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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] mptcp: schedule rtx timer only after pushing data" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 2ea6190f42d0416a4310e60a7fcb0b49fcbbd4fb # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025122952-supervise-regulate-a26b@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 2ea6190f42d0416a4310e60a7fcb0b49fcbbd4fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2025 19:55:16 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] mptcp: schedule rtx timer only after pushing data The MPTCP protocol usually schedule the retransmission timer only when there is some chances for such retransmissions to happen. With a notable exception: __mptcp_push_pending() currently schedule such timer unconditionally, potentially leading to unnecessary rtx timer expiration. The issue is present since the blamed commit below but become easily reproducible after commit 27b0e701d387 ("mptcp: drop bogus optimization in __mptcp_check_push()") Fixes: 33d41c9cd74c ("mptcp: more accurate timeout") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251205-net-mptcp-misc-fixes-6-19-rc1-v1-3-9e4781… Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> diff --git a/net/mptcp/protocol.c b/net/mptcp/protocol.c index e212c1374bd0..d8a7f7029164 100644 --- a/net/mptcp/protocol.c +++ b/net/mptcp/protocol.c @@ -1623,7 +1623,7 @@ void __mptcp_push_pending(struct sock *sk, unsigned int flags) struct mptcp_sendmsg_info info = { .flags = flags, }; - bool do_check_data_fin = false; + bool copied = false; int push_count = 1; while (mptcp_send_head(sk) && (push_count > 0)) { @@ -1665,7 +1665,7 @@ void __mptcp_push_pending(struct sock *sk, unsigned int flags) push_count--; continue; } - do_check_data_fin = true; + copied = true; } } } @@ -1674,11 +1674,14 @@ void __mptcp_push_pending(struct sock *sk, unsigned int flags) if (ssk) mptcp_push_release(ssk, &info); - /* ensure the rtx timer is running */ - if (!mptcp_rtx_timer_pending(sk)) - mptcp_reset_rtx_timer(sk); - if (do_check_data_fin) + /* Avoid scheduling the rtx timer if no data has been pushed; the timer + * will be updated on positive acks by __mptcp_cleanup_una(). + */ + if (copied) { + if (!mptcp_rtx_timer_pending(sk)) + mptcp_reset_rtx_timer(sk); mptcp_check_send_data_fin(sk); + } } static void __mptcp_subflow_push_pending(struct sock *sk, struct sock *ssk, bool first)

1 week, 1 day

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] selftests: mptcp: pm: ensure unknown flags are ignored" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 29f4801e9c8dfd12bdcb33b61a6ac479c7162bd7 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025122947-enforced-elective-e753@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 29f4801e9c8dfd12bdcb33b61a6ac479c7162bd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Matthieu Baerts (NGI0)" <matttbe(a)kernel.org> Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2025 19:55:15 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] selftests: mptcp: pm: ensure unknown flags are ignored This validates the previous commit: the userspace can set unknown flags -- the 7th bit is currently unused -- without errors, but only the supported ones are printed in the endpoints dumps. The 'Fixes' tag here below is the same as the one from the previous commit: this patch here is not fixing anything wrong in the selftests, but it validates the previous fix for an issue introduced by this commit ID. Fixes: 01cacb00b35c ("mptcp: add netlink-based PM") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Mat Martineau <martineau(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251205-net-mptcp-misc-fixes-6-19-rc1-v1-2-9e4781… Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/pm_netlink.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/pm_netlink.sh index ec6a87588191..123d9d7a0278 100755 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/pm_netlink.sh +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/pm_netlink.sh @@ -192,6 +192,10 @@ check "show_endpoints" \ flush_endpoint check "show_endpoints" "" "flush addrs" +add_endpoint 10.0.1.1 flags unknown +check "show_endpoints" "$(format_endpoints "1,10.0.1.1")" "ignore unknown flags" +flush_endpoint + set_limits 9 1 2>/dev/null check "get_limits" "${default_limits}" "rcv addrs above hard limit" diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/pm_nl_ctl.c b/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/pm_nl_ctl.c index 65b374232ff5..99eecccbf0c8 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/pm_nl_ctl.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/pm_nl_ctl.c @@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ #define IPPROTO_MPTCP 262 #endif +#define MPTCP_PM_ADDR_FLAG_UNKNOWN _BITUL(7) + static void syntax(char *argv[]) { fprintf(stderr, "%s add|ann|rem|csf|dsf|get|set|del|flush|dump|events|listen|accept [<args>]\n", argv[0]); @@ -836,6 +838,8 @@ int add_addr(int fd, int pm_family, int argc, char *argv[]) flags |= MPTCP_PM_ADDR_FLAG_BACKUP; else if (!strcmp(tok, "fullmesh")) flags |= MPTCP_PM_ADDR_FLAG_FULLMESH; + else if (!strcmp(tok, "unknown")) + flags |= MPTCP_PM_ADDR_FLAG_UNKNOWN; else error(1, errno, "unknown flag %s", argv[arg]); @@ -1048,6 +1052,13 @@ static void print_addr(struct rtattr *attrs, int len) printf(","); } + if (flags & MPTCP_PM_ADDR_FLAG_UNKNOWN) { + printf("unknown"); + flags &= ~MPTCP_PM_ADDR_FLAG_UNKNOWN; + if (flags) + printf(","); + } + /* bump unknown flags, if any */ if (flags) printf("0x%x", flags);

1 week, 1 day

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] selftests: mptcp: pm: ensure unknown flags are ignored" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 29f4801e9c8dfd12bdcb33b61a6ac479c7162bd7 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025122947-clapping-zookeeper-5d32@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 29f4801e9c8dfd12bdcb33b61a6ac479c7162bd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Matthieu Baerts (NGI0)" <matttbe(a)kernel.org> Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2025 19:55:15 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] selftests: mptcp: pm: ensure unknown flags are ignored This validates the previous commit: the userspace can set unknown flags -- the 7th bit is currently unused -- without errors, but only the supported ones are printed in the endpoints dumps. The 'Fixes' tag here below is the same as the one from the previous commit: this patch here is not fixing anything wrong in the selftests, but it validates the previous fix for an issue introduced by this commit ID. Fixes: 01cacb00b35c ("mptcp: add netlink-based PM") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Mat Martineau <martineau(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251205-net-mptcp-misc-fixes-6-19-rc1-v1-2-9e4781… Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/pm_netlink.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/pm_netlink.sh index ec6a87588191..123d9d7a0278 100755 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/pm_netlink.sh +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/pm_netlink.sh @@ -192,6 +192,10 @@ check "show_endpoints" \ flush_endpoint check "show_endpoints" "" "flush addrs" +add_endpoint 10.0.1.1 flags unknown +check "show_endpoints" "$(format_endpoints "1,10.0.1.1")" "ignore unknown flags" +flush_endpoint + set_limits 9 1 2>/dev/null check "get_limits" "${default_limits}" "rcv addrs above hard limit" diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/pm_nl_ctl.c b/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/pm_nl_ctl.c index 65b374232ff5..99eecccbf0c8 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/pm_nl_ctl.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/pm_nl_ctl.c @@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ #define IPPROTO_MPTCP 262 #endif +#define MPTCP_PM_ADDR_FLAG_UNKNOWN _BITUL(7) + static void syntax(char *argv[]) { fprintf(stderr, "%s add|ann|rem|csf|dsf|get|set|del|flush|dump|events|listen|accept [<args>]\n", argv[0]); @@ -836,6 +838,8 @@ int add_addr(int fd, int pm_family, int argc, char *argv[]) flags |= MPTCP_PM_ADDR_FLAG_BACKUP; else if (!strcmp(tok, "fullmesh")) flags |= MPTCP_PM_ADDR_FLAG_FULLMESH; + else if (!strcmp(tok, "unknown")) + flags |= MPTCP_PM_ADDR_FLAG_UNKNOWN; else error(1, errno, "unknown flag %s", argv[arg]); @@ -1048,6 +1052,13 @@ static void print_addr(struct rtattr *attrs, int len) printf(","); } + if (flags & MPTCP_PM_ADDR_FLAG_UNKNOWN) { + printf("unknown"); + flags &= ~MPTCP_PM_ADDR_FLAG_UNKNOWN; + if (flags) + printf(","); + } + /* bump unknown flags, if any */ if (flags) printf("0x%x", flags);

1 week, 1 day

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] selftests: mptcp: pm: ensure unknown flags are ignored" failed to apply to 6.6-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.6-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.6.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 29f4801e9c8dfd12bdcb33b61a6ac479c7162bd7 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025122946-puppet-visiting-41e4@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.6.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 29f4801e9c8dfd12bdcb33b61a6ac479c7162bd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Matthieu Baerts (NGI0)" <matttbe(a)kernel.org> Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2025 19:55:15 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] selftests: mptcp: pm: ensure unknown flags are ignored This validates the previous commit: the userspace can set unknown flags -- the 7th bit is currently unused -- without errors, but only the supported ones are printed in the endpoints dumps. The 'Fixes' tag here below is the same as the one from the previous commit: this patch here is not fixing anything wrong in the selftests, but it validates the previous fix for an issue introduced by this commit ID. Fixes: 01cacb00b35c ("mptcp: add netlink-based PM") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Mat Martineau <martineau(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251205-net-mptcp-misc-fixes-6-19-rc1-v1-2-9e4781… Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/pm_netlink.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/pm_netlink.sh index ec6a87588191..123d9d7a0278 100755 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/pm_netlink.sh +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/pm_netlink.sh @@ -192,6 +192,10 @@ check "show_endpoints" \ flush_endpoint check "show_endpoints" "" "flush addrs" +add_endpoint 10.0.1.1 flags unknown +check "show_endpoints" "$(format_endpoints "1,10.0.1.1")" "ignore unknown flags" +flush_endpoint + set_limits 9 1 2>/dev/null check "get_limits" "${default_limits}" "rcv addrs above hard limit" diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/pm_nl_ctl.c b/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/pm_nl_ctl.c index 65b374232ff5..99eecccbf0c8 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/pm_nl_ctl.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/pm_nl_ctl.c @@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ #define IPPROTO_MPTCP 262 #endif +#define MPTCP_PM_ADDR_FLAG_UNKNOWN _BITUL(7) + static void syntax(char *argv[]) { fprintf(stderr, "%s add|ann|rem|csf|dsf|get|set|del|flush|dump|events|listen|accept [<args>]\n", argv[0]); @@ -836,6 +838,8 @@ int add_addr(int fd, int pm_family, int argc, char *argv[]) flags |= MPTCP_PM_ADDR_FLAG_BACKUP; else if (!strcmp(tok, "fullmesh")) flags |= MPTCP_PM_ADDR_FLAG_FULLMESH; + else if (!strcmp(tok, "unknown")) + flags |= MPTCP_PM_ADDR_FLAG_UNKNOWN; else error(1, errno, "unknown flag %s", argv[arg]); @@ -1048,6 +1052,13 @@ static void print_addr(struct rtattr *attrs, int len) printf(","); } + if (flags & MPTCP_PM_ADDR_FLAG_UNKNOWN) { + printf("unknown"); + flags &= ~MPTCP_PM_ADDR_FLAG_UNKNOWN; + if (flags) + printf(","); + } + /* bump unknown flags, if any */ if (flags) printf("0x%x", flags);

1 week, 1 day

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] selftests: mptcp: pm: ensure unknown flags are ignored" failed to apply to 6.1-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.1-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.1.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 29f4801e9c8dfd12bdcb33b61a6ac479c7162bd7 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025122946-wharf-satin-c518@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.1.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 29f4801e9c8dfd12bdcb33b61a6ac479c7162bd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Matthieu Baerts (NGI0)" <matttbe(a)kernel.org> Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2025 19:55:15 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] selftests: mptcp: pm: ensure unknown flags are ignored This validates the previous commit: the userspace can set unknown flags -- the 7th bit is currently unused -- without errors, but only the supported ones are printed in the endpoints dumps. The 'Fixes' tag here below is the same as the one from the previous commit: this patch here is not fixing anything wrong in the selftests, but it validates the previous fix for an issue introduced by this commit ID. Fixes: 01cacb00b35c ("mptcp: add netlink-based PM") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Mat Martineau <martineau(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251205-net-mptcp-misc-fixes-6-19-rc1-v1-2-9e4781… Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/pm_netlink.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/pm_netlink.sh index ec6a87588191..123d9d7a0278 100755 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/pm_netlink.sh +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/pm_netlink.sh @@ -192,6 +192,10 @@ check "show_endpoints" \ flush_endpoint check "show_endpoints" "" "flush addrs" +add_endpoint 10.0.1.1 flags unknown +check "show_endpoints" "$(format_endpoints "1,10.0.1.1")" "ignore unknown flags" +flush_endpoint + set_limits 9 1 2>/dev/null check "get_limits" "${default_limits}" "rcv addrs above hard limit" diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/pm_nl_ctl.c b/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/pm_nl_ctl.c index 65b374232ff5..99eecccbf0c8 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/pm_nl_ctl.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/pm_nl_ctl.c @@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ #define IPPROTO_MPTCP 262 #endif +#define MPTCP_PM_ADDR_FLAG_UNKNOWN _BITUL(7) + static void syntax(char *argv[]) { fprintf(stderr, "%s add|ann|rem|csf|dsf|get|set|del|flush|dump|events|listen|accept [<args>]\n", argv[0]); @@ -836,6 +838,8 @@ int add_addr(int fd, int pm_family, int argc, char *argv[]) flags |= MPTCP_PM_ADDR_FLAG_BACKUP; else if (!strcmp(tok, "fullmesh")) flags |= MPTCP_PM_ADDR_FLAG_FULLMESH; + else if (!strcmp(tok, "unknown")) + flags |= MPTCP_PM_ADDR_FLAG_UNKNOWN; else error(1, errno, "unknown flag %s", argv[arg]); @@ -1048,6 +1052,13 @@ static void print_addr(struct rtattr *attrs, int len) printf(","); } + if (flags & MPTCP_PM_ADDR_FLAG_UNKNOWN) { + printf("unknown"); + flags &= ~MPTCP_PM_ADDR_FLAG_UNKNOWN; + if (flags) + printf(","); + } + /* bump unknown flags, if any */ if (flags) printf("0x%x", flags);

1 week, 1 day

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] selftests: mptcp: pm: ensure unknown flags are ignored" failed to apply to 6.12-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

1 week, 1 day

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] tpm2-sessions: Fix out of range indexing in name_size" failed to apply to 6.12-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.12-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.12.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 6e9722e9a7bfe1bbad649937c811076acf86e1fd # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025122957-risotto-carnage-e13f@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.12.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 6e9722e9a7bfe1bbad649937c811076acf86e1fd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> Date: Sun, 30 Nov 2025 21:07:12 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] tpm2-sessions: Fix out of range indexing in name_size 'name_size' does not have any range checks, and it just directly indexes with TPM_ALG_ID, which could lead into memory corruption at worst. Address the issue by only processing known values and returning -EINVAL for unrecognized values. Make also 'tpm_buf_append_name' and 'tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session' fallible so that errors are detected before causing any spurious TPM traffic. End also the authorization session on failure in both of the functions, as the session state would be then by definition corrupted. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.10+ Fixes: 1085b8276bb4 ("tpm: Add the rest of the session HMAC API") Reviewed-by: Jonathan McDowell <noodles(a)meta.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c index dd502322f499..be4a9c7f2e1a 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c @@ -199,7 +199,11 @@ int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, } if (!disable_pcr_integrity) { - tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, pcr_idx, NULL); + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, pcr_idx, NULL); + if (rc) { + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + return rc; + } tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, 0, NULL, 0); } else { tpm_buf_append_handle(chip, &buf, pcr_idx); @@ -214,8 +218,14 @@ int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, chip->allocated_banks[i].digest_size); } - if (!disable_pcr_integrity) - tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (!disable_pcr_integrity) { + rc = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (rc) { + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + return rc; + } + } + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "attempting extend a PCR value"); if (!disable_pcr_integrity) rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc); @@ -273,7 +283,12 @@ int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max) | TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION, NULL, 0); tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, num_bytes); - tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + err = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (err) { + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + return err; + } + err = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, offsetof(struct tpm2_get_random_out, buffer), diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c index 6d03c224e6b2..385014dbca39 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -144,16 +144,23 @@ struct tpm2_auth { /* * Name Size based on TPM algorithm (assumes no hash bigger than 255) */ -static u8 name_size(const u8 *name) +static int name_size(const u8 *name) { - static u8 size_map[] = { - [TPM_ALG_SHA1] = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, - [TPM_ALG_SHA256] = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, - [TPM_ALG_SHA384] = SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE, - [TPM_ALG_SHA512] = SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE, - }; - u16 alg = get_unaligned_be16(name); - return size_map[alg] + 2; + u16 hash_alg = get_unaligned_be16(name); + + switch (hash_alg) { + case TPM_ALG_SHA1: + return SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + 2; + case TPM_ALG_SHA256: + return SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + 2; + case TPM_ALG_SHA384: + return SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE + 2; + case TPM_ALG_SHA512: + return SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE + 2; + default: + pr_warn("tpm: unsupported name algorithm: 0x%04x\n", hash_alg); + return -EINVAL; + } } static int tpm2_parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf) @@ -161,6 +168,7 @@ static int tpm2_parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf) struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; u32 tot_len = be32_to_cpu(head->length); + int ret; u32 val; /* we're starting after the header so adjust the length */ @@ -173,8 +181,13 @@ static int tpm2_parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf) offset += val; /* name */ val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset); - if (val != name_size(&buf->data[offset])) + ret = name_size(&buf->data[offset]); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + if (val != ret) return -EINVAL; + memcpy(name, &buf->data[offset], val); /* forget the rest */ return 0; @@ -221,46 +234,72 @@ static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, char *name) * As with most tpm_buf operations, success is assumed because failure * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a * kernel message. + * + * Ends the authorization session on failure. */ -void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, - u32 handle, u8 *name) +int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, + u32 handle, u8 *name) { #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC enum tpm2_mso_type mso = tpm2_handle_mso(handle); struct tpm2_auth *auth; int slot; + int ret; #endif if (!tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) { tpm_buf_append_handle(chip, buf, handle); - return; + return 0; } #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC slot = (tpm_buf_length(buf) - TPM_HEADER_SIZE) / 4; if (slot >= AUTH_MAX_NAMES) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: too many handles\n"); - return; + dev_err(&chip->dev, "too many handles\n"); + ret = -EIO; + goto err; } auth = chip->auth; - WARN(auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf), - "name added in wrong place\n"); + if (auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf)) { + dev_err(&chip->dev, "session state malformed"); + ret = -EIO; + goto err; + } tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle); auth->session += 4; if (mso == TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT || mso == TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE || mso == TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) { - if (!name) - tpm2_read_public(chip, handle, auth->name[slot]); + if (!name) { + ret = tpm2_read_public(chip, handle, auth->name[slot]); + if (ret) + goto err; + } } else { - if (name) - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: Handle does not require name but one is specified\n"); + if (name) { + dev_err(&chip->dev, "handle 0x%08x does not use a name\n", + handle); + ret = -EIO; + goto err; + } } auth->name_h[slot] = handle; - if (name) - memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, name_size(name)); + if (name) { + ret = name_size(name); + if (ret < 0) + goto err; + + memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, ret); + } +#endif + return 0; + +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC +err: + tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); + return tpm_ret_to_err(ret); #endif } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_name); @@ -533,11 +572,9 @@ static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip, * encryption key and encrypts the first parameter of the command * buffer with it. * - * As with most tpm_buf operations, success is assumed because failure - * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a - * kernel message. + * Ends the authorization session on failure. */ -void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) +int tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) { u32 cc, handles, val; struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth; @@ -549,9 +586,12 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) u8 cphash[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; struct sha256_ctx sctx; struct hmac_sha256_ctx hctx; + int ret; - if (!auth) - return; + if (!auth) { + ret = -EIO; + goto err; + } /* save the command code in BE format */ auth->ordinal = head->ordinal; @@ -560,9 +600,11 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) i = tpm2_find_cc(chip, cc); if (i < 0) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "Command 0x%x not found in TPM\n", cc); - return; + dev_err(&chip->dev, "command 0x%08x not found\n", cc); + ret = -EIO; + goto err; } + attrs = chip->cc_attrs_tbl[i]; handles = (attrs >> TPM2_CC_ATTR_CHANDLES) & GENMASK(2, 0); @@ -576,9 +618,9 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) u32 handle = tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_s); if (auth->name_h[i] != handle) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: handle %d wrong for name\n", - i); - return; + dev_err(&chip->dev, "invalid handle 0x%08x\n", handle); + ret = -EIO; + goto err; } } /* point offset_s to the start of the sessions */ @@ -609,12 +651,14 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) offset_s += len; } if (offset_s != offset_p) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM session length is incorrect\n"); - return; + dev_err(&chip->dev, "session length is incorrect\n"); + ret = -EIO; + goto err; } if (!hmac) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM could not find HMAC session\n"); - return; + dev_err(&chip->dev, "could not find HMAC session\n"); + ret = -EIO; + goto err; } /* encrypt before HMAC */ @@ -646,8 +690,11 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) if (mso == TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT || mso == TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE || mso == TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) { - sha256_update(&sctx, auth->name[i], - name_size(auth->name[i])); + ret = name_size(auth->name[i]); + if (ret < 0) + goto err; + + sha256_update(&sctx, auth->name[i], ret); } else { __be32 h = cpu_to_be32(auth->name_h[i]); @@ -668,6 +715,11 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) hmac_sha256_update(&hctx, auth->tpm_nonce, sizeof(auth->tpm_nonce)); hmac_sha256_update(&hctx, &auth->attrs, 1); hmac_sha256_final(&hctx, hmac); + return 0; + +err: + tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); + return ret; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session); diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index 3d8f7d1ce2b8..aa816b144ab3 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -529,8 +529,8 @@ static inline struct tpm2_auth *tpm2_chip_auth(struct tpm_chip *chip) #endif } -void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, - u32 handle, u8 *name); +int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, + u32 handle, u8 *name); void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase, int passphraselen); @@ -563,7 +563,7 @@ static inline void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session_opt(struct tpm_chip *chip, #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip); -void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf); +int tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf); int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, int rc); void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip); @@ -577,10 +577,13 @@ static inline int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) static inline void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) { } -static inline void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, - struct tpm_buf *buf) + +static inline int tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, + struct tpm_buf *buf) { + return 0; } + static inline int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, int rc) diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index 8bc6efa8accb..5b205279584b 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -268,7 +268,10 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, goto out_put; } - tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + if (rc) + goto out; + tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_DECRYPT, options->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); @@ -316,7 +319,10 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, goto out; } - tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + rc = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (rc) + goto out; + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "sealing data"); rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc); if (rc) @@ -427,7 +433,10 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, return rc; } - tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + if (rc) + goto out; + tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, 0, options->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); @@ -439,7 +448,10 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, goto out; } - tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + rc = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (rc) + goto out; + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "loading blob"); rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc); if (!rc) @@ -484,7 +496,9 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, return rc; } - tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, blob_handle, NULL); + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + if (rc) + goto out; if (!options->policyhandle) { tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, @@ -509,7 +523,10 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, NULL, 0); } - tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + rc = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (rc) + goto out; + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 6, "unsealing"); rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc);

1 week, 1 day

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] mm/huge_memory: merge uniform_split_supported() and" failed to apply to 6.12-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

1 week, 1 day

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] block: Remove queue freezing from several sysfs store" failed to apply to 6.12-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

1 week, 1 day

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] ext4: fix string copying in parse_apply_sb_mount_options()" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x ee5a977b4e771cc181f39d504426dbd31ed701cc # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025122958-ambitious-prenatal-99c2@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From ee5a977b4e771cc181f39d504426dbd31ed701cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin(a)ispras.ru> Date: Sat, 1 Nov 2025 19:04:28 +0300 Subject: [PATCH] ext4: fix string copying in parse_apply_sb_mount_options() strscpy_pad() can't be used to copy a non-NUL-term string into a NUL-term string of possibly bigger size. Commit 0efc5990bca5 ("string.h: Introduce memtostr() and memtostr_pad()") provides additional information in that regard. So if this happens, the following warning is observed: strnlen: detected buffer overflow: 65 byte read of buffer size 64 WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 28655 at lib/string_helpers.c:1032 __fortify_report+0x96/0xc0 lib/string_helpers.c:1032 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 28655 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 6.12.54-syzkaller-00144-g5f0270f1ba00 #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:__fortify_report+0x96/0xc0 lib/string_helpers.c:1032 Call Trace: <TASK> __fortify_panic+0x1f/0x30 lib/string_helpers.c:1039 strnlen include/linux/fortify-string.h:235 [inline] sized_strscpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:309 [inline] parse_apply_sb_mount_options fs/ext4/super.c:2504 [inline] __ext4_fill_super fs/ext4/super.c:5261 [inline] ext4_fill_super+0x3c35/0xad00 fs/ext4/super.c:5706 get_tree_bdev_flags+0x387/0x620 fs/super.c:1636 vfs_get_tree+0x93/0x380 fs/super.c:1814 do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:3553 [inline] path_mount+0x6ae/0x1f70 fs/namespace.c:3880 do_mount fs/namespace.c:3893 [inline] __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4103 [inline] __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4080 [inline] __x64_sys_mount+0x280/0x300 fs/namespace.c:4080 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x64/0x140 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Since userspace is expected to provide s_mount_opts field to be at most 63 characters long with the ending byte being NUL-term, use a 64-byte buffer which matches the size of s_mount_opts, so that strscpy_pad() does its job properly. Return with error if the user still managed to provide a non-NUL-term string here. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller. Fixes: 8ecb790ea8c3 ("ext4: avoid potential buffer over-read in parse_apply_sb_mount_options()") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin(a)ispras.ru> Reviewed-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz> Message-ID: <20251101160430.222297-1-pchelkin(a)ispras.ru> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso(a)mit.edu> diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c index 7de15249e826..d1ba894c0e0a 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/super.c +++ b/fs/ext4/super.c @@ -2476,7 +2476,7 @@ static int parse_apply_sb_mount_options(struct super_block *sb, struct ext4_fs_context *m_ctx) { struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb); - char s_mount_opts[65]; + char s_mount_opts[64]; struct ext4_fs_context *s_ctx = NULL; struct fs_context *fc = NULL; int ret = -ENOMEM; @@ -2484,7 +2484,8 @@ static int parse_apply_sb_mount_options(struct super_block *sb, if (!sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts[0]) return 0; - strscpy_pad(s_mount_opts, sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts); + if (strscpy_pad(s_mount_opts, sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts) < 0) + return -E2BIG; fc = kzalloc(sizeof(struct fs_context), GFP_KERNEL); if (!fc)

1 week, 1 day

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