One of our customers reported a crash and a corrupted ocfs2 filesystem.
The crash was due to the detection of corruption. Upon troubleshooting,
the fsck -fn output showed the below corruption
[EXTENT_LIST_FREE] Extent list in owner 33080590 claims 230 as the next free chain record,
but fsck believes the largest valid value is 227. Clamp the next record value? n
The stat output from the debugfs.ocfs2 showed the following corruption
where the "Next Free Rec:" had overshot the "Count:" in the root metadata
block.
Inode: 33080590 Mode: 0640 Generation: 2619713622 (0x9c25a856)
FS Generation: 904309833 (0x35e6ac49)
CRC32: 00000000 ECC: 0000
Type: Regular Attr: 0x0 Flags: Valid
Dynamic Features: (0x16) HasXattr InlineXattr Refcounted
Extended Attributes Block: 0 Extended Attributes Inline Size: 256
User: 0 (root) Group: 0 (root) Size: 281320357888
Links: 1 Clusters: 141738
ctime: 0x66911b56 0x316edcb8 -- Fri Jul 12 06:02:30.829349048 2024
atime: 0x66911d6b 0x7f7a28d -- Fri Jul 12 06:11:23.133669517 2024
mtime: 0x66911b56 0x12ed75d7 -- Fri Jul 12 06:02:30.317552087 2024
dtime: 0x0 -- Wed Dec 31 17:00:00 1969
Refcount Block: 2777346
Last Extblk: 2886943 Orphan Slot: 0
Sub Alloc Slot: 0 Sub Alloc Bit: 14
Tree Depth: 1 Count: 227 Next Free Rec: 230
## Offset Clusters Block#
0 0 2310 2776351
1 2310 2139 2777375
2 4449 1221 2778399
3 5670 731 2779423
4 6401 566 2780447
....... .... .......
....... .... .......
The issue was in the reflink workfow while reserving space for inline xattr.
The problematic function is ocfs2_reflink_xattr_inline(). By the time this
function is called the reflink tree is already recreated at the destination
inode from the source inode. At this point, this function reserves space
space inline xattrs at the destination inode without even checking if there
is space at the root metadata block. It simply reduces the l_count from 243
to 227 thereby making space of 256 bytes for inline xattr whereas the inode
already has extents beyond this index (in this case upto 230), thereby causing
corruption.
The fix for this is to reserve space for inline metadata before the at the
destination inode before the reflink tree gets recreated. The customer has
verified the fix.
Fixes: ef962df057aa ("ocfs2: xattr: fix inlined xattr reflink")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gautham Ananthakrishna <gautham.ananthakrishna(a)oracle.com>
---
fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--
fs/ocfs2/xattr.c | 11 +----------
2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c b/fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c
index 3f80a56d0d60..05105d271fc8 100644
--- a/fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include "namei.h"
#include "ocfs2_trace.h"
#include "file.h"
+#include "symlink.h"
#include <linux/bio.h>
#include <linux/blkdev.h>
@@ -4155,8 +4156,9 @@ static int __ocfs2_reflink(struct dentry *old_dentry,
int ret;
struct inode *inode = d_inode(old_dentry);
struct buffer_head *new_bh = NULL;
+ struct ocfs2_inode_info *oi = OCFS2_I(inode);
- if (OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_flags & OCFS2_INODE_SYSTEM_FILE) {
+ if (oi->ip_flags & OCFS2_INODE_SYSTEM_FILE) {
ret = -EINVAL;
mlog_errno(ret);
goto out;
@@ -4182,6 +4184,26 @@ static int __ocfs2_reflink(struct dentry *old_dentry,
goto out_unlock;
}
+ if ((oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_HAS_XATTR_FL) &&
+ (oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_INLINE_XATTR_FL)) {
+ /*
+ * Adjust extent record count to reserve space for extended attribute.
+ * Inline data count had been adjusted in ocfs2_duplicate_inline_data().
+ */
+ struct ocfs2_inode_info *new_oi = OCFS2_I(new_inode);
+
+ if (!(new_oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_INLINE_DATA_FL) &&
+ !(ocfs2_inode_is_fast_symlink(new_inode))) {
+ struct ocfs2_dinode *new_di = new_bh->b_data;
+ struct ocfs2_dinode *old_di = old_bh->b_data;
+ struct ocfs2_extent_list *el = &new_di->id2.i_list;
+ int inline_size = le16_to_cpu(old_di->i_xattr_inline_size);
+
+ le16_add_cpu(&el->l_count, -(inline_size /
+ sizeof(struct ocfs2_extent_rec)));
+ }
+ }
+
ret = ocfs2_create_reflink_node(inode, old_bh,
new_inode, new_bh, preserve);
if (ret) {
@@ -4189,7 +4211,7 @@ static int __ocfs2_reflink(struct dentry *old_dentry,
goto inode_unlock;
}
- if (OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_HAS_XATTR_FL) {
+ if (oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_HAS_XATTR_FL) {
ret = ocfs2_reflink_xattrs(inode, old_bh,
new_inode, new_bh,
preserve);
diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c b/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c
index 3b81213ed7b8..a9f716ec89e2 100644
--- a/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c
@@ -6511,16 +6511,7 @@ static int ocfs2_reflink_xattr_inline(struct ocfs2_xattr_reflink *args)
}
new_oi = OCFS2_I(args->new_inode);
- /*
- * Adjust extent record count to reserve space for extended attribute.
- * Inline data count had been adjusted in ocfs2_duplicate_inline_data().
- */
- if (!(new_oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_INLINE_DATA_FL) &&
- !(ocfs2_inode_is_fast_symlink(args->new_inode))) {
- struct ocfs2_extent_list *el = &new_di->id2.i_list;
- le16_add_cpu(&el->l_count, -(inline_size /
- sizeof(struct ocfs2_extent_rec)));
- }
+
spin_lock(&new_oi->ip_lock);
new_oi->ip_dyn_features |= OCFS2_HAS_XATTR_FL | OCFS2_INLINE_XATTR_FL;
new_di->i_dyn_features = cpu_to_le16(new_oi->ip_dyn_features);
--
2.39.3
Supposing the following scenario.
CPU0 CPU1
blk_mq_insert_request() 1) store blk_mq_unquiesce_queue()
blk_mq_run_hw_queue() blk_queue_flag_clear(QUEUE_FLAG_QUIESCED) 3) store
if (blk_queue_quiesced()) 2) load blk_mq_run_hw_queues()
return blk_mq_run_hw_queue()
blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests() if (!blk_mq_hctx_has_pending()) 4) load
return
The full memory barrier should be inserted between 1) and 2), as well as
between 3) and 4) to make sure that either CPU0 sees QUEUE_FLAG_QUIESCED is
cleared or CPU1 sees dispatch list or setting of bitmap of software queue.
Otherwise, either CPU will not re-run the hardware queue causing starvation.
So the first solution is to 1) add a pair of memory barrier to fix the
problem, another solution is to 2) use hctx->queue->queue_lock to synchronize
QUEUE_FLAG_QUIESCED. Here, we chose 2) to fix it since memory barrier is not
easy to be maintained.
Fixes: f4560ffe8cec1 ("blk-mq: use QUEUE_FLAG_QUIESCED to quiesce queue")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song(a)linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Muchun Song <songmuchun(a)bytedance.com>
---
block/blk-mq.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/block/blk-mq.c b/block/blk-mq.c
index b2d0f22de0c7f..ac39f2a346a52 100644
--- a/block/blk-mq.c
+++ b/block/blk-mq.c
@@ -2202,6 +2202,24 @@ void blk_mq_delay_run_hw_queue(struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx, unsigned long msecs)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(blk_mq_delay_run_hw_queue);
+static inline bool blk_mq_hw_queue_need_run(struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx)
+{
+ bool need_run;
+
+ /*
+ * When queue is quiesced, we may be switching io scheduler, or
+ * updating nr_hw_queues, or other things, and we can't run queue
+ * any more, even blk_mq_hctx_has_pending() can't be called safely.
+ *
+ * And queue will be rerun in blk_mq_unquiesce_queue() if it is
+ * quiesced.
+ */
+ __blk_mq_run_dispatch_ops(hctx->queue, false,
+ need_run = !blk_queue_quiesced(hctx->queue) &&
+ blk_mq_hctx_has_pending(hctx));
+ return need_run;
+}
+
/**
* blk_mq_run_hw_queue - Start to run a hardware queue.
* @hctx: Pointer to the hardware queue to run.
@@ -2222,20 +2240,23 @@ void blk_mq_run_hw_queue(struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx, bool async)
might_sleep_if(!async && hctx->flags & BLK_MQ_F_BLOCKING);
- /*
- * When queue is quiesced, we may be switching io scheduler, or
- * updating nr_hw_queues, or other things, and we can't run queue
- * any more, even __blk_mq_hctx_has_pending() can't be called safely.
- *
- * And queue will be rerun in blk_mq_unquiesce_queue() if it is
- * quiesced.
- */
- __blk_mq_run_dispatch_ops(hctx->queue, false,
- need_run = !blk_queue_quiesced(hctx->queue) &&
- blk_mq_hctx_has_pending(hctx));
+ need_run = blk_mq_hw_queue_need_run(hctx);
+ if (!need_run) {
+ unsigned long flags;
- if (!need_run)
- return;
+ /*
+ * Synchronize with blk_mq_unquiesce_queue(), becuase we check
+ * if hw queue is quiesced locklessly above, we need the use
+ * ->queue_lock to make sure we see the up-to-date status to
+ * not miss rerunning the hw queue.
+ */
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&hctx->queue->queue_lock, flags);
+ need_run = blk_mq_hw_queue_need_run(hctx);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hctx->queue->queue_lock, flags);
+
+ if (!need_run)
+ return;
+ }
if (async || !cpumask_test_cpu(raw_smp_processor_id(), hctx->cpumask)) {
blk_mq_delay_run_hw_queue(hctx, 0);
--
2.20.1
virtual machines under Xen Hypervisor (DomU) running in Xen PV mode use a
special, nonstandard synthetized CPU topology which "just works" under
kernels 6.9.x while newer kernels assuming a "crash kernel" and disable
SMT (reducing to one CPU core) because the newer topology implementation
produces a wrong error "[Firmware Bug]: APIC enumeration order not
specification compliant" after new topology checks which are improper for
Xen PV platform. As a result, the kernel disables SMT and activates just
one CPU core within the VM (DomU).
The patch disables the regarding checks if it is running in Xen PV
mode (only) and bring back SMT / all CPUs as in the past to such DomU
VMs.
Signed-off-by: Niels Dettenbach <nd(a)syndicat.com>
---
The current behaviour leads all of our production Xen Host platforms
unusable after updating to newer linux kernels (with just one CPU
available/activated per VM) while older kernels other OS still work
fully (and stable since many years on the platform).
Xen PV mode is still provided by current Xen and widely used - even
if less wide as the newer Xen PVH mode today. So a solution probably
will be required.
So we assume that bug affects stable(a)vger.kernel.org as well.
dmesg from affected kernel:
-- snip --
Sep 10 14:35:50 ffm1 kernel: [ 0.640364] CPU topo: Enumerated BSP APIC 0 is not marked in APICBASE MSR
Sep 10 14:35:50 ffm1 kernel: [ 0.640367] CPU topo: Assuming crash kernel. Limiting to one CPU to prevent machine INIT
Sep 10 14:35:50 ffm1 kernel: [ 0.640368] CPU topo: [Firmware Bug]: APIC enumeration order not specification compliant
Sep 10 14:35:50 ffm1 kernel: [ 0.640376] CPU topo: Max. logical packages: 1
Sep 10 14:35:50 ffm1 kernel: [ 0.640378] CPU topo: Max. logical dies: 1
Sep 10 14:35:50 ffm1 kernel: [ 0.640379] CPU topo: Max. dies per package: 1
Sep 10 14:35:50 ffm1 kernel: [ 0.640386] CPU topo: Max. threads per core: 1
Sep 10 14:35:50 ffm1 kernel: [ 0.640388] CPU topo: Num. cores per package: 1
Sep 10 14:35:50 ffm1 kernel: [ 0.640389] CPU topo: Num. threads per package: 1
Sep 10 14:35:50 ffm1 kernel: [ 0.640390] CPU topo: Allowing 1 present CPUs plus 0 hotplug CPUs
Sep 10 14:35:50 ffm1 kernel: [ 0.640402] Cannot find an available gap in the 32-bit address range
-- snap --
We tested the patch intensely under productive / high load since 2 days now with no issues.
references:
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/topology.c
[line 448]
--- snip ---
/*
* XEN PV is special as it does not advertise the local APIC
* properly, but provides a fake topology for it so that the
* infrastructure works. So don't apply the restrictions vs. APIC
* here.
*/
---snap ---
Related errors / tickets:
https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/fedora-sees-only-1-cpu-core-after-updating-the…
--- linux/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/topology.c.orig 2024-09-11 09:53:16.194095250 +0200
+++ linux/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/topology.c 2024-09-11 09:55:17.338448094 +0200
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ static __init bool check_for_real_bsp(u3
is_bsp = !!(msr & MSR_IA32_APICBASE_BSP);
}
- if (apic_id == topo_info.boot_cpu_apic_id) {
+ if (!xen_pv_domain() && apic_id == topo_info.boot_cpu_apic_id) {
/*
* If the boot CPU has the APIC BSP bit set then the
* firmware enumeration is agreeing. If the CPU does not
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ static __init bool check_for_real_bsp(u3
pr_warn("Boot CPU APIC ID not the first enumerated APIC ID: %x != %x\n",
topo_info.boot_cpu_apic_id, apic_id);
- if (is_bsp) {
+ if (!xen_pv_domain() && is_bsp) {
/*
* The boot CPU has the APIC BSP bit set. Use it and complain
* about the broken firmware enumeration.
One of our customers reported a crash and a corrupted ocfs2 filesystem.
The crash was due to the detection of corruption. Upon troubleshooting,
the fsck -fn output showed the below corruption
[EXTENT_LIST_FREE] Extent list in owner 33080590 claims 230 as the next free chain record,
but fsck believes the largest valid value is 227. Clamp the next record value? n
The stat output from the debugfs.ocfs2 showed the following corruption
where the "Next Free Rec:" had overshot the "Count:" in the root metadata
block.
Inode: 33080590 Mode: 0640 Generation: 2619713622 (0x9c25a856)
FS Generation: 904309833 (0x35e6ac49)
CRC32: 00000000 ECC: 0000
Type: Regular Attr: 0x0 Flags: Valid
Dynamic Features: (0x16) HasXattr InlineXattr Refcounted
Extended Attributes Block: 0 Extended Attributes Inline Size: 256
User: 0 (root) Group: 0 (root) Size: 281320357888
Links: 1 Clusters: 141738
ctime: 0x66911b56 0x316edcb8 -- Fri Jul 12 06:02:30.829349048 2024
atime: 0x66911d6b 0x7f7a28d -- Fri Jul 12 06:11:23.133669517 2024
mtime: 0x66911b56 0x12ed75d7 -- Fri Jul 12 06:02:30.317552087 2024
dtime: 0x0 -- Wed Dec 31 17:00:00 1969
Refcount Block: 2777346
Last Extblk: 2886943 Orphan Slot: 0
Sub Alloc Slot: 0 Sub Alloc Bit: 14
Tree Depth: 1 Count: 227 Next Free Rec: 230
## Offset Clusters Block#
0 0 2310 2776351
1 2310 2139 2777375
2 4449 1221 2778399
3 5670 731 2779423
4 6401 566 2780447
....... .... .......
....... .... .......
The issue was in the reflink workfow while reserving space for inline xattr.
The problematic function is ocfs2_reflink_xattr_inline(). By the time this
function is called the reflink tree is already recreated at the destination
inode from the source inode. At this point, this function reserves space
space inline xattrs at the destination inode without even checking if there
is space at the root metadata block. It simply reduces the l_count from 243
to 227 thereby making space of 256 bytes for inline xattr whereas the inode
already has extents beyond this index (in this case upto 230), thereby causing
corruption.
The fix for this is to reserve space for inline metadata before the at the
destination inode before the reflink tree gets recreated. The customer has
verified the fix.
Fixes: ef962df057aa ("ocfs2: xattr: fix inlined xattr reflink")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gautham Ananthakrishna <gautham.ananthakrishna(a)oracle.com>
---
fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--
fs/ocfs2/xattr.c | 11 +----------
2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c b/fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c
index 3f80a56d0d60..1d427da06bee 100644
--- a/fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include "namei.h"
#include "ocfs2_trace.h"
#include "file.h"
+#include "symlink.h"
#include <linux/bio.h>
#include <linux/blkdev.h>
@@ -4155,8 +4156,9 @@ static int __ocfs2_reflink(struct dentry *old_dentry,
int ret;
struct inode *inode = d_inode(old_dentry);
struct buffer_head *new_bh = NULL;
+ struct ocfs2_inode_info *oi = OCFS2_I(inode);
- if (OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_flags & OCFS2_INODE_SYSTEM_FILE) {
+ if (oi->ip_flags & OCFS2_INODE_SYSTEM_FILE) {
ret = -EINVAL;
mlog_errno(ret);
goto out;
@@ -4182,6 +4184,26 @@ static int __ocfs2_reflink(struct dentry *old_dentry,
goto out_unlock;
}
+ if ((oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_HAS_XATTR_FL) &&
+ (oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_INLINE_XATTR_FL)) {
+ /*
+ * Adjust extent record count to reserve space for extended attribute.
+ * Inline data count had been adjusted in ocfs2_duplicate_inline_data().
+ */
+ struct ocfs2_inode_info *ni = OCFS2_I(new_inode);
+
+ if (!(ni->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_INLINE_DATA_FL) &&
+ !(ocfs2_inode_is_fast_symlink(new_inode))) {
+ struct ocfs2_dinode *new_di = new_bh->b_data;
+ struct ocfs2_dinode *old_di = old_bh->b_data;
+ struct ocfs2_extent_list *el = &new_di->id2.i_list;
+ int inline_size = le16_to_cpu(old_di->i_xattr_inline_size);
+
+ le16_add_cpu(&el->l_count, -(inline_size /
+ sizeof(struct ocfs2_extent_rec)));
+ }
+ }
+
ret = ocfs2_create_reflink_node(inode, old_bh,
new_inode, new_bh, preserve);
if (ret) {
@@ -4189,7 +4211,7 @@ static int __ocfs2_reflink(struct dentry *old_dentry,
goto inode_unlock;
}
- if (OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_HAS_XATTR_FL) {
+ if (oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_HAS_XATTR_FL) {
ret = ocfs2_reflink_xattrs(inode, old_bh,
new_inode, new_bh,
preserve);
diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c b/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c
index 3b81213ed7b8..a9f716ec89e2 100644
--- a/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c
@@ -6511,16 +6511,7 @@ static int ocfs2_reflink_xattr_inline(struct ocfs2_xattr_reflink *args)
}
new_oi = OCFS2_I(args->new_inode);
- /*
- * Adjust extent record count to reserve space for extended attribute.
- * Inline data count had been adjusted in ocfs2_duplicate_inline_data().
- */
- if (!(new_oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_INLINE_DATA_FL) &&
- !(ocfs2_inode_is_fast_symlink(args->new_inode))) {
- struct ocfs2_extent_list *el = &new_di->id2.i_list;
- le16_add_cpu(&el->l_count, -(inline_size /
- sizeof(struct ocfs2_extent_rec)));
- }
+
spin_lock(&new_oi->ip_lock);
new_oi->ip_dyn_features |= OCFS2_HAS_XATTR_FL | OCFS2_INLINE_XATTR_FL;
new_di->i_dyn_features = cpu_to_le16(new_oi->ip_dyn_features);
--
2.39.3
One of our customers reported a crash and a corrupted ocfs2 filesystem.
The crash was due to the detection of corruption. Upon troubleshooting,
the fsck -fn output showed the below corruption
[EXTENT_LIST_FREE] Extent list in owner 33080590 claims 230 as the next free chain record,
but fsck believes the largest valid value is 227. Clamp the next record value? n
The stat output from the debugfs.ocfs2 showed the following corruption
where the "Next Free Rec:" had overshot the "Count:" in the root metadata
block.
Inode: 33080590 Mode: 0640 Generation: 2619713622 (0x9c25a856)
FS Generation: 904309833 (0x35e6ac49)
CRC32: 00000000 ECC: 0000
Type: Regular Attr: 0x0 Flags: Valid
Dynamic Features: (0x16) HasXattr InlineXattr Refcounted
Extended Attributes Block: 0 Extended Attributes Inline Size: 256
User: 0 (root) Group: 0 (root) Size: 281320357888
Links: 1 Clusters: 141738
ctime: 0x66911b56 0x316edcb8 -- Fri Jul 12 06:02:30.829349048 2024
atime: 0x66911d6b 0x7f7a28d -- Fri Jul 12 06:11:23.133669517 2024
mtime: 0x66911b56 0x12ed75d7 -- Fri Jul 12 06:02:30.317552087 2024
dtime: 0x0 -- Wed Dec 31 17:00:00 1969
Refcount Block: 2777346
Last Extblk: 2886943 Orphan Slot: 0
Sub Alloc Slot: 0 Sub Alloc Bit: 14
Tree Depth: 1 Count: 227 Next Free Rec: 230
## Offset Clusters Block#
0 0 2310 2776351
1 2310 2139 2777375
2 4449 1221 2778399
3 5670 731 2779423
4 6401 566 2780447
....... .... .......
....... .... .......
The issue was in the reflink workfow while reserving space for inline xattr.
The problematic function is ocfs2_reflink_xattr_inline(). By the time this
function is called the reflink tree is already recreated at the destination
inode from the source inode. At this point, this function reserves space
space inline xattrs at the destination inode without even checking if there
is space at the root metadata block. It simply reduces the l_count from 243
to 227 thereby making space of 256 bytes for inline xattr whereas the inode
already has extents beyond this index (in this case upto 230), thereby causing
corruption.
The fix for this is to reserve space for inline metadata before the at the
destination inode before the reflink tree gets recreated. The customer has
verified the fix.
Fixes: ef962df057aa ("ocfs2: xattr: fix inlined xattr reflink")
Signed-off-by: Gautham Ananthakrishna <gautham.ananthakrishna(a)oracle.com>
---
fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--
fs/ocfs2/xattr.c | 11 +----------
2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c b/fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c
index 3f80a56d0d60..1d427da06bee 100644
--- a/fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include "namei.h"
#include "ocfs2_trace.h"
#include "file.h"
+#include "symlink.h"
#include <linux/bio.h>
#include <linux/blkdev.h>
@@ -4155,8 +4156,9 @@ static int __ocfs2_reflink(struct dentry *old_dentry,
int ret;
struct inode *inode = d_inode(old_dentry);
struct buffer_head *new_bh = NULL;
+ struct ocfs2_inode_info *oi = OCFS2_I(inode);
- if (OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_flags & OCFS2_INODE_SYSTEM_FILE) {
+ if (oi->ip_flags & OCFS2_INODE_SYSTEM_FILE) {
ret = -EINVAL;
mlog_errno(ret);
goto out;
@@ -4182,6 +4184,26 @@ static int __ocfs2_reflink(struct dentry *old_dentry,
goto out_unlock;
}
+ if ((oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_HAS_XATTR_FL) &&
+ (oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_INLINE_XATTR_FL)) {
+ /*
+ * Adjust extent record count to reserve space for extended attribute.
+ * Inline data count had been adjusted in ocfs2_duplicate_inline_data().
+ */
+ struct ocfs2_inode_info *ni = OCFS2_I(new_inode);
+
+ if (!(ni->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_INLINE_DATA_FL) &&
+ !(ocfs2_inode_is_fast_symlink(new_inode))) {
+ struct ocfs2_dinode *new_di = new_bh->b_data;
+ struct ocfs2_dinode *old_di = old_bh->b_data;
+ struct ocfs2_extent_list *el = &new_di->id2.i_list;
+ int inline_size = le16_to_cpu(old_di->i_xattr_inline_size);
+
+ le16_add_cpu(&el->l_count, -(inline_size /
+ sizeof(struct ocfs2_extent_rec)));
+ }
+ }
+
ret = ocfs2_create_reflink_node(inode, old_bh,
new_inode, new_bh, preserve);
if (ret) {
@@ -4189,7 +4211,7 @@ static int __ocfs2_reflink(struct dentry *old_dentry,
goto inode_unlock;
}
- if (OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_HAS_XATTR_FL) {
+ if (oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_HAS_XATTR_FL) {
ret = ocfs2_reflink_xattrs(inode, old_bh,
new_inode, new_bh,
preserve);
diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c b/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c
index 3b81213ed7b8..a9f716ec89e2 100644
--- a/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c
@@ -6511,16 +6511,7 @@ static int ocfs2_reflink_xattr_inline(struct ocfs2_xattr_reflink *args)
}
new_oi = OCFS2_I(args->new_inode);
- /*
- * Adjust extent record count to reserve space for extended attribute.
- * Inline data count had been adjusted in ocfs2_duplicate_inline_data().
- */
- if (!(new_oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_INLINE_DATA_FL) &&
- !(ocfs2_inode_is_fast_symlink(args->new_inode))) {
- struct ocfs2_extent_list *el = &new_di->id2.i_list;
- le16_add_cpu(&el->l_count, -(inline_size /
- sizeof(struct ocfs2_extent_rec)));
- }
+
spin_lock(&new_oi->ip_lock);
new_oi->ip_dyn_features |= OCFS2_HAS_XATTR_FL | OCFS2_INLINE_XATTR_FL;
new_di->i_dyn_features = cpu_to_le16(new_oi->ip_dyn_features);
--
2.39.3
From: Dumitru Ceclan <mitrutzceclan(a)gmail.com>
commit 61cbfb5368dd50ed0d65ce21d305aa923581db2b upstream
The cfg pointer is set before reading the channel number that the
configuration should point to. This causes configurations to be shifted
by one channel.
For example setting bipolar to the first channel defined in the DT will
cause bipolar mode to be active on the second defined channel.
Fix by moving the cfg pointer setting after reading the channel number.
Fixes: 7b8d045e497a ("iio: adc: ad7124: allow more than 8 channels")
Signed-off-by: Dumitru Ceclan <dumitru.ceclan(a)analog.com>
Reviewed-by: Nuno Sa <nuno.sa(a)analog.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240806085133.114547-1-dumitru.ceclan@analog.com
Cc: <Stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron(a)huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: He Lugang <helugang(a)uniontech.com>
---
drivers/iio/adc/ad7124.c | 3 +--
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/iio/adc/ad7124.c b/drivers/iio/adc/ad7124.c
index e7b1d517d3de..089398a7664a 100644
--- a/drivers/iio/adc/ad7124.c
+++ b/drivers/iio/adc/ad7124.c
@@ -837,8 +837,6 @@ static int ad7124_parse_channel_config(struct iio_dev *indio_dev,
st->channels = channels;
device_for_each_child_node_scoped(dev, child) {
- cfg = &st->channels[channel].cfg;
-
ret = fwnode_property_read_u32(child, "reg", &channel);
if (ret)
return ret;
@@ -856,6 +854,7 @@ static int ad7124_parse_channel_config(struct iio_dev *indio_dev,
st->channels[channel].ain = AD7124_CHANNEL_AINP(ain[0]) |
AD7124_CHANNEL_AINM(ain[1]);
+ cfg = &st->channels[channel].cfg;
cfg->bipolar = fwnode_property_read_bool(child, "bipolar");
ret = fwnode_property_read_u32(child, "adi,reference-select", &tmp);
--
2.45.2