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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] fscrypt: remove kernel-internal constants from UAPI header" failed to apply to 5.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.4-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From 3ceb6543e9cf6ed87cc1fbc6f23ca2db903564cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2020 17:51:31 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] fscrypt: remove kernel-internal constants from UAPI header There isn't really any valid reason to use __FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX or FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID in a userspace program. These constants are only meant to be used by the kernel internally, and they are defined in the UAPI header next to the mode numbers and flags only so that kernel developers don't forget to update them when adding new modes or flags. In https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201005074133.1958633-2-satyat@google.com there was an example of someone wanting to use __FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX in a user program, and it was wrong because the program would have broken if __FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX were ever increased. So having this definition available is harmful. FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID has the same problem. So, remove these definitions from the UAPI header. Replace FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID with just listing the valid flags explicitly in the one kernel function that needs it. Move __FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX to fscrypt_private.h, remove the double underscores (which were only present to discourage use by userspace), and add a BUILD_BUG_ON() and comments to (hopefully) ensure it is kept in sync. Keep the old name FS_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID, since it's been around for longer and there's a greater chance that removing it would break source compatibility with some program. Indeed, mtd-utils is using it in an #ifdef, and removing it would introduce compiler warnings (about FS_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_* being redefined) into the mtd-utils build. However, reduce its value to 0x07 so that it only includes the flags with old names (the ones present before Linux 5.4), and try to make it clear that it's now "frozen" and no new flags should be added to it. Fixes: 2336d0deb2d4 ("fscrypt: use FSCRYPT_ prefix for uapi constants") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v5.4+ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201024005132.495952-1-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> diff --git a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h index 4f5806a3b73d..322ecae9a758 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h +++ b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h @@ -25,6 +25,9 @@ #define FSCRYPT_CONTEXT_V1 1 #define FSCRYPT_CONTEXT_V2 2 +/* Keep this in sync with include/uapi/linux/fscrypt.h */ +#define FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX FSCRYPT_MODE_ADIANTUM + struct fscrypt_context_v1 { u8 version; /* FSCRYPT_CONTEXT_V1 */ u8 contents_encryption_mode; @@ -491,9 +494,9 @@ struct fscrypt_master_key { * Per-mode encryption keys for the various types of encryption policies * that use them. Allocated and derived on-demand. */ - struct fscrypt_prepared_key mk_direct_keys[__FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX + 1]; - struct fscrypt_prepared_key mk_iv_ino_lblk_64_keys[__FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX + 1]; - struct fscrypt_prepared_key mk_iv_ino_lblk_32_keys[__FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX + 1]; + struct fscrypt_prepared_key mk_direct_keys[FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX + 1]; + struct fscrypt_prepared_key mk_iv_ino_lblk_64_keys[FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX + 1]; + struct fscrypt_prepared_key mk_iv_ino_lblk_32_keys[FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX + 1]; /* Hash key for inode numbers. Initialized only when needed. */ siphash_key_t mk_ino_hash_key; diff --git a/fs/crypto/keyring.c b/fs/crypto/keyring.c index 53cc552a7b8f..d7ec52cb3d9a 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/keyring.c +++ b/fs/crypto/keyring.c @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ static void free_master_key(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk) wipe_master_key_secret(&mk->mk_secret); - for (i = 0; i <= __FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX; i++) { + for (i = 0; i <= FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX; i++) { fscrypt_destroy_prepared_key(&mk->mk_direct_keys[i]); fscrypt_destroy_prepared_key(&mk->mk_iv_ino_lblk_64_keys[i]); fscrypt_destroy_prepared_key(&mk->mk_iv_ino_lblk_32_keys[i]); diff --git a/fs/crypto/keysetup.c b/fs/crypto/keysetup.c index d595abb8ef90..31fb08d94f87 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/keysetup.c +++ b/fs/crypto/keysetup.c @@ -56,6 +56,8 @@ static struct fscrypt_mode * select_encryption_mode(const union fscrypt_policy *policy, const struct inode *inode) { + BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(fscrypt_modes) != FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX + 1); + if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) return &fscrypt_modes[fscrypt_policy_contents_mode(policy)]; @@ -168,7 +170,7 @@ static int setup_per_mode_enc_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci, unsigned int hkdf_infolen = 0; int err; - if (WARN_ON(mode_num > __FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX)) + if (WARN_ON(mode_num > FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX)) return -EINVAL; prep_key = &keys[mode_num]; diff --git a/fs/crypto/policy.c b/fs/crypto/policy.c index 4441d9944b9e..faa0f21daa68 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/policy.c +++ b/fs/crypto/policy.c @@ -175,7 +175,10 @@ static bool fscrypt_supported_v2_policy(const struct fscrypt_policy_v2 *policy, return false; } - if (policy->flags & ~FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID) { + if (policy->flags & ~(FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_MASK | + FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY | + FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_64 | + FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_32)) { fscrypt_warn(inode, "Unsupported encryption flags (0x%02x)", policy->flags); return false; diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/fscrypt.h b/include/uapi/linux/fscrypt.h index e5de60336938..9f4428be3e36 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/fscrypt.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/fscrypt.h @@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ #define FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY 0x04 #define FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_64 0x08 #define FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_32 0x10 -#define FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID 0x1F /* Encryption algorithms */ #define FSCRYPT_MODE_AES_256_XTS 1 @@ -28,7 +27,7 @@ #define FSCRYPT_MODE_AES_128_CBC 5 #define FSCRYPT_MODE_AES_128_CTS 6 #define FSCRYPT_MODE_ADIANTUM 9 -#define __FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX 9 +/* If adding a mode number > 9, update FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX in fscrypt_private.h */ /* * Legacy policy version; ad-hoc KDF and no key verification. @@ -177,7 +176,7 @@ struct fscrypt_get_key_status_arg { #define FS_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_32 FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_32 #define FS_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_MASK FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_MASK #define FS_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY -#define FS_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID +#define FS_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID 0x07 /* contains old flags only */ #define FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_INVALID 0 /* never used */ #define FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_XTS FSCRYPT_MODE_AES_256_XTS #define FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_GCM 2 /* never used */

4 years, 8 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] f2fs: prevent creating duplicate encrypted filenames" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From bfc2b7e8518999003a61f91c1deb5e88ed77b07d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2020 23:56:07 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] f2fs: prevent creating duplicate encrypted filenames As described in "fscrypt: add fscrypt_is_nokey_name()", it's possible to create a duplicate filename in an encrypted directory by creating a file concurrently with adding the directory's encryption key. Fix this bug on f2fs by rejecting no-key dentries in f2fs_add_link(). Note that the weird check for the current task in f2fs_do_add_link() seems to make this bug difficult to reproduce on f2fs. Fixes: 9ea97163c6da ("f2fs crypto: add filename encryption for f2fs_add_link") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201118075609.120337-4-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> diff --git a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h index cb700d797296..9a321c52face 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h +++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h @@ -3251,6 +3251,8 @@ bool f2fs_empty_dir(struct inode *dir); static inline int f2fs_add_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) { + if (fscrypt_is_nokey_name(dentry)) + return -ENOKEY; return f2fs_do_add_link(d_inode(dentry->d_parent), &dentry->d_name, inode, inode->i_ino, inode->i_mode); }

4 years, 8 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] f2fs: prevent creating duplicate encrypted filenames" failed to apply to 5.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.4-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From bfc2b7e8518999003a61f91c1deb5e88ed77b07d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2020 23:56:07 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] f2fs: prevent creating duplicate encrypted filenames As described in "fscrypt: add fscrypt_is_nokey_name()", it's possible to create a duplicate filename in an encrypted directory by creating a file concurrently with adding the directory's encryption key. Fix this bug on f2fs by rejecting no-key dentries in f2fs_add_link(). Note that the weird check for the current task in f2fs_do_add_link() seems to make this bug difficult to reproduce on f2fs. Fixes: 9ea97163c6da ("f2fs crypto: add filename encryption for f2fs_add_link") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201118075609.120337-4-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> diff --git a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h index cb700d797296..9a321c52face 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h +++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h @@ -3251,6 +3251,8 @@ bool f2fs_empty_dir(struct inode *dir); static inline int f2fs_add_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) { + if (fscrypt_is_nokey_name(dentry)) + return -ENOKEY; return f2fs_do_add_link(d_inode(dentry->d_parent), &dentry->d_name, inode, inode->i_ino, inode->i_mode); }

4 years, 8 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] f2fs: prevent creating duplicate encrypted filenames" failed to apply to 4.19-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.19-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From bfc2b7e8518999003a61f91c1deb5e88ed77b07d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2020 23:56:07 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] f2fs: prevent creating duplicate encrypted filenames As described in "fscrypt: add fscrypt_is_nokey_name()", it's possible to create a duplicate filename in an encrypted directory by creating a file concurrently with adding the directory's encryption key. Fix this bug on f2fs by rejecting no-key dentries in f2fs_add_link(). Note that the weird check for the current task in f2fs_do_add_link() seems to make this bug difficult to reproduce on f2fs. Fixes: 9ea97163c6da ("f2fs crypto: add filename encryption for f2fs_add_link") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201118075609.120337-4-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> diff --git a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h index cb700d797296..9a321c52face 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h +++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h @@ -3251,6 +3251,8 @@ bool f2fs_empty_dir(struct inode *dir); static inline int f2fs_add_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) { + if (fscrypt_is_nokey_name(dentry)) + return -ENOKEY; return f2fs_do_add_link(d_inode(dentry->d_parent), &dentry->d_name, inode, inode->i_ino, inode->i_mode); }

4 years, 8 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] f2fs: prevent creating duplicate encrypted filenames" failed to apply to 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.14-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From bfc2b7e8518999003a61f91c1deb5e88ed77b07d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2020 23:56:07 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] f2fs: prevent creating duplicate encrypted filenames As described in "fscrypt: add fscrypt_is_nokey_name()", it's possible to create a duplicate filename in an encrypted directory by creating a file concurrently with adding the directory's encryption key. Fix this bug on f2fs by rejecting no-key dentries in f2fs_add_link(). Note that the weird check for the current task in f2fs_do_add_link() seems to make this bug difficult to reproduce on f2fs. Fixes: 9ea97163c6da ("f2fs crypto: add filename encryption for f2fs_add_link") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201118075609.120337-4-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> diff --git a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h index cb700d797296..9a321c52face 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h +++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h @@ -3251,6 +3251,8 @@ bool f2fs_empty_dir(struct inode *dir); static inline int f2fs_add_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) { + if (fscrypt_is_nokey_name(dentry)) + return -ENOKEY; return f2fs_do_add_link(d_inode(dentry->d_parent), &dentry->d_name, inode, inode->i_ino, inode->i_mode); }

4 years, 8 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] f2fs: prevent creating duplicate encrypted filenames" failed to apply to 4.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.4-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From bfc2b7e8518999003a61f91c1deb5e88ed77b07d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2020 23:56:07 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] f2fs: prevent creating duplicate encrypted filenames As described in "fscrypt: add fscrypt_is_nokey_name()", it's possible to create a duplicate filename in an encrypted directory by creating a file concurrently with adding the directory's encryption key. Fix this bug on f2fs by rejecting no-key dentries in f2fs_add_link(). Note that the weird check for the current task in f2fs_do_add_link() seems to make this bug difficult to reproduce on f2fs. Fixes: 9ea97163c6da ("f2fs crypto: add filename encryption for f2fs_add_link") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201118075609.120337-4-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> diff --git a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h index cb700d797296..9a321c52face 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h +++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h @@ -3251,6 +3251,8 @@ bool f2fs_empty_dir(struct inode *dir); static inline int f2fs_add_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) { + if (fscrypt_is_nokey_name(dentry)) + return -ENOKEY; return f2fs_do_add_link(d_inode(dentry->d_parent), &dentry->d_name, inode, inode->i_ino, inode->i_mode); }

4 years, 8 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] scsi: megaraid_sas: Check user-provided offsets" failed to apply to 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.14-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From 381d34e376e3d9d27730fda8a0e870600e6c8196 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> Date: Fri, 30 Oct 2020 17:44:20 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] scsi: megaraid_sas: Check user-provided offsets It sounds unwise to let user space pass an unchecked 32-bit offset into a kernel structure in an ioctl. This is an unsigned variable, so checking the upper bound for the size of the structure it points into is sufficient to avoid data corruption, but as the pointer might also be unaligned, it has to be written carefully as well. While I stumbled over this problem by reading the code, I did not continue checking the function for further problems like it. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201030164450.1253641-2-arnd@kernel.org Fixes: c4a3e0a529ab ("[SCSI] MegaRAID SAS RAID: new driver") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.15+ Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch(a)lst.de> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen(a)oracle.com> diff --git a/drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c b/drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c index 41cd66fc7d81..5e31bd364a5b 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c @@ -8134,7 +8134,7 @@ megasas_mgmt_fw_ioctl(struct megasas_instance *instance, int error = 0, i; void *sense = NULL; dma_addr_t sense_handle; - unsigned long *sense_ptr; + void *sense_ptr; u32 opcode = 0; int ret = DCMD_SUCCESS; @@ -8257,6 +8257,13 @@ megasas_mgmt_fw_ioctl(struct megasas_instance *instance, } if (ioc->sense_len) { + /* make sure the pointer is part of the frame */ + if (ioc->sense_off > + (sizeof(union megasas_frame) - sizeof(__le64))) { + error = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + sense = dma_alloc_coherent(&instance->pdev->dev, ioc->sense_len, &sense_handle, GFP_KERNEL); if (!sense) { @@ -8264,12 +8271,11 @@ megasas_mgmt_fw_ioctl(struct megasas_instance *instance, goto out; } - sense_ptr = - (unsigned long *) ((unsigned long)cmd->frame + ioc->sense_off); + sense_ptr = (void *)cmd->frame + ioc->sense_off; if (instance->consistent_mask_64bit) - *sense_ptr = cpu_to_le64(sense_handle); + put_unaligned_le64(sense_handle, sense_ptr); else - *sense_ptr = cpu_to_le32(sense_handle); + put_unaligned_le32(sense_handle, sense_ptr); } /*

4 years, 8 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] scsi: megaraid_sas: Check user-provided offsets" failed to apply to 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.9-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From 381d34e376e3d9d27730fda8a0e870600e6c8196 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> Date: Fri, 30 Oct 2020 17:44:20 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] scsi: megaraid_sas: Check user-provided offsets It sounds unwise to let user space pass an unchecked 32-bit offset into a kernel structure in an ioctl. This is an unsigned variable, so checking the upper bound for the size of the structure it points into is sufficient to avoid data corruption, but as the pointer might also be unaligned, it has to be written carefully as well. While I stumbled over this problem by reading the code, I did not continue checking the function for further problems like it. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201030164450.1253641-2-arnd@kernel.org Fixes: c4a3e0a529ab ("[SCSI] MegaRAID SAS RAID: new driver") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.15+ Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch(a)lst.de> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen(a)oracle.com> diff --git a/drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c b/drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c index 41cd66fc7d81..5e31bd364a5b 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c @@ -8134,7 +8134,7 @@ megasas_mgmt_fw_ioctl(struct megasas_instance *instance, int error = 0, i; void *sense = NULL; dma_addr_t sense_handle; - unsigned long *sense_ptr; + void *sense_ptr; u32 opcode = 0; int ret = DCMD_SUCCESS; @@ -8257,6 +8257,13 @@ megasas_mgmt_fw_ioctl(struct megasas_instance *instance, } if (ioc->sense_len) { + /* make sure the pointer is part of the frame */ + if (ioc->sense_off > + (sizeof(union megasas_frame) - sizeof(__le64))) { + error = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + sense = dma_alloc_coherent(&instance->pdev->dev, ioc->sense_len, &sense_handle, GFP_KERNEL); if (!sense) { @@ -8264,12 +8271,11 @@ megasas_mgmt_fw_ioctl(struct megasas_instance *instance, goto out; } - sense_ptr = - (unsigned long *) ((unsigned long)cmd->frame + ioc->sense_off); + sense_ptr = (void *)cmd->frame + ioc->sense_off; if (instance->consistent_mask_64bit) - *sense_ptr = cpu_to_le64(sense_handle); + put_unaligned_le64(sense_handle, sense_ptr); else - *sense_ptr = cpu_to_le32(sense_handle); + put_unaligned_le32(sense_handle, sense_ptr); } /*

4 years, 8 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] scsi: megaraid_sas: Check user-provided offsets" failed to apply to 4.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.4-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From 381d34e376e3d9d27730fda8a0e870600e6c8196 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> Date: Fri, 30 Oct 2020 17:44:20 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] scsi: megaraid_sas: Check user-provided offsets It sounds unwise to let user space pass an unchecked 32-bit offset into a kernel structure in an ioctl. This is an unsigned variable, so checking the upper bound for the size of the structure it points into is sufficient to avoid data corruption, but as the pointer might also be unaligned, it has to be written carefully as well. While I stumbled over this problem by reading the code, I did not continue checking the function for further problems like it. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201030164450.1253641-2-arnd@kernel.org Fixes: c4a3e0a529ab ("[SCSI] MegaRAID SAS RAID: new driver") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.15+ Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch(a)lst.de> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen(a)oracle.com> diff --git a/drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c b/drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c index 41cd66fc7d81..5e31bd364a5b 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c @@ -8134,7 +8134,7 @@ megasas_mgmt_fw_ioctl(struct megasas_instance *instance, int error = 0, i; void *sense = NULL; dma_addr_t sense_handle; - unsigned long *sense_ptr; + void *sense_ptr; u32 opcode = 0; int ret = DCMD_SUCCESS; @@ -8257,6 +8257,13 @@ megasas_mgmt_fw_ioctl(struct megasas_instance *instance, } if (ioc->sense_len) { + /* make sure the pointer is part of the frame */ + if (ioc->sense_off > + (sizeof(union megasas_frame) - sizeof(__le64))) { + error = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + sense = dma_alloc_coherent(&instance->pdev->dev, ioc->sense_len, &sense_handle, GFP_KERNEL); if (!sense) { @@ -8264,12 +8271,11 @@ megasas_mgmt_fw_ioctl(struct megasas_instance *instance, goto out; } - sense_ptr = - (unsigned long *) ((unsigned long)cmd->frame + ioc->sense_off); + sense_ptr = (void *)cmd->frame + ioc->sense_off; if (instance->consistent_mask_64bit) - *sense_ptr = cpu_to_le64(sense_handle); + put_unaligned_le64(sense_handle, sense_ptr); else - *sense_ptr = cpu_to_le32(sense_handle); + put_unaligned_le32(sense_handle, sense_ptr); } /*

4 years, 8 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] fuse: fix bad inode" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From 5d069dbe8aaf2a197142558b6fb2978189ba3454 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi(a)redhat.com> Date: Thu, 10 Dec 2020 15:33:14 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] fuse: fix bad inode Jan Kara's analysis of the syzbot report (edited): The reproducer opens a directory on FUSE filesystem, it then attaches dnotify mark to the open directory. After that a fuse_do_getattr() call finds that attributes returned by the server are inconsistent, and calls make_bad_inode() which, among other things does: inode->i_mode = S_IFREG; This then confuses dnotify which doesn't tear down its structures properly and eventually crashes. Avoid calling make_bad_inode() on a live inode: switch to a private flag on the fuse inode. Also add the test to ops which the bad_inode_ops would have caught. This bug goes back to the initial merge of fuse in 2.6.14... Reported-by: syzbot+f427adf9324b92652ccc(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi(a)redhat.com> Tested-by: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> diff --git a/fs/fuse/acl.c b/fs/fuse/acl.c index 5a48cee6d7d3..f529075a2ce8 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/acl.c +++ b/fs/fuse/acl.c @@ -19,6 +19,9 @@ struct posix_acl *fuse_get_acl(struct inode *inode, int type) void *value = NULL; struct posix_acl *acl; + if (fuse_is_bad(inode)) + return ERR_PTR(-EIO); + if (!fc->posix_acl || fc->no_getxattr) return NULL; @@ -53,6 +56,9 @@ int fuse_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, int type) const char *name; int ret; + if (fuse_is_bad(inode)) + return -EIO; + if (!fc->posix_acl || fc->no_setxattr) return -EOPNOTSUPP; diff --git a/fs/fuse/dir.c b/fs/fuse/dir.c index 5d43af1169b7..78f9f209078c 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/dir.c +++ b/fs/fuse/dir.c @@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ static int fuse_dentry_revalidate(struct dentry *entry, unsigned int flags) int ret; inode = d_inode_rcu(entry); - if (inode && is_bad_inode(inode)) + if (inode && fuse_is_bad(inode)) goto invalid; else if (time_before64(fuse_dentry_time(entry), get_jiffies_64()) || (flags & (LOOKUP_EXCL | LOOKUP_REVAL))) { @@ -462,6 +462,9 @@ static struct dentry *fuse_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *entry, bool outarg_valid = true; bool locked; + if (fuse_is_bad(dir)) + return ERR_PTR(-EIO); + locked = fuse_lock_inode(dir); err = fuse_lookup_name(dir->i_sb, get_node_id(dir), &entry->d_name, &outarg, &inode); @@ -611,6 +614,9 @@ static int fuse_atomic_open(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *entry, struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn(dir); struct dentry *res = NULL; + if (fuse_is_bad(dir)) + return -EIO; + if (d_in_lookup(entry)) { res = fuse_lookup(dir, entry, 0); if (IS_ERR(res)) @@ -659,6 +665,9 @@ static int create_new_entry(struct fuse_mount *fm, struct fuse_args *args, int err; struct fuse_forget_link *forget; + if (fuse_is_bad(dir)) + return -EIO; + forget = fuse_alloc_forget(); if (!forget) return -ENOMEM; @@ -786,6 +795,9 @@ static int fuse_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *entry) struct fuse_mount *fm = get_fuse_mount(dir); FUSE_ARGS(args); + if (fuse_is_bad(dir)) + return -EIO; + args.opcode = FUSE_UNLINK; args.nodeid = get_node_id(dir); args.in_numargs = 1; @@ -822,6 +834,9 @@ static int fuse_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *entry) struct fuse_mount *fm = get_fuse_mount(dir); FUSE_ARGS(args); + if (fuse_is_bad(dir)) + return -EIO; + args.opcode = FUSE_RMDIR; args.nodeid = get_node_id(dir); args.in_numargs = 1; @@ -900,6 +915,9 @@ static int fuse_rename2(struct inode *olddir, struct dentry *oldent, struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn(olddir); int err; + if (fuse_is_bad(olddir)) + return -EIO; + if (flags & ~(RENAME_NOREPLACE | RENAME_EXCHANGE | RENAME_WHITEOUT)) return -EINVAL; @@ -1035,7 +1053,7 @@ static int fuse_do_getattr(struct inode *inode, struct kstat *stat, if (!err) { if (fuse_invalid_attr(&outarg.attr) || (inode->i_mode ^ outarg.attr.mode) & S_IFMT) { - make_bad_inode(inode); + fuse_make_bad(inode); err = -EIO; } else { fuse_change_attributes(inode, &outarg.attr, @@ -1237,6 +1255,9 @@ static int fuse_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) bool refreshed = false; int err = 0; + if (fuse_is_bad(inode)) + return -EIO; + if (!fuse_allow_current_process(fc)) return -EACCES; @@ -1332,7 +1353,7 @@ static const char *fuse_get_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, int err; err = -EIO; - if (is_bad_inode(inode)) + if (fuse_is_bad(inode)) goto out_err; if (fc->cache_symlinks) @@ -1380,7 +1401,7 @@ static int fuse_dir_fsync(struct file *file, loff_t start, loff_t end, struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn(inode); int err; - if (is_bad_inode(inode)) + if (fuse_is_bad(inode)) return -EIO; if (fc->no_fsyncdir) @@ -1679,7 +1700,7 @@ int fuse_do_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr, if (fuse_invalid_attr(&outarg.attr) || (inode->i_mode ^ outarg.attr.mode) & S_IFMT) { - make_bad_inode(inode); + fuse_make_bad(inode); err = -EIO; goto error; } @@ -1742,6 +1763,9 @@ static int fuse_setattr(struct dentry *entry, struct iattr *attr) struct file *file = (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_FILE) ? attr->ia_file : NULL; int ret; + if (fuse_is_bad(inode)) + return -EIO; + if (!fuse_allow_current_process(get_fuse_conn(inode))) return -EACCES; @@ -1800,6 +1824,9 @@ static int fuse_getattr(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat, struct inode *inode = d_inode(path->dentry); struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn(inode); + if (fuse_is_bad(inode)) + return -EIO; + if (!fuse_allow_current_process(fc)) { if (!request_mask) { /* diff --git a/fs/fuse/file.c b/fs/fuse/file.c index 349885353036..8cccecb55fb8 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/file.c +++ b/fs/fuse/file.c @@ -232,6 +232,9 @@ int fuse_open_common(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, bool isdir) bool dax_truncate = (file->f_flags & O_TRUNC) && fc->atomic_o_trunc && FUSE_IS_DAX(inode); + if (fuse_is_bad(inode)) + return -EIO; + err = generic_file_open(inode, file); if (err) return err; @@ -469,7 +472,7 @@ static int fuse_flush(struct file *file, fl_owner_t id) FUSE_ARGS(args); int err; - if (is_bad_inode(inode)) + if (fuse_is_bad(inode)) return -EIO; err = write_inode_now(inode, 1); @@ -541,7 +544,7 @@ static int fuse_fsync(struct file *file, loff_t start, loff_t end, struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn(inode); int err; - if (is_bad_inode(inode)) + if (fuse_is_bad(inode)) return -EIO; inode_lock(inode); @@ -865,7 +868,7 @@ static int fuse_readpage(struct file *file, struct page *page) int err; err = -EIO; - if (is_bad_inode(inode)) + if (fuse_is_bad(inode)) goto out; err = fuse_do_readpage(file, page); @@ -958,7 +961,7 @@ static void fuse_readahead(struct readahead_control *rac) struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn(inode); unsigned int i, max_pages, nr_pages = 0; - if (is_bad_inode(inode)) + if (fuse_is_bad(inode)) return; max_pages = min_t(unsigned int, fc->max_pages, @@ -1570,7 +1573,7 @@ static ssize_t fuse_file_read_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *to) struct fuse_file *ff = file->private_data; struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); - if (is_bad_inode(inode)) + if (fuse_is_bad(inode)) return -EIO; if (FUSE_IS_DAX(inode)) @@ -1588,7 +1591,7 @@ static ssize_t fuse_file_write_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *from) struct fuse_file *ff = file->private_data; struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); - if (is_bad_inode(inode)) + if (fuse_is_bad(inode)) return -EIO; if (FUSE_IS_DAX(inode)) @@ -2187,7 +2190,7 @@ static int fuse_writepages(struct address_space *mapping, int err; err = -EIO; - if (is_bad_inode(inode)) + if (fuse_is_bad(inode)) goto out; data.inode = inode; @@ -2972,7 +2975,7 @@ long fuse_ioctl_common(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, if (!fuse_allow_current_process(fc)) return -EACCES; - if (is_bad_inode(inode)) + if (fuse_is_bad(inode)) return -EIO; return fuse_do_ioctl(file, cmd, arg, flags); diff --git a/fs/fuse/fuse_i.h b/fs/fuse/fuse_i.h index d414c787e362..7c4b8cb93f9f 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/fuse_i.h +++ b/fs/fuse/fuse_i.h @@ -172,6 +172,8 @@ enum { FUSE_I_INIT_RDPLUS, /** An operation changing file size is in progress */ FUSE_I_SIZE_UNSTABLE, + /* Bad inode */ + FUSE_I_BAD, }; struct fuse_conn; @@ -859,6 +861,16 @@ static inline u64 fuse_get_attr_version(struct fuse_conn *fc) return atomic64_read(&fc->attr_version); } +static inline void fuse_make_bad(struct inode *inode) +{ + set_bit(FUSE_I_BAD, &get_fuse_inode(inode)->state); +} + +static inline bool fuse_is_bad(struct inode *inode) +{ + return unlikely(test_bit(FUSE_I_BAD, &get_fuse_inode(inode)->state)); +} + /** Device operations */ extern const struct file_operations fuse_dev_operations; diff --git a/fs/fuse/inode.c b/fs/fuse/inode.c index 36ab05315828..b0e18b470e91 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/inode.c +++ b/fs/fuse/inode.c @@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ static void fuse_evict_inode(struct inode *inode) fi->forget = NULL; } } - if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) && !is_bad_inode(inode)) { + if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) && !fuse_is_bad(inode)) { WARN_ON(!list_empty(&fi->write_files)); WARN_ON(!list_empty(&fi->queued_writes)); } @@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ struct inode *fuse_iget(struct super_block *sb, u64 nodeid, unlock_new_inode(inode); } else if ((inode->i_mode ^ attr->mode) & S_IFMT) { /* Inode has changed type, any I/O on the old should fail */ - make_bad_inode(inode); + fuse_make_bad(inode); iput(inode); goto retry; } diff --git a/fs/fuse/readdir.c b/fs/fuse/readdir.c index 3b5e91045871..3441ffa740f3 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/readdir.c +++ b/fs/fuse/readdir.c @@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ static int fuse_direntplus_link(struct file *file, dput(dentry); goto retry; } - if (is_bad_inode(inode)) { + if (fuse_is_bad(inode)) { dput(dentry); return -EIO; } @@ -568,7 +568,7 @@ int fuse_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); int err; - if (is_bad_inode(inode)) + if (fuse_is_bad(inode)) return -EIO; mutex_lock(&ff->readdir.lock); diff --git a/fs/fuse/xattr.c b/fs/fuse/xattr.c index 371bdcbc7233..cdea18de94f7 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/xattr.c +++ b/fs/fuse/xattr.c @@ -113,6 +113,9 @@ ssize_t fuse_listxattr(struct dentry *entry, char *list, size_t size) struct fuse_getxattr_out outarg; ssize_t ret; + if (fuse_is_bad(inode)) + return -EIO; + if (!fuse_allow_current_process(fm->fc)) return -EACCES; @@ -178,6 +181,9 @@ static int fuse_xattr_get(const struct xattr_handler *handler, struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *value, size_t size) { + if (fuse_is_bad(inode)) + return -EIO; + return fuse_getxattr(inode, name, value, size); } @@ -186,6 +192,9 @@ static int fuse_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) { + if (fuse_is_bad(inode)) + return -EIO; + if (!value) return fuse_removexattr(inode, name);

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