January 2025 - Linux-stable-mirror

[PATCH v3 2/2] HID: corsair-void: Initialise memory for psy_cfg

by Stuart Hayhurst

power_supply_config psy_cfg was missing its initialiser, add it in. Fixes: 6ea2a6fd3872 ("HID: corsair-void: Add Corsair Void headset family driver") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Stuart Hayhurst <stuart.a.hayhurst(a)gmail.com> --- drivers/hid/hid-corsair-void.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-corsair-void.c b/drivers/hid/hid-corsair-void.c index bd8f3d849b58..56e858066c3c 100644 --- a/drivers/hid/hid-corsair-void.c +++ b/drivers/hid/hid-corsair-void.c @@ -553,7 +553,7 @@ static void corsair_void_battery_remove_work_handler(struct work_struct *work) static void corsair_void_battery_add_work_handler(struct work_struct *work) { struct corsair_void_drvdata *drvdata; - struct power_supply_config psy_cfg; + struct power_supply_config psy_cfg = {}; struct power_supply *new_supply; drvdata = container_of(work, struct corsair_void_drvdata, -- 2.47.1

4 weeks

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[PATCH v3 1/2] HID: corsair-void: Add missing delayed work cancel for headset status

by Stuart Hayhurst

The cancel_delayed_work_sync() call was missed, causing a use-after-free in corsair_void_remove(). Reported-by: yan kang <kangyan91(a)outlook.com> Reported-by: yue sun <samsun1006219(a)gmail.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/SY8P300MB042106286A2536707D2FB736A1E42@SY8P300M… Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/SY8P300MB0421872E0AE934C9616FA61EA1E42@SY8P300M… Fixes: 6ea2a6fd3872 ("HID: corsair-void: Add Corsair Void headset family driver") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Stuart Hayhurst <stuart.a.hayhurst(a)gmail.com> --- drivers/hid/hid-corsair-void.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-corsair-void.c b/drivers/hid/hid-corsair-void.c index 6ece56b850fc..bd8f3d849b58 100644 --- a/drivers/hid/hid-corsair-void.c +++ b/drivers/hid/hid-corsair-void.c @@ -726,6 +726,7 @@ static void corsair_void_remove(struct hid_device *hid_dev) if (drvdata->battery) power_supply_unregister(drvdata->battery); + cancel_delayed_work_sync(&drvdata->delayed_status_work); cancel_delayed_work_sync(&drvdata->delayed_firmware_work); sysfs_remove_group(&hid_dev->dev.kobj, &corsair_void_attr_group); } -- 2.47.1

4 weeks

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[PATCH 6.6 0/3] Manual backport of overlayfs fixes from v6.6.72

by Amir Goldstein

Greg, Per your request, here is a manual backport of the overlayfs fixes that were applied in v6.6.72 and reverted in v6.6.73. For the record, this overlayfs series from v6.7 [2] changes subtle internal semantics across overlayfs code, which are not detectable by build error and therefore are a backporting landmine. This is exactly what happened with the automatic apply of dependecy patch in v6.6.72. I will try to be extra diligent about review of auto backports below v6.7 from now on. Luckily, the leaked mount reference was caught by a vfs assertion and promptly reported by Ignat from Cloudflare team. Thanks! Amir. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/stable/2025012123-cable-reburial-568e@gregkh/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-unionfs/20230816152334.924960-1-amir73il@gmai… Amir Goldstein (3): ovl: pass realinode to ovl_encode_real_fh() instead of realdentry ovl: support encoding fid from inode with no alias fs: relax assertions on failure to encode file handles fs/notify/fdinfo.c | 4 +--- fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c | 16 ++++++------- fs/overlayfs/export.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ fs/overlayfs/namei.c | 4 ++-- fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h | 2 +- 5 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

4 weeks

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] vsock: prevent null-ptr-deref in vsock_*[has_data|has_space]" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 91751e248256efc111e52e15115840c35d85abaf # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025012045-irritably-duplex-5af0@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 91751e248256efc111e52e15115840c35d85abaf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare(a)redhat.com> Date: Fri, 10 Jan 2025 09:35:11 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] vsock: prevent null-ptr-deref in vsock_*[has_data|has_space] Recent reports have shown how we sometimes call vsock_*_has_data() when a vsock socket has been de-assigned from a transport (see attached links), but we shouldn't. Previous commits should have solved the real problems, but we may have more in the future, so to avoid null-ptr-deref, we can return 0 (no space, no data available) but with a warning. This way the code should continue to run in a nearly consistent state and have a warning that allows us to debug future problems. Fixes: c0cfa2d8a788 ("vsock: add multi-transports support") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/Z2K%2FI4nlHdfMRTZC@v4bel-B760M-AORUS-ELITE-A… Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/5ca20d4c-1017-49c2-9516-f6f75fd331e9@rbox.co/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/677f84a8.050a0220.25a300.01b3.GAE@google.com/ Co-developed-by: Hyunwoo Kim <v4bel(a)theori.io> Signed-off-by: Hyunwoo Kim <v4bel(a)theori.io> Co-developed-by: Wongi Lee <qwerty(a)theori.io> Signed-off-by: Wongi Lee <qwerty(a)theori.io> Signed-off-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare(a)redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Luigi Leonardi <leonardi(a)redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hyunwoo Kim <v4bel(a)theori.io> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> diff --git a/net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c b/net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c index 74d35a871644..fa9d1b49599b 100644 --- a/net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c +++ b/net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c @@ -879,6 +879,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vsock_create_connected); s64 vsock_stream_has_data(struct vsock_sock *vsk) { + if (WARN_ON(!vsk->transport)) + return 0; + return vsk->transport->stream_has_data(vsk); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vsock_stream_has_data); @@ -887,6 +890,9 @@ s64 vsock_connectible_has_data(struct vsock_sock *vsk) { struct sock *sk = sk_vsock(vsk); + if (WARN_ON(!vsk->transport)) + return 0; + if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_SEQPACKET) return vsk->transport->seqpacket_has_data(vsk); else @@ -896,6 +902,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vsock_connectible_has_data); s64 vsock_stream_has_space(struct vsock_sock *vsk) { + if (WARN_ON(!vsk->transport)) + return 0; + return vsk->transport->stream_has_space(vsk); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vsock_stream_has_space);

4 weeks

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[PATCH 6.6.y] net: fix data-races around sk->sk_forward_alloc

by alvalan9＠foxmail.com

From: Wang Liang <wangliang74(a)huawei.com> commit 073d89808c065ac4c672c0a613a71b27a80691cb upstream. Syzkaller reported this warning: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 16 at net/ipv4/af_inet.c:156 inet_sock_destruct+0x1c5/0x1e0 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 16 Comm: ksoftirqd/0 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc5 #26 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:inet_sock_destruct+0x1c5/0x1e0 Code: 24 12 4c 89 e2 5b 48 c7 c7 98 ec bb 82 41 5c e9 d1 18 17 ff 4c 89 e6 5b 48 c7 c7 d0 ec bb 82 41 5c e9 bf 18 17 ff 0f 0b eb 83 <0f> 0b eb 97 0f 0b eb 87 0f 0b e9 68 ff ff ff 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000008bd90 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: 0000000000000300 RBX: ffff88810b172a90 RCX: 0000000000000007 RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000000000000300 RDI: ffff88810b172a00 RBP: ffff88810b172a00 R08: ffff888104273c00 R09: 0000000000100007 R10: 0000000000020000 R11: 0000000000000006 R12: ffff88810b172a00 R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff888237c31f78 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888237c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007ffc63fecac8 CR3: 000000000342e000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __warn+0x88/0x130 ? inet_sock_destruct+0x1c5/0x1e0 ? report_bug+0x18e/0x1a0 ? handle_bug+0x53/0x90 ? exc_invalid_op+0x18/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? inet_sock_destruct+0x1c5/0x1e0 __sk_destruct+0x2a/0x200 rcu_do_batch+0x1aa/0x530 ? rcu_do_batch+0x13b/0x530 rcu_core+0x159/0x2f0 handle_softirqs+0xd3/0x2b0 ? __pfx_smpboot_thread_fn+0x10/0x10 run_ksoftirqd+0x25/0x30 smpboot_thread_fn+0xdd/0x1d0 kthread+0xd3/0x100 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Its possible that two threads call tcp_v6_do_rcv()/sk_forward_alloc_add() concurrently when sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN with sk->sk_lock unlocked, which triggers a data-race around sk->sk_forward_alloc: tcp_v6_rcv tcp_v6_do_rcv skb_clone_and_charge_r sk_rmem_schedule __sk_mem_schedule sk_forward_alloc_add() skb_set_owner_r sk_mem_charge sk_forward_alloc_add() __kfree_skb skb_release_all skb_release_head_state sock_rfree sk_mem_uncharge sk_forward_alloc_add() sk_mem_reclaim // set local var reclaimable __sk_mem_reclaim sk_forward_alloc_add() In this syzkaller testcase, two threads call tcp_v6_do_rcv() with skb->truesize=768, the sk_forward_alloc changes like this: (cpu 1) | (cpu 2) | sk_forward_alloc ... | ... | 0 __sk_mem_schedule() | | +4096 = 4096 | __sk_mem_schedule() | +4096 = 8192 sk_mem_charge() | | -768 = 7424 | sk_mem_charge() | -768 = 6656 ... | ... | sk_mem_uncharge() | | +768 = 7424 reclaimable=7424 | | | sk_mem_uncharge() | +768 = 8192 | reclaimable=8192 | __sk_mem_reclaim() | | -4096 = 4096 | __sk_mem_reclaim() | -8192 = -4096 != 0 The skb_clone_and_charge_r() should not be called in tcp_v6_do_rcv() when sk->sk_state is TCP_LISTEN, it happens later in tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock(). Fix the same issue in dccp_v6_do_rcv(). Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Fixes: e994b2f0fb92 ("tcp: do not lock listener to process SYN packets") Signed-off-by: Wang Liang <wangliang74(a)huawei.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241107023405.889239-1-wangliang74@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alva Lan <alvalan9(a)foxmail.com> --- Backport to fix CVE-2024-53124. Link: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-53124 --- net/dccp/ipv6.c | 2 +- net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c | 4 +--- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/dccp/ipv6.c b/net/dccp/ipv6.c index d25e962b18a5..2839ca8053ba 100644 --- a/net/dccp/ipv6.c +++ b/net/dccp/ipv6.c @@ -616,7 +616,7 @@ static int dccp_v6_do_rcv(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) by tcp. Feel free to propose better solution. --ANK (980728) */ - if (np->rxopt.all) + if (np->rxopt.all && sk->sk_state != DCCP_LISTEN) opt_skb = skb_clone_and_charge_r(skb, sk); if (sk->sk_state == DCCP_OPEN) { /* Fast path */ diff --git a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c index 64bdb6d978ee..f285e52b8b85 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c +++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c @@ -1456,7 +1456,7 @@ int tcp_v6_do_rcv(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) by tcp. Feel free to propose better solution. --ANK (980728) */ - if (np->rxopt.all) + if (np->rxopt.all && sk->sk_state != TCP_LISTEN) opt_skb = skb_clone_and_charge_r(skb, sk); reason = SKB_DROP_REASON_NOT_SPECIFIED; @@ -1495,8 +1495,6 @@ int tcp_v6_do_rcv(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) if (nsk != sk) { if (tcp_child_process(sk, nsk, skb)) goto reset; - if (opt_skb) - __kfree_skb(opt_skb); return 0; } } else -- 2.43.0

4 weeks

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[PATCH 6.1.y] net: fix data-races around sk->sk_forward_alloc

by alvalan9＠foxmail.com

From: Wang Liang <wangliang74(a)huawei.com> commit 073d89808c065ac4c672c0a613a71b27a80691cb upstream. Syzkaller reported this warning: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 16 at net/ipv4/af_inet.c:156 inet_sock_destruct+0x1c5/0x1e0 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 16 Comm: ksoftirqd/0 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc5 #26 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:inet_sock_destruct+0x1c5/0x1e0 Code: 24 12 4c 89 e2 5b 48 c7 c7 98 ec bb 82 41 5c e9 d1 18 17 ff 4c 89 e6 5b 48 c7 c7 d0 ec bb 82 41 5c e9 bf 18 17 ff 0f 0b eb 83 <0f> 0b eb 97 0f 0b eb 87 0f 0b e9 68 ff ff ff 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000008bd90 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: 0000000000000300 RBX: ffff88810b172a90 RCX: 0000000000000007 RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000000000000300 RDI: ffff88810b172a00 RBP: ffff88810b172a00 R08: ffff888104273c00 R09: 0000000000100007 R10: 0000000000020000 R11: 0000000000000006 R12: ffff88810b172a00 R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff888237c31f78 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888237c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007ffc63fecac8 CR3: 000000000342e000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __warn+0x88/0x130 ? inet_sock_destruct+0x1c5/0x1e0 ? report_bug+0x18e/0x1a0 ? handle_bug+0x53/0x90 ? exc_invalid_op+0x18/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? inet_sock_destruct+0x1c5/0x1e0 __sk_destruct+0x2a/0x200 rcu_do_batch+0x1aa/0x530 ? rcu_do_batch+0x13b/0x530 rcu_core+0x159/0x2f0 handle_softirqs+0xd3/0x2b0 ? __pfx_smpboot_thread_fn+0x10/0x10 run_ksoftirqd+0x25/0x30 smpboot_thread_fn+0xdd/0x1d0 kthread+0xd3/0x100 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Its possible that two threads call tcp_v6_do_rcv()/sk_forward_alloc_add() concurrently when sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN with sk->sk_lock unlocked, which triggers a data-race around sk->sk_forward_alloc: tcp_v6_rcv tcp_v6_do_rcv skb_clone_and_charge_r sk_rmem_schedule __sk_mem_schedule sk_forward_alloc_add() skb_set_owner_r sk_mem_charge sk_forward_alloc_add() __kfree_skb skb_release_all skb_release_head_state sock_rfree sk_mem_uncharge sk_forward_alloc_add() sk_mem_reclaim // set local var reclaimable __sk_mem_reclaim sk_forward_alloc_add() In this syzkaller testcase, two threads call tcp_v6_do_rcv() with skb->truesize=768, the sk_forward_alloc changes like this: (cpu 1) | (cpu 2) | sk_forward_alloc ... | ... | 0 __sk_mem_schedule() | | +4096 = 4096 | __sk_mem_schedule() | +4096 = 8192 sk_mem_charge() | | -768 = 7424 | sk_mem_charge() | -768 = 6656 ... | ... | sk_mem_uncharge() | | +768 = 7424 reclaimable=7424 | | | sk_mem_uncharge() | +768 = 8192 | reclaimable=8192 | __sk_mem_reclaim() | | -4096 = 4096 | __sk_mem_reclaim() | -8192 = -4096 != 0 The skb_clone_and_charge_r() should not be called in tcp_v6_do_rcv() when sk->sk_state is TCP_LISTEN, it happens later in tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock(). Fix the same issue in dccp_v6_do_rcv(). Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Fixes: e994b2f0fb92 ("tcp: do not lock listener to process SYN packets") Signed-off-by: Wang Liang <wangliang74(a)huawei.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241107023405.889239-1-wangliang74@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alva Lan <alvalan9(a)foxmail.com> --- Backport to fix CVE-2024-53124. Link: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-53124 --- net/dccp/ipv6.c | 2 +- net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c | 4 +--- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/dccp/ipv6.c b/net/dccp/ipv6.c index d90bb941f2ad..8f5f56b1e5f8 100644 --- a/net/dccp/ipv6.c +++ b/net/dccp/ipv6.c @@ -615,7 +615,7 @@ static int dccp_v6_do_rcv(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) by tcp. Feel free to propose better solution. --ANK (980728) */ - if (np->rxopt.all) + if (np->rxopt.all && sk->sk_state != DCCP_LISTEN) opt_skb = skb_clone_and_charge_r(skb, sk); if (sk->sk_state == DCCP_OPEN) { /* Fast path */ diff --git a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c index 06b4acbfd314..0ccaa78f6ff3 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c +++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c @@ -1463,7 +1463,7 @@ int tcp_v6_do_rcv(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) by tcp. Feel free to propose better solution. --ANK (980728) */ - if (np->rxopt.all) + if (np->rxopt.all && sk->sk_state != TCP_LISTEN) opt_skb = skb_clone_and_charge_r(skb, sk); reason = SKB_DROP_REASON_NOT_SPECIFIED; @@ -1502,8 +1502,6 @@ int tcp_v6_do_rcv(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) if (nsk != sk) { if (tcp_child_process(sk, nsk, skb)) goto reset; - if (opt_skb) - __kfree_skb(opt_skb); return 0; } } else -- 2.43.0

4 weeks

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[PATCH v6.1-v5.4] scsi: sg: Fix slab-use-after-free read in sg_release()

by hsimeliere.opensource＠witekio.com

From: Suraj Sonawane <surajsonawane0215(a)gmail.com> [ Upstream commit f10593ad9bc36921f623361c9e3dd96bd52d85ee ] Fix a use-after-free bug in sg_release(), detected by syzbot with KASAN: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in lock_release+0x151/0xa30 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5838 __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0xe2/0x750 kernel/locking/mutex.c:912 sg_release+0x1f4/0x2e0 drivers/scsi/sg.c:407 In sg_release(), the function kref_put(&sfp->f_ref, sg_remove_sfp) is called before releasing the open_rel_lock mutex. The kref_put() call may decrement the reference count of sfp to zero, triggering its cleanup through sg_remove_sfp(). This cleanup includes scheduling deferred work via sg_remove_sfp_usercontext(), which ultimately frees sfp. After kref_put(), sg_release() continues to unlock open_rel_lock and may reference sfp or sdp. If sfp has already been freed, this results in a slab-use-after-free error. Move the kref_put(&sfp->f_ref, sg_remove_sfp) call after unlocking the open_rel_lock mutex. This ensures: - No references to sfp or sdp occur after the reference count is decremented. - Cleanup functions such as sg_remove_sfp() and sg_remove_sfp_usercontext() can safely execute without impacting the mutex handling in sg_release(). The fix has been tested and validated by syzbot. This patch closes the bug reported at the following syzkaller link and ensures proper sequencing of resource cleanup and mutex operations, eliminating the risk of use-after-free errors in sg_release(). Reported-by: syzbot+7efb5850a17ba6ce098b(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=7efb5850a17ba6ce098b Tested-by: syzbot+7efb5850a17ba6ce098b(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: cc833acbee9d ("sg: O_EXCL and other lock handling") Signed-off-by: Suraj Sonawane <surajsonawane0215(a)gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241120125944.88095-1-surajsonawane0215@gmail.com Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche(a)acm.org> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: BRUNO VERNAY <bruno.vernay(a)se.com> Signed-off-by: Hugo SIMELIERE <hsimeliere.opensource(a)witekio.com> --- drivers/scsi/sg.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/sg.c b/drivers/scsi/sg.c index 12344be14232..1946cc96c172 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/sg.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/sg.c @@ -390,7 +390,6 @@ sg_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) mutex_lock(&sdp->open_rel_lock); scsi_autopm_put_device(sdp->device); - kref_put(&sfp->f_ref, sg_remove_sfp); sdp->open_cnt--; /* possibly many open()s waiting on exlude clearing, start many; @@ -402,6 +401,7 @@ sg_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) wake_up_interruptible(&sdp->open_wait); } mutex_unlock(&sdp->open_rel_lock); + kref_put(&sfp->f_ref, sg_remove_sfp); return 0; } -- 2.43.0

4 weeks

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[PATCH 0/2] HID: corsair-void: Fix various memory issues

by Stuart Hayhurst

Fixes a use-after-free and a struct without an initialiser Stuart Hayhurst (2): HID: corsair-void: Add missing delayed work cancel for headset status HID: corsair-void: Initialise memory for psy_cfg drivers/hid/hid-corsair-void.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) -- 2.47.1

4 weeks

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] mm: zswap: properly synchronize freeing resources during CPU" failed to apply to 6.6-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.6-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.6.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 12dcb0ef540629a281533f9dedc1b6b8e14cfb65 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025012012-capacity-swiftly-0214@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.6.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 12dcb0ef540629a281533f9dedc1b6b8e14cfb65 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yosry Ahmed <yosryahmed(a)google.com> Date: Wed, 8 Jan 2025 22:24:41 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] mm: zswap: properly synchronize freeing resources during CPU hotunplug In zswap_compress() and zswap_decompress(), the per-CPU acomp_ctx of the current CPU at the beginning of the operation is retrieved and used throughout. However, since neither preemption nor migration are disabled, it is possible that the operation continues on a different CPU. If the original CPU is hotunplugged while the acomp_ctx is still in use, we run into a UAF bug as some of the resources attached to the acomp_ctx are freed during hotunplug in zswap_cpu_comp_dead() (i.e. acomp_ctx.buffer, acomp_ctx.req, or acomp_ctx.acomp). The problem was introduced in commit 1ec3b5fe6eec ("mm/zswap: move to use crypto_acomp API for hardware acceleration") when the switch to the crypto_acomp API was made. Prior to that, the per-CPU crypto_comp was retrieved using get_cpu_ptr() which disables preemption and makes sure the CPU cannot go away from under us. Preemption cannot be disabled with the crypto_acomp API as a sleepable context is needed. Use the acomp_ctx.mutex to synchronize CPU hotplug callbacks allocating and freeing resources with compression/decompression paths. Make sure that acomp_ctx.req is NULL when the resources are freed. In the compression/decompression paths, check if acomp_ctx.req is NULL after acquiring the mutex (meaning the CPU was offlined) and retry on the new CPU. The initialization of acomp_ctx.mutex is moved from the CPU hotplug callback to the pool initialization where it belongs (where the mutex is allocated). In addition to adding clarity, this makes sure that CPU hotplug cannot reinitialize a mutex that is already locked by compression/decompression. Previously a fix was attempted by holding cpus_read_lock() [1]. This would have caused a potential deadlock as it is possible for code already holding the lock to fall into reclaim and enter zswap (causing a deadlock). A fix was also attempted using SRCU for synchronization, but Johannes pointed out that synchronize_srcu() cannot be used in CPU hotplug notifiers [2]. Alternative fixes that were considered/attempted and could have worked: - Refcounting the per-CPU acomp_ctx. This involves complexity in handling the race between the refcount dropping to zero in zswap_[de]compress() and the refcount being re-initialized when the CPU is onlined. - Disabling migration before getting the per-CPU acomp_ctx [3], but that's discouraged and is a much bigger hammer than needed, and could result in subtle performance issues. [1]https://lkml.kernel.org/20241219212437.2714151-1-yosryahmed@google.com/ [2]https://lkml.kernel.org/20250107074724.1756696-2-yosryahmed@google.com/ [3]https://lkml.kernel.org/20250107222236.2715883-2-yosryahmed@google.com/ [yosryahmed(a)google.com: remove comment] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAJD7tkaxS1wjn+swugt8QCvQ-rVF5RZnjxwPGX17k8x9zSMa… Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250108222441.3622031-1-yosryahmed@google.com Fixes: 1ec3b5fe6eec ("mm/zswap: move to use crypto_acomp API for hardware acceleration") Signed-off-by: Yosry Ahmed <yosryahmed(a)google.com> Reported-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes(a)cmpxchg.org> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20241113213007.GB1564047@cmpxchg.org/ Reported-by: Sam Sun <samsun1006219(a)gmail.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAEkJfYMtSdM5HceNsXUDf5haghD5+o2e7Qv4OcuruL4tP… Cc: Barry Song <baohua(a)kernel.org> Cc: Chengming Zhou <chengming.zhou(a)linux.dev> Cc: Kanchana P Sridhar <kanchana.p.sridhar(a)intel.com> Cc: Nhat Pham <nphamcs(a)gmail.com> Cc: Vitaly Wool <vitalywool(a)gmail.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> diff --git a/mm/zswap.c b/mm/zswap.c index f6316b66fb23..30f5a27a6862 100644 --- a/mm/zswap.c +++ b/mm/zswap.c @@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ static struct zswap_pool *zswap_pool_create(char *type, char *compressor) struct zswap_pool *pool; char name[38]; /* 'zswap' + 32 char (max) num + \0 */ gfp_t gfp = __GFP_NORETRY | __GFP_NOWARN | __GFP_KSWAPD_RECLAIM; - int ret; + int ret, cpu; if (!zswap_has_pool) { /* if either are unset, pool initialization failed, and we @@ -285,6 +285,9 @@ static struct zswap_pool *zswap_pool_create(char *type, char *compressor) goto error; } + for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) + mutex_init(&per_cpu_ptr(pool->acomp_ctx, cpu)->mutex); + ret = cpuhp_state_add_instance(CPUHP_MM_ZSWP_POOL_PREPARE, &pool->node); if (ret) @@ -821,11 +824,12 @@ static int zswap_cpu_comp_prepare(unsigned int cpu, struct hlist_node *node) struct acomp_req *req; int ret; - mutex_init(&acomp_ctx->mutex); - + mutex_lock(&acomp_ctx->mutex); acomp_ctx->buffer = kmalloc_node(PAGE_SIZE * 2, GFP_KERNEL, cpu_to_node(cpu)); - if (!acomp_ctx->buffer) - return -ENOMEM; + if (!acomp_ctx->buffer) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto buffer_fail; + } acomp = crypto_alloc_acomp_node(pool->tfm_name, 0, 0, cpu_to_node(cpu)); if (IS_ERR(acomp)) { @@ -855,12 +859,15 @@ static int zswap_cpu_comp_prepare(unsigned int cpu, struct hlist_node *node) acomp_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG, crypto_req_done, &acomp_ctx->wait); + mutex_unlock(&acomp_ctx->mutex); return 0; req_fail: crypto_free_acomp(acomp_ctx->acomp); acomp_fail: kfree(acomp_ctx->buffer); +buffer_fail: + mutex_unlock(&acomp_ctx->mutex); return ret; } @@ -869,17 +876,45 @@ static int zswap_cpu_comp_dead(unsigned int cpu, struct hlist_node *node) struct zswap_pool *pool = hlist_entry(node, struct zswap_pool, node); struct crypto_acomp_ctx *acomp_ctx = per_cpu_ptr(pool->acomp_ctx, cpu); + mutex_lock(&acomp_ctx->mutex); if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(acomp_ctx)) { if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(acomp_ctx->req)) acomp_request_free(acomp_ctx->req); + acomp_ctx->req = NULL; if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(acomp_ctx->acomp)) crypto_free_acomp(acomp_ctx->acomp); kfree(acomp_ctx->buffer); } + mutex_unlock(&acomp_ctx->mutex); return 0; } +static struct crypto_acomp_ctx *acomp_ctx_get_cpu_lock(struct zswap_pool *pool) +{ + struct crypto_acomp_ctx *acomp_ctx; + + for (;;) { + acomp_ctx = raw_cpu_ptr(pool->acomp_ctx); + mutex_lock(&acomp_ctx->mutex); + if (likely(acomp_ctx->req)) + return acomp_ctx; + /* + * It is possible that we were migrated to a different CPU after + * getting the per-CPU ctx but before the mutex was acquired. If + * the old CPU got offlined, zswap_cpu_comp_dead() could have + * already freed ctx->req (among other things) and set it to + * NULL. Just try again on the new CPU that we ended up on. + */ + mutex_unlock(&acomp_ctx->mutex); + } +} + +static void acomp_ctx_put_unlock(struct crypto_acomp_ctx *acomp_ctx) +{ + mutex_unlock(&acomp_ctx->mutex); +} + static bool zswap_compress(struct page *page, struct zswap_entry *entry, struct zswap_pool *pool) { @@ -893,10 +928,7 @@ static bool zswap_compress(struct page *page, struct zswap_entry *entry, gfp_t gfp; u8 *dst; - acomp_ctx = raw_cpu_ptr(pool->acomp_ctx); - - mutex_lock(&acomp_ctx->mutex); - + acomp_ctx = acomp_ctx_get_cpu_lock(pool); dst = acomp_ctx->buffer; sg_init_table(&input, 1); sg_set_page(&input, page, PAGE_SIZE, 0); @@ -949,7 +981,7 @@ static bool zswap_compress(struct page *page, struct zswap_entry *entry, else if (alloc_ret) zswap_reject_alloc_fail++; - mutex_unlock(&acomp_ctx->mutex); + acomp_ctx_put_unlock(acomp_ctx); return comp_ret == 0 && alloc_ret == 0; } @@ -960,9 +992,7 @@ static void zswap_decompress(struct zswap_entry *entry, struct folio *folio) struct crypto_acomp_ctx *acomp_ctx; u8 *src; - acomp_ctx = raw_cpu_ptr(entry->pool->acomp_ctx); - mutex_lock(&acomp_ctx->mutex); - + acomp_ctx = acomp_ctx_get_cpu_lock(entry->pool); src = zpool_map_handle(zpool, entry->handle, ZPOOL_MM_RO); /* * If zpool_map_handle is atomic, we cannot reliably utilize its mapped buffer @@ -986,10 +1016,10 @@ static void zswap_decompress(struct zswap_entry *entry, struct folio *folio) acomp_request_set_params(acomp_ctx->req, &input, &output, entry->length, PAGE_SIZE); BUG_ON(crypto_wait_req(crypto_acomp_decompress(acomp_ctx->req), &acomp_ctx->wait)); BUG_ON(acomp_ctx->req->dlen != PAGE_SIZE); - mutex_unlock(&acomp_ctx->mutex); if (src != acomp_ctx->buffer) zpool_unmap_handle(zpool, entry->handle); + acomp_ctx_put_unlock(acomp_ctx); } /*********************************

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] mm: zswap: properly synchronize freeing resources during CPU" failed to apply to 6.12-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.12-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.12.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 12dcb0ef540629a281533f9dedc1b6b8e14cfb65 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025012011-urgency-shredder-353e@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.12.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 12dcb0ef540629a281533f9dedc1b6b8e14cfb65 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yosry Ahmed <yosryahmed(a)google.com> Date: Wed, 8 Jan 2025 22:24:41 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] mm: zswap: properly synchronize freeing resources during CPU hotunplug In zswap_compress() and zswap_decompress(), the per-CPU acomp_ctx of the current CPU at the beginning of the operation is retrieved and used throughout. However, since neither preemption nor migration are disabled, it is possible that the operation continues on a different CPU. If the original CPU is hotunplugged while the acomp_ctx is still in use, we run into a UAF bug as some of the resources attached to the acomp_ctx are freed during hotunplug in zswap_cpu_comp_dead() (i.e. acomp_ctx.buffer, acomp_ctx.req, or acomp_ctx.acomp). The problem was introduced in commit 1ec3b5fe6eec ("mm/zswap: move to use crypto_acomp API for hardware acceleration") when the switch to the crypto_acomp API was made. Prior to that, the per-CPU crypto_comp was retrieved using get_cpu_ptr() which disables preemption and makes sure the CPU cannot go away from under us. Preemption cannot be disabled with the crypto_acomp API as a sleepable context is needed. Use the acomp_ctx.mutex to synchronize CPU hotplug callbacks allocating and freeing resources with compression/decompression paths. Make sure that acomp_ctx.req is NULL when the resources are freed. In the compression/decompression paths, check if acomp_ctx.req is NULL after acquiring the mutex (meaning the CPU was offlined) and retry on the new CPU. The initialization of acomp_ctx.mutex is moved from the CPU hotplug callback to the pool initialization where it belongs (where the mutex is allocated). In addition to adding clarity, this makes sure that CPU hotplug cannot reinitialize a mutex that is already locked by compression/decompression. Previously a fix was attempted by holding cpus_read_lock() [1]. This would have caused a potential deadlock as it is possible for code already holding the lock to fall into reclaim and enter zswap (causing a deadlock). A fix was also attempted using SRCU for synchronization, but Johannes pointed out that synchronize_srcu() cannot be used in CPU hotplug notifiers [2]. Alternative fixes that were considered/attempted and could have worked: - Refcounting the per-CPU acomp_ctx. This involves complexity in handling the race between the refcount dropping to zero in zswap_[de]compress() and the refcount being re-initialized when the CPU is onlined. - Disabling migration before getting the per-CPU acomp_ctx [3], but that's discouraged and is a much bigger hammer than needed, and could result in subtle performance issues. [1]https://lkml.kernel.org/20241219212437.2714151-1-yosryahmed@google.com/ [2]https://lkml.kernel.org/20250107074724.1756696-2-yosryahmed@google.com/ [3]https://lkml.kernel.org/20250107222236.2715883-2-yosryahmed@google.com/ [yosryahmed(a)google.com: remove comment] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAJD7tkaxS1wjn+swugt8QCvQ-rVF5RZnjxwPGX17k8x9zSMa… Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250108222441.3622031-1-yosryahmed@google.com Fixes: 1ec3b5fe6eec ("mm/zswap: move to use crypto_acomp API for hardware acceleration") Signed-off-by: Yosry Ahmed <yosryahmed(a)google.com> Reported-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes(a)cmpxchg.org> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20241113213007.GB1564047@cmpxchg.org/ Reported-by: Sam Sun <samsun1006219(a)gmail.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAEkJfYMtSdM5HceNsXUDf5haghD5+o2e7Qv4OcuruL4tP… Cc: Barry Song <baohua(a)kernel.org> Cc: Chengming Zhou <chengming.zhou(a)linux.dev> Cc: Kanchana P Sridhar <kanchana.p.sridhar(a)intel.com> Cc: Nhat Pham <nphamcs(a)gmail.com> Cc: Vitaly Wool <vitalywool(a)gmail.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> diff --git a/mm/zswap.c b/mm/zswap.c index f6316b66fb23..30f5a27a6862 100644 --- a/mm/zswap.c +++ b/mm/zswap.c @@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ static struct zswap_pool *zswap_pool_create(char *type, char *compressor) struct zswap_pool *pool; char name[38]; /* 'zswap' + 32 char (max) num + \0 */ gfp_t gfp = __GFP_NORETRY | __GFP_NOWARN | __GFP_KSWAPD_RECLAIM; - int ret; + int ret, cpu; if (!zswap_has_pool) { /* if either are unset, pool initialization failed, and we @@ -285,6 +285,9 @@ static struct zswap_pool *zswap_pool_create(char *type, char *compressor) goto error; } + for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) + mutex_init(&per_cpu_ptr(pool->acomp_ctx, cpu)->mutex); + ret = cpuhp_state_add_instance(CPUHP_MM_ZSWP_POOL_PREPARE, &pool->node); if (ret) @@ -821,11 +824,12 @@ static int zswap_cpu_comp_prepare(unsigned int cpu, struct hlist_node *node) struct acomp_req *req; int ret; - mutex_init(&acomp_ctx->mutex); - + mutex_lock(&acomp_ctx->mutex); acomp_ctx->buffer = kmalloc_node(PAGE_SIZE * 2, GFP_KERNEL, cpu_to_node(cpu)); - if (!acomp_ctx->buffer) - return -ENOMEM; + if (!acomp_ctx->buffer) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto buffer_fail; + } acomp = crypto_alloc_acomp_node(pool->tfm_name, 0, 0, cpu_to_node(cpu)); if (IS_ERR(acomp)) { @@ -855,12 +859,15 @@ static int zswap_cpu_comp_prepare(unsigned int cpu, struct hlist_node *node) acomp_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG, crypto_req_done, &acomp_ctx->wait); + mutex_unlock(&acomp_ctx->mutex); return 0; req_fail: crypto_free_acomp(acomp_ctx->acomp); acomp_fail: kfree(acomp_ctx->buffer); +buffer_fail: + mutex_unlock(&acomp_ctx->mutex); return ret; } @@ -869,17 +876,45 @@ static int zswap_cpu_comp_dead(unsigned int cpu, struct hlist_node *node) struct zswap_pool *pool = hlist_entry(node, struct zswap_pool, node); struct crypto_acomp_ctx *acomp_ctx = per_cpu_ptr(pool->acomp_ctx, cpu); + mutex_lock(&acomp_ctx->mutex); if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(acomp_ctx)) { if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(acomp_ctx->req)) acomp_request_free(acomp_ctx->req); + acomp_ctx->req = NULL; if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(acomp_ctx->acomp)) crypto_free_acomp(acomp_ctx->acomp); kfree(acomp_ctx->buffer); } + mutex_unlock(&acomp_ctx->mutex); return 0; } +static struct crypto_acomp_ctx *acomp_ctx_get_cpu_lock(struct zswap_pool *pool) +{ + struct crypto_acomp_ctx *acomp_ctx; + + for (;;) { + acomp_ctx = raw_cpu_ptr(pool->acomp_ctx); + mutex_lock(&acomp_ctx->mutex); + if (likely(acomp_ctx->req)) + return acomp_ctx; + /* + * It is possible that we were migrated to a different CPU after + * getting the per-CPU ctx but before the mutex was acquired. If + * the old CPU got offlined, zswap_cpu_comp_dead() could have + * already freed ctx->req (among other things) and set it to + * NULL. Just try again on the new CPU that we ended up on. + */ + mutex_unlock(&acomp_ctx->mutex); + } +} + +static void acomp_ctx_put_unlock(struct crypto_acomp_ctx *acomp_ctx) +{ + mutex_unlock(&acomp_ctx->mutex); +} + static bool zswap_compress(struct page *page, struct zswap_entry *entry, struct zswap_pool *pool) { @@ -893,10 +928,7 @@ static bool zswap_compress(struct page *page, struct zswap_entry *entry, gfp_t gfp; u8 *dst; - acomp_ctx = raw_cpu_ptr(pool->acomp_ctx); - - mutex_lock(&acomp_ctx->mutex); - + acomp_ctx = acomp_ctx_get_cpu_lock(pool); dst = acomp_ctx->buffer; sg_init_table(&input, 1); sg_set_page(&input, page, PAGE_SIZE, 0); @@ -949,7 +981,7 @@ static bool zswap_compress(struct page *page, struct zswap_entry *entry, else if (alloc_ret) zswap_reject_alloc_fail++; - mutex_unlock(&acomp_ctx->mutex); + acomp_ctx_put_unlock(acomp_ctx); return comp_ret == 0 && alloc_ret == 0; } @@ -960,9 +992,7 @@ static void zswap_decompress(struct zswap_entry *entry, struct folio *folio) struct crypto_acomp_ctx *acomp_ctx; u8 *src; - acomp_ctx = raw_cpu_ptr(entry->pool->acomp_ctx); - mutex_lock(&acomp_ctx->mutex); - + acomp_ctx = acomp_ctx_get_cpu_lock(entry->pool); src = zpool_map_handle(zpool, entry->handle, ZPOOL_MM_RO); /* * If zpool_map_handle is atomic, we cannot reliably utilize its mapped buffer @@ -986,10 +1016,10 @@ static void zswap_decompress(struct zswap_entry *entry, struct folio *folio) acomp_request_set_params(acomp_ctx->req, &input, &output, entry->length, PAGE_SIZE); BUG_ON(crypto_wait_req(crypto_acomp_decompress(acomp_ctx->req), &acomp_ctx->wait)); BUG_ON(acomp_ctx->req->dlen != PAGE_SIZE); - mutex_unlock(&acomp_ctx->mutex); if (src != acomp_ctx->buffer) zpool_unmap_handle(zpool, entry->handle); + acomp_ctx_put_unlock(acomp_ctx); } /*********************************

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