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[PATCH 5.6 056/177] kselftests: dmabuf-heaps: Fix confused return value on expected error testing

by Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: John Stultz <john.stultz(a)linaro.org> [ Upstream commit 4bb9d46d47b105a774f9dca642f5271375bca4b2 ] When I added the expected error testing, I forgot I need to set the return to zero when we successfully see an error. Without this change we only end up testing a single heap before the test quits. Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah(a)kernel.org> Cc: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal(a)linaro.org> Cc: Benjamin Gaignard <benjamin.gaignard(a)linaro.org> Cc: Brian Starkey <brian.starkey(a)arm.com> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott(a)redhat.com> Cc: "Andrew F. Davis" <afd(a)ti.com> Cc: linux-kselftest(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <skhan(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- tools/testing/selftests/dmabuf-heaps/dmabuf-heap.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/dmabuf-heaps/dmabuf-heap.c b/tools/testing/selftests/dmabuf-heaps/dmabuf-heap.c index cd5e1f602ac9..909da9cdda97 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/dmabuf-heaps/dmabuf-heap.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/dmabuf-heaps/dmabuf-heap.c @@ -351,6 +351,7 @@ static int test_alloc_errors(char *heap_name) } printf("Expected error checking passed\n"); + ret = 0; out: if (dmabuf_fd >= 0) close(dmabuf_fd); -- 2.25.1

4 years, 7 months

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[PATCH v2] selftests/seccomp: use 90s as timeout

by Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo

As seccomp_benchmark tries to calibrate how many samples will take more than 5 seconds to execute, it may end up picking up a number of samples that take 10 (but up to 12) seconds. As the calibration will take double that time, it takes around 20 seconds. Then, it executes the whole thing again, and then once more, with some added overhead. So, the thing might take more than 40 seconds, which is too close to the 45s timeout. That is very dependent on the system where it's executed, so may not be observed always, but it has been observed on x86 VMs. Using a 90s timeout seems safe enough. Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo(a)canonical.com> --- tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/settings | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/settings diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/settings b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/settings new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..ba4d85f74cd6 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/settings @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +timeout=90 -- 2.25.1

4 years, 7 months

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[PATCH v31 19/21] selftests/x86: Add a selftest for SGX

by Jarkko Sakkinen

Add a selftest for SGX. It is a trivial test where a simple enclave copies one 64-bit word of memory between two memory locations. Cc: linux-kselftest(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen(a)linux.intel.com> --- tools/testing/selftests/Makefile | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/sgx/.gitignore | 2 + tools/testing/selftests/sgx/Makefile | 53 +++ tools/testing/selftests/sgx/call.S | 54 +++ tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h | 21 + tools/testing/selftests/sgx/load.c | 282 +++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c | 199 +++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.h | 38 ++ tools/testing/selftests/sgx/sigstruct.c | 395 ++++++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c | 20 + tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.lds | 40 ++ .../selftests/sgx/test_encl_bootstrap.S | 89 ++++ 12 files changed, 1194 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/.gitignore create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/Makefile create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/call.S create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/load.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.h create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/sigstruct.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.lds create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl_bootstrap.S diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/Makefile index 2ff68702fd41..008497495ae4 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/Makefile +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/Makefile @@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ TARGETS += user TARGETS += vm TARGETS += x86 TARGETS += zram +TARGETS += sgx #Please keep the TARGETS list alphabetically sorted # Run "make quicktest=1 run_tests" or # "make quicktest=1 kselftest" from top level Makefile diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/.gitignore b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/.gitignore new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..fbaf0bda9a92 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/.gitignore @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +test_sgx +test_encl.elf diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..95e5c4df8014 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +top_srcdir = ../../../.. + +include ../lib.mk + +.PHONY: all clean + +CAN_BUILD_X86_64 := $(shell ../x86/check_cc.sh $(CC) \ + ../x86/trivial_64bit_program.c) + +ifndef OBJCOPY +OBJCOPY := $(CROSS_COMPILE)objcopy +endif + +INCLUDES := -I$(top_srcdir)/tools/include +HOST_CFLAGS := -Wall -Werror -g $(INCLUDES) -fPIC -z noexecstack +ENCL_CFLAGS := -Wall -Werror -static -nostdlib -nostartfiles -fPIC \ + -fno-stack-protector -mrdrnd $(INCLUDES) + +TEST_CUSTOM_PROGS := $(OUTPUT)/test_sgx $(OUTPUT)/test_encl.elf + +ifeq ($(CAN_BUILD_X86_64), 1) +all: $(TEST_CUSTOM_PROGS) +endif + +$(OUTPUT)/test_sgx: $(OUTPUT)/main.o \ + $(OUTPUT)/load.o \ + $(OUTPUT)/sigstruct.o \ + $(OUTPUT)/call.o + $(CC) $(HOST_CFLAGS) -o $@ $^ -lcrypto + +$(OUTPUT)/main.o: main.c + $(CC) $(HOST_CFLAGS) -c $< -o $@ + +$(OUTPUT)/load.o: load.c + $(CC) $(HOST_CFLAGS) -c $< -o $@ + +$(OUTPUT)/sigstruct.o: sigstruct.c + $(CC) $(HOST_CFLAGS) -c $< -o $@ + +$(OUTPUT)/call.o: call.S + $(CC) $(HOST_CFLAGS) -c $< -o $@ + +$(OUTPUT)/test_encl.elf: test_encl.lds test_encl.c test_encl_bootstrap.S + $(CC) $(ENCL_CFLAGS) -T $^ -o $@ + +EXTRA_CLEAN := \ + $(OUTPUT)/test_encl.elf \ + $(OUTPUT)/load.o \ + $(OUTPUT)/call.o \ + $(OUTPUT)/main.o \ + $(OUTPUT)/sigstruct.o \ + $(OUTPUT)/test_sgx \ + $(OUTPUT)/test_sgx.o \ diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/call.S b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/call.S new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..77131e83db42 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/call.S @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause) */ +/** +* Copyright(c) 2016-18 Intel Corporation. +*/ + + .text + + .macro ENCLU + .byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xd7 + .endm + + .text + + .global sgx_call_vdso +sgx_call_vdso: + .cfi_startproc + push %r15 + .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8 + .cfi_rel_offset %r15, 0 + push %r14 + .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8 + .cfi_rel_offset %r14, 0 + push %r13 + .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8 + .cfi_rel_offset %r13, 0 + push %r12 + .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8 + .cfi_rel_offset %r12, 0 + push %rbx + .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8 + .cfi_rel_offset %rbx, 0 + push $0 + .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8 + push 0x48(%rsp) + .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8 + push 0x48(%rsp) + .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8 + push 0x48(%rsp) + .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8 + call *eenter(%rip) + add $0x20, %rsp + .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset -0x20 + pop %rbx + .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset -8 + pop %r12 + .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset -8 + pop %r13 + .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset -8 + pop %r14 + .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset -8 + pop %r15 + .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset -8 + ret + .cfi_endproc diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..be8969922804 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Copyright(c) 2016-19 Intel Corporation. + */ + +#ifndef DEFINES_H +#define DEFINES_H + +#include <stdint.h> + +#define PAGE_SIZE 4096 +#define PAGE_MASK (~(PAGE_SIZE - 1)) + +#define __aligned(x) __attribute__((__aligned__(x))) +#define __packed __attribute__((packed)) + +#include "../../../../arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h" +#include "../../../../arch/x86/include/asm/enclu.h" +#include "../../../../arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h" + +#endif /* DEFINES_H */ diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/load.c b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/load.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..91407036541c --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/load.c @@ -0,0 +1,282 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause) +// Copyright(c) 2016-18 Intel Corporation. + +#include <assert.h> +#include <elf.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <fcntl.h> +#include <stdbool.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdint.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <sys/ioctl.h> +#include <sys/mman.h> +#include <sys/stat.h> +#include <sys/time.h> +#include <sys/types.h> +#include "defines.h" +#include "main.h" + +void encl_delete(struct encl *encl) +{ + if (encl->encl_base) + munmap((void *)encl->encl_base, encl->encl_size); + + if (encl->bin) + munmap(encl->bin, encl->bin_size); + + if (encl->fd) + close(encl->fd); + + if (encl->segment_tbl) + free(encl->segment_tbl); + + memset(encl, 0, sizeof(*encl)); +} + +static bool encl_map_bin(const char *path, struct encl *encl) +{ + struct stat sb; + void *bin; + int ret; + int fd; + + fd = open(path, O_RDONLY); + if (fd == -1) { + perror("open()"); + return false; + } + + ret = stat(path, &sb); + if (ret) { + perror("stat()"); + goto err; + } + + bin = mmap(NULL, sb.st_size, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0); + if (bin == MAP_FAILED) { + perror("mmap()"); + goto err; + } + + encl->bin = bin; + encl->bin_size = sb.st_size; + + close(fd); + return true; + +err: + close(fd); + return false; +} + +static bool encl_ioc_create(struct encl *encl) +{ + struct sgx_secs *secs = &encl->secs; + struct sgx_enclave_create ioc; + int rc; + + assert(encl->encl_base != 0); + + memset(secs, 0, sizeof(*secs)); + secs->ssa_frame_size = 1; + secs->attributes = SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT; + secs->xfrm = 3; + secs->base = encl->encl_base; + secs->size = encl->encl_size; + + ioc.src = (unsigned long)secs; + rc = ioctl(encl->fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE, &ioc); + if (rc) { + fprintf(stderr, "SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE failed: errno=%d\n", + errno); + munmap((void *)secs->base, encl->encl_size); + return false; + } + + return true; +} + +static bool encl_ioc_add_pages(struct encl *encl, struct encl_segment *seg) +{ + struct sgx_enclave_add_pages ioc; + struct sgx_secinfo secinfo; + int rc; + + memset(&secinfo, 0, sizeof(secinfo)); + secinfo.flags = seg->flags; + + ioc.src = (uint64_t)encl->src + seg->offset; + ioc.offset = seg->offset; + ioc.length = seg->size; + ioc.secinfo = (unsigned long)&secinfo; + ioc.flags = SGX_PAGE_MEASURE; + + rc = ioctl(encl->fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES, &ioc); + if (rc) { + fprintf(stderr, "SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES failed: errno=%d.\n", + errno); + return false; + } + + if (ioc.count != ioc.length) { + fprintf(stderr, "A segment not fully processed.\n"); + return false; + } + + return true; +} + +bool encl_load(const char *path, struct encl *encl) +{ + Elf64_Phdr *phdr_tbl; + off_t src_offset; + Elf64_Ehdr *ehdr; + int i, j; + int ret; + + memset(encl, 0, sizeof(*encl)); + + ret = open("/dev/sgx/enclave", O_RDWR); + if (ret < 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "Unable to open /dev/sgx\n"); + goto err; + } + + encl->fd = ret; + + if (!encl_map_bin(path, encl)) + goto err; + + ehdr = encl->bin; + phdr_tbl = encl->bin + ehdr->e_phoff; + + for (i = 0; i < ehdr->e_phnum; i++) { + Elf64_Phdr *phdr = &phdr_tbl[i]; + + if (phdr->p_type == PT_LOAD) + encl->nr_segments++; + } + + encl->segment_tbl = calloc(encl->nr_segments, + sizeof(struct encl_segment)); + if (!encl->segment_tbl) + goto err; + + for (i = 0, j = 0; i < ehdr->e_phnum; i++) { + Elf64_Phdr *phdr = &phdr_tbl[i]; + unsigned int flags = phdr->p_flags; + struct encl_segment *seg; + + if (phdr->p_type != PT_LOAD) + continue; + + seg = &encl->segment_tbl[j]; + + if (!!(flags & ~(PF_R | PF_W | PF_X))) { + fprintf(stderr, + "%d has invalid segment flags 0x%02x.\n", i, + phdr->p_flags); + goto err; + } + + if (j == 0 && flags != (PF_R | PF_W)) { + fprintf(stderr, + "TCS has invalid segment flags 0x%02x.\n", + phdr->p_flags); + goto err; + } + + if (j == 0) { + src_offset = (phdr->p_offset & PAGE_MASK) - src_offset; + + seg->prot = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE; + seg->flags = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TCS << 8; + } else { + seg->prot = (phdr->p_flags & PF_R) ? PROT_READ : 0; + seg->prot |= (phdr->p_flags & PF_W) ? PROT_WRITE : 0; + seg->prot |= (phdr->p_flags & PF_X) ? PROT_EXEC : 0; + seg->flags = (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG << 8) | seg->prot; + } + + seg->offset = (phdr->p_offset & PAGE_MASK) - src_offset; + seg->size = (phdr->p_filesz + PAGE_SIZE - 1) & PAGE_MASK; + + printf("0x%016lx 0x%016lx 0x%02x\n", seg->offset, seg->size, + seg->prot); + + j++; + } + + assert(j == encl->nr_segments); + + encl->src = encl->bin + src_offset; + encl->src_size = encl->segment_tbl[j - 1].offset + + encl->segment_tbl[j - 1].size; + + for (encl->encl_size = 4096; encl->encl_size < encl->src_size; ) + encl->encl_size <<= 1; + + return true; + +err: + encl_delete(encl); + return false; +} + +static bool encl_map_area(struct encl *encl) +{ + size_t encl_size = encl->encl_size; + void *area; + + area = mmap(NULL, encl_size * 2, PROT_NONE, + MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0); + if (area == MAP_FAILED) { + perror("mmap"); + return false; + } + + encl->encl_base = ((uint64_t)area + encl_size - 1) & ~(encl_size - 1); + + munmap(area, encl->encl_base - (uint64_t)area); + munmap((void *)(encl->encl_base + encl_size), + (uint64_t)area + encl_size - encl->encl_base); + + return true; +} + +bool encl_build(struct encl *encl) +{ + struct sgx_enclave_init ioc; + int ret; + int i; + + if (!encl_map_area(encl)) + return false; + + if (!encl_ioc_create(encl)) + return false; + + /* + * Pages must be added before mapping VMAs because their permissions + * cap the VMA permissions. + */ + for (i = 0; i < encl->nr_segments; i++) { + struct encl_segment *seg = &encl->segment_tbl[i]; + + if (!encl_ioc_add_pages(encl, seg)) + return false; + } + + ioc.sigstruct = (uint64_t)&encl->sigstruct; + ret = ioctl(encl->fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT, &ioc); + if (ret) { + fprintf(stderr, "SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT failed: errno=%d\n", + errno); + return false; + } + + return true; +} diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..5394b2f6af8e --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c @@ -0,0 +1,199 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause) +// Copyright(c) 2016-18 Intel Corporation. + +#include <elf.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <fcntl.h> +#include <stdbool.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdint.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <sys/ioctl.h> +#include <sys/mman.h> +#include <sys/stat.h> +#include <sys/time.h> +#include <sys/types.h> +#include "defines.h" +#include "main.h" + +static const uint64_t MAGIC = 0x1122334455667788ULL; +vdso_sgx_enter_enclave_t eenter; + +struct vdso_symtab { + Elf64_Sym *elf_symtab; + const char *elf_symstrtab; + Elf64_Word *elf_hashtab; +}; + +static void *vdso_get_base_addr(char *envp[]) +{ + Elf64_auxv_t *auxv; + int i; + + for (i = 0; envp[i]; i++) + ; + + auxv = (Elf64_auxv_t *)&envp[i + 1]; + + for (i = 0; auxv[i].a_type != AT_NULL; i++) { + if (auxv[i].a_type == AT_SYSINFO_EHDR) + return (void *)auxv[i].a_un.a_val; + } + + return NULL; +} + +static Elf64_Dyn *vdso_get_dyntab(void *addr) +{ + Elf64_Ehdr *ehdr = addr; + Elf64_Phdr *phdrtab = addr + ehdr->e_phoff; + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ehdr->e_phnum; i++) + if (phdrtab[i].p_type == PT_DYNAMIC) + return addr + phdrtab[i].p_offset; + + return NULL; +} + +static void *vdso_get_dyn(void *addr, Elf64_Dyn *dyntab, Elf64_Sxword tag) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; dyntab[i].d_tag != DT_NULL; i++) + if (dyntab[i].d_tag == tag) + return addr + dyntab[i].d_un.d_ptr; + + return NULL; +} + +static bool vdso_get_symtab(void *addr, struct vdso_symtab *symtab) +{ + Elf64_Dyn *dyntab = vdso_get_dyntab(addr); + + symtab->elf_symtab = vdso_get_dyn(addr, dyntab, DT_SYMTAB); + if (!symtab->elf_symtab) + return false; + + symtab->elf_symstrtab = vdso_get_dyn(addr, dyntab, DT_STRTAB); + if (!symtab->elf_symstrtab) + return false; + + symtab->elf_hashtab = vdso_get_dyn(addr, dyntab, DT_HASH); + if (!symtab->elf_hashtab) + return false; + + return true; +} + +static unsigned long elf_sym_hash(const char *name) +{ + unsigned long h = 0, high; + + while (*name) { + h = (h << 4) + *name++; + high = h & 0xf0000000; + + if (high) + h ^= high >> 24; + + h &= ~high; + } + + return h; +} + +static Elf64_Sym *vdso_symtab_get(struct vdso_symtab *symtab, const char *name) +{ + Elf64_Word bucketnum = symtab->elf_hashtab[0]; + Elf64_Word *buckettab = &symtab->elf_hashtab[2]; + Elf64_Word *chaintab = &symtab->elf_hashtab[2 + bucketnum]; + Elf64_Sym *sym; + Elf64_Word i; + + for (i = buckettab[elf_sym_hash(name) % bucketnum]; i != STN_UNDEF; + i = chaintab[i]) { + sym = &symtab->elf_symtab[i]; + if (!strcmp(name, &symtab->elf_symstrtab[sym->st_name])) + return sym; + } + + return NULL; +} + +int main(int argc, char *argv[], char *envp[]) +{ + struct sgx_enclave_exception exception; + struct vdso_symtab symtab; + Elf64_Sym *eenter_sym; + uint64_t result = 0; + struct encl encl; + unsigned int i; + void *addr; + + if (!encl_load("test_encl.elf", &encl)) + goto err; + + if (!encl_measure(&encl)) + goto err; + + if (!encl_build(&encl)) + goto err; + + /* + * An enclave consumer only must do this. + */ + for (i = 0; i < encl.nr_segments; i++) { + struct encl_segment *seg = &encl.segment_tbl[i]; + + addr = mmap((void *)encl.encl_base + seg->offset, seg->size, + seg->prot, MAP_SHARED | MAP_FIXED, encl.fd, 0); + if (addr == MAP_FAILED) { + fprintf(stderr, "mmap() failed, errno=%d.\n", errno); + return false; + } + } + + memset(&exception, 0, sizeof(exception)); + + addr = vdso_get_base_addr(envp); + if (!addr) + goto err; + + if (!vdso_get_symtab(addr, &symtab)) + goto err; + + eenter_sym = vdso_symtab_get(&symtab, "__vdso_sgx_enter_enclave"); + if (!eenter_sym) + goto err; + + eenter = addr + eenter_sym->st_value; + + sgx_call_vdso((void *)&MAGIC, &result, 0, EENTER, NULL, NULL, + (void *)encl.encl_base, &exception, NULL); + if (result != MAGIC) { + printf("FAIL: sgx_call_vdso(), expected: 0x%lx, got: 0x%lx\n", + MAGIC, result); + goto err; + } + + /* Invoke the vDSO directly. */ + result = 0; + eenter((unsigned long)&MAGIC, (unsigned long)&result, 0, EENTER, 0, 0, + (void *)encl.encl_base, &exception, NULL); + if (result != MAGIC) { + printf("FAIL: eenter(), expected: 0x%lx, got: 0x%lx\n", + MAGIC, result); + goto err; + } + + printf("SUCCESS\n"); + encl_delete(&encl); + exit(0); + +err: + encl_delete(&encl); + exit(1); +} diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.h b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..999422cc7343 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.h @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Copyright(c) 2016-19 Intel Corporation. + */ + +#ifndef MAIN_H +#define MAIN_H + +struct encl_segment { + off_t offset; + size_t size; + unsigned int prot; + unsigned int flags; +}; + +struct encl { + int fd; + void *bin; + off_t bin_size; + void *src; + size_t src_size; + size_t encl_size; + off_t encl_base; + unsigned int nr_segments; + struct encl_segment *segment_tbl; + struct sgx_secs secs; + struct sgx_sigstruct sigstruct; +}; + +void encl_delete(struct encl *ctx); +bool encl_load(const char *path, struct encl *encl); +bool encl_measure(struct encl *encl); +bool encl_build(struct encl *encl); + +int sgx_call_vdso(void *rdi, void *rsi, long rdx, u32 leaf, void *r8, void *r9, + void *tcs, struct sgx_enclave_exception *ei, void *cb); + +#endif /* MAIN_H */ diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/sigstruct.c b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/sigstruct.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..ceddad478672 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/sigstruct.c @@ -0,0 +1,395 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause) +// Copyright(c) 2016-18 Intel Corporation. + +#define _GNU_SOURCE +#include <assert.h> +#include <getopt.h> +#include <stdbool.h> +#include <stdint.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <sys/stat.h> +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <openssl/err.h> +#include <openssl/pem.h> +#include "defines.h" +#include "main.h" + +struct q1q2_ctx { + BN_CTX *bn_ctx; + BIGNUM *m; + BIGNUM *s; + BIGNUM *q1; + BIGNUM *qr; + BIGNUM *q2; +}; + +static void free_q1q2_ctx(struct q1q2_ctx *ctx) +{ + BN_CTX_free(ctx->bn_ctx); + BN_free(ctx->m); + BN_free(ctx->s); + BN_free(ctx->q1); + BN_free(ctx->qr); + BN_free(ctx->q2); +} + +static bool alloc_q1q2_ctx(const uint8_t *s, const uint8_t *m, + struct q1q2_ctx *ctx) +{ + ctx->bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); + ctx->s = BN_bin2bn(s, SGX_MODULUS_SIZE, NULL); + ctx->m = BN_bin2bn(m, SGX_MODULUS_SIZE, NULL); + ctx->q1 = BN_new(); + ctx->qr = BN_new(); + ctx->q2 = BN_new(); + + if (!ctx->bn_ctx || !ctx->s || !ctx->m || !ctx->q1 || !ctx->qr || + !ctx->q2) { + free_q1q2_ctx(ctx); + return false; + } + + return true; +} + +static bool calc_q1q2(const uint8_t *s, const uint8_t *m, uint8_t *q1, + uint8_t *q2) +{ + struct q1q2_ctx ctx; + + if (!alloc_q1q2_ctx(s, m, &ctx)) { + fprintf(stderr, "Not enough memory for Q1Q2 calculation\n"); + return false; + } + + if (!BN_mul(ctx.q1, ctx.s, ctx.s, ctx.bn_ctx)) + goto out; + + if (!BN_div(ctx.q1, ctx.qr, ctx.q1, ctx.m, ctx.bn_ctx)) + goto out; + + if (BN_num_bytes(ctx.q1) > SGX_MODULUS_SIZE) { + fprintf(stderr, "Too large Q1 %d bytes\n", + BN_num_bytes(ctx.q1)); + goto out; + } + + if (!BN_mul(ctx.q2, ctx.s, ctx.qr, ctx.bn_ctx)) + goto out; + + if (!BN_div(ctx.q2, NULL, ctx.q2, ctx.m, ctx.bn_ctx)) + goto out; + + if (BN_num_bytes(ctx.q2) > SGX_MODULUS_SIZE) { + fprintf(stderr, "Too large Q2 %d bytes\n", + BN_num_bytes(ctx.q2)); + goto out; + } + + BN_bn2bin(ctx.q1, q1); + BN_bn2bin(ctx.q2, q2); + + free_q1q2_ctx(&ctx); + return true; +out: + free_q1q2_ctx(&ctx); + return false; +} + +struct sgx_sigstruct_payload { + struct sgx_sigstruct_header header; + struct sgx_sigstruct_body body; +}; + +static bool check_crypto_errors(void) +{ + int err; + bool had_errors = false; + const char *filename; + int line; + char str[256]; + + for ( ; ; ) { + if (ERR_peek_error() == 0) + break; + + had_errors = true; + err = ERR_get_error_line(&filename, &line); + ERR_error_string_n(err, str, sizeof(str)); + fprintf(stderr, "crypto: %s: %s:%d\n", str, filename, line); + } + + return had_errors; +} + +static inline const BIGNUM *get_modulus(RSA *key) +{ +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L + return key->n; +#else + const BIGNUM *n; + + RSA_get0_key(key, &n, NULL, NULL); + return n; +#endif +} + +static RSA *gen_sign_key(void) +{ + BIGNUM *e; + RSA *key; + int ret; + + e = BN_new(); + key = RSA_new(); + + if (!e || !key) + goto err; + + ret = BN_set_word(e, RSA_3); + if (ret != 1) + goto err; + + ret = RSA_generate_key_ex(key, 3072, e, NULL); + if (ret != 1) + goto err; + + BN_free(e); + + return key; + +err: + RSA_free(key); + BN_free(e); + + return NULL; +} + +static void reverse_bytes(void *data, int length) +{ + int i = 0; + int j = length - 1; + uint8_t temp; + uint8_t *ptr = data; + + while (i < j) { + temp = ptr[i]; + ptr[i] = ptr[j]; + ptr[j] = temp; + i++; + j--; + } +} + +enum mrtags { + MRECREATE = 0x0045544145524345, + MREADD = 0x0000000044444145, + MREEXTEND = 0x00444E4554584545, +}; + +static bool mrenclave_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data) +{ + if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, data, 64)) { + fprintf(stderr, "digest update failed\n"); + return false; + } + + return true; +} + +static bool mrenclave_commit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *mrenclave) +{ + unsigned int size; + + if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, (unsigned char *)mrenclave, &size)) { + fprintf(stderr, "digest commit failed\n"); + return false; + } + + if (size != 32) { + fprintf(stderr, "invalid digest size = %u\n", size); + return false; + } + + return true; +} + +struct mrecreate { + uint64_t tag; + uint32_t ssaframesize; + uint64_t size; + uint8_t reserved[44]; +} __attribute__((__packed__)); + + +static bool mrenclave_ecreate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, uint64_t blob_size) +{ + struct mrecreate mrecreate; + uint64_t encl_size; + + for (encl_size = 0x1000; encl_size < blob_size; ) + encl_size <<= 1; + + memset(&mrecreate, 0, sizeof(mrecreate)); + mrecreate.tag = MRECREATE; + mrecreate.ssaframesize = 1; + mrecreate.size = encl_size; + + if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, EVP_sha256(), NULL)) + return false; + + return mrenclave_update(ctx, &mrecreate); +} + +struct mreadd { + uint64_t tag; + uint64_t offset; + uint64_t flags; /* SECINFO flags */ + uint8_t reserved[40]; +} __attribute__((__packed__)); + +static bool mrenclave_eadd(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, uint64_t offset, uint64_t flags) +{ + struct mreadd mreadd; + + memset(&mreadd, 0, sizeof(mreadd)); + mreadd.tag = MREADD; + mreadd.offset = offset; + mreadd.flags = flags; + + return mrenclave_update(ctx, &mreadd); +} + +struct mreextend { + uint64_t tag; + uint64_t offset; + uint8_t reserved[48]; +} __attribute__((__packed__)); + +static bool mrenclave_eextend(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, uint64_t offset, + const uint8_t *data) +{ + struct mreextend mreextend; + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < 0x1000; i += 0x100) { + memset(&mreextend, 0, sizeof(mreextend)); + mreextend.tag = MREEXTEND; + mreextend.offset = offset + i; + + if (!mrenclave_update(ctx, &mreextend)) + return false; + + if (!mrenclave_update(ctx, &data[i + 0x00])) + return false; + + if (!mrenclave_update(ctx, &data[i + 0x40])) + return false; + + if (!mrenclave_update(ctx, &data[i + 0x80])) + return false; + + if (!mrenclave_update(ctx, &data[i + 0xC0])) + return false; + } + + return true; +} + +static bool mrenclave_segment(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, struct encl *encl, + struct encl_segment *seg) +{ + uint64_t end = seg->offset + seg->size; + uint64_t offset; + + for (offset = seg->offset; offset < end; offset += PAGE_SIZE) { + if (!mrenclave_eadd(ctx, offset, seg->flags)) + return false; + + if (!mrenclave_eextend(ctx, offset, encl->src + offset)) + return false; + } + + return true; +} + +bool encl_measure(struct encl *encl) +{ + uint64_t header1[2] = {0x000000E100000006, 0x0000000000010000}; + uint64_t header2[2] = {0x0000006000000101, 0x0000000100000060}; + struct sgx_sigstruct *sigstruct = &encl->sigstruct; + struct sgx_sigstruct_payload payload; + uint8_t digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + unsigned int siglen; + RSA *key = NULL; + EVP_MD_CTX *ctx; + int i; + + memset(sigstruct, 0, sizeof(*sigstruct)); + + sigstruct->header.header1[0] = header1[0]; + sigstruct->header.header1[1] = header1[1]; + sigstruct->header.header2[0] = header2[0]; + sigstruct->header.header2[1] = header2[1]; + sigstruct->exponent = 3; + sigstruct->body.attributes = SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT; + sigstruct->body.xfrm = 3; + + /* sanity check */ + if (check_crypto_errors()) + goto err; + + key = gen_sign_key(); + if (!key) + goto err; + + BN_bn2bin(get_modulus(key), sigstruct->modulus); + + ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create(); + if (!ctx) + goto err; + + if (!mrenclave_ecreate(ctx, encl->src_size)) + goto err; + + for (i = 0; i < encl->nr_segments; i++) { + struct encl_segment *seg = &encl->segment_tbl[i]; + + if (!mrenclave_segment(ctx, encl, seg)) + goto err; + } + + if (!mrenclave_commit(ctx, sigstruct->body.mrenclave)) + goto err; + + memcpy(&payload.header, &sigstruct->header, sizeof(sigstruct->header)); + memcpy(&payload.body, &sigstruct->body, sizeof(sigstruct->body)); + + SHA256((unsigned char *)&payload, sizeof(payload), digest); + + if (!RSA_sign(NID_sha256, digest, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, + sigstruct->signature, &siglen, key)) + goto err; + + if (!calc_q1q2(sigstruct->signature, sigstruct->modulus, sigstruct->q1, + sigstruct->q2)) + goto err; + + /* BE -> LE */ + reverse_bytes(sigstruct->signature, SGX_MODULUS_SIZE); + reverse_bytes(sigstruct->modulus, SGX_MODULUS_SIZE); + reverse_bytes(sigstruct->q1, SGX_MODULUS_SIZE); + reverse_bytes(sigstruct->q2, SGX_MODULUS_SIZE); + + EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx); + RSA_free(key); + return true; + +err: + EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx); + RSA_free(key); + return false; +} diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..ede915399742 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause) +// Copyright(c) 2016-18 Intel Corporation. + +#include <stddef.h> +#include "defines.h" + +static void *memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, size_t n) +{ + size_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) + ((char *)dest)[i] = ((char *)src)[i]; + + return dest; +} + +void encl_body(void *rdi, void *rsi) +{ + memcpy(rsi, rdi, 8); +} diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.lds b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.lds new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..0fbbda7e665e --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.lds @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +OUTPUT_FORMAT(elf64-x86-64) + +PHDRS +{ + tcs PT_LOAD; + text PT_LOAD; + data PT_LOAD; +} + +SECTIONS +{ + . = 0; + .tcs : { + *(.tcs*) + } : tcs + + . = ALIGN(4096); + .text : { + *(.text*) + *(.rodata*) + } : text + + . = ALIGN(4096); + .data : { + *(.data*) + } : data + + /DISCARD/ : { + *(.comment*) + *(.note*) + *(.debug*) + *(.eh_frame*) + } +} + +ASSERT(!DEFINED(.altinstructions), "ALTERNATIVES are not supported in enclaves") +ASSERT(!DEFINED(.altinstr_replacement), "ALTERNATIVES are not supported in enclaves") +ASSERT(!DEFINED(.discard.retpoline_safe), "RETPOLINE ALTERNATIVES are not supported in enclaves") +ASSERT(!DEFINED(.discard.nospec), "RETPOLINE ALTERNATIVES are not supported in enclaves") +ASSERT(!DEFINED(.got.plt), "Libcalls are not supported in enclaves") diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl_bootstrap.S b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl_bootstrap.S new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..6836ea86126e --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl_bootstrap.S @@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause) */ +/* + * Copyright(c) 2016-18 Intel Corporation. + */ + + .macro ENCLU + .byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xd7 + .endm + + .section ".tcs", "aw" + .balign 4096 + + .fill 1, 8, 0 # STATE (set by CPU) + .fill 1, 8, 0 # FLAGS + .quad encl_ssa # OSSA + .fill 1, 4, 0 # CSSA (set by CPU) + .fill 1, 4, 1 # NSSA + .quad encl_entry # OENTRY + .fill 1, 8, 0 # AEP (set by EENTER and ERESUME) + .fill 1, 8, 0 # OFSBASE + .fill 1, 8, 0 # OGSBASE + .fill 1, 4, 0xFFFFFFFF # FSLIMIT + .fill 1, 4, 0xFFFFFFFF # GSLIMIT + .fill 4024, 1, 0 # Reserved + + # Identical to the previous TCS. + .fill 1, 8, 0 # STATE (set by CPU) + .fill 1, 8, 0 # FLAGS + .quad encl_ssa # OSSA + .fill 1, 4, 0 # CSSA (set by CPU) + .fill 1, 4, 1 # NSSA + .quad encl_entry # OENTRY + .fill 1, 8, 0 # AEP (set by EENTER and ERESUME) + .fill 1, 8, 0 # OFSBASE + .fill 1, 8, 0 # OGSBASE + .fill 1, 4, 0xFFFFFFFF # FSLIMIT + .fill 1, 4, 0xFFFFFFFF # GSLIMIT + .fill 4024, 1, 0 # Reserved + + .text + +encl_entry: + # RBX contains the base address for TCS, which is also the first address + # inside the enclave. By adding the value of le_stack_end to it, we get + # the absolute address for the stack. + lea (encl_stack)(%rbx), %rax + xchg %rsp, %rax + push %rax + + push %rcx # push the address after EENTER + push %rbx # push the enclave base address + + call encl_body + + pop %rbx # pop the enclave base address + + /* Clear volatile GPRs, except RAX (EEXIT leaf). */ + xor %rcx, %rcx + xor %rdx, %rdx + xor %rdi, %rdi + xor %rsi, %rsi + xor %r8, %r8 + xor %r9, %r9 + xor %r10, %r10 + xor %r11, %r11 + + # Reset status flags. + add %rdx, %rdx # OF = SF = AF = CF = 0; ZF = PF = 1 + + # Prepare EEXIT target by popping the address of the instruction after + # EENTER to RBX. + pop %rbx + + # Restore the caller stack. + pop %rax + mov %rax, %rsp + + # EEXIT + mov $4, %rax + enclu + + .section ".data", "aw" + +encl_ssa: + .space 4096 + + .balign 4096 + .space 8192 +encl_stack: -- 2.25.1

4 years, 7 months

1
0
0 0

[PATCH 0/6] nouveau/hmm: add support for mapping large pages

by Ralph Campbell

hmm_range_fault() returns an array of page frame numbers and flags for how the pages are mapped in the requested process' page tables. The PFN can be used to get the struct page with hmm_pfn_to_page() and the page size order can be determined with compound_order(page) but if the page is larger than order 0 (PAGE_SIZE), there is no indication that the page is mapped using a larger page size. To be fully general, hmm_range_fault() would need to return the mapping size to handle cases like a 1GB compound page being mapped with 2MB PMD entries. However, the most common case is the mapping size the same as the underlying compound page size. This series adds a new output flag to indicate this so that callers know it is safe to use a large device page table mapping if one is available. Nouveau and the HMM tests are updated to use the new flag. Note that this series depends on a patch queued in Ben Skeggs' nouveau tree ("nouveau/hmm: map pages after migration") and the patches queued in Jason's HMM tree. There is also a patch outstanding ("nouveau/hmm: fix nouveau_dmem_chunk allocations") that is independent of the above and could be applied before or after. Ralph Campbell (6): nouveau/hmm: map pages after migration nouveau: make nvkm_vmm_ctor() and nvkm_mmu_ptp_get() static nouveau/hmm: fault one page at a time mm/hmm: add output flag for compound page mapping nouveau/hmm: support mapping large sysmem pages hmm: add tests for HMM_PFN_COMPOUND flag drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_dmem.c | 46 ++- drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_dmem.h | 2 + drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_svm.c | 288 +++++++++--------- drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_svm.h | 5 + .../gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/mmu/base.c | 6 +- .../gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/mmu/priv.h | 2 + drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/mmu/vmm.c | 12 +- drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/mmu/vmm.h | 3 - .../drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/mmu/vmmgp100.c | 29 +- include/linux/hmm.h | 4 +- lib/test_hmm.c | 2 + lib/test_hmm_uapi.h | 2 + mm/hmm.c | 10 +- tools/testing/selftests/vm/hmm-tests.c | 76 +++++ 14 files changed, 311 insertions(+), 176 deletions(-) -- 2.20.1

4 years, 7 months

5
17
0 0

[fixup v2] kunit: use --build_dir=.kunit as default

by Vitor Massaru Iha

To make KUnit easier to use, and to avoid overwriting object and .config files, the default KUnit build directory is set to .kunit Fixed up minor merge conflicts - Shuah Khan <skhan(a)linuxfoundation.org> Fixed this identation error exchanging spaces for tabs between lines 248 and 252: tools/testing/kunit/kunit.py run --defconfig File "tools/testing/kunit/kunit.py", line 254 if not linux: ^ TabError: inconsistent use of tabs and spaces in indentation Signed-off-by: Vitor Massaru Iha <vitor(a)massaru.org> Reviewed-by: Brendan Higgins <brendanhiggins(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <skhan(a)linuxfoundation.org> Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=205221 --- version after merge on kunit brach: v1: * fix identation (tabs instead of spaces) v2: * fix v1 changelog description: fix identation (spaces instead of tabs, lines 248-252); * add python error message on commit message; * fix Link tag on commit message. --- tools/testing/kunit/kunit.py | 13 ++++++------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/kunit/kunit.py b/tools/testing/kunit/kunit.py index b01838b6f5f9..b3490271a103 100755 --- a/tools/testing/kunit/kunit.py +++ b/tools/testing/kunit/kunit.py @@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ def add_common_opts(parser): parser.add_argument('--build_dir', help='As in the make command, it specifies the build ' 'directory.', - type=str, default='', metavar='build_dir') + type=str, default='.kunit', metavar='build_dir') parser.add_argument('--make_options', help='X=Y make option, can be repeated.', action='append') @@ -245,12 +245,11 @@ def main(argv, linux=None): cli_args = parser.parse_args(argv) if cli_args.subcommand == 'run': - if cli_args.build_dir: - if not os.path.exists(cli_args.build_dir): - os.mkdir(cli_args.build_dir) - kunit_kernel.kunitconfig_path = os.path.join( - cli_args.build_dir, - kunit_kernel.kunitconfig_path) + if not os.path.exists(cli_args.build_dir): + os.mkdir(cli_args.build_dir) + kunit_kernel.kunitconfig_path = os.path.join( + cli_args.build_dir, + kunit_kernel.kunitconfig_path) if not linux: linux = kunit_kernel.LinuxSourceTree() -- 2.26.2

4 years, 7 months

2
2
0 0

[PATCH v18 00/12] Landlock LSM

by Mickaël Salaün

Hi, This new patch series mainly extend the LSM framework and fixes some issues: * Replace landlock_release_inodes() with a new LSM hook security_sb_delete() which is called at superblock shutdown (before unmount). * Replace struct super_block->s_landlock_inode_refs with the LSM infrastructure management of the superblock: Casey Schaufler's work on LSM stacking. The SLOC count is 1304 for security/landlock/ and 1733 for tools/testing/selftest/landlock/ . Test coverage for security/landlock/ is 93.6% of lines. The code not covered only deals with internal kernel errors (e.g. memory allocation) and race conditions. The compiled documentation is available here: https://landlock.io/linux-doc/landlock-v18/security/landlock/index.html This series can be applied on top of v5.7-rc7. This can be tested with CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK and CONFIG_SAMPLE_LANDLOCK. This patch series can be found in a Git repository here: https://github.com/landlock-lsm/linux/commits/landlock-v18 I would really appreciate constructive comments on this patch series. # Landlock LSM The goal of Landlock is to enable to restrict ambient rights (e.g. global filesystem access) for a set of processes. Because Landlock is a stackable LSM [2], it makes possible to create safe security sandboxes as new security layers in addition to the existing system-wide access-controls. This kind of sandbox is expected to help mitigate the security impact of bugs or unexpected/malicious behaviors in user-space applications. Landlock empowers any process, including unprivileged ones, to securely restrict themselves. Landlock is inspired by seccomp-bpf but instead of filtering syscalls and their raw arguments, a Landlock rule can restrict the use of kernel objects like file hierarchies, according to the kernel semantic. Landlock also takes inspiration from other OS sandbox mechanisms: XNU Sandbox, FreeBSD Capsicum or OpenBSD Pledge/Unveil. Previous version: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200511192156.1618284-1-mic@digikod.net/ [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/e07fe473-1801-01cc-12ae-b3167f95250e@digikod.n… [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/50db058a-7dde-441b-a7f9-f6837fe8b69f@schaufler… Casey Schaufler (1): LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock Mickaël Salaün (11): landlock: Add object management landlock: Add ruleset and domain management landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials landlock: Add ptrace restrictions fs,security: Add sb_delete hook landlock: Support filesystem access-control landlock: Add syscall implementation arch: Wire up landlock() syscall selftests/landlock: Add initial tests samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example landlock: Add user and kernel documentation Documentation/security/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/security/landlock/index.rst | 18 + Documentation/security/landlock/kernel.rst | 69 + Documentation/security/landlock/user.rst | 268 +++ MAINTAINERS | 12 + arch/Kconfig | 7 + arch/alpha/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/arm/tools/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h | 2 + arch/ia64/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/m68k/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/microblaze/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n32.tbl | 1 + arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl | 1 + arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_o32.tbl | 1 + arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/powerpc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/s390/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/sh/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/sparc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/um/Kconfig | 1 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 + arch/xtensa/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + fs/super.c | 1 + include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 1 + include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 3 + include/linux/security.h | 4 + include/linux/syscalls.h | 3 + include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 4 +- include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 302 +++ kernel/sys_ni.c | 3 + samples/Kconfig | 7 + samples/Makefile | 1 + samples/landlock/.gitignore | 1 + samples/landlock/Makefile | 15 + samples/landlock/sandboxer.c | 228 +++ security/Kconfig | 11 +- security/Makefile | 2 + security/landlock/Kconfig | 18 + security/landlock/Makefile | 4 + security/landlock/common.h | 20 + security/landlock/cred.c | 46 + security/landlock/cred.h | 58 + security/landlock/fs.c | 610 ++++++ security/landlock/fs.h | 60 + security/landlock/object.c | 66 + security/landlock/object.h | 91 + security/landlock/ptrace.c | 120 ++ security/landlock/ptrace.h | 14 + security/landlock/ruleset.c | 342 ++++ security/landlock/ruleset.h | 157 ++ security/landlock/setup.c | 40 + security/landlock/setup.h | 18 + security/landlock/syscall.c | 532 +++++ security/security.c | 51 +- security/selinux/hooks.c | 58 +- security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 6 + security/selinux/ss/services.c | 3 +- security/smack/smack.h | 6 + security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 35 +- tools/testing/selftests/Makefile | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/landlock/.gitignore | 2 + tools/testing/selftests/landlock/Makefile | 29 + tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c | 163 ++ tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h | 108 + tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config | 5 + tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 1730 +++++++++++++++++ .../testing/selftests/landlock/ptrace_test.c | 293 +++ tools/testing/selftests/landlock/true.c | 5 + 71 files changed, 5596 insertions(+), 77 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/security/landlock/index.rst create mode 100644 Documentation/security/landlock/kernel.rst create mode 100644 Documentation/security/landlock/user.rst create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/landlock.h create mode 100644 samples/landlock/.gitignore create mode 100644 samples/landlock/Makefile create mode 100644 samples/landlock/sandboxer.c create mode 100644 security/landlock/Kconfig create mode 100644 security/landlock/Makefile create mode 100644 security/landlock/common.h create mode 100644 security/landlock/cred.c create mode 100644 security/landlock/cred.h create mode 100644 security/landlock/fs.c create mode 100644 security/landlock/fs.h create mode 100644 security/landlock/object.c create mode 100644 security/landlock/object.h create mode 100644 security/landlock/ptrace.c create mode 100644 security/landlock/ptrace.h create mode 100644 security/landlock/ruleset.c create mode 100644 security/landlock/ruleset.h create mode 100644 security/landlock/setup.c create mode 100644 security/landlock/setup.h create mode 100644 security/landlock/syscall.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/.gitignore create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/Makefile create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/ptrace_test.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/true.c -- 2.26.2

4 years, 7 months

2
14
0 0

Re: [PATCH] selftests/bpf: split -extras target to -static and -gen

by Yauheni Kaliuta

Hi, Alexei! >>>>> On Wed, 27 May 2020 09:48:04 -0700, Alexei Starovoitov wrote: > On Wed, May 27, 2020 at 12:19 AM Yauheni Kaliuta > <yauheni.kaliuta(a)redhat.com> wrote: >> >> Hi, Alexei! >> >> >>>>> On Tue, 26 May 2020 22:37:39 -0700, Alexei Starovoitov wrote: >> >> > On Tue, May 26, 2020 at 10:31 PM Yauheni Kaliuta >> > <yauheni.kaliuta(a)redhat.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> Hi, Andrii! >> >> >> >> >>>>> On Tue, 26 May 2020 17:19:18 -0700, Andrii Nakryiko wrote: >> >> >> >> > On Fri, May 22, 2020 at 1:19 AM Yauheni Kaliuta >> >> > <yauheni.kaliuta(a)redhat.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> There is difference in depoying static and generated extra resource >> >> >> files between in/out of tree build and flavors: >> >> >> >> >> >> - in case of unflavored out-of-tree build static files are not >> >> >> available and must be copied as well as both static and generated >> >> >> files for flavored build. >> >> >> >> >> >> So split the rules and variables. The name TRUNNER_EXTRA_GEN_FILES >> >> >> is chosen in analogy to TEST_GEN_* variants. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Can we keep them together but be smarter about what needs to >> >> > be copied based on source/target directories? I would really >> >> > like to not blow up all these rules. >> >> >> >> I can try, ok, I just find it a bit more clear. But it's good to >> >> get some input from kselftest about OOT build in general. >> >> > I see no value in 'make install' of selftests/bpf >> > and since it's broken just remove that makefile target. >> >> Some CI systems perform testing next stage after building were >> build tree is not available anymore. So it's in use at the >> moment. > such CI systems can do 'cp -r' then It's a discussion for linux-kselftest@ (added). At the moment `make install` is generic kselftest functionality and since bpf is part of that infra it looks a bit strange to break it intentionally. -- WBR, Yauheni Kaliuta

4 years, 7 months

6
20
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[PATCH v7 0/5] KUnit-KASAN Integration

by David Gow

This patchset contains everything needed to integrate KASAN and KUnit. KUnit will be able to: (1) Fail tests when an unexpected KASAN error occurs (2) Pass tests when an expected KASAN error occurs Convert KASAN tests to KUnit with the exception of copy_user_test because KUnit is unable to test those. Add documentation on how to run the KASAN tests with KUnit and what to expect when running these tests. This patchset depends on: - "[PATCH v3 kunit-next 0/2] kunit: extend kunit resources API" [1] - "[PATCH v3 0/3] Fix some incompatibilites between KASAN and FORTIFY_SOURCE" [2] Changes from v6: - Rebased on top of kselftest/kunit - Rebased on top of Daniel Axtens' fix for FORTIFY_SOURCE incompatibilites [2] - Removed a redundant report_enabled() check. - Fixed some places with out of date Kconfig names in the documentation. Changes from v5: - Split out the panic_on_warn changes to a separate patch. - Fix documentation to fewer to the new Kconfig names. - Fix some changes which were in the wrong patch. - Rebase on top of kselftest/kunit (currently identical to 5.7-rc1) Changes from v4: - KASAN no longer will panic on errors if both panic_on_warn and kasan_multishot are enabled. - As a result, the KASAN tests will no-longer disable panic_on_warn. - This also means panic_on_warn no-longer needs to be exported. - The use of temporary "kasan_data" variables has been cleaned up somewhat. - A potential refcount/resource leak should multiple KASAN errors appear during an assertion was fixed. - Some wording changes to the KASAN test Kconfig entries. Changes from v3: - KUNIT_SET_KASAN_DATA and KUNIT_DO_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL have been combined and included in KUNIT_DO_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL() instead. - Reordered logic in kasan_update_kunit_status() in report.c to be easier to read. - Added comment to not use the name "kasan_data" for any kunit tests outside of KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(). Changes since v2: - Due to Alan's changes in [1], KUnit can be built as a module. - The name of the tests that could not be run with KUnit has been changed to be more generic: test_kasan_module. - Documentation on how to run the new KASAN tests and what to expect when running them has been added. - Some variables and functions are now static. - Now save/restore panic_on_warn in a similar way to kasan_multi_shot and renamed the init/exit functions to be more generic to accommodate. - Due to [3] in kasan_strings, kasan_memchr, and kasan_memcmp will fail if CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT is enabled so return early and print message explaining this circumstance. - Changed preprocessor checks to C checks where applicable. Changes since v1: - Make use of Alan Maguire's suggestion to use his patch that allows static resources for integration instead of adding a new attribute to the kunit struct - All KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL statements are local to each test - The definition of KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL is local to the test_kasan.c file since it seems this is the only place this will be used. - Integration relies on KUnit being builtin - copy_user_test has been separated into its own file since KUnit is unable to test these. This can be run as a module just as before, using CONFIG_TEST_KASAN_USER - The addition to the current task has been separated into its own patch as this is a significant enough change to be on its own. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-kselftest/1585313122-26441-1-git-send-email-a… [2] https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/4/23/708 [3] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206337 David Gow (1): mm: kasan: Do not panic if both panic_on_warn and kasan_multishot set Patricia Alfonso (4): Add KUnit Struct to Current Task KUnit: KASAN Integration KASAN: Port KASAN Tests to KUnit KASAN: Testing Documentation Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst | 70 +++ include/kunit/test.h | 5 + include/linux/kasan.h | 6 + include/linux/sched.h | 4 + lib/Kconfig.kasan | 18 +- lib/Makefile | 3 +- lib/kunit/test.c | 13 +- lib/test_kasan.c | 688 +++++++++++++----------------- lib/test_kasan_module.c | 76 ++++ mm/kasan/report.c | 34 +- 10 files changed, 514 insertions(+), 403 deletions(-) create mode 100644 lib/test_kasan_module.c -- 2.26.2.303.gf8c07b1a785-goog

4 years, 7 months

6
11
0 0

BUG: arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c:3722: kvm_mmu_load+0x407/0x420

by Naresh Kamboju

While running selftest kvm set_memory_region_test on x86_64 linux-next kernel 5.7.0-rc6-next-20200518 the kernel BUG noticed. steps to reproduce: (always reproducible ) ------------------------- cd /opt/kselftests/default-in-kernel/kvm ./set_memory_region_test BAD: next-20200518 (still reproducible on next-20200526) GOOD: next-20200515 git tree: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/next/linux-next.git kernel config: http://snapshots.linaro.org/openembedded/lkft/lkft/sumo/intel-corei7-64/lkf… kernel crash log, ----------------------- [ 33.074161] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 33.079845] kernel BUG at /usr/src/kernel/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c:3722! [ 33.086422] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [ 33.090792] CPU: 3 PID: 512 Comm: set_memory_regi Not tainted 5.7.0-rc7-next-20200526 #1 [ 33.100253] Hardware name: Supermicro SYS-5019S-ML/X11SSH-F, BIOS 2.2 05/23/2018 [ 33.107642] RIP: 0010:kvm_mmu_load+0x407/0x420 [ 33.112086] Code: ff e9 42 fc ff ff 48 8b 0d f6 ec 99 01 e9 31 ff ff ff 48 8b 0d ea ec 99 01 e9 ac fe ff ff 48 8b 0d de ec 99 01 e9 af fd ff ff <0f> 0b 48 8b 0d d0 ec 99 01 eb 90 0f 1f 40 00 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 [ 33.130829] RSP: 0018:ffffb225803d7d20 EFLAGS: 00010293 [ 33.136047] RAX: ffff936ee4fd8420 RBX: ffff936ee4fd8000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 33.143171] RDX: 0000000000000027 RSI: ffffffffacc81b20 RDI: ffff936ee76fb9a8 [ 33.150294] RBP: ffffb225803d7d50 R08: ffff936eefbb66c0 R09: ffff936eec668800 [ 33.157418] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 33.164567] R13: 00000000002dc6c0 R14: ffff936ee4fd8000 R15: 0000000000000001 [ 33.171710] FS: 00007fce5aed3740(0000) GS:ffff936eefb80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 33.179787] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 33.185525] CR2: 0000000000fdd298 CR3: 0000000263c74004 CR4: 00000000003626e0 [ 33.192682] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 33.199806] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 33.206930] Call Trace: [ 33.209377] vcpu_enter_guest+0x10d0/0x17f0 [ 33.213580] ? kvm_load_guest_fpu.isra.131+0x4d/0x140 [ 33.218632] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x12a/0x650 [ 33.223250] ? kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x12a/0x650 [ 33.228036] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x261/0x680 [ 33.231872] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xdd/0x130 [ 33.236400] ksys_ioctl+0x98/0xb0 [ 33.239715] ? do_syscall_64+0x20/0xa0 [ 33.243461] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x1a/0x20 [ 33.247212] do_syscall_64+0x5a/0xa0 [ 33.250785] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 33.255836] RIP: 0033:0x7fce5a7d18f7 [ 33.259415] Code: b3 66 90 48 8b 05 a1 35 2c 00 64 c7 00 26 00 00 00 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 71 35 2c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 33.278152] RSP: 002b:00007ffca3313c68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 [ 33.285708] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000fdd3e0 RCX: 00007fce5a7d18f7 [ 33.292831] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000ae80 RDI: 0000000000000005 [ 33.299954] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000409dc3 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 33.307078] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000004018a0 [ 33.314204] R13: 00007ffca3313e80 R14: 00007fce5aed36c0 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 33.321331] Modules linked in: x86_pkg_temp_thermal fuse [ 33.326672] ---[ end trace 76d29d87896dd85b ]--- [ 33.331308] RIP: 0010:kvm_mmu_load+0x407/0x420 [ 33.335753] Code: ff e9 42 fc ff ff 48 8b 0d f6 ec 99 01 e9 31 ff ff ff 48 8b 0d ea ec 99 01 e9 ac fe ff ff 48 8b 0d de ec 99 01 e9 af fd ff ff <0f> 0b 48 8b 0d d0 ec 99 01 eb 90 0f 1f 40 00 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 [ 33.354497] RSP: 0018:ffffb225803d7d20 EFLAGS: 00010293 [ 33.359749] RAX: ffff936ee4fd8420 RBX: ffff936ee4fd8000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 33.366882] RDX: 0000000000000027 RSI: ffffffffacc81b20 RDI: ffff936ee76fb9a8 [ 33.374015] RBP: ffffb225803d7d50 R08: ffff936eefbb66c0 R09: ffff936eec668800 [ 33.381145] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 33.388278] R13: 00000000002dc6c0 R14: ffff936ee4fd8000 R15: 0000000000000001 [ 33.395412] FS: 00007fce5aed3740(0000) GS:ffff936eefb80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 33.403496] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 33.409242] CR2: 0000000000fdd298 CR3: 0000000263c74004 CR4: 00000000003626e0 [ 33.416374] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 33.423509] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 t_memory_region_[ 33.431191] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdead000000000100: 0000 [#2] SMP PTI [ 33.442078] CPU: 1 PID: 512 Comm: set_memory_regi Tainted: G D 5.7.0-rc7-next-20200526 #1 [ 33.451541] Hardware name: Supermicro SYS-5019S-ML/X11SSH-F, BIOS 2.2 05/23/2018 [ 33.458927] RIP: 0010:__schedule+0x48b/0x830 [ 33.463197] Code: 84 be fd ff ff 48 01 83 68 0c 00 00 48 83 83 60 0c 00 00 01 e9 aa fd ff ff 4d 8b bc 24 50 03 00 00 4d 85 ff 0f 84 c3 fd ff ff <49> 8b 47 10 4c 89 ff 4c 89 f6 48 8b 40 08 e8 f2 83 21 00 4d 8b 3f [ 33.481933] RSP: 0018:ffffb225803d7bf8 EFLAGS: 00010086 [ 33.487151] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff936eefaacc00 RCX: 0000000000000002 [ 33.494276] RDX: 0000006500000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff936ee4fd8000 [ 33.501398] RBP: ffffb225803d7c50 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 [ 33.508523] R10: ffffb225803d7b80 R11: 0000000000000197 R12: ffff936ee76fb100 [ 33.515646] R13: ffff936eefaacc18 R14: ffff936eee1d1880 R15: dead000000000100 [ 33.522771] FS: 00007fce5aed3740(0000) GS:ffff936eefa80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 33.530848] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 33.536586] CR2: 000055c5745b6280 CR3: 0000000207c10006 CR4: 00000000003626e0 [ 33.543710] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 33.550832] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 33.557957] Call Trace: [ 33.560406] preempt_schedule_common+0x15/0x30 [ 33.564849] _cond_resched+0x22/0x30 [ 33.568426] wait_for_completion+0x42/0x120 [ 33.572605] __synchronize_srcu+0xef/0x180 [ 33.576704] ? __bpf_trace_rcu_invoke_callback+0x10/0x10 [ 33.582017] synchronize_srcu+0x66/0x110 [ 33.585941] ? synchronize_srcu+0x66/0x110 [ 33.590031] kvm_page_track_unregister_notifier+0x4f/0x60 [ 33.595423] kvm_mmu_uninit_vm+0x15/0x20 [ 33.599340] kvm_arch_destroy_vm+0x1ab/0x210 [ 33.603604] kvm_put_kvm+0x1c6/0x3d0 [ 33.607176] kvm_vm_release+0x21/0x30 [ 33.610840] __fput+0x109/0x270 [ 33.613979] ____fput+0xe/0x10 [ 33.617037] task_work_run+0x6f/0xc0 [ 33.620609] do_exit+0x3ec/0xd10 [ 33.623842] rewind_stack_do_exit+0x17/0x17 [ 33.628024] RIP: 0033:0x7fce5a7d18f7 [ 33.631597] Code: Bad RIP value. [ 33.634821] RSP: 002b:00007ffca3313c68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 [ 33.642387] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000fdd3e0 RCX: 00007fce5a7d18f7 [ 33.649511] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000ae80 RDI: 0000000000000005 [ 33.656634] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000409dc3 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 33.663757] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000004018a0 [ 33.670882] R13: 00007ffca3313e80 R14: 00007fce5aed36c0 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 33.678007] Modules linked in: x86_pkg_temp_thermal fuse [ 33.683320] ---[ end trace 76d29d87896dd85c ]--- [ 33.687937] RIP: 0010:kvm_mmu_load+0x407/0x420 [ 33.692373] Code: ff e9 42 fc ff ff 48 8b 0d f6 ec 99 01 e9 31 ff ff ff 48 8b 0d ea ec 99 01 e9 ac fe ff ff 48 8b 0d de ec 99 01 e9 af fd ff ff <0f> 0b 48 8b 0d d0 ec 99 01 eb 90 0f 1f 40 00 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 [ 33.711111] RSP: 0018:ffffb225803d7d20 EFLAGS: 00010293 [ 33.716329] RAX: ffff936ee4fd8420 RBX: ffff936ee4fd8000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 33.723452] RDX: 0000000000000027 RSI: ffffffffacc81b20 RDI: ffff936ee76fb9a8 [ 33.730576] RBP: ffffb225803d7d50 R08: ffff936eefbb66c0 R09: ffff936eec668800 [ 33.737699] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 33.744823] R13: 00000000002dc6c0 R14: ffff936ee4fd8000 R15: 0000000000000001 [ 33.751948] FS: 00007fce5aed3740(0000) GS:ffff936eefa80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 33.760024] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 33.765760] CR2: 00007fce5a7d18cd CR3: 0000000207c10006 CR4: 00000000003626e0 [ 33.772885] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 33.780009] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 33.787132] note: set_memory_regi[512] exited with preempt_count 2 [ 33.793304] Fixing recursive fault but reboot is needed! Test job link, https://lkft.validation.linaro.org/scheduler/job/1455528#L1230 -- Linaro LKFT https://lkft.linaro.org

4 years, 7 months

2
2
0 0

[PATCH v3 kunit-next 0/2] kunit: extend kunit resources API

by Alan Maguire

A recent RFC patch set [1] suggests some additional functionality may be needed around kunit resources. It seems to require 1. support for resources without allocation 2. support for lookup of such resources 3. support for access to resources across multiple kernel threads The proposed changes here are designed to address these needs. The idea is we first generalize the API to support adding resources with static data; then from there we support named resources. The latter support is needed because if we are in a different thread context and only have the "struct kunit *" to work with, we need a way to identify a resource in lookup. [1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/2/26/1286 Changes since v2: - moved a few functions relating to resource retrieval in patches 1 and 2 into include/kunit/test.h and defined as "static inline"; this allows built-in consumers to use these functions when KUnit is built as a module Changes since v1: - reformatted longer parameter lists to have one parameter per-line (Brendan, patch 1) - fixed phrasing in various comments to clarify allocation of memory and added comment to kunit resource tests to clarify why kunit_put_resource() is used there (Brendan, patch 1) - changed #define to static inline function (Brendan, patch 2) - simplified kunit_add_named_resource() to use more of existing code for non-named resource (Brendan, patch 2) Alan Maguire (2): kunit: generalize kunit_resource API beyond allocated resources kunit: add support for named resources include/kunit/test.h | 211 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- lib/kunit/kunit-test.c | 111 +++++++++++++++++++----- lib/kunit/string-stream.c | 14 ++- lib/kunit/test.c | 172 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- 4 files changed, 382 insertions(+), 126 deletions(-) -- 1.8.3.1

4 years, 7 months

2
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