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[Linux-stable-mirror] apply (dmaengine: dmatest: fix container_of member in dmatest_callback) to stable

by Adam Wallis

Please apply commit: 66b3bd2356e0a1531c71a3dcf96944621e25c17c (dmaengine: dmatest: fix container_of member in dmatest_callback) to stable This fixes a bug in dmatest that will cause the test to give a false negative. -- Adam Wallis Qualcomm Datacenter Technologies as an affiliate of Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. is a member of the Code Aurora Forum, a Linux Foundation Collaborative Project.

7 years, 10 months

[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH stable] cifs: empty TargetInfo leads to crash on recovery

by Dan Aloni

commit cabfb3680f78 upstream. [ resend from Oct 20, 2014, see [1] ] A trivially patched Samba server (see [2] [3]) can cause a remote kernel crash (see [4]) in a client's CIFS kernel module upon session recovery, under kernels prior to v4.11. The server patch can made by a single source line modification - returning an empty TargetInfo in an NTLMSSP setup negotiation response. To reproduce at the client side, the CIFS client can be instructed to mount with SMB 2.0, on a share without user/password credentials, e.g: mount -t cifs //[host]/[share] -o vers=2.0,guest [mountpoint] (It may also reproduce with credentials, but I used a simpler configuration for the reproduction) An demo patch to Samba 4.7.4 is provided in the links provided. As for the client crash itself: When the session is recovered (after a server start/stop, for example), the following condition turns out to be true: ses->auth_key.len != 0 && ses->auth_key.response == NULL This will cause the following memcpy() in setup_ntlmv2_rsp() to GPF, because tiblob == NULL and tilen != 0 (these are the old auth_key values): memcpy(ses->auth_key.response + baselen, tiblob, tilen); By bisecting, upstream commit cabfb3680f78 ("CIFS: Enable encryption during session setup phase") from v4.11 have fixed this issue. According to my tests, LTS kernels versions 4.4.x and 4.9.x are affected. The patch below applies for 4.4.x however a similar patch can be applied to 4.9.x and older kernels. Signed-off-by: Dan Aloni <dan(a)kernelim.com> CC: Steve French <sfrench(a)samba.org> CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 4.4.x CC: linux-cifs(a)vger.kernel.org CC: linux-kernel(a)vger.kernel.org [1] https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/5106391/ [2] (temporary url) http://copr-dist-git.fedorainfracloud.org/cgit/alonid/samba-for-client-cras… [3] (temporary url) https://copr.fedorainfracloud.org/coprs/alonid/samba-for-client-crash-repro/ [4] [ 3414.518134] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) [ 3414.518200] IP: memcpy_erms+0x6/0x10 [ 3414.518227] PGD 0 [ 3414.518252] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 3414.518272] Modules linked in: arc4 md4 cifs rpcsec_gss_krb5 nfsv4 dns_resolver nfs fscache ip6t_rpfilter ip6t_REJECT nf_reject_ipv6 xt_conntrack ip_set nfnetlink ebtable_nat ebtable_broute bridge stp llc ip6table_nat nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_nat_ipv6 ip6table_mangle ip6table_security ip6table_raw iptable_nat nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat nf_conntrack iptable_mangle iptable_security iptable_raw ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_filter ip6_tables snd_hda_codec_generic ppdev snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul snd_hwdep snd_hda_core ghash_clmulni_intel snd_seq snd_seq_device snd_pcm joydev parport_pc tpm_tis parport tpm_tis_core tpm snd_timer snd soundcore qemu_fw_cfg virtio_balloon i2c_piix4 nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd grace sunrpc xfs libcrc32c [ 3414.518708] virtio_blk virtio_console virtio_net qxl drm_kms_helper ttm crc32c_intel drm ata_generic nvme serio_raw nvme_core virtio_pci virtio_ring virtio pata_acpi [ 3414.518803] CPU: 3 PID: 1697 Comm: kworker/3:1 Not tainted 4.10.0-rc6-dan-00097-ge765a3d89ede #20 [ 3414.518852] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-2.fc27 04/01/2014 [ 3414.518927] Workqueue: cifsiod smb2_reconnect_server [cifs] [ 3414.518960] task: ffff8cc6764a4000 task.stack: ffff9bc548808000 [ 3414.518997] RIP: 0010:memcpy_erms+0x6/0x10 [ 3414.519021] RSP: 0018:ffff9bc54880bbc8 EFLAGS: 00010296 [ 3414.519051] RAX: ffff8cc6ba00d8dc RBX: ffff8cc676190400 RCX: 0000000000000010 [ 3414.519091] RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8cc6ba00d8dc [ 3414.519130] RBP: ffff9bc54880bc30 R08: ffff9bc54880bb58 R09: ffff9bc54880bb58 [ 3414.519170] R10: 000000004619520e R11: 00000000f46cd8cf R12: 0000000000000000 [ 3414.519209] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8cc6ba00d8a0 R15: 0000000000000010 [ 3414.519250] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8cc6bfd80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 3414.519314] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 3414.519347] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000007992a000 CR4: 00000000003406e0 [ 3414.519392] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 3414.519431] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 3414.519470] Call Trace: [ 3414.519510] ? setup_ntlmv2_rsp+0x124/0xa10 [cifs] [ 3414.519553] build_ntlmssp_auth_blob+0x36/0x310 [cifs] [ 3414.519597] SMB2_sess_auth_rawntlmssp_authenticate+0xc7/0x300 [cifs] [ 3414.519646] SMB2_sess_setup+0x9a/0x140 [cifs] [ 3414.519685] cifs_setup_session+0x78/0x100 [cifs] [ 3414.519722] ? cifs_negotiate_protocol+0x84/0xd0 [cifs] [ 3414.519763] smb2_reconnect+0x308/0x3e0 [cifs] [ 3414.519793] ? __internal_add_timer+0x1f/0x60 [ 3414.519831] smb2_reconnect_server+0x187/0x260 [cifs] [ 3414.519863] process_one_work+0x19e/0x440 [ 3414.519887] worker_thread+0x4e/0x4a0 [ 3414.519910] ? process_one_work+0x440/0x440 [ 3414.519936] kthread+0x11e/0x140 [ 3414.520493] ? kthread_park+0x90/0x90 [ 3414.520989] ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x40 [ 3414.521450] Code: 78 ff ff ff 90 eb 1e 0f 1f 00 48 89 f8 48 89 d1 48 c1 e9 03 83 e2 07 f3 48 a5 89 d1 f3 a4 c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 d1 <f3> a4 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 83 fa 20 72 7e 40 38 [ 3414.522488] RIP: memcpy_erms+0x6/0x10 RSP: ffff9bc54880bbc8 [ 3414.522964] CR2: 0000000000000000 [ 3414.526127] ---[ end trace bbe4aa1e45cc6c17 ]--- --- fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c b/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c index f2ff60e58ec8..91c9e83df457 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c +++ b/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c @@ -633,6 +633,7 @@ SMB2_sess_setup(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses, */ kfree(ses->auth_key.response); ses->auth_key.response = NULL; + ses->auth_key.len = 0; /* * If memory allocation is successful, caller of this function @@ -837,6 +838,7 @@ ssetup_exit: rc = server->ops->generate_signingkey(ses); kfree(ses->auth_key.response); ses->auth_key.response = NULL; + ses->auth_key.len = 0; if (rc) { cifs_dbg(FYI, "SMB3 session key generation failed\n"); @@ -861,6 +863,7 @@ keygen_exit: if (!server->sign) { kfree(ses->auth_key.response); ses->auth_key.response = NULL; + ses->auth_key.len = 0; } if (spnego_key) { key_invalidate(spnego_key); -- 2.14.3

7 years, 10 months

Re: [PATCH v3] MIPS: fix incorrect mem=X@Y handling

by Mathieu Malaterre

Hi, On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 3:32 PM, James Hogan <jhogan(a)kernel.org> wrote: > On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 03:03:24PM +0100, Mathieu Malaterre wrote: >> James, >> >> On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 2:38 PM, James Hogan <jhogan(a)kernel.org> wrote: >> > On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 01:14:29PM +0100, Mathieu Malaterre wrote: >> >> Could you please review the patch v3 ? >> > >> > Yes, looks good to me, and Ralf had applied to his test branch so I >> > presume he's happy with it too. I'll apply for 4.16. >> >> Hum, just to be sure I understand the process. Which branch are you >> talking about: >> >> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ralf/linux.git > > I was referring to upstream-sfr.git branch=mips-next-test > https://git.linux-mips.org/cgit/ralf/upstream-sfr.git/log/?h=mips-next-test > > (The mips-next branch there is what Ralf puts into linux-next) > > I've applied the patch to my mips-fixes branch here: > git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jhogan/mips.git > > Sorry it seems a bit haphazard with multiple trees in use. I see it now, sorry for the noise. I was not looking at the right location. Anyway if that answer earlier question 4.11 should be correct, since I asked Greg to not backport the earlier patch: https://www.mail-archive.com/linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org/msg1505915.html

7 years, 10 months

[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH] KVM: prevent overlap between user and private memslots

by Eric Biggers

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Memslots must not overlap in guest physical memory, since otherwise some guest physical addresses will not uniquely map to a memslot. Yet, the overlap check in __kvm_set_memory_region() allows a memslot that overlaps one of the "private" memslots, e.g. the memslot reserved for the TSS on x86. This seems to be a very old bug that was introduced years ago when private memory slots were first added. It seems that later refactoring incorrectly assumed this bug was intentional and preserved it. Fix it by removing the loophole for private memslots, so we just check for overlap against all memslots. This bug was found by syzkaller, which used a memslot overlap to make pte_list_remove() be called for the wrong memslot, hitting a BUG(): pte_list_remove: 000000007185ed42 0->BUG kernel BUG at arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c:1209! [...] RIP: 0010:pte_list_remove+0x107/0x110 arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c:1208 [...] Call Trace: mmu_page_zap_pte+0x7e/0xd0 arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c:2499 kvm_mmu_page_unlink_children arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c:2521 [inline] kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page+0x4f/0x340 arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c:2565 kvm_zap_obsolete_pages arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c:5348 [inline] kvm_mmu_invalidate_zap_all_pages+0xa6/0x100 arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c:5389 kvm_mmu_notifier_release+0x4f/0x80 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:468 __mmu_notifier_release+0x63/0x100 mm/mmu_notifier.c:75 mmu_notifier_release include/linux/mmu_notifier.h:244 [inline] exit_mmap+0x160/0x170 mm/mmap.c:3009 __mmput kernel/fork.c:966 [inline] mmput+0x44/0xd0 kernel/fork.c:987 exit_mm kernel/exit.c:544 [inline] do_exit+0x24a/0xb50 kernel/exit.c:856 do_group_exit+0x34/0xb0 kernel/exit.c:972 SYSC_exit_group kernel/exit.c:983 [inline] SyS_exit_group+0xb/0x10 kernel/exit.c:981 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0x8b Reproducer: #include <fcntl.h> #include <linux/kvm.h> #include <sys/ioctl.h> int main() { static char buf[4096*3] __attribute__((aligned(4096))); int kvm, vm, cpu; struct kvm_mp_state mp_state = { KVM_MP_STATE_SIPI_RECEIVED }; struct kvm_userspace_memory_region memreg = { .memory_size = sizeof(buf), .userspace_addr = (__u64)buf, }; kvm = open("/dev/kvm", O_RDWR); vm = ioctl(kvm, KVM_CREATE_VM, 0); ioctl(vm, KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP); cpu = ioctl(vm, KVM_CREATE_VCPU, 0); ioctl(cpu, KVM_SET_MP_STATE, &mp_state); ioctl(vm, KVM_SET_TSS_ADDR, 0); ioctl(cpu, KVM_RUN, 0); ioctl(vm, KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION, &memreg); } Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller(a)googlegroups.com> Fixes: e0d62c7f4860 ("KVM: Add kernel-internal memory slots") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.25+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> --- virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c index 210bf820385a..e536977e7b6d 100644 --- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c @@ -974,8 +974,7 @@ int __kvm_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm, /* Check for overlaps */ r = -EEXIST; kvm_for_each_memslot(slot, __kvm_memslots(kvm, as_id)) { - if ((slot->id >= KVM_USER_MEM_SLOTS) || - (slot->id == id)) + if (slot->id == id) continue; if (!((base_gfn + npages <= slot->base_gfn) || (base_gfn >= slot->base_gfn + slot->npages))) -- 2.16.0

7 years, 10 months

Re: [PATCH v3] MIPS: fix incorrect mem=X@Y handling

by Mathieu Malaterre

James, On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 2:38 PM, James Hogan <jhogan(a)kernel.org> wrote: > On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 01:14:29PM +0100, Mathieu Malaterre wrote: >> On Thu, Feb 1, 2018 at 1:12 PM, Mathieu Malaterre <malat(a)debian.org> wrote: >> > On Thu, Feb 1, 2018 at 12:37 PM, Marcin Nowakowski >> > <marcin.nowakowski(a)mips.com> wrote: >> >> Commit 73fbc1eba7ff ("MIPS: fix mem=X@Y commandline processing") added a >> >> fix to ensure that the memory range between PHYS_OFFSET and low memory >> >> address specified by mem= cmdline argument is not later processed by >> >> free_all_bootmem. This change was incorrect for systems where the >> >> commandline specifies more than 1 mem argument, as it will cause all >> >> memory between PHYS_OFFSET and each of the memory offsets to be marked >> >> as reserved, which results in parts of the RAM marked as reserved >> >> (Creator CI20's u-boot has a default commandline argument 'mem=256M@0x0 >> >> mem=768M@0x30000000'). >> >> >> >> Change the behaviour to ensure that only the range between PHYS_OFFSET >> >> and the lowest start address of the memories is marked as protected. >> >> >> >> This change also ensures that the range is marked protected even if it's >> >> only defined through the devicetree and not only via commandline >> >> arguments. >> >> >> >> Reported-by: Mathieu Malaterre <mathieu.malaterre(a)gmail.com> >> >> Signed-off-by: Marcin Nowakowski <marcin.nowakowski(a)mips.com> >> >> Fixes: 73fbc1eba7ff ("MIPS: fix mem=X@Y commandline processing") >> >> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v4.11+ >> >> --- >> >> v3: Update stable version, code cleanup as suggested by James Hogan >> >> v2: Use updated email adress, add tag for stable. >> >> --- >> >> arch/mips/kernel/setup.c | 16 ++++++++++++---- >> >> 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) >> >> >> >> diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/setup.c b/arch/mips/kernel/setup.c >> >> index 702c678de116..e4a1581ce822 100644 >> >> --- a/arch/mips/kernel/setup.c >> >> +++ b/arch/mips/kernel/setup.c >> >> @@ -375,6 +375,7 @@ static void __init bootmem_init(void) >> >> unsigned long reserved_end; >> >> unsigned long mapstart = ~0UL; >> >> unsigned long bootmap_size; >> >> + phys_addr_t ramstart = (phys_addr_t)ULLONG_MAX; >> >> bool bootmap_valid = false; >> >> int i; >> >> >> >> @@ -395,7 +396,8 @@ static void __init bootmem_init(void) >> >> max_low_pfn = 0; >> >> >> >> /* >> >> - * Find the highest page frame number we have available. >> >> + * Find the highest page frame number we have available >> >> + * and the lowest used RAM address >> >> */ >> >> for (i = 0; i < boot_mem_map.nr_map; i++) { >> >> unsigned long start, end; >> >> @@ -407,6 +409,8 @@ static void __init bootmem_init(void) >> >> end = PFN_DOWN(boot_mem_map.map[i].addr >> >> + boot_mem_map.map[i].size); >> >> >> >> + ramstart = min(ramstart, boot_mem_map.map[i].addr); >> >> + >> >> #ifndef CONFIG_HIGHMEM >> >> /* >> >> * Skip highmem here so we get an accurate max_low_pfn if low >> >> @@ -436,6 +440,13 @@ static void __init bootmem_init(void) >> >> mapstart = max(reserved_end, start); >> >> } >> >> >> >> + /* >> >> + * Reserve any memory between the start of RAM and PHYS_OFFSET >> >> + */ >> >> + if (ramstart > PHYS_OFFSET) >> >> + add_memory_region(PHYS_OFFSET, ramstart - PHYS_OFFSET, >> >> + BOOT_MEM_RESERVED); >> >> + >> >> if (min_low_pfn >= max_low_pfn) >> >> panic("Incorrect memory mapping !!!"); >> >> if (min_low_pfn > ARCH_PFN_OFFSET) { >> >> @@ -664,9 +675,6 @@ static int __init early_parse_mem(char *p) >> >> >> >> add_memory_region(start, size, BOOT_MEM_RAM); >> >> >> >> - if (start && start > PHYS_OFFSET) >> >> - add_memory_region(PHYS_OFFSET, start - PHYS_OFFSET, >> >> - BOOT_MEM_RESERVED); >> >> return 0; >> >> } >> >> early_param("mem", early_parse_mem); >> >> -- >> >> 2.14.1 >> >> >> > >> > Looks good to me: >> > >> > $ cat /proc/cpuinfo >> > system type : JZ4780 >> > machine : Creator CI20 >> > processor : 0 >> > cpu model : Ingenic JZRISC V4.15 FPU V0.0 >> > BogoMIPS : 956.00 >> > wait instruction : yes >> > microsecond timers : no >> > tlb_entries : 32 >> > extra interrupt vector : yes >> > hardware watchpoint : yes, count: 1, address/irw mask: [0x0fff] >> > isa : mips1 mips2 mips32r1 mips32r2 >> > ASEs implemented : >> > shadow register sets : 1 >> > kscratch registers : 0 >> > package : 0 >> > core : 0 >> > VCED exceptions : not available >> > VCEI exceptions : not available >> > $ uname -a >> > Linux ci20 4.15.0+ #323 PREEMPT Thu Feb 1 13:08:11 CET 2018 mips GNU/Linux >> > >> > Tested-by: Mathieu Malaterre <malat(a)debian.org> >> > >> > Thanks >> >> Could you please review the patch v3 ? > > Yes, looks good to me, and Ralf had applied to his test branch so I > presume he's happy with it too. I'll apply for 4.16. Hum, just to be sure I understand the process. Which branch are you talking about: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ralf/linux.git > Commit 73fbc1eba7ff ("MIPS: fix mem=X@Y commandline processing") which > this fixes was evidently requested to be backported to stable (unsure > who by) and added to the 4.9 queue, but then this arose and it was > removed until this fix is merged (see > https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/17268/). > > Anybody know how far back before 4.11 both of these patches should be > applied to stable? If not I'll just leave it at 4.11 and if its > important before then for kexec or whatever they can be requested again.

7 years, 10 months

v4.14.19 build: 0 failures 0 warnings (v4.14.19)

by Build bot for Mark Brown

Tree/Branch: v4.14.19 Git describe: v4.14.19 Commit: 1722fe3727 Linux 4.14.19 Build Time: 109 min 6 sec Passed: 10 / 10 (100.00 %) Failed: 0 / 10 ( 0.00 %) Errors: 0 Warnings: 0 Section Mismatches: 0 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- defconfigs with issues (other than build errors): ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- =============================================================================== Detailed per-defconfig build reports below: ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Passed with no errors, warnings or mismatches: arm64-allnoconfig arm64-allmodconfig arm-multi_v5_defconfig arm-multi_v7_defconfig x86_64-defconfig arm-allmodconfig arm-allnoconfig x86_64-allnoconfig arm-multi_v4t_defconfig arm64-defconfig close failed in file object destructor: sys.excepthook is missing lost sys.stderr

7 years, 10 months

[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH v3] MIPS: fix incorrect mem=X@Y handling

by Marcin Nowakowski

Commit 73fbc1eba7ff ("MIPS: fix mem=X@Y commandline processing") added a fix to ensure that the memory range between PHYS_OFFSET and low memory address specified by mem= cmdline argument is not later processed by free_all_bootmem. This change was incorrect for systems where the commandline specifies more than 1 mem argument, as it will cause all memory between PHYS_OFFSET and each of the memory offsets to be marked as reserved, which results in parts of the RAM marked as reserved (Creator CI20's u-boot has a default commandline argument 'mem=256M@0x0 mem=768M@0x30000000'). Change the behaviour to ensure that only the range between PHYS_OFFSET and the lowest start address of the memories is marked as protected. This change also ensures that the range is marked protected even if it's only defined through the devicetree and not only via commandline arguments. Reported-by: Mathieu Malaterre <mathieu.malaterre(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Marcin Nowakowski <marcin.nowakowski(a)mips.com> Fixes: 73fbc1eba7ff ("MIPS: fix mem=X@Y commandline processing") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v4.11+ --- v3: Update stable version, code cleanup as suggested by James Hogan v2: Use updated email adress, add tag for stable. --- arch/mips/kernel/setup.c | 16 ++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/setup.c b/arch/mips/kernel/setup.c index 702c678de116..e4a1581ce822 100644 --- a/arch/mips/kernel/setup.c +++ b/arch/mips/kernel/setup.c @@ -375,6 +375,7 @@ static void __init bootmem_init(void) unsigned long reserved_end; unsigned long mapstart = ~0UL; unsigned long bootmap_size; + phys_addr_t ramstart = (phys_addr_t)ULLONG_MAX; bool bootmap_valid = false; int i; @@ -395,7 +396,8 @@ static void __init bootmem_init(void) max_low_pfn = 0; /* - * Find the highest page frame number we have available. + * Find the highest page frame number we have available + * and the lowest used RAM address */ for (i = 0; i < boot_mem_map.nr_map; i++) { unsigned long start, end; @@ -407,6 +409,8 @@ static void __init bootmem_init(void) end = PFN_DOWN(boot_mem_map.map[i].addr + boot_mem_map.map[i].size); + ramstart = min(ramstart, boot_mem_map.map[i].addr); + #ifndef CONFIG_HIGHMEM /* * Skip highmem here so we get an accurate max_low_pfn if low @@ -436,6 +440,13 @@ static void __init bootmem_init(void) mapstart = max(reserved_end, start); } + /* + * Reserve any memory between the start of RAM and PHYS_OFFSET + */ + if (ramstart > PHYS_OFFSET) + add_memory_region(PHYS_OFFSET, ramstart - PHYS_OFFSET, + BOOT_MEM_RESERVED); + if (min_low_pfn >= max_low_pfn) panic("Incorrect memory mapping !!!"); if (min_low_pfn > ARCH_PFN_OFFSET) { @@ -664,9 +675,6 @@ static int __init early_parse_mem(char *p) add_memory_region(start, size, BOOT_MEM_RAM); - if (start && start > PHYS_OFFSET) - add_memory_region(PHYS_OFFSET, start - PHYS_OFFSET, - BOOT_MEM_RESERVED); return 0; } early_param("mem", early_parse_mem); -- 2.14.1

7 years, 10 months

[tip:x86/urgent] x86/smpboot: Fix uncore_pci_remove() indexing bug when hot-removing a physical CPU

by tip-bot for Masayoshi Mizuma

Commit-ID: 295cc7eb314eb3321fb6d67ca6f7305f5c50d10f Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/295cc7eb314eb3321fb6d67ca6f7305f5c50d10f Author: Masayoshi Mizuma <m.mizuma(a)jp.fujitsu.com> AuthorDate: Thu, 8 Feb 2018 09:19:08 -0500 Committer: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> CommitDate: Tue, 13 Feb 2018 12:47:28 +0100 x86/smpboot: Fix uncore_pci_remove() indexing bug when hot-removing a physical CPU When a physical CPU is hot-removed, the following warning messages are shown while the uncore device is removed in uncore_pci_remove(): WARNING: CPU: 120 PID: 5 at arch/x86/events/intel/uncore.c:988 uncore_pci_remove+0xf1/0x110 ... CPU: 120 PID: 5 Comm: kworker/u1024:0 Not tainted 4.15.0-rc8 #1 Workqueue: kacpi_hotplug acpi_hotplug_work_fn ... Call Trace: pci_device_remove+0x36/0xb0 device_release_driver_internal+0x145/0x210 pci_stop_bus_device+0x76/0xa0 pci_stop_root_bus+0x44/0x60 acpi_pci_root_remove+0x1f/0x80 acpi_bus_trim+0x54/0x90 acpi_bus_trim+0x2e/0x90 acpi_device_hotplug+0x2bc/0x4b0 acpi_hotplug_work_fn+0x1a/0x30 process_one_work+0x141/0x340 worker_thread+0x47/0x3e0 kthread+0xf5/0x130 When uncore_pci_remove() runs, it tries to get the package ID to clear the value of uncore_extra_pci_dev[].dev[] by using topology_phys_to_logical_pkg(). The warning messesages are shown because topology_phys_to_logical_pkg() returns -1. arch/x86/events/intel/uncore.c: static void uncore_pci_remove(struct pci_dev *pdev) { ... phys_id = uncore_pcibus_to_physid(pdev->bus); ... pkg = topology_phys_to_logical_pkg(phys_id); // returns -1 for (i = 0; i < UNCORE_EXTRA_PCI_DEV_MAX; i++) { if (uncore_extra_pci_dev[pkg].dev[i] == pdev) { uncore_extra_pci_dev[pkg].dev[i] = NULL; break; } } WARN_ON_ONCE(i >= UNCORE_EXTRA_PCI_DEV_MAX); // <=========== HERE!! topology_phys_to_logical_pkg() tries to find cpuinfo_x86->phys_proc_id that matches the phys_pkg argument. arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c: int topology_phys_to_logical_pkg(unsigned int phys_pkg) { int cpu; for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &cpu_data(cpu); if (c->initialized && c->phys_proc_id == phys_pkg) return c->logical_proc_id; } return -1; } However, the phys_proc_id was already set to 0 by remove_siblinginfo() when the CPU was offlined. So, topology_phys_to_logical_pkg() cannot find the correct logical_proc_id and always returns -1. As the result, uncore_pci_remove() calls WARN_ON_ONCE() and the warning messages are shown. What is worse is that the bogus 'pkg' index results in two bugs: - We dereference uncore_extra_pci_dev[] with a negative index - We fail to clean up a stale pointer in uncore_extra_pci_dev[][] To fix these bugs, remove the clearing of ->phys_proc_id from remove_siblinginfo(). This should not cause any problems, because ->phys_proc_id is not used after it is hot-removed and it is re-set while hot-adding. Signed-off-by: Masayoshi Mizuma <m.mizuma(a)jp.fujitsu.com> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: yasu.isimatu(a)gmail.com Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Fixes: 30bb9811856f ("x86/topology: Avoid wasting 128k for package id array") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/ed738d54-0f01-b38b-b794-c31dc118c207@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> --- arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c index 6f27fac..cfc61e1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c @@ -1430,7 +1430,6 @@ static void remove_siblinginfo(int cpu) cpumask_clear(cpu_llc_shared_mask(cpu)); cpumask_clear(topology_sibling_cpumask(cpu)); cpumask_clear(topology_core_cpumask(cpu)); - c->phys_proc_id = 0; c->cpu_core_id = 0; cpumask_clear_cpu(cpu, cpu_sibling_setup_mask); recompute_smt_state();

7 years, 10 months

Re: Linux 4.9.81

by Greg KH

diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt index 4c2667aa4634..466c039c622b 100644 --- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -2805,8 +2805,6 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted. norandmaps Don't use address space randomization. Equivalent to echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space - noreplace-paravirt [X86,IA-64,PV_OPS] Don't patch paravirt_ops - noreplace-smp [X86-32,SMP] Don't replace SMP instructions with UP alternatives diff --git a/Documentation/speculation.txt b/Documentation/speculation.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e9e6cbae2841 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/speculation.txt @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +This document explains potential effects of speculation, and how undesirable +effects can be mitigated portably using common APIs. + +=========== +Speculation +=========== + +To improve performance and minimize average latencies, many contemporary CPUs +employ speculative execution techniques such as branch prediction, performing +work which may be discarded at a later stage. + +Typically speculative execution cannot be observed from architectural state, +such as the contents of registers. However, in some cases it is possible to +observe its impact on microarchitectural state, such as the presence or +absence of data in caches. Such state may form side-channels which can be +observed to extract secret information. + +For example, in the presence of branch prediction, it is possible for bounds +checks to be ignored by code which is speculatively executed. Consider the +following code: + + int load_array(int *array, unsigned int index) + { + if (index >= MAX_ARRAY_ELEMS) + return 0; + else + return array[index]; + } + +Which, on arm64, may be compiled to an assembly sequence such as: + + CMP <index>, #MAX_ARRAY_ELEMS + B.LT less + MOV <returnval>, #0 + RET + less: + LDR <returnval>, [<array>, <index>] + RET + +It is possible that a CPU mis-predicts the conditional branch, and +speculatively loads array[index], even if index >= MAX_ARRAY_ELEMS. This +value will subsequently be discarded, but the speculated load may affect +microarchitectural state which can be subsequently measured. + +More complex sequences involving multiple dependent memory accesses may +result in sensitive information being leaked. Consider the following +code, building on the prior example: + + int load_dependent_arrays(int *arr1, int *arr2, int index) + { + int val1, val2, + + val1 = load_array(arr1, index); + val2 = load_array(arr2, val1); + + return val2; + } + +Under speculation, the first call to load_array() may return the value +of an out-of-bounds address, while the second call will influence +microarchitectural state dependent on this value. This may provide an +arbitrary read primitive. + +==================================== +Mitigating speculation side-channels +==================================== + +The kernel provides a generic API to ensure that bounds checks are +respected even under speculation. Architectures which are affected by +speculation-based side-channels are expected to implement these +primitives. + +The array_index_nospec() helper in <linux/nospec.h> can be used to +prevent information from being leaked via side-channels. + +A call to array_index_nospec(index, size) returns a sanitized index +value that is bounded to [0, size) even under cpu speculation +conditions. + +This can be used to protect the earlier load_array() example: + + int load_array(int *array, unsigned int index) + { + if (index >= MAX_ARRAY_ELEMS) + return 0; + else { + index = array_index_nospec(index, MAX_ARRAY_ELEMS); + return array[index]; + } + } diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 9550b6939076..4d5753f1c37b 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ VERSION = 4 PATCHLEVEL = 9 -SUBLEVEL = 80 +SUBLEVEL = 81 EXTRAVERSION = NAME = Roaring Lionus diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig index 6eda5abbd719..0a6bb48854e3 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig @@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ config PPC select ARCH_HAS_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL select GENERIC_SMP_IDLE_THREAD select GENERIC_CMOS_UPDATE + select GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES if PPC_BOOK3S_64 select GENERIC_TIME_VSYSCALL_OLD select GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS select GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS_BROADCAST if SMP diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/exception-64e.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/exception-64e.h index a703452d67b6..555e22d5e07f 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/exception-64e.h +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/exception-64e.h @@ -209,5 +209,11 @@ exc_##label##_book3e: ori r3,r3,vector_offset@l; \ mtspr SPRN_IVOR##vector_number,r3; +#define RFI_TO_KERNEL \ + rfi + +#define RFI_TO_USER \ + rfi + #endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_EXCEPTION_64E_H */ diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/exception-64s.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/exception-64s.h index 9a3eee661297..cab6d2a46c41 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/exception-64s.h +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/exception-64s.h @@ -51,6 +51,59 @@ #define EX_PPR 88 /* SMT thread status register (priority) */ #define EX_CTR 96 +/* + * Macros for annotating the expected destination of (h)rfid + * + * The nop instructions allow us to insert one or more instructions to flush the + * L1-D cache when returning to userspace or a guest. + */ +#define RFI_FLUSH_SLOT \ + RFI_FLUSH_FIXUP_SECTION; \ + nop; \ + nop; \ + nop + +#define RFI_TO_KERNEL \ + rfid + +#define RFI_TO_USER \ + RFI_FLUSH_SLOT; \ + rfid; \ + b rfi_flush_fallback + +#define RFI_TO_USER_OR_KERNEL \ + RFI_FLUSH_SLOT; \ + rfid; \ + b rfi_flush_fallback + +#define RFI_TO_GUEST \ + RFI_FLUSH_SLOT; \ + rfid; \ + b rfi_flush_fallback + +#define HRFI_TO_KERNEL \ + hrfid + +#define HRFI_TO_USER \ + RFI_FLUSH_SLOT; \ + hrfid; \ + b hrfi_flush_fallback + +#define HRFI_TO_USER_OR_KERNEL \ + RFI_FLUSH_SLOT; \ + hrfid; \ + b hrfi_flush_fallback + +#define HRFI_TO_GUEST \ + RFI_FLUSH_SLOT; \ + hrfid; \ + b hrfi_flush_fallback + +#define HRFI_TO_UNKNOWN \ + RFI_FLUSH_SLOT; \ + hrfid; \ + b hrfi_flush_fallback + #ifdef CONFIG_RELOCATABLE #define __EXCEPTION_RELON_PROLOG_PSERIES_1(label, h) \ mfspr r11,SPRN_##h##SRR0; /* save SRR0 */ \ diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/feature-fixups.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/feature-fixups.h index ddf54f5bbdd1..7b332342071c 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/feature-fixups.h +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/feature-fixups.h @@ -189,4 +189,19 @@ void apply_feature_fixups(void); void setup_feature_keys(void); #endif +#define RFI_FLUSH_FIXUP_SECTION \ +951: \ + .pushsection __rfi_flush_fixup,"a"; \ + .align 2; \ +952: \ + FTR_ENTRY_OFFSET 951b-952b; \ + .popsection; + + +#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ + +extern long __start___rfi_flush_fixup, __stop___rfi_flush_fixup; + +#endif + #endif /* __ASM_POWERPC_FEATURE_FIXUPS_H */ diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h index 708edebcf147..0e12cb2437d1 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h @@ -240,6 +240,7 @@ #define H_GET_HCA_INFO 0x1B8 #define H_GET_PERF_COUNT 0x1BC #define H_MANAGE_TRACE 0x1C0 +#define H_GET_CPU_CHARACTERISTICS 0x1C8 #define H_FREE_LOGICAL_LAN_BUFFER 0x1D4 #define H_QUERY_INT_STATE 0x1E4 #define H_POLL_PENDING 0x1D8 @@ -306,6 +307,17 @@ #define H_SET_MODE_RESOURCE_ADDR_TRANS_MODE 3 #define H_SET_MODE_RESOURCE_LE 4 +/* H_GET_CPU_CHARACTERISTICS return values */ +#define H_CPU_CHAR_SPEC_BAR_ORI31 (1ull << 63) // IBM bit 0 +#define H_CPU_CHAR_BCCTRL_SERIALISED (1ull << 62) // IBM bit 1 +#define H_CPU_CHAR_L1D_FLUSH_ORI30 (1ull << 61) // IBM bit 2 +#define H_CPU_CHAR_L1D_FLUSH_TRIG2 (1ull << 60) // IBM bit 3 +#define H_CPU_CHAR_L1D_THREAD_PRIV (1ull << 59) // IBM bit 4 + +#define H_CPU_BEHAV_FAVOUR_SECURITY (1ull << 63) // IBM bit 0 +#define H_CPU_BEHAV_L1D_FLUSH_PR (1ull << 62) // IBM bit 1 +#define H_CPU_BEHAV_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR (1ull << 61) // IBM bit 2 + #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ /** @@ -433,6 +445,11 @@ static inline unsigned long cmo_get_page_size(void) } #endif /* CONFIG_PPC_PSERIES */ +struct h_cpu_char_result { + u64 character; + u64 behaviour; +}; + #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ #endif /* __KERNEL__ */ #endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_HVCALL_H */ diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/paca.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/paca.h index 6a6792bb39fb..ea43897183fd 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/paca.h +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/paca.h @@ -205,6 +205,16 @@ struct paca_struct { struct sibling_subcore_state *sibling_subcore_state; #endif #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 + /* + * rfi fallback flush must be in its own cacheline to prevent + * other paca data leaking into the L1d + */ + u64 exrfi[13] __aligned(0x80); + void *rfi_flush_fallback_area; + u64 l1d_flush_congruence; + u64 l1d_flush_sets; +#endif }; #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/plpar_wrappers.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/plpar_wrappers.h index 1b394247afc2..4e53b8570d1f 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/plpar_wrappers.h +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/plpar_wrappers.h @@ -340,4 +340,18 @@ static inline long plapr_set_watchpoint0(unsigned long dawr0, unsigned long dawr return plpar_set_mode(0, H_SET_MODE_RESOURCE_SET_DAWR, dawr0, dawrx0); } +static inline long plpar_get_cpu_characteristics(struct h_cpu_char_result *p) +{ + unsigned long retbuf[PLPAR_HCALL_BUFSIZE]; + long rc; + + rc = plpar_hcall(H_GET_CPU_CHARACTERISTICS, retbuf); + if (rc == H_SUCCESS) { + p->character = retbuf[0]; + p->behaviour = retbuf[1]; + } + + return rc; +} + #endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_PLPAR_WRAPPERS_H */ diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/setup.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/setup.h index 654d64c9f3ac..6825a67cc3db 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/setup.h +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/setup.h @@ -38,6 +38,19 @@ static inline void pseries_big_endian_exceptions(void) {} static inline void pseries_little_endian_exceptions(void) {} #endif /* CONFIG_PPC_PSERIES */ +void rfi_flush_enable(bool enable); + +/* These are bit flags */ +enum l1d_flush_type { + L1D_FLUSH_NONE = 0x1, + L1D_FLUSH_FALLBACK = 0x2, + L1D_FLUSH_ORI = 0x4, + L1D_FLUSH_MTTRIG = 0x8, +}; + +void __init setup_rfi_flush(enum l1d_flush_type, bool enable); +void do_rfi_flush_fixups(enum l1d_flush_type types); + #endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */ #endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_SETUP_H */ diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/asm-offsets.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/asm-offsets.c index c833d88c423d..64bcbd580495 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/asm-offsets.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/asm-offsets.c @@ -240,6 +240,10 @@ int main(void) #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 DEFINE(PACAMCEMERGSP, offsetof(struct paca_struct, mc_emergency_sp)); DEFINE(PACA_IN_MCE, offsetof(struct paca_struct, in_mce)); + DEFINE(PACA_RFI_FLUSH_FALLBACK_AREA, offsetof(struct paca_struct, rfi_flush_fallback_area)); + DEFINE(PACA_EXRFI, offsetof(struct paca_struct, exrfi)); + DEFINE(PACA_L1D_FLUSH_CONGRUENCE, offsetof(struct paca_struct, l1d_flush_congruence)); + DEFINE(PACA_L1D_FLUSH_SETS, offsetof(struct paca_struct, l1d_flush_sets)); #endif DEFINE(PACAHWCPUID, offsetof(struct paca_struct, hw_cpu_id)); DEFINE(PACAKEXECSTATE, offsetof(struct paca_struct, kexec_state)); diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/entry_64.S b/arch/powerpc/kernel/entry_64.S index caa659671599..c33b69d10919 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/entry_64.S +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/entry_64.S @@ -251,13 +251,23 @@ BEGIN_FTR_SECTION END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_HAS_PPR) ld r13,GPR13(r1) /* only restore r13 if returning to usermode */ + ld r2,GPR2(r1) + ld r1,GPR1(r1) + mtlr r4 + mtcr r5 + mtspr SPRN_SRR0,r7 + mtspr SPRN_SRR1,r8 + RFI_TO_USER + b . /* prevent speculative execution */ + + /* exit to kernel */ 1: ld r2,GPR2(r1) ld r1,GPR1(r1) mtlr r4 mtcr r5 mtspr SPRN_SRR0,r7 mtspr SPRN_SRR1,r8 - RFI + RFI_TO_KERNEL b . /* prevent speculative execution */ syscall_error: @@ -859,7 +869,7 @@ BEGIN_FTR_SECTION END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_HAS_PPR) ACCOUNT_CPU_USER_EXIT(r13, r2, r4) REST_GPR(13, r1) -1: + mtspr SPRN_SRR1,r3 ld r2,_CCR(r1) @@ -872,8 +882,22 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_HAS_PPR) ld r3,GPR3(r1) ld r4,GPR4(r1) ld r1,GPR1(r1) + RFI_TO_USER + b . /* prevent speculative execution */ - rfid +1: mtspr SPRN_SRR1,r3 + + ld r2,_CCR(r1) + mtcrf 0xFF,r2 + ld r2,_NIP(r1) + mtspr SPRN_SRR0,r2 + + ld r0,GPR0(r1) + ld r2,GPR2(r1) + ld r3,GPR3(r1) + ld r4,GPR4(r1) + ld r1,GPR1(r1) + RFI_TO_KERNEL b . /* prevent speculative execution */ #endif /* CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3E */ diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S b/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S index fd68e19b9ef7..96db6c3adebe 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S @@ -655,6 +655,8 @@ END_MMU_FTR_SECTION_IFCLR(MMU_FTR_TYPE_RADIX) andi. r10,r12,MSR_RI /* check for unrecoverable exception */ beq- 2f + andi. r10,r12,MSR_PR /* check for user mode (PR != 0) */ + bne 1f /* All done -- return from exception. */ @@ -671,7 +673,23 @@ END_MMU_FTR_SECTION_IFCLR(MMU_FTR_TYPE_RADIX) ld r11,PACA_EXSLB+EX_R11(r13) ld r12,PACA_EXSLB+EX_R12(r13) ld r13,PACA_EXSLB+EX_R13(r13) - rfid + RFI_TO_KERNEL + b . /* prevent speculative execution */ + +1: +.machine push +.machine "power4" + mtcrf 0x80,r9 + mtcrf 0x01,r9 /* slb_allocate uses cr0 and cr7 */ +.machine pop + + RESTORE_PPR_PACA(PACA_EXSLB, r9) + ld r9,PACA_EXSLB+EX_R9(r13) + ld r10,PACA_EXSLB+EX_R10(r13) + ld r11,PACA_EXSLB+EX_R11(r13) + ld r12,PACA_EXSLB+EX_R12(r13) + ld r13,PACA_EXSLB+EX_R13(r13) + RFI_TO_USER b . /* prevent speculative execution */ 2: mfspr r11,SPRN_SRR0 @@ -679,7 +697,7 @@ END_MMU_FTR_SECTION_IFCLR(MMU_FTR_TYPE_RADIX) mtspr SPRN_SRR0,r10 ld r10,PACAKMSR(r13) mtspr SPRN_SRR1,r10 - rfid + RFI_TO_KERNEL b . 8: mfspr r11,SPRN_SRR0 @@ -1576,6 +1594,92 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_CFAR) bl kernel_bad_stack b 1b + .globl rfi_flush_fallback +rfi_flush_fallback: + SET_SCRATCH0(r13); + GET_PACA(r13); + std r9,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R9(r13) + std r10,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R10(r13) + std r11,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R11(r13) + std r12,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R12(r13) + std r8,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R13(r13) + mfctr r9 + ld r10,PACA_RFI_FLUSH_FALLBACK_AREA(r13) + ld r11,PACA_L1D_FLUSH_SETS(r13) + ld r12,PACA_L1D_FLUSH_CONGRUENCE(r13) + /* + * The load adresses are at staggered offsets within cachelines, + * which suits some pipelines better (on others it should not + * hurt). + */ + addi r12,r12,8 + mtctr r11 + DCBT_STOP_ALL_STREAM_IDS(r11) /* Stop prefetch streams */ + + /* order ld/st prior to dcbt stop all streams with flushing */ + sync +1: li r8,0 + .rept 8 /* 8-way set associative */ + ldx r11,r10,r8 + add r8,r8,r12 + xor r11,r11,r11 // Ensure r11 is 0 even if fallback area is not + add r8,r8,r11 // Add 0, this creates a dependency on the ldx + .endr + addi r10,r10,128 /* 128 byte cache line */ + bdnz 1b + + mtctr r9 + ld r9,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R9(r13) + ld r10,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R10(r13) + ld r11,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R11(r13) + ld r12,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R12(r13) + ld r8,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R13(r13) + GET_SCRATCH0(r13); + rfid + + .globl hrfi_flush_fallback +hrfi_flush_fallback: + SET_SCRATCH0(r13); + GET_PACA(r13); + std r9,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R9(r13) + std r10,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R10(r13) + std r11,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R11(r13) + std r12,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R12(r13) + std r8,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R13(r13) + mfctr r9 + ld r10,PACA_RFI_FLUSH_FALLBACK_AREA(r13) + ld r11,PACA_L1D_FLUSH_SETS(r13) + ld r12,PACA_L1D_FLUSH_CONGRUENCE(r13) + /* + * The load adresses are at staggered offsets within cachelines, + * which suits some pipelines better (on others it should not + * hurt). + */ + addi r12,r12,8 + mtctr r11 + DCBT_STOP_ALL_STREAM_IDS(r11) /* Stop prefetch streams */ + + /* order ld/st prior to dcbt stop all streams with flushing */ + sync +1: li r8,0 + .rept 8 /* 8-way set associative */ + ldx r11,r10,r8 + add r8,r8,r12 + xor r11,r11,r11 // Ensure r11 is 0 even if fallback area is not + add r8,r8,r11 // Add 0, this creates a dependency on the ldx + .endr + addi r10,r10,128 /* 128 byte cache line */ + bdnz 1b + + mtctr r9 + ld r9,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R9(r13) + ld r10,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R10(r13) + ld r11,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R11(r13) + ld r12,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R12(r13) + ld r8,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R13(r13) + GET_SCRATCH0(r13); + hrfid + /* * Called from arch_local_irq_enable when an interrupt needs * to be resent. r3 contains 0x500, 0x900, 0xa00 or 0xe80 to indicate diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c index a12be60181bf..7c30a91c1f86 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c @@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ #include <linux/memblock.h> #include <linux/memory.h> #include <linux/nmi.h> +#include <linux/debugfs.h> #include <asm/io.h> #include <asm/kdump.h> @@ -678,4 +679,142 @@ static int __init disable_hardlockup_detector(void) return 0; } early_initcall(disable_hardlockup_detector); + +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 +static enum l1d_flush_type enabled_flush_types; +static void *l1d_flush_fallback_area; +static bool no_rfi_flush; +bool rfi_flush; + +static int __init handle_no_rfi_flush(char *p) +{ + pr_info("rfi-flush: disabled on command line."); + no_rfi_flush = true; + return 0; +} +early_param("no_rfi_flush", handle_no_rfi_flush); + +/* + * The RFI flush is not KPTI, but because users will see doco that says to use + * nopti we hijack that option here to also disable the RFI flush. + */ +static int __init handle_no_pti(char *p) +{ + pr_info("rfi-flush: disabling due to 'nopti' on command line.\n"); + handle_no_rfi_flush(NULL); + return 0; +} +early_param("nopti", handle_no_pti); + +static void do_nothing(void *unused) +{ + /* + * We don't need to do the flush explicitly, just enter+exit kernel is + * sufficient, the RFI exit handlers will do the right thing. + */ +} + +void rfi_flush_enable(bool enable) +{ + if (rfi_flush == enable) + return; + + if (enable) { + do_rfi_flush_fixups(enabled_flush_types); + on_each_cpu(do_nothing, NULL, 1); + } else + do_rfi_flush_fixups(L1D_FLUSH_NONE); + + rfi_flush = enable; +} + +static void init_fallback_flush(void) +{ + u64 l1d_size, limit; + int cpu; + + l1d_size = ppc64_caches.dsize; + limit = min(safe_stack_limit(), ppc64_rma_size); + + /* + * Align to L1d size, and size it at 2x L1d size, to catch possible + * hardware prefetch runoff. We don't have a recipe for load patterns to + * reliably avoid the prefetcher. + */ + l1d_flush_fallback_area = __va(memblock_alloc_base(l1d_size * 2, l1d_size, limit)); + memset(l1d_flush_fallback_area, 0, l1d_size * 2); + + for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { + /* + * The fallback flush is currently coded for 8-way + * associativity. Different associativity is possible, but it + * will be treated as 8-way and may not evict the lines as + * effectively. + * + * 128 byte lines are mandatory. + */ + u64 c = l1d_size / 8; + + paca[cpu].rfi_flush_fallback_area = l1d_flush_fallback_area; + paca[cpu].l1d_flush_congruence = c; + paca[cpu].l1d_flush_sets = c / 128; + } +} + +void __init setup_rfi_flush(enum l1d_flush_type types, bool enable) +{ + if (types & L1D_FLUSH_FALLBACK) { + pr_info("rfi-flush: Using fallback displacement flush\n"); + init_fallback_flush(); + } + + if (types & L1D_FLUSH_ORI) + pr_info("rfi-flush: Using ori type flush\n"); + + if (types & L1D_FLUSH_MTTRIG) + pr_info("rfi-flush: Using mttrig type flush\n"); + + enabled_flush_types = types; + + if (!no_rfi_flush) + rfi_flush_enable(enable); +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS +static int rfi_flush_set(void *data, u64 val) +{ + if (val == 1) + rfi_flush_enable(true); + else if (val == 0) + rfi_flush_enable(false); + else + return -EINVAL; + + return 0; +} + +static int rfi_flush_get(void *data, u64 *val) +{ + *val = rfi_flush ? 1 : 0; + return 0; +} + +DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE(fops_rfi_flush, rfi_flush_get, rfi_flush_set, "%llu\n"); + +static __init int rfi_flush_debugfs_init(void) +{ + debugfs_create_file("rfi_flush", 0600, powerpc_debugfs_root, NULL, &fops_rfi_flush); + return 0; +} +device_initcall(rfi_flush_debugfs_init); +#endif + +ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) +{ + if (rfi_flush) + return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: RFI Flush\n"); + + return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n"); +} +#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 */ #endif diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/powerpc/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S index 7394b770ae1f..b61fb7902018 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S @@ -132,6 +132,15 @@ SECTIONS /* Read-only data */ RODATA +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64 + . = ALIGN(8); + __rfi_flush_fixup : AT(ADDR(__rfi_flush_fixup) - LOAD_OFFSET) { + __start___rfi_flush_fixup = .; + *(__rfi_flush_fixup) + __stop___rfi_flush_fixup = .; + } +#endif + EXCEPTION_TABLE(0) NOTES :kernel :notes diff --git a/arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c b/arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c index 043415f0bdb1..e86bfa111f3c 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ #include <asm/sections.h> #include <asm/setup.h> #include <asm/firmware.h> +#include <asm/setup.h> struct fixup_entry { unsigned long mask; @@ -115,6 +116,47 @@ void do_feature_fixups(unsigned long value, void *fixup_start, void *fixup_end) } } +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 +void do_rfi_flush_fixups(enum l1d_flush_type types) +{ + unsigned int instrs[3], *dest; + long *start, *end; + int i; + + start = PTRRELOC(&__start___rfi_flush_fixup), + end = PTRRELOC(&__stop___rfi_flush_fixup); + + instrs[0] = 0x60000000; /* nop */ + instrs[1] = 0x60000000; /* nop */ + instrs[2] = 0x60000000; /* nop */ + + if (types & L1D_FLUSH_FALLBACK) + /* b .+16 to fallback flush */ + instrs[0] = 0x48000010; + + i = 0; + if (types & L1D_FLUSH_ORI) { + instrs[i++] = 0x63ff0000; /* ori 31,31,0 speculation barrier */ + instrs[i++] = 0x63de0000; /* ori 30,30,0 L1d flush*/ + } + + if (types & L1D_FLUSH_MTTRIG) + instrs[i++] = 0x7c12dba6; /* mtspr TRIG2,r0 (SPR #882) */ + + for (i = 0; start < end; start++, i++) { + dest = (void *)start + *start; + + pr_devel("patching dest %lx\n", (unsigned long)dest); + + patch_instruction(dest, instrs[0]); + patch_instruction(dest + 1, instrs[1]); + patch_instruction(dest + 2, instrs[2]); + } + + printk(KERN_DEBUG "rfi-flush: patched %d locations\n", i); +} +#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 */ + void do_lwsync_fixups(unsigned long value, void *fixup_start, void *fixup_end) { long *start, *end; diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/setup.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/setup.c index b33faa0015cc..6f8b4c19373a 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/setup.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/setup.c @@ -35,13 +35,63 @@ #include <asm/opal.h> #include <asm/kexec.h> #include <asm/smp.h> +#include <asm/tm.h> +#include <asm/setup.h> #include "powernv.h" +static void pnv_setup_rfi_flush(void) +{ + struct device_node *np, *fw_features; + enum l1d_flush_type type; + int enable; + + /* Default to fallback in case fw-features are not available */ + type = L1D_FLUSH_FALLBACK; + enable = 1; + + np = of_find_node_by_name(NULL, "ibm,opal"); + fw_features = of_get_child_by_name(np, "fw-features"); + of_node_put(np); + + if (fw_features) { + np = of_get_child_by_name(fw_features, "inst-l1d-flush-trig2"); + if (np && of_property_read_bool(np, "enabled")) + type = L1D_FLUSH_MTTRIG; + + of_node_put(np); + + np = of_get_child_by_name(fw_features, "inst-l1d-flush-ori30,30,0"); + if (np && of_property_read_bool(np, "enabled")) + type = L1D_FLUSH_ORI; + + of_node_put(np); + + /* Enable unless firmware says NOT to */ + enable = 2; + np = of_get_child_by_name(fw_features, "needs-l1d-flush-msr-hv-1-to-0"); + if (np && of_property_read_bool(np, "disabled")) + enable--; + + of_node_put(np); + + np = of_get_child_by_name(fw_features, "needs-l1d-flush-msr-pr-0-to-1"); + if (np && of_property_read_bool(np, "disabled")) + enable--; + + of_node_put(np); + of_node_put(fw_features); + } + + setup_rfi_flush(type, enable > 0); +} + static void __init pnv_setup_arch(void) { set_arch_panic_timeout(10, ARCH_PANIC_TIMEOUT); + pnv_setup_rfi_flush(); + /* Initialize SMP */ pnv_smp_init(); diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c index 97aa3f332f24..1845fc611912 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c @@ -450,6 +450,39 @@ static void __init find_and_init_phbs(void) of_pci_check_probe_only(); } +static void pseries_setup_rfi_flush(void) +{ + struct h_cpu_char_result result; + enum l1d_flush_type types; + bool enable; + long rc; + + /* Enable by default */ + enable = true; + + rc = plpar_get_cpu_characteristics(&result); + if (rc == H_SUCCESS) { + types = L1D_FLUSH_NONE; + + if (result.character & H_CPU_CHAR_L1D_FLUSH_TRIG2) + types |= L1D_FLUSH_MTTRIG; + if (result.character & H_CPU_CHAR_L1D_FLUSH_ORI30) + types |= L1D_FLUSH_ORI; + + /* Use fallback if nothing set in hcall */ + if (types == L1D_FLUSH_NONE) + types = L1D_FLUSH_FALLBACK; + + if (!(result.behaviour & H_CPU_BEHAV_L1D_FLUSH_PR)) + enable = false; + } else { + /* Default to fallback if case hcall is not available */ + types = L1D_FLUSH_FALLBACK; + } + + setup_rfi_flush(types, enable); +} + static void __init pSeries_setup_arch(void) { set_arch_panic_timeout(10, ARCH_PANIC_TIMEOUT); @@ -467,6 +500,8 @@ static void __init pSeries_setup_arch(void) fwnmi_init(); + pseries_setup_rfi_flush(); + /* By default, only probe PCI (can be overridden by rtas_pci) */ pci_add_flags(PCI_PROBE_ONLY); diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/common.c b/arch/x86/entry/common.c index bdd9cc59d20f..b0cd306dc527 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/entry/common.c @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ #include <linux/export.h> #include <linux/context_tracking.h> #include <linux/user-return-notifier.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h> #include <linux/uprobes.h> #include <asm/desc.h> @@ -201,7 +202,7 @@ __visible inline void prepare_exit_to_usermode(struct pt_regs *regs) * special case only applies after poking regs and before the * very next return to user mode. */ - current->thread.status &= ~(TS_COMPAT|TS_I386_REGS_POKED); + ti->status &= ~(TS_COMPAT|TS_I386_REGS_POKED); #endif user_enter_irqoff(); @@ -277,7 +278,8 @@ __visible void do_syscall_64(struct pt_regs *regs) * regs->orig_ax, which changes the behavior of some syscalls. */ if (likely((nr & __SYSCALL_MASK) < NR_syscalls)) { - regs->ax = sys_call_table[nr & __SYSCALL_MASK]( + nr = array_index_nospec(nr & __SYSCALL_MASK, NR_syscalls); + regs->ax = sys_call_table[nr]( regs->di, regs->si, regs->dx, regs->r10, regs->r8, regs->r9); } @@ -299,7 +301,7 @@ static __always_inline void do_syscall_32_irqs_on(struct pt_regs *regs) unsigned int nr = (unsigned int)regs->orig_ax; #ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION - current->thread.status |= TS_COMPAT; + ti->status |= TS_COMPAT; #endif if (READ_ONCE(ti->flags) & _TIF_WORK_SYSCALL_ENTRY) { @@ -313,6 +315,7 @@ static __always_inline void do_syscall_32_irqs_on(struct pt_regs *regs) } if (likely(nr < IA32_NR_syscalls)) { + nr = array_index_nospec(nr, IA32_NR_syscalls); /* * It's possible that a 32-bit syscall implementation * takes a 64-bit parameter but nonetheless assumes that diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S index a76dc738ec61..f5434b4670c1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S @@ -237,7 +237,8 @@ ENTRY(__switch_to_asm) * exist, overwrite the RSB with entries which capture * speculative execution to prevent attack. */ - FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %ebx, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW + /* Clobbers %ebx */ + FILL_RETURN_BUFFER RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW #endif /* restore callee-saved registers */ diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S index e729e1528584..db5009ce065a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S @@ -177,96 +177,17 @@ GLOBAL(entry_SYSCALL_64_after_swapgs) pushq %r9 /* pt_regs->r9 */ pushq %r10 /* pt_regs->r10 */ pushq %r11 /* pt_regs->r11 */ - sub $(6*8), %rsp /* pt_regs->bp, bx, r12-15 not saved */ + pushq %rbx /* pt_regs->rbx */ + pushq %rbp /* pt_regs->rbp */ + pushq %r12 /* pt_regs->r12 */ + pushq %r13 /* pt_regs->r13 */ + pushq %r14 /* pt_regs->r14 */ + pushq %r15 /* pt_regs->r15 */ - /* - * If we need to do entry work or if we guess we'll need to do - * exit work, go straight to the slow path. - */ - movq PER_CPU_VAR(current_task), %r11 - testl $_TIF_WORK_SYSCALL_ENTRY|_TIF_ALLWORK_MASK, TASK_TI_flags(%r11) - jnz entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path - -entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath: - /* - * Easy case: enable interrupts and issue the syscall. If the syscall - * needs pt_regs, we'll call a stub that disables interrupts again - * and jumps to the slow path. - */ - TRACE_IRQS_ON - ENABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_NONE) -#if __SYSCALL_MASK == ~0 - cmpq $__NR_syscall_max, %rax -#else - andl $__SYSCALL_MASK, %eax - cmpl $__NR_syscall_max, %eax -#endif - ja 1f /* return -ENOSYS (already in pt_regs->ax) */ - movq %r10, %rcx - - /* - * This call instruction is handled specially in stub_ptregs_64. - * It might end up jumping to the slow path. If it jumps, RAX - * and all argument registers are clobbered. - */ -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE - movq sys_call_table(, %rax, 8), %rax - call __x86_indirect_thunk_rax -#else - call *sys_call_table(, %rax, 8) -#endif -.Lentry_SYSCALL_64_after_fastpath_call: - - movq %rax, RAX(%rsp) -1: - - /* - * If we get here, then we know that pt_regs is clean for SYSRET64. - * If we see that no exit work is required (which we are required - * to check with IRQs off), then we can go straight to SYSRET64. - */ - DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_NONE) - TRACE_IRQS_OFF - movq PER_CPU_VAR(current_task), %r11 - testl $_TIF_ALLWORK_MASK, TASK_TI_flags(%r11) - jnz 1f - - LOCKDEP_SYS_EXIT - TRACE_IRQS_ON /* user mode is traced as IRQs on */ - movq RIP(%rsp), %rcx - movq EFLAGS(%rsp), %r11 - RESTORE_C_REGS_EXCEPT_RCX_R11 - /* - * This opens a window where we have a user CR3, but are - * running in the kernel. This makes using the CS - * register useless for telling whether or not we need to - * switch CR3 in NMIs. Normal interrupts are OK because - * they are off here. - */ - SWITCH_USER_CR3 - movq RSP(%rsp), %rsp - USERGS_SYSRET64 - -1: - /* - * The fast path looked good when we started, but something changed - * along the way and we need to switch to the slow path. Calling - * raise(3) will trigger this, for example. IRQs are off. - */ - TRACE_IRQS_ON - ENABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_NONE) - SAVE_EXTRA_REGS - movq %rsp, %rdi - call syscall_return_slowpath /* returns with IRQs disabled */ - jmp return_from_SYSCALL_64 - -entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path: /* IRQs are off. */ - SAVE_EXTRA_REGS movq %rsp, %rdi call do_syscall_64 /* returns with IRQs disabled */ -return_from_SYSCALL_64: RESTORE_EXTRA_REGS TRACE_IRQS_IRETQ /* we're about to change IF */ @@ -339,6 +260,7 @@ return_from_SYSCALL_64: syscall_return_via_sysret: /* rcx and r11 are already restored (see code above) */ RESTORE_C_REGS_EXCEPT_RCX_R11 + /* * This opens a window where we have a user CR3, but are * running in the kernel. This makes using the CS @@ -363,45 +285,6 @@ opportunistic_sysret_failed: jmp restore_c_regs_and_iret END(entry_SYSCALL_64) -ENTRY(stub_ptregs_64) - /* - * Syscalls marked as needing ptregs land here. - * If we are on the fast path, we need to save the extra regs, - * which we achieve by trying again on the slow path. If we are on - * the slow path, the extra regs are already saved. - * - * RAX stores a pointer to the C function implementing the syscall. - * IRQs are on. - */ - cmpq $.Lentry_SYSCALL_64_after_fastpath_call, (%rsp) - jne 1f - - /* - * Called from fast path -- disable IRQs again, pop return address - * and jump to slow path - */ - DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_NONE) - TRACE_IRQS_OFF - popq %rax - jmp entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path - -1: - JMP_NOSPEC %rax /* Called from C */ -END(stub_ptregs_64) - -.macro ptregs_stub func -ENTRY(ptregs_\func) - leaq \func(%rip), %rax - jmp stub_ptregs_64 -END(ptregs_\func) -.endm - -/* Instantiate ptregs_stub for each ptregs-using syscall */ -#define __SYSCALL_64_QUAL_(sym) -#define __SYSCALL_64_QUAL_ptregs(sym) ptregs_stub sym -#define __SYSCALL_64(nr, sym, qual) __SYSCALL_64_QUAL_##qual(sym) -#include <asm/syscalls_64.h> - /* * %rdi: prev task * %rsi: next task @@ -435,7 +318,8 @@ ENTRY(__switch_to_asm) * exist, overwrite the RSB with entries which capture * speculative execution to prevent attack. */ - FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %r12, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW + /* Clobbers %rbx */ + FILL_RETURN_BUFFER RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW #endif /* restore callee-saved registers */ diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c b/arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c index 9dbc5abb6162..6705edda4ac3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c @@ -6,14 +6,11 @@ #include <asm/asm-offsets.h> #include <asm/syscall.h> -#define __SYSCALL_64_QUAL_(sym) sym -#define __SYSCALL_64_QUAL_ptregs(sym) ptregs_##sym - -#define __SYSCALL_64(nr, sym, qual) extern asmlinkage long __SYSCALL_64_QUAL_##qual(sym)(unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long); +#define __SYSCALL_64(nr, sym, qual) extern asmlinkage long sym(unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long); #include <asm/syscalls_64.h> #undef __SYSCALL_64 -#define __SYSCALL_64(nr, sym, qual) [nr] = __SYSCALL_64_QUAL_##qual(sym), +#define __SYSCALL_64(nr, sym, qual) [nr] = sym, extern long sys_ni_syscall(unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long); diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c index 982c9e31daca..21298c173b0e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ #include <linux/debugfs.h> #include <linux/device.h> #include <linux/coredump.h> +#include <linux/kaiser.h> #include <asm-generic/sizes.h> #include <asm/perf_event.h> @@ -77,6 +78,23 @@ static size_t buf_size(struct page *page) return 1 << (PAGE_SHIFT + page_private(page)); } +static void bts_buffer_free_aux(void *data) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION + struct bts_buffer *buf = data; + int nbuf; + + for (nbuf = 0; nbuf < buf->nr_bufs; nbuf++) { + struct page *page = buf->buf[nbuf].page; + void *kaddr = page_address(page); + size_t page_size = buf_size(page); + + kaiser_remove_mapping((unsigned long)kaddr, page_size); + } +#endif + kfree(data); +} + static void * bts_buffer_setup_aux(int cpu, void **pages, int nr_pages, bool overwrite) { @@ -113,29 +131,33 @@ bts_buffer_setup_aux(int cpu, void **pages, int nr_pages, bool overwrite) buf->real_size = size - size % BTS_RECORD_SIZE; for (pg = 0, nbuf = 0, offset = 0, pad = 0; nbuf < buf->nr_bufs; nbuf++) { - unsigned int __nr_pages; + void *kaddr = pages[pg]; + size_t page_size; + + page = virt_to_page(kaddr); + page_size = buf_size(page); + + if (kaiser_add_mapping((unsigned long)kaddr, + page_size, __PAGE_KERNEL) < 0) { + buf->nr_bufs = nbuf; + bts_buffer_free_aux(buf); + return NULL; + } - page = virt_to_page(pages[pg]); - __nr_pages = PagePrivate(page) ? 1 << page_private(page) : 1; buf->buf[nbuf].page = page; buf->buf[nbuf].offset = offset; buf->buf[nbuf].displacement = (pad ? BTS_RECORD_SIZE - pad : 0); - buf->buf[nbuf].size = buf_size(page) - buf->buf[nbuf].displacement; + buf->buf[nbuf].size = page_size - buf->buf[nbuf].displacement; pad = buf->buf[nbuf].size % BTS_RECORD_SIZE; buf->buf[nbuf].size -= pad; - pg += __nr_pages; - offset += __nr_pages << PAGE_SHIFT; + pg += page_size >> PAGE_SHIFT; + offset += page_size; } return buf; } -static void bts_buffer_free_aux(void *data) -{ - kfree(data); -} - static unsigned long bts_buffer_offset(struct bts_buffer *buf, unsigned int idx) { return buf->buf[idx].offset + buf->buf[idx].displacement; diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h index b15aa4083dfd..166654218329 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h @@ -37,5 +37,7 @@ INDIRECT_THUNK(dx) INDIRECT_THUNK(si) INDIRECT_THUNK(di) INDIRECT_THUNK(bp) -INDIRECT_THUNK(sp) +asmlinkage void __fill_rsb(void); +asmlinkage void __clear_rsb(void); + #endif /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h index 00523524edbf..7bb29a416b77 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h @@ -11,10 +11,12 @@ # define __ASM_FORM_COMMA(x) " " #x "," #endif -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 +#ifndef __x86_64__ +/* 32 bit */ # define __ASM_SEL(a,b) __ASM_FORM(a) # define __ASM_SEL_RAW(a,b) __ASM_FORM_RAW(a) #else +/* 64 bit */ # define __ASM_SEL(a,b) __ASM_FORM(b) # define __ASM_SEL_RAW(a,b) __ASM_FORM_RAW(b) #endif diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h index bfb28caf97b1..857590390397 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h @@ -23,6 +23,34 @@ #define wmb() asm volatile("sfence" ::: "memory") #endif +/** + * array_index_mask_nospec() - generate a mask that is ~0UL when the + * bounds check succeeds and 0 otherwise + * @index: array element index + * @size: number of elements in array + * + * Returns: + * 0 - (index < size) + */ +static inline unsigned long array_index_mask_nospec(unsigned long index, + unsigned long size) +{ + unsigned long mask; + + asm ("cmp %1,%2; sbb %0,%0;" + :"=r" (mask) + :"r"(size),"r" (index) + :"cc"); + return mask; +} + +/* Override the default implementation from linux/nospec.h. */ +#define array_index_mask_nospec array_index_mask_nospec + +/* Prevent speculative execution past this barrier. */ +#define barrier_nospec() alternative_2("", "mfence", X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC, \ + "lfence", X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC) + #ifdef CONFIG_X86_PPRO_FENCE #define dma_rmb() rmb() #else diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h index 9ea67a04ff4f..8c101579f535 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ enum cpuid_leafs CPUID_8000_000A_EDX, CPUID_7_ECX, CPUID_8000_0007_EBX, + CPUID_7_EDX, }; #ifdef CONFIG_X86_FEATURE_NAMES @@ -78,8 +79,9 @@ extern const char * const x86_bug_flags[NBUGINTS*32]; CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 15, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 16, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 17, feature_bit) || \ + CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 18, feature_bit) || \ REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK || \ - BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 18)) + BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19)) #define DISABLED_MASK_BIT_SET(feature_bit) \ ( CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 0, feature_bit) || \ @@ -100,8 +102,9 @@ extern const char * const x86_bug_flags[NBUGINTS*32]; CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 15, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 16, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 17, feature_bit) || \ + CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 18, feature_bit) || \ DISABLED_MASK_CHECK || \ - BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 18)) + BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19)) #define cpu_has(c, bit) \ (__builtin_constant_p(bit) && REQUIRED_MASK_BIT_SET(bit) ? 1 : \ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index 8537a21acd8b..8eb23f5cf7f4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ /* * Defines x86 CPU feature bits */ -#define NCAPINTS 18 /* N 32-bit words worth of info */ +#define NCAPINTS 19 /* N 32-bit words worth of info */ #define NBUGINTS 1 /* N 32-bit bug flags */ /* @@ -194,16 +194,16 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_HW_PSTATE ( 7*32+ 8) /* AMD HW-PState */ #define X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK ( 7*32+ 9) /* AMD ProcFeedbackInterface */ -#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE ( 7*32+12) /* Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ -#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD ( 7*32+13) /* AMD Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ +#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE ( 7*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ +#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD ( 7*32+13) /* "" AMD Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ -#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW (7*32+16) /* AVX-512 Neural Network Instructions */ -#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS (7*32+17) /* AVX-512 Multiply Accumulation Single precision */ -#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW ( 7*32+19) /* Fill RSB on context switches */ +#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW ( 7*32+19) /* "" Fill RSB on context switches */ /* Because the ALTERNATIVE scheme is for members of the X86_FEATURE club... */ #define X86_FEATURE_KAISER ( 7*32+31) /* CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION w/o nokaiser */ +#define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB ( 7*32+21) /* "" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier enabled */ + /* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */ #define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW ( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */ #define X86_FEATURE_VNMI ( 8*32+ 1) /* Intel Virtual NMI */ @@ -260,6 +260,9 @@ /* AMD-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x80000008 (ebx), word 13 */ #define X86_FEATURE_CLZERO (13*32+0) /* CLZERO instruction */ #define X86_FEATURE_IRPERF (13*32+1) /* Instructions Retired Count */ +#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB (13*32+12) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */ +#define X86_FEATURE_IBRS (13*32+14) /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */ +#define X86_FEATURE_STIBP (13*32+15) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */ /* Thermal and Power Management Leaf, CPUID level 0x00000006 (eax), word 14 */ #define X86_FEATURE_DTHERM (14*32+ 0) /* Digital Thermal Sensor */ @@ -295,6 +298,13 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_SUCCOR (17*32+1) /* Uncorrectable error containment and recovery */ #define X86_FEATURE_SMCA (17*32+3) /* Scalable MCA */ +/* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (EDX), word 18 */ +#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW (18*32+ 2) /* AVX-512 Neural Network Instructions */ +#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS (18*32+ 3) /* AVX-512 Multiply Accumulation Single precision */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL (18*32+26) /* "" Speculation Control (IBRS + IBPB) */ +#define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP (18*32+27) /* "" Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */ +#define X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES (18*32+29) /* IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR (Intel) */ + /* * BUG word(s) */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h index 21c5ac15657b..1f8cca459c6c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h @@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ #define DISABLED_MASK15 0 #define DISABLED_MASK16 (DISABLE_PKU|DISABLE_OSPKE) #define DISABLED_MASK17 0 -#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 18) +#define DISABLED_MASK18 0 +#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19) #endif /* _ASM_X86_DISABLED_FEATURES_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h index 34a46dc076d3..75b748a1deb8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ */ #define INTEL_FAM6_CORE_YONAH 0x0E + #define INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_MEROM 0x0F #define INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_MEROM_L 0x16 #define INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_PENRYN 0x17 @@ -21,6 +22,7 @@ #define INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM_G 0x1F /* Auburndale / Havendale */ #define INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM_EP 0x1A #define INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM_EX 0x2E + #define INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE 0x25 #define INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE_EP 0x2C #define INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE_EX 0x2F @@ -36,9 +38,9 @@ #define INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_GT3E 0x46 #define INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_CORE 0x3D -#define INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D 0x56 #define INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_GT3E 0x47 #define INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X 0x4F +#define INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D 0x56 #define INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_MOBILE 0x4E #define INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP 0x5E @@ -57,9 +59,10 @@ #define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT2 0x4D /* Avaton/Rangely */ #define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_AIRMONT 0x4C /* CherryTrail / Braswell */ #define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_MERRIFIELD 0x4A /* Tangier */ -#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_MOOREFIELD 0x5A /* Annidale */ +#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_MOOREFIELD 0x5A /* Anniedale */ #define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT 0x5C #define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_DENVERTON 0x5F /* Goldmont Microserver */ +#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GEMINI_LAKE 0x7A /* Xeon Phi */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h index b11c4c072df8..c768bc1550a1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h @@ -37,6 +37,13 @@ #define EFER_FFXSR (1<<_EFER_FFXSR) /* Intel MSRs. Some also available on other CPUs */ +#define MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL 0x00000048 /* Speculation Control */ +#define SPEC_CTRL_IBRS (1 << 0) /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */ +#define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP (1 << 1) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */ + +#define MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD 0x00000049 /* Prediction Command */ +#define PRED_CMD_IBPB (1 << 0) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */ + #define MSR_IA32_PERFCTR0 0x000000c1 #define MSR_IA32_PERFCTR1 0x000000c2 #define MSR_FSB_FREQ 0x000000cd @@ -50,6 +57,11 @@ #define SNB_C3_AUTO_UNDEMOTE (1UL << 28) #define MSR_MTRRcap 0x000000fe + +#define MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES 0x0000010a +#define ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO (1 << 0) /* Not susceptible to Meltdown */ +#define ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL (1 << 1) /* Enhanced IBRS support */ + #define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL 0x00000119 #define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL3 0x0000011e diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h index b5fee97813cd..ed35b915b5c9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h @@ -188,8 +188,7 @@ static __always_inline unsigned long long rdtsc_ordered(void) * that some other imaginary CPU is updating continuously with a * time stamp. */ - alternative_2("", "mfence", X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC, - "lfence", X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC); + barrier_nospec(); return rdtsc(); } diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 4ad41087ce0e..300cc159b4a0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -1,56 +1,12 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ -#ifndef __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__ -#define __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__ +#ifndef _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_ +#define _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_ #include <asm/alternative.h> #include <asm/alternative-asm.h> #include <asm/cpufeatures.h> -/* - * Fill the CPU return stack buffer. - * - * Each entry in the RSB, if used for a speculative 'ret', contains an - * infinite 'pause; lfence; jmp' loop to capture speculative execution. - * - * This is required in various cases for retpoline and IBRS-based - * mitigations for the Spectre variant 2 vulnerability. Sometimes to - * eliminate potentially bogus entries from the RSB, and sometimes - * purely to ensure that it doesn't get empty, which on some CPUs would - * allow predictions from other (unwanted!) sources to be used. - * - * We define a CPP macro such that it can be used from both .S files and - * inline assembly. It's possible to do a .macro and then include that - * from C via asm(".include <asm/nospec-branch.h>") but let's not go there. - */ - -#define RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS 32 /* To forcibly overwrite all entries */ -#define RSB_FILL_LOOPS 16 /* To avoid underflow */ - -/* - * Google experimented with loop-unrolling and this turned out to be - * the optimal version — two calls, each with their own speculation - * trap should their return address end up getting used, in a loop. - */ -#define __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(reg, nr, sp) \ - mov $(nr/2), reg; \ -771: \ - call 772f; \ -773: /* speculation trap */ \ - pause; \ - lfence; \ - jmp 773b; \ -772: \ - call 774f; \ -775: /* speculation trap */ \ - pause; \ - lfence; \ - jmp 775b; \ -774: \ - dec reg; \ - jnz 771b; \ - add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * nr, sp; - #ifdef __ASSEMBLY__ /* @@ -121,17 +77,10 @@ #endif .endm - /* - * A simpler FILL_RETURN_BUFFER macro. Don't make people use the CPP - * monstrosity above, manually. - */ -.macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req +/* This clobbers the BX register */ +.macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER nr:req ftr:req #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE - ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE - ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@", \ - __stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(\reg,\nr,%_ASM_SP)) \ - \ftr -.Lskip_rsb_\@: + ALTERNATIVE "", "call __clear_rsb", \ftr #endif .endm @@ -201,22 +150,30 @@ extern char __indirect_thunk_end[]; * On VMEXIT we must ensure that no RSB predictions learned in the guest * can be followed in the host, by overwriting the RSB completely. Both * retpoline and IBRS mitigations for Spectre v2 need this; only on future - * CPUs with IBRS_ATT *might* it be avoided. + * CPUs with IBRS_ALL *might* it be avoided. */ static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void) { #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE - unsigned long loops; - - asm volatile (ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE - ALTERNATIVE("jmp 910f", - __stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(%0, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, %1)), - X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) - "910:" - : "=r" (loops), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT - : : "memory" ); + alternative_input("", + "call __fill_rsb", + X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, + ASM_NO_INPUT_CLOBBER(_ASM_BX, "memory")); #endif } +static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void) +{ + asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("", + "movl %[msr], %%ecx\n\t" + "movl %[val], %%eax\n\t" + "movl $0, %%edx\n\t" + "wrmsr", + X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB) + : : [msr] "i" (MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD), + [val] "i" (PRED_CMD_IBPB) + : "eax", "ecx", "edx", "memory"); +} + #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ -#endif /* __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__ */ +#endif /* _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_ */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgalloc.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgalloc.h index 1178a51b77f3..b6d425999f99 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgalloc.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgalloc.h @@ -27,17 +27,6 @@ static inline void paravirt_release_pud(unsigned long pfn) {} */ extern gfp_t __userpte_alloc_gfp; -#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION -/* - * Instead of one PGD, we acquire two PGDs. Being order-1, it is - * both 8k in size and 8k-aligned. That lets us just flip bit 12 - * in a pointer to swap between the two 4k halves. - */ -#define PGD_ALLOCATION_ORDER 1 -#else -#define PGD_ALLOCATION_ORDER 0 -#endif - /* * Allocate and free page tables. */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h index 2536f90cd30c..5af0401ccff2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h @@ -20,9 +20,15 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION extern int kaiser_enabled; +/* + * Instead of one PGD, we acquire two PGDs. Being order-1, it is + * both 8k in size and 8k-aligned. That lets us just flip bit 12 + * in a pointer to swap between the two 4k halves. + */ #else #define kaiser_enabled 0 #endif +#define PGD_ALLOCATION_ORDER kaiser_enabled void ptdump_walk_pgd_level(struct seq_file *m, pgd_t *pgd); void ptdump_walk_pgd_level_checkwx(void); diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h index 353f038ec645..cb866ae1bc5d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h @@ -391,8 +391,6 @@ struct thread_struct { unsigned short gsindex; #endif - u32 status; /* thread synchronous flags */ - #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 unsigned long fsbase; unsigned long gsbase; diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h index fac9a5c0abe9..6847d85400a8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h @@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ #define REQUIRED_MASK15 0 #define REQUIRED_MASK16 0 #define REQUIRED_MASK17 0 -#define REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 18) +#define REQUIRED_MASK18 0 +#define REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19) #endif /* _ASM_X86_REQUIRED_FEATURES_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h index e3c95e8e61c5..03eedc21246d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h @@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ static inline long syscall_get_error(struct task_struct *task, * TS_COMPAT is set for 32-bit syscall entries and then * remains set until we return to user mode. */ - if (task->thread.status & (TS_COMPAT|TS_I386_REGS_POKED)) + if (task->thread_info.status & (TS_COMPAT|TS_I386_REGS_POKED)) /* * Sign-extend the value so (int)-EFOO becomes (long)-EFOO * and will match correctly in comparisons. @@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ static inline void syscall_get_arguments(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long *args) { # ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION - if (task->thread.status & TS_COMPAT) + if (task->thread_info.status & TS_COMPAT) switch (i) { case 0: if (!n--) break; @@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ static inline void syscall_set_arguments(struct task_struct *task, const unsigned long *args) { # ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION - if (task->thread.status & TS_COMPAT) + if (task->thread_info.status & TS_COMPAT) switch (i) { case 0: if (!n--) break; diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h index bdf9c4c91572..89978b9c667a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h @@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ struct task_struct; struct thread_info { unsigned long flags; /* low level flags */ + u32 status; /* thread synchronous flags */ }; #define INIT_THREAD_INFO(tsk) \ @@ -213,7 +214,7 @@ static inline int arch_within_stack_frames(const void * const stack, #define in_ia32_syscall() true #else #define in_ia32_syscall() (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION) && \ - current->thread.status & TS_COMPAT) + current_thread_info()->status & TS_COMPAT) #endif /* diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h index dead0f3921f3..a8d85a687cf4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -123,6 +123,11 @@ extern int __get_user_bad(void); #define __uaccess_begin() stac() #define __uaccess_end() clac() +#define __uaccess_begin_nospec() \ +({ \ + stac(); \ + barrier_nospec(); \ +}) /* * This is a type: either unsigned long, if the argument fits into @@ -432,7 +437,7 @@ do { \ ({ \ int __gu_err; \ __inttype(*(ptr)) __gu_val; \ - __uaccess_begin(); \ + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); \ __get_user_size(__gu_val, (ptr), (size), __gu_err, -EFAULT); \ __uaccess_end(); \ (x) = (__force __typeof__(*(ptr)))__gu_val; \ @@ -474,6 +479,10 @@ struct __large_struct { unsigned long buf[100]; }; __uaccess_begin(); \ barrier(); +#define uaccess_try_nospec do { \ + current->thread.uaccess_err = 0; \ + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); \ + #define uaccess_catch(err) \ __uaccess_end(); \ (err) |= (current->thread.uaccess_err ? -EFAULT : 0); \ @@ -538,7 +547,7 @@ struct __large_struct { unsigned long buf[100]; }; * get_user_ex(...); * } get_user_catch(err) */ -#define get_user_try uaccess_try +#define get_user_try uaccess_try_nospec #define get_user_catch(err) uaccess_catch(err) #define get_user_ex(x, ptr) do { \ @@ -573,7 +582,7 @@ extern void __cmpxchg_wrong_size(void) __typeof__(ptr) __uval = (uval); \ __typeof__(*(ptr)) __old = (old); \ __typeof__(*(ptr)) __new = (new); \ - __uaccess_begin(); \ + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); \ switch (size) { \ case 1: \ { \ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h index 7d3bdd1ed697..d6d245088dd5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h @@ -102,17 +102,17 @@ __copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n) switch (n) { case 1: - __uaccess_begin(); + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); __get_user_size(*(u8 *)to, from, 1, ret, 1); __uaccess_end(); return ret; case 2: - __uaccess_begin(); + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); __get_user_size(*(u16 *)to, from, 2, ret, 2); __uaccess_end(); return ret; case 4: - __uaccess_begin(); + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); __get_user_size(*(u32 *)to, from, 4, ret, 4); __uaccess_end(); return ret; @@ -130,17 +130,17 @@ static __always_inline unsigned long __copy_from_user_nocache(void *to, switch (n) { case 1: - __uaccess_begin(); + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); __get_user_size(*(u8 *)to, from, 1, ret, 1); __uaccess_end(); return ret; case 2: - __uaccess_begin(); + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); __get_user_size(*(u16 *)to, from, 2, ret, 2); __uaccess_end(); return ret; case 4: - __uaccess_begin(); + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); __get_user_size(*(u32 *)to, from, 4, ret, 4); __uaccess_end(); return ret; diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h index 673059a109fe..6e5cc08134ba 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h @@ -59,31 +59,31 @@ int __copy_from_user_nocheck(void *dst, const void __user *src, unsigned size) return copy_user_generic(dst, (__force void *)src, size); switch (size) { case 1: - __uaccess_begin(); + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); __get_user_asm(*(u8 *)dst, (u8 __user *)src, ret, "b", "b", "=q", 1); __uaccess_end(); return ret; case 2: - __uaccess_begin(); + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); __get_user_asm(*(u16 *)dst, (u16 __user *)src, ret, "w", "w", "=r", 2); __uaccess_end(); return ret; case 4: - __uaccess_begin(); + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); __get_user_asm(*(u32 *)dst, (u32 __user *)src, ret, "l", "k", "=r", 4); __uaccess_end(); return ret; case 8: - __uaccess_begin(); + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); __get_user_asm(*(u64 *)dst, (u64 __user *)src, ret, "q", "", "=r", 8); __uaccess_end(); return ret; case 10: - __uaccess_begin(); + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); __get_user_asm(*(u64 *)dst, (u64 __user *)src, ret, "q", "", "=r", 10); if (likely(!ret)) @@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ int __copy_from_user_nocheck(void *dst, const void __user *src, unsigned size) __uaccess_end(); return ret; case 16: - __uaccess_begin(); + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); __get_user_asm(*(u64 *)dst, (u64 __user *)src, ret, "q", "", "=r", 16); if (likely(!ret)) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c index 10d5a3d6affc..03b6e5c6cf23 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c @@ -46,17 +46,6 @@ static int __init setup_noreplace_smp(char *str) } __setup("noreplace-smp", setup_noreplace_smp); -#ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT -static int __initdata_or_module noreplace_paravirt = 0; - -static int __init setup_noreplace_paravirt(char *str) -{ - noreplace_paravirt = 1; - return 1; -} -__setup("noreplace-paravirt", setup_noreplace_paravirt); -#endif - #define DPRINTK(fmt, args...) \ do { \ if (debug_alternative) \ @@ -588,9 +577,6 @@ void __init_or_module apply_paravirt(struct paravirt_patch_site *start, struct paravirt_patch_site *p; char insnbuf[MAX_PATCH_LEN]; - if (noreplace_paravirt) - return; - for (p = start; p < end; p++) { unsigned int used; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 8cacf62ec458..957ad443b786 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/utsname.h> #include <linux/cpu.h> +#include <linux/module.h> #include <asm/nospec-branch.h> #include <asm/cmdline.h> @@ -89,20 +90,41 @@ static const char *spectre_v2_strings[] = { }; #undef pr_fmt -#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V2 mitigation: " fmt +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V2 : " fmt static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled = SPECTRE_V2_NONE; +#ifdef RETPOLINE +static bool spectre_v2_bad_module; + +bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline) +{ + if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_NONE || has_retpoline) + return true; + + pr_err("System may be vulnerable to spectre v2\n"); + spectre_v2_bad_module = true; + return false; +} + +static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void) +{ + return spectre_v2_bad_module ? " - vulnerable module loaded" : ""; +} +#else +static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void) { return ""; } +#endif + static void __init spec2_print_if_insecure(const char *reason) { if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2)) - pr_info("%s\n", reason); + pr_info("%s selected on command line.\n", reason); } static void __init spec2_print_if_secure(const char *reason) { if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2)) - pr_info("%s\n", reason); + pr_info("%s selected on command line.\n", reason); } static inline bool retp_compiler(void) @@ -117,42 +139,68 @@ static inline bool match_option(const char *arg, int arglen, const char *opt) return len == arglen && !strncmp(arg, opt, len); } +static const struct { + const char *option; + enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd; + bool secure; +} mitigation_options[] = { + { "off", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE, false }, + { "on", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE, true }, + { "retpoline", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE, false }, + { "retpoline,amd", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD, false }, + { "retpoline,generic", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC, false }, + { "auto", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO, false }, +}; + static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void) { char arg[20]; - int ret; - - ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg, - sizeof(arg)); - if (ret > 0) { - if (match_option(arg, ret, "off")) { - goto disable; - } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "on")) { - spec2_print_if_secure("force enabled on command line."); - return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE; - } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "retpoline")) { - spec2_print_if_insecure("retpoline selected on command line."); - return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE; - } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "retpoline,amd")) { - if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD) { - pr_err("retpoline,amd selected but CPU is not AMD. Switching to AUTO select\n"); - return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; - } - spec2_print_if_insecure("AMD retpoline selected on command line."); - return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD; - } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "retpoline,generic")) { - spec2_print_if_insecure("generic retpoline selected on command line."); - return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC; - } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "auto")) { + int ret, i; + enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; + + if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2")) + return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE; + else { + ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg, + sizeof(arg)); + if (ret < 0) return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options); i++) { + if (!match_option(arg, ret, mitigation_options[i].option)) + continue; + cmd = mitigation_options[i].cmd; + break; } + + if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options)) { + pr_err("unknown option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n", + mitigation_options[i].option); + return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; + } + } + + if ((cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE || + cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD || + cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC) && + !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) { + pr_err("%s selected but not compiled in. Switching to AUTO select\n", + mitigation_options[i].option); + return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; } - if (!cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2")) + if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD && + boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD) { + pr_err("retpoline,amd selected but CPU is not AMD. Switching to AUTO select\n"); return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; -disable: - spec2_print_if_insecure("disabled on command line."); - return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE; + } + + if (mitigation_options[i].secure) + spec2_print_if_secure(mitigation_options[i].option); + else + spec2_print_if_insecure(mitigation_options[i].option); + + return cmd; } /* Check for Skylake-like CPUs (for RSB handling) */ @@ -190,10 +238,10 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) return; case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE: - /* FALLTRHU */ case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO: - goto retpoline_auto; - + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) + goto retpoline_auto; + break; case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD: if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) goto retpoline_amd; @@ -248,6 +296,12 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW); pr_info("Filling RSB on context switch\n"); } + + /* Initialize Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier if supported */ + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) { + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB); + pr_info("Enabling Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n"); + } } #undef pr_fmt @@ -268,7 +322,7 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, { if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1)) return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); - return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n"); + return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n"); } ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, @@ -277,6 +331,8 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2)) return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); - return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled]); + return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled], + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB) ? ", IBPB" : "", + spectre_v2_module_string()); } #endif diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index d198ae02f2b7..08e89ed6aa87 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -44,6 +44,8 @@ #include <asm/pat.h> #include <asm/microcode.h> #include <asm/microcode_intel.h> +#include <asm/intel-family.h> +#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC #include <asm/uv/uv.h> @@ -716,6 +718,26 @@ static void apply_forced_caps(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) } } +static void init_speculation_control(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) +{ + /* + * The Intel SPEC_CTRL CPUID bit implies IBRS and IBPB support, + * and they also have a different bit for STIBP support. Also, + * a hypervisor might have set the individual AMD bits even on + * Intel CPUs, for finer-grained selection of what's available. + * + * We use the AMD bits in 0x8000_0008 EBX as the generic hardware + * features, which are visible in /proc/cpuinfo and used by the + * kernel. So set those accordingly from the Intel bits. + */ + if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)) { + set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS); + set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBPB); + } + if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP)) + set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP); +} + void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx; @@ -737,6 +759,7 @@ void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) cpuid_count(0x00000007, 0, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); c->x86_capability[CPUID_7_0_EBX] = ebx; c->x86_capability[CPUID_7_ECX] = ecx; + c->x86_capability[CPUID_7_EDX] = edx; } /* Extended state features: level 0x0000000d */ @@ -809,6 +832,7 @@ void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_000A_EDX] = cpuid_edx(0x8000000a); init_scattered_cpuid_features(c); + init_speculation_control(c); } static void identify_cpu_without_cpuid(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) @@ -837,6 +861,41 @@ static void identify_cpu_without_cpuid(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) #endif } +static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_no_speculation[] = { + { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CEDARVIEW, X86_FEATURE_ANY }, + { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CLOVERVIEW, X86_FEATURE_ANY }, + { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_LINCROFT, X86_FEATURE_ANY }, + { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PENWELL, X86_FEATURE_ANY }, + { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PINEVIEW, X86_FEATURE_ANY }, + { X86_VENDOR_CENTAUR, 5 }, + { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 5 }, + { X86_VENDOR_NSC, 5 }, + { X86_VENDOR_ANY, 4 }, + {} +}; + +static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_no_meltdown[] = { + { X86_VENDOR_AMD }, + {} +}; + +static bool __init cpu_vulnerable_to_meltdown(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) +{ + u64 ia32_cap = 0; + + if (x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_meltdown)) + return false; + + if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES)) + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, ia32_cap); + + /* Rogue Data Cache Load? No! */ + if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO) + return false; + + return true; +} + /* * Do minimum CPU detection early. * Fields really needed: vendor, cpuid_level, family, model, mask, @@ -883,11 +942,12 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS); - if (c->x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD) - setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN); - - setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1); - setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2); + if (!x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_speculation)) { + if (cpu_vulnerable_to_meltdown(c)) + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN); + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1); + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2); + } fpu__init_system(c); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c index fcd484d2bb03..4097b43cba2d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c @@ -61,6 +61,59 @@ void check_mpx_erratum(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) } } +/* + * Early microcode releases for the Spectre v2 mitigation were broken. + * Information taken from; + * - https://newsroom.intel.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2018/01/microcode-up… + * - https://kb.vmware.com/s/article/52345 + * - Microcode revisions observed in the wild + * - Release note from 20180108 microcode release + */ +struct sku_microcode { + u8 model; + u8 stepping; + u32 microcode; +}; +static const struct sku_microcode spectre_bad_microcodes[] = { + { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP, 0x0B, 0x84 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP, 0x0A, 0x84 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP, 0x09, 0x84 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE, 0x0A, 0x84 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE, 0x09, 0x84 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X, 0x03, 0x0100013e }, + { INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X, 0x04, 0x0200003c }, + { INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_MOBILE, 0x03, 0xc2 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP, 0x03, 0xc2 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_CORE, 0x04, 0x28 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_GT3E, 0x01, 0x1b }, + { INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D, 0x02, 0x14 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D, 0x03, 0x07000011 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X, 0x01, 0x0b000025 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_ULT, 0x01, 0x21 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_GT3E, 0x01, 0x18 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_CORE, 0x03, 0x23 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X, 0x02, 0x3b }, + { INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X, 0x04, 0x10 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_IVYBRIDGE_X, 0x04, 0x42a }, + /* Updated in the 20180108 release; blacklist until we know otherwise */ + { INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GEMINI_LAKE, 0x01, 0x22 }, + /* Observed in the wild */ + { INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE_X, 0x06, 0x61b }, + { INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE_X, 0x07, 0x712 }, +}; + +static bool bad_spectre_microcode(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(spectre_bad_microcodes); i++) { + if (c->x86_model == spectre_bad_microcodes[i].model && + c->x86_mask == spectre_bad_microcodes[i].stepping) + return (c->microcode <= spectre_bad_microcodes[i].microcode); + } + return false; +} + static void early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { u64 misc_enable; @@ -87,6 +140,19 @@ static void early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) rdmsr(MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV, lower_word, c->microcode); } + /* Now if any of them are set, check the blacklist and clear the lot */ + if ((cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) || + cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP) || + cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS) || cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IBPB) || + cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP)) && bad_spectre_microcode(c)) { + pr_warn("Intel Spectre v2 broken microcode detected; disabling Speculation Control\n"); + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS); + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB); + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_STIBP); + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL); + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP); + } + /* * Atom erratum AAE44/AAF40/AAG38/AAH41: * diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c index 5ce5155f0695..0afaf00b029b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ #define MICROCODE_VERSION "2.01" static struct microcode_ops *microcode_ops; -static bool dis_ucode_ldr; +static bool dis_ucode_ldr = true; /* * Synchronization. @@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ struct cpu_info_ctx { static bool __init check_loader_disabled_bsp(void) { static const char *__dis_opt_str = "dis_ucode_ldr"; + u32 a, b, c, d; #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 const char *cmdline = (const char *)__pa_nodebug(boot_command_line); @@ -85,8 +86,20 @@ static bool __init check_loader_disabled_bsp(void) bool *res = &dis_ucode_ldr; #endif - if (cmdline_find_option_bool(cmdline, option)) - *res = true; + a = 1; + c = 0; + native_cpuid(&a, &b, &c, &d); + + /* + * CPUID(1).ECX[31]: reserved for hypervisor use. This is still not + * completely accurate as xen pv guests don't see that CPUID bit set but + * that's good enough as they don't land on the BSP path anyway. + */ + if (c & BIT(31)) + return *res; + + if (cmdline_find_option_bool(cmdline, option) <= 0) + *res = false; return *res; } @@ -114,9 +127,7 @@ void __init load_ucode_bsp(void) { int vendor; unsigned int family; - - if (check_loader_disabled_bsp()) - return; + bool intel = true; if (!have_cpuid_p()) return; @@ -126,16 +137,27 @@ void __init load_ucode_bsp(void) switch (vendor) { case X86_VENDOR_INTEL: - if (family >= 6) - load_ucode_intel_bsp(); + if (family < 6) + return; break; + case X86_VENDOR_AMD: - if (family >= 0x10) - load_ucode_amd_bsp(family); + if (family < 0x10) + return; + intel = false; break; + default: - break; + return; } + + if (check_loader_disabled_bsp()) + return; + + if (intel) + load_ucode_intel_bsp(); + else + load_ucode_amd_bsp(family); } static bool check_loader_disabled_ap(void) @@ -154,9 +176,6 @@ void load_ucode_ap(void) if (check_loader_disabled_ap()) return; - if (!have_cpuid_p()) - return; - vendor = x86_cpuid_vendor(); family = x86_cpuid_family(); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c index b0dd9aec183d..afbb52532791 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c @@ -31,8 +31,6 @@ void init_scattered_cpuid_features(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) const struct cpuid_bit *cb; static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits[] = { - { X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW, CR_EDX, 2, 0x00000007, 0 }, - { X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS, CR_EDX, 3, 0x00000007, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_APERFMPERF, CR_ECX, 0, 0x00000006, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_EPB, CR_ECX, 3, 0x00000006, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_HW_PSTATE, CR_EDX, 7, 0x80000007, 0 }, diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c index 0887d2ae3797..dffe81d3c261 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c @@ -538,7 +538,7 @@ void set_personality_ia32(bool x32) current->personality &= ~READ_IMPLIES_EXEC; /* in_compat_syscall() uses the presence of the x32 syscall bit flag to determine compat status */ - current->thread.status &= ~TS_COMPAT; + current_thread_info()->status &= ~TS_COMPAT; } else { set_thread_flag(TIF_IA32); clear_thread_flag(TIF_X32); @@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ void set_personality_ia32(bool x32) current->mm->context.ia32_compat = TIF_IA32; current->personality |= force_personality32; /* Prepare the first "return" to user space */ - current->thread.status |= TS_COMPAT; + current_thread_info()->status |= TS_COMPAT; } } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(set_personality_ia32); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c index 0e63c0267f99..e497d374412a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -934,7 +934,7 @@ static int putreg32(struct task_struct *child, unsigned regno, u32 value) */ regs->orig_ax = value; if (syscall_get_nr(child, regs) >= 0) - child->thread.status |= TS_I386_REGS_POKED; + child->thread_info.status |= TS_I386_REGS_POKED; break; case offsetof(struct user32, regs.eflags): diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c b/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c index 763af1d0de64..b1a5d252d482 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c @@ -785,7 +785,7 @@ static inline unsigned long get_nr_restart_syscall(const struct pt_regs *regs) * than the tracee. */ #ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION - if (current->thread.status & (TS_COMPAT|TS_I386_REGS_POKED)) + if (current_thread_info()->status & (TS_COMPAT|TS_I386_REGS_POKED)) return __NR_ia32_restart_syscall; #endif #ifdef CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c index 8402907825b0..21454e254a4c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c @@ -134,6 +134,16 @@ static int map_tboot_page(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long pfn, return -1; set_pte_at(&tboot_mm, vaddr, pte, pfn_pte(pfn, prot)); pte_unmap(pte); + + /* + * PTI poisons low addresses in the kernel page tables in the + * name of making them unusable for userspace. To execute + * code at such a low address, the poison must be cleared. + * + * Note: 'pgd' actually gets set in pud_alloc(). + */ + pgd->pgd &= ~_PAGE_NX; + return 0; } diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c index 91af75e37306..93f924de06cf 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c @@ -355,6 +355,10 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function, F(3DNOWPREFETCH) | F(OSVW) | 0 /* IBS */ | F(XOP) | 0 /* SKINIT, WDT, LWP */ | F(FMA4) | F(TBM); + /* cpuid 0x80000008.ebx */ + const u32 kvm_cpuid_8000_0008_ebx_x86_features = + F(IBPB) | F(IBRS); + /* cpuid 0xC0000001.edx */ const u32 kvm_cpuid_C000_0001_edx_x86_features = F(XSTORE) | F(XSTORE_EN) | F(XCRYPT) | F(XCRYPT_EN) | @@ -376,6 +380,10 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function, /* cpuid 7.0.ecx*/ const u32 kvm_cpuid_7_0_ecx_x86_features = F(PKU) | 0 /*OSPKE*/; + /* cpuid 7.0.edx*/ + const u32 kvm_cpuid_7_0_edx_x86_features = + F(SPEC_CTRL) | F(ARCH_CAPABILITIES); + /* all calls to cpuid_count() should be made on the same cpu */ get_cpu(); @@ -458,12 +466,14 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function, /* PKU is not yet implemented for shadow paging. */ if (!tdp_enabled || !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE)) entry->ecx &= ~F(PKU); + entry->edx &= kvm_cpuid_7_0_edx_x86_features; + cpuid_mask(&entry->edx, CPUID_7_EDX); } else { entry->ebx = 0; entry->ecx = 0; + entry->edx = 0; } entry->eax = 0; - entry->edx = 0; break; } case 9: @@ -607,7 +617,14 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function, if (!g_phys_as) g_phys_as = phys_as; entry->eax = g_phys_as | (virt_as << 8); - entry->ebx = entry->edx = 0; + entry->edx = 0; + /* IBRS and IBPB aren't necessarily present in hardware cpuid */ + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) + entry->ebx |= F(IBPB); + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) + entry->ebx |= F(IBRS); + entry->ebx &= kvm_cpuid_8000_0008_ebx_x86_features; + cpuid_mask(&entry->ebx, CPUID_8000_0008_EBX); break; } case 0x80000019: diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h index 9368fecca3ee..d1beb7156704 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h @@ -160,6 +160,37 @@ static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_rdtscp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) return best && (best->edx & bit(X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP)); } +static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_ibpb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best; + + best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x80000008, 0); + if (best && (best->ebx & bit(X86_FEATURE_IBPB))) + return true; + best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 7, 0); + return best && (best->edx & bit(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)); +} + +static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_ibrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best; + + best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x80000008, 0); + if (best && (best->ebx & bit(X86_FEATURE_IBRS))) + return true; + best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 7, 0); + return best && (best->edx & bit(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)); +} + +static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_arch_capabilities(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best; + + best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 7, 0); + return best && (best->edx & bit(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES)); +} + + /* * NRIPS is provided through cpuidfn 0x8000000a.edx bit 3 */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c index 6f5a3b076341..c8d573822e60 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ #include <asm/kvm_emulate.h> #include <linux/stringify.h> #include <asm/debugreg.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> #include "x86.h" #include "tss.h" @@ -1012,8 +1013,8 @@ static __always_inline u8 test_cc(unsigned int condition, unsigned long flags) void (*fop)(void) = (void *)em_setcc + 4 * (condition & 0xf); flags = (flags & EFLAGS_MASK) | X86_EFLAGS_IF; - asm("push %[flags]; popf; call *%[fastop]" - : "=a"(rc) : [fastop]"r"(fop), [flags]"r"(flags)); + asm("push %[flags]; popf; " CALL_NOSPEC + : "=a"(rc) : [thunk_target]"r"(fop), [flags]"r"(flags)); return rc; } @@ -5306,15 +5307,14 @@ static void fetch_possible_mmx_operand(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, static int fastop(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, void (*fop)(struct fastop *)) { - register void *__sp asm(_ASM_SP); ulong flags = (ctxt->eflags & EFLAGS_MASK) | X86_EFLAGS_IF; if (!(ctxt->d & ByteOp)) fop += __ffs(ctxt->dst.bytes) * FASTOP_SIZE; - asm("push %[flags]; popf; call *%[fastop]; pushf; pop %[flags]\n" + asm("push %[flags]; popf; " CALL_NOSPEC " ; pushf; pop %[flags]\n" : "+a"(ctxt->dst.val), "+d"(ctxt->src.val), [flags]"+D"(flags), - [fastop]"+S"(fop), "+r"(__sp) + [thunk_target]"+S"(fop), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT : "c"(ctxt->src2.val)); ctxt->eflags = (ctxt->eflags & ~EFLAGS_MASK) | (flags & EFLAGS_MASK); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c index 24af898fb3a6..be644afab1bb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c @@ -183,6 +183,8 @@ struct vcpu_svm { u64 gs_base; } host; + u64 spec_ctrl; + u32 *msrpm; ulong nmi_iret_rip; @@ -248,6 +250,8 @@ static const struct svm_direct_access_msrs { { .index = MSR_CSTAR, .always = true }, { .index = MSR_SYSCALL_MASK, .always = true }, #endif + { .index = MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, .always = false }, + { .index = MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, .always = false }, { .index = MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP, .always = false }, { .index = MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP, .always = false }, { .index = MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP, .always = false }, @@ -510,6 +514,7 @@ struct svm_cpu_data { struct kvm_ldttss_desc *tss_desc; struct page *save_area; + struct vmcb *current_vmcb; }; static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct svm_cpu_data *, svm_data); @@ -861,6 +866,25 @@ static bool valid_msr_intercept(u32 index) return false; } +static bool msr_write_intercepted(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned msr) +{ + u8 bit_write; + unsigned long tmp; + u32 offset; + u32 *msrpm; + + msrpm = is_guest_mode(vcpu) ? to_svm(vcpu)->nested.msrpm: + to_svm(vcpu)->msrpm; + + offset = svm_msrpm_offset(msr); + bit_write = 2 * (msr & 0x0f) + 1; + tmp = msrpm[offset]; + + BUG_ON(offset == MSR_INVALID); + + return !!test_bit(bit_write, &tmp); +} + static void set_msr_interception(u32 *msrpm, unsigned msr, int read, int write) { @@ -1535,6 +1559,8 @@ static void svm_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event) u32 dummy; u32 eax = 1; + svm->spec_ctrl = 0; + if (!init_event) { svm->vcpu.arch.apic_base = APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE | MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE; @@ -1644,11 +1670,17 @@ static void svm_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) __free_pages(virt_to_page(svm->nested.msrpm), MSRPM_ALLOC_ORDER); kvm_vcpu_uninit(vcpu); kmem_cache_free(kvm_vcpu_cache, svm); + /* + * The vmcb page can be recycled, causing a false negative in + * svm_vcpu_load(). So do a full IBPB now. + */ + indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(); } static void svm_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu) { struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu); + struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu); int i; if (unlikely(cpu != vcpu->cpu)) { @@ -1677,6 +1709,10 @@ static void svm_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu) if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP)) wrmsrl(MSR_TSC_AUX, svm->tsc_aux); + if (sd->current_vmcb != svm->vmcb) { + sd->current_vmcb = svm->vmcb; + indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(); + } avic_vcpu_load(vcpu, cpu); } @@ -3508,6 +3544,13 @@ static int svm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info) case MSR_VM_CR: msr_info->data = svm->nested.vm_cr_msr; break; + case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL: + if (!msr_info->host_initiated && + !guest_cpuid_has_ibrs(vcpu)) + return 1; + + msr_info->data = svm->spec_ctrl; + break; case MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV: msr_info->data = 0x01000065; break; @@ -3599,6 +3642,49 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr) case MSR_IA32_TSC: kvm_write_tsc(vcpu, msr); break; + case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL: + if (!msr->host_initiated && + !guest_cpuid_has_ibrs(vcpu)) + return 1; + + /* The STIBP bit doesn't fault even if it's not advertised */ + if (data & ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP)) + return 1; + + svm->spec_ctrl = data; + + if (!data) + break; + + /* + * For non-nested: + * When it's written (to non-zero) for the first time, pass + * it through. + * + * For nested: + * The handling of the MSR bitmap for L2 guests is done in + * nested_svm_vmrun_msrpm. + * We update the L1 MSR bit as well since it will end up + * touching the MSR anyway now. + */ + set_msr_interception(svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 1, 1); + break; + case MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD: + if (!msr->host_initiated && + !guest_cpuid_has_ibpb(vcpu)) + return 1; + + if (data & ~PRED_CMD_IBPB) + return 1; + + if (!data) + break; + + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_IBPB); + if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) + break; + set_msr_interception(svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, 0, 1); + break; case MSR_STAR: svm->vmcb->save.star = data; break; @@ -4826,6 +4912,15 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) local_irq_enable(); + /* + * If this vCPU has touched SPEC_CTRL, restore the guest's value if + * it's non-zero. Since vmentry is serialising on affected CPUs, there + * is no need to worry about the conditional branch over the wrmsr + * being speculatively taken. + */ + if (svm->spec_ctrl) + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, svm->spec_ctrl); + asm volatile ( "push %%" _ASM_BP "; \n\t" "mov %c[rbx](%[svm]), %%" _ASM_BX " \n\t" @@ -4918,6 +5013,27 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) #endif ); + /* + * We do not use IBRS in the kernel. If this vCPU has used the + * SPEC_CTRL MSR it may have left it on; save the value and + * turn it off. This is much more efficient than blindly adding + * it to the atomic save/restore list. Especially as the former + * (Saving guest MSRs on vmexit) doesn't even exist in KVM. + * + * For non-nested case: + * If the L01 MSR bitmap does not intercept the MSR, then we need to + * save it. + * + * For nested case: + * If the L02 MSR bitmap does not intercept the MSR, then we need to + * save it. + */ + if (!msr_write_intercepted(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL)) + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, svm->spec_ctrl); + + if (svm->spec_ctrl) + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0); + /* Eliminate branch target predictions from guest mode */ vmexit_fill_RSB(); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c index 178a344f55f8..d49da86e3099 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/tboot.h> #include <linux/hrtimer.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h> #include "kvm_cache_regs.h" #include "x86.h" @@ -109,6 +110,14 @@ static u64 __read_mostly host_xss; static bool __read_mostly enable_pml = 1; module_param_named(pml, enable_pml, bool, S_IRUGO); +#define MSR_TYPE_R 1 +#define MSR_TYPE_W 2 +#define MSR_TYPE_RW 3 + +#define MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC 1 +#define MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV 2 +#define MSR_BITMAP_MODE_LM 4 + #define KVM_VMX_TSC_MULTIPLIER_MAX 0xffffffffffffffffULL /* Guest_tsc -> host_tsc conversion requires 64-bit division. */ @@ -173,7 +182,6 @@ module_param(ple_window_max, int, S_IRUGO); extern const ulong vmx_return; #define NR_AUTOLOAD_MSRS 8 -#define VMCS02_POOL_SIZE 1 struct vmcs { u32 revision_id; @@ -191,6 +199,7 @@ struct loaded_vmcs { struct vmcs *shadow_vmcs; int cpu; int launched; + unsigned long *msr_bitmap; struct list_head loaded_vmcss_on_cpu_link; }; @@ -207,7 +216,7 @@ struct shared_msr_entry { * stored in guest memory specified by VMPTRLD, but is opaque to the guest, * which must access it using VMREAD/VMWRITE/VMCLEAR instructions. * More than one of these structures may exist, if L1 runs multiple L2 guests. - * nested_vmx_run() will use the data here to build a vmcs02: a VMCS for the + * nested_vmx_run() will use the data here to build the vmcs02: a VMCS for the * underlying hardware which will be used to run L2. * This structure is packed to ensure that its layout is identical across * machines (necessary for live migration). @@ -386,13 +395,6 @@ struct __packed vmcs12 { */ #define VMCS12_SIZE 0x1000 -/* Used to remember the last vmcs02 used for some recently used vmcs12s */ -struct vmcs02_list { - struct list_head list; - gpa_t vmptr; - struct loaded_vmcs vmcs02; -}; - /* * The nested_vmx structure is part of vcpu_vmx, and holds information we need * for correct emulation of VMX (i.e., nested VMX) on this vcpu. @@ -419,15 +421,15 @@ struct nested_vmx { */ bool sync_shadow_vmcs; - /* vmcs02_list cache of VMCSs recently used to run L2 guests */ - struct list_head vmcs02_pool; - int vmcs02_num; bool change_vmcs01_virtual_x2apic_mode; /* L2 must run next, and mustn't decide to exit to L1. */ bool nested_run_pending; + + struct loaded_vmcs vmcs02; + /* - * Guest pages referred to in vmcs02 with host-physical pointers, so - * we must keep them pinned while L2 runs. + * Guest pages referred to in the vmcs02 with host-physical + * pointers, so we must keep them pinned while L2 runs. */ struct page *apic_access_page; struct page *virtual_apic_page; @@ -436,8 +438,6 @@ struct nested_vmx { bool pi_pending; u16 posted_intr_nv; - unsigned long *msr_bitmap; - struct hrtimer preemption_timer; bool preemption_timer_expired; @@ -538,6 +538,7 @@ struct vcpu_vmx { unsigned long host_rsp; u8 fail; bool nmi_known_unmasked; + u8 msr_bitmap_mode; u32 exit_intr_info; u32 idt_vectoring_info; ulong rflags; @@ -549,6 +550,10 @@ struct vcpu_vmx { u64 msr_host_kernel_gs_base; u64 msr_guest_kernel_gs_base; #endif + + u64 arch_capabilities; + u64 spec_ctrl; + u32 vm_entry_controls_shadow; u32 vm_exit_controls_shadow; /* @@ -856,21 +861,18 @@ static const unsigned short vmcs_field_to_offset_table[] = { static inline short vmcs_field_to_offset(unsigned long field) { - BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table) > SHRT_MAX); + const size_t size = ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table); + unsigned short offset; - if (field >= ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table)) + BUILD_BUG_ON(size > SHRT_MAX); + if (field >= size) return -ENOENT; - /* - * FIXME: Mitigation for CVE-2017-5753. To be replaced with a - * generic mechanism. - */ - asm("lfence"); - - if (vmcs_field_to_offset_table[field] == 0) + field = array_index_nospec(field, size); + offset = vmcs_field_to_offset_table[field]; + if (offset == 0) return -ENOENT; - - return vmcs_field_to_offset_table[field]; + return offset; } static inline struct vmcs12 *get_vmcs12(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) @@ -912,6 +914,9 @@ static u32 vmx_segment_access_rights(struct kvm_segment *var); static void copy_vmcs12_to_shadow(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx); static void copy_shadow_to_vmcs12(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx); static int alloc_identity_pagetable(struct kvm *kvm); +static void vmx_update_msr_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); +static void __always_inline vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap, + u32 msr, int type); static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct vmcs *, vmxarea); static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct vmcs *, current_vmcs); @@ -931,12 +936,6 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(spinlock_t, blocked_vcpu_on_cpu_lock); static unsigned long *vmx_io_bitmap_a; static unsigned long *vmx_io_bitmap_b; -static unsigned long *vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy; -static unsigned long *vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode; -static unsigned long *vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic; -static unsigned long *vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic; -static unsigned long *vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic_apicv_inactive; -static unsigned long *vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic_apicv_inactive; static unsigned long *vmx_vmread_bitmap; static unsigned long *vmx_vmwrite_bitmap; @@ -1853,6 +1852,52 @@ static void update_exception_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) vmcs_write32(EXCEPTION_BITMAP, eb); } +/* + * Check if MSR is intercepted for currently loaded MSR bitmap. + */ +static bool msr_write_intercepted(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr) +{ + unsigned long *msr_bitmap; + int f = sizeof(unsigned long); + + if (!cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()) + return true; + + msr_bitmap = to_vmx(vcpu)->loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap; + + if (msr <= 0x1fff) { + return !!test_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x800 / f); + } else if ((msr >= 0xc0000000) && (msr <= 0xc0001fff)) { + msr &= 0x1fff; + return !!test_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0xc00 / f); + } + + return true; +} + +/* + * Check if MSR is intercepted for L01 MSR bitmap. + */ +static bool msr_write_intercepted_l01(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr) +{ + unsigned long *msr_bitmap; + int f = sizeof(unsigned long); + + if (!cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()) + return true; + + msr_bitmap = to_vmx(vcpu)->vmcs01.msr_bitmap; + + if (msr <= 0x1fff) { + return !!test_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x800 / f); + } else if ((msr >= 0xc0000000) && (msr <= 0xc0001fff)) { + msr &= 0x1fff; + return !!test_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0xc00 / f); + } + + return true; +} + static void clear_atomic_switch_msr_special(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long entry, unsigned long exit) { @@ -2262,6 +2307,7 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu) if (per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) != vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs) { per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) = vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs; vmcs_load(vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs); + indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(); } if (!already_loaded) { @@ -2530,36 +2576,6 @@ static void move_msr_up(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, int from, int to) vmx->guest_msrs[from] = tmp; } -static void vmx_set_msr_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) -{ - unsigned long *msr_bitmap; - - if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) - msr_bitmap = to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.msr_bitmap; - else if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls() && - (vmcs_read32(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL) & - SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE)) { - if (enable_apicv && kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu)) { - if (is_long_mode(vcpu)) - msr_bitmap = vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic; - else - msr_bitmap = vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic; - } else { - if (is_long_mode(vcpu)) - msr_bitmap = vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic_apicv_inactive; - else - msr_bitmap = vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic_apicv_inactive; - } - } else { - if (is_long_mode(vcpu)) - msr_bitmap = vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode; - else - msr_bitmap = vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy; - } - - vmcs_write64(MSR_BITMAP, __pa(msr_bitmap)); -} - /* * Set up the vmcs to automatically save and restore system * msrs. Don't touch the 64-bit msrs if the guest is in legacy @@ -2600,7 +2616,7 @@ static void setup_msrs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) vmx->save_nmsrs = save_nmsrs; if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()) - vmx_set_msr_bitmap(&vmx->vcpu); + vmx_update_msr_bitmap(&vmx->vcpu); } /* @@ -2989,6 +3005,19 @@ static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info) case MSR_IA32_TSC: msr_info->data = guest_read_tsc(vcpu); break; + case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL: + if (!msr_info->host_initiated && + !guest_cpuid_has_ibrs(vcpu)) + return 1; + + msr_info->data = to_vmx(vcpu)->spec_ctrl; + break; + case MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES: + if (!msr_info->host_initiated && + !guest_cpuid_has_arch_capabilities(vcpu)) + return 1; + msr_info->data = to_vmx(vcpu)->arch_capabilities; + break; case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS: msr_info->data = vmcs_read32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS); break; @@ -3093,6 +3122,68 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info) case MSR_IA32_TSC: kvm_write_tsc(vcpu, msr_info); break; + case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL: + if (!msr_info->host_initiated && + !guest_cpuid_has_ibrs(vcpu)) + return 1; + + /* The STIBP bit doesn't fault even if it's not advertised */ + if (data & ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP)) + return 1; + + vmx->spec_ctrl = data; + + if (!data) + break; + + /* + * For non-nested: + * When it's written (to non-zero) for the first time, pass + * it through. + * + * For nested: + * The handling of the MSR bitmap for L2 guests is done in + * nested_vmx_merge_msr_bitmap. We should not touch the + * vmcs02.msr_bitmap here since it gets completely overwritten + * in the merging. We update the vmcs01 here for L1 as well + * since it will end up touching the MSR anyway now. + */ + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap, + MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, + MSR_TYPE_RW); + break; + case MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD: + if (!msr_info->host_initiated && + !guest_cpuid_has_ibpb(vcpu)) + return 1; + + if (data & ~PRED_CMD_IBPB) + return 1; + + if (!data) + break; + + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_IBPB); + + /* + * For non-nested: + * When it's written (to non-zero) for the first time, pass + * it through. + * + * For nested: + * The handling of the MSR bitmap for L2 guests is done in + * nested_vmx_merge_msr_bitmap. We should not touch the + * vmcs02.msr_bitmap here since it gets completely overwritten + * in the merging. + */ + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, + MSR_TYPE_W); + break; + case MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES: + if (!msr_info->host_initiated) + return 1; + vmx->arch_capabilities = data; + break; case MSR_IA32_CR_PAT: if (vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT) { if (!kvm_mtrr_valid(vcpu, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, data)) @@ -3532,11 +3623,6 @@ static struct vmcs *alloc_vmcs_cpu(int cpu) return vmcs; } -static struct vmcs *alloc_vmcs(void) -{ - return alloc_vmcs_cpu(raw_smp_processor_id()); -} - static void free_vmcs(struct vmcs *vmcs) { free_pages((unsigned long)vmcs, vmcs_config.order); @@ -3552,9 +3638,38 @@ static void free_loaded_vmcs(struct loaded_vmcs *loaded_vmcs) loaded_vmcs_clear(loaded_vmcs); free_vmcs(loaded_vmcs->vmcs); loaded_vmcs->vmcs = NULL; + if (loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap) + free_page((unsigned long)loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap); WARN_ON(loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs != NULL); } +static struct vmcs *alloc_vmcs(void) +{ + return alloc_vmcs_cpu(raw_smp_processor_id()); +} + +static int alloc_loaded_vmcs(struct loaded_vmcs *loaded_vmcs) +{ + loaded_vmcs->vmcs = alloc_vmcs(); + if (!loaded_vmcs->vmcs) + return -ENOMEM; + + loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs = NULL; + loaded_vmcs_init(loaded_vmcs); + + if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()) { + loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap = (unsigned long *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); + if (!loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap) + goto out_vmcs; + memset(loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap, 0xff, PAGE_SIZE); + } + return 0; + +out_vmcs: + free_loaded_vmcs(loaded_vmcs); + return -ENOMEM; +} + static void free_kvm_area(void) { int cpu; @@ -4561,10 +4676,8 @@ static void free_vpid(int vpid) spin_unlock(&vmx_vpid_lock); } -#define MSR_TYPE_R 1 -#define MSR_TYPE_W 2 -static void __vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap, - u32 msr, int type) +static void __always_inline vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap, + u32 msr, int type) { int f = sizeof(unsigned long); @@ -4598,8 +4711,8 @@ static void __vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap, } } -static void __vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap, - u32 msr, int type) +static void __always_inline vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap, + u32 msr, int type) { int f = sizeof(unsigned long); @@ -4633,6 +4746,15 @@ static void __vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap, } } +static void __always_inline vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap, + u32 msr, int type, bool value) +{ + if (value) + vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, msr, type); + else + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, msr, type); +} + /* * If a msr is allowed by L0, we should check whether it is allowed by L1. * The corresponding bit will be cleared unless both of L0 and L1 allow it. @@ -4679,58 +4801,68 @@ static void nested_vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap_l1, } } -static void vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(u32 msr, bool longmode_only) +static u8 vmx_msr_bitmap_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { - if (!longmode_only) - __vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy, - msr, MSR_TYPE_R | MSR_TYPE_W); - __vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode, - msr, MSR_TYPE_R | MSR_TYPE_W); -} + u8 mode = 0; -static void vmx_enable_intercept_msr_read_x2apic(u32 msr, bool apicv_active) -{ - if (apicv_active) { - __vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic, - msr, MSR_TYPE_R); - __vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic, - msr, MSR_TYPE_R); - } else { - __vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic_apicv_inactive, - msr, MSR_TYPE_R); - __vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic_apicv_inactive, - msr, MSR_TYPE_R); + if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls() && + (vmcs_read32(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL) & + SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE)) { + mode |= MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC; + if (enable_apicv && kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu)) + mode |= MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV; } + + if (is_long_mode(vcpu)) + mode |= MSR_BITMAP_MODE_LM; + + return mode; } -static void vmx_disable_intercept_msr_read_x2apic(u32 msr, bool apicv_active) +#define X2APIC_MSR(r) (APIC_BASE_MSR + ((r) >> 4)) + +static void vmx_update_msr_bitmap_x2apic(unsigned long *msr_bitmap, + u8 mode) { - if (apicv_active) { - __vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic, - msr, MSR_TYPE_R); - __vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic, - msr, MSR_TYPE_R); - } else { - __vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic_apicv_inactive, - msr, MSR_TYPE_R); - __vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic_apicv_inactive, - msr, MSR_TYPE_R); + int msr; + + for (msr = 0x800; msr <= 0x8ff; msr += BITS_PER_LONG) { + unsigned word = msr / BITS_PER_LONG; + msr_bitmap[word] = (mode & MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV) ? 0 : ~0; + msr_bitmap[word + (0x800 / sizeof(long))] = ~0; + } + + if (mode & MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC) { + /* + * TPR reads and writes can be virtualized even if virtual interrupt + * delivery is not in use. + */ + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TASKPRI), MSR_TYPE_RW); + if (mode & MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV) { + vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TMCCT), MSR_TYPE_R); + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_EOI), MSR_TYPE_W); + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_SELF_IPI), MSR_TYPE_W); + } } } -static void vmx_disable_intercept_msr_write_x2apic(u32 msr, bool apicv_active) +static void vmx_update_msr_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { - if (apicv_active) { - __vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic, - msr, MSR_TYPE_W); - __vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic, - msr, MSR_TYPE_W); - } else { - __vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic_apicv_inactive, - msr, MSR_TYPE_W); - __vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic_apicv_inactive, - msr, MSR_TYPE_W); - } + struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu); + unsigned long *msr_bitmap = vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap; + u8 mode = vmx_msr_bitmap_mode(vcpu); + u8 changed = mode ^ vmx->msr_bitmap_mode; + + if (!changed) + return; + + vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW, + !(mode & MSR_BITMAP_MODE_LM)); + + if (changed & (MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC | MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV)) + vmx_update_msr_bitmap_x2apic(msr_bitmap, mode); + + vmx->msr_bitmap_mode = mode; } static bool vmx_get_enable_apicv(void) @@ -4738,30 +4870,45 @@ static bool vmx_get_enable_apicv(void) return enable_apicv; } -static int vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +static void nested_mark_vmcs12_pages_dirty(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu); + gfn_t gfn; + + /* + * Don't need to mark the APIC access page dirty; it is never + * written to by the CPU during APIC virtualization. + */ + + if (nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW)) { + gfn = vmcs12->virtual_apic_page_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT; + kvm_vcpu_mark_page_dirty(vcpu, gfn); + } + + if (nested_cpu_has_posted_intr(vmcs12)) { + gfn = vmcs12->posted_intr_desc_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT; + kvm_vcpu_mark_page_dirty(vcpu, gfn); + } +} + + +static void vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu); int max_irr; void *vapic_page; u16 status; - if (vmx->nested.pi_desc && - vmx->nested.pi_pending) { - vmx->nested.pi_pending = false; - if (!pi_test_and_clear_on(vmx->nested.pi_desc)) - return 0; - - max_irr = find_last_bit( - (unsigned long *)vmx->nested.pi_desc->pir, 256); + if (!vmx->nested.pi_desc || !vmx->nested.pi_pending) + return; - if (max_irr == 256) - return 0; + vmx->nested.pi_pending = false; + if (!pi_test_and_clear_on(vmx->nested.pi_desc)) + return; + max_irr = find_last_bit((unsigned long *)vmx->nested.pi_desc->pir, 256); + if (max_irr != 256) { vapic_page = kmap(vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page); - if (!vapic_page) { - WARN_ON(1); - return -ENOMEM; - } __kvm_apic_update_irr(vmx->nested.pi_desc->pir, vapic_page); kunmap(vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page); @@ -4772,7 +4919,8 @@ static int vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) vmcs_write16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS, status); } } - return 0; + + nested_mark_vmcs12_pages_dirty(vcpu); } static inline bool kvm_vcpu_trigger_posted_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) @@ -4959,7 +5107,7 @@ static void vmx_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) } if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()) - vmx_set_msr_bitmap(vcpu); + vmx_update_msr_bitmap(vcpu); } static u32 vmx_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) @@ -5048,7 +5196,7 @@ static int vmx_vcpu_setup(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) vmcs_write64(VMWRITE_BITMAP, __pa(vmx_vmwrite_bitmap)); } if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()) - vmcs_write64(MSR_BITMAP, __pa(vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy)); + vmcs_write64(MSR_BITMAP, __pa(vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap)); vmcs_write64(VMCS_LINK_POINTER, -1ull); /* 22.3.1.5 */ @@ -5122,6 +5270,8 @@ static int vmx_vcpu_setup(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) ++vmx->nmsrs; } + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES)) + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, vmx->arch_capabilities); vm_exit_controls_init(vmx, vmcs_config.vmexit_ctrl); @@ -5150,6 +5300,7 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event) u64 cr0; vmx->rmode.vm86_active = 0; + vmx->spec_ctrl = 0; vmx->soft_vnmi_blocked = 0; @@ -6379,7 +6530,7 @@ static void wakeup_handler(void) static __init int hardware_setup(void) { - int r = -ENOMEM, i, msr; + int r = -ENOMEM, i; rdmsrl_safe(MSR_EFER, &host_efer); @@ -6394,41 +6545,13 @@ static __init int hardware_setup(void) if (!vmx_io_bitmap_b) goto out; - vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy = (unsigned long *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); - if (!vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy) - goto out1; - - vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic = - (unsigned long *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); - if (!vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic) - goto out2; - - vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic_apicv_inactive = - (unsigned long *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); - if (!vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic_apicv_inactive) - goto out3; - - vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode = (unsigned long *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); - if (!vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode) - goto out4; - - vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic = - (unsigned long *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); - if (!vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic) - goto out5; - - vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic_apicv_inactive = - (unsigned long *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); - if (!vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic_apicv_inactive) - goto out6; - vmx_vmread_bitmap = (unsigned long *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); if (!vmx_vmread_bitmap) - goto out7; + goto out1; vmx_vmwrite_bitmap = (unsigned long *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); if (!vmx_vmwrite_bitmap) - goto out8; + goto out2; memset(vmx_vmread_bitmap, 0xff, PAGE_SIZE); memset(vmx_vmwrite_bitmap, 0xff, PAGE_SIZE); @@ -6437,12 +6560,9 @@ static __init int hardware_setup(void) memset(vmx_io_bitmap_b, 0xff, PAGE_SIZE); - memset(vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy, 0xff, PAGE_SIZE); - memset(vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode, 0xff, PAGE_SIZE); - if (setup_vmcs_config(&vmcs_config) < 0) { r = -EIO; - goto out9; + goto out3; } if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NX)) @@ -6499,47 +6619,8 @@ static __init int hardware_setup(void) kvm_tsc_scaling_ratio_frac_bits = 48; } - vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(MSR_FS_BASE, false); - vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(MSR_GS_BASE, false); - vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, true); - vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, false); - vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, false); - vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, false); - - memcpy(vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic, - vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy, PAGE_SIZE); - memcpy(vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic, - vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode, PAGE_SIZE); - memcpy(vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic_apicv_inactive, - vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy, PAGE_SIZE); - memcpy(vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic_apicv_inactive, - vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode, PAGE_SIZE); - set_bit(0, vmx_vpid_bitmap); /* 0 is reserved for host */ - /* - * enable_apicv && kvm_vcpu_apicv_active() - */ - for (msr = 0x800; msr <= 0x8ff; msr++) - vmx_disable_intercept_msr_read_x2apic(msr, true); - - /* TMCCT */ - vmx_enable_intercept_msr_read_x2apic(0x839, true); - /* TPR */ - vmx_disable_intercept_msr_write_x2apic(0x808, true); - /* EOI */ - vmx_disable_intercept_msr_write_x2apic(0x80b, true); - /* SELF-IPI */ - vmx_disable_intercept_msr_write_x2apic(0x83f, true); - - /* - * (enable_apicv && !kvm_vcpu_apicv_active()) || - * !enable_apicv - */ - /* TPR */ - vmx_disable_intercept_msr_read_x2apic(0x808, false); - vmx_disable_intercept_msr_write_x2apic(0x808, false); - if (enable_ept) { kvm_mmu_set_mask_ptes(VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK, (enable_ept_ad_bits) ? VMX_EPT_ACCESS_BIT : 0ull, @@ -6585,22 +6666,10 @@ static __init int hardware_setup(void) return alloc_kvm_area(); -out9: - free_page((unsigned long)vmx_vmwrite_bitmap); -out8: - free_page((unsigned long)vmx_vmread_bitmap); -out7: - free_page((unsigned long)vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic_apicv_inactive); -out6: - free_page((unsigned long)vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic); -out5: - free_page((unsigned long)vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode); -out4: - free_page((unsigned long)vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic_apicv_inactive); out3: - free_page((unsigned long)vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic); + free_page((unsigned long)vmx_vmwrite_bitmap); out2: - free_page((unsigned long)vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy); + free_page((unsigned long)vmx_vmread_bitmap); out1: free_page((unsigned long)vmx_io_bitmap_b); out: @@ -6611,12 +6680,6 @@ static __init int hardware_setup(void) static __exit void hardware_unsetup(void) { - free_page((unsigned long)vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic); - free_page((unsigned long)vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic_apicv_inactive); - free_page((unsigned long)vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic); - free_page((unsigned long)vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic_apicv_inactive); - free_page((unsigned long)vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy); - free_page((unsigned long)vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode); free_page((unsigned long)vmx_io_bitmap_b); free_page((unsigned long)vmx_io_bitmap_a); free_page((unsigned long)vmx_vmwrite_bitmap); @@ -6663,94 +6726,6 @@ static int handle_monitor(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) return handle_nop(vcpu); } -/* - * To run an L2 guest, we need a vmcs02 based on the L1-specified vmcs12. - * We could reuse a single VMCS for all the L2 guests, but we also want the - * option to allocate a separate vmcs02 for each separate loaded vmcs12 - this - * allows keeping them loaded on the processor, and in the future will allow - * optimizations where prepare_vmcs02 doesn't need to set all the fields on - * every entry if they never change. - * So we keep, in vmx->nested.vmcs02_pool, a cache of size VMCS02_POOL_SIZE - * (>=0) with a vmcs02 for each recently loaded vmcs12s, most recent first. - * - * The following functions allocate and free a vmcs02 in this pool. - */ - -/* Get a VMCS from the pool to use as vmcs02 for the current vmcs12. */ -static struct loaded_vmcs *nested_get_current_vmcs02(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) -{ - struct vmcs02_list *item; - list_for_each_entry(item, &vmx->nested.vmcs02_pool, list) - if (item->vmptr == vmx->nested.current_vmptr) { - list_move(&item->list, &vmx->nested.vmcs02_pool); - return &item->vmcs02; - } - - if (vmx->nested.vmcs02_num >= max(VMCS02_POOL_SIZE, 1)) { - /* Recycle the least recently used VMCS. */ - item = list_last_entry(&vmx->nested.vmcs02_pool, - struct vmcs02_list, list); - item->vmptr = vmx->nested.current_vmptr; - list_move(&item->list, &vmx->nested.vmcs02_pool); - return &item->vmcs02; - } - - /* Create a new VMCS */ - item = kmalloc(sizeof(struct vmcs02_list), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!item) - return NULL; - item->vmcs02.vmcs = alloc_vmcs(); - item->vmcs02.shadow_vmcs = NULL; - if (!item->vmcs02.vmcs) { - kfree(item); - return NULL; - } - loaded_vmcs_init(&item->vmcs02); - item->vmptr = vmx->nested.current_vmptr; - list_add(&(item->list), &(vmx->nested.vmcs02_pool)); - vmx->nested.vmcs02_num++; - return &item->vmcs02; -} - -/* Free and remove from pool a vmcs02 saved for a vmcs12 (if there is one) */ -static void nested_free_vmcs02(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, gpa_t vmptr) -{ - struct vmcs02_list *item; - list_for_each_entry(item, &vmx->nested.vmcs02_pool, list) - if (item->vmptr == vmptr) { - free_loaded_vmcs(&item->vmcs02); - list_del(&item->list); - kfree(item); - vmx->nested.vmcs02_num--; - return; - } -} - -/* - * Free all VMCSs saved for this vcpu, except the one pointed by - * vmx->loaded_vmcs. We must be running L1, so vmx->loaded_vmcs - * must be &vmx->vmcs01. - */ -static void nested_free_all_saved_vmcss(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) -{ - struct vmcs02_list *item, *n; - - WARN_ON(vmx->loaded_vmcs != &vmx->vmcs01); - list_for_each_entry_safe(item, n, &vmx->nested.vmcs02_pool, list) { - /* - * Something will leak if the above WARN triggers. Better than - * a use-after-free. - */ - if (vmx->loaded_vmcs == &item->vmcs02) - continue; - - free_loaded_vmcs(&item->vmcs02); - list_del(&item->list); - kfree(item); - vmx->nested.vmcs02_num--; - } -} - /* * The following 3 functions, nested_vmx_succeed()/failValid()/failInvalid(), * set the success or error code of an emulated VMX instruction, as specified @@ -7025,6 +7000,7 @@ static int handle_vmon(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) struct vmcs *shadow_vmcs; const u64 VMXON_NEEDED_FEATURES = FEATURE_CONTROL_LOCKED | FEATURE_CONTROL_VMXON_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX; + int r; /* The Intel VMX Instruction Reference lists a bunch of bits that * are prerequisite to running VMXON, most notably cr4.VMXE must be @@ -7064,12 +7040,9 @@ static int handle_vmon(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) return 1; } - if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()) { - vmx->nested.msr_bitmap = - (unsigned long *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); - if (!vmx->nested.msr_bitmap) - goto out_msr_bitmap; - } + r = alloc_loaded_vmcs(&vmx->nested.vmcs02); + if (r < 0) + goto out_vmcs02; vmx->nested.cached_vmcs12 = kmalloc(VMCS12_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); if (!vmx->nested.cached_vmcs12) @@ -7086,9 +7059,6 @@ static int handle_vmon(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) vmx->vmcs01.shadow_vmcs = shadow_vmcs; } - INIT_LIST_HEAD(&(vmx->nested.vmcs02_pool)); - vmx->nested.vmcs02_num = 0; - hrtimer_init(&vmx->nested.preemption_timer, CLOCK_MONOTONIC, HRTIMER_MODE_REL_PINNED); vmx->nested.preemption_timer.function = vmx_preemption_timer_fn; @@ -7103,9 +7073,9 @@ static int handle_vmon(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) kfree(vmx->nested.cached_vmcs12); out_cached_vmcs12: - free_page((unsigned long)vmx->nested.msr_bitmap); + free_loaded_vmcs(&vmx->nested.vmcs02); -out_msr_bitmap: +out_vmcs02: return -ENOMEM; } @@ -7181,17 +7151,13 @@ static void free_nested(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) vmx->nested.vmxon = false; free_vpid(vmx->nested.vpid02); nested_release_vmcs12(vmx); - if (vmx->nested.msr_bitmap) { - free_page((unsigned long)vmx->nested.msr_bitmap); - vmx->nested.msr_bitmap = NULL; - } if (enable_shadow_vmcs) { vmcs_clear(vmx->vmcs01.shadow_vmcs); free_vmcs(vmx->vmcs01.shadow_vmcs); vmx->vmcs01.shadow_vmcs = NULL; } kfree(vmx->nested.cached_vmcs12); - /* Unpin physical memory we referred to in current vmcs02 */ + /* Unpin physical memory we referred to in the vmcs02 */ if (vmx->nested.apic_access_page) { nested_release_page(vmx->nested.apic_access_page); vmx->nested.apic_access_page = NULL; @@ -7207,7 +7173,7 @@ static void free_nested(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) vmx->nested.pi_desc = NULL; } - nested_free_all_saved_vmcss(vmx); + free_loaded_vmcs(&vmx->nested.vmcs02); } /* Emulate the VMXOFF instruction */ @@ -7241,8 +7207,6 @@ static int handle_vmclear(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) vmptr + offsetof(struct vmcs12, launch_state), &zero, sizeof(zero)); - nested_free_vmcs02(vmx, vmptr); - skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu); nested_vmx_succeed(vcpu); return 1; @@ -8029,6 +7993,19 @@ static bool nested_vmx_exit_handled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_ERROR_CODE), KVM_ISA_VMX); + /* + * The host physical addresses of some pages of guest memory + * are loaded into the vmcs02 (e.g. vmcs12's Virtual APIC + * Page). The CPU may write to these pages via their host + * physical address while L2 is running, bypassing any + * address-translation-based dirty tracking (e.g. EPT write + * protection). + * + * Mark them dirty on every exit from L2 to prevent them from + * getting out of sync with dirty tracking. + */ + nested_mark_vmcs12_pages_dirty(vcpu); + if (vmx->nested.nested_run_pending) return false; @@ -8520,7 +8497,7 @@ static void vmx_set_virtual_x2apic_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool set) } vmcs_write32(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, sec_exec_control); - vmx_set_msr_bitmap(vcpu); + vmx_update_msr_bitmap(vcpu); } static void vmx_set_apic_access_page_addr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t hpa) @@ -8676,14 +8653,14 @@ static void vmx_handle_external_intr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) #endif "pushf\n\t" __ASM_SIZE(push) " $%c[cs]\n\t" - "call *%[entry]\n\t" + CALL_NOSPEC : #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 [sp]"=&r"(tmp), #endif "+r"(__sp) : - [entry]"r"(entry), + THUNK_TARGET(entry), [ss]"i"(__KERNEL_DS), [cs]"i"(__KERNEL_CS) ); @@ -8909,6 +8886,15 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) vmx_arm_hv_timer(vcpu); + /* + * If this vCPU has touched SPEC_CTRL, restore the guest's value if + * it's non-zero. Since vmentry is serialising on affected CPUs, there + * is no need to worry about the conditional branch over the wrmsr + * being speculatively taken. + */ + if (vmx->spec_ctrl) + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, vmx->spec_ctrl); + vmx->__launched = vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched; asm( /* Store host registers */ @@ -9027,6 +9013,27 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) #endif ); + /* + * We do not use IBRS in the kernel. If this vCPU has used the + * SPEC_CTRL MSR it may have left it on; save the value and + * turn it off. This is much more efficient than blindly adding + * it to the atomic save/restore list. Especially as the former + * (Saving guest MSRs on vmexit) doesn't even exist in KVM. + * + * For non-nested case: + * If the L01 MSR bitmap does not intercept the MSR, then we need to + * save it. + * + * For nested case: + * If the L02 MSR bitmap does not intercept the MSR, then we need to + * save it. + */ + if (!msr_write_intercepted(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL)) + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, vmx->spec_ctrl); + + if (vmx->spec_ctrl) + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0); + /* Eliminate branch target predictions from guest mode */ vmexit_fill_RSB(); @@ -9140,6 +9147,7 @@ static struct kvm_vcpu *vmx_create_vcpu(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int id) { int err; struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = kmem_cache_zalloc(kvm_vcpu_cache, GFP_KERNEL); + unsigned long *msr_bitmap; int cpu; if (!vmx) @@ -9172,17 +9180,24 @@ static struct kvm_vcpu *vmx_create_vcpu(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int id) if (!vmx->guest_msrs) goto free_pml; - vmx->loaded_vmcs = &vmx->vmcs01; - vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs = alloc_vmcs(); - vmx->loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs = NULL; - if (!vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs) - goto free_msrs; if (!vmm_exclusive) kvm_cpu_vmxon(__pa(per_cpu(vmxarea, raw_smp_processor_id()))); - loaded_vmcs_init(vmx->loaded_vmcs); + err = alloc_loaded_vmcs(&vmx->vmcs01); if (!vmm_exclusive) kvm_cpu_vmxoff(); + if (err < 0) + goto free_msrs; + msr_bitmap = vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap; + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_FS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW); + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_GS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW); + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW); + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, MSR_TYPE_RW); + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, MSR_TYPE_RW); + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, MSR_TYPE_RW); + vmx->msr_bitmap_mode = 0; + + vmx->loaded_vmcs = &vmx->vmcs01; cpu = get_cpu(); vmx_vcpu_load(&vmx->vcpu, cpu); vmx->vcpu.cpu = cpu; @@ -9576,21 +9591,31 @@ static inline bool nested_vmx_merge_msr_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int msr; struct page *page; unsigned long *msr_bitmap_l1; - unsigned long *msr_bitmap_l0 = to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.msr_bitmap; + unsigned long *msr_bitmap_l0 = to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.vmcs02.msr_bitmap; + /* + * pred_cmd & spec_ctrl are trying to verify two things: + * + * 1. L0 gave a permission to L1 to actually passthrough the MSR. This + * ensures that we do not accidentally generate an L02 MSR bitmap + * from the L12 MSR bitmap that is too permissive. + * 2. That L1 or L2s have actually used the MSR. This avoids + * unnecessarily merging of the bitmap if the MSR is unused. This + * works properly because we only update the L01 MSR bitmap lazily. + * So even if L0 should pass L1 these MSRs, the L01 bitmap is only + * updated to reflect this when L1 (or its L2s) actually write to + * the MSR. + */ + bool pred_cmd = msr_write_intercepted_l01(vcpu, MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD); + bool spec_ctrl = msr_write_intercepted_l01(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL); - /* This shortcut is ok because we support only x2APIC MSRs so far. */ - if (!nested_cpu_has_virt_x2apic_mode(vmcs12)) + if (!nested_cpu_has_virt_x2apic_mode(vmcs12) && + !pred_cmd && !spec_ctrl) return false; page = nested_get_page(vcpu, vmcs12->msr_bitmap); if (!page) return false; msr_bitmap_l1 = (unsigned long *)kmap(page); - if (!msr_bitmap_l1) { - nested_release_page_clean(page); - WARN_ON(1); - return false; - } memset(msr_bitmap_l0, 0xff, PAGE_SIZE); @@ -9617,6 +9642,19 @@ static inline bool nested_vmx_merge_msr_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, MSR_TYPE_W); } } + + if (spec_ctrl) + nested_vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr( + msr_bitmap_l1, msr_bitmap_l0, + MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, + MSR_TYPE_R | MSR_TYPE_W); + + if (pred_cmd) + nested_vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr( + msr_bitmap_l1, msr_bitmap_l0, + MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, + MSR_TYPE_W); + kunmap(page); nested_release_page_clean(page); @@ -10096,6 +10134,9 @@ static void prepare_vmcs02(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12) if (kvm_has_tsc_control) decache_tsc_multiplier(vmx); + if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()) + vmcs_write64(MSR_BITMAP, __pa(vmx->nested.vmcs02.msr_bitmap)); + if (enable_vpid) { /* * There is no direct mapping between vpid02 and vpid12, the @@ -10191,7 +10232,6 @@ static int nested_vmx_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool launch) struct vmcs12 *vmcs12; struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu); int cpu; - struct loaded_vmcs *vmcs02; bool ia32e; u32 msr_entry_idx; @@ -10331,17 +10371,13 @@ static int nested_vmx_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool launch) * the nested entry. */ - vmcs02 = nested_get_current_vmcs02(vmx); - if (!vmcs02) - return -ENOMEM; - enter_guest_mode(vcpu); if (!(vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_DEBUG_CONTROLS)) vmx->nested.vmcs01_debugctl = vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL); cpu = get_cpu(); - vmx->loaded_vmcs = vmcs02; + vmx->loaded_vmcs = &vmx->nested.vmcs02; vmx_vcpu_put(vcpu); vmx_vcpu_load(vcpu, cpu); vcpu->cpu = cpu; @@ -10493,7 +10529,8 @@ static int vmx_check_nested_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool external_intr) return 0; } - return vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt(vcpu); + vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt(vcpu); + return 0; } static u32 vmx_get_preemption_timer_value(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) @@ -10804,7 +10841,7 @@ static void load_vmcs12_host_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL, 0); if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()) - vmx_set_msr_bitmap(vcpu); + vmx_update_msr_bitmap(vcpu); if (nested_vmx_load_msr(vcpu, vmcs12->vm_exit_msr_load_addr, vmcs12->vm_exit_msr_load_count)) @@ -10855,10 +10892,6 @@ static void nested_vmx_vmexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 exit_reason, vm_exit_controls_reset_shadow(vmx); vmx_segment_cache_clear(vmx); - /* if no vmcs02 cache requested, remove the one we used */ - if (VMCS02_POOL_SIZE == 0) - nested_free_vmcs02(vmx, vmx->nested.current_vmptr); - load_vmcs12_host_state(vcpu, vmcs12); /* Update any VMCS fields that might have changed while L2 ran */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index e023ef981feb..75f756eac979 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -975,6 +975,7 @@ static u32 msrs_to_save[] = { #endif MSR_IA32_TSC, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA, MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL, MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS, MSR_TSC_AUX, + MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES }; static unsigned num_msrs_to_save; diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/Makefile b/arch/x86/lib/Makefile index 6bf1898ddf49..4ad7c4dd311c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/lib/Makefile @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ lib-$(CONFIG_RWSEM_XCHGADD_ALGORITHM) += rwsem.o lib-$(CONFIG_INSTRUCTION_DECODER) += insn.o inat.o lib-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE) += kaslr.o lib-$(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) += retpoline.o +OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD_retpoline.o :=y obj-y += msr.o msr-reg.o msr-reg-export.o hweight.o diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/getuser.S b/arch/x86/lib/getuser.S index 37b62d412148..b12b214713a6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/getuser.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/getuser.S @@ -39,6 +39,8 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_1) mov PER_CPU_VAR(current_task), %_ASM_DX cmp TASK_addr_limit(%_ASM_DX),%_ASM_AX jae bad_get_user + sbb %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_DX /* array_index_mask_nospec() */ + and %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX ASM_STAC 1: movzbl (%_ASM_AX),%edx xor %eax,%eax @@ -53,6 +55,8 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_2) mov PER_CPU_VAR(current_task), %_ASM_DX cmp TASK_addr_limit(%_ASM_DX),%_ASM_AX jae bad_get_user + sbb %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_DX /* array_index_mask_nospec() */ + and %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX ASM_STAC 2: movzwl -1(%_ASM_AX),%edx xor %eax,%eax @@ -67,6 +71,8 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_4) mov PER_CPU_VAR(current_task), %_ASM_DX cmp TASK_addr_limit(%_ASM_DX),%_ASM_AX jae bad_get_user + sbb %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_DX /* array_index_mask_nospec() */ + and %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX ASM_STAC 3: movl -3(%_ASM_AX),%edx xor %eax,%eax @@ -82,6 +88,8 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_8) mov PER_CPU_VAR(current_task), %_ASM_DX cmp TASK_addr_limit(%_ASM_DX),%_ASM_AX jae bad_get_user + sbb %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_DX /* array_index_mask_nospec() */ + and %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX ASM_STAC 4: movq -7(%_ASM_AX),%rdx xor %eax,%eax @@ -93,6 +101,8 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_8) mov PER_CPU_VAR(current_task), %_ASM_DX cmp TASK_addr_limit(%_ASM_DX),%_ASM_AX jae bad_get_user_8 + sbb %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_DX /* array_index_mask_nospec() */ + and %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX ASM_STAC 4: movl -7(%_ASM_AX),%edx 5: movl -3(%_ASM_AX),%ecx diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S index dfb2ba91b670..480edc3a5e03 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ #include <asm/alternative-asm.h> #include <asm/export.h> #include <asm/nospec-branch.h> +#include <asm/bitsperlong.h> .macro THUNK reg .section .text.__x86.indirect_thunk @@ -36,7 +37,6 @@ GENERATE_THUNK(_ASM_DX) GENERATE_THUNK(_ASM_SI) GENERATE_THUNK(_ASM_DI) GENERATE_THUNK(_ASM_BP) -GENERATE_THUNK(_ASM_SP) #ifdef CONFIG_64BIT GENERATE_THUNK(r8) GENERATE_THUNK(r9) @@ -47,3 +47,58 @@ GENERATE_THUNK(r13) GENERATE_THUNK(r14) GENERATE_THUNK(r15) #endif + +/* + * Fill the CPU return stack buffer. + * + * Each entry in the RSB, if used for a speculative 'ret', contains an + * infinite 'pause; lfence; jmp' loop to capture speculative execution. + * + * This is required in various cases for retpoline and IBRS-based + * mitigations for the Spectre variant 2 vulnerability. Sometimes to + * eliminate potentially bogus entries from the RSB, and sometimes + * purely to ensure that it doesn't get empty, which on some CPUs would + * allow predictions from other (unwanted!) sources to be used. + * + * Google experimented with loop-unrolling and this turned out to be + * the optimal version - two calls, each with their own speculation + * trap should their return address end up getting used, in a loop. + */ +.macro STUFF_RSB nr:req sp:req + mov $(\nr / 2), %_ASM_BX + .align 16 +771: + call 772f +773: /* speculation trap */ + pause + lfence + jmp 773b + .align 16 +772: + call 774f +775: /* speculation trap */ + pause + lfence + jmp 775b + .align 16 +774: + dec %_ASM_BX + jnz 771b + add $((BITS_PER_LONG/8) * \nr), \sp +.endm + +#define RSB_FILL_LOOPS 16 /* To avoid underflow */ + +ENTRY(__fill_rsb) + STUFF_RSB RSB_FILL_LOOPS, %_ASM_SP + ret +END(__fill_rsb) +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__fill_rsb) + +#define RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS 32 /* To forcibly overwrite all entries */ + +ENTRY(__clear_rsb) + STUFF_RSB RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, %_ASM_SP + ret +END(__clear_rsb) +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__clear_rsb) diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c b/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c index 3bc7baf2a711..5c06dbffc52f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c +++ b/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c @@ -570,12 +570,12 @@ do { \ unsigned long __copy_to_user_ll(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n) { - stac(); + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); if (movsl_is_ok(to, from, n)) __copy_user(to, from, n); else n = __copy_user_intel(to, from, n); - clac(); + __uaccess_end(); return n; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__copy_to_user_ll); @@ -627,7 +627,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__copy_from_user_ll_nocache); unsigned long __copy_from_user_ll_nocache_nozero(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n) { - stac(); + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); #ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_USERCOPY if (n > 64 && static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XMM2)) n = __copy_user_intel_nocache(to, from, n); @@ -636,7 +636,7 @@ unsigned long __copy_from_user_ll_nocache_nozero(void *to, const void __user *fr #else __copy_user(to, from, n); #endif - clac(); + __uaccess_end(); return n; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__copy_from_user_ll_nocache_nozero); diff --git a/crypto/tcrypt.c b/crypto/tcrypt.c index e3af318af2db..2a07341aca46 100644 --- a/crypto/tcrypt.c +++ b/crypto/tcrypt.c @@ -223,11 +223,13 @@ static void sg_init_aead(struct scatterlist *sg, char *xbuf[XBUFSIZE], } sg_init_table(sg, np + 1); - np--; + if (rem) + np--; for (k = 0; k < np; k++) sg_set_buf(&sg[k + 1], xbuf[k], PAGE_SIZE); - sg_set_buf(&sg[k + 1], xbuf[k], rem); + if (rem) + sg_set_buf(&sg[k + 1], xbuf[k], rem); } static void test_aead_speed(const char *algo, int enc, unsigned int secs, diff --git a/drivers/auxdisplay/img-ascii-lcd.c b/drivers/auxdisplay/img-ascii-lcd.c index 83f1439e57fd..6e8eaa7fe7a6 100644 --- a/drivers/auxdisplay/img-ascii-lcd.c +++ b/drivers/auxdisplay/img-ascii-lcd.c @@ -442,3 +442,7 @@ static struct platform_driver img_ascii_lcd_driver = { .remove = img_ascii_lcd_remove, }; module_platform_driver(img_ascii_lcd_driver); + +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Imagination Technologies ASCII LCD Display"); +MODULE_AUTHOR("Paul Burton <paul.burton(a)mips.com>"); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/rcar-du/rcar_du_crtc.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/rcar-du/rcar_du_crtc.c index a2ec6d8796a0..3322b157106d 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/rcar-du/rcar_du_crtc.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/rcar-du/rcar_du_crtc.c @@ -392,6 +392,31 @@ static void rcar_du_crtc_start(struct rcar_du_crtc *rcrtc) rcrtc->started = true; } +static void rcar_du_crtc_disable_planes(struct rcar_du_crtc *rcrtc) +{ + struct rcar_du_device *rcdu = rcrtc->group->dev; + struct drm_crtc *crtc = &rcrtc->crtc; + u32 status; + /* Make sure vblank interrupts are enabled. */ + drm_crtc_vblank_get(crtc); + /* + * Disable planes and calculate how many vertical blanking interrupts we + * have to wait for. If a vertical blanking interrupt has been triggered + * but not processed yet, we don't know whether it occurred before or + * after the planes got disabled. We thus have to wait for two vblank + * interrupts in that case. + */ + spin_lock_irq(&rcrtc->vblank_lock); + rcar_du_group_write(rcrtc->group, rcrtc->index % 2 ? DS2PR : DS1PR, 0); + status = rcar_du_crtc_read(rcrtc, DSSR); + rcrtc->vblank_count = status & DSSR_VBK ? 2 : 1; + spin_unlock_irq(&rcrtc->vblank_lock); + if (!wait_event_timeout(rcrtc->vblank_wait, rcrtc->vblank_count == 0, + msecs_to_jiffies(100))) + dev_warn(rcdu->dev, "vertical blanking timeout\n"); + drm_crtc_vblank_put(crtc); +} + static void rcar_du_crtc_stop(struct rcar_du_crtc *rcrtc) { struct drm_crtc *crtc = &rcrtc->crtc; @@ -400,17 +425,16 @@ static void rcar_du_crtc_stop(struct rcar_du_crtc *rcrtc) return; /* Disable all planes and wait for the change to take effect. This is - * required as the DSnPR registers are updated on vblank, and no vblank - * will occur once the CRTC is stopped. Disabling planes when starting - * the CRTC thus wouldn't be enough as it would start scanning out - * immediately from old frame buffers until the next vblank. + * required as the plane enable registers are updated on vblank, and no + * vblank will occur once the CRTC is stopped. Disabling planes when + * starting the CRTC thus wouldn't be enough as it would start scanning + * out immediately from old frame buffers until the next vblank. * * This increases the CRTC stop delay, especially when multiple CRTCs * are stopped in one operation as we now wait for one vblank per CRTC. * Whether this can be improved needs to be researched. */ - rcar_du_group_write(rcrtc->group, rcrtc->index % 2 ? DS2PR : DS1PR, 0); - drm_crtc_wait_one_vblank(crtc); + rcar_du_crtc_disable_planes(rcrtc); /* Disable vertical blanking interrupt reporting. We first need to wait * for page flip completion before stopping the CRTC as userspace @@ -548,10 +572,25 @@ static irqreturn_t rcar_du_crtc_irq(int irq, void *arg) irqreturn_t ret = IRQ_NONE; u32 status; + spin_lock(&rcrtc->vblank_lock); + status = rcar_du_crtc_read(rcrtc, DSSR); rcar_du_crtc_write(rcrtc, DSRCR, status & DSRCR_MASK); - if (status & DSSR_FRM) { + if (status & DSSR_VBK) { + /* + * Wake up the vblank wait if the counter reaches 0. This must + * be protected by the vblank_lock to avoid races in + * rcar_du_crtc_disable_planes(). + */ + if (rcrtc->vblank_count) { + if (--rcrtc->vblank_count == 0) + wake_up(&rcrtc->vblank_wait); + } + } + spin_unlock(&rcrtc->vblank_lock); + + if (status & DSSR_VBK) { drm_crtc_handle_vblank(&rcrtc->crtc); rcar_du_crtc_finish_page_flip(rcrtc); ret = IRQ_HANDLED; @@ -606,6 +645,8 @@ int rcar_du_crtc_create(struct rcar_du_group *rgrp, unsigned int index) } init_waitqueue_head(&rcrtc->flip_wait); + init_waitqueue_head(&rcrtc->vblank_wait); + spin_lock_init(&rcrtc->vblank_lock); rcrtc->group = rgrp; rcrtc->mmio_offset = mmio_offsets[index]; diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/rcar-du/rcar_du_crtc.h b/drivers/gpu/drm/rcar-du/rcar_du_crtc.h index 6f08b7e7db06..48bef05b4c62 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/rcar-du/rcar_du_crtc.h +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/rcar-du/rcar_du_crtc.h @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #define __RCAR_DU_CRTC_H__ #include <linux/mutex.h> +#include <linux/spinlock.h> #include <linux/wait.h> #include <drm/drmP.h> @@ -33,6 +34,9 @@ struct rcar_du_vsp; * @started: whether the CRTC has been started and is running * @event: event to post when the pending page flip completes * @flip_wait: wait queue used to signal page flip completion + * @vblank_lock: protects vblank_wait and vblank_count + * @vblank_wait: wait queue used to signal vertical blanking + * @vblank_count: number of vertical blanking interrupts to wait for * @outputs: bitmask of the outputs (enum rcar_du_output) driven by this CRTC * @group: CRTC group this CRTC belongs to */ @@ -48,6 +52,10 @@ struct rcar_du_crtc { struct drm_pending_vblank_event *event; wait_queue_head_t flip_wait; + spinlock_t vblank_lock; + wait_queue_head_t vblank_wait; + unsigned int vblank_count; + unsigned int outputs; struct rcar_du_group *group; diff --git a/drivers/media/platform/soc_camera/soc_scale_crop.c b/drivers/media/platform/soc_camera/soc_scale_crop.c index f77252d6ccd3..d29c24854c2c 100644 --- a/drivers/media/platform/soc_camera/soc_scale_crop.c +++ b/drivers/media/platform/soc_camera/soc_scale_crop.c @@ -418,3 +418,7 @@ void soc_camera_calc_client_output(struct soc_camera_device *icd, mf->height = soc_camera_shift_scale(rect->height, shift, scale_v); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(soc_camera_calc_client_output); + +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("soc-camera scaling-cropping functions"); +MODULE_AUTHOR("Guennadi Liakhovetski <kernel(a)pengutronix.de>"); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qlcnic/qlcnic_83xx_hw.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qlcnic/qlcnic_83xx_hw.c index bdbcd2b088a0..c3c28f0960e5 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qlcnic/qlcnic_83xx_hw.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qlcnic/qlcnic_83xx_hw.c @@ -3849,7 +3849,7 @@ static void qlcnic_83xx_flush_mbx_queue(struct qlcnic_adapter *adapter) struct list_head *head = &mbx->cmd_q; struct qlcnic_cmd_args *cmd = NULL; - spin_lock(&mbx->queue_lock); + spin_lock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock); while (!list_empty(head)) { cmd = list_entry(head->next, struct qlcnic_cmd_args, list); @@ -3860,7 +3860,7 @@ static void qlcnic_83xx_flush_mbx_queue(struct qlcnic_adapter *adapter) qlcnic_83xx_notify_cmd_completion(adapter, cmd); } - spin_unlock(&mbx->queue_lock); + spin_unlock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock); } static int qlcnic_83xx_check_mbx_status(struct qlcnic_adapter *adapter) @@ -3896,12 +3896,12 @@ static void qlcnic_83xx_dequeue_mbx_cmd(struct qlcnic_adapter *adapter, { struct qlcnic_mailbox *mbx = adapter->ahw->mailbox; - spin_lock(&mbx->queue_lock); + spin_lock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock); list_del(&cmd->list); mbx->num_cmds--; - spin_unlock(&mbx->queue_lock); + spin_unlock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock); qlcnic_83xx_notify_cmd_completion(adapter, cmd); } @@ -3966,7 +3966,7 @@ static int qlcnic_83xx_enqueue_mbx_cmd(struct qlcnic_adapter *adapter, init_completion(&cmd->completion); cmd->rsp_opcode = QLC_83XX_MBX_RESPONSE_UNKNOWN; - spin_lock(&mbx->queue_lock); + spin_lock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock); list_add_tail(&cmd->list, &mbx->cmd_q); mbx->num_cmds++; @@ -3974,7 +3974,7 @@ static int qlcnic_83xx_enqueue_mbx_cmd(struct qlcnic_adapter *adapter, *timeout = cmd->total_cmds * QLC_83XX_MBX_TIMEOUT; queue_work(mbx->work_q, &mbx->work); - spin_unlock(&mbx->queue_lock); + spin_unlock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock); return 0; } @@ -4070,15 +4070,15 @@ static void qlcnic_83xx_mailbox_worker(struct work_struct *work) mbx->rsp_status = QLC_83XX_MBX_RESPONSE_WAIT; spin_unlock_irqrestore(&mbx->aen_lock, flags); - spin_lock(&mbx->queue_lock); + spin_lock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock); if (list_empty(head)) { - spin_unlock(&mbx->queue_lock); + spin_unlock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock); return; } cmd = list_entry(head->next, struct qlcnic_cmd_args, list); - spin_unlock(&mbx->queue_lock); + spin_unlock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock); mbx_ops->encode_cmd(adapter, cmd); mbx_ops->nofity_fw(adapter, QLC_83XX_MBX_REQUEST); diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c index 298b74ebc1e9..18e68c91e651 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c @@ -1387,7 +1387,7 @@ DECLARE_RTL_COND(rtl_ocp_tx_cond) { void __iomem *ioaddr = tp->mmio_addr; - return RTL_R8(IBISR0) & 0x02; + return RTL_R8(IBISR0) & 0x20; } static void rtl8168ep_stop_cmac(struct rtl8169_private *tp) @@ -1395,7 +1395,7 @@ static void rtl8168ep_stop_cmac(struct rtl8169_private *tp) void __iomem *ioaddr = tp->mmio_addr; RTL_W8(IBCR2, RTL_R8(IBCR2) & ~0x01); - rtl_msleep_loop_wait_low(tp, &rtl_ocp_tx_cond, 50, 2000); + rtl_msleep_loop_wait_high(tp, &rtl_ocp_tx_cond, 50, 2000); RTL_W8(IBISR0, RTL_R8(IBISR0) | 0x20); RTL_W8(IBCR0, RTL_R8(IBCR0) & ~0x01); } diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c b/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c index db65d9ad4488..e1e5e8438457 100644 --- a/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c @@ -944,6 +944,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id products[] = { {QMI_QUIRK_SET_DTR(0x2c7c, 0x0125, 4)}, /* Quectel EC25, EC20 R2.0 Mini PCIe */ {QMI_QUIRK_SET_DTR(0x2c7c, 0x0121, 4)}, /* Quectel EC21 Mini PCIe */ {QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x2c7c, 0x0296, 4)}, /* Quectel BG96 */ + {QMI_QUIRK_SET_DTR(0x2c7c, 0x0306, 4)}, /* Quectel EP06 Mini PCIe */ /* 4. Gobi 1000 devices */ {QMI_GOBI1K_DEVICE(0x05c6, 0x9212)}, /* Acer Gobi Modem Device */ diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/b43/main.c b/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/b43/main.c index 6e5d9095b195..a635fc6b1722 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/b43/main.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/b43/main.c @@ -71,8 +71,18 @@ MODULE_FIRMWARE("b43/ucode11.fw"); MODULE_FIRMWARE("b43/ucode13.fw"); MODULE_FIRMWARE("b43/ucode14.fw"); MODULE_FIRMWARE("b43/ucode15.fw"); +MODULE_FIRMWARE("b43/ucode16_lp.fw"); MODULE_FIRMWARE("b43/ucode16_mimo.fw"); +MODULE_FIRMWARE("b43/ucode24_lcn.fw"); +MODULE_FIRMWARE("b43/ucode25_lcn.fw"); +MODULE_FIRMWARE("b43/ucode25_mimo.fw"); +MODULE_FIRMWARE("b43/ucode26_mimo.fw"); +MODULE_FIRMWARE("b43/ucode29_mimo.fw"); +MODULE_FIRMWARE("b43/ucode33_lcn40.fw"); +MODULE_FIRMWARE("b43/ucode30_mimo.fw"); MODULE_FIRMWARE("b43/ucode5.fw"); +MODULE_FIRMWARE("b43/ucode40.fw"); +MODULE_FIRMWARE("b43/ucode42.fw"); MODULE_FIRMWARE("b43/ucode9.fw"); static int modparam_bad_frames_preempt; diff --git a/drivers/pinctrl/pxa/pinctrl-pxa2xx.c b/drivers/pinctrl/pxa/pinctrl-pxa2xx.c index 866aa3ce1ac9..6cf0006d4c8d 100644 --- a/drivers/pinctrl/pxa/pinctrl-pxa2xx.c +++ b/drivers/pinctrl/pxa/pinctrl-pxa2xx.c @@ -436,3 +436,7 @@ int pxa2xx_pinctrl_exit(struct platform_device *pdev) return 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pxa2xx_pinctrl_exit); + +MODULE_AUTHOR("Robert Jarzmik <robert.jarzmik(a)free.fr>"); +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Marvell PXA2xx pinctrl driver"); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c b/drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c index f2303f390345..23973a8124fc 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c +++ b/drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c @@ -965,6 +965,8 @@ static int uart_set_info(struct tty_struct *tty, struct tty_port *port, } } else { retval = uart_startup(tty, state, 1); + if (retval == 0) + tty_port_set_initialized(port, true); if (retval > 0) retval = 0; } diff --git a/drivers/vhost/net.c b/drivers/vhost/net.c index 96a0661011fd..e5b7652234fc 100644 --- a/drivers/vhost/net.c +++ b/drivers/vhost/net.c @@ -1078,6 +1078,7 @@ static long vhost_net_reset_owner(struct vhost_net *n) } vhost_net_stop(n, &tx_sock, &rx_sock); vhost_net_flush(n); + vhost_dev_stop(&n->dev); vhost_dev_reset_owner(&n->dev, umem); vhost_net_vq_reset(n); done: diff --git a/include/linux/fdtable.h b/include/linux/fdtable.h index 6e84b2cae6ad..442b54a14cbc 100644 --- a/include/linux/fdtable.h +++ b/include/linux/fdtable.h @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ #include <linux/compiler.h> #include <linux/spinlock.h> #include <linux/rcupdate.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h> #include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/fs.h> @@ -81,8 +82,10 @@ static inline struct file *__fcheck_files(struct files_struct *files, unsigned i { struct fdtable *fdt = rcu_dereference_raw(files->fdt); - if (fd < fdt->max_fds) + if (fd < fdt->max_fds) { + fd = array_index_nospec(fd, fdt->max_fds); return rcu_dereference_raw(fdt->fd[fd]); + } return NULL; } diff --git a/include/linux/init.h b/include/linux/init.h index e30104ceb86d..8e346d1bd837 100644 --- a/include/linux/init.h +++ b/include/linux/init.h @@ -4,6 +4,13 @@ #include <linux/compiler.h> #include <linux/types.h> +/* Built-in __init functions needn't be compiled with retpoline */ +#if defined(RETPOLINE) && !defined(MODULE) +#define __noretpoline __attribute__((indirect_branch("keep"))) +#else +#define __noretpoline +#endif + /* These macros are used to mark some functions or * initialized data (doesn't apply to uninitialized data) * as `initialization' functions. The kernel can take this @@ -39,7 +46,7 @@ /* These are for everybody (although not all archs will actually discard it in modules) */ -#define __init __section(.init.text) __cold notrace __latent_entropy +#define __init __section(.init.text) __cold notrace __latent_entropy __noretpoline #define __initdata __section(.init.data) #define __initconst __section(.init.rodata) #define __exitdata __section(.exit.data) diff --git a/include/linux/module.h b/include/linux/module.h index 0c3207d26ac0..d2224a09b4b5 100644 --- a/include/linux/module.h +++ b/include/linux/module.h @@ -791,6 +791,15 @@ static inline void module_bug_finalize(const Elf_Ehdr *hdr, static inline void module_bug_cleanup(struct module *mod) {} #endif /* CONFIG_GENERIC_BUG */ +#ifdef RETPOLINE +extern bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline); +#else +static inline bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline) +{ + return true; +} +#endif + #ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG static inline bool module_sig_ok(struct module *module) { diff --git a/include/linux/nospec.h b/include/linux/nospec.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..b99bced39ac2 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/linux/nospec.h @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +// Copyright(c) 2018 Linus Torvalds. All rights reserved. +// Copyright(c) 2018 Alexei Starovoitov. All rights reserved. +// Copyright(c) 2018 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved. + +#ifndef _LINUX_NOSPEC_H +#define _LINUX_NOSPEC_H + +/** + * array_index_mask_nospec() - generate a ~0 mask when index < size, 0 otherwise + * @index: array element index + * @size: number of elements in array + * + * When @index is out of bounds (@index >= @size), the sign bit will be + * set. Extend the sign bit to all bits and invert, giving a result of + * zero for an out of bounds index, or ~0 if within bounds [0, @size). + */ +#ifndef array_index_mask_nospec +static inline unsigned long array_index_mask_nospec(unsigned long index, + unsigned long size) +{ + /* + * Warn developers about inappropriate array_index_nospec() usage. + * + * Even if the CPU speculates past the WARN_ONCE branch, the + * sign bit of @index is taken into account when generating the + * mask. + * + * This warning is compiled out when the compiler can infer that + * @index and @size are less than LONG_MAX. + */ + if (WARN_ONCE(index > LONG_MAX || size > LONG_MAX, + "array_index_nospec() limited to range of [0, LONG_MAX]\n")) + return 0; + + /* + * Always calculate and emit the mask even if the compiler + * thinks the mask is not needed. The compiler does not take + * into account the value of @index under speculation. + */ + OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(index); + return ~(long)(index | (size - 1UL - index)) >> (BITS_PER_LONG - 1); +} +#endif + +/* + * array_index_nospec - sanitize an array index after a bounds check + * + * For a code sequence like: + * + * if (index < size) { + * index = array_index_nospec(index, size); + * val = array[index]; + * } + * + * ...if the CPU speculates past the bounds check then + * array_index_nospec() will clamp the index within the range of [0, + * size). + */ +#define array_index_nospec(index, size) \ +({ \ + typeof(index) _i = (index); \ + typeof(size) _s = (size); \ + unsigned long _mask = array_index_mask_nospec(_i, _s); \ + \ + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(_i) > sizeof(long)); \ + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(_s) > sizeof(long)); \ + \ + _i &= _mask; \ + _i; \ +}) +#endif /* _LINUX_NOSPEC_H */ diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c index 0e54d5bf0097..07bfb9971f2f 100644 --- a/kernel/module.c +++ b/kernel/module.c @@ -2817,6 +2817,15 @@ static int check_modinfo_livepatch(struct module *mod, struct load_info *info) } #endif /* CONFIG_LIVEPATCH */ +static void check_modinfo_retpoline(struct module *mod, struct load_info *info) +{ + if (retpoline_module_ok(get_modinfo(info, "retpoline"))) + return; + + pr_warn("%s: loading module not compiled with retpoline compiler.\n", + mod->name); +} + /* Sets info->hdr and info->len. */ static int copy_module_from_user(const void __user *umod, unsigned long len, struct load_info *info) @@ -2969,6 +2978,8 @@ static int check_modinfo(struct module *mod, struct load_info *info, int flags) add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_OOT_MODULE, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK); } + check_modinfo_retpoline(mod, info); + if (get_modinfo(info, "staging")) { add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_CRAP, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK); pr_warn("%s: module is from the staging directory, the quality " diff --git a/net/core/sock_reuseport.c b/net/core/sock_reuseport.c index 77f396b679ce..5dce4291f0ed 100644 --- a/net/core/sock_reuseport.c +++ b/net/core/sock_reuseport.c @@ -93,6 +93,16 @@ static struct sock_reuseport *reuseport_grow(struct sock_reuseport *reuse) return more_reuse; } +static void reuseport_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head) +{ + struct sock_reuseport *reuse; + + reuse = container_of(head, struct sock_reuseport, rcu); + if (reuse->prog) + bpf_prog_destroy(reuse->prog); + kfree(reuse); +} + /** * reuseport_add_sock - Add a socket to the reuseport group of another. * @sk: New socket to add to the group. @@ -101,7 +111,7 @@ static struct sock_reuseport *reuseport_grow(struct sock_reuseport *reuse) */ int reuseport_add_sock(struct sock *sk, struct sock *sk2) { - struct sock_reuseport *reuse; + struct sock_reuseport *old_reuse, *reuse; if (!rcu_access_pointer(sk2->sk_reuseport_cb)) { int err = reuseport_alloc(sk2); @@ -112,10 +122,13 @@ int reuseport_add_sock(struct sock *sk, struct sock *sk2) spin_lock_bh(&reuseport_lock); reuse = rcu_dereference_protected(sk2->sk_reuseport_cb, - lockdep_is_held(&reuseport_lock)), - WARN_ONCE(rcu_dereference_protected(sk->sk_reuseport_cb, - lockdep_is_held(&reuseport_lock)), - "socket already in reuseport group"); + lockdep_is_held(&reuseport_lock)); + old_reuse = rcu_dereference_protected(sk->sk_reuseport_cb, + lockdep_is_held(&reuseport_lock)); + if (old_reuse && old_reuse->num_socks != 1) { + spin_unlock_bh(&reuseport_lock); + return -EBUSY; + } if (reuse->num_socks == reuse->max_socks) { reuse = reuseport_grow(reuse); @@ -133,19 +146,11 @@ int reuseport_add_sock(struct sock *sk, struct sock *sk2) spin_unlock_bh(&reuseport_lock); + if (old_reuse) + call_rcu(&old_reuse->rcu, reuseport_free_rcu); return 0; } -static void reuseport_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head) -{ - struct sock_reuseport *reuse; - - reuse = container_of(head, struct sock_reuseport, rcu); - if (reuse->prog) - bpf_prog_destroy(reuse->prog); - kfree(reuse); -} - void reuseport_detach_sock(struct sock *sk) { struct sock_reuseport *reuse; diff --git a/net/ipv4/igmp.c b/net/ipv4/igmp.c index 9c7a4cea1628..7f5fe07d0b13 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/igmp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/igmp.c @@ -386,7 +386,11 @@ static struct sk_buff *igmpv3_newpack(struct net_device *dev, unsigned int mtu) pip->frag_off = htons(IP_DF); pip->ttl = 1; pip->daddr = fl4.daddr; + + rcu_read_lock(); pip->saddr = igmpv3_get_srcaddr(dev, &fl4); + rcu_read_unlock(); + pip->protocol = IPPROTO_IGMP; pip->tot_len = 0; /* filled in later */ ip_select_ident(net, skb, NULL); diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c index 7efa6b062049..0d1a767db1bb 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c @@ -2316,6 +2316,12 @@ int tcp_disconnect(struct sock *sk, int flags) WARN_ON(inet->inet_num && !icsk->icsk_bind_hash); + if (sk->sk_frag.page) { + put_page(sk->sk_frag.page); + sk->sk_frag.page = NULL; + sk->sk_frag.offset = 0; + } + sk->sk_error_report(sk); return err; } diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_bbr.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_bbr.c index e86a34fd5484..8ec60532be2b 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_bbr.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_bbr.c @@ -452,7 +452,8 @@ static void bbr_advance_cycle_phase(struct sock *sk) bbr->cycle_idx = (bbr->cycle_idx + 1) & (CYCLE_LEN - 1); bbr->cycle_mstamp = tp->delivered_mstamp; - bbr->pacing_gain = bbr_pacing_gain[bbr->cycle_idx]; + bbr->pacing_gain = bbr->lt_use_bw ? BBR_UNIT : + bbr_pacing_gain[bbr->cycle_idx]; } /* Gain cycling: cycle pacing gain to converge to fair share of available bw. */ @@ -461,8 +462,7 @@ static void bbr_update_cycle_phase(struct sock *sk, { struct bbr *bbr = inet_csk_ca(sk); - if ((bbr->mode == BBR_PROBE_BW) && !bbr->lt_use_bw && - bbr_is_next_cycle_phase(sk, rs)) + if (bbr->mode == BBR_PROBE_BW && bbr_is_next_cycle_phase(sk, rs)) bbr_advance_cycle_phase(sk); } diff --git a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c index 5cad76f87536..421379014995 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c +++ b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c @@ -274,6 +274,7 @@ int inet6_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len) struct net *net = sock_net(sk); __be32 v4addr = 0; unsigned short snum; + bool saved_ipv6only; int addr_type = 0; int err = 0; @@ -378,19 +379,21 @@ int inet6_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len) if (!(addr_type & IPV6_ADDR_MULTICAST)) np->saddr = addr->sin6_addr; + saved_ipv6only = sk->sk_ipv6only; + if (addr_type != IPV6_ADDR_ANY && addr_type != IPV6_ADDR_MAPPED) + sk->sk_ipv6only = 1; + /* Make sure we are allowed to bind here. */ if ((snum || !inet->bind_address_no_port) && sk->sk_prot->get_port(sk, snum)) { + sk->sk_ipv6only = saved_ipv6only; inet_reset_saddr(sk); err = -EADDRINUSE; goto out; } - if (addr_type != IPV6_ADDR_ANY) { + if (addr_type != IPV6_ADDR_ANY) sk->sk_userlocks |= SOCK_BINDADDR_LOCK; - if (addr_type != IPV6_ADDR_MAPPED) - sk->sk_ipv6only = 1; - } if (snum) sk->sk_userlocks |= SOCK_BINDPORT_LOCK; inet->inet_sport = htons(inet->inet_num); diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c b/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c index 117405dd07a3..a30e7e925c9b 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c @@ -495,6 +495,7 @@ static void *ipmr_mfc_seq_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *pos) return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); it->mrt = mrt; + it->cache = NULL; return *pos ? ipmr_mfc_seq_idx(net, seq->private, *pos - 1) : SEQ_START_TOKEN; } diff --git a/net/sched/cls_u32.c b/net/sched/cls_u32.c index ae83c3aec308..da574a16e7b3 100644 --- a/net/sched/cls_u32.c +++ b/net/sched/cls_u32.c @@ -496,6 +496,7 @@ static void u32_clear_hw_hnode(struct tcf_proto *tp, struct tc_u_hnode *h) static int u32_replace_hw_knode(struct tcf_proto *tp, struct tc_u_knode *n, u32 flags) { + struct tc_u_hnode *ht = rtnl_dereference(n->ht_down); struct net_device *dev = tp->q->dev_queue->dev; struct tc_cls_u32_offload u32_offload = {0}; struct tc_to_netdev offload; @@ -520,7 +521,7 @@ static int u32_replace_hw_knode(struct tcf_proto *tp, struct tc_u_knode *n, offload.cls_u32->knode.sel = &n->sel; offload.cls_u32->knode.exts = &n->exts; if (n->ht_down) - offload.cls_u32->knode.link_handle = n->ht_down->handle; + offload.cls_u32->knode.link_handle = ht->handle; err = dev->netdev_ops->ndo_setup_tc(dev, tp->q->handle, tp->protocol, &offload); @@ -788,8 +789,9 @@ static void u32_replace_knode(struct tcf_proto *tp, struct tc_u_common *tp_c, static struct tc_u_knode *u32_init_knode(struct tcf_proto *tp, struct tc_u_knode *n) { - struct tc_u_knode *new; + struct tc_u_hnode *ht = rtnl_dereference(n->ht_down); struct tc_u32_sel *s = &n->sel; + struct tc_u_knode *new; new = kzalloc(sizeof(*n) + s->nkeys*sizeof(struct tc_u32_key), GFP_KERNEL); @@ -807,11 +809,11 @@ static struct tc_u_knode *u32_init_knode(struct tcf_proto *tp, new->fshift = n->fshift; new->res = n->res; new->flags = n->flags; - RCU_INIT_POINTER(new->ht_down, n->ht_down); + RCU_INIT_POINTER(new->ht_down, ht); /* bump reference count as long as we hold pointer to structure */ - if (new->ht_down) - new->ht_down->refcnt++; + if (ht) + ht->refcnt++; #ifdef CONFIG_CLS_U32_PERF /* Statistics may be incremented by readers during update diff --git a/net/wireless/nl80211.c b/net/wireless/nl80211.c index c626f679e1c8..91722e97cdd5 100644 --- a/net/wireless/nl80211.c +++ b/net/wireless/nl80211.c @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ #include <linux/nl80211.h> #include <linux/rtnetlink.h> #include <linux/netlink.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h> #include <linux/etherdevice.h> #include <net/net_namespace.h> #include <net/genetlink.h> @@ -2014,20 +2015,22 @@ static const struct nla_policy txq_params_policy[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_MAX + 1] = { static int parse_txq_params(struct nlattr *tb[], struct ieee80211_txq_params *txq_params) { + u8 ac; + if (!tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AC] || !tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_TXOP] || !tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_CWMIN] || !tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_CWMAX] || !tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AIFS]) return -EINVAL; - txq_params->ac = nla_get_u8(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AC]); + ac = nla_get_u8(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AC]); txq_params->txop = nla_get_u16(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_TXOP]); txq_params->cwmin = nla_get_u16(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_CWMIN]); txq_params->cwmax = nla_get_u16(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_CWMAX]); txq_params->aifs = nla_get_u8(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AIFS]); - if (txq_params->ac >= NL80211_NUM_ACS) + if (ac >= NL80211_NUM_ACS) return -EINVAL; - + txq_params->ac = array_index_nospec(ac, NL80211_NUM_ACS); return 0; } diff --git a/scripts/mod/modpost.c b/scripts/mod/modpost.c index 845eb9b800f3..238db4ffd30c 100644 --- a/scripts/mod/modpost.c +++ b/scripts/mod/modpost.c @@ -2130,6 +2130,14 @@ static void add_intree_flag(struct buffer *b, int is_intree) buf_printf(b, "\nMODULE_INFO(intree, \"Y\");\n"); } +/* Cannot check for assembler */ +static void add_retpoline(struct buffer *b) +{ + buf_printf(b, "\n#ifdef RETPOLINE\n"); + buf_printf(b, "MODULE_INFO(retpoline, \"Y\");\n"); + buf_printf(b, "#endif\n"); +} + static void add_staging_flag(struct buffer *b, const char *name) { static const char *staging_dir = "drivers/staging"; @@ -2474,6 +2482,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) add_header(&buf, mod); add_intree_flag(&buf, !external_module); + add_retpoline(&buf); add_staging_flag(&buf, mod->name); err |= add_versions(&buf, mod); add_depends(&buf, mod, modules); diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c index a871159bf03c..ead2fd60244d 100644 --- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c +++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c @@ -141,23 +141,22 @@ static int valid_ecryptfs_desc(const char *ecryptfs_desc) */ static int valid_master_desc(const char *new_desc, const char *orig_desc) { - if (!memcmp(new_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN)) { - if (strlen(new_desc) == KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN) - goto out; - if (orig_desc) - if (memcmp(new_desc, orig_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN)) - goto out; - } else if (!memcmp(new_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN)) { - if (strlen(new_desc) == KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN) - goto out; - if (orig_desc) - if (memcmp(new_desc, orig_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN)) - goto out; - } else - goto out; + int prefix_len; + + if (!strncmp(new_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN)) + prefix_len = KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN; + else if (!strncmp(new_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN)) + prefix_len = KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN; + else + return -EINVAL; + + if (!new_desc[prefix_len]) + return -EINVAL; + + if (orig_desc && strncmp(new_desc, orig_desc, prefix_len)) + return -EINVAL; + return 0; -out: - return -EINVAL; } /* diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/pcm512x-spi.c b/sound/soc/codecs/pcm512x-spi.c index 712ed6598c48..ebdf9bd5a64c 100644 --- a/sound/soc/codecs/pcm512x-spi.c +++ b/sound/soc/codecs/pcm512x-spi.c @@ -70,3 +70,7 @@ static struct spi_driver pcm512x_spi_driver = { }; module_spi_driver(pcm512x_spi_driver); + +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("ASoC PCM512x codec driver - SPI"); +MODULE_AUTHOR("Mark Brown <broonie(a)kernel.org>"); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); diff --git a/sound/soc/generic/simple-card.c b/sound/soc/generic/simple-card.c index f608f8d23f3d..dd88c2cb6470 100644 --- a/sound/soc/generic/simple-card.c +++ b/sound/soc/generic/simple-card.c @@ -232,13 +232,19 @@ static int asoc_simple_card_dai_link_of(struct device_node *node, snprintf(prop, sizeof(prop), "%scpu", prefix); cpu = of_get_child_by_name(node, prop); + if (!cpu) { + ret = -EINVAL; + dev_err(dev, "%s: Can't find %s DT node\n", __func__, prop); + goto dai_link_of_err; + } + snprintf(prop, sizeof(prop), "%splat", prefix); plat = of_get_child_by_name(node, prop); snprintf(prop, sizeof(prop), "%scodec", prefix); codec = of_get_child_by_name(node, prop); - if (!cpu || !codec) { + if (!codec) { ret = -EINVAL; dev_err(dev, "%s: Can't find %s DT node\n", __func__, prop); goto dai_link_of_err; diff --git a/sound/soc/sh/rcar/ssi.c b/sound/soc/sh/rcar/ssi.c index 560cf4b51a99..a9a43acce30e 100644 --- a/sound/soc/sh/rcar/ssi.c +++ b/sound/soc/sh/rcar/ssi.c @@ -699,9 +699,14 @@ static int rsnd_ssi_dma_remove(struct rsnd_mod *mod, struct rsnd_priv *priv) { struct rsnd_ssi *ssi = rsnd_mod_to_ssi(mod); + struct rsnd_mod *pure_ssi_mod = rsnd_io_to_mod_ssi(io); struct device *dev = rsnd_priv_to_dev(priv); int irq = ssi->irq; + /* Do nothing if non SSI (= SSI parent, multi SSI) mod */ + if (pure_ssi_mod != mod) + return 0; + /* PIO will request IRQ again */ devm_free_irq(dev, irq, mod);

7 years, 10 months

Patch "watchdog: indydog: Add dependency on SGI_HAS_INDYDOG" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled watchdog: indydog: Add dependency on SGI_HAS_INDYDOG to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: watchdog-indydog-add-dependency-on-sgi_has_indydog.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 24f8d233074badd4c18e4dafd2fb97d65838afed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matt Redfearn <matt.redfearn(a)mips.com> Date: Tue, 14 Nov 2017 10:52:54 +0000 Subject: watchdog: indydog: Add dependency on SGI_HAS_INDYDOG From: Matt Redfearn <matt.redfearn(a)mips.com> commit 24f8d233074badd4c18e4dafd2fb97d65838afed upstream. Commit da2a68b3eb47 ("watchdog: Enable COMPILE_TEST where possible") enabled building the Indy watchdog driver when COMPILE_TEST is enabled. However, the driver makes reference to symbols that are only defined for certain platforms are selected in the config. These platforms select SGI_HAS_INDYDOG. Without this, link time errors result, for example when building a MIPS allyesconfig. drivers/watchdog/indydog.o: In function `indydog_write': indydog.c:(.text+0x18): undefined reference to `sgimc' indydog.c:(.text+0x1c): undefined reference to `sgimc' drivers/watchdog/indydog.o: In function `indydog_start': indydog.c:(.text+0x54): undefined reference to `sgimc' indydog.c:(.text+0x58): undefined reference to `sgimc' drivers/watchdog/indydog.o: In function `indydog_stop': indydog.c:(.text+0xa4): undefined reference to `sgimc' drivers/watchdog/indydog.o:indydog.c:(.text+0xa8): more undefined references to `sgimc' follow make: *** [Makefile:1005: vmlinux] Error 1 Fix this by ensuring that CONFIG_INDIDOG can only be selected when the necessary dependent platform symbols are built in. Fixes: da2a68b3eb47 ("watchdog: Enable COMPILE_TEST where possible") Signed-off-by: Matt Redfearn <matt.redfearn(a)mips.com> Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf(a)linux-mips.org> Suggested-by: James Hogan <james.hogan(a)mips.com> Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck <linux(a)roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux(a)roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Wim Van Sebroeck <wim(a)iguana.be> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/watchdog/Kconfig | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/drivers/watchdog/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/watchdog/Kconfig @@ -1451,7 +1451,7 @@ config RC32434_WDT config INDYDOG tristate "Indy/I2 Hardware Watchdog" - depends on SGI_HAS_INDYDOG || (MIPS && COMPILE_TEST) + depends on SGI_HAS_INDYDOG help Hardware driver for the Indy's/I2's watchdog. This is a watchdog timer that will reboot the machine after a 60 second Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from matt.redfearn(a)mips.com are queue-4.14/watchdog-indydog-add-dependency-on-sgi_has_indydog.patch

7 years, 10 months

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