to apply to 6.6-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.6-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.6.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 711f19dfd783ffb37ca4324388b9c4cb87e71363 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025091317-snowsuit-earthen-6ad7@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.6.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 711f19dfd783ffb37ca4324388b9c4cb87e71363 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Quanmin Yan <yanquanmin1(a)huawei.com> Date: Wed, 27 Aug 2025 19:58:57 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] mm/damon/lru_sort: avoid divide-by-zero in damon_lru_sort_apply_parameters() Patch series "mm/damon: avoid divide-by-zero in DAMON module's parameters application". DAMON's RECLAIM and LRU_SORT modules perform no validation on user-configured parameters during application, which may lead to division-by-zero errors. Avoid the divide-by-zero by adding validation checks when DAMON modules attempt to apply the parameters. This patch (of 2): During the calculation of 'hot_thres' and 'cold_thres', either 'sample_interval' or 'aggr_interval' is used as the divisor, which may lead to division-by-zero errors. Fix it by directly returning -EINVAL when such a case occurs. Additionally, since 'aggr_interval' is already required to be set no smaller than 'sample_interval' in damon_set_attrs(), only the case where 'sample_interval' is zero needs to be checked. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250827115858.1186261-2-yanquanmin1@huawei.com Fixes: 40e983cca927 ("mm/damon: introduce DAMON-based LRU-lists Sorting") Signed-off-by: Quanmin Yan <yanquanmin1(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: SeongJae Park <sj(a)kernel.org> Cc: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang(a)huawei.com> Cc: ze zuo <zuoze1(a)huawei.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> [6.0+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> diff --git a/mm/damon/lru_sort.c b/mm/damon/lru_sort.c index 151a9de5ad8b..b5a5ed16a7a5 100644 --- a/mm/damon/lru_sort.c +++ b/mm/damon/lru_sort.c @@ -198,6 +198,11 @@ static int damon_lru_sort_apply_parameters(void) if (err) return err; + if (!damon_lru_sort_mon_attrs.sample_interval) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + err = damon_set_attrs(ctx, &damon_lru_sort_mon_attrs); if (err) goto out;

4 days, 3 hours

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