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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] io_uring: include dying ring in task_work "should cancel"" failed to apply to 6.1-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.1-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.1.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 3539b1467e94336d5854ebf976d9627bfb65d6c3 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025092128-embassy-flyable-e3fb@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.1.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 3539b1467e94336d5854ebf976d9627bfb65d6c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2025 10:21:14 -0600 Subject: [PATCH] io_uring: include dying ring in task_work "should cancel" state When running task_work for an exiting task, rather than perform the issue retry attempt, the task_work is canceled. However, this isn't done for a ring that has been closed. This can lead to requests being successfully completed post the ring being closed, which is somewhat confusing and surprising to an application. Rather than just check the task exit state, also include the ring ref state in deciding whether or not to terminate a given request when run from task_work. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 6.1+ Link: https://github.com/axboe/liburing/discussions/1459 Reported-by: Benedek Thaler <thaler(a)thaler.hu> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> diff --git a/io_uring/io_uring.c b/io_uring/io_uring.c index 93633613a165..bcec12256f34 100644 --- a/io_uring/io_uring.c +++ b/io_uring/io_uring.c @@ -1406,8 +1406,10 @@ static void io_req_task_cancel(struct io_kiocb *req, io_tw_token_t tw) void io_req_task_submit(struct io_kiocb *req, io_tw_token_t tw) { - io_tw_lock(req->ctx, tw); - if (unlikely(io_should_terminate_tw())) + struct io_ring_ctx *ctx = req->ctx; + + io_tw_lock(ctx, tw); + if (unlikely(io_should_terminate_tw(ctx))) io_req_defer_failed(req, -EFAULT); else if (req->flags & REQ_F_FORCE_ASYNC) io_queue_iowq(req); diff --git a/io_uring/io_uring.h b/io_uring/io_uring.h index abc6de227f74..1880902be6fd 100644 --- a/io_uring/io_uring.h +++ b/io_uring/io_uring.h @@ -476,9 +476,9 @@ static inline bool io_allowed_run_tw(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx) * 2) PF_KTHREAD is set, in which case the invoker of the task_work is * our fallback task_work. */ -static inline bool io_should_terminate_tw(void) +static inline bool io_should_terminate_tw(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx) { - return current->flags & (PF_KTHREAD | PF_EXITING); + return (current->flags & (PF_KTHREAD | PF_EXITING)) || percpu_ref_is_dying(&ctx->refs); } static inline void io_req_queue_tw_complete(struct io_kiocb *req, s32 res) diff --git a/io_uring/poll.c b/io_uring/poll.c index c786e587563b..6090a26975d4 100644 --- a/io_uring/poll.c +++ b/io_uring/poll.c @@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ static int io_poll_check_events(struct io_kiocb *req, io_tw_token_t tw) { int v; - if (unlikely(io_should_terminate_tw())) + if (unlikely(io_should_terminate_tw(req->ctx))) return -ECANCELED; do { diff --git a/io_uring/timeout.c b/io_uring/timeout.c index 7f13bfa9f2b6..17e3aab0af36 100644 --- a/io_uring/timeout.c +++ b/io_uring/timeout.c @@ -324,7 +324,7 @@ static void io_req_task_link_timeout(struct io_kiocb *req, io_tw_token_t tw) int ret; if (prev) { - if (!io_should_terminate_tw()) { + if (!io_should_terminate_tw(req->ctx)) { struct io_cancel_data cd = { .ctx = req->ctx, .data = prev->cqe.user_data, diff --git a/io_uring/uring_cmd.c b/io_uring/uring_cmd.c index 053bac89b6c0..213716e10d70 100644 --- a/io_uring/uring_cmd.c +++ b/io_uring/uring_cmd.c @@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ static void io_uring_cmd_work(struct io_kiocb *req, io_tw_token_t tw) struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd = io_kiocb_to_cmd(req, struct io_uring_cmd); unsigned int flags = IO_URING_F_COMPLETE_DEFER; - if (io_should_terminate_tw()) + if (io_should_terminate_tw(req->ctx)) flags |= IO_URING_F_TASK_DEAD; /* task_work executor checks the deffered list completion */

2 months, 1 week

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] io_uring: include dying ring in task_work "should cancel"" failed to apply to 6.6-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.6-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.6.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 3539b1467e94336d5854ebf976d9627bfb65d6c3 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025092127-emit-dean-5272@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.6.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 3539b1467e94336d5854ebf976d9627bfb65d6c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2025 10:21:14 -0600 Subject: [PATCH] io_uring: include dying ring in task_work "should cancel" state When running task_work for an exiting task, rather than perform the issue retry attempt, the task_work is canceled. However, this isn't done for a ring that has been closed. This can lead to requests being successfully completed post the ring being closed, which is somewhat confusing and surprising to an application. Rather than just check the task exit state, also include the ring ref state in deciding whether or not to terminate a given request when run from task_work. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 6.1+ Link: https://github.com/axboe/liburing/discussions/1459 Reported-by: Benedek Thaler <thaler(a)thaler.hu> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> diff --git a/io_uring/io_uring.c b/io_uring/io_uring.c index 93633613a165..bcec12256f34 100644 --- a/io_uring/io_uring.c +++ b/io_uring/io_uring.c @@ -1406,8 +1406,10 @@ static void io_req_task_cancel(struct io_kiocb *req, io_tw_token_t tw) void io_req_task_submit(struct io_kiocb *req, io_tw_token_t tw) { - io_tw_lock(req->ctx, tw); - if (unlikely(io_should_terminate_tw())) + struct io_ring_ctx *ctx = req->ctx; + + io_tw_lock(ctx, tw); + if (unlikely(io_should_terminate_tw(ctx))) io_req_defer_failed(req, -EFAULT); else if (req->flags & REQ_F_FORCE_ASYNC) io_queue_iowq(req); diff --git a/io_uring/io_uring.h b/io_uring/io_uring.h index abc6de227f74..1880902be6fd 100644 --- a/io_uring/io_uring.h +++ b/io_uring/io_uring.h @@ -476,9 +476,9 @@ static inline bool io_allowed_run_tw(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx) * 2) PF_KTHREAD is set, in which case the invoker of the task_work is * our fallback task_work. */ -static inline bool io_should_terminate_tw(void) +static inline bool io_should_terminate_tw(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx) { - return current->flags & (PF_KTHREAD | PF_EXITING); + return (current->flags & (PF_KTHREAD | PF_EXITING)) || percpu_ref_is_dying(&ctx->refs); } static inline void io_req_queue_tw_complete(struct io_kiocb *req, s32 res) diff --git a/io_uring/poll.c b/io_uring/poll.c index c786e587563b..6090a26975d4 100644 --- a/io_uring/poll.c +++ b/io_uring/poll.c @@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ static int io_poll_check_events(struct io_kiocb *req, io_tw_token_t tw) { int v; - if (unlikely(io_should_terminate_tw())) + if (unlikely(io_should_terminate_tw(req->ctx))) return -ECANCELED; do { diff --git a/io_uring/timeout.c b/io_uring/timeout.c index 7f13bfa9f2b6..17e3aab0af36 100644 --- a/io_uring/timeout.c +++ b/io_uring/timeout.c @@ -324,7 +324,7 @@ static void io_req_task_link_timeout(struct io_kiocb *req, io_tw_token_t tw) int ret; if (prev) { - if (!io_should_terminate_tw()) { + if (!io_should_terminate_tw(req->ctx)) { struct io_cancel_data cd = { .ctx = req->ctx, .data = prev->cqe.user_data, diff --git a/io_uring/uring_cmd.c b/io_uring/uring_cmd.c index 053bac89b6c0..213716e10d70 100644 --- a/io_uring/uring_cmd.c +++ b/io_uring/uring_cmd.c @@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ static void io_uring_cmd_work(struct io_kiocb *req, io_tw_token_t tw) struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd = io_kiocb_to_cmd(req, struct io_uring_cmd); unsigned int flags = IO_URING_F_COMPLETE_DEFER; - if (io_should_terminate_tw()) + if (io_should_terminate_tw(req->ctx)) flags |= IO_URING_F_TASK_DEAD; /* task_work executor checks the deffered list completion */

2 months, 1 week

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] mm/gup: local lru_add_drain() to avoid lru_add_drain_all()" failed to apply to 6.12-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.12-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.12.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x a09a8a1fbb374e0053b97306da9dbc05bd384685 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025092110-music-knoll-828f@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.12.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From a09a8a1fbb374e0053b97306da9dbc05bd384685 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hugh Dickins <hughd(a)google.com> Date: Mon, 8 Sep 2025 15:16:53 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] mm/gup: local lru_add_drain() to avoid lru_add_drain_all() In many cases, if collect_longterm_unpinnable_folios() does need to drain the LRU cache to release a reference, the cache in question is on this same CPU, and much more efficiently drained by a preliminary local lru_add_drain(), than the later cross-CPU lru_add_drain_all(). Marked for stable, to counter the increase in lru_add_drain_all()s from "mm/gup: check ref_count instead of lru before migration". Note for clean backports: can take 6.16 commit a03db236aebf ("gup: optimize longterm pin_user_pages() for large folio") first. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/66f2751f-283e-816d-9530-765db7edc465@google.com Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd(a)google.com> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar(a)kernel.org> Cc: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen(a)google.com> Cc: Chris Li <chrisl(a)kernel.org> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch(a)infradead.org> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg(a)ziepe.ca> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes(a)cmpxchg.org> Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard(a)nvidia.com> Cc: Keir Fraser <keirf(a)google.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i(a)gmail.com> Cc: Li Zhe <lizhe.67(a)bytedance.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy(a)infradead.org> Cc: Peter Xu <peterx(a)redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel(a)surriel.com> Cc: Shivank Garg <shivankg(a)amd.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka(a)suse.cz> Cc: Wei Xu <weixugc(a)google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will(a)kernel.org> Cc: yangge <yangge1116(a)126.com> Cc: Yuanchu Xie <yuanchu(a)google.com> Cc: Yu Zhao <yuzhao(a)google.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> diff --git a/mm/gup.c b/mm/gup.c index 82aec6443c0a..b47066a54f52 100644 --- a/mm/gup.c +++ b/mm/gup.c @@ -2287,8 +2287,8 @@ static unsigned long collect_longterm_unpinnable_folios( struct pages_or_folios *pofs) { unsigned long collected = 0; - bool drain_allow = true; struct folio *folio; + int drained = 0; long i = 0; for (folio = pofs_get_folio(pofs, i); folio; @@ -2307,10 +2307,17 @@ static unsigned long collect_longterm_unpinnable_folios( continue; } - if (drain_allow && folio_ref_count(folio) != - folio_expected_ref_count(folio) + 1) { + if (drained == 0 && + folio_ref_count(folio) != + folio_expected_ref_count(folio) + 1) { + lru_add_drain(); + drained = 1; + } + if (drained == 1 && + folio_ref_count(folio) != + folio_expected_ref_count(folio) + 1) { lru_add_drain_all(); - drain_allow = false; + drained = 2; } if (!folio_isolate_lru(folio))

2 months, 1 week

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] crypto: af_alg - Disallow concurrent writes in af_alg_sendmsg" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 1b34cbbf4f011a121ef7b2d7d6e6920a036d5285 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025092108-drinking-sloped-1caa@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 1b34cbbf4f011a121ef7b2d7d6e6920a036d5285 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2025 17:20:59 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] crypto: af_alg - Disallow concurrent writes in af_alg_sendmsg Issuing two writes to the same af_alg socket is bogus as the data will be interleaved in an unpredictable fashion. Furthermore, concurrent writes may create inconsistencies in the internal socket state. Disallow this by adding a new ctx->write field that indiciates exclusive ownership for writing. Fixes: 8ff590903d5 ("crypto: algif_skcipher - User-space interface for skcipher operations") Reported-by: Muhammad Alifa Ramdhan <ramdhan(a)starlabs.sg> Reported-by: Bing-Jhong Billy Jheng <billy(a)starlabs.sg> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> diff --git a/crypto/af_alg.c b/crypto/af_alg.c index 407f2c238f2c..ca6fdcc6c54a 100644 --- a/crypto/af_alg.c +++ b/crypto/af_alg.c @@ -970,6 +970,12 @@ int af_alg_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size, } lock_sock(sk); + if (ctx->write) { + release_sock(sk); + return -EBUSY; + } + ctx->write = true; + if (ctx->init && !ctx->more) { if (ctx->used) { err = -EINVAL; @@ -1105,6 +1111,7 @@ int af_alg_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size, unlock: af_alg_data_wakeup(sk); + ctx->write = false; release_sock(sk); return copied ?: err; diff --git a/include/crypto/if_alg.h b/include/crypto/if_alg.h index f7b3b93f3a49..0c70f3a55575 100644 --- a/include/crypto/if_alg.h +++ b/include/crypto/if_alg.h @@ -135,6 +135,7 @@ struct af_alg_async_req { * SG? * @enc: Cryptographic operation to be performed when * recvmsg is invoked. + * @write: True if we are in the middle of a write. * @init: True if metadata has been sent. * @len: Length of memory allocated for this data structure. * @inflight: Non-zero when AIO requests are in flight. @@ -151,10 +152,11 @@ struct af_alg_ctx { size_t used; atomic_t rcvused; - bool more; - bool merge; - bool enc; - bool init; + u32 more:1, + merge:1, + enc:1, + write:1, + init:1; unsigned int len;

2 months, 1 week

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] crypto: af_alg - Disallow concurrent writes in af_alg_sendmsg" failed to apply to 5.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.4-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.4.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 1b34cbbf4f011a121ef7b2d7d6e6920a036d5285 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025092108-unmarked-tropical-1899@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.4.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 1b34cbbf4f011a121ef7b2d7d6e6920a036d5285 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2025 17:20:59 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] crypto: af_alg - Disallow concurrent writes in af_alg_sendmsg Issuing two writes to the same af_alg socket is bogus as the data will be interleaved in an unpredictable fashion. Furthermore, concurrent writes may create inconsistencies in the internal socket state. Disallow this by adding a new ctx->write field that indiciates exclusive ownership for writing. Fixes: 8ff590903d5 ("crypto: algif_skcipher - User-space interface for skcipher operations") Reported-by: Muhammad Alifa Ramdhan <ramdhan(a)starlabs.sg> Reported-by: Bing-Jhong Billy Jheng <billy(a)starlabs.sg> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> diff --git a/crypto/af_alg.c b/crypto/af_alg.c index 407f2c238f2c..ca6fdcc6c54a 100644 --- a/crypto/af_alg.c +++ b/crypto/af_alg.c @@ -970,6 +970,12 @@ int af_alg_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size, } lock_sock(sk); + if (ctx->write) { + release_sock(sk); + return -EBUSY; + } + ctx->write = true; + if (ctx->init && !ctx->more) { if (ctx->used) { err = -EINVAL; @@ -1105,6 +1111,7 @@ int af_alg_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size, unlock: af_alg_data_wakeup(sk); + ctx->write = false; release_sock(sk); return copied ?: err; diff --git a/include/crypto/if_alg.h b/include/crypto/if_alg.h index f7b3b93f3a49..0c70f3a55575 100644 --- a/include/crypto/if_alg.h +++ b/include/crypto/if_alg.h @@ -135,6 +135,7 @@ struct af_alg_async_req { * SG? * @enc: Cryptographic operation to be performed when * recvmsg is invoked. + * @write: True if we are in the middle of a write. * @init: True if metadata has been sent. * @len: Length of memory allocated for this data structure. * @inflight: Non-zero when AIO requests are in flight. @@ -151,10 +152,11 @@ struct af_alg_ctx { size_t used; atomic_t rcvused; - bool more; - bool merge; - bool enc; - bool init; + u32 more:1, + merge:1, + enc:1, + write:1, + init:1; unsigned int len;

2 months, 1 week

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] crypto: af_alg - Disallow concurrent writes in af_alg_sendmsg" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 1b34cbbf4f011a121ef7b2d7d6e6920a036d5285 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025092107-crowbar-posting-c6ba@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 1b34cbbf4f011a121ef7b2d7d6e6920a036d5285 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2025 17:20:59 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] crypto: af_alg - Disallow concurrent writes in af_alg_sendmsg Issuing two writes to the same af_alg socket is bogus as the data will be interleaved in an unpredictable fashion. Furthermore, concurrent writes may create inconsistencies in the internal socket state. Disallow this by adding a new ctx->write field that indiciates exclusive ownership for writing. Fixes: 8ff590903d5 ("crypto: algif_skcipher - User-space interface for skcipher operations") Reported-by: Muhammad Alifa Ramdhan <ramdhan(a)starlabs.sg> Reported-by: Bing-Jhong Billy Jheng <billy(a)starlabs.sg> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> diff --git a/crypto/af_alg.c b/crypto/af_alg.c index 407f2c238f2c..ca6fdcc6c54a 100644 --- a/crypto/af_alg.c +++ b/crypto/af_alg.c @@ -970,6 +970,12 @@ int af_alg_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size, } lock_sock(sk); + if (ctx->write) { + release_sock(sk); + return -EBUSY; + } + ctx->write = true; + if (ctx->init && !ctx->more) { if (ctx->used) { err = -EINVAL; @@ -1105,6 +1111,7 @@ int af_alg_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size, unlock: af_alg_data_wakeup(sk); + ctx->write = false; release_sock(sk); return copied ?: err; diff --git a/include/crypto/if_alg.h b/include/crypto/if_alg.h index f7b3b93f3a49..0c70f3a55575 100644 --- a/include/crypto/if_alg.h +++ b/include/crypto/if_alg.h @@ -135,6 +135,7 @@ struct af_alg_async_req { * SG? * @enc: Cryptographic operation to be performed when * recvmsg is invoked. + * @write: True if we are in the middle of a write. * @init: True if metadata has been sent. * @len: Length of memory allocated for this data structure. * @inflight: Non-zero when AIO requests are in flight. @@ -151,10 +152,11 @@ struct af_alg_ctx { size_t used; atomic_t rcvused; - bool more; - bool merge; - bool enc; - bool init; + u32 more:1, + merge:1, + enc:1, + write:1, + init:1; unsigned int len;

2 months, 1 week

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] x86/sev: Guard sev_evict_cache() with CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT" failed to apply to 6.1-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.1-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.1.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 7f830e126dc357fc086905ce9730140fd4528d66 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025092126-fabulous-despair-ac21@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.1.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 7f830e126dc357fc086905ce9730140fd4528d66 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com> Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2025 11:04:12 -0500 Subject: [PATCH] x86/sev: Guard sev_evict_cache() with CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT The sev_evict_cache() is guest-related code and should be guarded by CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT, not CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV. CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT=y is required for a guest to run properly as an SEV-SNP guest, but a guest kernel built with CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=n would get the stub function of sev_evict_cache() instead of the version that performs the actual eviction. Move the function declarations under the appropriate #ifdef. Fixes: 7b306dfa326f ("x86/sev: Evict cache lines during SNP memory validation") Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp(a)alien8.de> Cc: stable(a)kernel.org # 6.16.x Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/70e38f2c4a549063de54052c9f64929705313526.17577089… diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h index 02236962fdb1..465b19fd1a2d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h @@ -562,6 +562,24 @@ enum es_result sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(struct ghcb *ghcb, extern struct ghcb *boot_ghcb; +static inline void sev_evict_cache(void *va, int npages) +{ + volatile u8 val __always_unused; + u8 *bytes = va; + int page_idx; + + /* + * For SEV guests, a read from the first/last cache-lines of a 4K page + * using the guest key is sufficient to cause a flush of all cache-lines + * associated with that 4K page without incurring all the overhead of a + * full CLFLUSH sequence. + */ + for (page_idx = 0; page_idx < npages; page_idx++) { + val = bytes[page_idx * PAGE_SIZE]; + val = bytes[page_idx * PAGE_SIZE + PAGE_SIZE - 1]; + } +} + #else /* !CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */ #define snp_vmpl 0 @@ -605,6 +623,7 @@ static inline int snp_send_guest_request(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc, static inline int snp_svsm_vtpm_send_command(u8 *buffer) { return -ENODEV; } static inline void __init snp_secure_tsc_prepare(void) { } static inline void __init snp_secure_tsc_init(void) { } +static inline void sev_evict_cache(void *va, int npages) {} #endif /* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */ @@ -619,24 +638,6 @@ int rmp_make_shared(u64 pfn, enum pg_level level); void snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int npages); void kdump_sev_callback(void); void snp_fixup_e820_tables(void); - -static inline void sev_evict_cache(void *va, int npages) -{ - volatile u8 val __always_unused; - u8 *bytes = va; - int page_idx; - - /* - * For SEV guests, a read from the first/last cache-lines of a 4K page - * using the guest key is sufficient to cause a flush of all cache-lines - * associated with that 4K page without incurring all the overhead of a - * full CLFLUSH sequence. - */ - for (page_idx = 0; page_idx < npages; page_idx++) { - val = bytes[page_idx * PAGE_SIZE]; - val = bytes[page_idx * PAGE_SIZE + PAGE_SIZE - 1]; - } -} #else static inline bool snp_probe_rmptable_info(void) { return false; } static inline int snp_rmptable_init(void) { return -ENOSYS; } @@ -652,7 +653,6 @@ static inline int rmp_make_shared(u64 pfn, enum pg_level level) { return -ENODEV static inline void snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int npages) {} static inline void kdump_sev_callback(void) { } static inline void snp_fixup_e820_tables(void) {} -static inline void sev_evict_cache(void *va, int npages) {} #endif #endif

2 months, 1 week

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] x86/sev: Guard sev_evict_cache() with CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT" failed to apply to 6.6-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.6-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.6.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 7f830e126dc357fc086905ce9730140fd4528d66 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025092125-stitch-starting-35cb@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.6.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 7f830e126dc357fc086905ce9730140fd4528d66 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com> Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2025 11:04:12 -0500 Subject: [PATCH] x86/sev: Guard sev_evict_cache() with CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT The sev_evict_cache() is guest-related code and should be guarded by CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT, not CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV. CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT=y is required for a guest to run properly as an SEV-SNP guest, but a guest kernel built with CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=n would get the stub function of sev_evict_cache() instead of the version that performs the actual eviction. Move the function declarations under the appropriate #ifdef. Fixes: 7b306dfa326f ("x86/sev: Evict cache lines during SNP memory validation") Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp(a)alien8.de> Cc: stable(a)kernel.org # 6.16.x Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/70e38f2c4a549063de54052c9f64929705313526.17577089… diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h index 02236962fdb1..465b19fd1a2d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h @@ -562,6 +562,24 @@ enum es_result sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(struct ghcb *ghcb, extern struct ghcb *boot_ghcb; +static inline void sev_evict_cache(void *va, int npages) +{ + volatile u8 val __always_unused; + u8 *bytes = va; + int page_idx; + + /* + * For SEV guests, a read from the first/last cache-lines of a 4K page + * using the guest key is sufficient to cause a flush of all cache-lines + * associated with that 4K page without incurring all the overhead of a + * full CLFLUSH sequence. + */ + for (page_idx = 0; page_idx < npages; page_idx++) { + val = bytes[page_idx * PAGE_SIZE]; + val = bytes[page_idx * PAGE_SIZE + PAGE_SIZE - 1]; + } +} + #else /* !CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */ #define snp_vmpl 0 @@ -605,6 +623,7 @@ static inline int snp_send_guest_request(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc, static inline int snp_svsm_vtpm_send_command(u8 *buffer) { return -ENODEV; } static inline void __init snp_secure_tsc_prepare(void) { } static inline void __init snp_secure_tsc_init(void) { } +static inline void sev_evict_cache(void *va, int npages) {} #endif /* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */ @@ -619,24 +638,6 @@ int rmp_make_shared(u64 pfn, enum pg_level level); void snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int npages); void kdump_sev_callback(void); void snp_fixup_e820_tables(void); - -static inline void sev_evict_cache(void *va, int npages) -{ - volatile u8 val __always_unused; - u8 *bytes = va; - int page_idx; - - /* - * For SEV guests, a read from the first/last cache-lines of a 4K page - * using the guest key is sufficient to cause a flush of all cache-lines - * associated with that 4K page without incurring all the overhead of a - * full CLFLUSH sequence. - */ - for (page_idx = 0; page_idx < npages; page_idx++) { - val = bytes[page_idx * PAGE_SIZE]; - val = bytes[page_idx * PAGE_SIZE + PAGE_SIZE - 1]; - } -} #else static inline bool snp_probe_rmptable_info(void) { return false; } static inline int snp_rmptable_init(void) { return -ENOSYS; } @@ -652,7 +653,6 @@ static inline int rmp_make_shared(u64 pfn, enum pg_level level) { return -ENODEV static inline void snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int npages) {} static inline void kdump_sev_callback(void) { } static inline void snp_fixup_e820_tables(void) {} -static inline void sev_evict_cache(void *va, int npages) {} #endif #endif

2 months, 1 week

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] btrfs: tree-checker: fix the incorrect inode ref size check" failed to apply to 5.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.4-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.4.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 96fa515e70f3e4b98685ef8cac9d737fc62f10e1 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025092135-breeding-chrome-585a@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.4.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 96fa515e70f3e4b98685ef8cac9d737fc62f10e1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Qu Wenruo <wqu(a)suse.com> Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2025 07:54:06 +0930 Subject: [PATCH] btrfs: tree-checker: fix the incorrect inode ref size check [BUG] Inside check_inode_ref(), we need to make sure every structure, including the btrfs_inode_extref header, is covered by the item. But our code is incorrectly using "sizeof(iref)", where @iref is just a pointer. This means "sizeof(iref)" will always be "sizeof(void *)", which is much smaller than "sizeof(struct btrfs_inode_extref)". This will allow some bad inode extrefs to sneak in, defeating tree-checker. [FIX] Fix the typo by calling "sizeof(*iref)", which is the same as "sizeof(struct btrfs_inode_extref)", and will be the correct behavior we want. Fixes: 71bf92a9b877 ("btrfs: tree-checker: Add check for INODE_REF") CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 6.1+ Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn(a)wdc.com> Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu(a)suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com> diff --git a/fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c b/fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c index 0f556f4de3f9..a997c7cc35a2 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c @@ -1756,10 +1756,10 @@ static int check_inode_ref(struct extent_buffer *leaf, while (ptr < end) { u16 namelen; - if (unlikely(ptr + sizeof(iref) > end)) { + if (unlikely(ptr + sizeof(*iref) > end)) { inode_ref_err(leaf, slot, "inode ref overflow, ptr %lu end %lu inode_ref_size %zu", - ptr, end, sizeof(iref)); + ptr, end, sizeof(*iref)); return -EUCLEAN; }

2 months, 1 week

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] iommu/amd/pgtbl: Fix possible race while increase page table" failed to apply to 5.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.4-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.4.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 1e56310b40fd2e7e0b9493da9ff488af145bdd0c # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025092105-gawk-armful-317b@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.4.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 1e56310b40fd2e7e0b9493da9ff488af145bdd0c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vasant Hegde <vasant.hegde(a)amd.com> Date: Sat, 13 Sep 2025 06:26:57 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] iommu/amd/pgtbl: Fix possible race while increase page table level The AMD IOMMU host page table implementation supports dynamic page table levels (up to 6 levels), starting with a 3-level configuration that expands based on IOVA address. The kernel maintains a root pointer and current page table level to enable proper page table walks in alloc_pte()/fetch_pte() operations. The IOMMU IOVA allocator initially starts with 32-bit address and onces its exhuasted it switches to 64-bit address (max address is determined based on IOMMU and device DMA capability). To support larger IOVA, AMD IOMMU driver increases page table level. But in unmap path (iommu_v1_unmap_pages()), fetch_pte() reads pgtable->[root/mode] without lock. So its possible that in exteme corner case, when increase_address_space() is updating pgtable->[root/mode], fetch_pte() reads wrong page table level (pgtable->mode). It does compare the value with level encoded in page table and returns NULL. This will result is iommu_unmap ops to fail and upper layer may retry/log WARN_ON. CPU 0 CPU 1 ------ ------ map pages unmap pages alloc_pte() -> increase_address_space() iommu_v1_unmap_pages() -> fetch_pte() pgtable->root = pte (new root value) READ pgtable->[mode/root] Reads new root, old mode Updates mode (pgtable->mode += 1) Since Page table level updates are infrequent and already synchronized with a spinlock, implement seqcount to enable lock-free read operations on the read path. Fixes: 754265bcab7 ("iommu/amd: Fix race in increase_address_space()") Reported-by: Alejandro Jimenez <alejandro.j.jimenez(a)oracle.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: Joao Martins <joao.m.martins(a)oracle.com> Cc: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Vasant Hegde <vasant.hegde(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <joerg.roedel(a)amd.com> diff --git a/drivers/iommu/amd/amd_iommu_types.h b/drivers/iommu/amd/amd_iommu_types.h index 5219d7ddfdaa..95f63c5f6159 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/amd/amd_iommu_types.h +++ b/drivers/iommu/amd/amd_iommu_types.h @@ -555,6 +555,7 @@ struct gcr3_tbl_info { }; struct amd_io_pgtable { + seqcount_t seqcount; /* Protects root/mode update */ struct io_pgtable pgtbl; int mode; u64 *root; diff --git a/drivers/iommu/amd/io_pgtable.c b/drivers/iommu/amd/io_pgtable.c index a91e71f981ef..70c2f5b1631b 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/amd/io_pgtable.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/amd/io_pgtable.c @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/dma-mapping.h> +#include <linux/seqlock.h> #include <asm/barrier.h> @@ -130,8 +131,11 @@ static bool increase_address_space(struct amd_io_pgtable *pgtable, *pte = PM_LEVEL_PDE(pgtable->mode, iommu_virt_to_phys(pgtable->root)); + write_seqcount_begin(&pgtable->seqcount); pgtable->root = pte; pgtable->mode += 1; + write_seqcount_end(&pgtable->seqcount); + amd_iommu_update_and_flush_device_table(domain); pte = NULL; @@ -153,6 +157,7 @@ static u64 *alloc_pte(struct amd_io_pgtable *pgtable, { unsigned long last_addr = address + (page_size - 1); struct io_pgtable_cfg *cfg = &pgtable->pgtbl.cfg; + unsigned int seqcount; int level, end_lvl; u64 *pte, *page; @@ -170,8 +175,14 @@ static u64 *alloc_pte(struct amd_io_pgtable *pgtable, } - level = pgtable->mode - 1; - pte = &pgtable->root[PM_LEVEL_INDEX(level, address)]; + do { + seqcount = read_seqcount_begin(&pgtable->seqcount); + + level = pgtable->mode - 1; + pte = &pgtable->root[PM_LEVEL_INDEX(level, address)]; + } while (read_seqcount_retry(&pgtable->seqcount, seqcount)); + + address = PAGE_SIZE_ALIGN(address, page_size); end_lvl = PAGE_SIZE_LEVEL(page_size); @@ -249,6 +260,7 @@ static u64 *fetch_pte(struct amd_io_pgtable *pgtable, unsigned long *page_size) { int level; + unsigned int seqcount; u64 *pte; *page_size = 0; @@ -256,8 +268,12 @@ static u64 *fetch_pte(struct amd_io_pgtable *pgtable, if (address > PM_LEVEL_SIZE(pgtable->mode)) return NULL; - level = pgtable->mode - 1; - pte = &pgtable->root[PM_LEVEL_INDEX(level, address)]; + do { + seqcount = read_seqcount_begin(&pgtable->seqcount); + level = pgtable->mode - 1; + pte = &pgtable->root[PM_LEVEL_INDEX(level, address)]; + } while (read_seqcount_retry(&pgtable->seqcount, seqcount)); + *page_size = PTE_LEVEL_PAGE_SIZE(level); while (level > 0) { @@ -541,6 +557,7 @@ static struct io_pgtable *v1_alloc_pgtable(struct io_pgtable_cfg *cfg, void *coo if (!pgtable->root) return NULL; pgtable->mode = PAGE_MODE_3_LEVEL; + seqcount_init(&pgtable->seqcount); cfg->pgsize_bitmap = amd_iommu_pgsize_bitmap; cfg->ias = IOMMU_IN_ADDR_BIT_SIZE;

2 months, 1 week

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