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[PATCH] wifi: cfg80211: Fix use-after-free in cfg80211_shutdown_all_interfaces

by Daniil Dulov

There is a use-after-free error in cfg80211_shutdown_all_interfaces found by syzkaller: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in cfg80211_shutdown_all_interfaces+0x213/0x220 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888112a78d98 by task kworker/0:5/5326 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5326 Comm: kworker/0:5 Not tainted 6.19.0-rc2 #2 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events cfg80211_rfkill_block_work Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x116/0x1f0 print_report+0xcd/0x630 kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 cfg80211_shutdown_all_interfaces+0x213/0x220 cfg80211_rfkill_block_work+0x1e/0x30 process_one_work+0x9cf/0x1b70 worker_thread+0x6c8/0xf10 kthread+0x3c5/0x780 ret_from_fork+0x56d/0x700 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> The problem arises due to the rfkill_block work is not cancelled when cfg80211 device is being freed. In order to fix the issue cancel the corresponding work before destroying rfkill in cfg80211_dev_free(). Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller. Fixes: 1f87f7d3a3b4 ("cfg80211: add rfkill support") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Daniil Dulov <d.dulov(a)aladdin.ru> --- net/wireless/core.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/net/wireless/core.c b/net/wireless/core.c index 54a34d8d356e..e94f69205f50 100644 --- a/net/wireless/core.c +++ b/net/wireless/core.c @@ -1226,6 +1226,7 @@ void cfg80211_dev_free(struct cfg80211_registered_device *rdev) spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rdev->wiphy_work_lock, flags); cancel_work_sync(&rdev->wiphy_work); + cancel_work_sync(&rdev->rfkill_block); rfkill_destroy(rdev->wiphy.rfkill); list_for_each_entry_safe(reg, treg, &rdev->beacon_registrations, list) { list_del(&reg->list); -- 2.34.1

5 days, 15 hours

[PATCH] mfd: core: Add locking around `mfd_of_node_list`

by Douglas Anderson

Manipulating a list in the kernel isn't safe without some sort of mutual exclusion. Add a mutex any time we access / modify `mfd_of_node_list` to prevent possible crashes. Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Fixes: 466a62d7642f ("mfd: core: Make a best effort attempt to match devices with the correct of_nodes") Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders(a)chromium.org> --- While I have no definitive way to reproduce the crash we've been seeing, it's clear that the `mfd_of_node_list` isn't right at the time of the crash. Code inspection shows the lack of locking. drivers/mfd/mfd-core.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/mfd/mfd-core.c b/drivers/mfd/mfd-core.c index 7d14a1e7631e..c55223ce4327 100644 --- a/drivers/mfd/mfd-core.c +++ b/drivers/mfd/mfd-core.c @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ #include <linux/regulator/consumer.h> static LIST_HEAD(mfd_of_node_list); +static DEFINE_MUTEX(mfd_of_node_mutex); struct mfd_of_node_entry { struct list_head list; @@ -105,9 +106,11 @@ static int mfd_match_of_node_to_dev(struct platform_device *pdev, u64 of_node_addr; /* Skip if OF node has previously been allocated to a device */ - list_for_each_entry(of_entry, &mfd_of_node_list, list) - if (of_entry->np == np) - return -EAGAIN; + scoped_guard(mutex, &mfd_of_node_mutex) { + list_for_each_entry(of_entry, &mfd_of_node_list, list) + if (of_entry->np == np) + return -EAGAIN; + } if (!cell->use_of_reg) /* No of_reg defined - allocate first free compatible match */ @@ -129,7 +132,8 @@ static int mfd_match_of_node_to_dev(struct platform_device *pdev, of_entry->dev = &pdev->dev; of_entry->np = np; - list_add_tail(&of_entry->list, &mfd_of_node_list); + scoped_guard(mutex, &mfd_of_node_mutex) + list_add_tail(&of_entry->list, &mfd_of_node_list); of_node_get(np); device_set_node(&pdev->dev, of_fwnode_handle(np)); @@ -286,11 +290,13 @@ static int mfd_add_device(struct device *parent, int id, if (cell->swnode) device_remove_software_node(&pdev->dev); fail_of_entry: - list_for_each_entry_safe(of_entry, tmp, &mfd_of_node_list, list) - if (of_entry->dev == &pdev->dev) { - list_del(&of_entry->list); - kfree(of_entry); - } + scoped_guard(mutex, &mfd_of_node_mutex) { + list_for_each_entry_safe(of_entry, tmp, &mfd_of_node_list, list) + if (of_entry->dev == &pdev->dev) { + list_del(&of_entry->list); + kfree(of_entry); + } + } fail_alias: regulator_bulk_unregister_supply_alias(&pdev->dev, cell->parent_supplies, @@ -360,11 +366,13 @@ static int mfd_remove_devices_fn(struct device *dev, void *data) if (cell->swnode) device_remove_software_node(&pdev->dev); - list_for_each_entry_safe(of_entry, tmp, &mfd_of_node_list, list) - if (of_entry->dev == &pdev->dev) { - list_del(&of_entry->list); - kfree(of_entry); - } + scoped_guard(mutex, &mfd_of_node_mutex) { + list_for_each_entry_safe(of_entry, tmp, &mfd_of_node_list, list) + if (of_entry->dev == &pdev->dev) { + list_del(&of_entry->list); + kfree(of_entry); + } + } regulator_bulk_unregister_supply_alias(dev, cell->parent_supplies, cell->num_parent_supplies); -- 2.52.0.223.gf5cc29aaa4-goog

5 days, 15 hours

[PATCH v2 1/2] drm/buddy: Prevent BUG_ON by validating rounded allocation

by Sanjay Yadav

When DRM_BUDDY_CONTIGUOUS_ALLOCATION is set, the requested size is rounded up to the next power-of-two via roundup_pow_of_two(). Similarly, for non-contiguous allocations with large min_block_size, the size is aligned up via round_up(). Both operations can produce a rounded size that exceeds mm->size, which later triggers BUG_ON(order > mm->max_order). Example scenarios: - 9G CONTIGUOUS allocation on 10G VRAM memory: roundup_pow_of_two(9G) = 16G > 10G - 9G allocation with 8G min_block_size on 10G VRAM memory: round_up(9G, 8G) = 16G > 10G Fix this by checking the rounded size against mm->size. For non-contiguous or range allocations where size > mm->size is invalid, return -EINVAL immediately. For contiguous allocations without range restrictions, allow the request to fall through to the existing __alloc_contig_try_harder() fallback. This ensures invalid user input returns an error or uses the fallback path instead of hitting BUG_ON. v2: (Matt A) - Add Fixes, Cc stable, and Closes tags for context Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/xe/kernel/-/issues/6712 Fixes: 0a1844bf0b53 ("drm/buddy: Improve contiguous memory allocation") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v6.7+ Cc: Christian König <christian.koenig(a)amd.com> Cc: Arunpravin Paneer Selvam <Arunpravin.PaneerSelvam(a)amd.com> Suggested-by: Matthew Auld <matthew.auld(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sanjay Yadav <sanjay.kumar.yadav(a)intel.com> Reviewed-by: Matthew Auld <matthew.auld(a)intel.com> Reviewed-by: Arunpravin Paneer Selvam <Arunpravin.PaneerSelvam(a)amd.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/drm_buddy.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_buddy.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_buddy.c index 2f279b46bd2c..5141348fc6c9 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_buddy.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_buddy.c @@ -1155,6 +1155,15 @@ int drm_buddy_alloc_blocks(struct drm_buddy *mm, order = fls(pages) - 1; min_order = ilog2(min_block_size) - ilog2(mm->chunk_size); + if (order > mm->max_order || size > mm->size) { + if ((flags & DRM_BUDDY_CONTIGUOUS_ALLOCATION) && + !(flags & DRM_BUDDY_RANGE_ALLOCATION)) + return __alloc_contig_try_harder(mm, original_size, + original_min_size, blocks); + + return -EINVAL; + } + do { order = min(order, (unsigned int)fls(pages) - 1); BUG_ON(order > mm->max_order); -- 2.52.0

5 days, 15 hours

[PATCH] lib/crypto: aes: Fix missing MMU protection for AES S-box

by Eric Biggers

__cacheline_aligned puts the data in the ".data..cacheline_aligned" section, which isn't marked read-only i.e. it doesn't receive MMU protection. Replace it with ____cacheline_aligned which does the right thing and just aligns the data while keeping it in ".rodata". Fixes: b5e0b032b6c3 ("crypto: aes - add generic time invariant AES cipher") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Qingfang Deng <dqfext(a)gmail.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260105074712.498-1-dqfext@gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)kernel.org> --- This patch is targeting libcrypto-fixes lib/crypto/aes.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/lib/crypto/aes.c b/lib/crypto/aes.c index b57fda3460f1..102aaa76bc8d 100644 --- a/lib/crypto/aes.c +++ b/lib/crypto/aes.c @@ -11,11 +11,11 @@ /* * Emit the sbox as volatile const to prevent the compiler from doing * constant folding on sbox references involving fixed indexes. */ -static volatile const u8 __cacheline_aligned aes_sbox[] = { +static volatile const u8 ____cacheline_aligned aes_sbox[] = { 0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5, 0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76, 0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0, 0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0, 0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc, @@ -46,11 +46,11 @@ static volatile const u8 __cacheline_aligned aes_sbox[] = { 0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf, 0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68, 0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16, }; -static volatile const u8 __cacheline_aligned aes_inv_sbox[] = { +static volatile const u8 ____cacheline_aligned aes_inv_sbox[] = { 0x52, 0x09, 0x6a, 0xd5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xa5, 0x38, 0xbf, 0x40, 0xa3, 0x9e, 0x81, 0xf3, 0xd7, 0xfb, 0x7c, 0xe3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9b, 0x2f, 0xff, 0x87, 0x34, 0x8e, 0x43, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xde, 0xe9, 0xcb, 0x54, 0x7b, 0x94, 0x32, 0xa6, 0xc2, 0x23, 0x3d, base-commit: fdfa4339e805276a458a5df9d6caf0b43ad4c439 -- 2.52.0

5 days, 15 hours

[PATCH v6.6] net: stmmac: make sure that ptp_rate is not 0 before configuring EST

by Rahul Sharma

From: Alexis Lothoré <alexis.lothore(a)bootlin.com> If the ptp_rate recorded earlier in the driver happens to be 0, this bogus value will propagate up to EST configuration, where it will trigger a division by 0. Prevent this division by 0 by adding the corresponding check and error code. Suggested-by: Maxime Chevallier <maxime.chevallier(a)bootlin.com> Signed-off-by: Alexis Lothoré <alexis.lothore(a)bootlin.com> Fixes: 8572aec3d0dc ("net: stmmac: Add basic EST support for XGMAC") Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250529-stmmac_tstamp_div-v4-2-d73340a794d5@bootl… Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> [ The context change is due to the commit c3f3b97238f6 ("net: stmmac: Refactor EST implementation") which is irrelevant to the logic of this patch. ] Signed-off-by: Rahul Sharma <black.hawk(a)163.com> --- drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac5.c | 5 +++++ drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwxgmac2_core.c | 5 +++++ 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac5.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac5.c index 8fd167501fa0..0afd4644a985 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac5.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac5.c @@ -597,6 +597,11 @@ int dwmac5_est_configure(void __iomem *ioaddr, struct stmmac_est *cfg, int i, ret = 0x0; u32 ctrl; + if (!ptp_rate) { + pr_warn("Dwmac5: Invalid PTP rate"); + return -EINVAL; + } + ret |= dwmac5_est_write(ioaddr, BTR_LOW, cfg->btr[0], false); ret |= dwmac5_est_write(ioaddr, BTR_HIGH, cfg->btr[1], false); ret |= dwmac5_est_write(ioaddr, TER, cfg->ter, false); diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwxgmac2_core.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwxgmac2_core.c index 0bcb378fa0bc..aab02328a613 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwxgmac2_core.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwxgmac2_core.c @@ -1537,6 +1537,11 @@ static int dwxgmac3_est_configure(void __iomem *ioaddr, struct stmmac_est *cfg, int i, ret = 0x0; u32 ctrl; + if (!ptp_rate) { + pr_warn("Dwxgmac2: Invalid PTP rate"); + return -EINVAL; + } + ret |= dwxgmac3_est_write(ioaddr, XGMAC_BTR_LOW, cfg->btr[0], false); ret |= dwxgmac3_est_write(ioaddr, XGMAC_BTR_HIGH, cfg->btr[1], false); ret |= dwxgmac3_est_write(ioaddr, XGMAC_TER, cfg->ter, false); -- 2.34.1

5 days, 16 hours

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] tpm: Cap the number of PCR banks" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x faf07e611dfa464b201223a7253e9dc5ee0f3c9e # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2026010815-sessions-arrogance-fc04@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From faf07e611dfa464b201223a7253e9dc5ee0f3c9e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen(a)opinsys.com> Date: Tue, 30 Sep 2025 15:58:02 +0300 Subject: [PATCH] tpm: Cap the number of PCR banks tpm2_get_pcr_allocation() does not cap any upper limit for the number of banks. Cap the limit to eight banks so that out of bounds values coming from external I/O cause on only limited harm. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v5.10+ Fixes: bcfff8384f6c ("tpm: dynamically allocate the allocated_banks array") Tested-by: Lai Yi <yi1.lai(a)linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jonathan McDowell <noodles(a)meta.com> Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen(a)opinsys.com> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c index 30d00219f9f3..082b910ddf0d 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c @@ -246,7 +246,6 @@ static void tpm_dev_release(struct device *dev) kfree(chip->work_space.context_buf); kfree(chip->work_space.session_buf); - kfree(chip->allocated_banks); #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC kfree(chip->auth); #endif diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c index cf64c7385105..b49a790f1bd5 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c @@ -799,11 +799,6 @@ int tpm1_pm_suspend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 tpm_suspend_pcr) */ int tpm1_get_pcr_allocation(struct tpm_chip *chip) { - chip->allocated_banks = kcalloc(1, sizeof(*chip->allocated_banks), - GFP_KERNEL); - if (!chip->allocated_banks) - return -ENOMEM; - chip->allocated_banks[0].alg_id = TPM_ALG_SHA1; chip->allocated_banks[0].digest_size = hash_digest_size[HASH_ALGO_SHA1]; chip->allocated_banks[0].crypto_id = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c index 5532e53a2dd3..dd502322f499 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c @@ -550,11 +550,9 @@ ssize_t tpm2_get_pcr_allocation(struct tpm_chip *chip) nr_possible_banks = be32_to_cpup( (__be32 *)&buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 5]); - - chip->allocated_banks = kcalloc(nr_possible_banks, - sizeof(*chip->allocated_banks), - GFP_KERNEL); - if (!chip->allocated_banks) { + if (nr_possible_banks > TPM2_MAX_PCR_BANKS) { + pr_err("tpm: out of bank capacity: %u > %u\n", + nr_possible_banks, TPM2_MAX_PCR_BANKS); rc = -ENOMEM; goto out; } diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index b15360ff78d7..53de9488c509 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -26,7 +26,9 @@ #include <crypto/aes.h> #define TPM_DIGEST_SIZE 20 /* Max TPM v1.2 PCR size */ -#define TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE + +#define TPM2_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE +#define TPM2_MAX_PCR_BANKS 8 struct tpm_chip; struct trusted_key_payload; @@ -68,7 +70,7 @@ enum tpm2_curves { struct tpm_digest { u16 alg_id; - u8 digest[TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; + u8 digest[TPM2_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; } __packed; struct tpm_bank_info { @@ -189,7 +191,7 @@ struct tpm_chip { unsigned int groups_cnt; u32 nr_allocated_banks; - struct tpm_bank_info *allocated_banks; + struct tpm_bank_info allocated_banks[TPM2_MAX_PCR_BANKS]; #ifdef CONFIG_ACPI acpi_handle acpi_dev_handle; char ppi_version[TPM_PPI_VERSION_LEN + 1];

5 days, 16 hours

[PATCH v2 0/1] fs/writeback: skip AS_NO_DATA_INTEGRITY mappings in wait_sb_inodes()

by Joanne Koong

This patch reverts fuse back to its original behavior of sync being a no-op. This fixes the userspace regression reported by Athul and J. upstream in [1][2] where if there is a bug in a fuse server that causes the server to never complete writeback, it will make wait_sb_inodes() wait forever. Thanks, Joanne [1] https://lore.kernel.org/regressions/CAJnrk1ZjQ8W8NzojsvJPRXiv9TuYPNdj8Ye7=C… [2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/aT7JRqhUvZvfUQlV@eldamar.lan/ Changelog: v1: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20251120184211.2379439-1-joannelkoong@gmai… * Change AS_WRITEBACK_MAY_HANG to AS_NO_DATA_INTEGRITY and keep AS_WRITEBACK_MAY_DEADLOCK_ON_RECLAIM as is. Joanne Koong (1): fs/writeback: skip AS_NO_DATA_INTEGRITY mappings in wait_sb_inodes() fs/fs-writeback.c | 3 ++- fs/fuse/file.c | 4 +++- include/linux/pagemap.h | 11 +++++++++++ 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) -- 2.47.3

5 days, 16 hours

[PATCH] drm/amdgpu: don't attach the tlb fence for SI

by Hans de Goede

From: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com> commit eb296c09805ee37dd4ea520a7fb3ec157c31090f upstream. SI hardware doesn't support pasids, user mode queues, or KIQ/MES so there is no need for this. Doing so results in a segfault as these callbacks are non-existent for SI. Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/amd/-/issues/4744 Fixes: f3854e04b708 ("drm/amdgpu: attach tlb fence to the PTs update") Reviewed-by: Timur Kristóf <timur.kristof(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <johannes.goede(a)oss.qualcomm.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vm.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vm.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vm.c index 676e24fb8864..cdcafde3c71a 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vm.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vm.c @@ -1066,7 +1066,9 @@ amdgpu_vm_tlb_flush(struct amdgpu_vm_update_params *params, } /* Prepare a TLB flush fence to be attached to PTs */ - if (!params->unlocked) { + if (!params->unlocked && + /* SI doesn't support pasid or KIQ/MES */ + params->adev->family > AMDGPU_FAMILY_SI) { amdgpu_vm_tlb_fence_create(params->adev, vm, fence); /* Makes sure no PD/PT is freed before the flush */ -- 2.52.0

5 days, 16 hours

[PATCH 5.15 1/2] x86: remove __range_not_ok()

by Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo

From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> commit 36903abedfe8d419e90ce349b2b4ce6dc2883e17 upstream. The __range_not_ok() helper is an x86 (and sparc64) specific interface that does roughly the same thing as __access_ok(), but with different calling conventions. Change this to use the normal interface in order for consistency as we clean up all access_ok() implementations. This changes the limit from TASK_SIZE to TASK_SIZE_MAX, which Al points out is the right thing do do here anyway. The callers have to use __access_ok() instead of the normal access_ok() though, because on x86 that contains a WARN_ON_IN_IRQ() check that cannot be used inside of NMI context while tracing. The check in copy_code() is not needed any more, because this one is already done by copy_from_user_nmi(). Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch(a)infradead.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YgsUKcXGR7r4nINj@zeniv-ca.linux.org.uk/ Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> Stable-dep-of: d319f344561d ("mm: Fix copy_from_user_nofault().") Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo(a)igalia.com> --- arch/x86/events/core.c | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 10 ++++++---- arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c | 6 ------ arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c | 2 +- arch/x86/lib/usercopy.c | 2 +- 5 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/events/core.c b/arch/x86/events/core.c index 9a77c6062c24..fdf1e2aaa5ed 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/core.c @@ -2790,7 +2790,7 @@ perf_callchain_kernel(struct perf_callchain_entry_ctx *entry, struct pt_regs *re static inline int valid_user_frame(const void __user *fp, unsigned long size) { - return (__range_not_ok(fp, size, TASK_SIZE) == 0); + return __access_ok(fp, size); } static unsigned long get_segment_base(unsigned int segment) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h index 3616fd4ba395..66284ac86076 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -16,8 +16,10 @@ * Test whether a block of memory is a valid user space address. * Returns 0 if the range is valid, nonzero otherwise. */ -static inline bool __chk_range_not_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size, unsigned long limit) +static inline bool __chk_range_not_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size) { + unsigned long limit = TASK_SIZE_MAX; + /* * If we have used "sizeof()" for the size, * we know it won't overflow the limit (but @@ -35,10 +37,10 @@ static inline bool __chk_range_not_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size, un return unlikely(addr > limit); } -#define __range_not_ok(addr, size, limit) \ +#define __access_ok(addr, size) \ ({ \ __chk_user_ptr(addr); \ - __chk_range_not_ok((unsigned long __force)(addr), size, limit); \ + !__chk_range_not_ok((unsigned long __force)(addr), size); \ }) #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP @@ -69,7 +71,7 @@ static inline bool pagefault_disabled(void); #define access_ok(addr, size) \ ({ \ WARN_ON_IN_IRQ(); \ - likely(!__range_not_ok(addr, size, TASK_SIZE_MAX)); \ + likely(__access_ok(addr, size)); \ }) extern int __get_user_1(void); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c index 8a8660074284..bf73dbfb2355 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c @@ -81,12 +81,6 @@ static int copy_code(struct pt_regs *regs, u8 *buf, unsigned long src, /* The user space code from other tasks cannot be accessed. */ if (regs != task_pt_regs(current)) return -EPERM; - /* - * Make sure userspace isn't trying to trick us into dumping kernel - * memory by pointing the userspace instruction pointer at it. - */ - if (__chk_range_not_ok(src, nbytes, TASK_SIZE_MAX)) - return -EINVAL; /* * Even if named copy_from_user_nmi() this can be invoked from diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c b/arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c index 15b058eefc4e..ee117fcf46ed 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ copy_stack_frame(const struct stack_frame_user __user *fp, { int ret; - if (__range_not_ok(fp, sizeof(*frame), TASK_SIZE)) + if (!__access_ok(fp, sizeof(*frame))) return 0; ret = 1; diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/usercopy.c b/arch/x86/lib/usercopy.c index c3e8a62ca561..ad0139d25401 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/usercopy.c +++ b/arch/x86/lib/usercopy.c @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ copy_from_user_nmi(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n) { unsigned long ret; - if (__range_not_ok(from, n, TASK_SIZE)) + if (!__access_ok(from, n)) return n; if (!nmi_uaccess_okay()) -- 2.47.3

5 days, 16 hours

[PATCH v6.12 0/4] sched: The newidle balance regression

by Ajay Kaher

This series is to backport following patches for v6.12: link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20251107160645.929564468@infradead.org/ Peter Zijlstra (3): sched/fair: Revert max_newidle_lb_cost bump sched/fair: Small cleanup to sched_balance_newidle() sched/fair: Small cleanup to update_newidle_cost() sched/fair: Proportional newidle balance include/linux/sched/topology.h | 3 ++ kernel/sched/core.c | 3 ++ kernel/sched/fair.c | 74 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------- kernel/sched/features.h | 5 +++ kernel/sched/sched.h | 7 ++++ kernel/sched/topology.c | 6 +++ 6 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) -- 2.40.4

5 days, 16 hours

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