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[PATCH AUTOSEL 6.15 01/34] hfs: fix general protection fault in hfs_find_init()

by Sasha Levin

From: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava(a)dubeyko.com> [ Upstream commit 736a0516a16268995f4898eded49bfef077af709 ] The hfs_find_init() method can trigger the crash if tree pointer is NULL: [ 45.746290][ T9787] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000008: 0000 [#1] SMP KAI [ 45.747287][ T9787] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000040-0x0000000000000047] [ 45.748716][ T9787] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 9787 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.16.0-rc3 #10 PREEMPT(full) [ 45.750250][ T9787] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 45.751983][ T9787] RIP: 0010:hfs_find_init+0x86/0x230 [ 45.752834][ T9787] Code: c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 9a 01 00 00 4c 8d 6b 40 48 c7 45 18 00 00 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc [ 45.755574][ T9787] RSP: 0018:ffffc90015157668 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 45.756432][ T9787] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff819a4d09 [ 45.757457][ T9787] RDX: 0000000000000008 RSI: ffffffff819acd3a RDI: ffffc900151576e8 [ 45.758282][ T9787] RBP: ffffc900151576d0 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 45.758943][ T9787] R10: 0000000080000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000004 [ 45.759619][ T9787] R13: 0000000000000040 R14: ffff88802c50814a R15: 0000000000000000 [ 45.760293][ T9787] FS: 00007ffb72734540(0000) GS:ffff8880cec64000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 45.761050][ T9787] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 45.761606][ T9787] CR2: 00007f9bd8225000 CR3: 000000010979a000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 45.762286][ T9787] Call Trace: [ 45.762570][ T9787] <TASK> [ 45.762824][ T9787] hfs_ext_read_extent+0x190/0x9d0 [ 45.763269][ T9787] ? submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x2dd/0xce0 [ 45.763766][ T9787] ? __pfx_hfs_ext_read_extent+0x10/0x10 [ 45.764250][ T9787] hfs_get_block+0x55f/0x830 [ 45.764646][ T9787] block_read_full_folio+0x36d/0x850 [ 45.765105][ T9787] ? __pfx_hfs_get_block+0x10/0x10 [ 45.765541][ T9787] ? const_folio_flags+0x5b/0x100 [ 45.765972][ T9787] ? __pfx_hfs_read_folio+0x10/0x10 [ 45.766415][ T9787] filemap_read_folio+0xbe/0x290 [ 45.766840][ T9787] ? __pfx_filemap_read_folio+0x10/0x10 [ 45.767325][ T9787] ? __filemap_get_folio+0x32b/0xbf0 [ 45.767780][ T9787] do_read_cache_folio+0x263/0x5c0 [ 45.768223][ T9787] ? __pfx_hfs_read_folio+0x10/0x10 [ 45.768666][ T9787] read_cache_page+0x5b/0x160 [ 45.769070][ T9787] hfs_btree_open+0x491/0x1740 [ 45.769481][ T9787] hfs_mdb_get+0x15e2/0x1fb0 [ 45.769877][ T9787] ? __pfx_hfs_mdb_get+0x10/0x10 [ 45.770316][ T9787] ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 [ 45.770731][ T9787] ? lockdep_init_map_type+0x5c/0x280 [ 45.771200][ T9787] ? lockdep_init_map_type+0x5c/0x280 [ 45.771674][ T9787] hfs_fill_super+0x38e/0x720 [ 45.772092][ T9787] ? __pfx_hfs_fill_super+0x10/0x10 [ 45.772549][ T9787] ? snprintf+0xbe/0x100 [ 45.772931][ T9787] ? __pfx_snprintf+0x10/0x10 [ 45.773350][ T9787] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x129/0x2b0 [ 45.773796][ T9787] ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 [ 45.774215][ T9787] ? set_blocksize+0x40a/0x510 [ 45.774636][ T9787] ? sb_set_blocksize+0x176/0x1d0 [ 45.775087][ T9787] ? setup_bdev_super+0x369/0x730 [ 45.775533][ T9787] get_tree_bdev_flags+0x384/0x620 [ 45.775985][ T9787] ? __pfx_hfs_fill_super+0x10/0x10 [ 45.776453][ T9787] ? __pfx_get_tree_bdev_flags+0x10/0x10 [ 45.776950][ T9787] ? bpf_lsm_capable+0x9/0x10 [ 45.777365][ T9787] ? security_capable+0x80/0x260 [ 45.777803][ T9787] vfs_get_tree+0x8e/0x340 [ 45.778203][ T9787] path_mount+0x13de/0x2010 [ 45.778604][ T9787] ? kmem_cache_free+0x2b0/0x4c0 [ 45.779052][ T9787] ? __pfx_path_mount+0x10/0x10 [ 45.779480][ T9787] ? getname_flags.part.0+0x1c5/0x550 [ 45.779954][ T9787] ? putname+0x154/0x1a0 [ 45.780335][ T9787] __x64_sys_mount+0x27b/0x300 [ 45.780758][ T9787] ? __pfx___x64_sys_mount+0x10/0x10 [ 45.781232][ T9787] do_syscall_64+0xc9/0x480 [ 45.781631][ T9787] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f [ 45.782149][ T9787] RIP: 0033:0x7ffb7265b6ca [ 45.782539][ T9787] Code: 48 8b 0d c9 17 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 [ 45.784212][ T9787] RSP: 002b:00007ffc0c10cfb8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 [ 45.784935][ T9787] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007ffb7265b6ca [ 45.785626][ T9787] RDX: 0000200000000240 RSI: 0000200000000280 RDI: 00007ffc0c10d100 [ 45.786316][ T9787] RBP: 00007ffc0c10d190 R08: 00007ffc0c10d000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 45.787011][ T9787] R10: 0000000000000048 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000560246733250 [ 45.787697][ T9787] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 45.788393][ T9787] </TASK> [ 45.788665][ T9787] Modules linked in: [ 45.789058][ T9787] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 45.789554][ T9787] RIP: 0010:hfs_find_init+0x86/0x230 [ 45.790028][ T9787] Code: c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 9a 01 00 00 4c 8d 6b 40 48 c7 45 18 00 00 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc [ 45.792364][ T9787] RSP: 0018:ffffc90015157668 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 45.793155][ T9787] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff819a4d09 [ 45.794123][ T9787] RDX: 0000000000000008 RSI: ffffffff819acd3a RDI: ffffc900151576e8 [ 45.795105][ T9787] RBP: ffffc900151576d0 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 45.796135][ T9787] R10: 0000000080000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000004 [ 45.797114][ T9787] R13: 0000000000000040 R14: ffff88802c50814a R15: 0000000000000000 [ 45.798024][ T9787] FS: 00007ffb72734540(0000) GS:ffff8880cec64000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 45.799019][ T9787] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 45.799822][ T9787] CR2: 00007f9bd8225000 CR3: 000000010979a000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 45.800747][ T9787] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception The hfs_fill_super() calls hfs_mdb_get() method that tries to construct Extents Tree and Catalog Tree: HFS_SB(sb)->ext_tree = hfs_btree_open(sb, HFS_EXT_CNID, hfs_ext_keycmp); if (!HFS_SB(sb)->ext_tree) { pr_err("unable to open extent tree\n"); goto out; } HFS_SB(sb)->cat_tree = hfs_btree_open(sb, HFS_CAT_CNID, hfs_cat_keycmp); if (!HFS_SB(sb)->cat_tree) { pr_err("unable to open catalog tree\n"); goto out; } However, hfs_btree_open() calls read_mapping_page() that calls hfs_get_block(). And this method calls hfs_ext_read_extent(): static int hfs_ext_read_extent(struct inode *inode, u16 block) { struct hfs_find_data fd; int res; if (block >= HFS_I(inode)->cached_start && block < HFS_I(inode)->cached_start + HFS_I(inode)->cached_blocks) return 0; res = hfs_find_init(HFS_SB(inode->i_sb)->ext_tree, &fd); if (!res) { res = __hfs_ext_cache_extent(&fd, inode, block); hfs_find_exit(&fd); } return res; } The problem here that hfs_find_init() is trying to use HFS_SB(inode->i_sb)->ext_tree that is not initialized yet. It will be initailized when hfs_btree_open() finishes the execution. The patch adds checking of tree pointer in hfs_find_init() and it reworks the logic of hfs_btree_open() by reading the b-tree's header directly from the volume. The read_mapping_page() is exchanged on filemap_grab_folio() that grab the folio from mapping. Then, sb_bread() extracts the b-tree's header content and copy it into the folio. Reported-by: Wenzhi Wang <wenzhi.wang(a)uwaterloo.ca> Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava(a)dubeyko.com> cc: John Paul Adrian Glaubitz <glaubitz(a)physik.fu-berlin.de> cc: Yangtao Li <frank.li(a)vivo.com> cc: linux-fsdevel(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250710213657.108285-1-slava@dubeyko.com Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava(a)dubeyko.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- LLM Generated explanations, may be completely bogus: **YES** This commit should be backported to stable kernel trees. Here's my extensive analysis: ## Critical Bug Fix Analysis This commit fixes a **critical kernel panic** (general protection fault) that can be triggered during normal HFS filesystem operations. The bug represents a serious stability issue that meets stable kernel criteria. ## Root Cause Analysis The crash occurs due to a **use-before-initialization bug** in the HFS filesystem code: 1. **Initialization Order Issue**: When `hfs_fill_super()` is called, it tries to construct the Extents Tree via: ```c HFS_SB(sb)->ext_tree = hfs_btree_open(sb, HFS_EXT_CNID, hfs_ext_keycmp); ``` 2. **Circular Dependency**: During `hfs_btree_open()` execution: - It calls `read_mapping_page()` to read the btree header - This triggers `hfs_get_block()` - Which calls `hfs_ext_read_extent()` - Which tries to use `HFS_SB(inode->i_sb)->ext_tree` via `hfs_find_init()` - But `ext_tree` is NULL because we're still in the process of initializing it! 3. **NULL Pointer Dereference**: The crash stack trace shows: ``` KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000040-0x0000000000000047] ``` This occurs when trying to access `tree->max_key_len` at offset 0x40 from a NULL tree pointer. ## Fix Implementation The patch implements two key fixes: 1. **Defensive Programming**: Adds NULL checks in `hfs_find_init()`: ```c + if (!tree || !fd) + return -EINVAL; ``` 2. **Breaking the Circular Dependency**: Reworks `hfs_btree_open()` to avoid the problematic code path: - Replaces `read_mapping_page()` with `filemap_grab_folio()` - Uses `sb_bread()` to read the btree header directly from disk - Avoids going through the extent management code during initialization ## Backport Justification This commit meets all stable kernel criteria: 1. **Fixes a Real Bug**: Prevents a kernel panic that can be triggered during normal filesystem operations 2. **Small and Contained**: The changes are limited to HFS filesystem code with no impact on other subsystems 3. **Clear Fix**: The solution directly addresses the root cause without architectural changes 4. **No New Features**: Only fixes the existing bug without adding functionality 5. **High Impact**: Kernel panics are critical issues that affect system stability 6. **Minimal Risk**: Changes are confined to HFS subsystem with clear boundaries ## Additional Context - The commit includes a detailed crash trace showing this is a real- world issue - Recent commit history shows HFS has had multiple similar stability fixes (slab-out-of-bounds, OOB reads/writes) - The fix follows established patterns for handling initialization order issues - The reporter is credited (Wenzhi Wang from University of Waterloo), indicating this was found through testing/research This is exactly the type of bug fix that stable kernels exist to incorporate - preventing kernel crashes without introducing new risks. fs/hfs/bfind.c | 3 +++ fs/hfs/btree.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- fs/hfs/extent.c | 2 +- fs/hfs/hfs_fs.h | 1 + 4 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/hfs/bfind.c b/fs/hfs/bfind.c index ef9498a6e88a..34e9804e0f36 100644 --- a/fs/hfs/bfind.c +++ b/fs/hfs/bfind.c @@ -16,6 +16,9 @@ int hfs_find_init(struct hfs_btree *tree, struct hfs_find_data *fd) { void *ptr; + if (!tree || !fd) + return -EINVAL; + fd->tree = tree; fd->bnode = NULL; ptr = kmalloc(tree->max_key_len * 2 + 4, GFP_KERNEL); diff --git a/fs/hfs/btree.c b/fs/hfs/btree.c index 2fa4b1f8cc7f..e86e1e235658 100644 --- a/fs/hfs/btree.c +++ b/fs/hfs/btree.c @@ -21,8 +21,12 @@ struct hfs_btree *hfs_btree_open(struct super_block *sb, u32 id, btree_keycmp ke struct hfs_btree *tree; struct hfs_btree_header_rec *head; struct address_space *mapping; - struct page *page; + struct folio *folio; + struct buffer_head *bh; unsigned int size; + u16 dblock; + sector_t start_block; + loff_t offset; tree = kzalloc(sizeof(*tree), GFP_KERNEL); if (!tree) @@ -75,12 +79,40 @@ struct hfs_btree *hfs_btree_open(struct super_block *sb, u32 id, btree_keycmp ke unlock_new_inode(tree->inode); mapping = tree->inode->i_mapping; - page = read_mapping_page(mapping, 0, NULL); - if (IS_ERR(page)) + folio = filemap_grab_folio(mapping, 0); + if (IS_ERR(folio)) goto free_inode; + folio_zero_range(folio, 0, folio_size(folio)); + + dblock = hfs_ext_find_block(HFS_I(tree->inode)->first_extents, 0); + start_block = HFS_SB(sb)->fs_start + (dblock * HFS_SB(sb)->fs_div); + + size = folio_size(folio); + offset = 0; + while (size > 0) { + size_t len; + + bh = sb_bread(sb, start_block); + if (!bh) { + pr_err("unable to read tree header\n"); + goto put_folio; + } + + len = min_t(size_t, folio_size(folio), sb->s_blocksize); + memcpy_to_folio(folio, offset, bh->b_data, sb->s_blocksize); + + brelse(bh); + + start_block++; + offset += len; + size -= len; + } + + folio_mark_uptodate(folio); + /* Load the header */ - head = (struct hfs_btree_header_rec *)(kmap_local_page(page) + + head = (struct hfs_btree_header_rec *)(kmap_local_folio(folio, 0) + sizeof(struct hfs_bnode_desc)); tree->root = be32_to_cpu(head->root); tree->leaf_count = be32_to_cpu(head->leaf_count); @@ -95,22 +127,22 @@ struct hfs_btree *hfs_btree_open(struct super_block *sb, u32 id, btree_keycmp ke size = tree->node_size; if (!is_power_of_2(size)) - goto fail_page; + goto fail_folio; if (!tree->node_count) - goto fail_page; + goto fail_folio; switch (id) { case HFS_EXT_CNID: if (tree->max_key_len != HFS_MAX_EXT_KEYLEN) { pr_err("invalid extent max_key_len %d\n", tree->max_key_len); - goto fail_page; + goto fail_folio; } break; case HFS_CAT_CNID: if (tree->max_key_len != HFS_MAX_CAT_KEYLEN) { pr_err("invalid catalog max_key_len %d\n", tree->max_key_len); - goto fail_page; + goto fail_folio; } break; default: @@ -121,12 +153,15 @@ struct hfs_btree *hfs_btree_open(struct super_block *sb, u32 id, btree_keycmp ke tree->pages_per_bnode = (tree->node_size + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT; kunmap_local(head); - put_page(page); + folio_unlock(folio); + folio_put(folio); return tree; -fail_page: +fail_folio: kunmap_local(head); - put_page(page); +put_folio: + folio_unlock(folio); + folio_put(folio); free_inode: tree->inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &hfs_aops; iput(tree->inode); diff --git a/fs/hfs/extent.c b/fs/hfs/extent.c index 4a0ce131e233..580c62981dbd 100644 --- a/fs/hfs/extent.c +++ b/fs/hfs/extent.c @@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ int hfs_ext_keycmp(const btree_key *key1, const btree_key *key2) * * Find a block within an extent record */ -static u16 hfs_ext_find_block(struct hfs_extent *ext, u16 off) +u16 hfs_ext_find_block(struct hfs_extent *ext, u16 off) { int i; u16 count; diff --git a/fs/hfs/hfs_fs.h b/fs/hfs/hfs_fs.h index a0c7cb0f79fc..732c5c4c7545 100644 --- a/fs/hfs/hfs_fs.h +++ b/fs/hfs/hfs_fs.h @@ -190,6 +190,7 @@ extern const struct inode_operations hfs_dir_inode_operations; /* extent.c */ extern int hfs_ext_keycmp(const btree_key *, const btree_key *); +extern u16 hfs_ext_find_block(struct hfs_extent *ext, u16 off); extern int hfs_free_fork(struct super_block *, struct hfs_cat_file *, int); extern int hfs_ext_write_extent(struct inode *); extern int hfs_extend_file(struct inode *); -- 2.39.5

1 month, 2 weeks

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[PATCH AUTOSEL 6.16 01/35] hfs: fix general protection fault in hfs_find_init()

by Sasha Levin

From: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava(a)dubeyko.com> [ Upstream commit 736a0516a16268995f4898eded49bfef077af709 ] The hfs_find_init() method can trigger the crash if tree pointer is NULL: [ 45.746290][ T9787] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000008: 0000 [#1] SMP KAI [ 45.747287][ T9787] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000040-0x0000000000000047] [ 45.748716][ T9787] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 9787 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.16.0-rc3 #10 PREEMPT(full) [ 45.750250][ T9787] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 45.751983][ T9787] RIP: 0010:hfs_find_init+0x86/0x230 [ 45.752834][ T9787] Code: c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 9a 01 00 00 4c 8d 6b 40 48 c7 45 18 00 00 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc [ 45.755574][ T9787] RSP: 0018:ffffc90015157668 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 45.756432][ T9787] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff819a4d09 [ 45.757457][ T9787] RDX: 0000000000000008 RSI: ffffffff819acd3a RDI: ffffc900151576e8 [ 45.758282][ T9787] RBP: ffffc900151576d0 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 45.758943][ T9787] R10: 0000000080000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000004 [ 45.759619][ T9787] R13: 0000000000000040 R14: ffff88802c50814a R15: 0000000000000000 [ 45.760293][ T9787] FS: 00007ffb72734540(0000) GS:ffff8880cec64000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 45.761050][ T9787] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 45.761606][ T9787] CR2: 00007f9bd8225000 CR3: 000000010979a000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 45.762286][ T9787] Call Trace: [ 45.762570][ T9787] <TASK> [ 45.762824][ T9787] hfs_ext_read_extent+0x190/0x9d0 [ 45.763269][ T9787] ? submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x2dd/0xce0 [ 45.763766][ T9787] ? __pfx_hfs_ext_read_extent+0x10/0x10 [ 45.764250][ T9787] hfs_get_block+0x55f/0x830 [ 45.764646][ T9787] block_read_full_folio+0x36d/0x850 [ 45.765105][ T9787] ? __pfx_hfs_get_block+0x10/0x10 [ 45.765541][ T9787] ? const_folio_flags+0x5b/0x100 [ 45.765972][ T9787] ? __pfx_hfs_read_folio+0x10/0x10 [ 45.766415][ T9787] filemap_read_folio+0xbe/0x290 [ 45.766840][ T9787] ? __pfx_filemap_read_folio+0x10/0x10 [ 45.767325][ T9787] ? __filemap_get_folio+0x32b/0xbf0 [ 45.767780][ T9787] do_read_cache_folio+0x263/0x5c0 [ 45.768223][ T9787] ? __pfx_hfs_read_folio+0x10/0x10 [ 45.768666][ T9787] read_cache_page+0x5b/0x160 [ 45.769070][ T9787] hfs_btree_open+0x491/0x1740 [ 45.769481][ T9787] hfs_mdb_get+0x15e2/0x1fb0 [ 45.769877][ T9787] ? __pfx_hfs_mdb_get+0x10/0x10 [ 45.770316][ T9787] ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 [ 45.770731][ T9787] ? lockdep_init_map_type+0x5c/0x280 [ 45.771200][ T9787] ? lockdep_init_map_type+0x5c/0x280 [ 45.771674][ T9787] hfs_fill_super+0x38e/0x720 [ 45.772092][ T9787] ? __pfx_hfs_fill_super+0x10/0x10 [ 45.772549][ T9787] ? snprintf+0xbe/0x100 [ 45.772931][ T9787] ? __pfx_snprintf+0x10/0x10 [ 45.773350][ T9787] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x129/0x2b0 [ 45.773796][ T9787] ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 [ 45.774215][ T9787] ? set_blocksize+0x40a/0x510 [ 45.774636][ T9787] ? sb_set_blocksize+0x176/0x1d0 [ 45.775087][ T9787] ? setup_bdev_super+0x369/0x730 [ 45.775533][ T9787] get_tree_bdev_flags+0x384/0x620 [ 45.775985][ T9787] ? __pfx_hfs_fill_super+0x10/0x10 [ 45.776453][ T9787] ? __pfx_get_tree_bdev_flags+0x10/0x10 [ 45.776950][ T9787] ? bpf_lsm_capable+0x9/0x10 [ 45.777365][ T9787] ? security_capable+0x80/0x260 [ 45.777803][ T9787] vfs_get_tree+0x8e/0x340 [ 45.778203][ T9787] path_mount+0x13de/0x2010 [ 45.778604][ T9787] ? kmem_cache_free+0x2b0/0x4c0 [ 45.779052][ T9787] ? __pfx_path_mount+0x10/0x10 [ 45.779480][ T9787] ? getname_flags.part.0+0x1c5/0x550 [ 45.779954][ T9787] ? putname+0x154/0x1a0 [ 45.780335][ T9787] __x64_sys_mount+0x27b/0x300 [ 45.780758][ T9787] ? __pfx___x64_sys_mount+0x10/0x10 [ 45.781232][ T9787] do_syscall_64+0xc9/0x480 [ 45.781631][ T9787] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f [ 45.782149][ T9787] RIP: 0033:0x7ffb7265b6ca [ 45.782539][ T9787] Code: 48 8b 0d c9 17 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 [ 45.784212][ T9787] RSP: 002b:00007ffc0c10cfb8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 [ 45.784935][ T9787] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007ffb7265b6ca [ 45.785626][ T9787] RDX: 0000200000000240 RSI: 0000200000000280 RDI: 00007ffc0c10d100 [ 45.786316][ T9787] RBP: 00007ffc0c10d190 R08: 00007ffc0c10d000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 45.787011][ T9787] R10: 0000000000000048 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000560246733250 [ 45.787697][ T9787] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 45.788393][ T9787] </TASK> [ 45.788665][ T9787] Modules linked in: [ 45.789058][ T9787] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 45.789554][ T9787] RIP: 0010:hfs_find_init+0x86/0x230 [ 45.790028][ T9787] Code: c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 9a 01 00 00 4c 8d 6b 40 48 c7 45 18 00 00 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc [ 45.792364][ T9787] RSP: 0018:ffffc90015157668 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 45.793155][ T9787] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff819a4d09 [ 45.794123][ T9787] RDX: 0000000000000008 RSI: ffffffff819acd3a RDI: ffffc900151576e8 [ 45.795105][ T9787] RBP: ffffc900151576d0 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 45.796135][ T9787] R10: 0000000080000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000004 [ 45.797114][ T9787] R13: 0000000000000040 R14: ffff88802c50814a R15: 0000000000000000 [ 45.798024][ T9787] FS: 00007ffb72734540(0000) GS:ffff8880cec64000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 45.799019][ T9787] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 45.799822][ T9787] CR2: 00007f9bd8225000 CR3: 000000010979a000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 45.800747][ T9787] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception The hfs_fill_super() calls hfs_mdb_get() method that tries to construct Extents Tree and Catalog Tree: HFS_SB(sb)->ext_tree = hfs_btree_open(sb, HFS_EXT_CNID, hfs_ext_keycmp); if (!HFS_SB(sb)->ext_tree) { pr_err("unable to open extent tree\n"); goto out; } HFS_SB(sb)->cat_tree = hfs_btree_open(sb, HFS_CAT_CNID, hfs_cat_keycmp); if (!HFS_SB(sb)->cat_tree) { pr_err("unable to open catalog tree\n"); goto out; } However, hfs_btree_open() calls read_mapping_page() that calls hfs_get_block(). And this method calls hfs_ext_read_extent(): static int hfs_ext_read_extent(struct inode *inode, u16 block) { struct hfs_find_data fd; int res; if (block >= HFS_I(inode)->cached_start && block < HFS_I(inode)->cached_start + HFS_I(inode)->cached_blocks) return 0; res = hfs_find_init(HFS_SB(inode->i_sb)->ext_tree, &fd); if (!res) { res = __hfs_ext_cache_extent(&fd, inode, block); hfs_find_exit(&fd); } return res; } The problem here that hfs_find_init() is trying to use HFS_SB(inode->i_sb)->ext_tree that is not initialized yet. It will be initailized when hfs_btree_open() finishes the execution. The patch adds checking of tree pointer in hfs_find_init() and it reworks the logic of hfs_btree_open() by reading the b-tree's header directly from the volume. The read_mapping_page() is exchanged on filemap_grab_folio() that grab the folio from mapping. Then, sb_bread() extracts the b-tree's header content and copy it into the folio. Reported-by: Wenzhi Wang <wenzhi.wang(a)uwaterloo.ca> Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava(a)dubeyko.com> cc: John Paul Adrian Glaubitz <glaubitz(a)physik.fu-berlin.de> cc: Yangtao Li <frank.li(a)vivo.com> cc: linux-fsdevel(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250710213657.108285-1-slava@dubeyko.com Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava(a)dubeyko.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- LLM Generated explanations, may be completely bogus: **YES** This commit should be backported to stable kernel trees. Here's my extensive analysis: ## Critical Bug Fix Analysis This commit fixes a **critical kernel panic** (general protection fault) that can be triggered during normal HFS filesystem operations. The bug represents a serious stability issue that meets stable kernel criteria. ## Root Cause Analysis The crash occurs due to a **use-before-initialization bug** in the HFS filesystem code: 1. **Initialization Order Issue**: When `hfs_fill_super()` is called, it tries to construct the Extents Tree via: ```c HFS_SB(sb)->ext_tree = hfs_btree_open(sb, HFS_EXT_CNID, hfs_ext_keycmp); ``` 2. **Circular Dependency**: During `hfs_btree_open()` execution: - It calls `read_mapping_page()` to read the btree header - This triggers `hfs_get_block()` - Which calls `hfs_ext_read_extent()` - Which tries to use `HFS_SB(inode->i_sb)->ext_tree` via `hfs_find_init()` - But `ext_tree` is NULL because we're still in the process of initializing it! 3. **NULL Pointer Dereference**: The crash stack trace shows: ``` KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000040-0x0000000000000047] ``` This occurs when trying to access `tree->max_key_len` at offset 0x40 from a NULL tree pointer. ## Fix Implementation The patch implements two key fixes: 1. **Defensive Programming**: Adds NULL checks in `hfs_find_init()`: ```c + if (!tree || !fd) + return -EINVAL; ``` 2. **Breaking the Circular Dependency**: Reworks `hfs_btree_open()` to avoid the problematic code path: - Replaces `read_mapping_page()` with `filemap_grab_folio()` - Uses `sb_bread()` to read the btree header directly from disk - Avoids going through the extent management code during initialization ## Backport Justification This commit meets all stable kernel criteria: 1. **Fixes a Real Bug**: Prevents a kernel panic that can be triggered during normal filesystem operations 2. **Small and Contained**: The changes are limited to HFS filesystem code with no impact on other subsystems 3. **Clear Fix**: The solution directly addresses the root cause without architectural changes 4. **No New Features**: Only fixes the existing bug without adding functionality 5. **High Impact**: Kernel panics are critical issues that affect system stability 6. **Minimal Risk**: Changes are confined to HFS subsystem with clear boundaries ## Additional Context - The commit includes a detailed crash trace showing this is a real- world issue - Recent commit history shows HFS has had multiple similar stability fixes (slab-out-of-bounds, OOB reads/writes) - The fix follows established patterns for handling initialization order issues - The reporter is credited (Wenzhi Wang from University of Waterloo), indicating this was found through testing/research This is exactly the type of bug fix that stable kernels exist to incorporate - preventing kernel crashes without introducing new risks. fs/hfs/bfind.c | 3 +++ fs/hfs/btree.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- fs/hfs/extent.c | 2 +- fs/hfs/hfs_fs.h | 1 + 4 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/hfs/bfind.c b/fs/hfs/bfind.c index ef9498a6e88a..34e9804e0f36 100644 --- a/fs/hfs/bfind.c +++ b/fs/hfs/bfind.c @@ -16,6 +16,9 @@ int hfs_find_init(struct hfs_btree *tree, struct hfs_find_data *fd) { void *ptr; + if (!tree || !fd) + return -EINVAL; + fd->tree = tree; fd->bnode = NULL; ptr = kmalloc(tree->max_key_len * 2 + 4, GFP_KERNEL); diff --git a/fs/hfs/btree.c b/fs/hfs/btree.c index 2fa4b1f8cc7f..e86e1e235658 100644 --- a/fs/hfs/btree.c +++ b/fs/hfs/btree.c @@ -21,8 +21,12 @@ struct hfs_btree *hfs_btree_open(struct super_block *sb, u32 id, btree_keycmp ke struct hfs_btree *tree; struct hfs_btree_header_rec *head; struct address_space *mapping; - struct page *page; + struct folio *folio; + struct buffer_head *bh; unsigned int size; + u16 dblock; + sector_t start_block; + loff_t offset; tree = kzalloc(sizeof(*tree), GFP_KERNEL); if (!tree) @@ -75,12 +79,40 @@ struct hfs_btree *hfs_btree_open(struct super_block *sb, u32 id, btree_keycmp ke unlock_new_inode(tree->inode); mapping = tree->inode->i_mapping; - page = read_mapping_page(mapping, 0, NULL); - if (IS_ERR(page)) + folio = filemap_grab_folio(mapping, 0); + if (IS_ERR(folio)) goto free_inode; + folio_zero_range(folio, 0, folio_size(folio)); + + dblock = hfs_ext_find_block(HFS_I(tree->inode)->first_extents, 0); + start_block = HFS_SB(sb)->fs_start + (dblock * HFS_SB(sb)->fs_div); + + size = folio_size(folio); + offset = 0; + while (size > 0) { + size_t len; + + bh = sb_bread(sb, start_block); + if (!bh) { + pr_err("unable to read tree header\n"); + goto put_folio; + } + + len = min_t(size_t, folio_size(folio), sb->s_blocksize); + memcpy_to_folio(folio, offset, bh->b_data, sb->s_blocksize); + + brelse(bh); + + start_block++; + offset += len; + size -= len; + } + + folio_mark_uptodate(folio); + /* Load the header */ - head = (struct hfs_btree_header_rec *)(kmap_local_page(page) + + head = (struct hfs_btree_header_rec *)(kmap_local_folio(folio, 0) + sizeof(struct hfs_bnode_desc)); tree->root = be32_to_cpu(head->root); tree->leaf_count = be32_to_cpu(head->leaf_count); @@ -95,22 +127,22 @@ struct hfs_btree *hfs_btree_open(struct super_block *sb, u32 id, btree_keycmp ke size = tree->node_size; if (!is_power_of_2(size)) - goto fail_page; + goto fail_folio; if (!tree->node_count) - goto fail_page; + goto fail_folio; switch (id) { case HFS_EXT_CNID: if (tree->max_key_len != HFS_MAX_EXT_KEYLEN) { pr_err("invalid extent max_key_len %d\n", tree->max_key_len); - goto fail_page; + goto fail_folio; } break; case HFS_CAT_CNID: if (tree->max_key_len != HFS_MAX_CAT_KEYLEN) { pr_err("invalid catalog max_key_len %d\n", tree->max_key_len); - goto fail_page; + goto fail_folio; } break; default: @@ -121,12 +153,15 @@ struct hfs_btree *hfs_btree_open(struct super_block *sb, u32 id, btree_keycmp ke tree->pages_per_bnode = (tree->node_size + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT; kunmap_local(head); - put_page(page); + folio_unlock(folio); + folio_put(folio); return tree; -fail_page: +fail_folio: kunmap_local(head); - put_page(page); +put_folio: + folio_unlock(folio); + folio_put(folio); free_inode: tree->inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &hfs_aops; iput(tree->inode); diff --git a/fs/hfs/extent.c b/fs/hfs/extent.c index 4a0ce131e233..580c62981dbd 100644 --- a/fs/hfs/extent.c +++ b/fs/hfs/extent.c @@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ int hfs_ext_keycmp(const btree_key *key1, const btree_key *key2) * * Find a block within an extent record */ -static u16 hfs_ext_find_block(struct hfs_extent *ext, u16 off) +u16 hfs_ext_find_block(struct hfs_extent *ext, u16 off) { int i; u16 count; diff --git a/fs/hfs/hfs_fs.h b/fs/hfs/hfs_fs.h index a0c7cb0f79fc..732c5c4c7545 100644 --- a/fs/hfs/hfs_fs.h +++ b/fs/hfs/hfs_fs.h @@ -190,6 +190,7 @@ extern const struct inode_operations hfs_dir_inode_operations; /* extent.c */ extern int hfs_ext_keycmp(const btree_key *, const btree_key *); +extern u16 hfs_ext_find_block(struct hfs_extent *ext, u16 off); extern int hfs_free_fork(struct super_block *, struct hfs_cat_file *, int); extern int hfs_ext_write_extent(struct inode *); extern int hfs_extend_file(struct inode *); -- 2.39.5

1 month, 2 weeks

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[PATCH v4] gpio-mlxbf2: use platform_get_irq_optional()

by David Thompson

The gpio-mlxbf2 driver interfaces with four GPIO controllers, device instances 0-3. There are two IRQ resources shared between the four controllers, and they are found in the ACPI table for instances 0 and 3. The driver should not use platform_get_irq(), otherwise this error is logged when probing instances 1 and 2: mlxbf2_gpio MLNXBF22:01: error -ENXIO: IRQ index 0 not found Fixes: 2b725265cb08 ("gpio: mlxbf2: Introduce IRQ support") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: David Thompson <davthompson(a)nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Shravan Kumar Ramani <shravankr(a)nvidia.com> --- v4: updated logic to simply use platform_get_irq_optional() v3: added version history v2: added tag "Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org" drivers/gpio/gpio-mlxbf2.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpio/gpio-mlxbf2.c b/drivers/gpio/gpio-mlxbf2.c index 6f3dda6b635f..390f2e74a9d8 100644 --- a/drivers/gpio/gpio-mlxbf2.c +++ b/drivers/gpio/gpio-mlxbf2.c @@ -397,7 +397,7 @@ mlxbf2_gpio_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) gc->ngpio = npins; gc->owner = THIS_MODULE; - irq = platform_get_irq(pdev, 0); + irq = platform_get_irq_optional(pdev, 0); if (irq >= 0) { girq = &gs->gc.irq; gpio_irq_chip_set_chip(girq, &mlxbf2_gpio_irq_chip); -- 2.43.2

1 month, 2 weeks

3
3
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Qualcomm Snapdragon <SM6375>

by Alan Ye

The Qualcomm SM6375 processor is a 7nm process SoC for the mid-range market with the following features: CPU: Eight-core design, including high-performance Kryo 670 core and efficient Kryo 265 core, optimized performance and energy efficiency. GPU: Equipped with Adreno 642L GPU, supporting high-quality graphics and gaming experience. AI Engine: Integrated Qualcomm AI engine to enhance intelligent features such as voice recognition and image processing. Connectivity: Supports modern wireless standards such as 5G, Wi-Fi 6 and Bluetooth 5.2. Multimedia: Supports 4K video encoding and decoding Mainly used in mid-to-high-end smartphones, tablets and some IoT devices, suitable for users who need to balance cost performance and performance. .# Part Number Manufacturer Date Code Quantity Unit Price Lead Time Condition (PCS) USD/Each one 1 SM-6375-1-PSP837-TR-00-0-AB QUALCOMM 2023+ 12000pcs US$18.00/pcs 7days New & original - stock 2 PM-6375-0-FOWNSP144-TR-01-0；TR-01-1 QUALCOMM 2023+ 12000pcs US$1.00/pcs 3 PMR-735A-0-WLNSP48-TR-05-0,TR-05-1 QUALCOMM 2023+ 12000pcs US$0.85/pcs 4 PMK-8003-0-FOWPSP36-TR-01-0 QUALCOMM 2023+ 12000pcs US$0.24/pcs 5 SDR-735-0-PSP219B-TR-01-0；TR-01-1 QUALCOMM 2023+ 12000pcs US$2.50/pcs 6 WCD-9370-0-WLPSP55-TR-01-0;TR-01-4 QUALCOMM 2023+ 12000pcs US$0.50/pcs 7 WCN-3988-0-82BWLPSP-TR-00-0 QUALCOMM 2023+ 12000pcs US$3.50/pcs 8 QET-6105-0-WLNSP24B-TR-00-1 QUALCOMM 2023+ 12000pcs US$1.20/pcs 9 QET4101-0-12WLNSP-TR-00-0 QUALCOMM 2022+ 12000pcs US$0.21/pcs These materials are sold as a set for $28/usd, and are guaranteed to be authentic. If you need other Qualcomm materials, please feel free to contact me Stay in tune with product evolutions—tap . Keep Receiving Notices Feel like taking a break? Select Configure Your Mailing.

1 month, 2 weeks

1
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[PATCH v2] usb: renesas-xhci: Fix External ROM access timeouts

by Marek Vasut

Increase the External ROM access timeouts to prevent failures during programming of External SPI EEPROM chips. The current timeouts are too short for some SPI EEPROMs used with uPD720201 controllers. The current timeout for Chip Erase in renesas_rom_erase() is 100 ms , the current timeout for Sector Erase issued by the controller before Page Program in renesas_fw_download_image() is also 100 ms. Neither timeout is sufficient for e.g. the Macronix MX25L5121E or MX25V5126F. MX25L5121E reference manual [1] page 35 section "ERASE AND PROGRAMMING PERFORMANCE" and page 23 section "Table 8. AC CHARACTERISTICS (Temperature = 0°C to 70°C for Commercial grade, VCC = 2.7V ~ 3.6V)" row "tCE" indicate that the maximum time required for Chip Erase opcode to complete is 2 s, and for Sector Erase it is 300 ms . MX25V5126F reference manual [2] page 47 section "13. ERASE AND PROGRAMMING PERFORMANCE (2.3V - 3.6V)" and page 42 section "Table 8. AC CHARACTERISTICS (Temperature = -40°C to 85°C for Industrial grade, VCC = 2.3V - 3.6V)" row "tCE" indicate that the maximum time required for Chip Erase opcode to complete is 3.2 s, and for Sector Erase it is 400 ms . Update the timeouts such, that Chip Erase timeout is set to 5 seconds, and Sector Erase timeout is set to 500 ms. Such lengthy timeouts ought to be sufficient for majority of SPI EEPROM chips. [1] https://www.macronix.com/Lists/Datasheet/Attachments/8634/MX25L5121E,%203V,… [2] https://www.macronix.com/Lists/Datasheet/Attachments/8750/MX25V5126F,%202.5… Fixes: 2478be82de44 ("usb: renesas-xhci: Add ROM loader for uPD720201") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Marek Vasut <marek.vasut+renesas(a)mailbox.org> --- Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas(a)glider.be> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman(a)intel.com> Cc: Vinod Koul <vkoul(a)kernel.org> Cc: linux-renesas-soc(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-usb(a)vger.kernel.org --- V2: Move Cc: stable above --- --- drivers/usb/host/xhci-pci-renesas.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-pci-renesas.c b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-pci-renesas.c index 620f8f0febb8..86df80399c9f 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-pci-renesas.c +++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-pci-renesas.c @@ -47,8 +47,9 @@ #define RENESAS_ROM_ERASE_MAGIC 0x5A65726F #define RENESAS_ROM_WRITE_MAGIC 0x53524F4D -#define RENESAS_RETRY 10000 -#define RENESAS_DELAY 10 +#define RENESAS_RETRY 50000 /* 50000 * RENESAS_DELAY ~= 500ms */ +#define RENESAS_CHIP_ERASE_RETRY 500000 /* 500000 * RENESAS_DELAY ~= 5s */ +#define RENESAS_DELAY 10 #define RENESAS_FW_NAME "renesas_usb_fw.mem" @@ -407,7 +408,7 @@ static void renesas_rom_erase(struct pci_dev *pdev) /* sleep a bit while ROM is erased */ msleep(20); - for (i = 0; i < RENESAS_RETRY; i++) { + for (i = 0; i < RENESAS_CHIP_ERASE_RETRY; i++) { retval = pci_read_config_byte(pdev, RENESAS_ROM_STATUS, &status); status &= RENESAS_ROM_STATUS_ERASE; -- 2.47.2

1 month, 2 weeks

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[PATCH] usb: renesas-xhci: Fix External ROM access timeouts

by Marek Vasut

Increase the External ROM access timeouts to prevent failures during programming of External SPI EEPROM chips. The current timeouts are too short for some SPI EEPROMs used with uPD720201 controllers. The current timeout for Chip Erase in renesas_rom_erase() is 100 ms , the current timeout for Sector Erase issued by the controller before Page Program in renesas_fw_download_image() is also 100 ms. Neither timeout is sufficient for e.g. the Macronix MX25L5121E or MX25V5126F. MX25L5121E reference manual [1] page 35 section "ERASE AND PROGRAMMING PERFORMANCE" and page 23 section "Table 8. AC CHARACTERISTICS (Temperature = 0°C to 70°C for Commercial grade, VCC = 2.7V ~ 3.6V)" row "tCE" indicate that the maximum time required for Chip Erase opcode to complete is 2 s, and for Sector Erase it is 300 ms . MX25V5126F reference manual [2] page 47 section "13. ERASE AND PROGRAMMING PERFORMANCE (2.3V - 3.6V)" and page 42 section "Table 8. AC CHARACTERISTICS (Temperature = -40°C to 85°C for Industrial grade, VCC = 2.3V - 3.6V)" row "tCE" indicate that the maximum time required for Chip Erase opcode to complete is 3.2 s, and for Sector Erase it is 400 ms . Update the timeouts such, that Chip Erase timeout is set to 5 seconds, and Sector Erase timeout is set to 500 ms. Such lengthy timeouts ought to be sufficient for majority of SPI EEPROM chips. [1] https://www.macronix.com/Lists/Datasheet/Attachments/8634/MX25L5121E,%203V,… [2] https://www.macronix.com/Lists/Datasheet/Attachments/8750/MX25V5126F,%202.5… Fixes: 2478be82de44 ("usb: renesas-xhci: Add ROM loader for uPD720201") Signed-off-by: Marek Vasut <marek.vasut+renesas(a)mailbox.org> --- Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas(a)glider.be> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman(a)intel.com> Cc: Vinod Koul <vkoul(a)kernel.org> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Cc: linux-renesas-soc(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-usb(a)vger.kernel.org --- drivers/usb/host/xhci-pci-renesas.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-pci-renesas.c b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-pci-renesas.c index 620f8f0febb8..86df80399c9f 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-pci-renesas.c +++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-pci-renesas.c @@ -47,8 +47,9 @@ #define RENESAS_ROM_ERASE_MAGIC 0x5A65726F #define RENESAS_ROM_WRITE_MAGIC 0x53524F4D -#define RENESAS_RETRY 10000 -#define RENESAS_DELAY 10 +#define RENESAS_RETRY 50000 /* 50000 * RENESAS_DELAY ~= 500ms */ +#define RENESAS_CHIP_ERASE_RETRY 500000 /* 500000 * RENESAS_DELAY ~= 5s */ +#define RENESAS_DELAY 10 #define RENESAS_FW_NAME "renesas_usb_fw.mem" @@ -407,7 +408,7 @@ static void renesas_rom_erase(struct pci_dev *pdev) /* sleep a bit while ROM is erased */ msleep(20); - for (i = 0; i < RENESAS_RETRY; i++) { + for (i = 0; i < RENESAS_CHIP_ERASE_RETRY; i++) { retval = pci_read_config_byte(pdev, RENESAS_ROM_STATUS, &status); status &= RENESAS_ROM_STATUS_ERASE; -- 2.47.2

1 month, 2 weeks

6
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[PATCH v2] kcov, usb: Fix invalid context sleep in softirq path on PREEMPT_RT

by Yunseong Kim

The KCOV subsystem currently utilizes standard spinlock_t and local_lock_t for synchronization. In PREEMPT_RT configurations, these locks can be implemented via rtmutexes and may therefore sleep. This behavior is problematic as kcov locks are sometimes used in atomic contexts or protect data accessed during critical instrumentation paths where sleeping is not permissible. Address these issues to make kcov PREEMPT_RT friendly: 1. Convert kcov->lock and kcov_remote_lock from spinlock_t to raw_spinlock_t. This ensures they remain true, non-sleeping spinlocks even on PREEMPT_RT kernels. 2. Refactor the KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE path to move memory allocations out of the critical section. All necessary struct kcov_remote structures are now pre-allocated individually in kcov_ioctl() using GFP_KERNEL (allowing sleep) before acquiring the raw spinlocks. 3. Modify the ioctl handling logic to utilize these pre-allocated structures within the critical section. kcov_remote_add() is modified to accept a pre-allocated structure instead of allocating one internally. 4. Remove the local_lock_t protection for kcov_percpu_data in kcov_remote_start/stop(). Since local_lock_t can also sleep under RT, and the required protection is against local interrupts when accessing per-CPU data, it is replaced with explicit local_irq_save/restore(). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250725201400.1078395-2-ysk@kzalloc.com/t/#u Fixes: f85d39dd7ed8 ("kcov, usb: disable interrupts in kcov_remote_start_usb_softirq") Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl(a)gmail.com> Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel(a)i-love.sakura.ne.jp> Cc: Alan Stern <stern(a)rowland.harvard.edu> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov(a)google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy(a)linutronix.de> Cc: Byungchul Park <byungchul(a)sk.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: kasan-dev(a)googlegroups.com Cc: syzkaller(a)googlegroups.com Cc: linux-usb(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-rt-devel(a)lists.linux.dev Signed-off-by: Yunseong Kim <ysk(a)kzalloc.com> --- kernel/kcov.c | 243 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------- 1 file changed, 130 insertions(+), 113 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/kcov.c b/kernel/kcov.c index 187ba1b80bda..9c8e4325cff8 100644 --- a/kernel/kcov.c +++ b/kernel/kcov.c @@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ struct kcov { */ refcount_t refcount; /* The lock protects mode, size, area and t. */ - spinlock_t lock; + raw_spinlock_t lock; enum kcov_mode mode; /* Size of arena (in long's). */ unsigned int size; @@ -84,13 +84,12 @@ struct kcov_remote { struct hlist_node hnode; }; -static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(kcov_remote_lock); +static DEFINE_RAW_SPINLOCK(kcov_remote_lock); static DEFINE_HASHTABLE(kcov_remote_map, 4); static struct list_head kcov_remote_areas = LIST_HEAD_INIT(kcov_remote_areas); struct kcov_percpu_data { void *irq_area; - local_lock_t lock; unsigned int saved_mode; unsigned int saved_size; @@ -99,9 +98,7 @@ struct kcov_percpu_data { int saved_sequence; }; -static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct kcov_percpu_data, kcov_percpu_data) = { - .lock = INIT_LOCAL_LOCK(lock), -}; +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct kcov_percpu_data, kcov_percpu_data); /* Must be called with kcov_remote_lock locked. */ static struct kcov_remote *kcov_remote_find(u64 handle) @@ -116,15 +113,9 @@ static struct kcov_remote *kcov_remote_find(u64 handle) } /* Must be called with kcov_remote_lock locked. */ -static struct kcov_remote *kcov_remote_add(struct kcov *kcov, u64 handle) +static struct kcov_remote *kcov_remote_add(struct kcov *kcov, u64 handle, + struct kcov_remote *remote) { - struct kcov_remote *remote; - - if (kcov_remote_find(handle)) - return ERR_PTR(-EEXIST); - remote = kmalloc(sizeof(*remote), GFP_ATOMIC); - if (!remote) - return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); remote->handle = handle; remote->kcov = kcov; hash_add(kcov_remote_map, &remote->hnode, handle); @@ -404,9 +395,8 @@ static void kcov_remote_reset(struct kcov *kcov) int bkt; struct kcov_remote *remote; struct hlist_node *tmp; - unsigned long flags; - spin_lock_irqsave(&kcov_remote_lock, flags); + raw_spin_lock(&kcov_remote_lock); hash_for_each_safe(kcov_remote_map, bkt, tmp, remote, hnode) { if (remote->kcov != kcov) continue; @@ -415,7 +405,7 @@ static void kcov_remote_reset(struct kcov *kcov) } /* Do reset before unlock to prevent races with kcov_remote_start(). */ kcov_reset(kcov); - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kcov_remote_lock, flags); + raw_spin_unlock(&kcov_remote_lock); } static void kcov_disable(struct task_struct *t, struct kcov *kcov) @@ -450,7 +440,7 @@ void kcov_task_exit(struct task_struct *t) if (kcov == NULL) return; - spin_lock_irqsave(&kcov->lock, flags); + raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&kcov->lock, flags); kcov_debug("t = %px, kcov->t = %px\n", t, kcov->t); /* * For KCOV_ENABLE devices we want to make sure that t->kcov->t == t, @@ -475,12 +465,12 @@ void kcov_task_exit(struct task_struct *t) * By combining all three checks into one we get: */ if (WARN_ON(kcov->t != t)) { - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kcov->lock, flags); + raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kcov->lock, flags); return; } /* Just to not leave dangling references behind. */ kcov_disable(t, kcov); - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kcov->lock, flags); + raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kcov->lock, flags); kcov_put(kcov); } @@ -492,14 +482,14 @@ static int kcov_mmap(struct file *filep, struct vm_area_struct *vma) struct page *page; unsigned long flags; - spin_lock_irqsave(&kcov->lock, flags); + raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&kcov->lock, flags); size = kcov->size * sizeof(unsigned long); if (kcov->area == NULL || vma->vm_pgoff != 0 || vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start != size) { res = -EINVAL; goto exit; } - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kcov->lock, flags); + raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kcov->lock, flags); vm_flags_set(vma, VM_DONTEXPAND); for (off = 0; off < size; off += PAGE_SIZE) { page = vmalloc_to_page(kcov->area + off); @@ -511,7 +501,7 @@ static int kcov_mmap(struct file *filep, struct vm_area_struct *vma) } return 0; exit: - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kcov->lock, flags); + raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kcov->lock, flags); return res; } @@ -525,7 +515,7 @@ static int kcov_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filep) kcov->mode = KCOV_MODE_DISABLED; kcov->sequence = 1; refcount_set(&kcov->refcount, 1); - spin_lock_init(&kcov->lock); + raw_spin_lock_init(&kcov->lock); filep->private_data = kcov; return nonseekable_open(inode, filep); } @@ -586,10 +576,8 @@ static int kcov_ioctl_locked(struct kcov *kcov, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) { struct task_struct *t; - unsigned long flags, unused; - int mode, i; - struct kcov_remote_arg *remote_arg; - struct kcov_remote *remote; + unsigned long unused; + int mode; switch (cmd) { case KCOV_ENABLE: @@ -627,69 +615,80 @@ static int kcov_ioctl_locked(struct kcov *kcov, unsigned int cmd, kcov_disable(t, kcov); kcov_put(kcov); return 0; - case KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE: - if (kcov->mode != KCOV_MODE_INIT || !kcov->area) - return -EINVAL; - t = current; - if (kcov->t != NULL || t->kcov != NULL) - return -EBUSY; - remote_arg = (struct kcov_remote_arg *)arg; - mode = kcov_get_mode(remote_arg->trace_mode); - if (mode < 0) - return mode; - if ((unsigned long)remote_arg->area_size > - LONG_MAX / sizeof(unsigned long)) - return -EINVAL; - kcov->mode = mode; - t->kcov = kcov; - t->kcov_mode = KCOV_MODE_REMOTE; - kcov->t = t; - kcov->remote = true; - kcov->remote_size = remote_arg->area_size; - spin_lock_irqsave(&kcov_remote_lock, flags); - for (i = 0; i < remote_arg->num_handles; i++) { - if (!kcov_check_handle(remote_arg->handles[i], - false, true, false)) { - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kcov_remote_lock, - flags); - kcov_disable(t, kcov); - return -EINVAL; - } - remote = kcov_remote_add(kcov, remote_arg->handles[i]); - if (IS_ERR(remote)) { - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kcov_remote_lock, - flags); - kcov_disable(t, kcov); - return PTR_ERR(remote); - } - } - if (remote_arg->common_handle) { - if (!kcov_check_handle(remote_arg->common_handle, - true, false, false)) { - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kcov_remote_lock, - flags); - kcov_disable(t, kcov); - return -EINVAL; - } - remote = kcov_remote_add(kcov, - remote_arg->common_handle); - if (IS_ERR(remote)) { - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kcov_remote_lock, - flags); - kcov_disable(t, kcov); - return PTR_ERR(remote); - } - t->kcov_handle = remote_arg->common_handle; - } - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kcov_remote_lock, flags); - /* Put either in kcov_task_exit() or in KCOV_DISABLE. */ - kcov_get(kcov); - return 0; default: return -ENOTTY; } } +static int kcov_ioctl_locked_remote_enabled(struct kcov *kcov, + unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg, + struct kcov_remote *remote_handles, + struct kcov_remote *remote_common_handle) +{ + struct task_struct *t; + int mode, i, ret; + struct kcov_remote_arg *remote_arg; + + if (kcov->mode != KCOV_MODE_INIT || !kcov->area) + return -EINVAL; + t = current; + if (kcov->t != NULL || t->kcov != NULL) + return -EBUSY; + remote_arg = (struct kcov_remote_arg *)arg; + mode = kcov_get_mode(remote_arg->trace_mode); + if (mode < 0) + return mode; + if ((unsigned long)remote_arg->area_size > + LONG_MAX / sizeof(unsigned long)) + return -EINVAL; + kcov->mode = mode; + t->kcov = kcov; + t->kcov_mode = KCOV_MODE_REMOTE; + kcov->t = t; + kcov->remote = true; + kcov->remote_size = remote_arg->area_size; + raw_spin_lock(&kcov_remote_lock); + for (i = 0; i < remote_arg->num_handles; i++) { + if (!kcov_check_handle(remote_arg->handles[i], + false, true, false)) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto err; + } + if (kcov_remote_find(remote_arg->handles[i])) { + ret = -EEXIST; + goto err; + } + kcov_remote_add(kcov, remote_arg->handles[i], + &remote_handles[i]); + } + if (remote_arg->common_handle) { + if (!kcov_check_handle(remote_arg->common_handle, + true, false, false)) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto err; + } + if (kcov_remote_find(remote_arg->common_handle)) { + ret = -EEXIST; + goto err; + } + kcov_remote_add(kcov, + remote_arg->common_handle, remote_common_handle); + t->kcov_handle = remote_arg->common_handle; + } + raw_spin_unlock(&kcov_remote_lock); + /* Put either in kcov_task_exit() or in KCOV_DISABLE. */ + kcov_get(kcov); + return 0; + +err: + raw_spin_unlock(&kcov_remote_lock); + kcov_disable(t, kcov); + kfree(remote_common_handle); + kfree(remote_handles); + + return ret; +} + static long kcov_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) { struct kcov *kcov; @@ -697,6 +696,7 @@ static long kcov_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) struct kcov_remote_arg *remote_arg = NULL; unsigned int remote_num_handles; unsigned long remote_arg_size; + struct kcov_remote *remote_handles, *remote_common_handle; unsigned long size, flags; void *area; @@ -716,16 +716,16 @@ static long kcov_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) area = vmalloc_user(size * sizeof(unsigned long)); if (area == NULL) return -ENOMEM; - spin_lock_irqsave(&kcov->lock, flags); + raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&kcov->lock, flags); if (kcov->mode != KCOV_MODE_DISABLED) { - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kcov->lock, flags); + raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kcov->lock, flags); vfree(area); return -EBUSY; } kcov->area = area; kcov->size = size; kcov->mode = KCOV_MODE_INIT; - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kcov->lock, flags); + raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kcov->lock, flags); return 0; case KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE: if (get_user(remote_num_handles, (unsigned __user *)(arg + @@ -743,18 +743,35 @@ static long kcov_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) return -EINVAL; } arg = (unsigned long)remote_arg; - fallthrough; + remote_handles = kmalloc_array(remote_arg->num_handles, + sizeof(struct kcov_remote), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!remote_handles) + return -ENOMEM; + remote_common_handle = kmalloc(sizeof(struct kcov_remote), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!remote_common_handle) { + kfree(remote_handles); + return -ENOMEM; + } + + raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&kcov->lock, flags); + res = kcov_ioctl_locked_remote_enabled(kcov, cmd, arg, + remote_handles, remote_common_handle); + raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kcov->lock, flags); + kfree(remote_arg); + break; default: /* + * KCOV_ENABLE, KCOV_DISABLE: * All other commands can be normally executed under a spin lock, so we * obtain and release it here in order to simplify kcov_ioctl_locked(). */ - spin_lock_irqsave(&kcov->lock, flags); + raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&kcov->lock, flags); res = kcov_ioctl_locked(kcov, cmd, arg); - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kcov->lock, flags); - kfree(remote_arg); - return res; + raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kcov->lock, flags); + break; } + + return res; } static const struct file_operations kcov_fops = { @@ -862,7 +879,7 @@ void kcov_remote_start(u64 handle) if (!in_task() && !in_softirq_really()) return; - local_lock_irqsave(&kcov_percpu_data.lock, flags); + local_irq_save(flags); /* * Check that kcov_remote_start() is not called twice in background @@ -870,7 +887,7 @@ void kcov_remote_start(u64 handle) */ mode = READ_ONCE(t->kcov_mode); if (WARN_ON(in_task() && kcov_mode_enabled(mode))) { - local_unlock_irqrestore(&kcov_percpu_data.lock, flags); + local_irq_restore(flags); return; } /* @@ -879,15 +896,15 @@ void kcov_remote_start(u64 handle) * happened while collecting coverage from a background thread. */ if (WARN_ON(in_serving_softirq() && t->kcov_softirq)) { - local_unlock_irqrestore(&kcov_percpu_data.lock, flags); + local_irq_restore(flags); return; } - spin_lock(&kcov_remote_lock); + raw_spin_lock(&kcov_remote_lock); remote = kcov_remote_find(handle); if (!remote) { - spin_unlock(&kcov_remote_lock); - local_unlock_irqrestore(&kcov_percpu_data.lock, flags); + raw_spin_unlock(&kcov_remote_lock); + local_irq_restore(flags); return; } kcov_debug("handle = %llx, context: %s\n", handle, @@ -908,17 +925,17 @@ void kcov_remote_start(u64 handle) size = CONFIG_KCOV_IRQ_AREA_SIZE; area = this_cpu_ptr(&kcov_percpu_data)->irq_area; } - spin_unlock(&kcov_remote_lock); + raw_spin_unlock(&kcov_remote_lock); /* Can only happen when in_task(). */ if (!area) { - local_unlock_irqrestore(&kcov_percpu_data.lock, flags); + local_irq_restore(flags); area = vmalloc(size * sizeof(unsigned long)); if (!area) { kcov_put(kcov); return; } - local_lock_irqsave(&kcov_percpu_data.lock, flags); + local_irq_save(flags); } /* Reset coverage size. */ @@ -930,7 +947,7 @@ void kcov_remote_start(u64 handle) } kcov_start(t, kcov, size, area, mode, sequence); - local_unlock_irqrestore(&kcov_percpu_data.lock, flags); + local_irq_restore(flags); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(kcov_remote_start); @@ -1004,12 +1021,12 @@ void kcov_remote_stop(void) if (!in_task() && !in_softirq_really()) return; - local_lock_irqsave(&kcov_percpu_data.lock, flags); + local_irq_save(flags); mode = READ_ONCE(t->kcov_mode); barrier(); if (!kcov_mode_enabled(mode)) { - local_unlock_irqrestore(&kcov_percpu_data.lock, flags); + local_irq_restore(flags); return; } /* @@ -1017,12 +1034,12 @@ void kcov_remote_stop(void) * actually found the remote handle and started collecting coverage. */ if (in_serving_softirq() && !t->kcov_softirq) { - local_unlock_irqrestore(&kcov_percpu_data.lock, flags); + local_irq_restore(flags); return; } /* Make sure that kcov_softirq is only set when in softirq. */ if (WARN_ON(!in_serving_softirq() && t->kcov_softirq)) { - local_unlock_irqrestore(&kcov_percpu_data.lock, flags); + local_irq_restore(flags); return; } @@ -1037,22 +1054,22 @@ void kcov_remote_stop(void) kcov_remote_softirq_stop(t); } - spin_lock(&kcov->lock); + raw_spin_lock(&kcov->lock); /* * KCOV_DISABLE could have been called between kcov_remote_start() * and kcov_remote_stop(), hence the sequence check. */ if (sequence == kcov->sequence && kcov->remote) kcov_move_area(kcov->mode, kcov->area, kcov->size, area); - spin_unlock(&kcov->lock); + raw_spin_unlock(&kcov->lock); if (in_task()) { - spin_lock(&kcov_remote_lock); + raw_spin_lock(&kcov_remote_lock); kcov_remote_area_put(area, size); - spin_unlock(&kcov_remote_lock); + raw_spin_unlock(&kcov_remote_lock); } - local_unlock_irqrestore(&kcov_percpu_data.lock, flags); + local_irq_restore(flags); /* Get in kcov_remote_start(). */ kcov_put(kcov); -- 2.50.0

1 month, 2 weeks

2
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Text mode VGA-console scrolling is broken in upstream & stable trees

by Jari Ruusu

The patch that broke text mode VGA-console scrolling is this one: "vgacon: Add check for vc_origin address range in vgacon_scroll()" commit 864f9963ec6b4b76d104d595ba28110b87158003 upstream. How to preproduce: (1) boot a kernel that is configured to use text mode VGA-console (2) type commands: ls -l /usr/bin | less -S (3) scroll up/down with cursor-down/up keys Above mentioned patch seems to have landed in upstream and all kernel.org stable trees with zero testing. Even minimal testing would have shown that it breaks text mode VGA-console scrolling. Greg, Sasha, Linus, Please consider reverting that buggy patch from all affected trees. -- Jari Ruusu 4096R/8132F189 12D6 4C3A DCDA 0AA4 27BD ACDF F073 3C80 8132 F189

1 month, 2 weeks

5
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[merged mm-stable] mm-fix-a-uaf-when-vma-mm-is-freed-after-vma-vm_refcnt-got-dropped.patch removed from -mm tree

by Andrew Morton

The quilt patch titled Subject: mm: fix a UAF when vma->mm is freed after vma->vm_refcnt got dropped has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was mm-fix-a-uaf-when-vma-mm-is-freed-after-vma-vm_refcnt-got-dropped.patch This patch was dropped because it was merged into the mm-stable branch of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm ------------------------------------------------------ From: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb(a)google.com> Subject: mm: fix a UAF when vma->mm is freed after vma->vm_refcnt got dropped Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2025 10:53:55 -0700 By inducing delays in the right places, Jann Horn created a reproducer for a hard to hit UAF issue that became possible after VMAs were allowed to be recycled by adding SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU to their cache. Race description is borrowed from Jann's discovery report: lock_vma_under_rcu() looks up a VMA locklessly with mas_walk() under rcu_read_lock(). At that point, the VMA may be concurrently freed, and it can be recycled by another process. vma_start_read() then increments the vma->vm_refcnt (if it is in an acceptable range), and if this succeeds, vma_start_read() can return a recycled VMA. In this scenario where the VMA has been recycled, lock_vma_under_rcu() will then detect the mismatching ->vm_mm pointer and drop the VMA through vma_end_read(), which calls vma_refcount_put(). vma_refcount_put() drops the refcount and then calls rcuwait_wake_up() using a copy of vma->vm_mm. This is wrong: It implicitly assumes that the caller is keeping the VMA's mm alive, but in this scenario the caller has no relation to the VMA's mm, so the rcuwait_wake_up() can cause UAF. The diagram depicting the race: T1 T2 T3 == == == lock_vma_under_rcu mas_walk <VMA gets removed from mm> mmap <the same VMA is reallocated> vma_start_read __refcount_inc_not_zero_limited_acquire munmap __vma_enter_locked refcount_add_not_zero vma_end_read vma_refcount_put __refcount_dec_and_test rcuwait_wait_event <finish operation> rcuwait_wake_up [UAF] Note that rcuwait_wait_event() in T3 does not block because refcount was already dropped by T1. At this point T3 can exit and free the mm causing UAF in T1. To avoid this we move vma->vm_mm verification into vma_start_read() and grab vma->vm_mm to stabilize it before vma_refcount_put() operation. [surenb(a)google.com: v3] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250729145709.2731370-1-surenb@google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250728175355.2282375-1-surenb@google.com Fixes: 3104138517fc ("mm: make vma cache SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU") Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb(a)google.com> Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAG48ez0-deFbVH=E3jbkWx=X3uVbd8nWeo6kbJPQ0KoUD+… Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka(a)suse.cz> Acked-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes(a)oracle.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> Cc: Liam Howlett <liam.howlett(a)oracle.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- include/linux/mmap_lock.h | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ mm/mmap_lock.c | 10 +++------- 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) --- a/include/linux/mmap_lock.h~mm-fix-a-uaf-when-vma-mm-is-freed-after-vma-vm_refcnt-got-dropped +++ a/include/linux/mmap_lock.h @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ extern int rcuwait_wake_up(struct rcuwai #include <linux/tracepoint-defs.h> #include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/cleanup.h> +#include <linux/sched/mm.h> #define MMAP_LOCK_INITIALIZER(name) \ .mmap_lock = __RWSEM_INITIALIZER((name).mmap_lock), @@ -154,6 +155,10 @@ static inline void vma_refcount_put(stru * reused and attached to a different mm before we lock it. * Returns the vma on success, NULL on failure to lock and EAGAIN if vma got * detached. + * + * WARNING! The vma passed to this function cannot be used if the function + * fails to lock it because in certain cases RCU lock is dropped and then + * reacquired. Once RCU lock is dropped the vma can be concurently freed. */ static inline struct vm_area_struct *vma_start_read(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *vma) @@ -183,6 +188,31 @@ static inline struct vm_area_struct *vma } rwsem_acquire_read(&vma->vmlock_dep_map, 0, 1, _RET_IP_); + + /* + * If vma got attached to another mm from under us, that mm is not + * stable and can be freed in the narrow window after vma->vm_refcnt + * is dropped and before rcuwait_wake_up(mm) is called. Grab it before + * releasing vma->vm_refcnt. + */ + if (unlikely(vma->vm_mm != mm)) { + /* Use a copy of vm_mm in case vma is freed after we drop vm_refcnt */ + struct mm_struct *other_mm = vma->vm_mm; + + /* + * __mmdrop() is a heavy operation and we don't need RCU + * protection here. Release RCU lock during these operations. + * We reinstate the RCU read lock as the caller expects it to + * be held when this function returns even on error. + */ + rcu_read_unlock(); + mmgrab(other_mm); + vma_refcount_put(vma); + mmdrop(other_mm); + rcu_read_lock(); + return NULL; + } + /* * Overflow of vm_lock_seq/mm_lock_seq might produce false locked result. * False unlocked result is impossible because we modify and check --- a/mm/mmap_lock.c~mm-fix-a-uaf-when-vma-mm-is-freed-after-vma-vm_refcnt-got-dropped +++ a/mm/mmap_lock.c @@ -164,8 +164,7 @@ retry: */ /* Check if the vma we locked is the right one. */ - if (unlikely(vma->vm_mm != mm || - address < vma->vm_start || address >= vma->vm_end)) + if (unlikely(address < vma->vm_start || address >= vma->vm_end)) goto inval_end_read; rcu_read_unlock(); @@ -236,11 +235,8 @@ retry: goto fallback; } - /* - * Verify the vma we locked belongs to the same address space and it's - * not behind of the last search position. - */ - if (unlikely(vma->vm_mm != mm || from_addr >= vma->vm_end)) + /* Verify the vma is not behind the last search position. */ + if (unlikely(from_addr >= vma->vm_end)) goto fallback_unlock; /* _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from surenb(a)google.com are

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[merged mm-stable] mm-shmem-swap-improve-cached-mthp-handling-and-fix-potential-hang.patch removed from -mm tree

by Andrew Morton

The quilt patch titled Subject: mm/shmem, swap: improve cached mTHP handling and fix potential hang has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was mm-shmem-swap-improve-cached-mthp-handling-and-fix-potential-hang.patch This patch was dropped because it was merged into the mm-stable branch of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm ------------------------------------------------------ From: Kairui Song <kasong(a)tencent.com> Subject: mm/shmem, swap: improve cached mTHP handling and fix potential hang Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2025 15:52:59 +0800 The current swap-in code assumes that, when a swap entry in shmem mapping is order 0, its cached folios (if present) must be order 0 too, which turns out not always correct. The problem is shmem_split_large_entry is called before verifying the folio will eventually be swapped in, one possible race is: CPU1 CPU2 shmem_swapin_folio /* swap in of order > 0 swap entry S1 */ folio = swap_cache_get_folio /* folio = NULL */ order = xa_get_order /* order > 0 */ folio = shmem_swap_alloc_folio /* mTHP alloc failure, folio = NULL */ <... Interrupted ...> shmem_swapin_folio /* S1 is swapped in */ shmem_writeout /* S1 is swapped out, folio cached */ shmem_split_large_entry(..., S1) /* S1 is split, but the folio covering it has order > 0 now */ Now any following swapin of S1 will hang: `xa_get_order` returns 0, and folio lookup will return a folio with order > 0. The `xa_get_order(&mapping->i_pages, index) != folio_order(folio)` will always return false causing swap-in to return -EEXIST. And this looks fragile. So fix this up by allowing seeing a larger folio in swap cache, and check the whole shmem mapping range covered by the swapin have the right swap value upon inserting the folio. And drop the redundant tree walks before the insertion. This will actually improve performance, as it avoids two redundant Xarray tree walks in the hot path, and the only side effect is that in the failure path, shmem may redundantly reallocate a few folios causing temporary slight memory pressure. And worth noting, it may seems the order and value check before inserting might help reducing the lock contention, which is not true. The swap cache layer ensures raced swapin will either see a swap cache folio or failed to do a swapin (we have SWAP_HAS_CACHE bit even if swap cache is bypassed), so holding the folio lock and checking the folio flag is already good enough for avoiding the lock contention. The chance that a folio passes the swap entry value check but the shmem mapping slot has changed should be very low. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250728075306.12704-1-ryncsn@gmail.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250728075306.12704-2-ryncsn@gmail.com Fixes: 809bc86517cc ("mm: shmem: support large folio swap out") Signed-off-by: Kairui Song <kasong(a)tencent.com> Reviewed-by: Kemeng Shi <shikemeng(a)huaweicloud.com> Reviewed-by: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang(a)linux.alibaba.com> Tested-by: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang(a)linux.alibaba.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe(a)redhat.com> Cc: Barry Song <baohua(a)kernel.org> Cc: Chris Li <chrisl(a)kernel.org> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd(a)google.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy(a)infradead.org> Cc: Nhat Pham <nphamcs(a)gmail.com> Cc: Dev Jain <dev.jain(a)arm.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- mm/shmem.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) --- a/mm/shmem.c~mm-shmem-swap-improve-cached-mthp-handling-and-fix-potential-hang +++ a/mm/shmem.c @@ -891,7 +891,9 @@ static int shmem_add_to_page_cache(struc pgoff_t index, void *expected, gfp_t gfp) { XA_STATE_ORDER(xas, &mapping->i_pages, index, folio_order(folio)); - long nr = folio_nr_pages(folio); + unsigned long nr = folio_nr_pages(folio); + swp_entry_t iter, swap; + void *entry; VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO(index != round_down(index, nr), folio); VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO(!folio_test_locked(folio), folio); @@ -903,14 +905,25 @@ static int shmem_add_to_page_cache(struc gfp &= GFP_RECLAIM_MASK; folio_throttle_swaprate(folio, gfp); + swap = radix_to_swp_entry(expected); do { + iter = swap; xas_lock_irq(&xas); - if (expected != xas_find_conflict(&xas)) { - xas_set_err(&xas, -EEXIST); - goto unlock; + xas_for_each_conflict(&xas, entry) { + /* + * The range must either be empty, or filled with + * expected swap entries. Shmem swap entries are never + * partially freed without split of both entry and + * folio, so there shouldn't be any holes. + */ + if (!expected || entry != swp_to_radix_entry(iter)) { + xas_set_err(&xas, -EEXIST); + goto unlock; + } + iter.val += 1 << xas_get_order(&xas); } - if (expected && xas_find_conflict(&xas)) { + if (expected && iter.val - nr != swap.val) { xas_set_err(&xas, -EEXIST); goto unlock; } @@ -2359,7 +2372,7 @@ static int shmem_swapin_folio(struct ino error = -ENOMEM; goto failed; } - } else if (order != folio_order(folio)) { + } else if (order > folio_order(folio)) { /* * Swap readahead may swap in order 0 folios into swapcache * asynchronously, while the shmem mapping can still stores @@ -2384,15 +2397,23 @@ static int shmem_swapin_folio(struct ino swap = swp_entry(swp_type(swap), swp_offset(swap) + offset); } + } else if (order < folio_order(folio)) { + swap.val = round_down(swap.val, 1 << folio_order(folio)); + index = round_down(index, 1 << folio_order(folio)); } alloced: - /* We have to do this with folio locked to prevent races */ + /* + * We have to do this with the folio locked to prevent races. + * The shmem_confirm_swap below only checks if the first swap + * entry matches the folio, that's enough to ensure the folio + * is not used outside of shmem, as shmem swap entries + * and swap cache folios are never partially freed. + */ folio_lock(folio); if ((!skip_swapcache && !folio_test_swapcache(folio)) || - folio->swap.val != swap.val || !shmem_confirm_swap(mapping, index, swap) || - xa_get_order(&mapping->i_pages, index) != folio_order(folio)) { + folio->swap.val != swap.val) { error = -EEXIST; goto unlock; } _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from kasong(a)tencent.com are

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