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[Linux-stable-mirror] + autofs-revert-fix-at_no_automount-not-being-honored.patch added to -mm tree

by akpm＠linux-foundation.org

The patch titled Subject: autofs: revert "autofs: fix AT_NO_AUTOMOUNT not being honored" has been added to the -mm tree. Its filename is autofs-revert-fix-at_no_automount-not-being-honored.patch This patch should soon appear at http://ozlabs.org/~akpm/mmots/broken-out/autofs-revert-fix-at_no_automount-… and later at http://ozlabs.org/~akpm/mmotm/broken-out/autofs-revert-fix-at_no_automount-… Before you just go and hit "reply", please: a) Consider who else should be cc'ed b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's *** Remember to use Documentation/SubmitChecklist when testing your code *** The -mm tree is included into linux-next and is updated there every 3-4 working days ------------------------------------------------------ From: Ian Kent <raven(a)themaw.net> Subject: autofs: revert "autofs: fix AT_NO_AUTOMOUNT not being honored" 42f4614821 ("autofs: fix AT_NO_AUTOMOUNT not being honored") allowed the fstatat(2) system call to properly honor the AT_NO_AUTOMOUNT flag but introduced a semantic change. In order to honor AT_NO_AUTOMOUNT a semantic change was made to the negative dentry case for stat family system calls in follow_automount(). This changed the unconditional triggering of an automount in this case to no longer be done and an error returned instead. This has caused more problems than I expected so reverting the change is needed. In a discussion with Neil Brown it was concluded that the automount(8) daemon can implement this change without kernel modifications. So that will be done instead and the autofs module documentation updated with a description of the problem and what needs to be done by module users for this specific case. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/151174730120.6162.3848002191530283984.stgit@pluto.… Fixes: 42f4614821 ("autofs: fix AT_NO_AUTOMOUNT not being honored") Signed-off-by: Ian Kent <raven(a)themaw.net> Cc: Neil Brown <neilb(a)suse.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro(a)ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Cc: David Howells <dhowells(a)redhat.com> Cc: Colin Walters <walters(a)redhat.com> Cc: Ondrej Holy <oholy(a)redhat.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> [4.11+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- fs/namei.c | 15 +++------------ include/linux/fs.h | 3 ++- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff -puN fs/namei.c~autofs-revert-fix-at_no_automount-not-being-honored fs/namei.c --- a/fs/namei.c~autofs-revert-fix-at_no_automount-not-being-honored +++ a/fs/namei.c @@ -1129,18 +1129,9 @@ static int follow_automount(struct path * of the daemon to instantiate them before they can be used. */ if (!(nd->flags & (LOOKUP_PARENT | LOOKUP_DIRECTORY | - LOOKUP_OPEN | LOOKUP_CREATE | - LOOKUP_AUTOMOUNT))) { - /* Positive dentry that isn't meant to trigger an - * automount, EISDIR will allow it to be used, - * otherwise there's no mount here "now" so return - * ENOENT. - */ - if (path->dentry->d_inode) - return -EISDIR; - else - return -ENOENT; - } + LOOKUP_OPEN | LOOKUP_CREATE | LOOKUP_AUTOMOUNT)) && + path->dentry->d_inode) + return -EISDIR; if (path->dentry->d_sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns) return -EACCES; diff -puN include/linux/fs.h~autofs-revert-fix-at_no_automount-not-being-honored include/linux/fs.h --- a/include/linux/fs.h~autofs-revert-fix-at_no_automount-not-being-honored +++ a/include/linux/fs.h @@ -3088,7 +3088,8 @@ static inline int vfs_lstat(const char _ static inline int vfs_fstatat(int dfd, const char __user *filename, struct kstat *stat, int flags) { - return vfs_statx(dfd, filename, flags, stat, STATX_BASIC_STATS); + return vfs_statx(dfd, filename, flags | AT_NO_AUTOMOUNT, + stat, STATX_BASIC_STATS); } static inline int vfs_fstat(int fd, struct kstat *stat) { _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from raven(a)themaw.net are autofs-revert-take-more-care-to-not-update-last_used-on-path-walk.patch autofs-revert-fix-at_no_automount-not-being-honored.patch

7 years, 2 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] + autofs-revert-take-more-care-to-not-update-last_used-on-path-walk.patch added to -mm tree

by akpm＠linux-foundation.org

The patch titled Subject: autofs: revert "autofs: take more care to not update last_used on path walk" has been added to the -mm tree. Its filename is autofs-revert-take-more-care-to-not-update-last_used-on-path-walk.patch This patch should soon appear at http://ozlabs.org/~akpm/mmots/broken-out/autofs-revert-take-more-care-to-no… and later at http://ozlabs.org/~akpm/mmotm/broken-out/autofs-revert-take-more-care-to-no… Before you just go and hit "reply", please: a) Consider who else should be cc'ed b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's *** Remember to use Documentation/SubmitChecklist when testing your code *** The -mm tree is included into linux-next and is updated there every 3-4 working days ------------------------------------------------------ From: Ian Kent <raven(a)themaw.net> Subject: autofs: revert "autofs: take more care to not update last_used on path walk" While 092a53452b ("autofs: take more care to not update last_used on path walk") helped (partially) resolve a problem where automounts were not expiring due to aggressive accesses from user space it has a side effect for very large environments. This change helps with the expire problem by making the expire more aggressive but, for very large environments, that means more mount requests from clients. When there are a lot of clients that can mean fairly significant server load increases. It turns out I put the last_used in this position to solve this very problem and failed to update my own thinking of the autofs expire policy. So the patch being reverted introduces a regression which should be fixed. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/151174729420.6162.1832622523537052460.stgit@pluto.… Fixes: 092a53452b ("autofs: take more care to not update last_used on path walk") Signed-off-by: Ian Kent <raven(a)themaw.net> Reviewed-by: NeilBrown <neilb(a)suse.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro(a)ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> [4.11+] Cc: Colin Walters <walters(a)redhat.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells(a)redhat.com> Cc: Ondrej Holy <oholy(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- fs/autofs4/root.c | 17 ++++++----------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff -puN fs/autofs4/root.c~autofs-revert-take-more-care-to-not-update-last_used-on-path-walk fs/autofs4/root.c --- a/fs/autofs4/root.c~autofs-revert-take-more-care-to-not-update-last_used-on-path-walk +++ a/fs/autofs4/root.c @@ -281,8 +281,8 @@ static int autofs4_mount_wait(const stru pr_debug("waiting for mount name=%pd\n", path->dentry); status = autofs4_wait(sbi, path, NFY_MOUNT); pr_debug("mount wait done status=%d\n", status); - ino->last_used = jiffies; } + ino->last_used = jiffies; return status; } @@ -321,21 +321,16 @@ static struct dentry *autofs4_mountpoint */ if (autofs_type_indirect(sbi->type) && d_unhashed(dentry)) { struct dentry *parent = dentry->d_parent; + struct autofs_info *ino; struct dentry *new; new = d_lookup(parent, &dentry->d_name); if (!new) return NULL; - if (new == dentry) - dput(new); - else { - struct autofs_info *ino; - - ino = autofs4_dentry_ino(new); - ino->last_used = jiffies; - dput(path->dentry); - path->dentry = new; - } + ino = autofs4_dentry_ino(new); + ino->last_used = jiffies; + dput(path->dentry); + path->dentry = new; } return path->dentry; } _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from raven(a)themaw.net are autofs-revert-take-more-care-to-not-update-last_used-on-path-walk.patch autofs-revert-fix-at_no_automount-not-being-honored.patch

7 years, 2 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] + fat-fix-sb_rdonly-change.patch added to -mm tree

by akpm＠linux-foundation.org

The patch titled Subject: fat: Fix sb_rdonly() change has been added to the -mm tree. Its filename is fat-fix-sb_rdonly-change.patch This patch should soon appear at http://ozlabs.org/~akpm/mmots/broken-out/fat-fix-sb_rdonly-change.patch and later at http://ozlabs.org/~akpm/mmotm/broken-out/fat-fix-sb_rdonly-change.patch Before you just go and hit "reply", please: a) Consider who else should be cc'ed b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's *** Remember to use Documentation/SubmitChecklist when testing your code *** The -mm tree is included into linux-next and is updated there every 3-4 working days ------------------------------------------------------ From: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi(a)mail.parknet.co.jp> Subject: fat: Fix sb_rdonly() change bc98a42c1f7d0f ("VFS: Convert sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY to sb_rdonly(sb)") converted fat_remount():new_rdonly from a bool to an int. However fat_remount() depends upon the compiler's conversion of a non-zero integer into boolean `true'. Fix it by switching `new_rdonly' back into a bool. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/87mv3d5x51.fsf@mail.parknet.co.jp Fixes: bc98a42c1f7d0f8 ("VFS: Convert sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY to sb_rdonly(sb)") Signed-off-by: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi(a)mail.parknet.co.jp> Cc: Joe Perches <joe(a)perches.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells(a)redhat.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- fs/fat/inode.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff -puN fs/fat/inode.c~fat-fix-sb_rdonly-change fs/fat/inode.c --- a/fs/fat/inode.c~fat-fix-sb_rdonly-change +++ a/fs/fat/inode.c @@ -779,7 +779,7 @@ static void __exit fat_destroy_inodecach static int fat_remount(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data) { - int new_rdonly; + bool new_rdonly; struct msdos_sb_info *sbi = MSDOS_SB(sb); *flags |= SB_NODIRATIME | (sbi->options.isvfat ? 0 : SB_NOATIME); _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from hirofumi(a)mail.parknet.co.jp are fat-fix-sb_rdonly-change.patch

7 years, 2 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] + revert-async-simplify-lowest_in_progress.patch added to -mm tree

by akpm＠linux-foundation.org

The patch titled Subject: kernel/async.c: revert "async: simplify lowest_in_progress()" has been added to the -mm tree. Its filename is revert-async-simplify-lowest_in_progress.patch This patch should soon appear at http://ozlabs.org/~akpm/mmots/broken-out/revert-async-simplify-lowest_in_pr… and later at http://ozlabs.org/~akpm/mmotm/broken-out/revert-async-simplify-lowest_in_pr… Before you just go and hit "reply", please: a) Consider who else should be cc'ed b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's *** Remember to use Documentation/SubmitChecklist when testing your code *** The -mm tree is included into linux-next and is updated there every 3-4 working days ------------------------------------------------------ From: Rasmus Villemoes <linux(a)rasmusvillemoes.dk> Subject: kernel/async.c: revert "async: simplify lowest_in_progress()" This reverts 92266d6ef60c2381 ("async: simplify lowest_in_progress()"), which was simply wrong: In the case where domain is NULL, we now use the wrong offsetof() in the list_first_entry macro, so we don't actually fetch the ->cookie value, but rather the eight bytes located sizeof(struct list_head) further into the struct async_entry. On 64 bit, that's the data member, while on 32 bit, that's a u64 built from func and data in some order. I think the bug happens to be harmless in practice: It obviously only affects callers which pass a NULL domain, and AFAICT the only such caller is async_synchronize_full() -> async_synchronize_full_domain(NULL) -> async_synchronize_cookie_domain(ASYNC_COOKIE_MAX, NULL) and the ASYNC_COOKIE_MAX means that in practice we end up waiting for the async_global_pending list to be empty - but it would break if somebody happened to pass (void*)-1 as the data element to async_schedule, and of course also if somebody ever does a async_synchronize_cookie_domain(, NULL) with a "finite" cookie value. Maybe the "harmless in practice" means this isn't -stable material. But I'm not completely confident my quick git grep'ing is enough, and there might be affected code in one of the earlier kernels that has since been removed, so I'll leave the decision to the stable guys. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171128104938.3921-1-linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk Fixes: 92266d6ef60c "async: simplify lowest_in_progress()" Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux(a)rasmusvillemoes.dk> Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj(a)kernel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Adam Wallis <awallis(a)codeaurora.org> Cc: Lai Jiangshan <laijs(a)cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> [3.10+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- kernel/async.c | 20 ++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff -puN kernel/async.c~revert-async-simplify-lowest_in_progress kernel/async.c --- a/kernel/async.c~revert-async-simplify-lowest_in_progress +++ a/kernel/async.c @@ -84,20 +84,24 @@ static atomic_t entry_count; static async_cookie_t lowest_in_progress(struct async_domain *domain) { - struct list_head *pending; + struct async_entry *first = NULL; async_cookie_t ret = ASYNC_COOKIE_MAX; unsigned long flags; spin_lock_irqsave(&async_lock, flags); - if (domain) - pending = &domain->pending; - else - pending = &async_global_pending; + if (domain) { + if (!list_empty(&domain->pending)) + first = list_first_entry(&domain->pending, + struct async_entry, domain_list); + } else { + if (!list_empty(&async_global_pending)) + first = list_first_entry(&async_global_pending, + struct async_entry, global_list); + } - if (!list_empty(pending)) - ret = list_first_entry(pending, struct async_entry, - domain_list)->cookie; + if (first) + ret = first->cookie; spin_unlock_irqrestore(&async_lock, flags); return ret; _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from linux(a)rasmusvillemoes.dk are revert-async-simplify-lowest_in_progress.patch

7 years, 2 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] + mm-memcg-fix-mem_cgroup_swapout-for-thps.patch added to -mm tree

by akpm＠linux-foundation.org

The patch titled Subject: mm, memcg: fix mem_cgroup_swapout() for THPs has been added to the -mm tree. Its filename is mm-memcg-fix-mem_cgroup_swapout-for-thps.patch This patch should soon appear at http://ozlabs.org/~akpm/mmots/broken-out/mm-memcg-fix-mem_cgroup_swapout-fo… and later at http://ozlabs.org/~akpm/mmotm/broken-out/mm-memcg-fix-mem_cgroup_swapout-fo… Before you just go and hit "reply", please: a) Consider who else should be cc'ed b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's *** Remember to use Documentation/SubmitChecklist when testing your code *** The -mm tree is included into linux-next and is updated there every 3-4 working days ------------------------------------------------------ From: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb(a)google.com> Subject: mm, memcg: fix mem_cgroup_swapout() for THPs d6810d730022 ("memcg, THP, swap: make mem_cgroup_swapout() support THP") changed mem_cgroup_swapout() to support transparent huge page (THP). However the patch missed one location which should be changed for correctly handling THPs. The resulting bug will cause the memory cgroups whose THPs were swapped out to become zombies on deletion. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171128161941.20931-1-shakeelb@google.com Fixes: d6810d730022 ("memcg, THP, swap: make mem_cgroup_swapout() support THP") Signed-off-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb(a)google.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko(a)suse.com> Cc: Huang Ying <ying.huang(a)intel.com> Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev(a)gmail.com> Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen(a)google.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes(a)cmpxchg.org> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- mm/memcontrol.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff -puN mm/memcontrol.c~mm-memcg-fix-mem_cgroup_swapout-for-thps mm/memcontrol.c --- a/mm/memcontrol.c~mm-memcg-fix-mem_cgroup_swapout-for-thps +++ a/mm/memcontrol.c @@ -6044,7 +6044,7 @@ void mem_cgroup_swapout(struct page *pag memcg_check_events(memcg, page); if (!mem_cgroup_is_root(memcg)) - css_put(&memcg->css); + css_put_many(&memcg->css, nr_entries); } /** _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from shakeelb(a)google.com are mm-memcg-fix-mem_cgroup_swapout-for-thps.patch mm-mlock-vmscan-no-more-skipping-pagevecs.patch vfs-remove-might_sleep-from-clear_inode.patch

7 years, 2 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH rdma-rc v2] IB/core: Only enforce security for InfiniBand

by Leon Romanovsky

From: Daniel Jurgens <danielj(a)mellanox.com> For now the only LSM security enforcement mechanism available is specific to InfiniBand. Bypass enforcement for non-IB link types. This fixes a regression where modify_qp fails for iWARP because querying the PKEY returns -EINVAL. Cc: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> Cc: Don Dutile <ddutile(a)redhat.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Potnuri Bharat Teja <bharat(a)chelsio.com> Fixes: d291f1a65232("IB/core: Enforce PKey security on QPs") Fixes: 47a2b338fe63("IB/core: Enforce security on management datagrams") Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj(a)mellanox.com> Reviewed-by: Parav Pandit <parav(a)mellanox.com> Tested-by: Potnuri Bharat Teja <bharat(a)chelsio.com> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon(a)kernel.org> --- Changelog: v1->v2: Fixed build errors v0->v1: Added proper SElinux patch --- drivers/infiniband/core/security.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c index 23278ed5be45..06c608c07b65 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c @@ -417,8 +417,17 @@ void ib_close_shared_qp_security(struct ib_qp_security *sec) int ib_create_qp_security(struct ib_qp *qp, struct ib_device *dev) { + u8 i = rdma_start_port(dev); + bool is_ib = false; int ret; + while (i <= rdma_end_port(dev) && !is_ib) + is_ib = rdma_protocol_ib(dev, i++); + + /* If this isn't an IB device don't create the security context */ + if (!is_ib) + return 0; + qp->qp_sec = kzalloc(sizeof(*qp->qp_sec), GFP_KERNEL); if (!qp->qp_sec) return -ENOMEM; @@ -441,6 +450,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(ib_create_qp_security); void ib_destroy_qp_security_begin(struct ib_qp_security *sec) { + /* Return if not IB */ + if (!sec) + return; + mutex_lock(&sec->mutex); /* Remove the QP from the lists so it won't get added to @@ -470,6 +483,10 @@ void ib_destroy_qp_security_abort(struct ib_qp_security *sec) int ret; int i; + /* Return if not IB */ + if (!sec) + return; + /* If a concurrent cache update is in progress this * QP security could be marked for an error state * transition. Wait for this to complete. @@ -505,6 +522,10 @@ void ib_destroy_qp_security_end(struct ib_qp_security *sec) { int i; + /* Return if not IB */ + if (!sec) + return; + /* If a concurrent cache update is occurring we must * wait until this QP security structure is processed * in the QP to error flow before destroying it because @@ -565,13 +586,19 @@ int ib_security_modify_qp(struct ib_qp *qp, bool pps_change = ((qp_attr_mask & (IB_QP_PKEY_INDEX | IB_QP_PORT)) || (qp_attr_mask & IB_QP_ALT_PATH)); + WARN_ONCE((qp_attr_mask & IB_QP_PORT && + rdma_protocol_ib(real_qp->device, qp_attr->port_num) && + !real_qp->qp_sec), + "%s: QP security is not initialized for IB QP: %d\n", + __func__, real_qp->qp_num); + /* The port/pkey settings are maintained only for the real QP. Open * handles on the real QP will be in the shared_qp_list. When * enforcing security on the real QP all the shared QPs will be * checked as well. */ - if (pps_change && !special_qp) { + if (pps_change && !special_qp && real_qp->qp_sec) { mutex_lock(&real_qp->qp_sec->mutex); new_pps = get_new_pps(real_qp, qp_attr, @@ -600,7 +627,7 @@ int ib_security_modify_qp(struct ib_qp *qp, qp_attr_mask, udata); - if (pps_change && !special_qp) { + if (pps_change && !special_qp && real_qp->qp_sec) { /* Clean up the lists and free the appropriate * ports_pkeys structure. */ @@ -631,6 +658,9 @@ int ib_security_pkey_access(struct ib_device *dev, u16 pkey; int ret; + if (!rdma_protocol_ib(dev, port_num)) + return 0; + ret = ib_get_cached_pkey(dev, port_num, pkey_index, &pkey); if (ret) return ret; @@ -665,6 +695,9 @@ int ib_mad_agent_security_setup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent, { int ret; + if (!rdma_protocol_ib(agent->device, agent->port_num)) + return 0; + ret = security_ib_alloc_security(&agent->security); if (ret) return ret; @@ -690,6 +723,9 @@ int ib_mad_agent_security_setup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent, void ib_mad_agent_security_cleanup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent) { + if (!rdma_protocol_ib(agent->device, agent->port_num)) + return; + security_ib_free_security(agent->security); if (agent->lsm_nb_reg) unregister_lsm_notifier(&agent->lsm_nb); @@ -697,6 +733,9 @@ void ib_mad_agent_security_cleanup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent) int ib_mad_enforce_security(struct ib_mad_agent_private *map, u16 pkey_index) { + if (!rdma_protocol_ib(map->agent.device, map->agent.port_num)) + return 0; + if (map->agent.qp->qp_type == IB_QPT_SMI && !map->agent.smp_allowed) return -EACCES; -- 2.15.0

7 years, 2 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH v2] KEYS: add missing permission check for request_key() destination

by Eric Biggers

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> When the request_key() syscall is not passed a destination keyring, it links the requested key (if constructed) into the "default" request-key keyring. This should require Write permission to the keyring. However, there is actually no permission check. This can be abused to add keys to any keyring to which only Search permission is granted. This is because Search permission allows joining the keyring. keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_SESSION_KEYRING) then will set the default request-key keyring to the session keyring. Then, request_key() can be used to add keys to the keyring. Both negatively and positively instantiated keys can be added using this method. Adding negative keys is trivial. Adding a positive key is a bit trickier. It requires that either /sbin/request-key positively instantiates the key, or that another thread adds the key to the process keyring at just the right time, such that request_key() misses it initially but then finds it in construct_alloc_key(). Fix this bug by checking for Write permission to the keyring in construct_get_dest_keyring() when the default keyring is being used. We don't do the permission check for non-default keyrings because that was already done by the earlier call to lookup_user_key(). Also, request_key_and_link() is currently passed a 'struct key *' rather than a key_ref_t, so the "possessed" bit is unavailable. We also don't do the permission check for the "requestor keyring", to continue to support the use case described by commit 8bbf4976b59f ("KEYS: Alter use of key instantiation link-to-keyring argument") where /sbin/request-key recursively calls request_key() to add keys to the original requestor's destination keyring. (I don't know of any users who actually do that, though...) Fixes: 3e30148c3d52 ("[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.13+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> --- v2: also skip permission check if default dest_keyring is NULL security/keys/request_key.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c index e8036cd0ad54..7dc741382154 100644 --- a/security/keys/request_key.c +++ b/security/keys/request_key.c @@ -251,11 +251,12 @@ static int construct_key(struct key *key, const void *callout_info, * The keyring selected is returned with an extra reference upon it which the * caller must release. */ -static void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring) +static int construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring) { struct request_key_auth *rka; const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct key *dest_keyring = *_dest_keyring, *authkey; + int ret; kenter("%p", dest_keyring); @@ -264,6 +265,8 @@ static void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring) /* the caller supplied one */ key_get(dest_keyring); } else { + bool do_perm_check = true; + /* use a default keyring; falling through the cases until we * find one that we actually have */ switch (cred->jit_keyring) { @@ -278,8 +281,10 @@ static void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring) dest_keyring = key_get(rka->dest_keyring); up_read(&authkey->sem); - if (dest_keyring) + if (dest_keyring) { + do_perm_check = false; break; + } } case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING: @@ -314,11 +319,29 @@ static void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring) default: BUG(); } + + /* + * Require Write permission on the keyring. This is essential + * because the default keyring may be the session keyring, and + * joining a keyring only requires Search permission. + * + * However, this check is skipped for the "requestor keyring" so + * that /sbin/request-key can itself use request_key() to add + * keys to the original requestor's destination keyring. + */ + if (dest_keyring && do_perm_check) { + ret = key_permission(make_key_ref(dest_keyring, 1), + KEY_NEED_WRITE); + if (ret) { + key_put(dest_keyring); + return ret; + } + } } *_dest_keyring = dest_keyring; kleave(" [dk %d]", key_serial(dest_keyring)); - return; + return 0; } /* @@ -444,11 +467,15 @@ static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct keyring_search_context *ctx, if (ctx->index_key.type == &key_type_keyring) return ERR_PTR(-EPERM); - user = key_user_lookup(current_fsuid()); - if (!user) - return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + ret = construct_get_dest_keyring(&dest_keyring); + if (ret) + goto error; - construct_get_dest_keyring(&dest_keyring); + user = key_user_lookup(current_fsuid()); + if (!user) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto error_put_dest_keyring; + } ret = construct_alloc_key(ctx, dest_keyring, flags, user, &key); key_user_put(user); @@ -463,7 +490,7 @@ static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct keyring_search_context *ctx, } else if (ret == -EINPROGRESS) { ret = 0; } else { - goto couldnt_alloc_key; + goto error_put_dest_keyring; } key_put(dest_keyring); @@ -473,8 +500,9 @@ static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct keyring_search_context *ctx, construction_failed: key_negate_and_link(key, key_negative_timeout, NULL, NULL); key_put(key); -couldnt_alloc_key: +error_put_dest_keyring: key_put(dest_keyring); +error: kleave(" = %d", ret); return ERR_PTR(ret); } -- 2.15.0.417.g466bffb3ac-goog

7 years, 2 months

1
0
0 0

[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH] KEYS: add missing permission check for request_key() destination

by Eric Biggers

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> When the request_key() syscall is not passed a destination keyring, it links the requested key (if constructed) into the "default" request-key keyring. This should require Write permission to the keyring. However, there is actually no permission check. This can be abused to add keys to any keyring to which only Search permission is granted. This is because Search permission allows joining the keyring. keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_SESSION_KEYRING) then will set the default request-key keyring to the session keyring. Then, request_key() can be used to add keys to the keyring. Both negatively and positively instantiated keys can be added using this method. Adding negative keys is trivial. Adding a positive key is a bit trickier. It requires that either /sbin/request-key positively instantiates the key, or that another thread adds the key to the process keyring at just the right time, such that request_key() misses it initially but then finds it in construct_alloc_key(). Fix this bug by checking for Write permission to the keyring in construct_get_dest_keyring() when the default keyring is being used. We don't do the permission check for non-default keyrings because that was already done by the earlier call to lookup_user_key(). Also, request_key_and_link() is currently passed a 'struct key *' rather than a key_ref_t, so the "possessed" bit is unavailable. We also don't do the permission check for the "requestor keyring", to continue to support the use case described by commit 8bbf4976b59f ("KEYS: Alter use of key instantiation link-to-keyring argument") where /sbin/request-key recursively calls request_key() to add keys to the original requestor's destination keyring. (I don't know of any users who actually do that, though...) Fixes: 3e30148c3d52 ("[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.13+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> --- security/keys/request_key.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c index c6880af8b411..4557c1c368aa 100644 --- a/security/keys/request_key.c +++ b/security/keys/request_key.c @@ -251,11 +251,12 @@ static int construct_key(struct key *key, const void *callout_info, * The keyring selected is returned with an extra reference upon it which the * caller must release. */ -static void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring) +static int construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring) { struct request_key_auth *rka; const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct key *dest_keyring = *_dest_keyring, *authkey; + int ret; kenter("%p", dest_keyring); @@ -264,6 +265,8 @@ static void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring) /* the caller supplied one */ key_get(dest_keyring); } else { + bool do_perm_check = true; + /* use a default keyring; falling through the cases until we * find one that we actually have */ switch (cred->jit_keyring) { @@ -278,8 +281,10 @@ static void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring) dest_keyring = key_get(rka->dest_keyring); up_read(&authkey->sem); - if (dest_keyring) + if (dest_keyring) { + do_perm_check = false; break; + } } case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING: @@ -314,11 +319,29 @@ static void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring) default: BUG(); } + + /* + * Require Write permission on the keyring. This is essential + * because the default keyring may be the session keyring, and + * joining a keyring only requires Search permission. + * + * However, this check is skipped for the "requestor keyring" so + * that /sbin/request-key can itself use request_key() to add + * keys to the original requestor's destination keyring. + */ + if (do_perm_check) { + ret = key_permission(make_key_ref(dest_keyring, 1), + KEY_NEED_WRITE); + if (ret) { + key_put(dest_keyring); + return ret; + } + } } *_dest_keyring = dest_keyring; kleave(" [dk %d]", key_serial(dest_keyring)); - return; + return 0; } /* @@ -444,11 +467,15 @@ static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct keyring_search_context *ctx, if (ctx->index_key.type == &key_type_keyring) return ERR_PTR(-EPERM); - user = key_user_lookup(current_fsuid()); - if (!user) - return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + ret = construct_get_dest_keyring(&dest_keyring); + if (ret) + goto error; - construct_get_dest_keyring(&dest_keyring); + user = key_user_lookup(current_fsuid()); + if (!user) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto error_put_dest_keyring; + } ret = construct_alloc_key(ctx, dest_keyring, flags, user, &key); key_user_put(user); @@ -463,7 +490,7 @@ static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct keyring_search_context *ctx, } else if (ret == -EINPROGRESS) { ret = 0; } else { - goto couldnt_alloc_key; + goto error_put_dest_keyring; } key_put(dest_keyring); @@ -473,8 +500,9 @@ static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct keyring_search_context *ctx, construction_failed: key_negate_and_link(key, key_negative_timeout, NULL, NULL); key_put(key); -couldnt_alloc_key: +error_put_dest_keyring: key_put(dest_keyring); +error: kleave(" = %d", ret); return ERR_PTR(ret); } -- 2.15.0.448.gf294e3d99a-goog

7 years, 2 months

2
2
0 0

[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH v2] X.509: fix comparisons of ->pkey_algo

by Eric Biggers

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> ->pkey_algo used to be an enum, but was changed to a string by commit 4e8ae72a75aa ("X.509: Make algo identifiers text instead of enum"). But two comparisons were not updated. Fix them to use strcmp(). This bug broke signature verification in certain configurations, depending on whether the string constants were deduplicated or not. Fixes: 4e8ae72a75aa ("X.509: Make algo identifiers text instead of enum") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v4.6+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> --- v2: use != 0 in comparisons crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 2 +- crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c index 2d93d9eccb4d..986033e64a83 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c @@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ static int pkcs7_find_key(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, pr_devel("Sig %u: Found cert serial match X.509[%u]\n", sinfo->index, certix); - if (x509->pub->pkey_algo != sinfo->sig->pkey_algo) { + if (strcmp(x509->pub->pkey_algo, sinfo->sig->pkey_algo) != 0) { pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 algo and PKCS#7 sig algo don't match\n", sinfo->index); continue; diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c index c9013582c026..3d6f124a8b34 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c @@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ int x509_check_for_self_signed(struct x509_certificate *cert) } ret = -EKEYREJECTED; - if (cert->pub->pkey_algo != cert->sig->pkey_algo) + if (strcmp(cert->pub->pkey_algo, cert->sig->pkey_algo) != 0) goto out; ret = public_key_verify_signature(cert->pub, cert->sig); -- 2.15.0.417.g466bffb3ac-goog

7 years, 2 months

1
0
0 0

[Linux-stable-mirror] patch "fpga: region: release of_parse_phandle nodes after use" added to char-misc-next

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled fpga: region: release of_parse_phandle nodes after use to my char-misc git tree which can be found at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc.git in the char-misc-next branch. The patch will show up in the next release of the linux-next tree (usually sometime within the next 24 hours during the week.) The patch will also be merged in the next major kernel release during the merge window. If you have any questions about this process, please let me know. >From 0f5eb1545907edeea7672a9c1652c4231150ff22 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ian Abbott <abbotti(a)mev.co.uk> Date: Wed, 15 Nov 2017 16:33:12 -0600 Subject: fpga: region: release of_parse_phandle nodes after use Both fpga_region_get_manager() and fpga_region_get_bridges() call of_parse_phandle(), but nothing calls of_node_put() on the returned struct device_node pointers. Make sure to do that to stop their reference counters getting out of whack. Fixes: 0fa20cdfcc1f ("fpga: fpga-region: device tree control for FPGA") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # 4.10+ Signed-off-by: Ian Abbott <abbotti(a)mev.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Alan Tull <atull(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/fpga/of-fpga-region.c | 13 ++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/fpga/of-fpga-region.c b/drivers/fpga/of-fpga-region.c index c6b21194dcbc..119ff75522f1 100644 --- a/drivers/fpga/of-fpga-region.c +++ b/drivers/fpga/of-fpga-region.c @@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ static struct fpga_manager *of_fpga_region_get_mgr(struct device_node *np) mgr_node = of_parse_phandle(np, "fpga-mgr", 0); if (mgr_node) { mgr = of_fpga_mgr_get(mgr_node); + of_node_put(mgr_node); of_node_put(np); return mgr; } @@ -120,10 +121,13 @@ static int of_fpga_region_get_bridges(struct fpga_region *region) parent_br = region_np->parent; /* If overlay has a list of bridges, use it. */ - if (of_parse_phandle(info->overlay, "fpga-bridges", 0)) + br = of_parse_phandle(info->overlay, "fpga-bridges", 0); + if (br) { + of_node_put(br); np = info->overlay; - else + } else { np = region_np; + } for (i = 0; ; i++) { br = of_parse_phandle(np, "fpga-bridges", i); @@ -131,12 +135,15 @@ static int of_fpga_region_get_bridges(struct fpga_region *region) break; /* If parent bridge is in list, skip it. */ - if (br == parent_br) + if (br == parent_br) { + of_node_put(br); continue; + } /* If node is a bridge, get it and add to list */ ret = of_fpga_bridge_get_to_list(br, info, &region->bridge_list); + of_node_put(br); /* If any of the bridges are in use, give up */ if (ret == -EBUSY) { -- 2.15.0

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