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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] tpm: Cap the number of PCR banks" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x faf07e611dfa464b201223a7253e9dc5ee0f3c9e # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025122900-hassle-blush-5272@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From faf07e611dfa464b201223a7253e9dc5ee0f3c9e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> Date: Tue, 30 Sep 2025 15:58:02 +0300 Subject: [PATCH] tpm: Cap the number of PCR banks tpm2_get_pcr_allocation() does not cap any upper limit for the number of banks. Cap the limit to eight banks so that out of bounds values coming from external I/O cause on only limited harm. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v5.10+ Fixes: bcfff8384f6c ("tpm: dynamically allocate the allocated_banks array") Tested-by: Lai Yi <yi1.lai(a)linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jonathan McDowell <noodles(a)meta.com> Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen(a)opinsys.com> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c index 30d00219f9f3..082b910ddf0d 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c @@ -246,7 +246,6 @@ static void tpm_dev_release(struct device *dev) kfree(chip->work_space.context_buf); kfree(chip->work_space.session_buf); - kfree(chip->allocated_banks); #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC kfree(chip->auth); #endif diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c index cf64c7385105..b49a790f1bd5 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c @@ -799,11 +799,6 @@ int tpm1_pm_suspend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 tpm_suspend_pcr) */ int tpm1_get_pcr_allocation(struct tpm_chip *chip) { - chip->allocated_banks = kcalloc(1, sizeof(*chip->allocated_banks), - GFP_KERNEL); - if (!chip->allocated_banks) - return -ENOMEM; - chip->allocated_banks[0].alg_id = TPM_ALG_SHA1; chip->allocated_banks[0].digest_size = hash_digest_size[HASH_ALGO_SHA1]; chip->allocated_banks[0].crypto_id = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c index 5532e53a2dd3..dd502322f499 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c @@ -550,11 +550,9 @@ ssize_t tpm2_get_pcr_allocation(struct tpm_chip *chip) nr_possible_banks = be32_to_cpup( (__be32 *)&buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 5]); - - chip->allocated_banks = kcalloc(nr_possible_banks, - sizeof(*chip->allocated_banks), - GFP_KERNEL); - if (!chip->allocated_banks) { + if (nr_possible_banks > TPM2_MAX_PCR_BANKS) { + pr_err("tpm: out of bank capacity: %u > %u\n", + nr_possible_banks, TPM2_MAX_PCR_BANKS); rc = -ENOMEM; goto out; } diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index b15360ff78d7..53de9488c509 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -26,7 +26,9 @@ #include <crypto/aes.h> #define TPM_DIGEST_SIZE 20 /* Max TPM v1.2 PCR size */ -#define TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE + +#define TPM2_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE +#define TPM2_MAX_PCR_BANKS 8 struct tpm_chip; struct trusted_key_payload; @@ -68,7 +70,7 @@ enum tpm2_curves { struct tpm_digest { u16 alg_id; - u8 digest[TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; + u8 digest[TPM2_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; } __packed; struct tpm_bank_info { @@ -189,7 +191,7 @@ struct tpm_chip { unsigned int groups_cnt; u32 nr_allocated_banks; - struct tpm_bank_info *allocated_banks; + struct tpm_bank_info allocated_banks[TPM2_MAX_PCR_BANKS]; #ifdef CONFIG_ACPI acpi_handle acpi_dev_handle; char ppi_version[TPM_PPI_VERSION_LEN + 1];

2 days, 20 hours

[PATCH 2/5] x86, fpu: separate fpstate->xfd and guest XFD

by Paolo Bonzini

Until now, fpstate->xfd has acted as both the guest value and the value that the host used when executing XSAVES and XRSTORS. This is wrong: the data in the guest's FPU might not be initialized even if a bit is set in XFD and, when that happens, XRSTORing the guest FPU will fail with a #NM exception *on the host*. Instead, store the value of XFD together with XFD_ERR in struct fpu_guest; it will still be synchronized in fpu_load_guest_fpstate(), but the XRSTOR(S) operation will be able to load any valid state of the FPU independent of the XFD value. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 820a6ee944e7 ("kvm: x86: Add emulation for IA32_XFD", 2022-01-14) Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> --- arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h | 6 ++---- arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h | 7 +++++++ arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c | 19 ++++--------------- arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h | 18 ++++++++++-------- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 6 +++--- 5 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h index 0820b2621416..ee9ba06b7dbe 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h @@ -152,11 +152,9 @@ extern int fpu_swap_kvm_fpstate(struct fpu_guest *gfpu, bool enter_guest); extern int fpu_enable_guest_xfd_features(struct fpu_guest *guest_fpu, u64 xfeatures); #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 -extern void fpu_update_guest_xfd(struct fpu_guest *guest_fpu, u64 xfd); -extern void fpu_sync_guest_vmexit_xfd_state(void); +extern void fpu_sync_guest_vmexit_xfd_state(struct fpu_guest *gfpu); #else -static inline void fpu_update_guest_xfd(struct fpu_guest *guest_fpu, u64 xfd) { } -static inline void fpu_sync_guest_vmexit_xfd_state(void) { } +static inline void fpu_sync_guest_vmexit_xfd_state(struct fpu_guest *gfpu) { } #endif extern void fpu_copy_guest_fpstate_to_uabi(struct fpu_guest *gfpu, void *buf, diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h index 93e99d2583d6..7abe231e2ffe 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h @@ -545,6 +545,13 @@ struct fpu_guest { */ u64 xfeatures; + /* + * @xfd: Save the guest value. Note that this is + * *not* fpstate->xfd, which is the value + * the host uses when doing XSAVE/XRSTOR. + */ + u64 xfd; + /* * @xfd_err: Save the guest value. */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c index a480fa8c65d5..ff17c96d290a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c @@ -317,16 +317,6 @@ int fpu_enable_guest_xfd_features(struct fpu_guest *guest_fpu, u64 xfeatures) EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM(fpu_enable_guest_xfd_features); #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 -void fpu_update_guest_xfd(struct fpu_guest *guest_fpu, u64 xfd) -{ - fpregs_lock(); - guest_fpu->fpstate->xfd = xfd; - if (guest_fpu->fpstate->in_use) - xfd_update_state(guest_fpu->fpstate); - fpregs_unlock(); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM(fpu_update_guest_xfd); - /** * fpu_sync_guest_vmexit_xfd_state - Synchronize XFD MSR and software state * @@ -339,14 +329,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM(fpu_update_guest_xfd); * Note: It can be invoked unconditionally even when write emulation is * enabled for the price of a then pointless MSR read. */ -void fpu_sync_guest_vmexit_xfd_state(void) +void fpu_sync_guest_vmexit_xfd_state(struct fpu_guest *gfpu) { - struct fpstate *fpstate = x86_task_fpu(current)->fpstate; - lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled(); if (fpu_state_size_dynamic()) { - rdmsrq(MSR_IA32_XFD, fpstate->xfd); - __this_cpu_write(xfd_state, fpstate->xfd); + rdmsrq(MSR_IA32_XFD, gfpu->xfd); + __this_cpu_write(xfd_state, gfpu->xfd); } } EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM(fpu_sync_guest_vmexit_xfd_state); @@ -890,6 +878,7 @@ void fpu_load_guest_fpstate(struct fpu_guest *gfpu) fpregs_restore_userregs(); fpregs_assert_state_consistent(); + xfd_set_state(gfpu->xfd); if (gfpu->xfd_err) wrmsrq(MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR, gfpu->xfd_err); } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h index 52ce19289989..c0ce05bee637 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h @@ -180,26 +180,28 @@ static inline void xfd_validate_state(struct fpstate *fpstate, u64 mask, bool rs #endif #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 -static inline void xfd_set_state(u64 xfd) +static inline void __xfd_set_state(u64 xfd) { wrmsrq(MSR_IA32_XFD, xfd); __this_cpu_write(xfd_state, xfd); } +static inline void xfd_set_state(u64 xfd) +{ + if (__this_cpu_read(xfd_state) != xfd) + __xfd_set_state(xfd); +} + static inline void xfd_update_state(struct fpstate *fpstate) { - if (fpu_state_size_dynamic()) { - u64 xfd = fpstate->xfd; - - if (__this_cpu_read(xfd_state) != xfd) - xfd_set_state(xfd); - } + if (fpu_state_size_dynamic()) + xfd_set_state(fpstate->xfd); } extern int __xfd_enable_feature(u64 which, struct fpu_guest *guest_fpu); #else static inline void xfd_set_state(u64 xfd) { } - +static inline void __xfd_set_state(u64 xfd) { } static inline void xfd_update_state(struct fpstate *fpstate) { } static inline int __xfd_enable_feature(u64 which, struct fpu_guest *guest_fpu) { diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index 01d95192dfc5..56fd082859bc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -4261,7 +4261,7 @@ int kvm_set_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info) if (data & ~kvm_guest_supported_xfd(vcpu)) return 1; - fpu_update_guest_xfd(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu, data); + vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.xfd = data; break; case MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR: if (!msr_info->host_initiated && @@ -4617,7 +4617,7 @@ int kvm_get_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info) !guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XFD)) return 1; - msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.fpstate->xfd; + msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.xfd; break; case MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR: if (!msr_info->host_initiated && @@ -11405,7 +11405,7 @@ static int vcpu_enter_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) * in #NM irqoff handler). */ if (vcpu->arch.xfd_no_write_intercept) - fpu_sync_guest_vmexit_xfd_state(); + fpu_sync_guest_vmexit_xfd_state(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu); kvm_x86_call(handle_exit_irqoff)(vcpu); -- 2.52.0

2 days, 21 hours

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] jbd2: fix the inconsistency between checksum and data in" failed to apply to 6.6-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.6-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.6.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 6abfe107894af7e8ce3a2e120c619d81ee764ad5 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025122901-exciting-strained-363f@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.6.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 6abfe107894af7e8ce3a2e120c619d81ee764ad5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ye Bin <yebin10(a)huawei.com> Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2025 09:01:23 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] jbd2: fix the inconsistency between checksum and data in memory for journal sb Copying the file system while it is mounted as read-only results in a mount failure: [~]# mkfs.ext4 -F /dev/sdc [~]# mount /dev/sdc -o ro /mnt/test [~]# dd if=/dev/sdc of=/dev/sda bs=1M [~]# mount /dev/sda /mnt/test1 [ 1094.849826] JBD2: journal checksum error [ 1094.850927] EXT4-fs (sda): Could not load journal inode mount: mount /dev/sda on /mnt/test1 failed: Bad message The process described above is just an abstracted way I came up with to reproduce the issue. In the actual scenario, the file system was mounted read-only and then copied while it was still mounted. It was found that the mount operation failed. The user intended to verify the data or use it as a backup, and this action was performed during a version upgrade. Above issue may happen as follows: ext4_fill_super set_journal_csum_feature_set(sb) if (ext4_has_metadata_csum(sb)) incompat = JBD2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_CSUM_V3; if (test_opt(sb, JOURNAL_CHECKSUM) jbd2_journal_set_features(sbi->s_journal, compat, 0, incompat); lock_buffer(journal->j_sb_buffer); sb->s_feature_incompat |= cpu_to_be32(incompat); //The data in the journal sb was modified, but the checksum was not updated, so the data remaining in memory has a mismatch between the data and the checksum. unlock_buffer(journal->j_sb_buffer); In this case, the journal sb copied over is in a state where the checksum and data are inconsistent, so mounting fails. To solve the above issue, update the checksum in memory after modifying the journal sb. Fixes: 4fd5ea43bc11 ("jbd2: checksum journal superblock") Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz> Message-ID: <20251103010123.3753631-1-yebin(a)huaweicloud.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso(a)mit.edu> Cc: stable(a)kernel.org diff --git a/fs/jbd2/journal.c b/fs/jbd2/journal.c index 2fe1786a8f1b..c973162d5b31 100644 --- a/fs/jbd2/journal.c +++ b/fs/jbd2/journal.c @@ -2354,6 +2354,12 @@ int jbd2_journal_set_features(journal_t *journal, unsigned long compat, sb->s_feature_compat |= cpu_to_be32(compat); sb->s_feature_ro_compat |= cpu_to_be32(ro); sb->s_feature_incompat |= cpu_to_be32(incompat); + /* + * Update the checksum now so that it is valid even for read-only + * filesystems where jbd2_write_superblock() doesn't get called. + */ + if (jbd2_journal_has_csum_v2or3(journal)) + sb->s_checksum = jbd2_superblock_csum(sb); unlock_buffer(journal->j_sb_buffer); jbd2_journal_init_transaction_limits(journal); @@ -2383,9 +2389,17 @@ void jbd2_journal_clear_features(journal_t *journal, unsigned long compat, sb = journal->j_superblock; + lock_buffer(journal->j_sb_buffer); sb->s_feature_compat &= ~cpu_to_be32(compat); sb->s_feature_ro_compat &= ~cpu_to_be32(ro); sb->s_feature_incompat &= ~cpu_to_be32(incompat); + /* + * Update the checksum now so that it is valid even for read-only + * filesystems where jbd2_write_superblock() doesn't get called. + */ + if (jbd2_journal_has_csum_v2or3(journal)) + sb->s_checksum = jbd2_superblock_csum(sb); + unlock_buffer(journal->j_sb_buffer); jbd2_journal_init_transaction_limits(journal); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(jbd2_journal_clear_features);

2 days, 21 hours

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] tpm: Cap the number of PCR banks" failed to apply to 6.1-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.1-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.1.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x faf07e611dfa464b201223a7253e9dc5ee0f3c9e # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025122959-dreamt-stank-d6e5@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.1.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From faf07e611dfa464b201223a7253e9dc5ee0f3c9e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> Date: Tue, 30 Sep 2025 15:58:02 +0300 Subject: [PATCH] tpm: Cap the number of PCR banks tpm2_get_pcr_allocation() does not cap any upper limit for the number of banks. Cap the limit to eight banks so that out of bounds values coming from external I/O cause on only limited harm. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v5.10+ Fixes: bcfff8384f6c ("tpm: dynamically allocate the allocated_banks array") Tested-by: Lai Yi <yi1.lai(a)linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jonathan McDowell <noodles(a)meta.com> Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen(a)opinsys.com> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c index 30d00219f9f3..082b910ddf0d 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c @@ -246,7 +246,6 @@ static void tpm_dev_release(struct device *dev) kfree(chip->work_space.context_buf); kfree(chip->work_space.session_buf); - kfree(chip->allocated_banks); #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC kfree(chip->auth); #endif diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c index cf64c7385105..b49a790f1bd5 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c @@ -799,11 +799,6 @@ int tpm1_pm_suspend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 tpm_suspend_pcr) */ int tpm1_get_pcr_allocation(struct tpm_chip *chip) { - chip->allocated_banks = kcalloc(1, sizeof(*chip->allocated_banks), - GFP_KERNEL); - if (!chip->allocated_banks) - return -ENOMEM; - chip->allocated_banks[0].alg_id = TPM_ALG_SHA1; chip->allocated_banks[0].digest_size = hash_digest_size[HASH_ALGO_SHA1]; chip->allocated_banks[0].crypto_id = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c index 5532e53a2dd3..dd502322f499 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c @@ -550,11 +550,9 @@ ssize_t tpm2_get_pcr_allocation(struct tpm_chip *chip) nr_possible_banks = be32_to_cpup( (__be32 *)&buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 5]); - - chip->allocated_banks = kcalloc(nr_possible_banks, - sizeof(*chip->allocated_banks), - GFP_KERNEL); - if (!chip->allocated_banks) { + if (nr_possible_banks > TPM2_MAX_PCR_BANKS) { + pr_err("tpm: out of bank capacity: %u > %u\n", + nr_possible_banks, TPM2_MAX_PCR_BANKS); rc = -ENOMEM; goto out; } diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index b15360ff78d7..53de9488c509 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -26,7 +26,9 @@ #include <crypto/aes.h> #define TPM_DIGEST_SIZE 20 /* Max TPM v1.2 PCR size */ -#define TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE + +#define TPM2_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE +#define TPM2_MAX_PCR_BANKS 8 struct tpm_chip; struct trusted_key_payload; @@ -68,7 +70,7 @@ enum tpm2_curves { struct tpm_digest { u16 alg_id; - u8 digest[TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; + u8 digest[TPM2_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; } __packed; struct tpm_bank_info { @@ -189,7 +191,7 @@ struct tpm_chip { unsigned int groups_cnt; u32 nr_allocated_banks; - struct tpm_bank_info *allocated_banks; + struct tpm_bank_info allocated_banks[TPM2_MAX_PCR_BANKS]; #ifdef CONFIG_ACPI acpi_handle acpi_dev_handle; char ppi_version[TPM_PPI_VERSION_LEN + 1];

2 days, 21 hours

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] jbd2: fix the inconsistency between checksum and data in" failed to apply to 6.12-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.12-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.12.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 6abfe107894af7e8ce3a2e120c619d81ee764ad5 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025122927-germicide-venus-61d2@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.12.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 6abfe107894af7e8ce3a2e120c619d81ee764ad5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ye Bin <yebin10(a)huawei.com> Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2025 09:01:23 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] jbd2: fix the inconsistency between checksum and data in memory for journal sb Copying the file system while it is mounted as read-only results in a mount failure: [~]# mkfs.ext4 -F /dev/sdc [~]# mount /dev/sdc -o ro /mnt/test [~]# dd if=/dev/sdc of=/dev/sda bs=1M [~]# mount /dev/sda /mnt/test1 [ 1094.849826] JBD2: journal checksum error [ 1094.850927] EXT4-fs (sda): Could not load journal inode mount: mount /dev/sda on /mnt/test1 failed: Bad message The process described above is just an abstracted way I came up with to reproduce the issue. In the actual scenario, the file system was mounted read-only and then copied while it was still mounted. It was found that the mount operation failed. The user intended to verify the data or use it as a backup, and this action was performed during a version upgrade. Above issue may happen as follows: ext4_fill_super set_journal_csum_feature_set(sb) if (ext4_has_metadata_csum(sb)) incompat = JBD2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_CSUM_V3; if (test_opt(sb, JOURNAL_CHECKSUM) jbd2_journal_set_features(sbi->s_journal, compat, 0, incompat); lock_buffer(journal->j_sb_buffer); sb->s_feature_incompat |= cpu_to_be32(incompat); //The data in the journal sb was modified, but the checksum was not updated, so the data remaining in memory has a mismatch between the data and the checksum. unlock_buffer(journal->j_sb_buffer); In this case, the journal sb copied over is in a state where the checksum and data are inconsistent, so mounting fails. To solve the above issue, update the checksum in memory after modifying the journal sb. Fixes: 4fd5ea43bc11 ("jbd2: checksum journal superblock") Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz> Message-ID: <20251103010123.3753631-1-yebin(a)huaweicloud.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso(a)mit.edu> Cc: stable(a)kernel.org diff --git a/fs/jbd2/journal.c b/fs/jbd2/journal.c index 2fe1786a8f1b..c973162d5b31 100644 --- a/fs/jbd2/journal.c +++ b/fs/jbd2/journal.c @@ -2354,6 +2354,12 @@ int jbd2_journal_set_features(journal_t *journal, unsigned long compat, sb->s_feature_compat |= cpu_to_be32(compat); sb->s_feature_ro_compat |= cpu_to_be32(ro); sb->s_feature_incompat |= cpu_to_be32(incompat); + /* + * Update the checksum now so that it is valid even for read-only + * filesystems where jbd2_write_superblock() doesn't get called. + */ + if (jbd2_journal_has_csum_v2or3(journal)) + sb->s_checksum = jbd2_superblock_csum(sb); unlock_buffer(journal->j_sb_buffer); jbd2_journal_init_transaction_limits(journal); @@ -2383,9 +2389,17 @@ void jbd2_journal_clear_features(journal_t *journal, unsigned long compat, sb = journal->j_superblock; + lock_buffer(journal->j_sb_buffer); sb->s_feature_compat &= ~cpu_to_be32(compat); sb->s_feature_ro_compat &= ~cpu_to_be32(ro); sb->s_feature_incompat &= ~cpu_to_be32(incompat); + /* + * Update the checksum now so that it is valid even for read-only + * filesystems where jbd2_write_superblock() doesn't get called. + */ + if (jbd2_journal_has_csum_v2or3(journal)) + sb->s_checksum = jbd2_superblock_csum(sb); + unlock_buffer(journal->j_sb_buffer); jbd2_journal_init_transaction_limits(journal); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(jbd2_journal_clear_features);

2 days, 21 hours

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] tpm: Cap the number of PCR banks" failed to apply to 6.6-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.6-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.6.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x faf07e611dfa464b201223a7253e9dc5ee0f3c9e # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025122959-residence-cover-1b11@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.6.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From faf07e611dfa464b201223a7253e9dc5ee0f3c9e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> Date: Tue, 30 Sep 2025 15:58:02 +0300 Subject: [PATCH] tpm: Cap the number of PCR banks tpm2_get_pcr_allocation() does not cap any upper limit for the number of banks. Cap the limit to eight banks so that out of bounds values coming from external I/O cause on only limited harm. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v5.10+ Fixes: bcfff8384f6c ("tpm: dynamically allocate the allocated_banks array") Tested-by: Lai Yi <yi1.lai(a)linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jonathan McDowell <noodles(a)meta.com> Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen(a)opinsys.com> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c index 30d00219f9f3..082b910ddf0d 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c @@ -246,7 +246,6 @@ static void tpm_dev_release(struct device *dev) kfree(chip->work_space.context_buf); kfree(chip->work_space.session_buf); - kfree(chip->allocated_banks); #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC kfree(chip->auth); #endif diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c index cf64c7385105..b49a790f1bd5 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c @@ -799,11 +799,6 @@ int tpm1_pm_suspend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 tpm_suspend_pcr) */ int tpm1_get_pcr_allocation(struct tpm_chip *chip) { - chip->allocated_banks = kcalloc(1, sizeof(*chip->allocated_banks), - GFP_KERNEL); - if (!chip->allocated_banks) - return -ENOMEM; - chip->allocated_banks[0].alg_id = TPM_ALG_SHA1; chip->allocated_banks[0].digest_size = hash_digest_size[HASH_ALGO_SHA1]; chip->allocated_banks[0].crypto_id = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c index 5532e53a2dd3..dd502322f499 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c @@ -550,11 +550,9 @@ ssize_t tpm2_get_pcr_allocation(struct tpm_chip *chip) nr_possible_banks = be32_to_cpup( (__be32 *)&buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 5]); - - chip->allocated_banks = kcalloc(nr_possible_banks, - sizeof(*chip->allocated_banks), - GFP_KERNEL); - if (!chip->allocated_banks) { + if (nr_possible_banks > TPM2_MAX_PCR_BANKS) { + pr_err("tpm: out of bank capacity: %u > %u\n", + nr_possible_banks, TPM2_MAX_PCR_BANKS); rc = -ENOMEM; goto out; } diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index b15360ff78d7..53de9488c509 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -26,7 +26,9 @@ #include <crypto/aes.h> #define TPM_DIGEST_SIZE 20 /* Max TPM v1.2 PCR size */ -#define TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE + +#define TPM2_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE +#define TPM2_MAX_PCR_BANKS 8 struct tpm_chip; struct trusted_key_payload; @@ -68,7 +70,7 @@ enum tpm2_curves { struct tpm_digest { u16 alg_id; - u8 digest[TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; + u8 digest[TPM2_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; } __packed; struct tpm_bank_info { @@ -189,7 +191,7 @@ struct tpm_chip { unsigned int groups_cnt; u32 nr_allocated_banks; - struct tpm_bank_info *allocated_banks; + struct tpm_bank_info allocated_banks[TPM2_MAX_PCR_BANKS]; #ifdef CONFIG_ACPI acpi_handle acpi_dev_handle; char ppi_version[TPM_PPI_VERSION_LEN + 1];

2 days, 21 hours

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] gfs2: fix freeze error handling" failed to apply to 6.1-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

2 days, 21 hours

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] gfs2: fix freeze error handling" failed to apply to 6.6-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

2 days, 21 hours

[PATCH 1/5] x86, fpu: introduce fpu_load_guest_fpstate()

by Paolo Bonzini

Create a variant of fpregs_lock_and_load() that KVM can use in its vCPU entry code after preemption has been disabled. While basing it on the existing logic in vcpu_enter_guest(), ensure that fpregs_assert_state_consistent() always runs and sprinkle a few more assertions. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 820a6ee944e7 ("kvm: x86: Add emulation for IA32_XFD", 2022-01-14) Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> --- arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 8 +------- 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h index cd6f194a912b..0820b2621416 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h @@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ extern void *get_xsave_addr(struct xregs_state *xsave, int xfeature_nr); /* KVM specific functions */ extern bool fpu_alloc_guest_fpstate(struct fpu_guest *gfpu); extern void fpu_free_guest_fpstate(struct fpu_guest *gfpu); +extern void fpu_load_guest_fpstate(struct fpu_guest *gfpu); extern int fpu_swap_kvm_fpstate(struct fpu_guest *gfpu, bool enter_guest); extern int fpu_enable_guest_xfd_features(struct fpu_guest *guest_fpu, u64 xfeatures); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c index 3ab27fb86618..a480fa8c65d5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c @@ -878,6 +878,23 @@ void fpregs_lock_and_load(void) fpregs_assert_state_consistent(); } +void fpu_load_guest_fpstate(struct fpu_guest *gfpu) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_DEBUG_FPU + struct fpu *fpu = x86_task_fpu(current); + WARN_ON_ONCE(gfpu->fpstate != fpu->fpstate); +#endif + + lockdep_assert_preemption_disabled(); + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD)) + fpregs_restore_userregs(); + + fpregs_assert_state_consistent(); + if (gfpu->xfd_err) + wrmsrq(MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR, gfpu->xfd_err); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM(fpu_load_guest_fpstate); + #ifdef CONFIG_X86_DEBUG_FPU /* * If current FPU state according to its tracking (loaded FPU context on this diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index ff8812f3a129..01d95192dfc5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -11300,13 +11300,7 @@ static int vcpu_enter_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu); } - fpregs_assert_state_consistent(); - if (test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD)) - switch_fpu_return(); - - if (vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.xfd_err) - wrmsrq(MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR, vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.xfd_err); - + fpu_load_guest_fpstate(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu); kvm_load_xfeatures(vcpu, true); if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs && -- 2.52.0

2 days, 22 hours

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] btrfs: don't rewrite ret from inode_permission" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 0185c2292c600993199bc6b1f342ad47a9e8c678 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025122956-output-cornmeal-7c59@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 0185c2292c600993199bc6b1f342ad47a9e8c678 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josef Bacik <josef(a)toxicpanda.com> Date: Tue, 18 Nov 2025 17:08:41 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] btrfs: don't rewrite ret from inode_permission In our user safe ino resolve ioctl we'll just turn any ret into -EACCES from inode_permission(). This is redundant, and could potentially be wrong if we had an ENOMEM in the security layer or some such other error, so simply return the actual return value. Note: The patch was taken from v5 of fscrypt patchset (https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/cover.1706116485.git.josef@toxicpanda.c…) which was handled over time by various people: Omar Sandoval, Sweet Tea Dorminy, Josef Bacik. Fixes: 23d0b79dfaed ("btrfs: Add unprivileged version of ino_lookup ioctl") CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 5.4+ Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn(a)wdc.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef(a)toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Vacek <neelx(a)suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com> [ add note ] Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com> diff --git a/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c b/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c index 59cef7e376a0..a10b60439718 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c @@ -1910,10 +1910,8 @@ static int btrfs_search_path_in_tree_user(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, ret = inode_permission(idmap, &temp_inode->vfs_inode, MAY_READ | MAY_EXEC); iput(&temp_inode->vfs_inode); - if (ret) { - ret = -EACCES; + if (ret) goto out_put; - } if (key.offset == upper_limit) break;

2 days, 22 hours

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