A process issuing blocking writes to a virtio console may get stuck
indefinitely if another thread polls the device. Here is how to trigger
the bug:
- Thread A writes to the port until the virtqueue is full.
- Thread A calls wait_port_writable() and goes to sleep, waiting on
port->waitqueue.
- The host processes some of the write, marks buffers as used and raises
an interrupt.
- Before the interrupt is serviced, thread B executes port_fops_poll().
This calls reclaim_consumed_buffers() via will_write_block() and
consumes all used buffers.
- The interrupt is serviced. vring_interrupt() finds no used buffers
via more_used() and returns without waking port->waitqueue.
- Thread A is still in wait_event(port->waitqueue), waiting for a
wakeup that never arrives.
The crux is that invoking reclaim_consumed_buffers() may cause
vring_interrupt() to omit wakeups.
Fix this by calling reclaim_consumed_buffers() in out_int() before
waking. This is similar to the call to discard_port_data() in
in_intr() which also frees buffer from a non-sleepable context.
This in turn guarantees that port->outvq_full is up to date when
handling polling. Since in_intr() already populates port->inbuf we
use that to avoid changing reader state.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb(a)isovalent.com>
---
As far as I can tell all currently maintained stable series kernels need
this commit. Applies and builds cleanly on 5.10.247, verified to fix
the issue.
---
Changes in v2:
- Call reclaim_consumed_buffers() in out_intr instead of
issuing another wake.
- Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251215-virtio-console-lost-wakeup-v1-1-79a5c578…
---
drivers/char/virtio_console.c | 16 ++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/virtio_console.c b/drivers/char/virtio_console.c
index 088182e54debd6029ea2c2a5542d7a28500e67b8..351e445da35e25910671615a8ecc79165dfc66b7 100644
--- a/drivers/char/virtio_console.c
+++ b/drivers/char/virtio_console.c
@@ -971,10 +971,17 @@ static __poll_t port_fops_poll(struct file *filp, poll_table *wait)
return EPOLLHUP;
}
ret = 0;
- if (!will_read_block(port))
+
+ spin_lock(&port->inbuf_lock);
+ if (port->inbuf)
ret |= EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM;
- if (!will_write_block(port))
+ spin_unlock(&port->inbuf_lock);
+
+ spin_lock(&port->outvq_lock);
+ if (!port->outvq_full)
ret |= EPOLLOUT;
+ spin_unlock(&port->outvq_lock);
+
if (!port->host_connected)
ret |= EPOLLHUP;
@@ -1698,6 +1705,7 @@ static void flush_bufs(struct virtqueue *vq, bool can_sleep)
static void out_intr(struct virtqueue *vq)
{
struct port *port;
+ unsigned long flags;
port = find_port_by_vq(vq->vdev->priv, vq);
if (!port) {
@@ -1705,6 +1713,10 @@ static void out_intr(struct virtqueue *vq)
return;
}
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&port->outvq_lock, flags);
+ reclaim_consumed_buffers(port);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&port->outvq_lock, flags);
+
wake_up_interruptible(&port->waitqueue);
}
---
base-commit: d358e5254674b70f34c847715ca509e46eb81e6f
change-id: 20251215-virtio-console-lost-wakeup-0f566c5cd35f
Best regards,
--
Lorenz Bauer <lmb(a)isovalent.com>
When a hugetlb folio is being poisoned again, try_memory_failure_hugetlb()
passed head pfn to kill_accessing_process(), that is not right.
The precise pfn of the poisoned page should be used in order to
determine the precise vaddr as the SIGBUS payload.
This issue has already been taken care of in the normal path, that is,
hwpoison_user_mappings(), see [1][2]. Further more, for [3] to work
correctly in the hugetlb repoisoning case, it's essential to inform
VM the precise poisoned page, not the head page.
[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20231218135837.3310403-1-willy@infradead.org
[2] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250224211445.2663312-1-jane.chu@oracle.com
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20251116013223.1557158-1-jiaqiyan@google.com/
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jane Chu <jane.chu(a)oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett(a)oracle.com>
---
v1 -> v2:
pickup R-B, add stable to cc list.
---
mm/memory-failure.c | 22 ++++++++++++----------
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mm/memory-failure.c b/mm/memory-failure.c
index 3edebb0cda30..c9d87811b1ea 100644
--- a/mm/memory-failure.c
+++ b/mm/memory-failure.c
@@ -681,9 +681,11 @@ static void set_to_kill(struct to_kill *tk, unsigned long addr, short shift)
}
static int check_hwpoisoned_entry(pte_t pte, unsigned long addr, short shift,
- unsigned long poisoned_pfn, struct to_kill *tk)
+ unsigned long poisoned_pfn, struct to_kill *tk,
+ int pte_nr)
{
unsigned long pfn = 0;
+ unsigned long hwpoison_vaddr;
if (pte_present(pte)) {
pfn = pte_pfn(pte);
@@ -694,10 +696,11 @@ static int check_hwpoisoned_entry(pte_t pte, unsigned long addr, short shift,
pfn = swp_offset_pfn(swp);
}
- if (!pfn || pfn != poisoned_pfn)
+ if (!pfn || (pfn > poisoned_pfn || (pfn + pte_nr - 1) < poisoned_pfn))
return 0;
- set_to_kill(tk, addr, shift);
+ hwpoison_vaddr = addr + ((poisoned_pfn - pfn) << PAGE_SHIFT);
+ set_to_kill(tk, hwpoison_vaddr, shift);
return 1;
}
@@ -749,7 +752,7 @@ static int hwpoison_pte_range(pmd_t *pmdp, unsigned long addr,
for (; addr != end; ptep++, addr += PAGE_SIZE) {
ret = check_hwpoisoned_entry(ptep_get(ptep), addr, PAGE_SHIFT,
- hwp->pfn, &hwp->tk);
+ hwp->pfn, &hwp->tk, 1);
if (ret == 1)
break;
}
@@ -772,8 +775,8 @@ static int hwpoison_hugetlb_range(pte_t *ptep, unsigned long hmask,
ptl = huge_pte_lock(h, walk->mm, ptep);
pte = huge_ptep_get(walk->mm, addr, ptep);
- ret = check_hwpoisoned_entry(pte, addr, huge_page_shift(h),
- hwp->pfn, &hwp->tk);
+ ret = check_hwpoisoned_entry(pte, addr, huge_page_shift(h), hwp->pfn,
+ &hwp->tk, pages_per_huge_page(h));
spin_unlock(ptl);
return ret;
}
@@ -2023,10 +2026,8 @@ static int try_memory_failure_hugetlb(unsigned long pfn, int flags, int *hugetlb
*hugetlb = 0;
return 0;
} else if (res == -EHWPOISON) {
- if (flags & MF_ACTION_REQUIRED) {
- folio = page_folio(p);
- res = kill_accessing_process(current, folio_pfn(folio), flags);
- }
+ if (flags & MF_ACTION_REQUIRED)
+ res = kill_accessing_process(current, pfn, flags);
action_result(pfn, MF_MSG_ALREADY_POISONED, MF_FAILED);
return res;
} else if (res == -EBUSY) {
@@ -2037,6 +2038,7 @@ static int try_memory_failure_hugetlb(unsigned long pfn, int flags, int *hugetlb
return action_result(pfn, MF_MSG_GET_HWPOISON, MF_IGNORED);
}
+
folio = page_folio(p);
folio_lock(folio);
--
2.43.5
The hw clock gating register sequence consists of register value pairs
that are written to the GPU during initialisation.
The a690 hwcg sequence has two GMU registers in it that used to amount
to random writes in the GPU mapping, but since commit 188db3d7fe66
("drm/msm/a6xx: Rebase GMU register offsets") they trigger a fault as
the updated offsets now lie outside the mapping. This in turn breaks
boot of machines like the Lenovo ThinkPad X13s.
Note that the updates of these GMU registers is already taken care of
properly since commit 40c297eb245b ("drm/msm/a6xx: Set GMU CGC
properties on a6xx too"), but for some reason these two entries were
left in the table.
Fixes: 5e7665b5e484 ("drm/msm/adreno: Add Adreno A690 support")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 6.5
Cc: Bjorn Andersson <andersson(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Konrad Dybcio <konradybcio(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan(a)kernel.org>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/msm/adreno/a6xx_catalog.c | 2 --
1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/adreno/a6xx_catalog.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/adreno/a6xx_catalog.c
index 29107b362346..4c2f739ee9b7 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/adreno/a6xx_catalog.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/adreno/a6xx_catalog.c
@@ -501,8 +501,6 @@ static const struct adreno_reglist a690_hwcg[] = {
{REG_A6XX_RBBM_CLOCK_CNTL_GMU_GX, 0x00000222},
{REG_A6XX_RBBM_CLOCK_DELAY_GMU_GX, 0x00000111},
{REG_A6XX_RBBM_CLOCK_HYST_GMU_GX, 0x00000555},
- {REG_A6XX_GPU_GMU_AO_GMU_CGC_DELAY_CNTL, 0x10111},
- {REG_A6XX_GPU_GMU_AO_GMU_CGC_HYST_CNTL, 0x5555},
{}
};
--
2.51.2
The driver trusts the 'num' and 'entry_size' fields read from BAR2 and
uses them directly to compute the length for memcpy_fromio() without
any bounds checking. If these fields get corrupted or otherwise contain
invalid values, num * entry_size can exceed the size of
proc_mon_info.entries and lead to a potential out-of-bounds write.
Add validation for 'entry_size' by ensuring it is non-zero and that
num * entry_size does not exceed the size of proc_mon_info.entries.
Fixes: ff428d052b3b ("misc: bcm-vk: add get_card_info, peerlog_info, and proc_mon_info")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Guangshuo Li <lgs201920130244(a)gmail.com>
---
drivers/misc/bcm-vk/bcm_vk_dev.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/misc/bcm-vk/bcm_vk_dev.c b/drivers/misc/bcm-vk/bcm_vk_dev.c
index a16b99bdaa13..a4a74c10f02b 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/bcm-vk/bcm_vk_dev.c
+++ b/drivers/misc/bcm-vk/bcm_vk_dev.c
@@ -439,6 +439,7 @@ static void bcm_vk_get_proc_mon_info(struct bcm_vk *vk)
struct device *dev = &vk->pdev->dev;
struct bcm_vk_proc_mon_info *mon = &vk->proc_mon_info;
u32 num, entry_size, offset, buf_size;
+ size_t max_bytes;
u8 *dst;
/* calculate offset which is based on peerlog offset */
@@ -458,6 +459,9 @@ static void bcm_vk_get_proc_mon_info(struct bcm_vk *vk)
num, BCM_VK_PROC_MON_MAX);
return;
}
+ if (!entry_size || (size_t)num > max_bytes / entry_size) {
+ return;
+ }
mon->num = num;
mon->entry_size = entry_size;
--
2.43.0
A process issuing blocking writes to a virtio console may get stuck
indefinitely if another thread polls the device. Here is how to trigger
the bug:
- Thread A writes to the port until the virtqueue is full.
- Thread A calls wait_port_writable() and goes to sleep, waiting on
port->waitqueue.
- The host processes some of the write, marks buffers as used and raises
an interrupt.
- Before the interrupt is serviced, thread B executes port_fops_poll().
This calls reclaim_consumed_buffers() via will_write_block() and
consumes all used buffers.
- The interrupt is serviced. vring_interrupt() finds no used buffers
via more_used() and returns without waking port->waitqueue.
- Thread A is still in wait_event(port->waitqueue), waiting for a
wakeup that never arrives.
The crux is that invoking reclaim_consumed_buffers() may cause
vring_interrupt() to omit wakeups.
Fix this by making reclaim_consumed_buffers() issue an additional wake
up if it consumed any buffers.
Signed-off-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb(a)isovalent.com>
---
As far as I can tell all currently maintained stable series kernels need
this commit. I've tested that it applies cleanly to 5.10.247, however
wasn't able to build the kernel due to an unrelated link error. Instead
I applied it to 5.15.197, which compiled and verified to be fixed.
---
drivers/char/virtio_console.c | 9 +++++++++
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/char/virtio_console.c b/drivers/char/virtio_console.c
index 088182e54debd6029ea2c2a5542d7a28500e67b8..7cd3ad9da9b53a7a570410f12501acc7fd7e3b9b 100644
--- a/drivers/char/virtio_console.c
+++ b/drivers/char/virtio_console.c
@@ -581,6 +581,7 @@ static ssize_t send_control_msg(struct port *port, unsigned int event,
static void reclaim_consumed_buffers(struct port *port)
{
struct port_buffer *buf;
+ bool freed = false;
unsigned int len;
if (!port->portdev) {
@@ -589,7 +590,15 @@ static void reclaim_consumed_buffers(struct port *port)
}
while ((buf = virtqueue_get_buf(port->out_vq, &len))) {
free_buf(buf, false);
+ freed = true;
+ }
+ if (freed) {
+ /* We freed all used buffers. Issue a wake up so that other pending
+ * tasks do not get stuck. This is necessary because vring_interrupt()
+ * will drop wakeups from the host if there are no used buffers.
+ */
port->outvq_full = false;
+ wake_up_interruptible(&port->waitqueue);
}
}
---
base-commit: d358e5254674b70f34c847715ca509e46eb81e6f
change-id: 20251215-virtio-console-lost-wakeup-0f566c5cd35f
Best regards,
--
Lorenz Bauer <lmb(a)isovalent.com>
Add missing null check for cci parameter before dereferencing it in
ucsi_sync_control_common(). The function can be called with cci=NULL
from ucsi_acknowledge(), which leads to a null pointer dereference
when accessing *cci in the condition check.
The crash occurs because the code checks if cci is not null before
calling ucsi->ops->read_cci(ucsi, cci), but then immediately
dereferences cci without a null check in the following condition:
(*cci & UCSI_CCI_COMMAND_COMPLETE).
KASAN trace:
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
RIP: 0010:ucsi_sync_control_common+0x2ae/0x4e0 [typec_ucsi]
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 667ecac55861 ("usb: typec: ucsi: return CCI and message from sync_control callback")
Reviewed-by: Heikki Krogerus <heikki.krogerus(a)linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello (AMD) <superm1(a)kernel.org>
---
v2:
* Add stable tag
* Add Heikki's tag
---
drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c b/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c
index 9b3df776137a1..7129973f19e7e 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ int ucsi_sync_control_common(struct ucsi *ucsi, u64 command, u32 *cci)
if (!ret && cci)
ret = ucsi->ops->read_cci(ucsi, cci);
- if (!ret && ucsi->message_in_size > 0 &&
+ if (!ret && cci && ucsi->message_in_size > 0 &&
(*cci & UCSI_CCI_COMMAND_COMPLETE))
ret = ucsi->ops->read_message_in(ucsi, ucsi->message_in,
ucsi->message_in_size);
--
2.43.0
From: Quentin Schulz <quentin.schulz(a)cherry.de>
The Device Tree specification specifies[1] that
"""
Each node in the devicetree is named according to the following
convention:
node-name@unit-address
[...]
The unit-address must match the first address specified in the reg
property of the node.
"""
The first address in the reg property is fdaXa000 and not fdaX9000. This
is likely a copy-paste error as the IOMMU for core0 has two entries in
the reg property, the first one being fdab9000 and the second fdaba000.
Let's fix this oversight to match what the spec is expecting.
[1] https://github.com/devicetree-org/devicetree-specification/releases/downloa… 2.2.1 Node Names
Fixes: a31dfc060a74 ("arm64: dts: rockchip: Add nodes for NPU and its MMU to rk3588-base")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Quentin Schulz <quentin.schulz(a)cherry.de>
---
arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3588-base.dtsi | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3588-base.dtsi b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3588-base.dtsi
index 2a79217930206..7ab12d1054a73 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3588-base.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3588-base.dtsi
@@ -1200,7 +1200,7 @@ rknn_core_1: npu@fdac0000 {
status = "disabled";
};
- rknn_mmu_1: iommu@fdac9000 {
+ rknn_mmu_1: iommu@fdaca000 {
compatible = "rockchip,rk3588-iommu", "rockchip,rk3568-iommu";
reg = <0x0 0xfdaca000 0x0 0x100>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 111 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH 0>;
@@ -1230,7 +1230,7 @@ rknn_core_2: npu@fdad0000 {
status = "disabled";
};
- rknn_mmu_2: iommu@fdad9000 {
+ rknn_mmu_2: iommu@fdada000 {
compatible = "rockchip,rk3588-iommu", "rockchip,rk3568-iommu";
reg = <0x0 0xfdada000 0x0 0x100>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 112 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH 0>;
---
base-commit: a619746d25c8adafe294777cc98c47a09759b3ed
change-id: 20251215-npu-dt-node-address-7bfeab42dae9
Best regards,
--
Quentin Schulz <quentin.schulz(a)cherry.de>