- Linux-stable-mirror - lists.linaro.org

[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCHv2 1/1] ext4/f2fs: don't put symlink in pagecache into highmem

by Jin Qian

From: Jin Qian <jinqian(a)google.com> partial backport from 21fc61c73c3903c4c312d0802da01ec2b323d174 upstream to v4.4 to prevent virt_to_page on highmem. ext4_encrypted_follow_link uses kmap() for cpage caddr = kmap(cpage); _ext4_fname_disk_to_usr calls virt_to_page on the kmapped address. _ext4_fname_disk_to_usr() ext4_fname_decrypt() sg_init_one() sg_init_one(&src_sg, iname->name, iname->len); sg_set_page(sg, virt_to_page(buf), buflen, offset_in_page(buf)); Cc: linux-stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # 4.4.y Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Jin Qian <jinqian(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Jin Qian <jinqian(a)android.com> --- fs/ext4/inode.c | 1 + fs/ext4/namei.c | 1 + fs/ext4/symlink.c | 10 +++------- fs/f2fs/inode.c | 1 + fs/f2fs/namei.c | 5 ++--- fs/inode.c | 6 ++++++ include/linux/fs.h | 1 + 7 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/inode.c b/fs/ext4/inode.c index 4df1cb19a243..f0cabc8c96cb 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/inode.c +++ b/fs/ext4/inode.c @@ -4417,6 +4417,7 @@ struct inode *ext4_iget(struct super_block *sb, unsigned long ino) inode->i_op = &ext4_symlink_inode_operations; ext4_set_aops(inode); } + inode_nohighmem(inode); } else if (S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode) || S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode) || S_ISFIFO(inode->i_mode) || S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode)) { inode->i_op = &ext4_special_inode_operations; diff --git a/fs/ext4/namei.c b/fs/ext4/namei.c index 4c36dca486cc..32960b3ecd4f 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/namei.c +++ b/fs/ext4/namei.c @@ -3151,6 +3151,7 @@ static int ext4_symlink(struct inode *dir, if ((disk_link.len > EXT4_N_BLOCKS * 4)) { if (!encryption_required) inode->i_op = &ext4_symlink_inode_operations; + inode_nohighmem(inode); ext4_set_aops(inode); /* * We cannot call page_symlink() with transaction started diff --git a/fs/ext4/symlink.c b/fs/ext4/symlink.c index e8e7af62ac95..287c3980fa0b 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/symlink.c +++ b/fs/ext4/symlink.c @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ static const char *ext4_encrypted_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, void **cook cpage = read_mapping_page(inode->i_mapping, 0, NULL); if (IS_ERR(cpage)) return ERR_CAST(cpage); - caddr = kmap(cpage); + caddr = page_address(cpage); caddr[size] = 0; } @@ -75,16 +75,12 @@ static const char *ext4_encrypted_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, void **cook /* Null-terminate the name */ if (res <= plen) paddr[res] = '\0'; - if (cpage) { - kunmap(cpage); + if (cpage) page_cache_release(cpage); - } return *cookie = paddr; errout: - if (cpage) { - kunmap(cpage); + if (cpage) page_cache_release(cpage); - } kfree(paddr); return ERR_PTR(res); } diff --git a/fs/f2fs/inode.c b/fs/f2fs/inode.c index 97e20decacb4..5528801a5baf 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/inode.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/inode.c @@ -202,6 +202,7 @@ make_now: inode->i_op = &f2fs_encrypted_symlink_inode_operations; else inode->i_op = &f2fs_symlink_inode_operations; + inode_nohighmem(inode); inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &f2fs_dblock_aops; } else if (S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode) || S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode) || S_ISFIFO(inode->i_mode) || S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode)) { diff --git a/fs/f2fs/namei.c b/fs/f2fs/namei.c index 2c32110f9fc0..484df6850747 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/namei.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/namei.c @@ -351,6 +351,7 @@ static int f2fs_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, inode->i_op = &f2fs_encrypted_symlink_inode_operations; else inode->i_op = &f2fs_symlink_inode_operations; + inode_nohighmem(inode); inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &f2fs_dblock_aops; f2fs_lock_op(sbi); @@ -942,7 +943,7 @@ static const char *f2fs_encrypted_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, void **cook cpage = read_mapping_page(inode->i_mapping, 0, NULL); if (IS_ERR(cpage)) return ERR_CAST(cpage); - caddr = kmap(cpage); + caddr = page_address(cpage); caddr[size] = 0; /* Symlink is encrypted */ @@ -982,13 +983,11 @@ static const char *f2fs_encrypted_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, void **cook /* Null-terminate the name */ paddr[res] = '\0'; - kunmap(cpage); page_cache_release(cpage); return *cookie = paddr; errout: kfree(cstr.name); f2fs_fname_crypto_free_buffer(&pstr); - kunmap(cpage); page_cache_release(cpage); return ERR_PTR(res); } diff --git a/fs/inode.c b/fs/inode.c index b0edef500590..b95615f3fc50 100644 --- a/fs/inode.c +++ b/fs/inode.c @@ -2028,3 +2028,9 @@ void inode_set_flags(struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags, new_flags) != old_flags)); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(inode_set_flags); + +void inode_nohighmem(struct inode *inode) +{ + mapping_set_gfp_mask(inode->i_mapping, GFP_USER); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(inode_nohighmem); diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h index c8decb7075d6..f746a59fcc88 100644 --- a/include/linux/fs.h +++ b/include/linux/fs.h @@ -3066,5 +3066,6 @@ static inline bool dir_relax(struct inode *inode) } extern bool path_noexec(const struct path *path); +extern void inode_nohighmem(struct inode *inode); #endif /* _LINUX_FS_H */ -- 2.16.0.rc1.238.g530d649a79-goog

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [merged] locking-qrwlock-include-asm-byteorderh-as-needed.patch removed from -mm tree

by akpm＠linux-foundation.org

The patch titled Subject: locking/qrwlock: include asm/byteorder.h as needed has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was locking-qrwlock-include-asm-byteorderh-as-needed.patch This patch was dropped because it was merged into mainline or a subsystem tree ------------------------------------------------------ From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> Subject: locking/qrwlock: include asm/byteorder.h as needed Moving the qrwlock struct definition into a header file introduced a subtle bug on all little-endian machines, where some files in some configurations would see the fields in an incorrect order. This was found by building with an LTO enabled compiler that warns every time we try to link together files with incompatible data structures. A second patch changes linux/kconfig.h to always define the symbols, but this seems to be the root cause of most of the issues, so I'd suggest we do both. On a current linux-next kernel, I verified that this header is responsible for all type mismatches as a result from the endianess confusion. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180202154104.1522809-1-arnd@arndb.de Fixes: e0d02285f16e ("locking/qrwlock: Use 'struct qrwlock' instead of 'struct __qrwlock'") Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon(a)arm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: Nicolas Pitre <nico(a)linaro.org> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Babu Moger <babu.moger(a)amd.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro(a)socionext.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- include/asm-generic/qrwlock_types.h | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff -puN include/asm-generic/qrwlock_types.h~locking-qrwlock-include-asm-byteorderh-as-needed include/asm-generic/qrwlock_types.h --- a/include/asm-generic/qrwlock_types.h~locking-qrwlock-include-asm-byteorderh-as-needed +++ a/include/asm-generic/qrwlock_types.h @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ #define __ASM_GENERIC_QRWLOCK_TYPES_H #include <linux/types.h> +#include <asm/byteorder.h> #include <asm/spinlock_types.h> /* _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from arnd(a)arndb.de are kbuild-always-define-endianess-in-kconfigh.patch bugh-work-around-gcc-pr82365-in-bug.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [merged] pipe-fix-off-by-one-error-when-checking-buffer-limits.patch removed from -mm tree

by akpm＠linux-foundation.org

The patch titled Subject: pipe: fix off-by-one error when checking buffer limits has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was pipe-fix-off-by-one-error-when-checking-buffer-limits.patch This patch was dropped because it was merged into mainline or a subsystem tree ------------------------------------------------------ From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Subject: pipe: fix off-by-one error when checking buffer limits With pipe-user-pages-hard set to 'N', users were actually only allowed up to 'N - 1' buffers; and likewise for pipe-user-pages-soft. Fix this to allow up to 'N' buffers, as would be expected. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180111052902.14409-5-ebiggers3@gmail.com Fixes: b0b91d18e2e9 ("pipe: fix limit checking in pipe_set_size()") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Acked-by: Willy Tarreau <w(a)1wt.eu> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> Acked-by: Joe Lawrence <joe.lawrence(a)redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: "Luis R . Rodriguez" <mcgrof(a)kernel.org> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages(a)gmail.com> Cc: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka(a)redhat.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- fs/pipe.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff -puN fs/pipe.c~pipe-fix-off-by-one-error-when-checking-buffer-limits fs/pipe.c --- a/fs/pipe.c~pipe-fix-off-by-one-error-when-checking-buffer-limits +++ a/fs/pipe.c @@ -605,12 +605,12 @@ static unsigned long account_pipe_buffer static bool too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(unsigned long user_bufs) { - return pipe_user_pages_soft && user_bufs >= pipe_user_pages_soft; + return pipe_user_pages_soft && user_bufs > pipe_user_pages_soft; } static bool too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(unsigned long user_bufs) { - return pipe_user_pages_hard && user_bufs >= pipe_user_pages_hard; + return pipe_user_pages_hard && user_bufs > pipe_user_pages_hard; } static bool is_unprivileged_user(void) _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from ebiggers(a)google.com are

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [merged] pipe-actually-allow-root-to-exceed-the-pipe-buffer-limits.patch removed from -mm tree

by akpm＠linux-foundation.org

The patch titled Subject: pipe: actually allow root to exceed the pipe buffer limits has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was pipe-actually-allow-root-to-exceed-the-pipe-buffer-limits.patch This patch was dropped because it was merged into mainline or a subsystem tree ------------------------------------------------------ From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Subject: pipe: actually allow root to exceed the pipe buffer limits pipe-user-pages-hard and pipe-user-pages-soft are only supposed to apply to unprivileged users, as documented in both Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt and the pipe(7) man page. However, the capabilities are actually only checked when increasing a pipe's size using F_SETPIPE_SZ, not when creating a new pipe. Therefore, if pipe-user-pages-hard has been set, the root user can run into it and be unable to create pipes. Similarly, if pipe-user-pages-soft has been set, the root user can run into it and have their pipes limited to 1 page each. Fix this by allowing the privileged override in both cases. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180111052902.14409-4-ebiggers3@gmail.com Fixes: 759c01142a5d ("pipe: limit the per-user amount of pages allocated in pipes") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> Acked-by: Joe Lawrence <joe.lawrence(a)redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: "Luis R . Rodriguez" <mcgrof(a)kernel.org> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages(a)gmail.com> Cc: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka(a)redhat.com> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w(a)1wt.eu> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- fs/pipe.c | 11 ++++++++--- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff -puN fs/pipe.c~pipe-actually-allow-root-to-exceed-the-pipe-buffer-limits fs/pipe.c --- a/fs/pipe.c~pipe-actually-allow-root-to-exceed-the-pipe-buffer-limits +++ a/fs/pipe.c @@ -613,6 +613,11 @@ static bool too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(u return pipe_user_pages_hard && user_bufs >= pipe_user_pages_hard; } +static bool is_unprivileged_user(void) +{ + return !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN); +} + struct pipe_inode_info *alloc_pipe_info(void) { struct pipe_inode_info *pipe; @@ -629,12 +634,12 @@ struct pipe_inode_info *alloc_pipe_info( user_bufs = account_pipe_buffers(user, 0, pipe_bufs); - if (too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(user_bufs)) { + if (too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(user_bufs) && is_unprivileged_user()) { user_bufs = account_pipe_buffers(user, pipe_bufs, 1); pipe_bufs = 1; } - if (too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(user_bufs)) + if (too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(user_bufs) && is_unprivileged_user()) goto out_revert_acct; pipe->bufs = kcalloc(pipe_bufs, sizeof(struct pipe_buffer), @@ -1065,7 +1070,7 @@ static long pipe_set_size(struct pipe_in if (nr_pages > pipe->buffers && (too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(user_bufs) || too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(user_bufs)) && - !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { + is_unprivileged_user()) { ret = -EPERM; goto out_revert_acct; } _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from ebiggers(a)google.com are

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [merged] kasan-rework-kconfig-settings.patch removed from -mm tree

by akpm＠linux-foundation.org

The patch titled Subject: kasan: rework Kconfig settings has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was kasan-rework-kconfig-settings.patch This patch was dropped because it was merged into mainline or a subsystem tree ------------------------------------------------------ From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> Subject: kasan: rework Kconfig settings We get a lot of very large stack frames using gcc-7.0.1 with the default -fsanitize-address-use-after-scope --param asan-stack=1 options, which can easily cause an overflow of the kernel stack, e.g. drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/handlers.c:2434:1: warning: the frame size of 46176 bytes is larger than 3072 bytes drivers/net/wireless/ralink/rt2x00/rt2800lib.c:5650:1: warning: the frame size of 23632 bytes is larger than 3072 bytes lib/atomic64_test.c:250:1: warning: the frame size of 11200 bytes is larger than 3072 bytes drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/handlers.c:2621:1: warning: the frame size of 9208 bytes is larger than 3072 bytes drivers/media/dvb-frontends/stv090x.c:3431:1: warning: the frame size of 6816 bytes is larger than 3072 bytes fs/fscache/stats.c:287:1: warning: the frame size of 6536 bytes is larger than 3072 bytes To reduce this risk, -fsanitize-address-use-after-scope is now split out into a separate CONFIG_KASAN_EXTRA Kconfig option, leading to stack frames that are smaller than 2 kilobytes most of the time on x86_64. An earlier version of this patch also prevented combining KASAN_EXTRA with KASAN_INLINE, but that is no longer necessary with gcc-7.0.1. All patches to get the frame size below 2048 bytes with CONFIG_KASAN=y and CONFIG_KASAN_EXTRA=n have been merged by maintainers now, so we can bring back that default now. KASAN_EXTRA=y still causes lots of warnings but now defaults to !COMPILE_TEST to disable it in allmodconfig, and it remains disabled in all other defconfigs since it is a new option. I arbitrarily raise the warning limit for KASAN_EXTRA to 3072 to reduce the noise, but an allmodconfig kernel still has around 50 warnings on gcc-7. I experimented a bit more with smaller stack frames and have another follow-up series that reduces the warning limit for 64-bit architectures to 1280 bytes (without CONFIG_KASAN). With earlier versions of this patch series, I also had patches to address the warnings we get with KASAN and/or KASAN_EXTRA, using a "noinline_if_stackbloat" annotation. That annotation now got replaced with a gcc-8 bugfix (see https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=81715) and a workaround for older compilers, which means that KASAN_EXTRA is now just as bad as before and will lead to an instant stack overflow in a few extreme cases. This reverts parts of commit commit 3f181b4 ("lib/Kconfig.debug: disable -Wframe-larger-than warnings with KASAN=y"). Two patches in linux-next should be merged first to avoid introducing warnings in an allmodconfig build: 3cd890dbe2a4 ("media: dvb-frontends: fix i2c access helpers for KASAN") 16c3ada89cff ("media: r820t: fix r820t_write_reg for KASAN") Do we really need to backport this? I think we do: without this patch, enabling KASAN will lead to unavoidable kernel stack overflow in certain device drivers when built with gcc-7 or higher on linux-4.10+ or any version that contains a backport of commit c5caf21ab0cf8. Most people are probably still on older compilers, but it will get worse over time as they upgrade their distros. The warnings we get on kernels older than this should all be for code that uses dangerously large stack frames, though most of them do not cause an actual stack overflow by themselves.The asan-stack option was added in linux-4.0, and commit 3f181b4d8652 ("lib/Kconfig.debug: disable -Wframe-larger-than warnings with KASAN=y") effectively turned off the warning for allmodconfig kernels, so I would like to see this fix backported to any kernels later than 4.0. I have done dozens of fixes for individual functions with stack frames larger than 2048 bytes with asan-stack, and I plan to make sure that all those fixes make it into the stable kernels as well (most are already there). Part of the complication here is that asan-stack (from 4.0) was originally assumed to always require much larger stacks, but that turned out to be a combination of multiple gcc bugs that we have now worked around and fixed, but sanitize-address-use-after-scope (from v4.10) has a much higher inherent stack usage and also suffers from at least three other problems that we have analyzed but not yet fixed upstream, each of them makes the stack usage more severe than it should be. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171221134744.2295529-1-arnd@arndb.de Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin(a)virtuozzo.com> Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab(a)kernel.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin(a)virtuozzo.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider(a)google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov(a)google.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl(a)google.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- lib/Kconfig.debug | 2 +- lib/Kconfig.kasan | 11 +++++++++++ scripts/Makefile.kasan | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff -puN lib/Kconfig.debug~kasan-rework-kconfig-settings lib/Kconfig.debug --- a/lib/Kconfig.debug~kasan-rework-kconfig-settings +++ a/lib/Kconfig.debug @@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ config ENABLE_MUST_CHECK config FRAME_WARN int "Warn for stack frames larger than (needs gcc 4.4)" range 0 8192 - default 0 if KASAN + default 3072 if KASAN_EXTRA default 2048 if GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY default 1280 if (!64BIT && PARISC) default 1024 if (!64BIT && !PARISC) diff -puN lib/Kconfig.kasan~kasan-rework-kconfig-settings lib/Kconfig.kasan --- a/lib/Kconfig.kasan~kasan-rework-kconfig-settings +++ a/lib/Kconfig.kasan @@ -20,6 +20,17 @@ config KASAN Currently CONFIG_KASAN doesn't work with CONFIG_DEBUG_SLAB (the resulting kernel does not boot). +config KASAN_EXTRA + bool "KAsan: extra checks" + depends on KASAN && DEBUG_KERNEL && !COMPILE_TEST + help + This enables further checks in the kernel address sanitizer, for now + it only includes the address-use-after-scope check that can lead + to excessive kernel stack usage, frame size warnings and longer + compile time. + https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=81715 has more + + choice prompt "Instrumentation type" depends on KASAN diff -puN scripts/Makefile.kasan~kasan-rework-kconfig-settings scripts/Makefile.kasan --- a/scripts/Makefile.kasan~kasan-rework-kconfig-settings +++ a/scripts/Makefile.kasan @@ -38,7 +38,9 @@ else endif +ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_EXTRA CFLAGS_KASAN += $(call cc-option, -fsanitize-address-use-after-scope) +endif CFLAGS_KASAN_NOSANITIZE := -fno-builtin _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from arnd(a)arndb.de are kbuild-always-define-endianess-in-kconfigh.patch bugh-work-around-gcc-pr82365-in-bug.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [merged] lib-ubsan-add-type-mismatch-handler-for-new-gcc-clang.patch removed from -mm tree

by akpm＠linux-foundation.org

The patch titled Subject: lib/ubsan: add type mismatch handler for new GCC/Clang has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was lib-ubsan-add-type-mismatch-handler-for-new-gcc-clang.patch This patch was dropped because it was merged into mainline or a subsystem tree ------------------------------------------------------ From: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin(a)virtuozzo.com> Subject: lib/ubsan: add type mismatch handler for new GCC/Clang UBSAN=y fails to build with new GCC/clang: arch/x86/kernel/head64.o: In function `sanitize_boot_params': arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam_utils.h:37: undefined reference to `__ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1' because Clang and GCC 8 slightly changed ABI for 'type mismatch' errors. Compiler now uses new __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1() function with slightly modified 'struct type_mismatch_data'. Let's add new 'struct type_mismatch_data_common' which is independent from compiler's layout of 'struct type_mismatch_data'. And make __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch[_v1]() functions transform compiler-dependent type mismatch data to our internal representation. This way, we can support both old and new compilers with minimal amount of change. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180119152853.16806-1-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin(a)virtuozzo.com> Reported-by: Sodagudi Prasad <psodagud(a)codeaurora.org> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> [4.5+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- lib/ubsan.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- lib/ubsan.h | 14 ++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff -puN lib/ubsan.c~lib-ubsan-add-type-mismatch-handler-for-new-gcc-clang lib/ubsan.c --- a/lib/ubsan.c~lib-ubsan-add-type-mismatch-handler-for-new-gcc-clang +++ a/lib/ubsan.c @@ -265,14 +265,14 @@ void __ubsan_handle_divrem_overflow(stru } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ubsan_handle_divrem_overflow); -static void handle_null_ptr_deref(struct type_mismatch_data *data) +static void handle_null_ptr_deref(struct type_mismatch_data_common *data) { unsigned long flags; - if (suppress_report(&data->location)) + if (suppress_report(data->location)) return; - ubsan_prologue(&data->location, &flags); + ubsan_prologue(data->location, &flags); pr_err("%s null pointer of type %s\n", type_check_kinds[data->type_check_kind], @@ -281,15 +281,15 @@ static void handle_null_ptr_deref(struct ubsan_epilogue(&flags); } -static void handle_misaligned_access(struct type_mismatch_data *data, +static void handle_misaligned_access(struct type_mismatch_data_common *data, unsigned long ptr) { unsigned long flags; - if (suppress_report(&data->location)) + if (suppress_report(data->location)) return; - ubsan_prologue(&data->location, &flags); + ubsan_prologue(data->location, &flags); pr_err("%s misaligned address %p for type %s\n", type_check_kinds[data->type_check_kind], @@ -299,15 +299,15 @@ static void handle_misaligned_access(str ubsan_epilogue(&flags); } -static void handle_object_size_mismatch(struct type_mismatch_data *data, +static void handle_object_size_mismatch(struct type_mismatch_data_common *data, unsigned long ptr) { unsigned long flags; - if (suppress_report(&data->location)) + if (suppress_report(data->location)) return; - ubsan_prologue(&data->location, &flags); + ubsan_prologue(data->location, &flags); pr_err("%s address %p with insufficient space\n", type_check_kinds[data->type_check_kind], (void *) ptr); @@ -315,7 +315,7 @@ static void handle_object_size_mismatch( ubsan_epilogue(&flags); } -void __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch(struct type_mismatch_data *data, +static void ubsan_type_mismatch_common(struct type_mismatch_data_common *data, unsigned long ptr) { @@ -326,8 +326,36 @@ void __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch(struct else handle_object_size_mismatch(data, ptr); } + +void __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch(struct type_mismatch_data *data, + unsigned long ptr) +{ + struct type_mismatch_data_common common_data = { + .location = &data->location, + .type = data->type, + .alignment = data->alignment, + .type_check_kind = data->type_check_kind + }; + + ubsan_type_mismatch_common(&common_data, ptr); +} EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ubsan_handle_type_mismatch); +void __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1(struct type_mismatch_data_v1 *data, + unsigned long ptr) +{ + + struct type_mismatch_data_common common_data = { + .location = &data->location, + .type = data->type, + .alignment = 1UL << data->log_alignment, + .type_check_kind = data->type_check_kind + }; + + ubsan_type_mismatch_common(&common_data, ptr); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1); + void __ubsan_handle_nonnull_return(struct nonnull_return_data *data) { unsigned long flags; diff -puN lib/ubsan.h~lib-ubsan-add-type-mismatch-handler-for-new-gcc-clang lib/ubsan.h --- a/lib/ubsan.h~lib-ubsan-add-type-mismatch-handler-for-new-gcc-clang +++ a/lib/ubsan.h @@ -37,6 +37,20 @@ struct type_mismatch_data { unsigned char type_check_kind; }; +struct type_mismatch_data_v1 { + struct source_location location; + struct type_descriptor *type; + unsigned char log_alignment; + unsigned char type_check_kind; +}; + +struct type_mismatch_data_common { + struct source_location *location; + struct type_descriptor *type; + unsigned long alignment; + unsigned char type_check_kind; +}; + struct nonnull_arg_data { struct source_location location; struct source_location attr_location; _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from aryabinin(a)virtuozzo.com are mm-kasan-dont-vfree-nonexistent-vm_area.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [merged] revert-kernel-relayc-fix-potential-memory-leak.patch removed from -mm tree

by akpm＠linux-foundation.org

The patch titled Subject: kernel/relay.c: revert "kernel/relay.c: fix potential memory leak" has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was revert-kernel-relayc-fix-potential-memory-leak.patch This patch was dropped because it was merged into mainline or a subsystem tree ------------------------------------------------------ From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Subject: kernel/relay.c: revert "kernel/relay.c: fix potential memory leak" This reverts ba62bafe942b159a6 ("kernel/relay.c: fix potential memory leak"). This commit introduced a double free bug, because 'chan' is already freed by the line: kref_put(&chan->kref, relay_destroy_channel); This bug was found by syzkaller, using the BLKTRACESETUP ioctl. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180127004759.101823-1-ebiggers3@gmail.com Fixes: ba62bafe942b ("kernel/relay.c: fix potential memory leak") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller(a)googlegroups.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Zhouyi Zhou <yizhouzhou(a)ict.ac.cn> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> [4.7+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- kernel/relay.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff -puN kernel/relay.c~revert-kernel-relayc-fix-potential-memory-leak kernel/relay.c --- a/kernel/relay.c~revert-kernel-relayc-fix-potential-memory-leak +++ a/kernel/relay.c @@ -611,7 +611,6 @@ free_bufs: kref_put(&chan->kref, relay_destroy_channel); mutex_unlock(&relay_channels_mutex); - kfree(chan); return NULL; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(relay_open); _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from ebiggers(a)google.com are

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [merged] revert-async-simplify-lowest_in_progress.patch removed from -mm tree

by akpm＠linux-foundation.org

The patch titled Subject: kernel/async.c: revert "async: simplify lowest_in_progress()" has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was revert-async-simplify-lowest_in_progress.patch This patch was dropped because it was merged into mainline or a subsystem tree ------------------------------------------------------ From: Rasmus Villemoes <linux(a)rasmusvillemoes.dk> Subject: kernel/async.c: revert "async: simplify lowest_in_progress()" This reverts 92266d6ef60c2381 ("async: simplify lowest_in_progress()"), which was simply wrong: In the case where domain is NULL, we now use the wrong offsetof() in the list_first_entry macro, so we don't actually fetch the ->cookie value, but rather the eight bytes located sizeof(struct list_head) further into the struct async_entry. On 64 bit, that's the data member, while on 32 bit, that's a u64 built from func and data in some order. I think the bug happens to be harmless in practice: It obviously only affects callers which pass a NULL domain, and AFAICT the only such caller is async_synchronize_full() -> async_synchronize_full_domain(NULL) -> async_synchronize_cookie_domain(ASYNC_COOKIE_MAX, NULL) and the ASYNC_COOKIE_MAX means that in practice we end up waiting for the async_global_pending list to be empty - but it would break if somebody happened to pass (void*)-1 as the data element to async_schedule, and of course also if somebody ever does a async_synchronize_cookie_domain(, NULL) with a "finite" cookie value. Maybe the "harmless in practice" means this isn't -stable material. But I'm not completely confident my quick git grep'ing is enough, and there might be affected code in one of the earlier kernels that has since been removed, so I'll leave the decision to the stable guys. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171128104938.3921-1-linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk Fixes: 92266d6ef60c "async: simplify lowest_in_progress()" Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux(a)rasmusvillemoes.dk> Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj(a)kernel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Adam Wallis <awallis(a)codeaurora.org> Cc: Lai Jiangshan <laijs(a)cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> [3.10+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- kernel/async.c | 20 ++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff -puN kernel/async.c~revert-async-simplify-lowest_in_progress kernel/async.c --- a/kernel/async.c~revert-async-simplify-lowest_in_progress +++ a/kernel/async.c @@ -84,20 +84,24 @@ static atomic_t entry_count; static async_cookie_t lowest_in_progress(struct async_domain *domain) { - struct list_head *pending; + struct async_entry *first = NULL; async_cookie_t ret = ASYNC_COOKIE_MAX; unsigned long flags; spin_lock_irqsave(&async_lock, flags); - if (domain) - pending = &domain->pending; - else - pending = &async_global_pending; + if (domain) { + if (!list_empty(&domain->pending)) + first = list_first_entry(&domain->pending, + struct async_entry, domain_list); + } else { + if (!list_empty(&async_global_pending)) + first = list_first_entry(&async_global_pending, + struct async_entry, global_list); + } - if (!list_empty(pending)) - ret = list_first_entry(pending, struct async_entry, - domain_list)->cookie; + if (first) + ret = first->cookie; spin_unlock_irqrestore(&async_lock, flags); return ret; _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from linux(a)rasmusvillemoes.dk are ida-do-zeroing-in-ida_pre_get.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [merged] fs-proc-kcorec-use-probe_kernel_read-instead-of-memcpy.patch removed from -mm tree

by akpm＠linux-foundation.org

The patch titled Subject: fs/proc/kcore.c: use probe_kernel_read() instead of memcpy() has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was fs-proc-kcorec-use-probe_kernel_read-instead-of-memcpy.patch This patch was dropped because it was merged into mainline or a subsystem tree ------------------------------------------------------ From: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens(a)de.ibm.com> Subject: fs/proc/kcore.c: use probe_kernel_read() instead of memcpy() df04abfd181a ("fs/proc/kcore.c: Add bounce buffer for ktext data") added a bounce buffer to avoid hardened usercopy checks. Copying to the bounce buffer was implemented with a simple memcpy() assuming that it is always valid to read from kernel memory iff the kern_addr_valid() check passed. A simple, but pointless, test case like "dd if=/proc/kcore of=/dev/null" now can easily crash the kernel, since the former execption handling on invalid kernel addresses now doesn't work anymore. Also adding a kern_addr_valid() implementation wouldn't help here. Most architectures simply return 1 here, while a couple implemented a page table walk to figure out if something is mapped at the address in question. With DEBUG_PAGEALLOC active mappings are established and removed all the time, so that relying on the result of kern_addr_valid() before executing the memcpy() also doesn't work. Therefore simply use probe_kernel_read() to copy to the bounce buffer. This also allows to simplify read_kcore(). At least on s390 this fixes the observed crashes and doesn't introduce warnings that were removed with df04abfd181a ("fs/proc/kcore.c: Add bounce buffer for ktext data"), even though the generic probe_kernel_read() implementation uses uaccess functions. While looking into this I'm also wondering if kern_addr_valid() could be completely removed...(?) Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171202132739.99971-1-heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com Fixes: df04abfd181a ("fs/proc/kcore.c: Add bounce buffer for ktext data") Fixes: f5509cc18daa ("mm: Hardened usercopy") Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens(a)de.ibm.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa(a)kernel.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro(a)ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- fs/proc/kcore.c | 18 +++++------------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff -puN fs/proc/kcore.c~fs-proc-kcorec-use-probe_kernel_read-instead-of-memcpy fs/proc/kcore.c --- a/fs/proc/kcore.c~fs-proc-kcorec-use-probe_kernel_read-instead-of-memcpy +++ a/fs/proc/kcore.c @@ -512,23 +512,15 @@ read_kcore(struct file *file, char __use return -EFAULT; } else { if (kern_addr_valid(start)) { - unsigned long n; - /* * Using bounce buffer to bypass the * hardened user copy kernel text checks. */ - memcpy(buf, (char *) start, tsz); - n = copy_to_user(buffer, buf, tsz); - /* - * We cannot distinguish between fault on source - * and fault on destination. When this happens - * we clear too and hope it will trigger the - * EFAULT again. - */ - if (n) { - if (clear_user(buffer + tsz - n, - n)) + if (probe_kernel_read(buf, (void *) start, tsz)) { + if (clear_user(buffer, tsz)) + return -EFAULT; + } else { + if (copy_to_user(buffer, buf, tsz)) return -EFAULT; } } else { _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from heiko.carstens(a)de.ibm.com are

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [merged] kasan-dont-emit-builtin-calls-when-sanitization-is-off.patch removed from -mm tree

by akpm＠linux-foundation.org

The patch titled Subject: kasan: don't emit builtin calls when sanitization is off has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was kasan-dont-emit-builtin-calls-when-sanitization-is-off.patch This patch was dropped because it was merged into mainline or a subsystem tree ------------------------------------------------------ From: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl(a)google.com> Subject: kasan: don't emit builtin calls when sanitization is off With KASAN enabled the kernel has two different memset() functions, one with KASAN checks (memset) and one without (__memset). KASAN uses some macro tricks to use the proper version where required. For example memset() calls in mm/slub.c are without KASAN checks, since they operate on poisoned slab object metadata. The issue is that clang emits memset() calls even when there is no memset() in the source code. They get linked with improper memset() implementation and the kernel fails to boot due to a huge amount of KASAN reports during early boot stages. The solution is to add -fno-builtin flag for files with KASAN_SANITIZE := n marker. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/8ffecfffe04088c52c42b92739c2bd8a0bcb3f5e.151638459… Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl(a)google.com> Acked-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers(a)google.com> Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro(a)socionext.com> Cc: Michal Marek <michal.lkml(a)markovi.net> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin(a)virtuozzo.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider(a)google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov(a)google.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- Makefile | 3 ++- scripts/Makefile.kasan | 3 +++ scripts/Makefile.lib | 2 +- 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff -puN Makefile~kasan-dont-emit-builtin-calls-when-sanitization-is-off Makefile --- a/Makefile~kasan-dont-emit-builtin-calls-when-sanitization-is-off +++ a/Makefile @@ -434,7 +434,8 @@ export MAKE LEX YACC AWK GENKSYMS INSTAL export HOSTCXX HOSTCXXFLAGS LDFLAGS_MODULE CHECK CHECKFLAGS export KBUILD_CPPFLAGS NOSTDINC_FLAGS LINUXINCLUDE OBJCOPYFLAGS LDFLAGS -export KBUILD_CFLAGS CFLAGS_KERNEL CFLAGS_MODULE CFLAGS_KASAN CFLAGS_UBSAN +export KBUILD_CFLAGS CFLAGS_KERNEL CFLAGS_MODULE +export CFLAGS_KASAN CFLAGS_KASAN_NOSANITIZE CFLAGS_UBSAN export KBUILD_AFLAGS AFLAGS_KERNEL AFLAGS_MODULE export KBUILD_AFLAGS_MODULE KBUILD_CFLAGS_MODULE KBUILD_LDFLAGS_MODULE export KBUILD_AFLAGS_KERNEL KBUILD_CFLAGS_KERNEL diff -puN scripts/Makefile.kasan~kasan-dont-emit-builtin-calls-when-sanitization-is-off scripts/Makefile.kasan --- a/scripts/Makefile.kasan~kasan-dont-emit-builtin-calls-when-sanitization-is-off +++ a/scripts/Makefile.kasan @@ -31,4 +31,7 @@ else endif CFLAGS_KASAN += $(call cc-option, -fsanitize-address-use-after-scope) + +CFLAGS_KASAN_NOSANITIZE := -fno-builtin + endif diff -puN scripts/Makefile.lib~kasan-dont-emit-builtin-calls-when-sanitization-is-off scripts/Makefile.lib --- a/scripts/Makefile.lib~kasan-dont-emit-builtin-calls-when-sanitization-is-off +++ a/scripts/Makefile.lib @@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ endif ifeq ($(CONFIG_KASAN),y) _c_flags += $(if $(patsubst n%,, \ $(KASAN_SANITIZE_$(basetarget).o)$(KASAN_SANITIZE)y), \ - $(CFLAGS_KASAN)) + $(CFLAGS_KASAN), $(CFLAGS_KASAN_NOSANITIZE)) endif ifeq ($(CONFIG_UBSAN),y) _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from andreyknvl(a)google.com are

7 years, 7 months

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