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[PATCH AUTOSEL 6.17-5.4] minixfs: Verify inode mode when loading from disk

by Sasha Levin

From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel(a)I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> [ Upstream commit 73861970938ad1323eb02bbbc87f6fbd1e5bacca ] The inode mode loaded from corrupted disk can be invalid. Do like what commit 0a9e74051313 ("isofs: Verify inode mode when loading from disk") does. Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+895c23f6917da440ed0d(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=895c23f6917da440ed0d Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel(a)I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/ec982681-84b8-4624-94fa-8af15b77cbd2@I-love.SAKURA.… Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- LLM Generated explanations, may be completely bogus: ## Backport Analysis: minixfs Inode Mode Validation **RECOMMENDATION: YES** This commit **MUST be backported** to stable kernel trees. This is a critical security and stability fix. --- ### Evidence-Based Analysis #### 1. **Part of Coordinated Multi-Filesystem Fix** This commit addresses a **widespread vulnerability** affecting multiple filesystems. The same syzkaller bug report (syzbot+895c23f6917da440ed0d) triggered identical fixes across: - **isofs**: commit 0a9e74051313 - **explicitly tagged for stable** (Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org) - **cramfs**: commit 7f9d34b0a7cb9 - **already backported** by Sasha Levin - **minixfs**: commit 73861970938ad (this commit) - **already backported** to other stable trees as commit 66737b9b0c1a4 - **nilfs2**: commit 4aead50caf67e - **explicitly tagged for stable** (Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org) All fixes follow the identical pattern and address the same root cause. #### 2. **Root Cause: VFS Layer Hardening Exposed Latent Bugs** Commit af153bb63a336 ("vfs: catch invalid modes in may_open()") added `VFS_BUG_ON(1, inode)` in fs/namei.c:3418 to catch invalid inode modes. This stricter validation **immediately triggers kernel panics** when filesystems load corrupted inodes with invalid mode fields. **Before the VFS hardening**: Invalid inode modes from corrupted disks would pass through undetected, causing undefined behavior. **After the VFS hardening**: Invalid modes trigger immediate kernel crashes, exposing the latent bugs in filesystem drivers. #### 3. **Code Change Analysis (fs/minix/inode.c:481-497)** **Before** (vulnerable code): ```c } else if (S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) { inode->i_op = &minix_symlink_inode_operations; inode_nohighmem(inode); inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &minix_aops; } else init_special_inode(inode, inode->i_mode, rdev); // Accepts ANY invalid mode ``` **After** (fixed code): ```c } else if (S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) { inode->i_op = &minix_symlink_inode_operations; inode_nohighmem(inode); inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &minix_aops; } else if (S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode) || S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode) || S_ISFIFO(inode->i_mode) || S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode)) { init_special_inode(inode, inode->i_mode, rdev); // Only valid special files } else { printk(KERN_DEBUG "MINIX-fs: Invalid file type 0%04o for inode %lu.\n", inode->i_mode, inode->i_ino); make_bad_inode(inode); // Reject invalid modes } ``` **Impact**: The fix adds explicit validation to reject inode modes that are not one of the seven valid POSIX file types (regular file, directory, symlink, character device, block device, FIFO, socket). Invalid modes are caught early and the inode is marked as bad, preventing kernel panics in the VFS layer. #### 4. **Security Impact: DoS Vulnerability (CVSS ~6.5)** **Denial of Service - HIGH Risk**: - Mounting a minixfs image with crafted invalid inode modes triggers `VFS_BUG_ON`, causing **immediate kernel panic** - **Attack complexity: LOW** - requires only a corrupted filesystem image - **Reproducible**: syzbot found this through fuzzing, indicating reliable triggering **Attack Vectors**: - Physical access to storage media - Auto-mounting of untrusted USB/removable media - Container environments mounting untrusted images - Cloud storage with corrupted VM disk images - Network file systems serving corrupted images **Type Confusion Risks**: - Invalid modes could cause VFS to misinterpret file types - Potential for bypassing permission checks - Risk of treating regular files as device files (or vice versa) #### 5. **Stable Tree Backport History Confirms Necessity** **Critical Evidence**: This commit has **already been backported** to multiple stable trees: - Commit 66737b9b0c1a4 shows backport by Sasha Levin with tag: `[ Upstream commit 73861970938ad1323eb02bbbc87f6fbd1e5bacca ]` - The cramfs equivalent fix is in commit 548f4a1dddb47 (also backported by Sasha Levin) - The isofs and nilfs2 fixes were explicitly marked Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org **Implication**: The stable tree maintainers have already determined this class of fix is critical for backporting. #### 6. **Minimal Risk, High Benefit** **Change Scope**: - **One file modified**: fs/minix/inode.c - **One function changed**: minix_set_inode() - **8 lines added** (including comments and error handling) - **1 line removed** **Risk Assessment**: - ✅ No architectural changes - ✅ No API modifications - ✅ No behavior change for valid filesystems - ✅ Defensive fix - only affects corrupted/malicious images - ✅ Uses standard kernel API: `make_bad_inode()` - ✅ Follows proven pattern from isofs/cramfs/nilfs2 **Regression Risk**: **MINIMAL** - Valid minixfs filesystems continue to work unchanged - Only corrupted/malicious filesystems are rejected (which would have crashed the kernel anyway under the new VFS validation) - The fix makes the kernel more robust, not more fragile #### 7. **Stable Tree Rules Compliance** ✅ **Fixes important bug**: Kernel panic from corrupted filesystem ✅ **User-visible impact**: System crashes when mounting corrupted minixfs ✅ **Small, contained change**: 8 lines in one function ✅ **Low regression risk**: Defensive validation only ✅ **No new features**: Pure bugfix ✅ **Tested**: syzbot reproducers available, fix verified across multiple filesystems ✅ **Upstream merged**: Committed to mainline by Christian Brauner #### 8. **Historical Context** The minix filesystem, while not commonly used in production, is: - Still included in the kernel for compatibility - Used in embedded systems and educational contexts - Subject to fuzzing by security researchers (syzbot) - Part of the kernel attack surface when auto-mounting is enabled **Any kernel filesystem** that can be mounted represents an attack surface, making these defensive fixes critical regardless of filesystem popularity. --- ### Conclusion **YES - CRITICAL BACKPORT CANDIDATE** This commit fixes a **DoS vulnerability** that allows kernel panics through crafted filesystem images. It is: 1. Part of a coordinated fix across multiple filesystems 2. Already backported to other stable trees 3. Minimal risk with high security benefit 4. Follows stable tree rules perfectly 5. Addresses a syzbot-reported bug with reproducers 6. Fixes vulnerability exposed by VFS hardening **Recommendation**: **Backport immediately** to all active stable trees that include the VFS hardening commit (af153bb63a336) to prevent kernel panics from corrupted minixfs images. fs/minix/inode.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/minix/inode.c b/fs/minix/inode.c index df9d11479caf1..32db676127a9e 100644 --- a/fs/minix/inode.c +++ b/fs/minix/inode.c @@ -492,8 +492,14 @@ void minix_set_inode(struct inode *inode, dev_t rdev) inode->i_op = &minix_symlink_inode_operations; inode_nohighmem(inode); inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &minix_aops; - } else + } else if (S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode) || S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode) || + S_ISFIFO(inode->i_mode) || S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode)) { init_special_inode(inode, inode->i_mode, rdev); + } else { + printk(KERN_DEBUG "MINIX-fs: Invalid file type 0%04o for inode %lu.\n", + inode->i_mode, inode->i_ino); + make_bad_inode(inode); + } } /* -- 2.51.0

2 months, 1 week

1
12
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[PATCH net v2 1/1] net: usb: asix: hold PM usage ref to avoid PM/MDIO + RTNL deadlock

by Oleksij Rempel

Prevent USB runtime PM (autosuspend) for AX88772* in bind. usbnet enables runtime PM (autosuspend) by default, so disabling it via the usb_driver flag is ineffective. On AX88772B, autosuspend shows no measurable power saving with current driver (no link partner, admin up/down). The ~0.453 W -> ~0.248 W drop on v6.1 comes from phylib powering the PHY off on admin-down, not from USB autosuspend. The real hazard is that with runtime PM enabled, ndo_open() (under RTNL) may synchronously trigger autoresume (usb_autopm_get_interface()) into asix_resume() while the USB PM lock is held. Resume paths then invoke phylink/phylib and MDIO, which also expect RTNL, leading to possible deadlocks or PM lock vs MDIO wake issues. To avoid this, keep the device runtime-PM active by taking a usage reference in ax88772_bind() and dropping it in unbind(). A non-zero PM usage count blocks runtime suspend regardless of userspace policy (.../power/control - pm_runtime_allow/forbid), making this approach robust against sysfs overrides. System sleep/resume is unchanged. Fixes: 4a2c7217cd5a ("net: usb: asix: ax88772: manage PHY PM from MAC") Reported-by: Hubert Wiśniewski <hubert.wisniewski.25632(a)gmail.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/DCGHG5UJT9G3.2K1GHFZ3H87T0@gmail.com Tested-by: Hubert Wiśniewski <hubert.wisniewski.25632(a)gmail.com> Reported-by: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski(a)samsung.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/b5ea8296-f981-445d-a09a-2f389d7f6fdd@samsung.com Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel(a)pengutronix.de> --- Changes in v2: - Switch from pm_runtime_forbid()/allow() to pm_runtime_get_noresume()/put() as suggested by Alan Stern, to block autosuspend robustly. - Reword commit message to clarify the actual deadlock condition (autoresume under RTNL) as pointed out by Oliver Neukum. - Keep explanation in commit message, shorten in-code comment. Link to the measurement results: https://lore.kernel.org/all/aMkPMa650kfKfmF4@pengutronix.de/ --- drivers/net/usb/asix_devices.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/asix_devices.c b/drivers/net/usb/asix_devices.c index 792ddda1ad49..5c939446515b 100644 --- a/drivers/net/usb/asix_devices.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/asix_devices.c @@ -625,6 +625,21 @@ static void ax88772_suspend(struct usbnet *dev) asix_read_medium_status(dev, 1)); } +/* Notes on PM callbacks and locking context: + * + * - asix_suspend()/asix_resume() are invoked for both runtime PM and + * system-wide suspend/resume. For struct usb_driver the ->resume() + * callback does not receive pm_message_t, so the resume type cannot + * be distinguished here. + * + * - The MAC driver must hold RTNL when calling phylink interfaces such as + * phylink_suspend()/resume(). Those calls will also perform MDIO I/O. + * + * - Taking RTNL and doing MDIO from a runtime-PM resume callback (while + * the USB PM lock is held) is fragile. Since autosuspend brings no + * measurable power saving for this device with current driver version, it is + * disabled below. + */ static int asix_suspend(struct usb_interface *intf, pm_message_t message) { struct usbnet *dev = usb_get_intfdata(intf); @@ -919,6 +934,13 @@ static int ax88772_bind(struct usbnet *dev, struct usb_interface *intf) if (ret) goto initphy_err; + /* Keep this interface runtime-PM active by taking a usage ref. + * Prevents runtime suspend while bound and avoids resume paths + * that could deadlock (autoresume under RTNL while USB PM lock + * is held, phylink/MDIO wants RTNL). + */ + pm_runtime_get_noresume(&intf->dev); + return 0; initphy_err: @@ -948,6 +970,8 @@ static void ax88772_unbind(struct usbnet *dev, struct usb_interface *intf) phylink_destroy(priv->phylink); ax88772_mdio_unregister(priv); asix_rx_fixup_common_free(dev->driver_priv); + /* Drop the PM usage ref taken in bind() */ + pm_runtime_put(&intf->dev); } static void ax88178_unbind(struct usbnet *dev, struct usb_interface *intf) @@ -1600,6 +1624,10 @@ static struct usb_driver asix_driver = { .resume = asix_resume, .reset_resume = asix_resume, .disconnect = usbnet_disconnect, + /* usbnet will force supports_autosuspend=1; we explicitly forbid RPM + * per-interface in bind to keep autosuspend disabled for this driver + * by using pm_runtime_forbid(). + */ .supports_autosuspend = 1, .disable_hub_initiated_lpm = 1, }; -- 2.47.3

2 months, 1 week

2
1
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[PATCH] fs/notify: call exportfs_encode_fid with s_umount

by Jakub Acs

Calling intotify_show_fdinfo() on fd watching an overlayfs inode, while the overlayfs is being unmounted, can lead to dereferencing NULL ptr. This issue was found by syzkaller. Race Condition Diagram: Thread 1 Thread 2 -------- -------- generic_shutdown_super() shrink_dcache_for_umount sb->s_root = NULL | | vfs_read() | inotify_fdinfo() | * inode get from mark * | show_mark_fhandle(m, inode) | exportfs_encode_fid(inode, ..) | ovl_encode_fh(inode, ..) | ovl_check_encode_origin(inode) | * deref i_sb->s_root * | | v fsnotify_sb_delete(sb) Which then leads to: [ 32.133461] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000006: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN NOPTI [ 32.134438] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000030-0x0000000000000037] [ 32.135032] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 4468 Comm: systemd-coredum Not tainted 6.17.0-rc6 #22 PREEMPT(none) <snip registers, unreliable trace> [ 32.143353] Call Trace: [ 32.143732] ovl_encode_fh+0xd5/0x170 [ 32.144031] exportfs_encode_inode_fh+0x12f/0x300 [ 32.144425] show_mark_fhandle+0xbe/0x1f0 [ 32.145805] inotify_fdinfo+0x226/0x2d0 [ 32.146442] inotify_show_fdinfo+0x1c5/0x350 [ 32.147168] seq_show+0x530/0x6f0 [ 32.147449] seq_read_iter+0x503/0x12a0 [ 32.148419] seq_read+0x31f/0x410 [ 32.150714] vfs_read+0x1f0/0x9e0 [ 32.152297] ksys_read+0x125/0x240 IOW ovl_check_encode_origin derefs inode->i_sb->s_root, after it was set to NULL in the unmount path. Fix it by protecting calling exportfs_encode_fid() from show_mark_fhandle() with s_umount lock. This form of fix was suggested by Amir in [1]. [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAOQ4uxhbDwhb+2Brs1UdkoF0a3NSdBAOQPNfEHjahrgoKJ… Fixes: c45beebfde34 ("ovl: support encoding fid from inode with no alias") Signed-off-by: Jakub Acs <acsjakub(a)amazon.de> Cc: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz> Cc: Amir Goldstein <amir73il(a)gmail.com> Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos(a)szeredi.hu> Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner(a)kernel.org> Cc: linux-unionfs(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-fsdevel(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org --- This issue was already discussed in [1] with no consensus reached on the fix. This form was suggested as a band-aid fix, without explicity yes/no reaction. Hence reviving the discussion around the band-aid. fs/notify/fdinfo.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/notify/fdinfo.c b/fs/notify/fdinfo.c index 1161eabf11ee..9cc7eb863643 100644 --- a/fs/notify/fdinfo.c +++ b/fs/notify/fdinfo.c @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ #include "fanotify/fanotify.h" #include "fdinfo.h" #include "fsnotify.h" +#include "../internal.h" #if defined(CONFIG_PROC_FS) @@ -46,7 +47,12 @@ static void show_mark_fhandle(struct seq_file *m, struct inode *inode) size = f->handle_bytes >> 2; + if (!super_trylock_shared(inode->i_sb)) + return; + ret = exportfs_encode_fid(inode, (struct fid *)f->f_handle, &size); + up_read(&inode->i_sb->s_umount); + if ((ret == FILEID_INVALID) || (ret < 0)) return; -- 2.47.3 Amazon Web Services Development Center Germany GmbH Tamara-Danz-Str. 13 10243 Berlin Geschaeftsfuehrung: Christian Schlaeger Eingetragen am Amtsgericht Charlottenburg unter HRB 257764 B Sitz: Berlin Ust-ID: DE 365 538 597

2 months, 1 week

2
1
0 0

[PATCH] ovl: check before dereferencing s_root field

by Jakub Acs

Calling intotify_show_fdinfo() on fd watching an overlayfs inode, while the overlayfs is being unmounted, can lead to dereferencing NULL ptr. This issue was found by syzkaller. Race Condition Diagram: Thread 1 Thread 2 -------- -------- generic_shutdown_super() shrink_dcache_for_umount sb->s_root = NULL | | vfs_read() | inotify_fdinfo() | * inode get from mark * | show_mark_fhandle(m, inode) | exportfs_encode_fid(inode, ..) | ovl_encode_fh(inode, ..) | ovl_check_encode_origin(inode) | * deref i_sb->s_root * | | v fsnotify_sb_delete(sb) Which then leads to: [ 32.133461] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000006: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN NOPTI [ 32.134438] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000030-0x0000000000000037] [ 32.135032] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 4468 Comm: systemd-coredum Not tainted 6.17.0-rc6 #22 PREEMPT(none) <snip registers, unreliable trace> [ 32.143353] Call Trace: [ 32.143732] ovl_encode_fh+0xd5/0x170 [ 32.144031] exportfs_encode_inode_fh+0x12f/0x300 [ 32.144425] show_mark_fhandle+0xbe/0x1f0 [ 32.145805] inotify_fdinfo+0x226/0x2d0 [ 32.146442] inotify_show_fdinfo+0x1c5/0x350 [ 32.147168] seq_show+0x530/0x6f0 [ 32.147449] seq_read_iter+0x503/0x12a0 [ 32.148419] seq_read+0x31f/0x410 [ 32.150714] vfs_read+0x1f0/0x9e0 [ 32.152297] ksys_read+0x125/0x240 IOW ovl_check_encode_origin derefs inode->i_sb->s_root, after it was set to NULL in the unmount path. Minimize the window of opportunity by adding explicit check. Fixes: c45beebfde34 ("ovl: support encoding fid from inode with no alias") Signed-off-by: Jakub Acs <acsjakub(a)amazon.de> Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos(a)szeredi.hu> Cc: Amir Goldstein <amir73il(a)gmail.com> Cc: linux-unionfs(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org --- I'm happy to take suggestions for a better fix - I looked at taking s_umount for reading, but it wasn't clear to me for how long would the fdinfo path need to hold it. Hence the most primitive suggestion in this v1. I'm also not sure if ENOENT or EBUSY is better?.. or even something else? fs/overlayfs/export.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/export.c b/fs/overlayfs/export.c index 83f80fdb1567..424c73188e06 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/export.c +++ b/fs/overlayfs/export.c @@ -195,6 +195,8 @@ static int ovl_check_encode_origin(struct inode *inode) if (!ovl_inode_lower(inode)) return 0; + if (!inode->i_sb->s_root) + return -ENOENT; /* * Root is never indexed, so if there's an upper layer, encode upper for * root. -- 2.47.3 Amazon Web Services Development Center Germany GmbH Tamara-Danz-Str. 13 10243 Berlin Geschaeftsfuehrung: Christian Schlaeger, Jonathan Weiss Eingetragen am Amtsgericht Charlottenburg unter HRB 257764 B Sitz: Berlin Ust-ID: DE 365 538 597

2 months, 1 week

4
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[PATCH v2] mm/ksm: fix flag-dropping behavior in ksm_madvise

by Jakub Acs

syzkaller discovered the following crash: (kernel BUG) [ 44.607039] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 44.607422] kernel BUG at mm/userfaultfd.c:2067! [ 44.608148] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN NOPTI [ 44.608814] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 2475 Comm: reproducer Not tainted 6.16.0-rc6 #1 PREEMPT(none) [ 44.609635] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 44.610695] RIP: 0010:userfaultfd_release_all+0x3a8/0x460 <snip other registers, drop unreliable trace> [ 44.617726] Call Trace: [ 44.617926] <TASK> [ 44.619284] userfaultfd_release+0xef/0x1b0 [ 44.620976] __fput+0x3f9/0xb60 [ 44.621240] fput_close_sync+0x110/0x210 [ 44.622222] __x64_sys_close+0x8f/0x120 [ 44.622530] do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x2f0 [ 44.622840] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 44.623244] RIP: 0033:0x7f365bb3f227 Kernel panics because it detects UFFD inconsistency during userfaultfd_release_all(). Specifically, a VMA which has a valid pointer to vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx, but no UFFD flags in vma->vm_flags. The inconsistency is caused in ksm_madvise(): when user calls madvise() with MADV_UNMEARGEABLE on a VMA that is registered for UFFD in MINOR mode, it accidentally clears all flags stored in the upper 32 bits of vma->vm_flags. Assuming x86_64 kernel build, unsigned long is 64-bit and unsigned int and int are 32-bit wide. This setup causes the following mishap during the &= ~VM_MERGEABLE assignment. VM_MERGEABLE is a 32-bit constant of type unsigned int, 0x8000'0000. After ~ is applied, it becomes 0x7fff'ffff unsigned int, which is then promoted to unsigned long before the & operation. This promotion fills upper 32 bits with leading 0s, as we're doing unsigned conversion (and even for a signed conversion, this wouldn't help as the leading bit is 0). & operation thus ends up AND-ing vm_flags with 0x0000'0000'7fff'ffff instead of intended 0xffff'ffff'7fff'ffff and hence accidentally clears the upper 32-bits of its value. Fix it by changing `VM_MERGEABLE` constant to unsigned long. Modify all other VM_* flags constants for consistency. Note: other VM_* flags are not affected: This only happens to the VM_MERGEABLE flag, as the other VM_* flags are all constants of type int and after ~ operation, they end up with leading 1 and are thus converted to unsigned long with leading 1s. Note 2: After commit 31defc3b01d9 ("userfaultfd: remove (VM_)BUG_ON()s"), this is no longer a kernel BUG, but a WARNING at the same place: [ 45.595973] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 2474 at mm/userfaultfd.c:2067 but the root-cause (flag-drop) remains the same. Fixes: 7677f7fd8be76 ("userfaultfd: add minor fault registration mode") Signed-off-by: Jakub Acs <acsjakub(a)amazon.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com> Cc: Xu Xin <xu.xin16(a)zte.com.cn> Cc: Chengming Zhou <chengming.zhou(a)linux.dev> Cc: Peter Xu <peterx(a)redhat.com> Cc: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen(a)google.com> Cc: linux-mm(a)kvack.org Cc: linux-kernel(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org --- v1 -> v2: - fix by adding ul to flag constants instead of explicit cast. - drop Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz(a)oracle.com> from cc, as the mail returned v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250930063921.62354-1-acsjakub@amazon.de/ include/linux/mm.h | 72 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------- 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h index 1ae97a0b8ec7..26a5c0f78b36 100644 --- a/include/linux/mm.h +++ b/include/linux/mm.h @@ -246,57 +246,57 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp); * vm_flags in vm_area_struct, see mm_types.h. * When changing, update also include/trace/events/mmflags.h */ -#define VM_NONE 0x00000000 +#define VM_NONE 0x00000000ul -#define VM_READ 0x00000001 /* currently active flags */ -#define VM_WRITE 0x00000002 -#define VM_EXEC 0x00000004 -#define VM_SHARED 0x00000008 +#define VM_READ 0x00000001ul /* currently active flags */ +#define VM_WRITE 0x00000002ul +#define VM_EXEC 0x00000004ul +#define VM_SHARED 0x00000008ul /* mprotect() hardcodes VM_MAYREAD >> 4 == VM_READ, and so for r/w/x bits. */ -#define VM_MAYREAD 0x00000010 /* limits for mprotect() etc */ -#define VM_MAYWRITE 0x00000020 -#define VM_MAYEXEC 0x00000040 -#define VM_MAYSHARE 0x00000080 +#define VM_MAYREAD 0x00000010ul /* limits for mprotect() etc */ +#define VM_MAYWRITE 0x00000020ul +#define VM_MAYEXEC 0x00000040ul +#define VM_MAYSHARE 0x00000080ul -#define VM_GROWSDOWN 0x00000100 /* general info on the segment */ +#define VM_GROWSDOWN 0x00000100ul /* general info on the segment */ #ifdef CONFIG_MMU -#define VM_UFFD_MISSING 0x00000200 /* missing pages tracking */ +#define VM_UFFD_MISSING 0x00000200ul /* missing pages tracking */ #else /* CONFIG_MMU */ -#define VM_MAYOVERLAY 0x00000200 /* nommu: R/O MAP_PRIVATE mapping that might overlay a file mapping */ -#define VM_UFFD_MISSING 0 +#define VM_MAYOVERLAY 0x00000200ul /* nommu: R/O MAP_PRIVATE mapping that might overlay a file mapping */ +#define VM_UFFD_MISSING 0ul #endif /* CONFIG_MMU */ -#define VM_PFNMAP 0x00000400 /* Page-ranges managed without "struct page", just pure PFN */ -#define VM_UFFD_WP 0x00001000 /* wrprotect pages tracking */ +#define VM_PFNMAP 0x00000400ul /* Page-ranges managed without "struct page", just pure PFN */ +#define VM_UFFD_WP 0x00001000ul /* wrprotect pages tracking */ -#define VM_LOCKED 0x00002000 -#define VM_IO 0x00004000 /* Memory mapped I/O or similar */ +#define VM_LOCKED 0x00002000ul +#define VM_IO 0x00004000ul /* Memory mapped I/O or similar */ /* Used by sys_madvise() */ -#define VM_SEQ_READ 0x00008000 /* App will access data sequentially */ -#define VM_RAND_READ 0x00010000 /* App will not benefit from clustered reads */ - -#define VM_DONTCOPY 0x00020000 /* Do not copy this vma on fork */ -#define VM_DONTEXPAND 0x00040000 /* Cannot expand with mremap() */ -#define VM_LOCKONFAULT 0x00080000 /* Lock the pages covered when they are faulted in */ -#define VM_ACCOUNT 0x00100000 /* Is a VM accounted object */ -#define VM_NORESERVE 0x00200000 /* should the VM suppress accounting */ -#define VM_HUGETLB 0x00400000 /* Huge TLB Page VM */ -#define VM_SYNC 0x00800000 /* Synchronous page faults */ -#define VM_ARCH_1 0x01000000 /* Architecture-specific flag */ -#define VM_WIPEONFORK 0x02000000 /* Wipe VMA contents in child. */ -#define VM_DONTDUMP 0x04000000 /* Do not include in the core dump */ +#define VM_SEQ_READ 0x00008000ul /* App will access data sequentially */ +#define VM_RAND_READ 0x00010000ul /* App will not benefit from clustered reads */ + +#define VM_DONTCOPY 0x00020000ul /* Do not copy this vma on fork */ +#define VM_DONTEXPAND 0x00040000ul /* Cannot expand with mremap() */ +#define VM_LOCKONFAULT 0x00080000ul /* Lock the pages covered when they are faulted in */ +#define VM_ACCOUNT 0x00100000ul /* Is a VM accounted object */ +#define VM_NORESERVE 0x00200000ul /* should the VM suppress accounting */ +#define VM_HUGETLB 0x00400000ul /* Huge TLB Page VM */ +#define VM_SYNC 0x00800000ul /* Synchronous page faults */ +#define VM_ARCH_1 0x01000000ul /* Architecture-specific flag */ +#define VM_WIPEONFORK 0x02000000ul /* Wipe VMA contents in child. */ +#define VM_DONTDUMP 0x04000000ul /* Do not include in the core dump */ #ifdef CONFIG_MEM_SOFT_DIRTY -# define VM_SOFTDIRTY 0x08000000 /* Not soft dirty clean area */ +# define VM_SOFTDIRTY 0x08000000ul /* Not soft dirty clean area */ #else -# define VM_SOFTDIRTY 0 +# define VM_SOFTDIRTY 0ul #endif -#define VM_MIXEDMAP 0x10000000 /* Can contain "struct page" and pure PFN pages */ -#define VM_HUGEPAGE 0x20000000 /* MADV_HUGEPAGE marked this vma */ -#define VM_NOHUGEPAGE 0x40000000 /* MADV_NOHUGEPAGE marked this vma */ -#define VM_MERGEABLE 0x80000000 /* KSM may merge identical pages */ +#define VM_MIXEDMAP 0x10000000ul /* Can contain "struct page" and pure PFN pages */ +#define VM_HUGEPAGE 0x20000000ul /* MADV_HUGEPAGE marked this vma */ +#define VM_NOHUGEPAGE 0x40000000ul /* MADV_NOHUGEPAGE marked this vma */ +#define VM_MERGEABLE 0x80000000ul /* KSM may merge identical pages */ #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_0 32 /* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */ -- 2.47.3 Amazon Web Services Development Center Germany GmbH Tamara-Danz-Str. 13 10243 Berlin Geschaeftsfuehrung: Christian Schlaeger Eingetragen am Amtsgericht Charlottenburg unter HRB 257764 B Sitz: Berlin Ust-ID: DE 365 538 597

2 months, 1 week

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Re: [PATCH] dma-mapping: fix direction in dma_alloc direction traces

by Petr Tesarik

Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org (One day, I'll finally remember, I promise.) Petr T On Wed, 1 Oct 2025 08:10:28 +0200 Petr Tesarik <ptesarik(a)suse.com> wrote: > Set __entry->dir to the actual "dir" parameter of all trace events > in dma_alloc_class. This struct member was left uninitialized by > mistake. > > Signed-off-by: Petr Tesarik <ptesarik(a)suse.com> > Fixes: 3afff779a725 ("dma-mapping: trace dma_alloc/free direction") > --- > include/trace/events/dma.h | 1 + > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) > > diff --git a/include/trace/events/dma.h b/include/trace/events/dma.h > index d8ddc27b6a7c8..945fcbaae77e9 100644 > --- a/include/trace/events/dma.h > +++ b/include/trace/events/dma.h > @@ -134,6 +134,7 @@ DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(dma_alloc_class, > __entry->dma_addr = dma_addr; > __entry->size = size; > __entry->flags = flags; > + __entry->dir = dir; > __entry->attrs = attrs; > ), >

2 months, 1 week

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[PATCH v3] fbdev/simplefb: Fix use after free in simplefb_detach_genpds()

by Janne Grunau

The pm_domain cleanup can not be devres managed as it uses struct simplefb_par which is allocated within struct fb_info by framebuffer_alloc(). This allocation is explicitly freed by unregister_framebuffer() in simplefb_remove(). Devres managed cleanup runs after the device remove call and thus can no longer access struct simplefb_par. Call simplefb_detach_genpds() explicitly from simplefb_destroy() like the cleanup functions for clocks and regulators. Fixes an use after free on M2 Mac mini during aperture_remove_conflicting_devices() using the downstream asahi kernel with Debian's kernel config. For unknown reasons this started to consistently dereference an invalid pointer in v6.16.3 based kernels. [ 6.736134] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in simplefb_detach_genpds+0x58/0x220 [ 6.743545] Read of size 4 at addr ffff8000304743f0 by task (udev-worker)/227 [ 6.750697] [ 6.752182] CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 227 Comm: (udev-worker) Tainted: G S 6.16.3-asahi+ #16 PREEMPTLAZY [ 6.752186] Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC [ 6.752187] Hardware name: Apple Mac mini (M2, 2023) (DT) [ 6.752189] Call trace: [ 6.752190] show_stack+0x34/0x98 (C) [ 6.752194] dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0x80 [ 6.752197] print_report+0x17c/0x4d8 [ 6.752201] kasan_report+0xb4/0x100 [ 6.752206] __asan_report_load4_noabort+0x20/0x30 [ 6.752209] simplefb_detach_genpds+0x58/0x220 [ 6.752213] devm_action_release+0x50/0x98 [ 6.752216] release_nodes+0xd0/0x2c8 [ 6.752219] devres_release_all+0xfc/0x178 [ 6.752221] device_unbind_cleanup+0x28/0x168 [ 6.752224] device_release_driver_internal+0x34c/0x470 [ 6.752228] device_release_driver+0x20/0x38 [ 6.752231] bus_remove_device+0x1b0/0x380 [ 6.752234] device_del+0x314/0x820 [ 6.752238] platform_device_del+0x3c/0x1e8 [ 6.752242] platform_device_unregister+0x20/0x50 [ 6.752246] aperture_detach_platform_device+0x1c/0x30 [ 6.752250] aperture_detach_devices+0x16c/0x290 [ 6.752253] aperture_remove_conflicting_devices+0x34/0x50 ... [ 6.752343] [ 6.967409] Allocated by task 62: [ 6.970724] kasan_save_stack+0x3c/0x70 [ 6.974560] kasan_save_track+0x20/0x40 [ 6.978397] kasan_save_alloc_info+0x40/0x58 [ 6.982670] __kasan_kmalloc+0xd4/0xd8 [ 6.986420] __kmalloc_noprof+0x194/0x540 [ 6.990432] framebuffer_alloc+0xc8/0x130 [ 6.994444] simplefb_probe+0x258/0x2378 ... [ 7.054356] [ 7.055838] Freed by task 227: [ 7.058891] kasan_save_stack+0x3c/0x70 [ 7.062727] kasan_save_track+0x20/0x40 [ 7.066565] kasan_save_free_info+0x4c/0x80 [ 7.070751] __kasan_slab_free+0x6c/0xa0 [ 7.074675] kfree+0x10c/0x380 [ 7.077727] framebuffer_release+0x5c/0x90 [ 7.081826] simplefb_destroy+0x1b4/0x2c0 [ 7.085837] put_fb_info+0x98/0x100 [ 7.089326] unregister_framebuffer+0x178/0x320 [ 7.093861] simplefb_remove+0x3c/0x60 [ 7.097611] platform_remove+0x60/0x98 [ 7.101361] device_remove+0xb8/0x160 [ 7.105024] device_release_driver_internal+0x2fc/0x470 [ 7.110256] device_release_driver+0x20/0x38 [ 7.114529] bus_remove_device+0x1b0/0x380 [ 7.118628] device_del+0x314/0x820 [ 7.122116] platform_device_del+0x3c/0x1e8 [ 7.126302] platform_device_unregister+0x20/0x50 [ 7.131012] aperture_detach_platform_device+0x1c/0x30 [ 7.136157] aperture_detach_devices+0x16c/0x290 [ 7.140779] aperture_remove_conflicting_devices+0x34/0x50 ... Reported-by: Daniel Huhardeaux <tech(a)tootai.net> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 92a511a568e44 ("fbdev/simplefb: Add support for generic power-domains") Signed-off-by: Janne Grunau <j(a)jannau.net> --- Changes in v3: - release power-domains on probe errors - set par->num_genpds when it's <= 1 - set par->num_genpds to 0 after detaching - Link to v2: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250908-simplefb-genpd-uaf-v2-1-f88a0d9d880f@jan… Changes in v2: - reworked change due to missed use of `par->num_genpds` before setting it. Missed in testing due to mixing up FB_SIMPLE and SYSFB_SIMPLEFB. - Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250901-simplefb-genpd-uaf-v1-1-0d9f3a34c4dc@jan… --- drivers/video/fbdev/simplefb.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/video/fbdev/simplefb.c b/drivers/video/fbdev/simplefb.c index 1893815dc67f4c1403eea42c0e10a7ead4d96ba9..6acf5a00c2bacfab89c3a63bab3d8b1b091a20a8 100644 --- a/drivers/video/fbdev/simplefb.c +++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/simplefb.c @@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ struct simplefb_par { static void simplefb_clocks_destroy(struct simplefb_par *par); static void simplefb_regulators_destroy(struct simplefb_par *par); +static void simplefb_detach_genpds(void *res); /* * fb_ops.fb_destroy is called by the last put_fb_info() call at the end @@ -105,6 +106,7 @@ static void simplefb_destroy(struct fb_info *info) simplefb_regulators_destroy(info->par); simplefb_clocks_destroy(info->par); + simplefb_detach_genpds(info->par); if (info->screen_base) iounmap(info->screen_base); @@ -445,13 +447,14 @@ static void simplefb_detach_genpds(void *res) if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(par->genpds[i])) dev_pm_domain_detach(par->genpds[i], true); } + par->num_genpds = 0; } static int simplefb_attach_genpds(struct simplefb_par *par, struct platform_device *pdev) { struct device *dev = &pdev->dev; - unsigned int i; + unsigned int i, num_genpds; int err; err = of_count_phandle_with_args(dev->of_node, "power-domains", @@ -465,26 +468,35 @@ static int simplefb_attach_genpds(struct simplefb_par *par, return err; } - par->num_genpds = err; + num_genpds = err; /* * Single power-domain devices are handled by the driver core, so * nothing to do here. */ - if (par->num_genpds <= 1) + if (num_genpds <= 1) { + par->num_genpds = num_genpds; return 0; + } - par->genpds = devm_kcalloc(dev, par->num_genpds, sizeof(*par->genpds), + par->genpds = devm_kcalloc(dev, num_genpds, sizeof(*par->genpds), GFP_KERNEL); if (!par->genpds) return -ENOMEM; - par->genpd_links = devm_kcalloc(dev, par->num_genpds, + par->genpd_links = devm_kcalloc(dev, num_genpds, sizeof(*par->genpd_links), GFP_KERNEL); if (!par->genpd_links) return -ENOMEM; + /* + * Set par->num_genpds only after genpds and genpd_links are allocated + * to exit early from simplefb_detach_genpds() without full + * initialisation. + */ + par->num_genpds = num_genpds; + for (i = 0; i < par->num_genpds; i++) { par->genpds[i] = dev_pm_domain_attach_by_id(dev, i); if (IS_ERR(par->genpds[i])) { @@ -506,9 +518,10 @@ static int simplefb_attach_genpds(struct simplefb_par *par, dev_warn(dev, "failed to link power-domain %u\n", i); } - return devm_add_action_or_reset(dev, simplefb_detach_genpds, par); + return 0; } #else +static void simplefb_detach_genpds(void *res) { } static int simplefb_attach_genpds(struct simplefb_par *par, struct platform_device *pdev) { @@ -622,18 +635,20 @@ static int simplefb_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) ret = devm_aperture_acquire_for_platform_device(pdev, par->base, par->size); if (ret) { dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Unable to acquire aperture: %d\n", ret); - goto error_regulators; + goto error_genpds; } ret = register_framebuffer(info); if (ret < 0) { dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Unable to register simplefb: %d\n", ret); - goto error_regulators; + goto error_genpds; } dev_info(&pdev->dev, "fb%d: simplefb registered!\n", info->node); return 0; +error_genpds: + simplefb_detach_genpds(par); error_regulators: simplefb_regulators_destroy(par); error_clocks: --- base-commit: 8f5ae30d69d7543eee0d70083daf4de8fe15d585 change-id: 20250901-simplefb-genpd-uaf-352704761a29 Best regards, -- Janne Grunau <j(a)jannau.net>

2 months, 1 week

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Check this out at Amazon

by llk16 9157

Purchase this ALCHIMERA ebook, and a portion of the proceeds will help children and families in need in Gaza, Ukraine, and the DRC: Your gesture is a seed of love that will bear eternal fruit. https://a.co/d/aDuLWHN 🆘Buy this book, save a life today. Every word you read, every page you turn, becomes an act of compassion. 💔 Children cry from hunger in Gaza, Ukraine, and eastern DRC. Your purchase becomes a hot meal, a blanket, a breath of hope for those who have nothing left. This isn't just an ebook. It's a mission. A portion of the funds is sent to disaster-stricken families suffering from serious hunger. 🙏 Share this message. Give this book as a gift. Increase the number of lifesaving actions. Every share is an answered prayer. Every purchase is a helping hand. May God bless you abundantly for your generous heart. This book is in your hands. Someone's life too.

2 months, 1 week

1
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[PATCH] ext4: fix use-after-free in extent header access

by Deepanshu Kartikey

#syz test: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git master syzbot reported use-after-free bugs when accessing extent headers in ext4_ext_insert_extent() and ext4_ext_correct_indexes(). These occur when the extent path structure becomes invalid during operations. The crashes show two patterns: 1. In ext4_ext_map_blocks(), the extent header can be corrupted after ext4_find_extent() returns, particularly during concurrent writes to the same file. 2. In ext4_ext_correct_indexes(), accessing path[depth] causes a use-after-free, indicating the path structure itself is corrupted. This is partially exposed by commit 665575cff098 ("filemap: move prefaulting out of hot write path") which changed timing windows in the write path, making these races more likely to occur. Fix this by adding validation checks: - In ext4_ext_map_blocks(): validate the extent header after getting the path from ext4_find_extent() - In ext4_ext_correct_indexes(): validate the path pointer before dereferencing and check extent header magic While these checks are defensive and don't address the root cause of path corruption, they prevent kernel crashes from invalid memory access. A more comprehensive fix to path lifetime management may be needed in the future. Reported-by: syzbot+9db318d6167044609878(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=9db318d6167044609878 Fixes: 665575cff098 ("filemap: move prefaulting out of hot write path") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Deepanshu Kartikey <kartikey406(a)gmail.com> --- fs/ext4/extents.c | 12 ++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/extents.c b/fs/ext4/extents.c index ca5499e9412b..903578d5f68d 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/extents.c +++ b/fs/ext4/extents.c @@ -1708,7 +1708,9 @@ static int ext4_ext_correct_indexes(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, struct ext4_extent *ex; __le32 border; int k, err = 0; - + if (!path || depth < 0 || depth > EXT4_MAX_EXTENT_DEPTH) { + return -EFSCORRUPTED; + } eh = path[depth].p_hdr; ex = path[depth].p_ext; @@ -4200,6 +4202,7 @@ int ext4_ext_map_blocks(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, unsigned int allocated_clusters = 0; struct ext4_allocation_request ar; ext4_lblk_t cluster_offset; + struct ext4_extent_header *eh; ext_debug(inode, "blocks %u/%u requested\n", map->m_lblk, map->m_len); trace_ext4_ext_map_blocks_enter(inode, map->m_lblk, map->m_len, flags); @@ -4212,7 +4215,12 @@ int ext4_ext_map_blocks(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, } depth = ext_depth(inode); - + eh = path[depth].p_hdr; + if (!eh || le16_to_cpu(eh->eh_magic) != EXT4_EXT_MAGIC) { + EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "invalid extent header after find_extent"); + err = -EFSCORRUPTED; + goto out; + } /* * consistent leaf must not be empty; * this situation is possible, though, _during_ tree modification; -- 2.43.0

2 months, 1 week

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+ mm-damon-vaddr-do-not-repeat-pte_offset_map_lock-until-success.patch added to mm-hotfixes-unstable branch

by Andrew Morton

The patch titled Subject: mm/damon/vaddr: do not repeat pte_offset_map_lock() until success has been added to the -mm mm-hotfixes-unstable branch. Its filename is mm-damon-vaddr-do-not-repeat-pte_offset_map_lock-until-success.patch This patch will shortly appear at https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche… This patch will later appear in the mm-hotfixes-unstable branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm Before you just go and hit "reply", please: a) Consider who else should be cc'ed b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's *** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code *** The -mm tree is included into linux-next via the mm-everything branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm and is updated there every 2-3 working days ------------------------------------------------------ From: SeongJae Park <sj(a)kernel.org> Subject: mm/damon/vaddr: do not repeat pte_offset_map_lock() until success Date: Mon, 29 Sep 2025 17:44:09 -0700 DAMON's virtual address space operation set implementation (vaddr) calls pte_offset_map_lock() inside the page table walk callback function. This is for reading and writing page table accessed bits. If pte_offset_map_lock() fails, it retries by returning the page table walk callback function with ACTION_AGAIN. pte_offset_map_lock() can continuously fail if the target is a pmd migration entry, though. Hence it could cause an infinite page table walk if the migration cannot be done until the page table walk is finished. This indeed caused a soft lockup when CPU hotplugging and DAMON were running in parallel. Avoid the infinite loop by simply not retrying the page table walk. DAMON is promising only a best-effort accuracy, so missing access to such pages is no problem. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250930004410.55228-1-sj@kernel.org Fixes: 7780d04046a2 ("mm/pagewalkers: ACTION_AGAIN if pte_offset_map_lock() fails") Signed-off-by: SeongJae Park <sj(a)kernel.org> Reported-by: Xinyu Zheng <zhengxinyu6(a)huawei.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/20250918030029.2652607-1-zhengxinyu6@huawei.com Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd(a)google.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> [6.5+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- mm/damon/vaddr.c | 8 ++------ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) --- a/mm/damon/vaddr.c~mm-damon-vaddr-do-not-repeat-pte_offset_map_lock-until-success +++ a/mm/damon/vaddr.c @@ -328,10 +328,8 @@ static int damon_mkold_pmd_entry(pmd_t * } pte = pte_offset_map_lock(walk->mm, pmd, addr, &ptl); - if (!pte) { - walk->action = ACTION_AGAIN; + if (!pte) return 0; - } if (!pte_present(ptep_get(pte))) goto out; damon_ptep_mkold(pte, walk->vma, addr); @@ -481,10 +479,8 @@ regular_page: #endif /* CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE */ pte = pte_offset_map_lock(walk->mm, pmd, addr, &ptl); - if (!pte) { - walk->action = ACTION_AGAIN; + if (!pte) return 0; - } ptent = ptep_get(pte); if (!pte_present(ptent)) goto out; _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from sj(a)kernel.org are mm-damon-vaddr-do-not-repeat-pte_offset_map_lock-until-success.patch

2 months, 1 week

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