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[REGRESSION 6.12.y] hyper-v: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000a0: RIP: 0010:hv_uio_channel_cb+0xd/0x20 [uio_hv_generic]

by Salvatore Bonaccorso

Peter Morrow reported in Debian a regression, reported in https://bugs.debian.org/1120602 . The regression was seen after updating, to 6.12.57-1 in Debian, but details on the offending commit follows. His report was as follows: > Dear Maintainer, > > I'm seeing a kernel crash quite soon after boot on a debian trixie based > system running 6.12.57+deb13-amd64, unfortunately the kernel panics before > I can access the system to gather more information. Thus I'll provide details > of the system using a previously known good version. The panic is happening > 100% of the time unfortunately. I have access to the serial console however > so can enable any required verbose logging during boot if necessary. > > Crucially the crash is not seen with kernel version 6.12.41+deb13-amd64 with the > same userspace. We had pinned to that version until very recently to in order > to work around https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=1109676 > > I'm running a dpdk application here (VPP) on Azure, VM form factor is a > "Standard DS3 v2 (4 vcpus, 14 GiB memory)". > > The only relevant upstream commit in this area (as far as I can see) is: > > https://lore.kernel.org/linux-hyperv/1bb599ee-fe28-409d-b430-2fc086268936@l… > > The comment regarding avoiding races at start adds a bit more weight behind this > hunch, though it's only a hunch as I am most definitely nowhere near an expert > in this area. > > -- Package-specific info: > > [ 19.625535] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000a0 > [ 19.628874] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode > [ 19.630841] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page > [ 19.632788] PGD 0 P4D 0 > [ 19.633905] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI > [ 19.635586] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Not tainted 6.12.57+deb13-amd64 #1 Debian 6.12.57-1 > [ 19.640216] Hardware name: Microsoft Corporation Virtual Machine/Virtual Machine, BIOS Hyper-V UEFI Release v4.1 09/28/2024 > [ 19.644514] RIP: 0010:hv_uio_channel_cb+0xd/0x20 [uio_hv_generic] > [ 19.646994] Code: 02 00 00 5b 5d e9 53 98 69 e9 0f 1f 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8b 47 10 <48> 8b b8 a0 00 00 00 f0 83 44 24 fc 00 e9 51 6f fa ff 90 90 90 90 > [ 19.654377] RSP: 0018:ffffb15ac01a4fa8 EFLAGS: 00010046 > [ 19.656385] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000015 RCX: 0000000000000015 > [ 19.659240] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffffffffffff RDI: ffff8ff69c759400 > [ 19.662168] RBP: ffff8ff548790200 R08: ffff8ff548790200 R09: 00fca75150b080e9 > [ 19.665239] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffb15ac01a4ff8 R12: ffff8ff871dc1480 > [ 19.668193] R13: ffff8ff69c759400 R14: ffff8ff69c7596a0 R15: ffffffffc106e160 > [ 19.671106] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8ff871d80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 > [ 19.674281] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 > [ 19.676533] CR2: 00000000000000a0 CR3: 0000000100ba6003 CR4: 00000000003706f0 > [ 19.679385] Call Trace: > [ 19.680361] <IRQ> > [ 19.681181] vmbus_isr+0x1a5/0x210 [hv_vmbus] > [ 19.682916] __sysvec_hyperv_callback+0x32/0x60 > [ 19.684991] sysvec_hyperv_callback+0x6c/0x90 > [ 19.686665] </IRQ> > [ 19.687509] <TASK> > [ 19.688366] asm_sysvec_hyperv_callback+0x1a/0x20 > [ 19.690262] RIP: 0010:pv_native_safe_halt+0xf/0x20 > [ 19.692067] Code: 09 e9 c5 08 01 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa 66 90 0f 00 2d e5 3b 31 00 fb f4 <c3> cc cc cc cc 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 > [ 19.699119] RSP: 0018:ffffb15ac0103ed8 EFLAGS: 00000246 > [ 19.701412] RAX: 0000000000000003 RBX: ffff8ff5403b1fc0 RCX: ffff8ff54c64ce30 > [ 19.704328] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000003 RDI: 000000000001f894 > [ 19.706910] RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 000000000bb760d9 R09: 00fca75150b080e9 > [ 19.709762] R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000 > [ 19.712510] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 > [ 19.715173] default_idle+0x9/0x20 > [ 19.716846] default_idle_call+0x29/0x100 > [ 19.718623] do_idle+0x1fe/0x240 > [ 19.720045] cpu_startup_entry+0x29/0x30 > [ 19.721595] start_secondary+0x11e/0x140 > [ 19.723080] common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141 > [ 19.725222] </TASK> > [ 19.726387] Modules linked in: isofs cdrom uio_hv_generic uio binfmt_misc intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common intel_uncore_frequency_common isst_if_mbox_msr isst_if_common rpcrdma skx_edac_common nfit sunrpc libnvdimm crct10dif_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel sha512_ssse3 sha256_ssse3 rdma_ucm ib_iser sha1_ssse3 rdma_cm aesni_intel iw_cm gf128mul crypto_simd libiscsi cryptd ib_umad ib_ipoib scsi_transport_iscsi ib_cm rapl sg hv_utils hv_balloon evdev pcspkr joydev mpls_router ip_tunnel ramoops configfs pstore_blk efi_pstore pstore_zone nfnetlink vsock_loopback vmw_vsock_virtio_transport_common hv_sock vmw_vsock_vmci_transport vsock vmw_vmci efivarfs ip_tables x_tables autofs4 overlay squashfs dm_verity dm_bufio reed_solomon dm_mod loop ext4 crc16 mbcache jbd2 crc32c_generic mlx5_ib ib_uverbs ib_core mlx5_core mlxfw pci_hyperv pci_hyperv_intf hyperv_drm drm_shmem_helper sd_mod drm_kms_helper hv_storvsc scsi_transport_fc drm scsi_mod hid_generic hid_hyperv hid serio_raw hv_netvsc hyperv_keyboard scsi_common hv_vmbus > [ 19.726466] crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel > [ 19.765771] CR2: 00000000000000a0 > [ 19.767524] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- > [ 19.800433] RIP: 0010:hv_uio_channel_cb+0xd/0x20 [uio_hv_generic] > [ 19.803170] Code: 02 00 00 5b 5d e9 53 98 69 e9 0f 1f 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8b 47 10 <48> 8b b8 a0 00 00 00 f0 83 44 24 fc 00 e9 51 6f fa ff 90 90 90 90 > [ 19.811041] RSP: 0018:ffffb15ac01a4fa8 EFLAGS: 00010046 > [ 19.813466] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000015 RCX: 0000000000000015 > [ 19.816504] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffffffffffff RDI: ffff8ff69c759400 > [ 19.819484] RBP: ffff8ff548790200 R08: ffff8ff548790200 R09: 00fca75150b080e9 > [ 19.822625] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffb15ac01a4ff8 R12: ffff8ff871dc1480 > [ 19.825569] R13: ffff8ff69c759400 R14: ffff8ff69c7596a0 R15: ffffffffc106e160 > [ 19.828804] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8ff871d80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 > [ 19.832214] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 > [ 19.834709] CR2: 00000000000000a0 CR3: 0000000100ba6003 CR4: 00000000003706f0 > [ 19.837976] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt > [ 19.841825] Kernel Offset: 0x28a00000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff) > [ 19.896620] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt ]--- > > > lspci output: > > Collected from a system that is not crashing (6.12.41+deb13-amd64 #1 SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC Debian 6.12.41-1 (2025-08-12) x86_64 GNU/Linux)... > > $ sudo lspci -v > 2f22:00:02.0 Ethernet controller: Mellanox Technologies MT27710 Family [ConnectX-4 Lx Virtual Function] (rev 80) > Subsystem: Mellanox Technologies Device 0190 > Physical Slot: 3 > Flags: bus master, fast devsel, latency 0, NUMA node 0 > Memory at fe0100000 (64-bit, prefetchable) [size=1M] > Capabilities: [60] Express Endpoint, IntMsgNum 0 > Capabilities: [9c] MSI-X: Enable+ Count=8 Masked- > Kernel driver in use: mlx5_core > Kernel modules: mlx5_core > > 52f7:00:02.0 Ethernet controller: Mellanox Technologies MT27710 Family [ConnectX-4 Lx Virtual Function] (rev 80) > Subsystem: Mellanox Technologies Device 0190 > Physical Slot: 2 > Flags: bus master, fast devsel, latency 0, NUMA node 0 > Memory at fe0000000 (64-bit, prefetchable) [size=1M] > Capabilities: [60] Express Endpoint, IntMsgNum 0 > Capabilities: [9c] MSI-X: Enable+ Count=8 Masked- > Kernel driver in use: mlx5_core > Kernel modules: mlx5_core > > 7852:00:02.0 Ethernet controller: Mellanox Technologies MT27710 Family [ConnectX-4 Lx Virtual Function] (rev 80) > Subsystem: Mellanox Technologies Device 0190 > Physical Slot: 4 > Flags: bus master, fast devsel, latency 0, NUMA node 0 > Memory at fe0200000 (64-bit, prefetchable) [size=1M] > Capabilities: [60] Express Endpoint, IntMsgNum 0 > Capabilities: [9c] MSI-X: Enable+ Count=8 Masked- > Kernel driver in use: mlx5_core > Kernel modules: mlx5_core > > dmidecode output: > > $ sudo dmidecode > # dmidecode 3.6 > Getting SMBIOS data from sysfs. > SMBIOS 3.1.0 present. > Table at 0x3FF82000. > > Handle 0x0000, DMI type 0, 26 bytes > BIOS Information > Vendor: Microsoft Corporation > Version: Hyper-V UEFI Release v4.1 > Release Date: 05/13/2024 > ROM Size: 64 kB > Characteristics: > BIOS characteristics not supported > ACPI is supported > Targeted content distribution is supported > UEFI is supported > System is a virtual machine > BIOS Revision: 4.1 > > Handle 0x0001, DMI type 1, 27 bytes > System Information > Manufacturer: Microsoft Corporation > Product Name: Virtual Machine > Version: Hyper-V UEFI Release v4.1 > Serial Number: 0000-0010-5437-9499-5225-4477-46 > UUID: 925315af-4af4-4d42-915a-1516b5a1fe5c > Wake-up Type: Power Switch > SKU Number: None > Family: Virtual Machine > > Handle 0x0002, DMI type 3, 24 bytes > Chassis Information > Manufacturer: Microsoft Corporation > Type: Desktop > Lock: Not Present > Version: Hyper-V UEFI Release v4.1 > Serial Number: 2466-9316-1078-9783-6078-7718-80 > Asset Tag: 7783-7084-3265-9085-8269-3286-77 > Boot-up State: Safe > Power Supply State: Safe > Thermal State: Safe > Security Status: Unknown > OEM Information: 0x00000000 > Height: Unspecified > Number Of Power Cords: Unspecified > Contained Elements: 0 > SKU Number: Virtual Machine > > Handle 0x0003, DMI type 2, 17 bytes > Base Board Information > Manufacturer: Microsoft Corporation > Product Name: Virtual Machine > Version: Hyper-V UEFI Release v4.1 > Serial Number: 0000-0010-4737-0707-0684-2660-76 > Asset Tag: None > Features: > Board is a hosting board > Location In Chassis: Virtual Machine > Chassis Handle: 0x0002 > Type: Motherboard > Contained Object Handles: 0 > > Handle 0x0004, DMI type 4, 48 bytes > Processor Information > Socket Designation: None > Type: Central Processor > Family: Unknown > Manufacturer: None > ID: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 > Version: None > Voltage: Unknown > External Clock: Unknown > Max Speed: Unknown > Current Speed: Unknown > Status: Unpopulated > Upgrade: Other > L1 Cache Handle: Not Provided > L2 Cache Handle: Not Provided > L3 Cache Handle: Not Provided > Serial Number: None > Asset Tag: None > Part Number: None > Core Count: 4 > Core Enabled: 4 > Thread Count: 1 > Characteristics: None > > Handle 0x0005, DMI type 11, 5 bytes > OEM Strings > String 1: [MS_VM_CERT/SHA1/9b80ca0d5dd061ec9da4e494f4c3fd1196270c22] > String 2: None > String 3: To be filled by OEM > > Handle 0x0006, DMI type 16, 23 bytes > Physical Memory Array > Location: System Board Or Motherboard > Use: System Memory > Error Correction Type: None > Maximum Capacity: 0 bytes > Error Information Handle: Not Provided > Number Of Devices: 3 > > Handle 0x0007, DMI type 17, 92 bytes > Memory Device > Array Handle: 0x0006 > Error Information Handle: Not Provided > Total Width: Unknown > Data Width: Unknown > Size: 26 MB > Form Factor: Unknown > Set: None > Locator: M0001 > Bank Locator: None > Type: Unknown > Type Detail: Unknown > Speed: Unknown > Manufacturer: Microsoft Corporation > Serial Number: None > Asset Tag: None > Part Number: None > Rank: Unknown > Configured Memory Speed: Unknown > Minimum Voltage: Unknown > Maximum Voltage: Unknown > Configured Voltage: Unknown > Memory Technology: <OUT OF SPEC> > Memory Operating Mode Capability: None > Firmware Version: Not Specified > Module Manufacturer ID: Unknown > Module Product ID: Unknown > Memory Subsystem Controller Manufacturer ID: Unknown > Memory Subsystem Controller Product ID: Unknown > Non-Volatile Size: None > Volatile Size: None > Cache Size: None > Logical Size: None > > Handle 0x0008, DMI type 19, 31 bytes > Memory Array Mapped Address > Starting Address: 0x00000000000 > Ending Address: 0x00001A003FF > Range Size: 26625 kB > Physical Array Handle: 0x0006 > Partition Width: 0 > > Handle 0x0009, DMI type 20, 35 bytes > Memory Device Mapped Address > Starting Address: 0x00000000000 > Ending Address: 0x00001A003FF > Range Size: 26625 kB > Physical Device Handle: 0x0007 > Memory Array Mapped Address Handle: 0x0008 > Partition Row Position: Unknown > > Handle 0x000A, DMI type 17, 92 bytes > Memory Device > Array Handle: 0x0006 > Error Information Handle: Not Provided > Total Width: Unknown > Data Width: Unknown > Size: 948 MB > Form Factor: Unknown > Set: None > Locator: M0002 > Bank Locator: None > Type: Unknown > Type Detail: Unknown > Speed: Unknown > Manufacturer: Microsoft Corporation > Serial Number: None > Asset Tag: None > Part Number: None > Rank: Unknown > Configured Memory Speed: Unknown > Minimum Voltage: Unknown > Maximum Voltage: Unknown > Configured Voltage: Unknown > Memory Technology: <OUT OF SPEC> > Memory Operating Mode Capability: None > Firmware Version: Not Specified > Module Manufacturer ID: Unknown > Module Product ID: Unknown > Memory Subsystem Controller Manufacturer ID: Unknown > Memory Subsystem Controller Product ID: Unknown > Non-Volatile Size: None > Volatile Size: None > Cache Size: None > Logical Size: None > > Handle 0x000B, DMI type 19, 31 bytes > Memory Array Mapped Address > Starting Address: 0x00004C00000 > Ending Address: 0x000400003FF > Range Size: 970753 kB > Physical Array Handle: 0x0006 > Partition Width: 0 > > Handle 0x000C, DMI type 20, 35 bytes > Memory Device Mapped Address > Starting Address: 0x00004C00000 > Ending Address: 0x000400003FF > Range Size: 970753 kB > Physical Device Handle: 0x000A > Memory Array Mapped Address Handle: 0x000B > Partition Row Position: Unknown > > Handle 0x000D, DMI type 17, 92 bytes > Memory Device > Array Handle: 0x0006 > Error Information Handle: Not Provided > Total Width: Unknown > Data Width: Unknown > Size: 13 GB > Form Factor: Unknown > Set: None > Locator: M0003 > Bank Locator: None > Type: Unknown > Type Detail: Unknown > Speed: Unknown > Manufacturer: Microsoft Corporation > Serial Number: None > Asset Tag: None > Part Number: None > Rank: Unknown > Configured Memory Speed: Unknown > Minimum Voltage: Unknown > Maximum Voltage: Unknown > Configured Voltage: Unknown > Memory Technology: <OUT OF SPEC> > Memory Operating Mode Capability: None > Firmware Version: Not Specified > Module Manufacturer ID: Unknown > Module Product ID: Unknown > Memory Subsystem Controller Manufacturer ID: Unknown > Memory Subsystem Controller Product ID: Unknown > Non-Volatile Size: None > Volatile Size: None > Cache Size: None > Logical Size: None > > Handle 0x000E, DMI type 19, 31 bytes > Memory Array Mapped Address > Starting Address: 0x00100000000 > Ending Address: 0x004400003FF > Range Size: 13 GB > Physical Array Handle: 0x0006 > Partition Width: 0 > > Handle 0x000F, DMI type 20, 35 bytes > Memory Device Mapped Address > Starting Address: 0x00100000000 > Ending Address: 0x004400003FF > Range Size: 13 GB > Physical Device Handle: 0x000D > Memory Array Mapped Address Handle: 0x000E > Partition Row Position: Unknown > > Handle 0x0010, DMI type 32, 11 bytes > System Boot Information > Status: No errors detected > > Handle 0xFEFF, DMI type 127, 4 bytes > End Of Table The offending commit appers to be the backport of b15b7d2a1b09 ("uio_hv_generic: Let userspace take care of interrupt mask") for 6.12.y. Peter confirmed that reverting this commit on top of 6.12.57-1 as packaged in Debian resolves indeed the issue. Interestingly the issue is *not* seen with 6.17.7 based kernel in Debian. #regzbot introduced: 37bd91f22794dc05436130d6983302cb90ecfe7e #regzbot monitor: https://bugs.debian.org/1120602 Thank you already! Regards, Salvatore

3 weeks, 4 days

3
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[PATCH v3] Bluetooth: btusb: mediatek: Avoid btusb_mtk_claim_iso_intf() NULL deref

by Douglas Anderson

In btusb_mtk_setup(), we set `btmtk_data->isopkt_intf` to: usb_ifnum_to_if(data->udev, MTK_ISO_IFNUM) That function can return NULL in some cases. Even when it returns NULL, though, we still go on to call btusb_mtk_claim_iso_intf(). As of commit e9087e828827 ("Bluetooth: btusb: mediatek: Add locks for usb_driver_claim_interface()"), calling btusb_mtk_claim_iso_intf() when `btmtk_data->isopkt_intf` is NULL will cause a crash because we'll end up passing a bad pointer to device_lock(). Prior to that commit we'd pass the NULL pointer directly to usb_driver_claim_interface() which would detect it and return an error, which was handled. Resolve the crash in btusb_mtk_claim_iso_intf() by adding a NULL check at the start of the function. This makes the code handle a NULL `btmtk_data->isopkt_intf` the same way it did before the problematic commit (just with a slight change to the error message printed). Reported-by: IncogCyberpunk <incogcyberpunk(a)proton.me> Closes: http://lore.kernel.org/r/a380d061-479e-4713-bddd-1d6571ca7e86@leemhuis.info Fixes: e9087e828827 ("Bluetooth: btusb: mediatek: Add locks for usb_driver_claim_interface()") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Tested-by: IncogCyberpunk <incogcyberpunk(a)proton.me> Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders(a)chromium.org> --- Changes in v3: - Added Cc to stable. - Added IncogCyberpunk Tested-by tag. - v2: https://patch.msgid.link/20251119092641.v2.1.I1ae7aebc967e52c7c4be7aa65fbd8… Changes in v2: - Rebase atop commit 529ac8e706c3 ("Bluetooth: ... mtk iso interface") - v1: https://patch.msgid.link/20251119085354.1.I1ae7aebc967e52c7c4be7aa65fbd8173… drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c b/drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c index fcc62e2fb641..683ac02e964b 100644 --- a/drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c +++ b/drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c @@ -2751,6 +2751,11 @@ static void btusb_mtk_claim_iso_intf(struct btusb_data *data) if (!btmtk_data) return; + if (!btmtk_data->isopkt_intf) { + bt_dev_err(data->hdev, "Can't claim NULL iso interface"); + return; + } + /* * The function usb_driver_claim_interface() is documented to need * locks held if it's not called from a probe routine. The code here -- 2.52.0.rc1.455.g30608eb744-goog

3 weeks, 4 days

6
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[PATCH] LoongArch: Fix arch_dup_task_struct() for CONFIG_RANDSTRUCT

by Huacai Chen

Now the optimized version of arch_dup_task_struct() for LoongArch assumes 'thread' is the last member of 'task_struct'. But this is not true if CONFIG_RANDSTRUCT is enabled after Linux-6.16. So fix the arch_dup_task_struct() function for CONFIG_RANDSTRUCT by copying the whole 'task_struct'. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai(a)loongson.cn> --- arch/loongarch/kernel/process.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/loongarch/kernel/process.c b/arch/loongarch/kernel/process.c index efd9edf65603..d1e04f9e0f79 100644 --- a/arch/loongarch/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/loongarch/kernel/process.c @@ -130,6 +130,11 @@ int arch_dup_task_struct(struct task_struct *dst, struct task_struct *src) preempt_enable(); + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDSTRUCT)) { + memcpy(dst, src, sizeof(struct task_struct)); + return 0; + } + if (!used_math()) memcpy(dst, src, offsetof(struct task_struct, thread.fpu.fpr)); else -- 2.47.3

3 weeks, 4 days

1
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[PATCH] ksmbd: ipc: fix use-after-free in ipc_msg_send_request

by Qianchang Zhao

ipc_msg_send_request() waits for a generic netlink reply using an ipc_msg_table_entry on the stack. The generic netlink handler (handle_generic_event()/handle_response()) fills entry->response under ipc_msg_table_lock, but ipc_msg_send_request() used to validate and free entry->response without holding the same lock. Under high concurrency this allows a race where handle_response() is copying data into entry->response while ipc_msg_send_request() has just freed it, leading to a slab-use-after-free reported by KASAN in handle_generic_event(): BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in handle_generic_event+0x3c4/0x5f0 [ksmbd] Write of size 12 at addr ffff888198ee6e20 by task pool/109349 ... Freed by task: kvfree ipc_msg_send_request [ksmbd] ksmbd_rpc_open -> ksmbd_session_rpc_open [ksmbd] Fix by: - Taking ipc_msg_table_lock in ipc_msg_send_request() while validating entry->response, freeing it when invalid, and removing the entry from ipc_msg_table. - Returning the final entry->response pointer to the caller only after the hash entry is removed under the lock. - Returning NULL in the error path, preserving the original API semantics. This makes all accesses to entry->response consistent with handle_response(), which already updates and fills the response buffer under ipc_msg_table_lock, and closes the race that allowed the UAF. Reported-by: Qianchang Zhao <pioooooooooip(a)gmail.com> Reported-by: Zhitong Liu <liuzhitong1993(a)gmail.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Qianchang Zhao <pioooooooooip(a)gmail.com> --- fs/smb/server/transport_ipc.c | 13 ++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/smb/server/transport_ipc.c b/fs/smb/server/transport_ipc.c index 46f87fd1c..7b1a060da 100644 --- a/fs/smb/server/transport_ipc.c +++ b/fs/smb/server/transport_ipc.c @@ -532,6 +532,7 @@ static int ipc_validate_msg(struct ipc_msg_table_entry *entry) static void *ipc_msg_send_request(struct ksmbd_ipc_msg *msg, unsigned int handle) { struct ipc_msg_table_entry entry; + void *response = NULL; int ret; if ((int)handle < 0) @@ -553,6 +554,8 @@ static void *ipc_msg_send_request(struct ksmbd_ipc_msg *msg, unsigned int handle ret = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(entry.wait, entry.response != NULL, IPC_WAIT_TIMEOUT); + + down_write(&ipc_msg_table_lock); if (entry.response) { ret = ipc_validate_msg(&entry); if (ret) { @@ -560,11 +563,19 @@ static void *ipc_msg_send_request(struct ksmbd_ipc_msg *msg, unsigned int handle entry.response = NULL; } } + + response = entry.response; + hash_del(&entry.ipc_table_hlist); + up_write(&ipc_msg_table_lock); + + return response; + out: down_write(&ipc_msg_table_lock); hash_del(&entry.ipc_table_hlist); up_write(&ipc_msg_table_lock); - return entry.response; + + return NULL; } static int ksmbd_ipc_heartbeat_request(void) -- 2.34.1

3 weeks, 4 days

2
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[PATCH] smb: client: fix memory leak in cifs_construct_tcon()

by Paulo Alcantara

When having a multiuser mount with domain= specified and using cifscreds, cifs_set_cifscreds() will end up setting @ctx->domainname, so it needs to be freed before leaving cifs_construct_tcon(). This fixes the following memory leak reported by kmemleak: mount.cifs //srv/share /mnt -o domain=ZELDA,multiuser,... su - testuser cifscreds add -d ZELDA -u testuser ... ls /mnt/1 ... umount /mnt echo scan > /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak cat /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak unreferenced object 0xffff8881203c3f08 (size 8): comm "ls", pid 5060, jiffies 4307222943 hex dump (first 8 bytes): 5a 45 4c 44 41 00 cc cc ZELDA... backtrace (crc d109a8cf): __kmalloc_node_track_caller_noprof+0x572/0x710 kstrdup+0x3a/0x70 cifs_sb_tlink+0x1209/0x1770 [cifs] cifs_get_fattr+0xe1/0xf50 [cifs] cifs_get_inode_info+0xb5/0x240 [cifs] cifs_revalidate_dentry_attr+0x2d1/0x470 [cifs] cifs_getattr+0x28e/0x450 [cifs] vfs_getattr_nosec+0x126/0x180 vfs_statx+0xf6/0x220 do_statx+0xab/0x110 __x64_sys_statx+0xd5/0x130 do_syscall_64+0xbb/0x380 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Fixes: f2aee329a68f ("cifs: set domainName when a domain-key is used in multiuser") Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) <pc(a)manguebit.org> Cc: Jay Shin <jaeshin(a)redhat.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-cifs(a)vger.kernel.org --- fs/smb/client/connect.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/fs/smb/client/connect.c b/fs/smb/client/connect.c index 55cb4b0cbd48..2f94d93b95e9 100644 --- a/fs/smb/client/connect.c +++ b/fs/smb/client/connect.c @@ -4451,6 +4451,7 @@ cifs_construct_tcon(struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb, kuid_t fsuid) out: kfree(ctx->username); + kfree(ctx->domainname); kfree_sensitive(ctx->password); kfree(origin_fullpath); kfree(ctx); -- 2.51.1

3 weeks, 4 days

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Re: [PATCH] e1000: fix OOB in e1000_tbi_should_accept()

by Tony Nguyen

On 11/23/2025 7:45 PM, Guangshuo Li wrote: > Hi Tony, all, > > Thanks for the review. As suggested by Tony, I’ll keep the declarations > at the top and place the bounds checks before assigning last_byte. I’ll > send a v2 with the following change: > > static bool e1000_tbi_should_accept(struct e1000_adapter *adapter, > u8 status, u8 errors, > u32 length, const u8 *data) > { > struct e1000_hw *hw = &adapter->hw; > u8 last_byte; > > /* Guard against OOB on data[length - 1] */ > if (unlikely(!length)) > return false; > > /* Upper bound: length must not exceed rx_buffer_len */ > if (unlikely(length > adapter->rx_buffer_len)) > return false; > > last_byte = data[length - 1]; > > /* existing logic follows ... */ > } > Please let me know if further adjustments are preferred. This looks along the lines of what I was expecting. Thanks, Tony > Best regards, > Guangshuo Li

3 weeks, 5 days

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Re: [PATCH] fuse: fix io-uring list corruption for terminated non-committed requests

by Joanne Koong

On Tue, Nov 25, 2025 at 10:15 AM Joanne Koong <joannelkoong(a)gmail.com> wrote: > > When a request is terminated before it has been committed, the request > is not removed from the queue's list. This leaves a dangling list entry > that leads to list corruption and use-after-free issues. > > Remove the request from the queue's list for terminated non-committed > requests. > > Signed-off-by: Joanne Koong <joannelkoong(a)gmail.com> > Fixes: c090c8abae4b ("fuse: Add io-uring sqe commit and fetch support") Sorry, forgot to add the stable tag. There should be this line: Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org > --- > fs/fuse/dev_uring.c | 1 + > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) > > diff --git a/fs/fuse/dev_uring.c b/fs/fuse/dev_uring.c > index 0066c9c0a5d5..7760fe4e1f9e 100644 > --- a/fs/fuse/dev_uring.c > +++ b/fs/fuse/dev_uring.c > @@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ static void fuse_uring_req_end(struct fuse_ring_ent *ent, struct fuse_req *req, > lockdep_assert_not_held(&queue->lock); > spin_lock(&queue->lock); > ent->fuse_req = NULL; > + list_del_init(&req->list); > if (test_bit(FR_BACKGROUND, &req->flags)) { > queue->active_background--; > spin_lock(&fc->bg_lock); > -- > 2.47.3 >

3 weeks, 5 days

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[patch 1/3] x86/msi: Make irq_retrigger() functional for posted MSI

by Thomas Gleixner

Luigi reported that retriggering a posted MSI interrupt does not work correctly. The reason is that the retrigger happens at the vector domain by sending an IPI to the actual vector on the target CPU. That works correctly exactly once because the posted MSI interrupt chip does not issue an EOI as that's only required for the posted MSI notification vector itself. As a consequence the vector becomes stale in the ISR, which not only affects this vector but also any lower priority vector in the affected APIC because the ISR bit is not cleared. Luigi proposed to set the vector in the remap PIR bitmap and raise the posted MSI notification vector. That works, but that still does not cure a related problem: If there is ever a stray interrupt on such a vector, then the related APIC ISR bit becomes stale due to the lack of EOI as described above. Unlikely to happen, but if it happens it's not debuggable at all. So instead of playing games with the PIR, this can be actually solved for both cases by: 1) Keeping track of the posted interrupt vector handler state 2) Implementing a posted MSI specific irq_ack() callback which checks that state. If the posted vector handler is inactive it issues an EOI, otherwise it delegates that to the posted handler. This is correct versus affinity changes and concurrent events on the posted vector as the actual handler invocation is serialized through the interrupt descriptor lock. Fixes: ed1e48ea4370 ("iommu/vt-d: Enable posted mode for device MSIs") Reported-by: Luigi Rizzo <lrizzo(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Tested-by: Luigi Rizzo <lrizzo(a)google.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20251124104836.3685533-1-lrizzo@google.com --- arch/x86/include/asm/irq_remapping.h | 7 +++++++ arch/x86/kernel/irq.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/iommu/intel/irq_remapping.c | 8 ++++---- 3 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/irq_remapping.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/irq_remapping.h @@ -87,4 +87,11 @@ static inline void panic_if_irq_remap(co } #endif /* CONFIG_IRQ_REMAP */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_POSTED_MSI +void intel_ack_posted_msi_irq(struct irq_data *irqd); +#else +#define intel_ack_posted_msi_irq NULL +#endif + #endif /* __X86_IRQ_REMAPPING_H */ --- a/arch/x86/kernel/irq.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/irq.c @@ -397,6 +397,7 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_SYSVEC_SIMPLE(sysvec_kvm /* Posted Interrupt Descriptors for coalesced MSIs to be posted */ DEFINE_PER_CPU_ALIGNED(struct pi_desc, posted_msi_pi_desc); +static DEFINE_PER_CPU_CACHE_HOT(bool, posted_msi_handler_active); void intel_posted_msi_init(void) { @@ -414,6 +415,25 @@ void intel_posted_msi_init(void) this_cpu_write(posted_msi_pi_desc.ndst, destination); } +void intel_ack_posted_msi_irq(struct irq_data *irqd) +{ + irq_move_irq(irqd); + + /* + * Handle the rare case that irq_retrigger() raised the actual + * assigned vector on the target CPU, which means that it was not + * invoked via the posted MSI handler below. In that case APIC EOI + * is required as otherwise the ISR entry becomes stale and lower + * priority interrupts are never going to be delivered after that. + * + * If the posted handler invoked the device interrupt handler then + * the EOI would be premature because it would acknowledge the + * posted vector. + */ + if (unlikely(!this_cpu_read(posted_msi_handler_active))) + apic_eoi(); +} + static __always_inline bool handle_pending_pir(unsigned long *pir, struct pt_regs *regs) { unsigned long pir_copy[NR_PIR_WORDS]; @@ -446,6 +466,8 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_SYSVEC(sysvec_posted_msi pid = this_cpu_ptr(&posted_msi_pi_desc); + /* Mark the handler active for intel_ack_posted_msi_irq() */ + this_cpu_write(posted_msi_handler_active, true); inc_irq_stat(posted_msi_notification_count); irq_enter(); @@ -474,6 +496,7 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_SYSVEC(sysvec_posted_msi apic_eoi(); irq_exit(); + this_cpu_write(posted_msi_handler_active, false); set_irq_regs(old_regs); } #endif /* X86_POSTED_MSI */ --- a/drivers/iommu/intel/irq_remapping.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/irq_remapping.c @@ -1303,17 +1303,17 @@ static struct irq_chip intel_ir_chip = { * irq_enter(); * handle_edge_irq() * irq_chip_ack_parent() - * irq_move_irq(); // No EOI + * intel_ack_posted_msi_irq(); // No EOI * handle_irq_event() * driver_handler() * handle_edge_irq() * irq_chip_ack_parent() - * irq_move_irq(); // No EOI + * intel_ack_posted_msi_irq(); // No EOI * handle_irq_event() * driver_handler() * handle_edge_irq() * irq_chip_ack_parent() - * irq_move_irq(); // No EOI + * intel_ack_posted_msi_irq(); // No EOI * handle_irq_event() * driver_handler() * apic_eoi() @@ -1322,7 +1322,7 @@ static struct irq_chip intel_ir_chip = { */ static struct irq_chip intel_ir_chip_post_msi = { .name = "INTEL-IR-POST", - .irq_ack = irq_move_irq, + .irq_ack = intel_ack_posted_msi_irq, .irq_set_affinity = intel_ir_set_affinity, .irq_compose_msi_msg = intel_ir_compose_msi_msg, .irq_set_vcpu_affinity = intel_ir_set_vcpu_affinity,

3 weeks, 5 days

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by Valeria Pérez

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3 weeks, 5 days

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[PATCH] media: ipu6: isys: csi2: guard NULL remote pad/subdev on enable/disable

by Alexei Safin

media_pad_remote_pad_first() may return NULL when the media link is absent or disabled. The code dereferenced remote_pad->entity unconditionally, leading to a possible NULL dereference. On the disable path, always shut down the local stream when the remote pad or subdev is missing and then return 0, preserving local shutdown semantics and avoiding a crash. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. Fixes: 3a5c59ad926b ("media: ipu6: Rework CSI-2 sub-device streaming control") Signed-off-by: Alexei Safin <a.safin(a)rosa.ru> --- drivers/media/pci/intel/ipu6/ipu6-isys-csi2.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/media/pci/intel/ipu6/ipu6-isys-csi2.c b/drivers/media/pci/intel/ipu6/ipu6-isys-csi2.c index 08148bfc2b4b..4a75b0b6c525 100644 --- a/drivers/media/pci/intel/ipu6/ipu6-isys-csi2.c +++ b/drivers/media/pci/intel/ipu6/ipu6-isys-csi2.c @@ -358,7 +358,12 @@ static int ipu6_isys_csi2_enable_streams(struct v4l2_subdev *sd, int ret; remote_pad = media_pad_remote_pad_first(&sd->entity.pads[CSI2_PAD_SINK]); + if (!remote_pad) + return -ENOLINK; + remote_sd = media_entity_to_v4l2_subdev(remote_pad->entity); + if (!remote_sd) + return -ENODEV; sink_streams = v4l2_subdev_state_xlate_streams(state, pad, CSI2_PAD_SINK, @@ -395,7 +400,16 @@ static int ipu6_isys_csi2_disable_streams(struct v4l2_subdev *sd, &streams_mask); remote_pad = media_pad_remote_pad_first(&sd->entity.pads[CSI2_PAD_SINK]); + if (!remote_pad) { + ipu6_isys_csi2_set_stream(sd, NULL, 0, false); + return 0; + } + remote_sd = media_entity_to_v4l2_subdev(remote_pad->entity); + if (!remote_sd) { + ipu6_isys_csi2_set_stream(sd, NULL, 0, false); + return 0; + } ipu6_isys_csi2_set_stream(sd, NULL, 0, false); -- 2.50.1 (Apple Git-155)

3 weeks, 5 days

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