Neil Berrington reported a double-fault on a VM with 768GB of RAM that
uses large amounts of vmalloc space with PTI enabled.
The cause is that load_new_mm_cr3() was never fixed to take the
5-level pgd folding code into account, so, on a 4-level kernel, the
pgd synchronization logic compiles away to exactly nothing.
Interestingly, the problem doesn't trigger with nopti. I assume this
is because the kernel is mapped with global pages if we boot with
nopti. The sequence of operations when we create a new task is that
we first load its mm while still running on the old stack (which
crashes if the old stack is unmapped in the new mm unless the TLB
saves us), then we call prepare_switch_to(), and then we switch to the
new stack. prepare_switch_to() pokes the new stack directly, which
will populate the mapping through vmalloc_fault(). I assume that
we're getting lucky on non-PTI systems -- the old stack's TLB entry
stays alive long enough to make it all the way through
prepare_switch_to() and switch_to() so that we make it to a valid
stack.
Fixes: b50858ce3e2a ("x86/mm/vmalloc: Add 5-level paging support")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Reported-and-tested-by: Neil Berrington <neil.berrington(a)datacore.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org>
---
arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
index a1561957dccb..5bfe61a5e8e3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
@@ -151,6 +151,34 @@ void switch_mm(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
local_irq_restore(flags);
}
+static void sync_current_stack_to_mm(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+ unsigned long sp = current_stack_pointer;
+ pgd_t *pgd = pgd_offset(mm, sp);
+
+ if (CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS > 4) {
+ if (unlikely(pgd_none(*pgd))) {
+ pgd_t *pgd_ref = pgd_offset_k(sp);
+
+ set_pgd(pgd, *pgd_ref);
+ }
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * "pgd" is faked. The top level entries are "p4d"s, so sync
+ * the p4d. This compiles to approximately the same code as
+ * the 5-level case.
+ */
+ p4d_t *p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, sp);
+
+ if (unlikely(p4d_none(*p4d))) {
+ pgd_t *pgd_ref = pgd_offset_k(sp);
+ p4d_t *p4d_ref = p4d_offset(pgd_ref, sp);
+
+ set_p4d(p4d, *p4d_ref);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
struct task_struct *tsk)
{
@@ -226,11 +254,7 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
* mapped in the new pgd, we'll double-fault. Forcibly
* map it.
*/
- unsigned int index = pgd_index(current_stack_pointer);
- pgd_t *pgd = next->pgd + index;
-
- if (unlikely(pgd_none(*pgd)))
- set_pgd(pgd, init_mm.pgd[index]);
+ sync_current_stack_to_mm(next);
}
/* Stop remote flushes for the previous mm */
--
2.14.3
commit 1005bccd7a4a ("crypto: caam - enable instantiation of all RNG4 state
handles") introduces a control when incrementing ent_delay which contains
the following comment above it:
/*
* If either SH were instantiated by somebody else
* (e.g. u-boot) then it is assumed that the entropy
* parameters are properly set and thus the function
* setting these (kick_trng(...)) is skipped.
* Also, if a handle was instantiated, do not change
* the TRNG parameters.
*/
This is a problem observed when sec_init() has been run in u-boot and
and TrustZone is enabled. We can fix this by instantiating all rng state
handles in u-boot but, on the Kernel side we should ensure that this
non-terminating path is dealt with.
Fixes: 1005bccd7a4a ("crypto: caam - enable instantiation of all RNG4 state
handles")
Reported-by: Ryan Harkin <ryan.harkin(a)linaro.org>
Cc: "Horia Geantă" <horia.geanta(a)nxp.com>
Cc: Aymen Sghaier <aymen.sghaier(a)nxp.com>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam(a)nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan(a)nxp.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem(a)davemloft.net>
Cc: Lukas Auer <lukas.auer(a)aisec.fraunhofer.de>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # 4.12+
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <pure.logic(a)nexus-software.ie>
---
drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
index 98986d3..0a1e96b 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
@@ -704,7 +704,10 @@ static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
ent_delay);
kick_trng(pdev, ent_delay);
ent_delay += 400;
+ } else if (ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init && inst_handles) {
+ ent_delay += 400;
}
+
/*
* if instantiate_rng(...) fails, the loop will rerun
* and the kick_trng(...) function will modfiy the
--
2.7.4
Upstream commit 1c9de5bf4286 ("usbip: vhci-hcd: Add USB3 SuperSpeed
support")
vhci_hcd clears all the bits port_status bits instead of clearing
just the USB_PORT_STAT_POWER bit when it handles ClearPortFeature:
USB_PORT_FEAT_POWER. This causes vhci_hcd attach to fail in a bad
state, leaving device unusable by the client. The device is still
attached and however client can't use it.
The problem was fixed as part of larger change to add USB3 Super
Speed support. This patch backports just the change to clear the
USB_PORT_STAT_POWER.
In addition, a minor formatting error in status file is fixed.
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <shuahkh(a)osg.samsung.com>
---
drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_hcd.c | 2 +-
drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c | 5 ++---
2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_hcd.c b/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_hcd.c
index 00d68945548e..2d96bfd34138 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_hcd.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_hcd.c
@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ static int vhci_hub_control(struct usb_hcd *hcd, u16 typeReq, u16 wValue,
case USB_PORT_FEAT_POWER:
usbip_dbg_vhci_rh(
" ClearPortFeature: USB_PORT_FEAT_POWER\n");
- dum->port_status[rhport] = 0;
+ dum->port_status[rhport] &= ~USB_PORT_STAT_POWER;
dum->resuming = 0;
break;
case USB_PORT_FEAT_C_RESET:
diff --git a/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c b/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c
index 1c7f41a65565..ebf133c9eea3 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ static ssize_t status_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
* a security hole, the change is made to use sockfd instead.
*/
out += sprintf(out,
- "prt sta spd bus dev sockfd local_busid\n");
+ "prt sta spd dev sockfd local_busid\n");
for (i = 0; i < VHCI_NPORTS; i++) {
struct vhci_device *vdev = port_to_vdev(i);
@@ -64,8 +64,7 @@ static ssize_t status_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
if (vdev->ud.status == VDEV_ST_USED) {
out += sprintf(out, "%03u %08x ",
vdev->speed, vdev->devid);
- out += sprintf(out, "%16p ", vdev->ud.tcp_socket);
- out += sprintf(out, "%06u", vdev->ud.sockfd);
+ out += sprintf(out, "%06u ", vdev->ud.sockfd);
out += sprintf(out, "%s", dev_name(&vdev->udev->dev));
} else
--
2.14.1
commit 1005bccd7a4a ("crypto: caam - enable instantiation of all RNG4 state
handles") introduces a control when incrementing ent_delay which contains
the following comment above it:
/*
* If either SH were instantiated by somebody else
* (e.g. u-boot) then it is assumed that the entropy
* parameters are properly set and thus the function
* setting these (kick_trng(...)) is skipped.
* Also, if a handle was instantiated, do not change
* the TRNG parameters.
*/
This is a problem observed when sec_init() has been run in u-boot and
and TrustZone is enabled. We can fix this by instantiating all rng state
handles in u-boot but, on the Kernel side we should ensure that this
non-terminating path is dealt with.
Fixes: 1005bccd7a4a ("crypto: caam - enable instantiation of all RNG4 state
handles")
Reported-by: Ryan Harkin <ryan.harkin(a)linaro.org>
Cc: "Horia Geantă" <horia.geanta(a)nxp.com>
Cc: Aymen Sghaier <aymen.sghaier(a)nxp.com>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam(a)nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan(a)nxp.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem(a)davemloft.net>
Cc: Lukas Auer <lukas.auer(a)aisec.fraunhofer.de>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # 4.12+
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <pure.logic(a)nexus-software.ie>
---
drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
index 98986d3..0a1e96b 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
@@ -704,7 +704,10 @@ static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
ent_delay);
kick_trng(pdev, ent_delay);
ent_delay += 400;
+ } else if (ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init && inst_handles) {
+ ent_delay += 400;
}
+
/*
* if instantiate_rng(...) fails, the loop will rerun
* and the kick_trng(...) function will modfiy the
--
2.7.4
The patch
ASoC: compress: Correct handling of copy callback
has been applied to the asoc tree at
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/broonie/sound.git
All being well this means that it will be integrated into the linux-next
tree (usually sometime in the next 24 hours) and sent to Linus during
the next merge window (or sooner if it is a bug fix), however if
problems are discovered then the patch may be dropped or reverted.
You may get further e-mails resulting from automated or manual testing
and review of the tree, please engage with people reporting problems and
send followup patches addressing any issues that are reported if needed.
If any updates are required or you are submitting further changes they
should be sent as incremental updates against current git, existing
patches will not be replaced.
Please add any relevant lists and maintainers to the CCs when replying
to this mail.
Thanks,
Mark
>From 290df4d3ab192821b66857c05346b23056ee9545 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Charles Keepax <ckeepax(a)opensource.cirrus.com>
Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2018 13:08:43 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] ASoC: compress: Correct handling of copy callback
The soc_compr_copy callback is currently broken. Since the
changes to move the compr_ops over to the component the return
value is not correctly propagated, always returning zero on
success rather than the number of bytes copied. This causes
user-space to stall continuously reading as it does not believe
it has received any data.
Furthermore, the changes to move the compr_ops over to the
component iterate through the list of components and will call
the copy callback for any that have compressed ops. There isn't
currently any consensus on the mechanism to combine the results
of multiple copy callbacks.
To fix this issue for now halt searching the component list when
we locate a copy callback and return the result of that single
callback. Additional work should probably be done to look at the
other ops, tidy things up, and work out if we want to support
multiple components on a single compressed, but this is the only
fix required to get things working again.
Fixes: 9e7e3738ab0e ("ASoC: snd_soc_component_driver has snd_compr_ops")
Signed-off-by: Charles Keepax <ckeepax(a)opensource.cirrus.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie(a)kernel.org>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
---
sound/soc/soc-compress.c | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/sound/soc/soc-compress.c b/sound/soc/soc-compress.c
index d9b1e6417fb9..1507117d1185 100644
--- a/sound/soc/soc-compress.c
+++ b/sound/soc/soc-compress.c
@@ -944,7 +944,7 @@ static int soc_compr_copy(struct snd_compr_stream *cstream,
struct snd_soc_platform *platform = rtd->platform;
struct snd_soc_component *component;
struct snd_soc_rtdcom_list *rtdcom;
- int ret = 0, __ret;
+ int ret = 0;
mutex_lock_nested(&rtd->pcm_mutex, rtd->pcm_subclass);
@@ -965,10 +965,10 @@ static int soc_compr_copy(struct snd_compr_stream *cstream,
!component->driver->compr_ops->copy)
continue;
- __ret = component->driver->compr_ops->copy(cstream, buf, count);
- if (__ret < 0)
- ret = __ret;
+ ret = component->driver->compr_ops->copy(cstream, buf, count);
+ break;
}
+
err:
mutex_unlock(&rtd->pcm_mutex);
return ret;
--
2.15.1
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
staging: lustre: separate a connection destroy from free struct
to my staging git tree which can be found at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/staging.git
in the staging-next branch.
The patch will show up in the next release of the linux-next tree
(usually sometime within the next 24 hours during the week.)
The patch will also be merged in the next major kernel release
during the merge window.
If you have any questions about this process, please let me know.
>From 9b046013e5837f8a58453d1e9f8e01d03adb7fe7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Eremin <dmitry.eremin(a)intel.com>
Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2018 16:51:04 +0300
Subject: staging: lustre: separate a connection destroy from free struct
kib_conn
The logic of the original commit 4d99b2581eff ("staging: lustre: avoid
intensive reconnecting for ko2iblnd") was assumed conditional free of
struct kib_conn if the second argument free_conn in function
kiblnd_destroy_conn(struct kib_conn *conn, bool free_conn) is true.
But this hunk of code was dropped from original commit. As result the logic
works wrong and current code use struct kib_conn after free.
> drivers/staging/lustre/lnet/klnds/o2iblnd/o2iblnd_cb.c
> 3317 kiblnd_destroy_conn(conn, !peer);
> ^^^^ Freed always (but should be conditionally)
> 3318
> 3319 spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flags);
> 3320 if (!peer)
> 3321 continue;
> 3322
> 3323 conn->ibc_peer = peer;
> ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Use after free
> 3324 if (peer->ibp_reconnected < KIB_RECONN_HIGH_RACE)
> 3325 list_add_tail(&conn->ibc_list,
> ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Use after free
> 3326 &kiblnd_data.kib_reconn_list);
> 3327 else
> 3328 list_add_tail(&conn->ibc_list,
> ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Use after free
> 3329 &kiblnd_data.kib_reconn_wait);
To avoid confusion this fix moved the freeing a struct kib_conn outside of
the function kiblnd_destroy_conn() and free as it was intended in original
commit.
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v4.6
Fixes: 4d99b2581eff ("staging: lustre: avoid intensive reconnecting for ko2iblnd")
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Eremin <Dmitry.Eremin(a)intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <andreas.dilger(a)intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/staging/lustre/lnet/klnds/o2iblnd/o2iblnd.c | 7 +++----
drivers/staging/lustre/lnet/klnds/o2iblnd/o2iblnd.h | 2 +-
drivers/staging/lustre/lnet/klnds/o2iblnd/o2iblnd_cb.c | 6 ++++--
3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/staging/lustre/lnet/klnds/o2iblnd/o2iblnd.c b/drivers/staging/lustre/lnet/klnds/o2iblnd/o2iblnd.c
index 2ebc484385b3..ec84edfda271 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/lustre/lnet/klnds/o2iblnd/o2iblnd.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/lustre/lnet/klnds/o2iblnd/o2iblnd.c
@@ -824,14 +824,15 @@ struct kib_conn *kiblnd_create_conn(struct kib_peer *peer, struct rdma_cm_id *cm
return conn;
failed_2:
- kiblnd_destroy_conn(conn, true);
+ kiblnd_destroy_conn(conn);
+ kfree(conn);
failed_1:
kfree(init_qp_attr);
failed_0:
return NULL;
}
-void kiblnd_destroy_conn(struct kib_conn *conn, bool free_conn)
+void kiblnd_destroy_conn(struct kib_conn *conn)
{
struct rdma_cm_id *cmid = conn->ibc_cmid;
struct kib_peer *peer = conn->ibc_peer;
@@ -889,8 +890,6 @@ void kiblnd_destroy_conn(struct kib_conn *conn, bool free_conn)
rdma_destroy_id(cmid);
atomic_dec(&net->ibn_nconns);
}
-
- kfree(conn);
}
int kiblnd_close_peer_conns_locked(struct kib_peer *peer, int why)
diff --git a/drivers/staging/lustre/lnet/klnds/o2iblnd/o2iblnd.h b/drivers/staging/lustre/lnet/klnds/o2iblnd/o2iblnd.h
index 171eced213f8..b18911d09e9a 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/lustre/lnet/klnds/o2iblnd/o2iblnd.h
+++ b/drivers/staging/lustre/lnet/klnds/o2iblnd/o2iblnd.h
@@ -1016,7 +1016,7 @@ int kiblnd_close_peer_conns_locked(struct kib_peer *peer, int why);
struct kib_conn *kiblnd_create_conn(struct kib_peer *peer,
struct rdma_cm_id *cmid,
int state, int version);
-void kiblnd_destroy_conn(struct kib_conn *conn, bool free_conn);
+void kiblnd_destroy_conn(struct kib_conn *conn);
void kiblnd_close_conn(struct kib_conn *conn, int error);
void kiblnd_close_conn_locked(struct kib_conn *conn, int error);
diff --git a/drivers/staging/lustre/lnet/klnds/o2iblnd/o2iblnd_cb.c b/drivers/staging/lustre/lnet/klnds/o2iblnd/o2iblnd_cb.c
index 9b3328c5d1e7..b3e7f28eb978 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/lustre/lnet/klnds/o2iblnd/o2iblnd_cb.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/lustre/lnet/klnds/o2iblnd/o2iblnd_cb.c
@@ -3314,11 +3314,13 @@ kiblnd_connd(void *arg)
spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flags);
dropped_lock = 1;
- kiblnd_destroy_conn(conn, !peer);
+ kiblnd_destroy_conn(conn);
spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flags);
- if (!peer)
+ if (!peer) {
+ kfree(conn);
continue;
+ }
conn->ibc_peer = peer;
if (peer->ibp_reconnected < KIB_RECONN_HIGH_RACE)
--
2.16.1