The patch below does not apply to the 6.1-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.1.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x a0ee1d5faff135e28810f29e0f06328c66f89852
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025062034-chastise-wrecking-9a12@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.1.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From a0ee1d5faff135e28810f29e0f06328c66f89852 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Chao Gao <chao.gao(a)intel.com>
Date: Mon, 24 Mar 2025 22:08:48 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] KVM: VMX: Flush shadow VMCS on emergency reboot
Ensure the shadow VMCS cache is evicted during an emergency reboot to
prevent potential memory corruption if the cache is evicted after reboot.
This issue was identified through code inspection, as __loaded_vmcs_clear()
flushes both the normal VMCS and the shadow VMCS.
Avoid checking the "launched" state during an emergency reboot, unlike the
behavior in __loaded_vmcs_clear(). This is important because reboot NMIs
can interfere with operations like copy_shadow_to_vmcs12(), where shadow
VMCSes are loaded directly using VMPTRLD. In such cases, if NMIs occur
right after the VMCS load, the shadow VMCSes will be active but the
"launched" state may not be set.
Fixes: 16f5b9034b69 ("KVM: nVMX: Copy processor-specific shadow-vmcs to VMCS12")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao(a)intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang(a)intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250324140849.2099723-1-chao.gao@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com>
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index ef2d7208dd20..848c4963bdb8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -770,8 +770,11 @@ void vmx_emergency_disable_virtualization_cpu(void)
return;
list_for_each_entry(v, &per_cpu(loaded_vmcss_on_cpu, cpu),
- loaded_vmcss_on_cpu_link)
+ loaded_vmcss_on_cpu_link) {
vmcs_clear(v->vmcs);
+ if (v->shadow_vmcs)
+ vmcs_clear(v->shadow_vmcs);
+ }
kvm_cpu_vmxoff();
}
The check for a fast symlink in the presence of only an
external xattr inode is incorrect. If a fast symlink does
not have an xattr block (i_file_acl == 0), but does have
an external xattr inode that increases inode i_blocks, then
the check for a fast symlink will incorrectly fail and
__ext4_iget()->ext4_ind_check_inode() will report the inode
is corrupt when it "validates" i_data[] on the next read:
# ln -s foo /mnt/tmp/bar
# setfattr -h -n trusted.test \
-v "$(yes | head -n 4000)" /mnt/tmp/bar
# umount /mnt/tmp
# mount /mnt/tmp
# ls -l /mnt/tmp
ls: cannot access '/mnt/tmp/bar': Structure needs cleaning
total 4
? l?????????? ? ? ? ? ? bar
# dmesg | tail -1
EXT4-fs error (device dm-8): __ext4_iget:5098:
inode #24578: block 7303014: comm ls: invalid block
(note that "block 7303014" = 0x6f6f66 = "foo" in LE order).
ext4_inode_is_fast_symlink() should check the superblock
EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_EA_INODE feature flag, not the inode
EXT4_EA_INODE_FL, since the latter is only set on the xattr
inode itself, and not on the inode that uses this xattr.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: fc82228a5e38 ("ext4: support fast symlinks from ext3 file systems")
Signed-off-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger(a)whamcloud.com>
Reviewed-by: Li Dongyang <dongyangli(a)ddn.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Zhuravlev <bzzz(a)whamcloud.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Drokin <green(a)whamcloud.com>
Reviewed-on: https://review.whamcloud.com/59879
Lustre-bug-id: https://jira.whamcloud.com/browse/LU-19121
---
fs/ext4/inode.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/ext4/inode.c b/fs/ext4/inode.c
index be9a4cba35fd..caca88521c75 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/inode.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/inode.c
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ static inline int ext4_begin_ordered_truncate(struct inode *inode,
*/
int ext4_inode_is_fast_symlink(struct inode *inode)
{
- if (!(EXT4_I(inode)->i_flags & EXT4_EA_INODE_FL)) {
+ if (!ext4_has_feature_ea_inode(inode->i_sb)) {
int ea_blocks = EXT4_I(inode)->i_file_acl ?
EXT4_CLUSTER_SIZE(inode->i_sb) >> 9 : 0;
--
2.43.5
netlink_attachskb() checks for the socket's read memory allocation
constraints. Firstly, it has:
rmem < READ_ONCE(sk->sk_rcvbuf)
to check if the just increased rmem value fits into the socket's receive
buffer. If not, it proceeds and tries to wait for the memory under:
rmem + skb->truesize > READ_ONCE(sk->sk_rcvbuf)
The checks don't cover the case when skb->truesize + sk->sk_rmem_alloc is
equal to sk->sk_rcvbuf. Thus the function neither successfully accepts
these conditions, nor manages to reschedule the task - and is called in
retry loop for indefinite time which is caught as:
rcu: INFO: rcu_sched self-detected stall on CPU
rcu: 0-....: (25999 ticks this GP) idle=ef2/1/0x4000000000000000 softirq=262269/262269 fqs=6212
(t=26000 jiffies g=230833 q=259957)
NMI backtrace for cpu 0
CPU: 0 PID: 22 Comm: kauditd Not tainted 5.10.240 #68
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-4.fc42 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:120
nmi_cpu_backtrace.cold lib/nmi_backtrace.c:105
nmi_trigger_cpumask_backtrace lib/nmi_backtrace.c:62
rcu_dump_cpu_stacks kernel/rcu/tree_stall.h:335
rcu_sched_clock_irq.cold kernel/rcu/tree.c:2590
update_process_times kernel/time/timer.c:1953
tick_sched_handle kernel/time/tick-sched.c:227
tick_sched_timer kernel/time/tick-sched.c:1399
__hrtimer_run_queues kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1652
hrtimer_interrupt kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1717
__sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1113
asm_call_irq_on_stack arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:808
</IRQ>
netlink_attachskb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1234
netlink_unicast net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1349
kauditd_send_queue kernel/audit.c:776
kauditd_thread kernel/audit.c:897
kthread kernel/kthread.c:328
ret_from_fork arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:304
Restore the original behavior of the check which commit in Fixes
accidentally missed when restructuring the code.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org).
Fixes: ae8f160e7eb2 ("netlink: Fix wraparounds of sk->sk_rmem_alloc.")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin(a)ispras.ru>
---
Similar rmem and sk->sk_rcvbuf comparing pattern in
netlink_broadcast_deliver() accepts these values being equal, while
the netlink_dump() case does not - but it goes all the way down to
f9c2288837ba ("netlink: implement memory mapped recvmsg()") and looks
like an irrelevant issue without any real consequences. Though might be
cleaned up if needed.
Updated sk->sk_rmem_alloc vs sk->sk_rcvbuf checks throughout the kernel
diverse in treating the corner case of them being equal.
net/netlink/af_netlink.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
index 6332a0e06596..0fc3f045fb65 100644
--- a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
@@ -1218,7 +1218,7 @@ int netlink_attachskb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
nlk = nlk_sk(sk);
rmem = atomic_add_return(skb->truesize, &sk->sk_rmem_alloc);
- if ((rmem == skb->truesize || rmem < READ_ONCE(sk->sk_rcvbuf)) &&
+ if ((rmem == skb->truesize || rmem <= READ_ONCE(sk->sk_rcvbuf)) &&
!test_bit(NETLINK_S_CONGESTED, &nlk->state)) {
netlink_skb_set_owner_r(skb, sk);
return 0;
--
2.50.1
On Thu, Jul 24, 2025 at 4:00 PM Al Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Jul 24, 2025 at 01:02:48PM -0700, Andrei Vagin wrote:
> > Hi Al and Christian,
> >
> > The commit 12f147ddd6de ("do_change_type(): refuse to operate on
> > unmounted/not ours mounts") introduced an ABI backward compatibility
> > break. CRIU depends on the previous behavior, and users are now
> > reporting criu restore failures following the kernel update. This change
> > has been propagated to stable kernels. Is this check strictly required?
>
> Yes.
>
> > Would it be possible to check only if the current process has
> > CAP_SYS_ADMIN within the mount user namespace?
>
> Not enough, both in terms of permissions *and* in terms of "thou
> shalt not bugger the kernel data structures - nobody's priveleged
> enough for that".
Al,
I am still thinking in terms of "Thou shalt not break userspace"...
Seriously though, this original behavior has been in the kernel for 20
years, and it hasn't triggered any corruptions in all that time. I
understand this change might be necessary in its current form, and
that some collateral damage could be unavoidable. But if that's the
case, I'd expect a detailed explanation of why it had to be so and why
userspace breakage is unavoidable.
The original change was merged two decades ago. We need to
consider that some applications might rely on that behavior. I'm not
questioning the security aspect - that must be addressed. But for
anything else, we need to minimize the impact on user applications that
don't violate security.
We can consider a cleaner fix for the upstream kernel, but when we are
talking about stable kernels, the user-space backward compatibility
aspect should be even more critical.
Thanks,
Andrei
Hub driver warm-resets ports in SS.Inactive or Compliance mode to
recover a possible connected device. The port reset code correctly
detects if a connection is lost during reset, but hub driver
port_event() fails to take this into account in some cases.
port_event() ends up using stale values and assumes there is a
connected device, and will try all means to recover it, including
power-cycling the port.
Details:
This case was triggered when xHC host was suspended with DbC (Debug
Capability) enabled and connected. DbC turns one xHC port into a simple
usb debug device, allowing debugging a system with an A-to-A USB debug
cable.
xhci DbC code disables DbC when xHC is system suspended to D3, and
enables it back during resume.
We essentially end up with two hosts connected to each other during
suspend, and, for a short while during resume, until DbC is enabled back.
The suspended xHC host notices some activity on the roothub port, but
can't train the link due to being suspended, so xHC hardware sets a CAS
(Cold Attach Status) flag for this port to inform xhci host driver that
the port needs to be warm reset once xHC resumes.
CAS is xHCI specific, and not part of USB specification, so xhci driver
tells usb core that the port has a connection and link is in compliance
mode. Recovery from complinace mode is similar to CAS recovery.
xhci CAS driver support that fakes a compliance mode connection was added
in commit 8bea2bd37df0 ("usb: Add support for root hub port status CAS")
Once xHCI resumes and DbC is enabled back, all activity on the xHC
roothub host side port disappears. The hub driver will anyway think
port has a connection and link is in compliance mode, and hub driver
will try to recover it.
The port power-cycle during recovery seems to cause issues to the active
DbC connection.
Fix this by clearing connect_change flag if hub_port_reset() returns
-ENOTCONN, thus avoiding the whole unnecessary port recovery and
initialization attempt.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 8bea2bd37df0 ("usb: Add support for root hub port status CAS")
Tested-by: Łukasz Bartosik <ukaszb(a)chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman(a)linux.intel.com>
---
drivers/usb/core/hub.c | 8 ++++++--
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/usb/core/hub.c b/drivers/usb/core/hub.c
index 6bb6e92cb0a4..f981e365be36 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/core/hub.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/core/hub.c
@@ -5754,6 +5754,7 @@ static void port_event(struct usb_hub *hub, int port1)
struct usb_device *hdev = hub->hdev;
u16 portstatus, portchange;
int i = 0;
+ int err;
connect_change = test_bit(port1, hub->change_bits);
clear_bit(port1, hub->event_bits);
@@ -5850,8 +5851,11 @@ static void port_event(struct usb_hub *hub, int port1)
} else if (!udev || !(portstatus & USB_PORT_STAT_CONNECTION)
|| udev->state == USB_STATE_NOTATTACHED) {
dev_dbg(&port_dev->dev, "do warm reset, port only\n");
- if (hub_port_reset(hub, port1, NULL,
- HUB_BH_RESET_TIME, true) < 0)
+ err = hub_port_reset(hub, port1, NULL,
+ HUB_BH_RESET_TIME, true);
+ if (!udev && err == -ENOTCONN)
+ connect_change = 0;
+ else if (err < 0)
hub_port_disable(hub, port1, 1);
} else {
dev_dbg(&port_dev->dev, "do warm reset, full device\n");
--
2.43.0
The FRED specification has been changed in v9.0 to state that there
is no need for FRED event handlers to begin with ENDBR64, because
in the presence of supervisor indirect branch tracking, FRED event
delivery does not enter the WAIT_FOR_ENDBRANCH state.
As a result, remove ENDBR64 from FRED entry points.
Then add ANNOTATE_NOENDBR to indicate that FRED entry points will
never be used for indirect calls to suppress an objtool warning.
This change implies that any indirect CALL/JMP to FRED entry points
causes #CP in the presence of supervisor indirect branch tracking.
Credit goes to Jennifer Miller <jmill(a)asu.edu> and other contributors
from Arizona State University whose research shows that placing ENDBR
at entry points has negative value thus led to this change.
Fixes: 14619d912b65 ("x86/fred: FRED entry/exit and dispatch code")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-hardening/Z60NwR4w%2F28Z7XUa@ubun/
Reviewed-by: H. Peter Anvin (Intel) <hpa(a)zytor.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3(a)citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Li (Intel) <xin(a)zytor.com>
Cc: Jennifer Miller <jmill(a)asu.edu>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3(a)citrix.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa(a)zytor.com>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.9+
---
Change in v3:
*) Revise the FRED spec change description to clearly indicate that it
deviates from previous versions and is based on new research showing
that placing ENDBR at entry points has negative value (Andrew Cooper).
Change in v2:
*) CC stable and add a fixes tag (PeterZ).
---
arch/x86/entry/entry_64_fred.S | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_fred.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_fred.S
index 29c5c32c16c3..907bd233c6c1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_fred.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_fred.S
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
.macro FRED_ENTER
UNWIND_HINT_END_OF_STACK
- ENDBR
+ ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS
movq %rsp, %rdi /* %rdi -> pt_regs */
.endm
--
2.50.1
On 6/25/2025 3:15 AM, Baochen Qiang wrote:
>
>
> On 6/25/2025 5:51 PM, Johan Hovold wrote:
>> [ +CC: Gregoire ]
>>
>> On Fri, May 23, 2025 at 11:49:00AM +0800, Baochen Qiang wrote:
>>> We got report that WCN7850 is not working with IWD [1][2]. Debug
>>> shows the reason is that IWD installs group key before pairwise
>>> key, which goes against WCN7850's firmware.
>>>
>>> Reorder key install to workaround this.
>>>
>>> [1] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218733
>>> [2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/AS8P190MB12051DDBD84CD88E71C40AD7873F2@AS8P190M…
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Baochen Qiang <quic_bqiang(a)quicinc.com>
>>> ---
>>> ---
>>> Baochen Qiang (2):
>>> wifi: ath12k: avoid bit operation on key flags
>>> wifi: ath12k: install pairwise key first
>>
>> Thanks for fixing this, Baochen.
>>
>> I noticed the patches weren't clearly marked as fixes. Do you think we
>> should ask the stable team to backport these once they are in mainline
>> (e.g. after 6.17-rc1 is out)? Or do you think they are too intrusive and
>> risky to backport or similar?
>
> Yeah, I think they should be backported.
>
>>
>> [ Also please try to remember to CC any (public) reporters. I only found
>> out today that this had been addressed in linux-next. ]
>
> Thanks, will keep in mind.
+Stable team,
Per the above discussion please backport the series:
https://msgid.link/20250523-ath12k-unicast-key-first-v1-0-f53c3880e6d8@quic…
This is a 0-day issue so ideally this should be backported from 6.6+
/jeff
Add the missing write_blocked check for updating sysfs related to uncore
efficiency latency control (ELC). If write operation is blocked return
error.
Fixes: bb516dc79c4a ("platform/x86/intel-uncore-freq: Add support for efficiency latency control")
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada(a)linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
---
Non urgent patch. It can go through regular merge window even if it has fix tag.
This is not a current production use case.
Rebased on
https://kernel.googlesource.com/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pdx86/platform-dri…
for-next
.../x86/intel/uncore-frequency/uncore-frequency-tpmi.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/intel/uncore-frequency/uncore-frequency-tpmi.c b/drivers/platform/x86/intel/uncore-frequency/uncore-frequency-tpmi.c
index 6df55c8e16b7..bfcf92aa4d69 100644
--- a/drivers/platform/x86/intel/uncore-frequency/uncore-frequency-tpmi.c
+++ b/drivers/platform/x86/intel/uncore-frequency/uncore-frequency-tpmi.c
@@ -192,9 +192,14 @@ static int uncore_read_control_freq(struct uncore_data *data, unsigned int *valu
static int write_eff_lat_ctrl(struct uncore_data *data, unsigned int val, enum uncore_index index)
{
struct tpmi_uncore_cluster_info *cluster_info;
+ struct tpmi_uncore_struct *uncore_root;
u64 control;
cluster_info = container_of(data, struct tpmi_uncore_cluster_info, uncore_data);
+ uncore_root = cluster_info->uncore_root;
+
+ if (uncore_root->write_blocked)
+ return -EPERM;
if (cluster_info->root_domain)
return -ENODATA;
--
2.49.0