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+ kasan-unpoison-pcpu-chunks-with-base-address-tag.patch added to mm-hotfixes-unstable branch

by Andrew Morton

The patch titled Subject: kasan: unpoison pcpu chunks with base address tag has been added to the -mm mm-hotfixes-unstable branch. Its filename is kasan-unpoison-pcpu-chunks-with-base-address-tag.patch This patch will shortly appear at https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche… This patch will later appear in the mm-hotfixes-unstable branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm Before you just go and hit "reply", please: a) Consider who else should be cc'ed b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's *** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code *** The -mm tree is included into linux-next via the mm-everything branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm and is updated there every 2-3 working days ------------------------------------------------------ From: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com> Subject: kasan: unpoison pcpu chunks with base address tag Date: Wed, 29 Oct 2025 19:05:49 +0000 The problem presented here is related to NUMA systems and tag-based KASAN modes - software and hardware ones. It can be explained in the following points: 1. There can be more than one virtual memory chunk. 2. Chunk's base address has a tag. 3. The base address points at the first chunk and thus inherits the tag of the first chunk. 4. The subsequent chunks will be accessed with the tag from the first chunk. 5. Thus, the subsequent chunks need to have their tag set to match that of the first chunk. Refactor code by moving it into a helper in preparation for the actual fix. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/fbce40a59b0a22a5735cb6e9b95c5a45a34b23cb.17617636… Fixes: 1d96320f8d53 ("kasan, vmalloc: add vmalloc tagging for SW_TAGS") Signed-off-by: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com> Tested-by: Baoquan He <bhe(a)redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider(a)google.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl(a)gmail.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a(a)gmail.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb(a)kernel.org> Cc: Barry Song <baohua(a)kernel.org> Cc: Bill Wendling <morbo(a)google.com> Cc: Borislav Betkov <bp(a)alien8.de> Cc: Breno Leitao <leitao(a)debian.org> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst(a)gmail.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas(a)arm.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com> Cc: Dmitriy Vyukov <dvyukov(a)google.com> Cc: FUJITA Tomonori <fujita.tomonori(a)gmail.com> Cc: Guilherme Giacomo Simoes <trintaeoitogc(a)gmail.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa(a)zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)redhat.com> Cc: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka(a)siemens.com> Cc: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton(a)arm.com> Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard(a)nvidia.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet(a)lwn.net> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)kernel.org> Cc: Justin Stitt <justinstitt(a)google.com> Cc: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh(a)google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <kees(a)kernel.org> Cc: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang(a)huawei.com> Cc: Kieran Bingham <kbingham(a)kernel.org> Cc: levi.yun <yeoreum.yun(a)arm.com> Cc: Liam Howlett <liam.howlett(a)oracle.com> Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes(a)oracle.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver(a)google.com> Cc: Marc Rutland <mark.rutland(a)arm.com> Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz(a)kernel.org> Cc: Mark Brown <broonie(a)kernel.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko(a)suse.com> Cc: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda(a)kernel.org> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt(a)kernel.org> Cc: Mostafa Saleh <smostafa(a)google.com> Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan(a)kernel.org> Cc: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta(a)amd.com> Cc: Pasha Tatashin <pasha.tatashin(a)soleen.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: Samuel Holland <samuel.holland(a)sifive.com> Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy(a)linutronix.de> Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb(a)google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleinxer <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: Thomas Huth <thuth(a)redhat.com> Cc: "Uladzislau Rezki (Sony)" <urezki(a)gmail.com> Cc: Uros Bizjak <ubizjak(a)gmail.com> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino(a)arm.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka(a)suse.cz> Cc: Will Deacon <will(a)kernel.org> Cc: Xin Li (Intel) <xin(a)zytor.com> Cc: Zi Yan <ziy(a)nvidia.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> [6.1+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- include/linux/kasan.h | 10 ++++++++++ mm/kasan/tags.c | 11 +++++++++++ mm/vmalloc.c | 4 +--- 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) --- a/include/linux/kasan.h~kasan-unpoison-pcpu-chunks-with-base-address-tag +++ a/include/linux/kasan.h @@ -614,6 +614,13 @@ static __always_inline void kasan_poison __kasan_poison_vmalloc(start, size); } +void __kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(struct vm_struct **vms, int nr_vms); +static __always_inline void kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(struct vm_struct **vms, int nr_vms) +{ + if (kasan_enabled()) + __kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(vms, nr_vms); +} + #else /* CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC */ static inline void kasan_populate_early_vm_area_shadow(void *start, @@ -638,6 +645,9 @@ static inline void *kasan_unpoison_vmall static inline void kasan_poison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size) { } +static inline void kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(struct vm_struct **vms, int nr_vms) +{ } + #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC */ #if (defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS)) && \ --- a/mm/kasan/tags.c~kasan-unpoison-pcpu-chunks-with-base-address-tag +++ a/mm/kasan/tags.c @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ #include <linux/static_key.h> #include <linux/string.h> #include <linux/types.h> +#include <linux/vmalloc.h> #include "kasan.h" #include "../slab.h" @@ -146,3 +147,13 @@ void __kasan_save_free_info(struct kmem_ { save_stack_info(cache, object, 0, true); } + +void __kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(struct vm_struct **vms, int nr_vms) +{ + int area; + + for (area = 0 ; area < nr_vms ; area++) { + kasan_poison(vms[area]->addr, vms[area]->size, + arch_kasan_get_tag(vms[area]->addr), false); + } +} --- a/mm/vmalloc.c~kasan-unpoison-pcpu-chunks-with-base-address-tag +++ a/mm/vmalloc.c @@ -4870,9 +4870,7 @@ retry: * With hardware tag-based KASAN, marking is skipped for * non-VM_ALLOC mappings, see __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(). */ - for (area = 0; area < nr_vms; area++) - vms[area]->addr = kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(vms[area]->addr, - vms[area]->size, KASAN_VMALLOC_PROT_NORMAL); + kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(vms, nr_vms); kfree(vas); return vms; _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com are kasan-unpoison-pcpu-chunks-with-base-address-tag.patch kasan-unpoison-vms-addresses-with-a-common-tag.patch

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[PATCH 06/25] media: i2c: ov01a10: Fix test-pattern disabling

by Hans de Goede

When the test-pattern control gets set to 0 (Disabled) 0 should be written to the test-pattern register, rather then doing nothing. Fixes: 0827b58dabff ("media: i2c: add ov01a10 image sensor driver") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hansg(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/media/i2c/ov01a10.c | 6 ++---- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/media/i2c/ov01a10.c b/drivers/media/i2c/ov01a10.c index 0405ec7c75fd..733e5bf0180c 100644 --- a/drivers/media/i2c/ov01a10.c +++ b/drivers/media/i2c/ov01a10.c @@ -406,10 +406,8 @@ static int ov01a10_update_digital_gain(struct ov01a10 *ov01a10, u32 d_gain) static int ov01a10_test_pattern(struct ov01a10 *ov01a10, u32 pattern) { - if (!pattern) - return 0; - - pattern = (pattern - 1) | OV01A10_TEST_PATTERN_ENABLE; + if (pattern) + pattern = (pattern - 1) | OV01A10_TEST_PATTERN_ENABLE; return ov01a10_write_reg(ov01a10, OV01A10_REG_TEST_PATTERN, 1, pattern); } -- 2.51.0

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, conoce mejor a tu candidato antes de contratar

by Valeria Pérez

Evaluaciones Psicométricas para RR.HH. body { margin: 0; padding: 0; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; color: #333; background-color: #ffffff; } table { border-spacing: 0; width: 100%; max-width: 600px; margin: auto; } td { padding: 12px 20px; } a { color: #1a73e8; text-decoration: none; } .footer { font-size: 12px; color: #888888; text-align: center; } Mejora tus procesos de selección con evaluaciones psicométricas fáciles y confiables. Hola, , Sabemos que encontrar al candidato ideal va más allá del currículum. Por eso quiero contarte brevemente sobre PsicoSmart, una plataforma que ayuda a equipos de RR.HH. a evaluar talento con pruebas psicométricas rápidas, confiables y fáciles de aplicar. Con PsicoSmart puedes: Aplicar evaluaciones psicométricas 100% en línea. Elegir entre más de 31 pruebas psicométricas Generar reportes automáticos, visuales y fáciles de interpretar. Comparar resultados entre candidatos en segundos. Ahorrar horas valiosas del proceso de selección. Si estás buscando mejorar tus contrataciones, te lo recomiendo muchísimo. Si quieres conocer más puedes responder este correo o simplemente contactarme, mis datos están abajo. Saludos, ----------------------------- Atte.: Valeria Pérez Ciudad de México: (55) 5018 0565 WhatsApp: +52 33 1607 2089 Si no deseas recibir más correos, haz clic aquí para darte de baja. Para remover su dirección de esta lista haga <a href="https://s1.arrobamail.com/unsuscribe.php?id=yiwtsrewispppseup">click aquí</a>

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[PATCH] dma: qcom: gpi: Fix memory leak in gpi_peripheral_config()

by Miaoqian Lin

Fix a memory leak in gpi_peripheral_config() where the original memory pointed to by gchan->config could be lost if krealloc() fails. The issue occurs when: 1. gchan->config points to previously allocated memory 2. krealloc() fails and returns NULL 3. The function directly assigns NULL to gchan->config, losing the reference to the original memory 4. The original memory becomes unreachable and cannot be freed Fix this by using a temporary variable to hold the krealloc() result and only updating gchan->config when the allocation succeeds. Found via static analysis and code review. Fixes: 5d0c3533a19f ("dmaengine: qcom: Add GPI dma driver") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin <linmq006(a)gmail.com> --- drivers/dma/qcom/gpi.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/dma/qcom/gpi.c b/drivers/dma/qcom/gpi.c index 8e87738086b2..8908b7c71900 100644 --- a/drivers/dma/qcom/gpi.c +++ b/drivers/dma/qcom/gpi.c @@ -1605,14 +1605,16 @@ static int gpi_peripheral_config(struct dma_chan *chan, struct dma_slave_config *config) { struct gchan *gchan = to_gchan(chan); + void *new_config; if (!config->peripheral_config) return -EINVAL; - gchan->config = krealloc(gchan->config, config->peripheral_size, GFP_NOWAIT); - if (!gchan->config) + new_config = krealloc(gchan->config, config->peripheral_size, GFP_NOWAIT); + if (!new_config) return -ENOMEM; + gchan->config = new_config; memcpy(gchan->config, config->peripheral_config, config->peripheral_size); return 0; -- 2.39.5 (Apple Git-154)

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[PATCH] Documentation: process: Also mention Sasha Levin as stable tree maintainer

by Bagas Sanjaya

Sasha has also maintaining stable branch in conjunction with Greg since cb5d21946d2a2f ("MAINTAINERS: Add Sasha as a stable branch maintainer"). Mention him in 2.Process.rst. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme(a)gmail.com> --- Documentation/process/2.Process.rst | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/process/2.Process.rst b/Documentation/process/2.Process.rst index 8e63d171767db8..7bd41838a5464f 100644 --- a/Documentation/process/2.Process.rst +++ b/Documentation/process/2.Process.rst @@ -99,8 +99,10 @@ go out with a handful of known regressions, though, hopefully, none of them are serious. Once a stable release is made, its ongoing maintenance is passed off to the -"stable team," currently Greg Kroah-Hartman. The stable team will release -occasional updates to the stable release using the 9.x.y numbering scheme. +"stable team," currently consists of Greg Kroah-Hartman and Sasha Levin. The +stable team will release occasional updates to the stable release using the +9.x.y numbering scheme. + To be considered for an update release, a patch must (1) fix a significant bug, and (2) already be merged into the mainline for the next development kernel. Kernels will typically receive stable updates for a little more base-commit: 0aa760051f4eb3d3bcd812125557bd09629a71e8 -- An old man doll... just what I always wanted! - Clara

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[PATCH v1] mm/mm_init: Fix hash table order logging in alloc_large_system_hash()

by Isaac J. Manjarres

When emitting the order of the allocation for a hash table, alloc_large_system_hash() unconditionally subtracts PAGE_SHIFT from log base 2 of the allocation size. This is not correct if the allocation size is smaller than a page, and yields a negative value for the order as seen below: TCP established hash table entries: 32 (order: -4, 256 bytes, linear) TCP bind hash table entries: 32 (order: -2, 1024 bytes, linear) Use get_order() to compute the order when emitting the hash table information to correctly handle cases where the allocation size is smaller than a page: TCP established hash table entries: 32 (order: 0, 256 bytes, linear) TCP bind hash table entries: 32 (order: 0, 1024 bytes, linear) Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v5.4+ Signed-off-by: Isaac J. Manjarres <isaacmanjarres(a)google.com> --- mm/mm_init.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/mm/mm_init.c b/mm/mm_init.c index 3db2dea7db4c..7712d887b696 100644 --- a/mm/mm_init.c +++ b/mm/mm_init.c @@ -2469,7 +2469,7 @@ void *__init alloc_large_system_hash(const char *tablename, panic("Failed to allocate %s hash table\n", tablename); pr_info("%s hash table entries: %ld (order: %d, %lu bytes, %s)\n", - tablename, 1UL << log2qty, ilog2(size) - PAGE_SHIFT, size, + tablename, 1UL << log2qty, get_order(size), size, virt ? (huge ? "vmalloc hugepage" : "vmalloc") : "linear"); if (_hash_shift) -- 2.51.1.851.g4ebd6896fd-goog

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[PATCH] drm/sun4i: Fix device node reference leak in sun4i_tcon_of_get_id_from_port

by Miaoqian Lin

Fix a device node reference leak where the remote endpoint node obtained by of_graph_get_remote_endpoint() was not being properly released. Add of_node_put() calls after of_property_read_u32() to fix this. Fixes: e8d5bbf7f4c4 ("drm/sun4i: tcon: get TCON ID and matching engine with remote endpoint ID") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin <linmq006(a)gmail.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/sun4i/sun4i_tcon.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/sun4i/sun4i_tcon.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/sun4i/sun4i_tcon.c index 960e83c8291d..9214769a2857 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/sun4i/sun4i_tcon.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/sun4i/sun4i_tcon.c @@ -970,6 +970,7 @@ static int sun4i_tcon_of_get_id_from_port(struct device_node *port) continue; ret = of_property_read_u32(remote, "reg", &reg); + of_node_put(remote); if (ret) continue; -- 2.39.5 (Apple Git-154)

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[PATCH net v6] virtio-net: fix received length check in big packets

by Bui Quang Minh

Since commit 4959aebba8c0 ("virtio-net: use mtu size as buffer length for big packets"), when guest gso is off, the allocated size for big packets is not MAX_SKB_FRAGS * PAGE_SIZE anymore but depends on negotiated MTU. The number of allocated frags for big packets is stored in vi->big_packets_num_skbfrags. Because the host announced buffer length can be malicious (e.g. the host vhost_net driver's get_rx_bufs is modified to announce incorrect length), we need a check in virtio_net receive path. Currently, the check is not adapted to the new change which can lead to NULL page pointer dereference in the below while loop when receiving length that is larger than the allocated one. This commit fixes the received length check corresponding to the new change. Fixes: 4959aebba8c0 ("virtio-net: use mtu size as buffer length for big packets") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Bui Quang Minh <minhquangbui99(a)gmail.com> --- Changes in v6: - Fix the length check - Link to v5: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20251024150649.22906-1-minhquangbui99@gmail.… Changes in v5: - Move the length check to receive_big - Link to v4: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20251022160623.51191-1-minhquangbui99@gmail.… Changes in v4: - Remove unrelated changes, add more comments - Link to v3: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20251021154534.53045-1-minhquangbui99@gmail.… Changes in v3: - Convert BUG_ON to WARN_ON_ONCE - Link to v2: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20250708144206.95091-1-minhquangbui99@gmail.… Changes in v2: - Remove incorrect give_pages call - Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20250706141150.25344-1-minhquangbui99@gmail.… --- drivers/net/virtio_net.c | 25 ++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/virtio_net.c b/drivers/net/virtio_net.c index a757cbcab87f..461ad1019c37 100644 --- a/drivers/net/virtio_net.c +++ b/drivers/net/virtio_net.c @@ -910,17 +910,6 @@ static struct sk_buff *page_to_skb(struct virtnet_info *vi, goto ok; } - /* - * Verify that we can indeed put this data into a skb. - * This is here to handle cases when the device erroneously - * tries to receive more than is possible. This is usually - * the case of a broken device. - */ - if (unlikely(len > MAX_SKB_FRAGS * PAGE_SIZE)) { - net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: too much data\n", skb->dev->name); - dev_kfree_skb(skb); - return NULL; - } BUG_ON(offset >= PAGE_SIZE); while (len) { unsigned int frag_size = min((unsigned)PAGE_SIZE - offset, len); @@ -2107,9 +2096,19 @@ static struct sk_buff *receive_big(struct net_device *dev, struct virtnet_rq_stats *stats) { struct page *page = buf; - struct sk_buff *skb = - page_to_skb(vi, rq, page, 0, len, PAGE_SIZE, 0); + struct sk_buff *skb; + + /* Make sure that len does not exceed the allocated size in + * add_recvbuf_big. + */ + if (unlikely(len > (vi->big_packets_num_skbfrags + 1) * PAGE_SIZE)) { + pr_debug("%s: rx error: len %u exceeds allocate size %lu\n", + dev->name, len, + (vi->big_packets_num_skbfrags + 1) * PAGE_SIZE); + goto err; + } + skb = page_to_skb(vi, rq, page, 0, len, PAGE_SIZE, 0); u64_stats_add(&stats->bytes, len - vi->hdr_len); if (unlikely(!skb)) goto err; -- 2.43.0

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[PATCH v2] w1: therm: Fix off-by-one buffer overflow in alarms_store

by Thorsten Blum

The sysfs buffer passed to alarms_store() is allocated with 'size + 1' bytes and a NUL terminator is appended. However, the 'size' argument does not account for this extra byte. The original code then allocated 'size' bytes and used strcpy() to copy 'buf', which always writes one byte past the allocated buffer since strcpy() copies until the NUL terminator at index 'size'. Fix this by parsing the 'buf' parameter directly using simple_strtol() without allocating any intermediate memory or string copying. This removes the overflow while simplifying the code. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: e2c94d6f5720 ("w1_therm: adding alarm sysfs entry") Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum(a)linux.dev> --- Compile-tested only. Changes in v2: - Fix buffer overflow instead of truncating the copy using strscpy() - Parse buffer directly using simple_strtol() as suggested by David - Update patch subject and description - Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20251017170047.114224-2-thorsten.blum@linux.de… --- drivers/w1/slaves/w1_therm.c | 98 ++++++++++++------------------------ 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/w1/slaves/w1_therm.c b/drivers/w1/slaves/w1_therm.c index 9ccedb3264fb..046fa682d57d 100644 --- a/drivers/w1/slaves/w1_therm.c +++ b/drivers/w1/slaves/w1_therm.c @@ -1836,59 +1836,32 @@ static ssize_t alarms_store(struct device *device, struct w1_slave *sl = dev_to_w1_slave(device); struct therm_info info; u8 new_config_register[3]; /* array of data to be written */ - int temp, ret; - char *token = NULL; + long temp; + int ret; s8 tl, th; /* 1 byte per value + temp ring order */ - char *p_args, *orig; + const char *p = buf; + char *endp; - p_args = orig = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); - /* Safe string copys as buf is const */ - if (!p_args) { - dev_warn(device, - "%s: error unable to allocate memory %d\n", - __func__, -ENOMEM); - return size; + temp = simple_strtol(p, &endp, 10); + if (p == endp || *endp != ' ') { + dev_info(device, "%s: error parsing args %d\n", + __func__, -EINVAL); + goto err; } - strcpy(p_args, buf); - - /* Split string using space char */ - token = strsep(&p_args, " "); - - if (!token) { - dev_info(device, - "%s: error parsing args %d\n", __func__, -EINVAL); - goto free_m; - } - - /* Convert 1st entry to int */ - ret = kstrtoint (token, 10, &temp); - if (ret) { - dev_info(device, - "%s: error parsing args %d\n", __func__, ret); - goto free_m; - } - + /* Cast to short to eliminate out of range values */ tl = int_to_short(temp); - /* Split string using space char */ - token = strsep(&p_args, " "); - if (!token) { - dev_info(device, - "%s: error parsing args %d\n", __func__, -EINVAL); - goto free_m; - } - /* Convert 2nd entry to int */ - ret = kstrtoint (token, 10, &temp); - if (ret) { - dev_info(device, - "%s: error parsing args %d\n", __func__, ret); - goto free_m; + p = endp + 1; + temp = simple_strtol(p, &endp, 10); + if (p == endp) { + dev_info(device, "%s: error parsing args %d\n", + __func__, -EINVAL); + goto err; } - - /* Prepare to cast to short by eliminating out of range values */ + /* Cast to short to eliminate out of range values */ th = int_to_short(temp); - /* Reorder if required th and tl */ + /* Reorder if required */ if (tl > th) swap(tl, th); @@ -1897,35 +1870,30 @@ static ssize_t alarms_store(struct device *device, * (th : byte 2 - tl: byte 3) */ ret = read_scratchpad(sl, &info); - if (!ret) { - new_config_register[0] = th; /* Byte 2 */ - new_config_register[1] = tl; /* Byte 3 */ - new_config_register[2] = info.rom[4];/* Byte 4 */ - } else { - dev_info(device, - "%s: error reading from the slave device %d\n", - __func__, ret); - goto free_m; + if (ret) { + dev_info(device, "%s: error reading from the slave device %d\n", + __func__, ret); + goto err; } + new_config_register[0] = th; /* Byte 2 */ + new_config_register[1] = tl; /* Byte 3 */ + new_config_register[2] = info.rom[4]; /* Byte 4 */ /* Write data in the device RAM */ if (!SLAVE_SPECIFIC_FUNC(sl)) { - dev_info(device, - "%s: Device not supported by the driver %d\n", - __func__, -ENODEV); - goto free_m; + dev_info(device, "%s: Device not supported by the driver %d\n", + __func__, -ENODEV); + goto err; } ret = SLAVE_SPECIFIC_FUNC(sl)->write_data(sl, new_config_register); - if (ret) - dev_info(device, - "%s: error writing to the slave device %d\n", + if (ret) { + dev_info(device, "%s: error writing to the slave device %d\n", __func__, ret); + goto err; + } -free_m: - /* free allocated memory */ - kfree(orig); - +err: return size; } -- 2.51.0

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] ksmbd: transport_ipc: validate payload size before reading" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 6f40e50ceb99fc8ef37e5c56e2ec1d162733fef0 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025102920-mace-herbal-edee@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 6f40e50ceb99fc8ef37e5c56e2ec1d162733fef0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Qianchang Zhao <pioooooooooip(a)gmail.com> Date: Wed, 22 Oct 2025 15:27:47 +0900 Subject: [PATCH] ksmbd: transport_ipc: validate payload size before reading handle handle_response() dereferences the payload as a 4-byte handle without verifying that the declared payload size is at least 4 bytes. A malformed or truncated message from ksmbd.mountd can lead to a 4-byte read past the declared payload size. Validate the size before dereferencing. This is a minimal fix to guard the initial handle read. Fixes: 0626e6641f6b ("cifsd: add server handler for central processing and tranport layers") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Qianchang Zhao <pioooooooooip(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Qianchang Zhao <pioooooooooip(a)gmail.com> Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench(a)microsoft.com> diff --git a/fs/smb/server/transport_ipc.c b/fs/smb/server/transport_ipc.c index 46f87fd1ce1c..2c08cccfa680 100644 --- a/fs/smb/server/transport_ipc.c +++ b/fs/smb/server/transport_ipc.c @@ -263,10 +263,16 @@ static void ipc_msg_handle_free(int handle) static int handle_response(int type, void *payload, size_t sz) { - unsigned int handle = *(unsigned int *)payload; + unsigned int handle; struct ipc_msg_table_entry *entry; int ret = 0; + /* Prevent 4-byte read beyond declared payload size */ + if (sz < sizeof(unsigned int)) + return -EINVAL; + + handle = *(unsigned int *)payload; + ipc_update_last_active(); down_read(&ipc_msg_table_lock); hash_for_each_possible(ipc_msg_table, entry, ipc_table_hlist, handle) {

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