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Patch "x86/paravirt, objtool: Annotate indirect calls" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/paravirt, objtool: Annotate indirect calls to the 4.15-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-paravirt-objtool-annotate-indirect-calls.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.15 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 3010a0663fd949d122eca0561b06b0a9453f7866 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2018 16:58:11 +0100 Subject: x86/paravirt, objtool: Annotate indirect calls From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> commit 3010a0663fd949d122eca0561b06b0a9453f7866 upstream. Paravirt emits indirect calls which get flagged by objtool retpoline checks, annotate it away because all these indirect calls will be patched out before we start userspace. This patching happens through alternative_instructions() -> apply_paravirt() -> pv_init_ops.patch() which will eventually end up in paravirt_patch_default(). This function _will_ write direct alternatives. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz(a)infradead.org> Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)alien8.de> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2(a)infradead.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h | 17 +++++++++++++---- arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt_types.h | 5 ++++- 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT #include <asm/pgtable_types.h> #include <asm/asm.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> #include <asm/paravirt_types.h> @@ -879,23 +880,27 @@ extern void default_banner(void); #define INTERRUPT_RETURN \ PARA_SITE(PARA_PATCH(pv_cpu_ops, PV_CPU_iret), CLBR_NONE, \ - jmp PARA_INDIRECT(pv_cpu_ops+PV_CPU_iret)) + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; \ + jmp PARA_INDIRECT(pv_cpu_ops+PV_CPU_iret);) #define DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(clobbers) \ PARA_SITE(PARA_PATCH(pv_irq_ops, PV_IRQ_irq_disable), clobbers, \ PV_SAVE_REGS(clobbers | CLBR_CALLEE_SAVE); \ + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; \ call PARA_INDIRECT(pv_irq_ops+PV_IRQ_irq_disable); \ PV_RESTORE_REGS(clobbers | CLBR_CALLEE_SAVE);) #define ENABLE_INTERRUPTS(clobbers) \ PARA_SITE(PARA_PATCH(pv_irq_ops, PV_IRQ_irq_enable), clobbers, \ PV_SAVE_REGS(clobbers | CLBR_CALLEE_SAVE); \ + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; \ call PARA_INDIRECT(pv_irq_ops+PV_IRQ_irq_enable); \ PV_RESTORE_REGS(clobbers | CLBR_CALLEE_SAVE);) #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 #define GET_CR0_INTO_EAX \ push %ecx; push %edx; \ + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; \ call PARA_INDIRECT(pv_cpu_ops+PV_CPU_read_cr0); \ pop %edx; pop %ecx #else /* !CONFIG_X86_32 */ @@ -917,21 +922,25 @@ extern void default_banner(void); */ #define SWAPGS \ PARA_SITE(PARA_PATCH(pv_cpu_ops, PV_CPU_swapgs), CLBR_NONE, \ - call PARA_INDIRECT(pv_cpu_ops+PV_CPU_swapgs) \ + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; \ + call PARA_INDIRECT(pv_cpu_ops+PV_CPU_swapgs); \ ) #define GET_CR2_INTO_RAX \ - call PARA_INDIRECT(pv_mmu_ops+PV_MMU_read_cr2) + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; \ + call PARA_INDIRECT(pv_mmu_ops+PV_MMU_read_cr2); #define USERGS_SYSRET64 \ PARA_SITE(PARA_PATCH(pv_cpu_ops, PV_CPU_usergs_sysret64), \ CLBR_NONE, \ - jmp PARA_INDIRECT(pv_cpu_ops+PV_CPU_usergs_sysret64)) + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; \ + jmp PARA_INDIRECT(pv_cpu_ops+PV_CPU_usergs_sysret64);) #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY #define SAVE_FLAGS(clobbers) \ PARA_SITE(PARA_PATCH(pv_irq_ops, PV_IRQ_save_fl), clobbers, \ PV_SAVE_REGS(clobbers | CLBR_CALLEE_SAVE); \ + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; \ call PARA_INDIRECT(pv_irq_ops+PV_IRQ_save_fl); \ PV_RESTORE_REGS(clobbers | CLBR_CALLEE_SAVE);) #endif --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt_types.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt_types.h @@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ #include <asm/desc_defs.h> #include <asm/kmap_types.h> #include <asm/pgtable_types.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> struct page; struct thread_struct; @@ -392,7 +393,9 @@ int paravirt_disable_iospace(void); * offset into the paravirt_patch_template structure, and can therefore be * freely converted back into a structure offset. */ -#define PARAVIRT_CALL "call *%c[paravirt_opptr];" +#define PARAVIRT_CALL \ + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \ + "call *%c[paravirt_opptr];" /* * These macros are intended to wrap calls through one of the paravirt Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from peterz(a)infradead.org are queue-4.15/x86-boot-objtool-annotate-indirect-jump-in-secondary_startup_64.patch queue-4.15/x86-retpoline-support-retpoline-builds-with-clang.patch queue-4.15/x86-ldt-avoid-warning-in-32-bit-builds-with-older-gcc.patch queue-4.15/x86-entry-reduce-the-code-footprint-of-the-idtentry-macro.patch queue-4.15/bug-use-pb-in-bug-and-stack-protector-failure.patch queue-4.15/revert-x86-retpoline-simplify-vmexit_fill_rsb.patch queue-4.15/nospec-include-asm-barrier.h-dependency.patch queue-4.15/x86-mm-remove-stale-comment-about-kmemcheck.patch queue-4.15/x86-mm-sme-objtool-annotate-indirect-call-in-sme_encrypt_execute.patch queue-4.15/x86-speculation-use-ibrs-if-available-before-calling-into-firmware.patch queue-4.15/x86-asm-improve-how-gen_-_suffixed_rmwcc-specify-clobbers.patch queue-4.15/x86-64-realmode-add-instruction-suffix.patch queue-4.15/x86-speculation-objtool-annotate-indirect-calls-jumps-for-objtool.patch queue-4.15/x86-paravirt-objtool-annotate-indirect-calls.patch queue-4.15/x86-entry-64-use-xorl-for-faster-register-clearing.patch queue-4.15/nospec-kill-array_index_nospec_mask_check.patch queue-4.15/lib-bug.c-exclude-non-bug-warn-exceptions-from-report_bug.patch queue-4.15/x86-io-apic-avoid-warning-in-32-bit-builds.patch

7 years, 6 months

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Patch "x86/mm/sme, objtool: Annotate indirect call in sme_encrypt_execute()" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/mm/sme, objtool: Annotate indirect call in sme_encrypt_execute() to the 4.15-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-mm-sme-objtool-annotate-indirect-call-in-sme_encrypt_execute.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.15 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 531bb52a869a9c6e08c8d17ba955fcbfc18037ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2018 16:18:50 +0100 Subject: x86/mm/sme, objtool: Annotate indirect call in sme_encrypt_execute() From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> commit 531bb52a869a9c6e08c8d17ba955fcbfc18037ad upstream. This is boot code and thus Spectre-safe: we run this _way_ before userspace comes along to have a chance to poison our branch predictor. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz(a)infradead.org> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2(a)infradead.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #include <asm/page.h> #include <asm/processor-flags.h> #include <asm/msr-index.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> .text .code64 @@ -59,6 +60,7 @@ ENTRY(sme_encrypt_execute) movq %rax, %r8 /* Workarea encryption routine */ addq $PAGE_SIZE, %r8 /* Workarea intermediate copy buffer */ + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE call *%rax /* Call the encryption routine */ pop %r12 Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from peterz(a)infradead.org are queue-4.15/x86-boot-objtool-annotate-indirect-jump-in-secondary_startup_64.patch queue-4.15/x86-retpoline-support-retpoline-builds-with-clang.patch queue-4.15/x86-ldt-avoid-warning-in-32-bit-builds-with-older-gcc.patch queue-4.15/x86-entry-reduce-the-code-footprint-of-the-idtentry-macro.patch queue-4.15/bug-use-pb-in-bug-and-stack-protector-failure.patch queue-4.15/revert-x86-retpoline-simplify-vmexit_fill_rsb.patch queue-4.15/nospec-include-asm-barrier.h-dependency.patch queue-4.15/x86-mm-remove-stale-comment-about-kmemcheck.patch queue-4.15/x86-mm-sme-objtool-annotate-indirect-call-in-sme_encrypt_execute.patch queue-4.15/x86-speculation-use-ibrs-if-available-before-calling-into-firmware.patch queue-4.15/x86-asm-improve-how-gen_-_suffixed_rmwcc-specify-clobbers.patch queue-4.15/x86-64-realmode-add-instruction-suffix.patch queue-4.15/x86-speculation-objtool-annotate-indirect-calls-jumps-for-objtool.patch queue-4.15/x86-paravirt-objtool-annotate-indirect-calls.patch queue-4.15/x86-entry-64-use-xorl-for-faster-register-clearing.patch queue-4.15/nospec-kill-array_index_nospec_mask_check.patch queue-4.15/lib-bug.c-exclude-non-bug-warn-exceptions-from-report_bug.patch queue-4.15/x86-io-apic-avoid-warning-in-32-bit-builds.patch

7 years, 6 months

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Patch "x86/boot, objtool: Annotate indirect jump in secondary_startup_64()" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/boot, objtool: Annotate indirect jump in secondary_startup_64() to the 4.15-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-boot-objtool-annotate-indirect-jump-in-secondary_startup_64.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.15 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From bd89004f6305cbf7352238f61da093207ee518d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2018 10:38:09 +0100 Subject: x86/boot, objtool: Annotate indirect jump in secondary_startup_64() From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> commit bd89004f6305cbf7352238f61da093207ee518d6 upstream. The objtool retpoline validation found this indirect jump. Seeing how it's on CPU bringup before we run userspace it should be safe, annotate it. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz(a)infradead.org> Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)alien8.de> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2(a)infradead.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) --- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ #include <asm/nops.h> #include "../entry/calling.h" #include <asm/export.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> #ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT #include <asm/asm-offsets.h> @@ -134,6 +135,7 @@ ENTRY(secondary_startup_64) /* Ensure I am executing from virtual addresses */ movq $1f, %rax + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE jmp *%rax 1: UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from peterz(a)infradead.org are queue-4.15/x86-boot-objtool-annotate-indirect-jump-in-secondary_startup_64.patch queue-4.15/x86-retpoline-support-retpoline-builds-with-clang.patch queue-4.15/x86-ldt-avoid-warning-in-32-bit-builds-with-older-gcc.patch queue-4.15/x86-entry-reduce-the-code-footprint-of-the-idtentry-macro.patch queue-4.15/bug-use-pb-in-bug-and-stack-protector-failure.patch queue-4.15/revert-x86-retpoline-simplify-vmexit_fill_rsb.patch queue-4.15/nospec-include-asm-barrier.h-dependency.patch queue-4.15/x86-mm-remove-stale-comment-about-kmemcheck.patch queue-4.15/x86-mm-sme-objtool-annotate-indirect-call-in-sme_encrypt_execute.patch queue-4.15/x86-speculation-use-ibrs-if-available-before-calling-into-firmware.patch queue-4.15/x86-asm-improve-how-gen_-_suffixed_rmwcc-specify-clobbers.patch queue-4.15/x86-64-realmode-add-instruction-suffix.patch queue-4.15/x86-speculation-objtool-annotate-indirect-calls-jumps-for-objtool.patch queue-4.15/x86-paravirt-objtool-annotate-indirect-calls.patch queue-4.15/x86-entry-64-use-xorl-for-faster-register-clearing.patch queue-4.15/nospec-kill-array_index_nospec_mask_check.patch queue-4.15/lib-bug.c-exclude-non-bug-warn-exceptions-from-report_bug.patch queue-4.15/x86-io-apic-avoid-warning-in-32-bit-builds.patch

7 years, 6 months

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Patch "x86/mm/sme, objtool: Annotate indirect call in sme_encrypt_execute()" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/mm/sme, objtool: Annotate indirect call in sme_encrypt_execute() to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-mm-sme-objtool-annotate-indirect-call-in-sme_encrypt_execute.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 531bb52a869a9c6e08c8d17ba955fcbfc18037ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2018 16:18:50 +0100 Subject: x86/mm/sme, objtool: Annotate indirect call in sme_encrypt_execute() From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> commit 531bb52a869a9c6e08c8d17ba955fcbfc18037ad upstream. This is boot code and thus Spectre-safe: we run this _way_ before userspace comes along to have a chance to poison our branch predictor. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz(a)infradead.org> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2(a)infradead.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #include <asm/page.h> #include <asm/processor-flags.h> #include <asm/msr-index.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> .text .code64 @@ -59,6 +60,7 @@ ENTRY(sme_encrypt_execute) movq %rax, %r8 /* Workarea encryption routine */ addq $PAGE_SIZE, %r8 /* Workarea intermediate copy buffer */ + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE call *%rax /* Call the encryption routine */ pop %r12 Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from peterz(a)infradead.org are queue-4.14/x86-boot-objtool-annotate-indirect-jump-in-secondary_startup_64.patch queue-4.14/x86-retpoline-support-retpoline-builds-with-clang.patch queue-4.14/x86-ldt-avoid-warning-in-32-bit-builds-with-older-gcc.patch queue-4.14/x86-entry-reduce-the-code-footprint-of-the-idtentry-macro.patch queue-4.14/revert-x86-retpoline-simplify-vmexit_fill_rsb.patch queue-4.14/nospec-include-asm-barrier.h-dependency.patch queue-4.14/x86-mm-remove-stale-comment-about-kmemcheck.patch queue-4.14/x86-mm-sme-objtool-annotate-indirect-call-in-sme_encrypt_execute.patch queue-4.14/x86-speculation-use-ibrs-if-available-before-calling-into-firmware.patch queue-4.14/x86-asm-improve-how-gen_-_suffixed_rmwcc-specify-clobbers.patch queue-4.14/x86-64-realmode-add-instruction-suffix.patch queue-4.14/x86-speculation-objtool-annotate-indirect-calls-jumps-for-objtool.patch queue-4.14/x86-paravirt-objtool-annotate-indirect-calls.patch queue-4.14/x86-entry-64-use-xorl-for-faster-register-clearing.patch queue-4.14/nospec-kill-array_index_nospec_mask_check.patch queue-4.14/lib-bug.c-exclude-non-bug-warn-exceptions-from-report_bug.patch

7 years, 6 months

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Patch "x86/paravirt, objtool: Annotate indirect calls" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/paravirt, objtool: Annotate indirect calls to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-paravirt-objtool-annotate-indirect-calls.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 3010a0663fd949d122eca0561b06b0a9453f7866 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2018 16:58:11 +0100 Subject: x86/paravirt, objtool: Annotate indirect calls From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> commit 3010a0663fd949d122eca0561b06b0a9453f7866 upstream. Paravirt emits indirect calls which get flagged by objtool retpoline checks, annotate it away because all these indirect calls will be patched out before we start userspace. This patching happens through alternative_instructions() -> apply_paravirt() -> pv_init_ops.patch() which will eventually end up in paravirt_patch_default(). This function _will_ write direct alternatives. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz(a)infradead.org> Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)alien8.de> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2(a)infradead.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h | 17 +++++++++++++---- arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt_types.h | 5 ++++- 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT #include <asm/pgtable_types.h> #include <asm/asm.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> #include <asm/paravirt_types.h> @@ -879,23 +880,27 @@ extern void default_banner(void); #define INTERRUPT_RETURN \ PARA_SITE(PARA_PATCH(pv_cpu_ops, PV_CPU_iret), CLBR_NONE, \ - jmp PARA_INDIRECT(pv_cpu_ops+PV_CPU_iret)) + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; \ + jmp PARA_INDIRECT(pv_cpu_ops+PV_CPU_iret);) #define DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(clobbers) \ PARA_SITE(PARA_PATCH(pv_irq_ops, PV_IRQ_irq_disable), clobbers, \ PV_SAVE_REGS(clobbers | CLBR_CALLEE_SAVE); \ + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; \ call PARA_INDIRECT(pv_irq_ops+PV_IRQ_irq_disable); \ PV_RESTORE_REGS(clobbers | CLBR_CALLEE_SAVE);) #define ENABLE_INTERRUPTS(clobbers) \ PARA_SITE(PARA_PATCH(pv_irq_ops, PV_IRQ_irq_enable), clobbers, \ PV_SAVE_REGS(clobbers | CLBR_CALLEE_SAVE); \ + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; \ call PARA_INDIRECT(pv_irq_ops+PV_IRQ_irq_enable); \ PV_RESTORE_REGS(clobbers | CLBR_CALLEE_SAVE);) #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 #define GET_CR0_INTO_EAX \ push %ecx; push %edx; \ + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; \ call PARA_INDIRECT(pv_cpu_ops+PV_CPU_read_cr0); \ pop %edx; pop %ecx #else /* !CONFIG_X86_32 */ @@ -917,21 +922,25 @@ extern void default_banner(void); */ #define SWAPGS \ PARA_SITE(PARA_PATCH(pv_cpu_ops, PV_CPU_swapgs), CLBR_NONE, \ - call PARA_INDIRECT(pv_cpu_ops+PV_CPU_swapgs) \ + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; \ + call PARA_INDIRECT(pv_cpu_ops+PV_CPU_swapgs); \ ) #define GET_CR2_INTO_RAX \ - call PARA_INDIRECT(pv_mmu_ops+PV_MMU_read_cr2) + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; \ + call PARA_INDIRECT(pv_mmu_ops+PV_MMU_read_cr2); #define USERGS_SYSRET64 \ PARA_SITE(PARA_PATCH(pv_cpu_ops, PV_CPU_usergs_sysret64), \ CLBR_NONE, \ - jmp PARA_INDIRECT(pv_cpu_ops+PV_CPU_usergs_sysret64)) + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; \ + jmp PARA_INDIRECT(pv_cpu_ops+PV_CPU_usergs_sysret64);) #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY #define SAVE_FLAGS(clobbers) \ PARA_SITE(PARA_PATCH(pv_irq_ops, PV_IRQ_save_fl), clobbers, \ PV_SAVE_REGS(clobbers | CLBR_CALLEE_SAVE); \ + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; \ call PARA_INDIRECT(pv_irq_ops+PV_IRQ_save_fl); \ PV_RESTORE_REGS(clobbers | CLBR_CALLEE_SAVE);) #endif --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt_types.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt_types.h @@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ #include <asm/desc_defs.h> #include <asm/kmap_types.h> #include <asm/pgtable_types.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> struct page; struct thread_struct; @@ -392,7 +393,9 @@ int paravirt_disable_iospace(void); * offset into the paravirt_patch_template structure, and can therefore be * freely converted back into a structure offset. */ -#define PARAVIRT_CALL "call *%c[paravirt_opptr];" +#define PARAVIRT_CALL \ + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \ + "call *%c[paravirt_opptr];" /* * These macros are intended to wrap calls through one of the paravirt Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from peterz(a)infradead.org are queue-4.14/x86-boot-objtool-annotate-indirect-jump-in-secondary_startup_64.patch queue-4.14/x86-retpoline-support-retpoline-builds-with-clang.patch queue-4.14/x86-ldt-avoid-warning-in-32-bit-builds-with-older-gcc.patch queue-4.14/x86-entry-reduce-the-code-footprint-of-the-idtentry-macro.patch queue-4.14/revert-x86-retpoline-simplify-vmexit_fill_rsb.patch queue-4.14/nospec-include-asm-barrier.h-dependency.patch queue-4.14/x86-mm-remove-stale-comment-about-kmemcheck.patch queue-4.14/x86-mm-sme-objtool-annotate-indirect-call-in-sme_encrypt_execute.patch queue-4.14/x86-speculation-use-ibrs-if-available-before-calling-into-firmware.patch queue-4.14/x86-asm-improve-how-gen_-_suffixed_rmwcc-specify-clobbers.patch queue-4.14/x86-64-realmode-add-instruction-suffix.patch queue-4.14/x86-speculation-objtool-annotate-indirect-calls-jumps-for-objtool.patch queue-4.14/x86-paravirt-objtool-annotate-indirect-calls.patch queue-4.14/x86-entry-64-use-xorl-for-faster-register-clearing.patch queue-4.14/nospec-kill-array_index_nospec_mask_check.patch queue-4.14/lib-bug.c-exclude-non-bug-warn-exceptions-from-report_bug.patch

7 years, 6 months

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Patch "x86/boot, objtool: Annotate indirect jump in secondary_startup_64()" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/boot, objtool: Annotate indirect jump in secondary_startup_64() to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-boot-objtool-annotate-indirect-jump-in-secondary_startup_64.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From bd89004f6305cbf7352238f61da093207ee518d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2018 10:38:09 +0100 Subject: x86/boot, objtool: Annotate indirect jump in secondary_startup_64() From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> commit bd89004f6305cbf7352238f61da093207ee518d6 upstream. The objtool retpoline validation found this indirect jump. Seeing how it's on CPU bringup before we run userspace it should be safe, annotate it. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz(a)infradead.org> Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)alien8.de> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2(a)infradead.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) --- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ #include <asm/nops.h> #include "../entry/calling.h" #include <asm/export.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> #ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT #include <asm/asm-offsets.h> @@ -134,6 +135,7 @@ ENTRY(secondary_startup_64) /* Ensure I am executing from virtual addresses */ movq $1f, %rax + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE jmp *%rax 1: UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from peterz(a)infradead.org are queue-4.14/x86-boot-objtool-annotate-indirect-jump-in-secondary_startup_64.patch queue-4.14/x86-retpoline-support-retpoline-builds-with-clang.patch queue-4.14/x86-ldt-avoid-warning-in-32-bit-builds-with-older-gcc.patch queue-4.14/x86-entry-reduce-the-code-footprint-of-the-idtentry-macro.patch queue-4.14/revert-x86-retpoline-simplify-vmexit_fill_rsb.patch queue-4.14/nospec-include-asm-barrier.h-dependency.patch queue-4.14/x86-mm-remove-stale-comment-about-kmemcheck.patch queue-4.14/x86-mm-sme-objtool-annotate-indirect-call-in-sme_encrypt_execute.patch queue-4.14/x86-speculation-use-ibrs-if-available-before-calling-into-firmware.patch queue-4.14/x86-asm-improve-how-gen_-_suffixed_rmwcc-specify-clobbers.patch queue-4.14/x86-64-realmode-add-instruction-suffix.patch queue-4.14/x86-speculation-objtool-annotate-indirect-calls-jumps-for-objtool.patch queue-4.14/x86-paravirt-objtool-annotate-indirect-calls.patch queue-4.14/x86-entry-64-use-xorl-for-faster-register-clearing.patch queue-4.14/nospec-kill-array_index_nospec_mask_check.patch queue-4.14/lib-bug.c-exclude-non-bug-warn-exceptions-from-report_bug.patch

7 years, 6 months

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[PATCH 3.16 00/76] 3.16.56-rc1 review

by Ben Hutchings

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 3.16.56 release. There are 76 patches in this series, which will be posted as responses to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know. Responses should be made by Wed Mar 14 12:00:00 UTC 2018. Anything received after that time might be too late. All the patches have also been committed to the linux-3.16.y-rc branch of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bwh/linux-stable-rc.git . A shortlog and diffstat can be found below. Ben. ------------- Andi Kleen (3): module/retpoline: Warn about missing retpoline in module [caf7501a1b4ec964190f31f9c3f163de252273b8] x86/retpoline/irq32: Convert assembler indirect jumps [7614e913db1f40fff819b36216484dc3808995d4] x86/retpoline: Optimize inline assembler for vmexit_fill_RSB [3f7d875566d8e79c5e0b2c9a413e91b2c29e0854] Andrey Ryabinin (1): x86/asm: Use register variable to get stack pointer value [196bd485ee4f03ce4c690bfcf38138abfcd0a4bc] Andy Lutomirski (3): x86/asm: Make asm/alternative.h safe from assembly [f005f5d860e0231fe212cfda8c1a3148b99609f4] x86/cpu: Factor out application of forced CPU caps [8bf1ebca215c262e48c15a4a15f175991776f57f] x86: Clean up current_stack_pointer [83653c16da91112236292871b820cb8b367220e3] Arnd Bergmann (1): x86: fix build warnign with 32-bit PAE [not upstream; specific to KAISER] Ben Hutchings (1): x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation [2fbd7af5af8665d18bcefae3e9700be07e22b681] Borislav Petkov (6): x86/alternatives: Fix ALTERNATIVE_2 padding generation properly [dbe4058a6a44af4ca5d146aebe01b0a1f9b7fd2a] x86/alternatives: Fix optimize_nops() checking [612e8e9350fd19cae6900cf36ea0c6892d1a0dca] x86/alternatives: Guard NOPs optimization [69df353ff305805fc16082d0c5bfa6e20fa8b863] x86/bugs: Drop one "mitigation" from dmesg [55fa19d3e51f33d9cd4056d25836d93abf9438db] x86/cpu: Merge bugs.c and bugs_64.c [62a67e123e058a67db58bc6a14354dd037bafd0a] x86/nospec: Fix header guards names [7a32fc51ca938e67974cbb9db31e1a43f98345a9] Colin Ian King (1): x86/spectre: Fix spelling mistake: "vunerable"-> "vulnerable" [e698dcdfcda41efd0984de539767b4cddd235f1e] Dan Carpenter (1): x86/spectre: Fix an error message [9de29eac8d2189424d81c0d840cd0469aa3d41c8] Dan Williams (13): array_index_nospec: Sanitize speculative array de-references [f3804203306e098dae9ca51540fcd5eb700d7f40] nl80211: Sanitize array index in parse_txq_params [259d8c1e984318497c84eef547bbb6b1d9f4eb05] nospec: Include <asm/barrier.h> dependency [eb6174f6d1be16b19cfa43dac296bfed003ce1a6] nospec: Kill array_index_nospec_mask_check() [1d91c1d2c80cb70e2e553845e278b87a960c04da] vfs, fdtable: Prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution [56c30ba7b348b90484969054d561f711ba196507] x86/get_user: Use pointer masking to limit speculation [c7f631cb07e7da06ac1d231ca178452339e32a94] x86/kvm: Update spectre-v1 mitigation [085331dfc6bbe3501fb936e657331ca943827600] x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1 [edfbae53dab8348fca778531be9f4855d2ca0360] x86/uaccess: Use __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec [304ec1b050310548db33063e567123fae8fd0301] x86/usercopy: Replace open coded stac/clac with __uaccess_{begin, end} [b5c4ae4f35325d520b230bab6eb3310613b72ac1] x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec [babdde2698d482b6c0de1eab4f697cf5856c5859] x86: Introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec [b3bbfb3fb5d25776b8e3f361d2eedaabb0b496cd] x86: Introduce barrier_nospec [b3d7ad85b80bbc404635dca80f5b129f6242bc7a] Darren Kenny (1): x86/speculation: Fix typo IBRS_ATT, which should be IBRS_ALL [af189c95a371b59f493dbe0f50c0a09724868881] Dave Hansen (2): x86/Documentation: Add PTI description [01c9b17bf673b05bb401b76ec763e9730ccf1376] x86/cpu/intel: Introduce macros for Intel family numbers [970442c599b22ccd644ebfe94d1d303bf6f87c05] David Woodhouse (14): sysfs/cpu: Fix typos in vulnerability documentation [9ecccfaa7cb5249bd31bdceb93fcf5bedb8a24d8] x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V[12] [99c6fa2511d8a683e61468be91b83f85452115fa] x86/cpufeatures: Clean up Spectre v2 related CPUID flags [2961298efe1ea1b6fc0d7ee8b76018fa6c0bcef2] x86/retpoline/checksum32: Convert assembler indirect jumps [5096732f6f695001fa2d6f1335a2680b37912c69] x86/retpoline/crypto: Convert crypto assembler indirect jumps [9697fa39efd3fc3692f2949d4045f393ec58450b] x86/retpoline/entry: Convert entry assembler indirect jumps [2641f08bb7fc63a636a2b18173221d7040a3512e] x86/retpoline/ftrace: Convert ftrace assembler indirect jumps [9351803bd803cdbeb9b5a7850b7b6f464806e3db] x86/retpoline/hyperv: Convert assembler indirect jumps [e70e5892b28c18f517f29ab6e83bd57705104b31] x86/retpoline/xen: Convert Xen hypercall indirect jumps [ea08816d5b185ab3d09e95e393f265af54560350] x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support [76b043848fd22dbf7f8bf3a1452f8c70d557b860] x86/retpoline: Avoid retpolines for built-in __init functions [66f793099a636862a71c59d4a6ba91387b155e0c] x86/retpoline: Fill RSB on context switch for affected CPUs [c995efd5a740d9cbafbf58bde4973e8b50b4d761] x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit [117cc7a908c83697b0b737d15ae1eb5943afe35b] x86/spectre: Add boot time option to select Spectre v2 mitigation [da285121560e769cc31797bba6422eea71d473e0] Dou Liyang (1): x86/spectre: Check CONFIG_RETPOLINE in command line parser [9471eee9186a46893726e22ebb54cade3f9bc043] Gustavo A. R. Silva (1): x86/cpu: Change type of x86_cache_size variable to unsigned int [24dbc6000f4b9b0ef5a9daecb161f1907733765a] Jim Mattson (1): kvm: vmx: Scrub hardware GPRs at VM-exit [0cb5b30698fdc8f6b4646012e3acb4ddce430788] Josh Poimboeuf (1): x86/paravirt: Remove 'noreplace-paravirt' cmdline option [12c69f1e94c89d40696e83804dd2f0965b5250cd] KarimAllah Ahmed (1): x86/spectre: Simplify spectre_v2 command line parsing [9005c6834c0ffdfe46afa76656bd9276cca864f6] Linus Torvalds (2): x86: fix SMAP in 32-bit environments [de9e478b9d49f3a0214310d921450cf5bb4a21e6] x86: reorganize SMAP handling in user space accesses [11f1a4b9755f5dbc3e822a96502ebe9b044b14d8] Mark Rutland (1): Documentation: Document array_index_nospec [f84a56f73dddaeac1dba8045b007f742f61cd2da] Masahiro Yamada (1): kconfig.h: use __is_defined() to check if MODULE is defined [4f920843d248946545415c1bf6120942048708ed] Masami Hiramatsu (3): kprobes/x86: Blacklist indirect thunk functions for kprobes [c1804a236894ecc942da7dc6c5abe209e56cba93] kprobes/x86: Disable optimizing on the function jumps to indirect thunk [c86a32c09f8ced67971a2310e3b0dda4d1749007] retpoline: Introduce start/end markers of indirect thunk [736e80a4213e9bbce40a7c050337047128b472ac] Peter Zijlstra (2): KVM: VMX: Make indirect call speculation safe [c940a3fb1e2e9b7d03228ab28f375fb5a47ff699] KVM: x86: Make indirect calls in emulator speculation safe [1a29b5b7f347a1a9230c1e0af5b37e3e571588ab] Thomas Gleixner (8): sysfs/cpu: Add vulnerability folder [87590ce6e373d1a5401f6539f0c59ef92dd924a9] x86/alternatives: Make optimize_nops() interrupt safe and synced [66c117d7fa2ae429911e60d84bf31a90b2b96189] x86/cpu/bugs: Make retpoline module warning conditional [e383095c7fe8d218e00ec0f83e4b95ed4e627b02] x86/cpu: Implement CPU vulnerabilites sysfs functions [61dc0f555b5c761cdafb0ba5bd41ecf22d68a4c4] x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE [a89f040fa34ec9cd682aed98b8f04e3c47d998bd] x86/cpufeatures: Make CPU bugs sticky [6cbd2171e89b13377261d15e64384df60ecb530e] x86/pti: Rename BUG_CPU_INSECURE to BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN [de791821c295cc61419a06fe5562288417d1bc58] x86/retpoline: Remove compile time warning [b8b9ce4b5aec8de9e23cabb0a26b78641f9ab1d6] Tom Lendacky (4): x86/cpu, x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on AMD processors [694d99d40972f12e59a3696effee8a376b79d7c8] x86/cpu/AMD: Make LFENCE a serializing instruction [e4d0e84e490790798691aaa0f2e598637f1867ec] x86/cpu/AMD: Use LFENCE_RDTSC in preference to MFENCE_RDTSC [9c6a73c75864ad9fa49e5fa6513e4c4071c0e29f] x86/retpoline: Add LFENCE to the retpoline/RSB filling RSB macros [28d437d550e1e39f805d99f9f8ac399c778827b7] Waiman Long (1): x86/retpoline: Remove the esp/rsp thunk [1df37383a8aeabb9b418698f0bcdffea01f4b1b2] Will Deacon (1): nospec: Move array_index_nospec() parameter checking into separate macro [8fa80c503b484ddc1abbd10c7cb2ab81f3824a50] Zhenwei.Pi (1): x86/pti: Document fix wrong index [98f0fceec7f84d80bc053e49e596088573086421] Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu | 16 ++ Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 51 +++- Documentation/speculation.txt | 90 +++++++ Documentation/x86/pti.txt | 186 +++++++++++++ Makefile | 4 +- arch/x86/Kconfig | 14 + arch/x86/Makefile | 8 + arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S | 5 +- arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx-asm_64.S | 3 +- arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx2-asm_64.S | 3 +- arch/x86/crypto/crc32c-pcl-intel-asm_64.S | 3 +- arch/x86/include/asm/alternative-asm.h | 14 +- arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h | 20 +- arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h | 11 + arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h | 31 ++- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 8 + arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h | 68 +++++ arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 198 ++++++++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 6 +- arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h | 38 +++ arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 64 +++-- arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h | 24 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h | 94 +++++-- arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h | 5 +- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/msr-index.h | 3 + arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 29 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile | 4 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 28 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 299 ++++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs_64.c | 33 --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 32 ++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/proc.c | 4 +- arch/x86/kernel/entry_32.S | 15 +- arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S | 29 +- arch/x86/kernel/irq_32.c | 16 +- arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c | 23 +- arch/x86/kernel/mcount_64.S | 8 +- arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 6 + arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 9 +- arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 23 ++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 46 ++-- arch/x86/lib/Makefile | 2 + arch/x86/lib/checksum_32.S | 7 +- arch/x86/lib/getuser.S | 10 + arch/x86/lib/retpoline-export.c | 24 ++ arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S | 47 ++++ arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c | 20 +- drivers/base/Kconfig | 3 + drivers/base/cpu.c | 48 ++++ drivers/hv/hv.c | 25 +- include/linux/cpu.h | 7 + include/linux/fdtable.h | 5 +- include/linux/init.h | 9 +- include/linux/kaiser.h | 2 +- include/linux/kconfig.h | 9 +- include/linux/module.h | 9 + include/linux/nospec.h | 59 ++++ kernel/module.c | 11 + net/wireless/nl80211.c | 9 +- scripts/mod/modpost.c | 9 + 61 files changed, 1662 insertions(+), 226 deletions(-) -- Ben Hutchings Design a system any fool can use, and only a fool will want to use it.

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Patch "x86/speculation: Use IBRS if available before calling into firmware" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/speculation: Use IBRS if available before calling into firmware to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-speculation-use-ibrs-if-available-before-calling-into-firmware.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From dd84441a797150dcc49298ec95c459a8891d8bb1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Date: Mon, 19 Feb 2018 10:50:54 +0000 Subject: x86/speculation: Use IBRS if available before calling into firmware From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> commit dd84441a797150dcc49298ec95c459a8891d8bb1 upstream. Retpoline means the kernel is safe because it has no indirect branches. But firmware isn't, so use IBRS for firmware calls if it's available. Block preemption while IBRS is set, although in practice the call sites already had to be doing that. Ignore hpwdt.c for now. It's taking spinlocks and calling into firmware code, from an NMI handler. I don't want to touch that with a bargepole. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: arjan.van.de.ven(a)intel.com Cc: bp(a)alien8.de Cc: dave.hansen(a)intel.com Cc: jmattson(a)google.com Cc: karahmed(a)amazon.de Cc: kvm(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: pbonzini(a)redhat.com Cc: rkrcmar(a)redhat.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1519037457-7643-2-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/include/asm/apm.h | 6 +++++ arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h | 17 +++++++++++++-- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 12 +++++++++- 5 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/apm.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/apm.h @@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ #ifndef _ASM_X86_MACH_DEFAULT_APM_H #define _ASM_X86_MACH_DEFAULT_APM_H +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> + #ifdef APM_ZERO_SEGS # define APM_DO_ZERO_SEGS \ "pushl %%ds\n\t" \ @@ -31,6 +33,7 @@ static inline void apm_bios_call_asm(u32 * N.B. We do NOT need a cld after the BIOS call * because we always save and restore the flags. */ + firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start(); __asm__ __volatile__(APM_DO_ZERO_SEGS "pushl %%edi\n\t" "pushl %%ebp\n\t" @@ -43,6 +46,7 @@ static inline void apm_bios_call_asm(u32 "=S" (*esi) : "a" (func), "b" (ebx_in), "c" (ecx_in) : "memory", "cc"); + firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end(); } static inline bool apm_bios_call_simple_asm(u32 func, u32 ebx_in, @@ -55,6 +59,7 @@ static inline bool apm_bios_call_simple_ * N.B. We do NOT need a cld after the BIOS call * because we always save and restore the flags. */ + firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start(); __asm__ __volatile__(APM_DO_ZERO_SEGS "pushl %%edi\n\t" "pushl %%ebp\n\t" @@ -67,6 +72,7 @@ static inline bool apm_bios_call_simple_ "=S" (si) : "a" (func), "b" (ebx_in), "c" (ecx_in) : "memory", "cc"); + firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end(); return error; } --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -203,6 +203,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_KAISER ( 7*32+31) /* CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION w/o nokaiser */ #define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB ( 7*32+21) /* "" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier enabled */ +#define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW ( 7*32+22) /* "" Use IBRS during runtime firmware calls */ /* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */ #define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW ( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */ --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ #include <asm/pgtable.h> #include <asm/processor-flags.h> #include <asm/tlb.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> /* * We map the EFI regions needed for runtime services non-contiguously, @@ -35,8 +36,18 @@ extern unsigned long asmlinkage efi_call_phys(void *, ...); -#define arch_efi_call_virt_setup() kernel_fpu_begin() -#define arch_efi_call_virt_teardown() kernel_fpu_end() +#define arch_efi_call_virt_setup() \ +({ \ + kernel_fpu_begin(); \ + firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start(); \ +}) + +#define arch_efi_call_virt_teardown() \ +({ \ + firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end(); \ + kernel_fpu_end(); \ +}) + /* * Wrap all the virtual calls in a way that forces the parameters on the stack. @@ -72,6 +83,7 @@ struct efi_scratch { efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings(); \ preempt_disable(); \ __kernel_fpu_begin(); \ + firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start(); \ \ if (efi_scratch.use_pgd) { \ efi_scratch.prev_cr3 = read_cr3(); \ @@ -90,6 +102,7 @@ struct efi_scratch { __flush_tlb_all(); \ } \ \ + firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end(); \ __kernel_fpu_end(); \ preempt_enable(); \ }) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -219,17 +219,38 @@ static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void) #endif } +#define alternative_msr_write(_msr, _val, _feature) \ + asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("", \ + "movl %[msr], %%ecx\n\t" \ + "movl %[val], %%eax\n\t" \ + "movl $0, %%edx\n\t" \ + "wrmsr", \ + _feature) \ + : : [msr] "i" (_msr), [val] "i" (_val) \ + : "eax", "ecx", "edx", "memory") + static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void) { - asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("", - "movl %[msr], %%ecx\n\t" - "movl %[val], %%eax\n\t" - "movl $0, %%edx\n\t" - "wrmsr", - X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB) - : : [msr] "i" (MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD), - [val] "i" (PRED_CMD_IBPB) - : "eax", "ecx", "edx", "memory"); + alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_IBPB, + X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB); +} + +/* + * With retpoline, we must use IBRS to restrict branch prediction + * before calling into firmware. + */ +static inline void firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start(void) +{ + preempt_disable(); + alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, SPEC_CTRL_IBRS, + X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); +} + +static inline void firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end(void) +{ + alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0, + X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); + preempt_enable(); } #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -299,6 +299,15 @@ retpoline_auto: setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB); pr_info("Spectre v2 mitigation: Enabling Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n"); } + + /* + * Retpoline means the kernel is safe because it has no indirect + * branches. But firmware isn't, so use IBRS to protect that. + */ + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) { + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); + pr_info("Enabling Restricted Speculation for firmware calls\n"); + } } #undef pr_fmt @@ -325,8 +334,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct devic if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2)) return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); - return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled], + return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled], boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB) ? ", IBPB" : "", + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ? ", IBRS_FW" : "", spectre_v2_module_string()); } #endif Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk are queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-support-retpoline-builds-with-clang.patch queue-4.9/revert-x86-retpoline-simplify-vmexit_fill_rsb.patch queue-4.9/x86-speculation-use-ibrs-if-available-before-calling-into-firmware.patch queue-4.9/x86-speculation-objtool-annotate-indirect-calls-jumps-for-objtool.patch

7 years, 6 months

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Patch "x86/speculation, objtool: Annotate indirect calls/jumps for objtool" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/speculation, objtool: Annotate indirect calls/jumps for objtool to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-speculation-objtool-annotate-indirect-calls-jumps-for-objtool.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 9e0e3c5130e949c389caabc8033e9799b129e429 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2018 22:34:34 +0100 Subject: x86/speculation, objtool: Annotate indirect calls/jumps for objtool From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> commit 9e0e3c5130e949c389caabc8033e9799b129e429 upstream. Annotate the indirect calls/jumps in the CALL_NOSPEC/JUMP_NOSPEC alternatives. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz(a)infradead.org> Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)alien8.de> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2(a)infradead.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -68,6 +68,18 @@ .endm /* + * This should be used immediately before an indirect jump/call. It tells + * objtool the subsequent indirect jump/call is vouched safe for retpoline + * builds. + */ +.macro ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE + .Lannotate_\@: + .pushsection .discard.retpoline_safe + _ASM_PTR .Lannotate_\@ + .popsection +.endm + +/* * These are the bare retpoline primitives for indirect jmp and call. * Do not use these directly; they only exist to make the ALTERNATIVE * invocation below less ugly. @@ -103,9 +115,9 @@ .macro JMP_NOSPEC reg:req #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE - ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(jmp *\reg), \ + ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *\reg), \ __stringify(RETPOLINE_JMP \reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, \ - __stringify(lfence; jmp *\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD + __stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD #else jmp *\reg #endif @@ -114,9 +126,9 @@ .macro CALL_NOSPEC reg:req #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE - ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(call *\reg), \ + ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; call *\reg), \ __stringify(RETPOLINE_CALL \reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE,\ - __stringify(lfence; call *\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD + __stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; call *\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD #else call *\reg #endif @@ -144,6 +156,12 @@ ".long 999b - .\n\t" \ ".popsection\n\t" +#define ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \ + "999:\n\t" \ + ".pushsection .discard.retpoline_safe\n\t" \ + _ASM_PTR " 999b\n\t" \ + ".popsection\n\t" + #if defined(CONFIG_X86_64) && defined(RETPOLINE) /* @@ -153,6 +171,7 @@ # define CALL_NOSPEC \ ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE \ ALTERNATIVE( \ + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \ "call *%[thunk_target]\n", \ "call __x86_indirect_thunk_%V[thunk_target]\n", \ X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from peterz(a)infradead.org are queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-support-retpoline-builds-with-clang.patch queue-4.9/revert-x86-retpoline-simplify-vmexit_fill_rsb.patch queue-4.9/nospec-include-asm-barrier.h-dependency.patch queue-4.9/x86-speculation-use-ibrs-if-available-before-calling-into-firmware.patch queue-4.9/x86-speculation-objtool-annotate-indirect-calls-jumps-for-objtool.patch queue-4.9/nospec-kill-array_index_nospec_mask_check.patch

7 years, 6 months

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Patch "x86/retpoline: Support retpoline builds with Clang" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/retpoline: Support retpoline builds with Clang to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-retpoline-support-retpoline-builds-with-clang.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 87358710c1fb4f1bf96bbe2349975ff9953fc9b2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Date: Mon, 19 Feb 2018 10:50:57 +0000 Subject: x86/retpoline: Support retpoline builds with Clang From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> commit 87358710c1fb4f1bf96bbe2349975ff9953fc9b2 upstream. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: arjan.van.de.ven(a)intel.com Cc: bp(a)alien8.de Cc: dave.hansen(a)intel.com Cc: jmattson(a)google.com Cc: karahmed(a)amazon.de Cc: kvm(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: pbonzini(a)redhat.com Cc: rkrcmar(a)redhat.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1519037457-7643-5-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/Makefile | 5 ++++- include/linux/compiler-clang.h | 5 +++++ include/linux/compiler-gcc.h | 4 ++++ include/linux/init.h | 8 ++++---- 4 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/Makefile @@ -184,7 +184,10 @@ KBUILD_AFLAGS += $(mflags-y) # Avoid indirect branches in kernel to deal with Spectre ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE - RETPOLINE_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-mindirect-branch=thunk-extern -mindirect-branch-register) + RETPOLINE_CFLAGS_GCC := -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern -mindirect-branch-register + RETPOLINE_CFLAGS_CLANG := -mretpoline-external-thunk + + RETPOLINE_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,$(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS_GCC),$(call cc-option,$(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS_CLANG))) ifneq ($(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS),) KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS) -DRETPOLINE endif --- a/include/linux/compiler-clang.h +++ b/include/linux/compiler-clang.h @@ -15,3 +15,8 @@ * with any version that can compile the kernel */ #define __UNIQUE_ID(prefix) __PASTE(__PASTE(__UNIQUE_ID_, prefix), __COUNTER__) + +/* Clang doesn't have a way to turn it off per-function, yet. */ +#ifdef __noretpoline +#undef __noretpoline +#endif --- a/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h +++ b/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h @@ -88,6 +88,10 @@ #define __weak __attribute__((weak)) #define __alias(symbol) __attribute__((alias(#symbol))) +#ifdef RETPOLINE +#define __noretpoline __attribute__((indirect_branch("keep"))) +#endif + /* * it doesn't make sense on ARM (currently the only user of __naked) * to trace naked functions because then mcount is called without --- a/include/linux/init.h +++ b/include/linux/init.h @@ -5,10 +5,10 @@ #include <linux/types.h> /* Built-in __init functions needn't be compiled with retpoline */ -#if defined(RETPOLINE) && !defined(MODULE) -#define __noretpoline __attribute__((indirect_branch("keep"))) +#if defined(__noretpoline) && !defined(MODULE) +#define __noinitretpoline __noretpoline #else -#define __noretpoline +#define __noinitretpoline #endif /* These macros are used to mark some functions or @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ /* These are for everybody (although not all archs will actually discard it in modules) */ -#define __init __section(.init.text) __cold notrace __latent_entropy __noretpoline +#define __init __section(.init.text) __cold notrace __latent_entropy __noinitretpoline #define __initdata __section(.init.data) #define __initconst __section(.init.rodata) #define __exitdata __section(.exit.data) Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk are queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-support-retpoline-builds-with-clang.patch queue-4.9/revert-x86-retpoline-simplify-vmexit_fill_rsb.patch queue-4.9/x86-speculation-use-ibrs-if-available-before-calling-into-firmware.patch queue-4.9/x86-speculation-objtool-annotate-indirect-calls-jumps-for-objtool.patch

7 years, 6 months

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