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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/spectre: Add boot time option to select Spectre v2 mitigation" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/spectre: Add boot time option to select Spectre v2 mitigation to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-spectre-add-boot-time-option-to-select-spectre-v2-mitigation.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From da285121560e769cc31797bba6422eea71d473e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2018 21:46:26 +0000 Subject: x86/spectre: Add boot time option to select Spectre v2 mitigation From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> commit da285121560e769cc31797bba6422eea71d473e0 upstream. Add a spectre_v2= option to select the mitigation used for the indirect branch speculation vulnerability. Currently, the only option available is retpoline, in its various forms. This will be expanded to cover the new IBRS/IBPB microcode features. The RETPOLINE_AMD feature relies on a serializing LFENCE for speculation control. For AMD hardware, only set RETPOLINE_AMD if LFENCE is a serializing instruction, which is indicated by the LFENCE_RDTSC feature. [ tglx: Folded back the LFENCE/AMD fixes and reworked it so IBRS integration becomes simple ] Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: gnomes(a)lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel(a)redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos(a)kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook(a)google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt(a)google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-5-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.… Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 28 ++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 10 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 158 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 4 4 files changed, 195 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) --- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -2691,6 +2691,11 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes nosmt [KNL,S390] Disable symmetric multithreading (SMT). Equivalent to smt=1. + nospectre_v2 [X86] Disable all mitigations for the Spectre variant 2 + (indirect branch prediction) vulnerability. System may + allow data leaks with this option, which is equivalent + to spectre_v2=off. + noxsave [BUGS=X86] Disables x86 extended register state save and restore using xsave. The kernel will fallback to enabling legacy floating-point and sse state. @@ -3944,6 +3949,29 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes sonypi.*= [HW] Sony Programmable I/O Control Device driver See Documentation/laptops/sonypi.txt + spectre_v2= [X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2 + (indirect branch speculation) vulnerability. + + on - unconditionally enable + off - unconditionally disable + auto - kernel detects whether your CPU model is + vulnerable + + Selecting 'on' will, and 'auto' may, choose a + mitigation method at run time according to the + CPU, the available microcode, the setting of the + CONFIG_RETPOLINE configuration option, and the + compiler with which the kernel was built. + + Specific mitigations can also be selected manually: + + retpoline - replace indirect branches + retpoline,generic - google's original retpoline + retpoline,amd - AMD-specific minimal thunk + + Not specifying this option is equivalent to + spectre_v2=auto. + spia_io_base= [HW,MTD] spia_fio_base= spia_pedr= --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -124,5 +124,15 @@ # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr) #endif +/* The Spectre V2 mitigation variants */ +enum spectre_v2_mitigation { + SPECTRE_V2_NONE, + SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL, + SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL_AMD, + SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC, + SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD, + SPECTRE_V2_IBRS, +}; + #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ #endif /* __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__ */ --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -10,6 +10,9 @@ #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/utsname.h> #include <linux/cpu.h> + +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> +#include <asm/cmdline.h> #include <asm/bugs.h> #include <asm/processor.h> #include <asm/processor-flags.h> @@ -20,6 +23,8 @@ #include <asm/pgtable.h> #include <asm/cacheflush.h> +static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void); + void __init check_bugs(void) { identify_boot_cpu(); @@ -29,6 +34,9 @@ void __init check_bugs(void) print_cpu_info(&boot_cpu_data); } + /* Select the proper spectre mitigation before patching alternatives */ + spectre_v2_select_mitigation(); + #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 /* * Check whether we are able to run this kernel safely on SMP. @@ -61,6 +69,153 @@ void __init check_bugs(void) #endif } +/* The kernel command line selection */ +enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd { + SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE, + SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO, + SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE, + SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE, + SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC, + SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD, +}; + +static const char *spectre_v2_strings[] = { + [SPECTRE_V2_NONE] = "Vulnerable", + [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL] = "Vulnerable: Minimal generic ASM retpoline", + [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL_AMD] = "Vulnerable: Minimal AMD ASM retpoline", + [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC] = "Mitigation: Full generic retpoline", + [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD] = "Mitigation: Full AMD retpoline", +}; + +#undef pr_fmt +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V2 mitigation: " fmt + +static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled = SPECTRE_V2_NONE; + +static void __init spec2_print_if_insecure(const char *reason) +{ + if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2)) + pr_info("%s\n", reason); +} + +static void __init spec2_print_if_secure(const char *reason) +{ + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2)) + pr_info("%s\n", reason); +} + +static inline bool retp_compiler(void) +{ + return __is_defined(RETPOLINE); +} + +static inline bool match_option(const char *arg, int arglen, const char *opt) +{ + int len = strlen(opt); + + return len == arglen && !strncmp(arg, opt, len); +} + +static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void) +{ + char arg[20]; + int ret; + + ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg, + sizeof(arg)); + if (ret > 0) { + if (match_option(arg, ret, "off")) { + goto disable; + } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "on")) { + spec2_print_if_secure("force enabled on command line."); + return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE; + } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "retpoline")) { + spec2_print_if_insecure("retpoline selected on command line."); + return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE; + } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "retpoline,amd")) { + if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD) { + pr_err("retpoline,amd selected but CPU is not AMD. Switching to AUTO select\n"); + return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; + } + spec2_print_if_insecure("AMD retpoline selected on command line."); + return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD; + } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "retpoline,generic")) { + spec2_print_if_insecure("generic retpoline selected on command line."); + return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC; + } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "auto")) { + return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; + } + } + + if (!cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2")) + return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; +disable: + spec2_print_if_insecure("disabled on command line."); + return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE; +} + +static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) +{ + enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(); + enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode = SPECTRE_V2_NONE; + + /* + * If the CPU is not affected and the command line mode is NONE or AUTO + * then nothing to do. + */ + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2) && + (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE || cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO)) + return; + + switch (cmd) { + case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE: + return; + + case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE: + /* FALLTRHU */ + case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO: + goto retpoline_auto; + + case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD: + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) + goto retpoline_amd; + break; + case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC: + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) + goto retpoline_generic; + break; + case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE: + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) + goto retpoline_auto; + break; + } + pr_err("kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!"); + return; + +retpoline_auto: + if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD) { + retpoline_amd: + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC)) { + pr_err("LFENCE not serializing. Switching to generic retpoline\n"); + goto retpoline_generic; + } + mode = retp_compiler() ? SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD : + SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL_AMD; + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD); + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE); + } else { + retpoline_generic: + mode = retp_compiler() ? SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC : + SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL; + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE); + } + + spectre_v2_enabled = mode; + pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]); +} + +#undef pr_fmt + #ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) @@ -85,6 +240,7 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct devic { if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2)) return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); - return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n"); + + return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled]); } #endif --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -889,10 +889,6 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(st setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1); setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2); -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE - setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE); -#endif - fpu__init_system(c); #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk are queue-4.9/x86-spectre-add-boot-time-option-to-select-spectre-v2-mitigation.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-irq32-convert-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/objtool-detect-jumps-to-retpoline-thunks.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-x86_bug_spectre_v.patch queue-4.9/x86-alternatives-add-missing-n-at-end-of-alternative-inline-asm.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-hyperv-convert-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-entry-convert-entry-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/sysfs-cpu-fix-typos-in-vulnerability-documentation.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-x86_bug_cpu_insecure.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-make-cpu-bugs-sticky.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpu-amd-make-lfence-a-serializing-instruction.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-ftrace-convert-ftrace-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/objtool-allow-alternatives-to-be-ignored.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpu-implement-cpu-vulnerabilites-sysfs-functions.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-crypto-convert-crypto-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpu-factor-out-application-of-forced-cpu-caps.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-xen-convert-xen-hypercall-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-checksum32-convert-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/x86-mm-32-move-setup_clear_cpu_cap-x86_feature_pcid-earlier.patch queue-4.9/sysfs-cpu-add-vulnerability-folder.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-fill-return-stack-buffer-on-vmexit.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-rename-bug_cpu_insecure-to-bug_cpu_meltdown.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-remove-compile-time-warning.patch queue-4.9/x86-alternatives-fix-optimize_nops-checking.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpu-amd-use-lfence_rdtsc-in-preference-to-mfence_rdtsc.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-add-initial-retpoline-support.patch

7 years, 5 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/retpoline/xen: Convert Xen hypercall indirect jumps" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/retpoline/xen: Convert Xen hypercall indirect jumps to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-retpoline-xen-convert-xen-hypercall-indirect-jumps.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From ea08816d5b185ab3d09e95e393f265af54560350 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2018 21:46:31 +0000 Subject: x86/retpoline/xen: Convert Xen hypercall indirect jumps From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> commit ea08816d5b185ab3d09e95e393f265af54560350 upstream. Convert indirect call in Xen hypercall to use non-speculative sequence, when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is enabled. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan(a)linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross(a)suse.com> Cc: gnomes(a)lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel(a)redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos(a)kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook(a)google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt(a)google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-10-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co… Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h @@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ #include <asm/page.h> #include <asm/pgtable.h> #include <asm/smap.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> #include <xen/interface/xen.h> #include <xen/interface/sched.h> @@ -216,9 +217,9 @@ privcmd_call(unsigned call, __HYPERCALL_5ARG(a1, a2, a3, a4, a5); stac(); - asm volatile("call *%[call]" + asm volatile(CALL_NOSPEC : __HYPERCALL_5PARAM - : [call] "a" (&hypercall_page[call]) + : [thunk_target] "a" (&hypercall_page[call]) : __HYPERCALL_CLOBBER5); clac(); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk are queue-4.9/x86-spectre-add-boot-time-option-to-select-spectre-v2-mitigation.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-irq32-convert-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/objtool-detect-jumps-to-retpoline-thunks.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-x86_bug_spectre_v.patch queue-4.9/x86-alternatives-add-missing-n-at-end-of-alternative-inline-asm.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-hyperv-convert-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-entry-convert-entry-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/sysfs-cpu-fix-typos-in-vulnerability-documentation.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-x86_bug_cpu_insecure.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-make-cpu-bugs-sticky.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpu-amd-make-lfence-a-serializing-instruction.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-ftrace-convert-ftrace-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/objtool-allow-alternatives-to-be-ignored.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpu-implement-cpu-vulnerabilites-sysfs-functions.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-crypto-convert-crypto-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpu-factor-out-application-of-forced-cpu-caps.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-xen-convert-xen-hypercall-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-checksum32-convert-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/x86-mm-32-move-setup_clear_cpu_cap-x86_feature_pcid-earlier.patch queue-4.9/sysfs-cpu-add-vulnerability-folder.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-fill-return-stack-buffer-on-vmexit.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-rename-bug_cpu_insecure-to-bug_cpu_meltdown.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-remove-compile-time-warning.patch queue-4.9/x86-alternatives-fix-optimize_nops-checking.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpu-amd-use-lfence_rdtsc-in-preference-to-mfence_rdtsc.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-add-initial-retpoline-support.patch

7 years, 5 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/retpoline: Remove compile time warning" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/retpoline: Remove compile time warning to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-retpoline-remove-compile-time-warning.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From b8b9ce4b5aec8de9e23cabb0a26b78641f9ab1d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Date: Sun, 14 Jan 2018 22:13:29 +0100 Subject: x86/retpoline: Remove compile time warning From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> commit b8b9ce4b5aec8de9e23cabb0a26b78641f9ab1d6 upstream. Remove the compile time warning when CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y and the compiler does not have retpoline support. Linus rationale for this is: It's wrong because it will just make people turn off RETPOLINE, and the asm updates - and return stack clearing - that are independent of the compiler are likely the most important parts because they are likely the ones easiest to target. And it's annoying because most people won't be able to do anything about it. The number of people building their own compiler? Very small. So if their distro hasn't got a compiler yet (and pretty much nobody does), the warning is just annoying crap. It is already properly reported as part of the sysfs interface. The compile-time warning only encourages bad things. Fixes: 76b043848fd2 ("x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support") Requested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: gnomes(a)lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel(a)redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos(a)kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook(a)google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linux-foundation.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFzWgquv4i6Mab6bASqYXg3ErV3XDFEYf=GEcCDQg5uA… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/Makefile | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/Makefile @@ -187,8 +187,6 @@ ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE RETPOLINE_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-mindirect-branch=thunk-extern -mindirect-branch-register) ifneq ($(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS),) KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS) -DRETPOLINE - else - $(warning CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y, but not supported by the compiler. Toolchain update recommended.) endif endif Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from tglx(a)linutronix.de are queue-4.9/x86-spectre-add-boot-time-option-to-select-spectre-v2-mitigation.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-irq32-convert-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/objtool-detect-jumps-to-retpoline-thunks.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-x86_bug_spectre_v.patch queue-4.9/x86-microcode-intel-extend-bdw-late-loading-with-a-revision-check.patch queue-4.9/x86-alternatives-add-missing-n-at-end-of-alternative-inline-asm.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-hyperv-convert-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-entry-convert-entry-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/x86-asm-use-register-variable-to-get-stack-pointer-value.patch queue-4.9/sysfs-cpu-fix-typos-in-vulnerability-documentation.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-x86_bug_cpu_insecure.patch queue-4.9/objtool-modules-discard-objtool-annotation-sections-for-modules.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-make-cpu-bugs-sticky.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpu-amd-make-lfence-a-serializing-instruction.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-ftrace-convert-ftrace-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/x86-documentation-add-pti-description.patch queue-4.9/x86-acpi-handle-sci-interrupts-above-legacy-space-gracefully.patch queue-4.9/objtool-allow-alternatives-to-be-ignored.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpu-implement-cpu-vulnerabilites-sysfs-functions.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-crypto-convert-crypto-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpu-factor-out-application-of-forced-cpu-caps.patch queue-4.9/selftests-x86-add-test_vsyscall.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-xen-convert-xen-hypercall-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpu-merge-bugs.c-and-bugs_64.c.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-checksum32-convert-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/x86-mm-32-move-setup_clear_cpu_cap-x86_feature_pcid-earlier.patch queue-4.9/sysfs-cpu-add-vulnerability-folder.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-fill-return-stack-buffer-on-vmexit.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-rename-bug_cpu_insecure-to-bug_cpu_meltdown.patch queue-4.9/x86-acpi-reduce-code-duplication-in-mp_override_legacy_irq.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-remove-compile-time-warning.patch queue-4.9/x86-alternatives-fix-optimize_nops-checking.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpu-amd-use-lfence_rdtsc-in-preference-to-mfence_rdtsc.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-add-initial-retpoline-support.patch

7 years, 5 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/retpoline/irq32: Convert assembler indirect jumps" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/retpoline/irq32: Convert assembler indirect jumps to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-retpoline-irq32-convert-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 7614e913db1f40fff819b36216484dc3808995d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2018 21:46:33 +0000 Subject: x86/retpoline/irq32: Convert assembler indirect jumps From: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> commit 7614e913db1f40fff819b36216484dc3808995d4 upstream. Convert all indirect jumps in 32bit irq inline asm code to use non speculative sequences. Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan(a)linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Cc: gnomes(a)lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel(a)redhat.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos(a)kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook(a)google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt(a)google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-12-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co… Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/kernel/irq_32.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/kernel/irq_32.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/irq_32.c @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ #include <linux/mm.h> #include <asm/apic.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_STACKOVERFLOW @@ -54,11 +55,11 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct irq_stack *, softi static void call_on_stack(void *func, void *stack) { asm volatile("xchgl %%ebx,%%esp \n" - "call *%%edi \n" + CALL_NOSPEC "movl %%ebx,%%esp \n" : "=b" (stack) : "0" (stack), - "D"(func) + [thunk_target] "D"(func) : "memory", "cc", "edx", "ecx", "eax"); } @@ -94,11 +95,11 @@ static inline int execute_on_irq_stack(i call_on_stack(print_stack_overflow, isp); asm volatile("xchgl %%ebx,%%esp \n" - "call *%%edi \n" + CALL_NOSPEC "movl %%ebx,%%esp \n" : "=a" (arg1), "=b" (isp) : "0" (desc), "1" (isp), - "D" (desc->handle_irq) + [thunk_target] "D" (desc->handle_irq) : "memory", "cc", "ecx"); return 1; } Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ak(a)linux.intel.com are queue-4.9/x86-spectre-add-boot-time-option-to-select-spectre-v2-mitigation.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-irq32-convert-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/objtool-detect-jumps-to-retpoline-thunks.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-x86_bug_spectre_v.patch queue-4.9/x86-alternatives-add-missing-n-at-end-of-alternative-inline-asm.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-hyperv-convert-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-entry-convert-entry-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-ftrace-convert-ftrace-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/objtool-allow-alternatives-to-be-ignored.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-crypto-convert-crypto-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-xen-convert-xen-hypercall-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-checksum32-convert-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-fill-return-stack-buffer-on-vmexit.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-rename-bug_cpu_insecure-to-bug_cpu_meltdown.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-remove-compile-time-warning.patch queue-4.9/x86-alternatives-fix-optimize_nops-checking.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-add-initial-retpoline-support.patch

7 years, 5 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/retpoline/hyperv: Convert assembler indirect jumps" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/retpoline/hyperv: Convert assembler indirect jumps to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-retpoline-hyperv-convert-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From e70e5892b28c18f517f29ab6e83bd57705104b31 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2018 21:46:30 +0000 Subject: x86/retpoline/hyperv: Convert assembler indirect jumps From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> commit e70e5892b28c18f517f29ab6e83bd57705104b31 upstream. Convert all indirect jumps in hyperv inline asm code to use non-speculative sequences when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is enabled. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan(a)linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Cc: gnomes(a)lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel(a)redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos(a)kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook(a)google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt(a)google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-9-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.… [ backport to 4.9, hopefully correct, not tested... - gregkh ] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/hv/hv.c | 11 +++++++---- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) --- a/drivers/hv/hv.c +++ b/drivers/hv/hv.c @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ #include <linux/clockchips.h> #include <asm/hyperv.h> #include <asm/mshyperv.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> #include "hyperv_vmbus.h" /* The one and only */ @@ -103,9 +104,10 @@ u64 hv_do_hypercall(u64 control, void *i return (u64)ULLONG_MAX; __asm__ __volatile__("mov %0, %%r8" : : "r" (output_address) : "r8"); - __asm__ __volatile__("call *%3" : "=a" (hv_status) : + __asm__ __volatile__(CALL_NOSPEC : + "=a" (hv_status) : "c" (control), "d" (input_address), - "m" (hypercall_page)); + THUNK_TARGET(hypercall_page)); return hv_status; @@ -123,11 +125,12 @@ u64 hv_do_hypercall(u64 control, void *i if (!hypercall_page) return (u64)ULLONG_MAX; - __asm__ __volatile__ ("call *%8" : "=d"(hv_status_hi), + __asm__ __volatile__ (CALL_NOSPEC : "=d"(hv_status_hi), "=a"(hv_status_lo) : "d" (control_hi), "a" (control_lo), "b" (input_address_hi), "c" (input_address_lo), "D"(output_address_hi), - "S"(output_address_lo), "m" (hypercall_page)); + "S"(output_address_lo), + THUNK_TARGET(hypercall_page)); return hv_status_lo | ((u64)hv_status_hi << 32); #endif /* !x86_64 */ Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk are queue-4.9/x86-spectre-add-boot-time-option-to-select-spectre-v2-mitigation.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-irq32-convert-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/objtool-detect-jumps-to-retpoline-thunks.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-x86_bug_spectre_v.patch queue-4.9/x86-alternatives-add-missing-n-at-end-of-alternative-inline-asm.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-hyperv-convert-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-entry-convert-entry-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/sysfs-cpu-fix-typos-in-vulnerability-documentation.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-x86_bug_cpu_insecure.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-make-cpu-bugs-sticky.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpu-amd-make-lfence-a-serializing-instruction.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-ftrace-convert-ftrace-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/objtool-allow-alternatives-to-be-ignored.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpu-implement-cpu-vulnerabilites-sysfs-functions.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-crypto-convert-crypto-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpu-factor-out-application-of-forced-cpu-caps.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-xen-convert-xen-hypercall-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-checksum32-convert-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/x86-mm-32-move-setup_clear_cpu_cap-x86_feature_pcid-earlier.patch queue-4.9/sysfs-cpu-add-vulnerability-folder.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-fill-return-stack-buffer-on-vmexit.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-rename-bug_cpu_insecure-to-bug_cpu_meltdown.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-remove-compile-time-warning.patch queue-4.9/x86-alternatives-fix-optimize_nops-checking.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpu-amd-use-lfence_rdtsc-in-preference-to-mfence_rdtsc.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-add-initial-retpoline-support.patch

7 years, 5 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/retpoline/ftrace: Convert ftrace assembler indirect jumps" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/retpoline/ftrace: Convert ftrace assembler indirect jumps to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-retpoline-ftrace-convert-ftrace-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 9351803bd803cdbeb9b5a7850b7b6f464806e3db Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2018 21:46:29 +0000 Subject: x86/retpoline/ftrace: Convert ftrace assembler indirect jumps From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> commit 9351803bd803cdbeb9b5a7850b7b6f464806e3db upstream. Convert all indirect jumps in ftrace assembler code to use non-speculative sequences when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is enabled. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan(a)linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Cc: gnomes(a)lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel(a)redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos(a)kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook(a)google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt(a)google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-8-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.… Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S | 5 +++-- arch/x86/kernel/mcount_64.S | 7 ++++--- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S @@ -985,7 +985,8 @@ trace: movl 0x4(%ebp), %edx subl $MCOUNT_INSN_SIZE, %eax - call *ftrace_trace_function + movl ftrace_trace_function, %ecx + CALL_NOSPEC %ecx popl %edx popl %ecx @@ -1021,7 +1022,7 @@ return_to_handler: movl %eax, %ecx popl %edx popl %eax - jmp *%ecx + JMP_NOSPEC %ecx #endif #ifdef CONFIG_TRACING --- a/arch/x86/kernel/mcount_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/mcount_64.S @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ #include <asm/ptrace.h> #include <asm/ftrace.h> #include <asm/export.h> - +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> .code64 .section .entry.text, "ax" @@ -290,8 +290,9 @@ trace: * ip and parent ip are used and the list function is called when * function tracing is enabled. */ - call *ftrace_trace_function + movq ftrace_trace_function, %r8 + CALL_NOSPEC %r8 restore_mcount_regs jmp fgraph_trace @@ -334,5 +335,5 @@ GLOBAL(return_to_handler) movq 8(%rsp), %rdx movq (%rsp), %rax addq $24, %rsp - jmp *%rdi + JMP_NOSPEC %rdi #endif Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk are queue-4.9/x86-spectre-add-boot-time-option-to-select-spectre-v2-mitigation.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-irq32-convert-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/objtool-detect-jumps-to-retpoline-thunks.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-x86_bug_spectre_v.patch queue-4.9/x86-alternatives-add-missing-n-at-end-of-alternative-inline-asm.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-hyperv-convert-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-entry-convert-entry-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/sysfs-cpu-fix-typos-in-vulnerability-documentation.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-x86_bug_cpu_insecure.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-make-cpu-bugs-sticky.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpu-amd-make-lfence-a-serializing-instruction.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-ftrace-convert-ftrace-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/objtool-allow-alternatives-to-be-ignored.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpu-implement-cpu-vulnerabilites-sysfs-functions.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-crypto-convert-crypto-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpu-factor-out-application-of-forced-cpu-caps.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-xen-convert-xen-hypercall-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-checksum32-convert-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/x86-mm-32-move-setup_clear_cpu_cap-x86_feature_pcid-earlier.patch queue-4.9/sysfs-cpu-add-vulnerability-folder.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-fill-return-stack-buffer-on-vmexit.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-rename-bug_cpu_insecure-to-bug_cpu_meltdown.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-remove-compile-time-warning.patch queue-4.9/x86-alternatives-fix-optimize_nops-checking.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpu-amd-use-lfence_rdtsc-in-preference-to-mfence_rdtsc.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-add-initial-retpoline-support.patch

7 years, 5 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-retpoline-fill-return-stack-buffer-on-vmexit.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 117cc7a908c83697b0b737d15ae1eb5943afe35b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Date: Fri, 12 Jan 2018 11:11:27 +0000 Subject: x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> commit 117cc7a908c83697b0b737d15ae1eb5943afe35b upstream. In accordance with the Intel and AMD documentation, we need to overwrite all entries in the RSB on exiting a guest, to prevent malicious branch target predictions from affecting the host kernel. This is needed both for retpoline and for IBRS. [ak: numbers again for the RSB stuffing labels] Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Tested-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: gnomes(a)lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel(a)redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos(a)kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook(a)google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt(a)google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515755487-8524-1-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 78 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 4 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 4 + 3 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -7,6 +7,48 @@ #include <asm/alternative-asm.h> #include <asm/cpufeatures.h> +/* + * Fill the CPU return stack buffer. + * + * Each entry in the RSB, if used for a speculative 'ret', contains an + * infinite 'pause; jmp' loop to capture speculative execution. + * + * This is required in various cases for retpoline and IBRS-based + * mitigations for the Spectre variant 2 vulnerability. Sometimes to + * eliminate potentially bogus entries from the RSB, and sometimes + * purely to ensure that it doesn't get empty, which on some CPUs would + * allow predictions from other (unwanted!) sources to be used. + * + * We define a CPP macro such that it can be used from both .S files and + * inline assembly. It's possible to do a .macro and then include that + * from C via asm(".include <asm/nospec-branch.h>") but let's not go there. + */ + +#define RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS 32 /* To forcibly overwrite all entries */ +#define RSB_FILL_LOOPS 16 /* To avoid underflow */ + +/* + * Google experimented with loop-unrolling and this turned out to be + * the optimal version — two calls, each with their own speculation + * trap should their return address end up getting used, in a loop. + */ +#define __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(reg, nr, sp) \ + mov $(nr/2), reg; \ +771: \ + call 772f; \ +773: /* speculation trap */ \ + pause; \ + jmp 773b; \ +772: \ + call 774f; \ +775: /* speculation trap */ \ + pause; \ + jmp 775b; \ +774: \ + dec reg; \ + jnz 771b; \ + add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * nr, sp; + #ifdef __ASSEMBLY__ /* @@ -76,6 +118,20 @@ #endif .endm + /* + * A simpler FILL_RETURN_BUFFER macro. Don't make people use the CPP + * monstrosity above, manually. + */ +.macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req +#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE + ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE + ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@", \ + __stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(\reg,\nr,%_ASM_SP)) \ + \ftr +.Lskip_rsb_\@: +#endif +.endm + #else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ #define ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE \ @@ -119,7 +175,7 @@ X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr) -#else /* No retpoline */ +#else /* No retpoline for C / inline asm */ # define CALL_NOSPEC "call *%[thunk_target]\n" # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr) #endif @@ -134,5 +190,25 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation { SPECTRE_V2_IBRS, }; +/* + * On VMEXIT we must ensure that no RSB predictions learned in the guest + * can be followed in the host, by overwriting the RSB completely. Both + * retpoline and IBRS mitigations for Spectre v2 need this; only on future + * CPUs with IBRS_ATT *might* it be avoided. + */ +static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE + unsigned long loops = RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS / 2; + + asm volatile (ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE + ALTERNATIVE("jmp 910f", + __stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(%0, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, %1)), + X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) + "910:" + : "=&r" (loops), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT + : "r" (loops) : "memory" ); +#endif +} #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ #endif /* __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__ */ --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c @@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ #include <asm/debugreg.h> #include <asm/kvm_para.h> #include <asm/irq_remapping.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> #include <asm/virtext.h> #include "trace.h" @@ -4917,6 +4918,9 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu #endif ); + /* Eliminate branch target predictions from guest mode */ + vmexit_fill_RSB(); + #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 wrmsrl(MSR_GS_BASE, svm->host.gs_base); #else --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c @@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ #include <asm/kexec.h> #include <asm/apic.h> #include <asm/irq_remapping.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> #include "trace.h" #include "pmu.h" @@ -9026,6 +9027,9 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struc #endif ); + /* Eliminate branch target predictions from guest mode */ + vmexit_fill_RSB(); + /* MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR is zeroed on vmexit. Restore it if needed */ if (debugctlmsr) update_debugctlmsr(debugctlmsr); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk are queue-4.9/x86-spectre-add-boot-time-option-to-select-spectre-v2-mitigation.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-irq32-convert-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/objtool-detect-jumps-to-retpoline-thunks.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-x86_bug_spectre_v.patch queue-4.9/x86-alternatives-add-missing-n-at-end-of-alternative-inline-asm.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-hyperv-convert-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-entry-convert-entry-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/sysfs-cpu-fix-typos-in-vulnerability-documentation.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-x86_bug_cpu_insecure.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-make-cpu-bugs-sticky.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpu-amd-make-lfence-a-serializing-instruction.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-ftrace-convert-ftrace-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/objtool-allow-alternatives-to-be-ignored.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpu-implement-cpu-vulnerabilites-sysfs-functions.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-crypto-convert-crypto-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpu-factor-out-application-of-forced-cpu-caps.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-xen-convert-xen-hypercall-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-checksum32-convert-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/x86-mm-32-move-setup_clear_cpu_cap-x86_feature_pcid-earlier.patch queue-4.9/sysfs-cpu-add-vulnerability-folder.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-fill-return-stack-buffer-on-vmexit.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-rename-bug_cpu_insecure-to-bug_cpu_meltdown.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-remove-compile-time-warning.patch queue-4.9/x86-alternatives-fix-optimize_nops-checking.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpu-amd-use-lfence_rdtsc-in-preference-to-mfence_rdtsc.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-add-initial-retpoline-support.patch

7 years, 5 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/retpoline/entry: Convert entry assembler indirect jumps" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/retpoline/entry: Convert entry assembler indirect jumps to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-retpoline-entry-convert-entry-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 2641f08bb7fc63a636a2b18173221d7040a3512e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2018 21:46:28 +0000 Subject: x86/retpoline/entry: Convert entry assembler indirect jumps From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> commit 2641f08bb7fc63a636a2b18173221d7040a3512e upstream. Convert indirect jumps in core 32/64bit entry assembler code to use non-speculative sequences when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is enabled. Don't use CALL_NOSPEC in entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath because the return address after the 'call' instruction must be *precisely* at the .Lentry_SYSCALL_64_after_fastpath label for stub_ptregs_64 to work, and the use of alternatives will mess that up unless we play horrid games to prepend with NOPs and make the variants the same length. It's not worth it; in the case where we ALTERNATIVE out the retpoline, the first instruction at __x86.indirect_thunk.rax is going to be a bare jmp *%rax anyway. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: gnomes(a)lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel(a)redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos(a)kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook(a)google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt(a)google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-7-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.… Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S | 5 +++-- arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 10 ++++++++-- 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S @@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ #include <asm/asm.h> #include <asm/smap.h> #include <asm/export.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> .section .entry.text, "ax" @@ -260,7 +261,7 @@ ENTRY(ret_from_fork) /* kernel thread */ 1: movl %edi, %eax - call *%ebx + CALL_NOSPEC %ebx /* * A kernel thread is allowed to return here after successfully * calling do_execve(). Exit to userspace to complete the execve() @@ -1062,7 +1063,7 @@ error_code: movl %ecx, %es TRACE_IRQS_OFF movl %esp, %eax # pt_regs pointer - call *%edi + CALL_NOSPEC %edi jmp ret_from_exception END(page_fault) --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S @@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ #include <asm/pgtable_types.h> #include <asm/export.h> #include <asm/kaiser.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> #include <linux/err.h> /* Avoid __ASSEMBLER__'ifying <linux/audit.h> just for this. */ @@ -208,7 +209,12 @@ entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath: * It might end up jumping to the slow path. If it jumps, RAX * and all argument registers are clobbered. */ +#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE + movq sys_call_table(, %rax, 8), %rax + call __x86_indirect_thunk_rax +#else call *sys_call_table(, %rax, 8) +#endif .Lentry_SYSCALL_64_after_fastpath_call: movq %rax, RAX(%rsp) @@ -380,7 +386,7 @@ ENTRY(stub_ptregs_64) jmp entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path 1: - jmp *%rax /* Called from C */ + JMP_NOSPEC %rax /* Called from C */ END(stub_ptregs_64) .macro ptregs_stub func @@ -457,7 +463,7 @@ ENTRY(ret_from_fork) 1: /* kernel thread */ movq %r12, %rdi - call *%rbx + CALL_NOSPEC %rbx /* * A kernel thread is allowed to return here after successfully * calling do_execve(). Exit to userspace to complete the execve() Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk are queue-4.9/x86-spectre-add-boot-time-option-to-select-spectre-v2-mitigation.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-irq32-convert-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/objtool-detect-jumps-to-retpoline-thunks.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-x86_bug_spectre_v.patch queue-4.9/x86-alternatives-add-missing-n-at-end-of-alternative-inline-asm.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-hyperv-convert-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-entry-convert-entry-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/sysfs-cpu-fix-typos-in-vulnerability-documentation.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-x86_bug_cpu_insecure.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-make-cpu-bugs-sticky.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpu-amd-make-lfence-a-serializing-instruction.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-ftrace-convert-ftrace-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/objtool-allow-alternatives-to-be-ignored.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpu-implement-cpu-vulnerabilites-sysfs-functions.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-crypto-convert-crypto-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpu-factor-out-application-of-forced-cpu-caps.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-xen-convert-xen-hypercall-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-checksum32-convert-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/x86-mm-32-move-setup_clear_cpu_cap-x86_feature_pcid-earlier.patch queue-4.9/sysfs-cpu-add-vulnerability-folder.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-fill-return-stack-buffer-on-vmexit.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-rename-bug_cpu_insecure-to-bug_cpu_meltdown.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-remove-compile-time-warning.patch queue-4.9/x86-alternatives-fix-optimize_nops-checking.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpu-amd-use-lfence_rdtsc-in-preference-to-mfence_rdtsc.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-add-initial-retpoline-support.patch

7 years, 5 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/retpoline/crypto: Convert crypto assembler indirect jumps" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/retpoline/crypto: Convert crypto assembler indirect jumps to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-retpoline-crypto-convert-crypto-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 9697fa39efd3fc3692f2949d4045f393ec58450b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2018 21:46:27 +0000 Subject: x86/retpoline/crypto: Convert crypto assembler indirect jumps From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> commit 9697fa39efd3fc3692f2949d4045f393ec58450b upstream. Convert all indirect jumps in crypto assembler code to use non-speculative sequences when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is enabled. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan(a)linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Cc: gnomes(a)lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel(a)redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos(a)kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook(a)google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt(a)google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-6-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.… Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S | 5 +++-- arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx-asm_64.S | 3 ++- arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx2-asm_64.S | 3 ++- arch/x86/crypto/crc32c-pcl-intel-asm_64.S | 3 ++- 4 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ #include <linux/linkage.h> #include <asm/inst.h> #include <asm/frame.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> /* * The following macros are used to move an (un)aligned 16 byte value to/from @@ -2734,7 +2735,7 @@ ENTRY(aesni_xts_crypt8) pxor INC, STATE4 movdqu IV, 0x30(OUTP) - call *%r11 + CALL_NOSPEC %r11 movdqu 0x00(OUTP), INC pxor INC, STATE1 @@ -2779,7 +2780,7 @@ ENTRY(aesni_xts_crypt8) _aesni_gf128mul_x_ble() movups IV, (IVP) - call *%r11 + CALL_NOSPEC %r11 movdqu 0x40(OUTP), INC pxor INC, STATE1 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx-asm_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx-asm_64.S @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ #include <linux/linkage.h> #include <asm/frame.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> #define CAMELLIA_TABLE_BYTE_LEN 272 @@ -1224,7 +1225,7 @@ camellia_xts_crypt_16way: vpxor 14 * 16(%rax), %xmm15, %xmm14; vpxor 15 * 16(%rax), %xmm15, %xmm15; - call *%r9; + CALL_NOSPEC %r9; addq $(16 * 16), %rsp; --- a/arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx2-asm_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx2-asm_64.S @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ #include <linux/linkage.h> #include <asm/frame.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> #define CAMELLIA_TABLE_BYTE_LEN 272 @@ -1337,7 +1338,7 @@ camellia_xts_crypt_32way: vpxor 14 * 32(%rax), %ymm15, %ymm14; vpxor 15 * 32(%rax), %ymm15, %ymm15; - call *%r9; + CALL_NOSPEC %r9; addq $(16 * 32), %rsp; --- a/arch/x86/crypto/crc32c-pcl-intel-asm_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/crc32c-pcl-intel-asm_64.S @@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ #include <asm/inst.h> #include <linux/linkage.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> ## ISCSI CRC 32 Implementation with crc32 and pclmulqdq Instruction @@ -172,7 +173,7 @@ continue_block: movzxw (bufp, %rax, 2), len lea crc_array(%rip), bufp lea (bufp, len, 1), bufp - jmp *bufp + JMP_NOSPEC bufp ################################################################ ## 2a) PROCESS FULL BLOCKS: Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk are queue-4.9/x86-spectre-add-boot-time-option-to-select-spectre-v2-mitigation.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-irq32-convert-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/objtool-detect-jumps-to-retpoline-thunks.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-x86_bug_spectre_v.patch queue-4.9/x86-alternatives-add-missing-n-at-end-of-alternative-inline-asm.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-hyperv-convert-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-entry-convert-entry-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/sysfs-cpu-fix-typos-in-vulnerability-documentation.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-x86_bug_cpu_insecure.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-make-cpu-bugs-sticky.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpu-amd-make-lfence-a-serializing-instruction.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-ftrace-convert-ftrace-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/objtool-allow-alternatives-to-be-ignored.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpu-implement-cpu-vulnerabilites-sysfs-functions.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-crypto-convert-crypto-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpu-factor-out-application-of-forced-cpu-caps.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-xen-convert-xen-hypercall-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-checksum32-convert-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/x86-mm-32-move-setup_clear_cpu_cap-x86_feature_pcid-earlier.patch queue-4.9/sysfs-cpu-add-vulnerability-folder.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-fill-return-stack-buffer-on-vmexit.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-rename-bug_cpu_insecure-to-bug_cpu_meltdown.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-remove-compile-time-warning.patch queue-4.9/x86-alternatives-fix-optimize_nops-checking.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpu-amd-use-lfence_rdtsc-in-preference-to-mfence_rdtsc.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-add-initial-retpoline-support.patch

7 years, 5 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/retpoline/checksum32: Convert assembler indirect jumps" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/retpoline/checksum32: Convert assembler indirect jumps to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-retpoline-checksum32-convert-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 5096732f6f695001fa2d6f1335a2680b37912c69 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2018 21:46:32 +0000 Subject: x86/retpoline/checksum32: Convert assembler indirect jumps From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> commit 5096732f6f695001fa2d6f1335a2680b37912c69 upstream. Convert all indirect jumps in 32bit checksum assembler code to use non-speculative sequences when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is enabled. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan(a)linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Cc: gnomes(a)lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel(a)redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos(a)kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook(a)google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt(a)google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-11-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/lib/checksum_32.S | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/lib/checksum_32.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/checksum_32.S @@ -29,7 +29,8 @@ #include <asm/errno.h> #include <asm/asm.h> #include <asm/export.h> - +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> + /* * computes a partial checksum, e.g. for TCP/UDP fragments */ @@ -156,7 +157,7 @@ ENTRY(csum_partial) negl %ebx lea 45f(%ebx,%ebx,2), %ebx testl %esi, %esi - jmp *%ebx + JMP_NOSPEC %ebx # Handle 2-byte-aligned regions 20: addw (%esi), %ax @@ -439,7 +440,7 @@ ENTRY(csum_partial_copy_generic) andl $-32,%edx lea 3f(%ebx,%ebx), %ebx testl %esi, %esi - jmp *%ebx + JMP_NOSPEC %ebx 1: addl $64,%esi addl $64,%edi SRC(movb -32(%edx),%bl) ; SRC(movb (%edx),%bl) Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk are queue-4.9/x86-spectre-add-boot-time-option-to-select-spectre-v2-mitigation.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-irq32-convert-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/objtool-detect-jumps-to-retpoline-thunks.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-x86_bug_spectre_v.patch queue-4.9/x86-alternatives-add-missing-n-at-end-of-alternative-inline-asm.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-hyperv-convert-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-entry-convert-entry-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/sysfs-cpu-fix-typos-in-vulnerability-documentation.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-x86_bug_cpu_insecure.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-make-cpu-bugs-sticky.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpu-amd-make-lfence-a-serializing-instruction.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-ftrace-convert-ftrace-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/objtool-allow-alternatives-to-be-ignored.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpu-implement-cpu-vulnerabilites-sysfs-functions.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-crypto-convert-crypto-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpu-factor-out-application-of-forced-cpu-caps.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-xen-convert-xen-hypercall-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-checksum32-convert-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/x86-mm-32-move-setup_clear_cpu_cap-x86_feature_pcid-earlier.patch queue-4.9/sysfs-cpu-add-vulnerability-folder.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-fill-return-stack-buffer-on-vmexit.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-rename-bug_cpu_insecure-to-bug_cpu_meltdown.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-remove-compile-time-warning.patch queue-4.9/x86-alternatives-fix-optimize_nops-checking.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpu-amd-use-lfence_rdtsc-in-preference-to-mfence_rdtsc.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-add-initial-retpoline-support.patch

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