Hi, all
Is there someone knows if exists one utilis dedicated to UFS device, rather than SCSI utils?
I have tried sg3-utils, but it is not convenient for the embedded ARM-based system.
And also it doesn't support several UFS special command.
If we don't have this kind of tool for UFS, is it necessary for us to develop a ufs-utils?
I need your every expert's inputs and suggestions.
Thanks in advance.
//Bean Huo
The patch titled
Subject: string.h: workaround for increased stack usage
has been added to the -mm tree. Its filename is
stringh-work-around-for-increased-stack-usage.patch
This patch should soon appear at
http://ozlabs.org/~akpm/mmots/broken-out/stringh-work-around-for-increased-…
and later at
http://ozlabs.org/~akpm/mmotm/broken-out/stringh-work-around-for-increased-…
Before you just go and hit "reply", please:
a) Consider who else should be cc'ed
b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well
c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a
reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's
*** Remember to use Documentation/SubmitChecklist when testing your code ***
The -mm tree is included into linux-next and is updated
there every 3-4 working days
------------------------------------------------------
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de>
Subject: string.h: workaround for increased stack usage
The hardened strlen() function causes rather large stack usage in at least
one file in the kernel, in particular when CONFIG_KASAN is enabled:
drivers/media/usb/em28xx/em28xx-dvb.c: In function 'em28xx_dvb_init':
drivers/media/usb/em28xx/em28xx-dvb.c:2062:1: error: the frame size of 3256 bytes is larger than 204 bytes [-Werror=frame-larger-than=]
Analyzing this problem led to the discovery that gcc fails to merge the
stack slots for the i2c_board_info[] structures after we strlcpy() into
them, due to the 'noreturn' attribute on the source string length check.
I reported this as a gcc bug, but it is unlikely to get fixed for gcc-8,
since it is relatively easy to work around, and it gets triggered rarely.
An earlier workaround I did added an empty inline assembly statement
before the call to fortify_panic(), which works surprisingly well, but is
really ugly and unintuitive.
This is a new approach to the same problem, this time addressing it by not
calling the 'extern __real_strnlen()' function for string constants where
__builtin_strlen() is a compile-time constant and therefore known to be
safe. We do this by checking if the last character in the string is a
compile-time constant '\0'. If it is, we can assume that strlen() of the
string is also constant. As a side-effect, this should also improve the
object code output for any other call of strlen() on a string constant.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171205215143.3085755-1-arnd@arndb.de
Link: https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=82365
Link: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/9980413/
Link: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/9974047/
Fixes: 6974f0c4555 ("include/linux/string.h: add the option of fortified string.h functions")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org>
Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov(a)google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider(a)google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin(a)virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Martin Wilck <mwilck(a)suse.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
include/linux/string.h | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff -puN include/linux/string.h~stringh-work-around-for-increased-stack-usage include/linux/string.h
--- a/include/linux/string.h~stringh-work-around-for-increased-stack-usage
+++ a/include/linux/string.h
@@ -259,7 +259,8 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE __kernel_size_t strlen(
{
__kernel_size_t ret;
size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
- if (p_size == (size_t)-1)
+ if (p_size == (size_t)-1 ||
+ (__builtin_constant_p(p[p_size - 1]) && p[p_size - 1] == '\0'))
return __builtin_strlen(p);
ret = strnlen(p, p_size);
if (p_size <= ret)
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from arnd(a)arndb.de are
stringh-work-around-for-increased-stack-usage.patch
The hardened strlen() function causes rather large stack usage in at
least one file in the kernel, in particular when CONFIG_KASAN is enabled:
drivers/media/usb/em28xx/em28xx-dvb.c: In function 'em28xx_dvb_init':
drivers/media/usb/em28xx/em28xx-dvb.c:2062:1: error: the frame size of 3256 bytes is larger than 204 bytes [-Werror=frame-larger-than=]
Analyzing this problem led to the discovery that gcc fails to merge the
stack slots for the i2c_board_info[] structures after we strlcpy() into
them, due to the 'noreturn' attribute on the source string length check.
I reported this as a gcc bug, but it is unlikely to get fixed for gcc-8,
since it is relatively easy to work around, and it gets triggered rarely.
An earlier workaround I did added an empty inline assembly statement
before the call to fortify_panic(), which works surprisingly well,
but is really ugly and unintuitive.
This is a new approach to the same problem, this time addressing it by
not calling the 'extern __real_strnlen()' function for string constants
where __builtin_strlen() is a compile-time constant and therefore known
to be safe. We do this by checking if the last character in the string
is a compile-time constant '\0'. If it is, we can assume that
strlen() of the string is also constant. As a side-effect, this should
also improve the object code output for any other call of strlen()
on a string constant.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Link: https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=82365
Link: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/9980413/
Link: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/9974047/
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de>
---
v3: don't use an asm barrier but use a constant string change.
Aside from two other patches for drivers/media that I sent last week,
this should fix all stack frames above 2KB, once all three are merged,
I'll send the patch to re-enable the warning.
---
include/linux/string.h | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/string.h b/include/linux/string.h
index 410ecf17de3c..e5cc3f27f6e0 100644
--- a/include/linux/string.h
+++ b/include/linux/string.h
@@ -259,7 +259,8 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE __kernel_size_t strlen(const char *p)
{
__kernel_size_t ret;
size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
- if (p_size == (size_t)-1)
+ if (p_size == (size_t)-1 ||
+ (__builtin_constant_p(p[p_size - 1]) && p[p_size - 1] == '\0'))
return __builtin_strlen(p);
ret = strnlen(p, p_size);
if (p_size <= ret)
--
2.9.0
From: Daniel Jurgens <danielj(a)mellanox.com>
Per the infiniband spec an SMI MAD can have any PKey. Checking the pkey
on SMI MADs is not necessary, and it seems that some older adapters
using the mthca driver don't follow the convention of using the default
PKey, resulting in false denials, or errors querying the PKey cache.
SMI MAD security is still enforced, only agents allowed to manage the
subnet are able to receive or send SMI MADs.
Reported-by: Chris Blake <chrisrblake93(a)gmail.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v4.12
Fixes: 47a2b338fe63 ("IB/core: Enforce security on management datagrams")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj(a)mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Parav Pandit <parav(a)mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon(a)kernel.org>
---
drivers/infiniband/core/security.c | 7 +++++--
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c
index a337386652b0..feafdb961c48 100644
--- a/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c
@@ -739,8 +739,11 @@ int ib_mad_enforce_security(struct ib_mad_agent_private *map, u16 pkey_index)
if (!rdma_protocol_ib(map->agent.device, map->agent.port_num))
return 0;
- if (map->agent.qp->qp_type == IB_QPT_SMI && !map->agent.smp_allowed)
- return -EACCES;
+ if (map->agent.qp->qp_type == IB_QPT_SMI) {
+ if (!map->agent.smp_allowed)
+ return -EACCES;
+ return 0;
+ }
return ib_security_pkey_access(map->agent.device,
map->agent.port_num,
--
2.15.1
The patch below does not apply to the 4.4-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From e492080e640c2d1235ddf3441cae634cfffef7e1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jaewon Kim <jaewon31.kim(a)samsung.com>
Date: Wed, 15 Nov 2017 17:39:07 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] mm/page_ext.c: check if page_ext is not prepared
online_page_ext() and page_ext_init() allocate page_ext for each
section, but they do not allocate if the first PFN is !pfn_present(pfn)
or !pfn_valid(pfn). Then section->page_ext remains as NULL.
lookup_page_ext checks NULL only if CONFIG_DEBUG_VM is enabled. For a
valid PFN, __set_page_owner will try to get page_ext through
lookup_page_ext. Without CONFIG_DEBUG_VM lookup_page_ext will misuse
NULL pointer as value 0. This incurrs invalid address access.
This is the panic example when PFN 0x100000 is not valid but PFN
0x13FC00 is being used for page_ext. section->page_ext is NULL,
get_entry returned invalid page_ext address as 0x1DFA000 for a PFN
0x13FC00.
To avoid this panic, CONFIG_DEBUG_VM should be removed so that page_ext
will be checked at all times.
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 01dfa014
------------[ cut here ]------------
Kernel BUG at ffffff80082371e0 [verbose debug info unavailable]
Internal error: Oops: 96000045 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in:
PC is at __set_page_owner+0x48/0x78
LR is at __set_page_owner+0x44/0x78
__set_page_owner+0x48/0x78
get_page_from_freelist+0x880/0x8e8
__alloc_pages_nodemask+0x14c/0xc48
__do_page_cache_readahead+0xdc/0x264
filemap_fault+0x2ac/0x550
ext4_filemap_fault+0x3c/0x58
__do_fault+0x80/0x120
handle_mm_fault+0x704/0xbb0
do_page_fault+0x2e8/0x394
do_mem_abort+0x88/0x124
Pre-4.7 kernels also need commit f86e4271978b ("mm: check the return
value of lookup_page_ext for all call sites").
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171107094131.14621-1-jaewon31.kim@samsung.com
Fixes: eefa864b701d ("mm/page_ext: resurrect struct page extending code for debugging")
Signed-off-by: Jaewon Kim <jaewon31.kim(a)samsung.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko(a)suse.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka(a)suse.cz>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <js1304(a)gmail.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> [depends on f86e427197, see above]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org>
diff --git a/mm/page_ext.c b/mm/page_ext.c
index 4f0367d472c4..2c16216c29b6 100644
--- a/mm/page_ext.c
+++ b/mm/page_ext.c
@@ -125,7 +125,6 @@ struct page_ext *lookup_page_ext(struct page *page)
struct page_ext *base;
base = NODE_DATA(page_to_nid(page))->node_page_ext;
-#if defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_VM)
/*
* The sanity checks the page allocator does upon freeing a
* page can reach here before the page_ext arrays are
@@ -134,7 +133,6 @@ struct page_ext *lookup_page_ext(struct page *page)
*/
if (unlikely(!base))
return NULL;
-#endif
index = pfn - round_down(node_start_pfn(page_to_nid(page)),
MAX_ORDER_NR_PAGES);
return get_entry(base, index);
@@ -199,7 +197,6 @@ struct page_ext *lookup_page_ext(struct page *page)
{
unsigned long pfn = page_to_pfn(page);
struct mem_section *section = __pfn_to_section(pfn);
-#if defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_VM)
/*
* The sanity checks the page allocator does upon freeing a
* page can reach here before the page_ext arrays are
@@ -208,7 +205,6 @@ struct page_ext *lookup_page_ext(struct page *page)
*/
if (!section->page_ext)
return NULL;
-#endif
return get_entry(section->page_ext, pfn);
}
This function was introduced by 247e743cbe6e ("Btrfs: Use async helpers to deal
with pages that have been improperly dirtied") and it didn't do any error
handling then. This function might very well fail in ENOMEM situation, yet
it's not handled, this could lead to inconsistent state. So let's handle the
failure by setting the mapping error bit.
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov(a)suse.com>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
---
fs/btrfs/inode.c | 11 +++++++++--
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/btrfs/inode.c b/fs/btrfs/inode.c
index 993061f83067..7a5a46fefdb4 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/inode.c
@@ -2098,8 +2098,15 @@ static void btrfs_writepage_fixup_worker(struct btrfs_work *work)
goto out;
}
- btrfs_set_extent_delalloc(inode, page_start, page_end, 0, &cached_state,
- 0);
+ ret = btrfs_set_extent_delalloc(inode, page_start, page_end, 0,
+ &cached_state, 0);
+ if (ret) {
+ mapping_set_error(page->mapping, ret);
+ end_extent_writepage(page, ret, page_start, page_end);
+ ClearPageChecked(page);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
ClearPageChecked(page);
set_page_dirty(page);
btrfs_delalloc_release_extents(BTRFS_I(inode), PAGE_SIZE);
--
2.7.4
On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 09:35:02AM -0800, Michael Lyle wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 9:01 AM, Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> wrote:
>
> > On 11/27/2017 09:45 AM, Eddie Chapman wrote:
> > > On 27/11/17 16:06, gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org wrote:
> > >>
> > >> This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
> > >>
> > >> bcache: only permit to recovery read error when cache device is
> > clean
> >
>
>
> > > Hi Greg,
> > >
> > > This patch is an important fix for a possible data corruption issue, but
> > > it also introduces a bug that can produce read errors under certain
> > > circumstances. The issue introduced by this patch is not as severe as
> > > the issue it fixes, but can lead to e.g. upper layer fs remounting read
> > > only. In my environment upper layer handled it badly and indirectly
> > > resulted in data loss (not directly bcache's fault of course).
> > >
> > > Michael Lyle CC'd the stable list with a follow up fix for the issue
> > > introduced by this patch, on 24th Nov, subject "bcache: recover data
> > > from backing when data is clean".
> > >
> > > However, the followup fix is not in Linus' tree yet, only in Michael's.
> > > I guess that means you can't pick it up yet. Never-the-less I felt it
> > > important to point this out here.
> >
> > It's commit e393aa2446150536929140739f09c6ecbcbea7f0 in my tree and will
> > go upstream shortly - but yes, probably should not add this one, before
> > both can be pulled in.
>
>
> Thanks everyone for the quick reply on this. I agree.
Ok, I've dropped this patch from all of the stable queues for now.
thanks,
greg k-h
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
mm, oom_reaper: gather each vma to prevent leaking TLB entry
to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
mm-oom_reaper-gather-each-vma-to-prevent-leaking-tlb-entry.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 687cb0884a714ff484d038e9190edc874edcf146 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Wang Nan <wangnan0(a)huawei.com>
Date: Wed, 29 Nov 2017 16:09:58 -0800
Subject: mm, oom_reaper: gather each vma to prevent leaking TLB entry
From: Wang Nan <wangnan0(a)huawei.com>
commit 687cb0884a714ff484d038e9190edc874edcf146 upstream.
tlb_gather_mmu(&tlb, mm, 0, -1) means gathering the whole virtual memory
space. In this case, tlb->fullmm is true. Some archs like arm64
doesn't flush TLB when tlb->fullmm is true:
commit 5a7862e83000 ("arm64: tlbflush: avoid flushing when fullmm == 1").
Which causes leaking of tlb entries.
Will clarifies his patch:
"Basically, we tag each address space with an ASID (PCID on x86) which
is resident in the TLB. This means we can elide TLB invalidation when
pulling down a full mm because we won't ever assign that ASID to
another mm without doing TLB invalidation elsewhere (which actually
just nukes the whole TLB).
I think that means that we could potentially not fault on a kernel
uaccess, because we could hit in the TLB"
There could be a window between complete_signal() sending IPI to other
cores and all threads sharing this mm are really kicked off from cores.
In this window, the oom reaper may calls tlb_flush_mmu_tlbonly() to
flush TLB then frees pages. However, due to the above problem, the TLB
entries are not really flushed on arm64. Other threads are possible to
access these pages through TLB entries. Moreover, a copy_to_user() can
also write to these pages without generating page fault, causes
use-after-free bugs.
This patch gathers each vma instead of gathering full vm space. In this
case tlb->fullmm is not true. The behavior of oom reaper become similar
to munmapping before do_exit, which should be safe for all archs.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171107095453.179940-1-wangnan0@huawei.com
Fixes: aac453635549 ("mm, oom: introduce oom reaper")
Signed-off-by: Wang Nan <wangnan0(a)huawei.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko(a)suse.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes(a)google.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon(a)arm.com>
Cc: Bob Liu <liubo95(a)huawei.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro(a)fb.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov(a)yandex-team.ru>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange(a)redhat.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org>
[backported to 4.9 stable tree]
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko(a)suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
mm/oom_kill.c | 7 ++++---
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/mm/oom_kill.c
+++ b/mm/oom_kill.c
@@ -524,7 +524,6 @@ static bool __oom_reap_task_mm(struct ta
*/
set_bit(MMF_UNSTABLE, &mm->flags);
- tlb_gather_mmu(&tlb, mm, 0, -1);
for (vma = mm->mmap ; vma; vma = vma->vm_next) {
if (is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma))
continue;
@@ -546,11 +545,13 @@ static bool __oom_reap_task_mm(struct ta
* we do not want to block exit_mmap by keeping mm ref
* count elevated without a good reason.
*/
- if (vma_is_anonymous(vma) || !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED))
+ if (vma_is_anonymous(vma) || !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED)) {
+ tlb_gather_mmu(&tlb, mm, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end);
unmap_page_range(&tlb, vma, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end,
&details);
+ tlb_finish_mmu(&tlb, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end);
+ }
}
- tlb_finish_mmu(&tlb, 0, -1);
pr_info("oom_reaper: reaped process %d (%s), now anon-rss:%lukB, file-rss:%lukB, shmem-rss:%lukB\n",
task_pid_nr(tsk), tsk->comm,
K(get_mm_counter(mm, MM_ANONPAGES)),
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from wangnan0(a)huawei.com are
queue-4.9/mm-oom_reaper-gather-each-vma-to-prevent-leaking-tlb-entry.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
drm/amdgpu: Use unsigned ring indices in amdgpu_queue_mgr_map
to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
drm-amdgpu-use-unsigned-ring-indices-in-amdgpu_queue_mgr_map.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From fa7c7939b4bf112cd06ba166b739244077898990 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Michel=20D=C3=A4nzer?= <michel.daenzer(a)amd.com>
Date: Wed, 22 Nov 2017 15:55:21 +0100
Subject: drm/amdgpu: Use unsigned ring indices in amdgpu_queue_mgr_map
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
From: Michel Dänzer <michel.daenzer(a)amd.com>
commit fa7c7939b4bf112cd06ba166b739244077898990 upstream.
This matches the corresponding UAPI fields. Treating the ring index as
signed could result in accessing random unrelated memory if the MSB was
set.
Fixes: effd924d2f3b ("drm/amdgpu: untie user ring ids from kernel ring ids v6")
Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig(a)amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michel Dänzer <michel.daenzer(a)amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu.h | 2 +-
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_queue_mgr.c | 6 +++---
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu.h
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu.h
@@ -697,7 +697,7 @@ int amdgpu_queue_mgr_fini(struct amdgpu_
struct amdgpu_queue_mgr *mgr);
int amdgpu_queue_mgr_map(struct amdgpu_device *adev,
struct amdgpu_queue_mgr *mgr,
- int hw_ip, int instance, int ring,
+ u32 hw_ip, u32 instance, u32 ring,
struct amdgpu_ring **out_ring);
/*
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_queue_mgr.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_queue_mgr.c
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ static int amdgpu_update_cached_map(stru
static int amdgpu_identity_map(struct amdgpu_device *adev,
struct amdgpu_queue_mapper *mapper,
- int ring,
+ u32 ring,
struct amdgpu_ring **out_ring)
{
switch (mapper->hw_ip) {
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ static enum amdgpu_ring_type amdgpu_hw_i
static int amdgpu_lru_map(struct amdgpu_device *adev,
struct amdgpu_queue_mapper *mapper,
- int user_ring,
+ u32 user_ring,
struct amdgpu_ring **out_ring)
{
int r, i, j;
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ int amdgpu_queue_mgr_fini(struct amdgpu_
*/
int amdgpu_queue_mgr_map(struct amdgpu_device *adev,
struct amdgpu_queue_mgr *mgr,
- int hw_ip, int instance, int ring,
+ u32 hw_ip, u32 instance, u32 ring,
struct amdgpu_ring **out_ring)
{
int r, ip_num_rings;
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from michel.daenzer(a)amd.com are
queue-4.14/drm-amdgpu-use-unsigned-ring-indices-in-amdgpu_queue_mgr_map.patch