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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID_7_EDX CPUID leaf" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID_7_EDX CPUID leaf to the 4.15-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86cpufeatures_Add_CPUID_7_EDX_CPUID_leaf.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.15 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. Subject: x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID_7_EDX CPUID leaf From: David Woodhouse dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk Date: Thu Jan 25 16:14:09 2018 +0000 From: David Woodhouse dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk commit 95ca0ee8636059ea2800dfbac9ecac6212d6b38f This is a pure feature bits leaf. There are two AVX512 feature bits in it already which were handled as scattered bits, and three more from this leaf are going to be added for speculation control features. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de> Cc: gnomes(a)lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: ak(a)linux.intel.com Cc: ashok.raj(a)intel.com Cc: dave.hansen(a)intel.com Cc: karahmed(a)amazon.de Cc: arjan(a)linux.intel.com Cc: torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org Cc: peterz(a)infradead.org Cc: bp(a)alien8.de Cc: pbonzini(a)redhat.com Cc: tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com Cc: gregkh(a)linux-foundation.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1516896855-7642-2-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 7 +++++-- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 8 +++++--- arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 3 ++- arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h | 3 ++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c | 2 -- 6 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ enum cpuid_leafs CPUID_8000_000A_EDX, CPUID_7_ECX, CPUID_8000_0007_EBX, + CPUID_7_EDX, }; #ifdef CONFIG_X86_FEATURE_NAMES @@ -79,8 +80,9 @@ extern const char * const x86_bug_flags[ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 15, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 16, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 17, feature_bit) || \ + CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 18, feature_bit) || \ REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK || \ - BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 18)) + BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19)) #define DISABLED_MASK_BIT_SET(feature_bit) \ ( CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 0, feature_bit) || \ @@ -101,8 +103,9 @@ extern const char * const x86_bug_flags[ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 15, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 16, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 17, feature_bit) || \ + CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 18, feature_bit) || \ DISABLED_MASK_CHECK || \ - BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 18)) + BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19)) #define cpu_has(c, bit) \ (__builtin_constant_p(bit) && REQUIRED_MASK_BIT_SET(bit) ? 1 : \ --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ /* * Defines x86 CPU feature bits */ -#define NCAPINTS 18 /* N 32-bit words worth of info */ +#define NCAPINTS 19 /* N 32-bit words worth of info */ #define NBUGINTS 1 /* N 32-bit bug flags */ /* @@ -206,8 +206,6 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE ( 7*32+12) /* Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD ( 7*32+13) /* AMD Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN ( 7*32+14) /* Intel Processor Inventory Number */ -#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW ( 7*32+16) /* AVX-512 Neural Network Instructions */ -#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS ( 7*32+17) /* AVX-512 Multiply Accumulation Single precision */ #define X86_FEATURE_MBA ( 7*32+18) /* Memory Bandwidth Allocation */ #define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW ( 7*32+19) /* Fill RSB on context switches */ @@ -319,6 +317,10 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_SUCCOR (17*32+ 1) /* Uncorrectable error containment and recovery */ #define X86_FEATURE_SMCA (17*32+ 3) /* Scalable MCA */ +/* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (EDX), word 18 */ +#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW (18*32+ 2) /* AVX-512 Neural Network Instructions */ +#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS (18*32+ 3) /* AVX-512 Multiply Accumulation Single precision */ + /* * BUG word(s) */ --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h @@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ #define DISABLED_MASK15 0 #define DISABLED_MASK16 (DISABLE_PKU|DISABLE_OSPKE|DISABLE_LA57|DISABLE_UMIP) #define DISABLED_MASK17 0 -#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 18) +#define DISABLED_MASK18 0 +#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19) #endif /* _ASM_X86_DISABLED_FEATURES_H */ --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h @@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ #define REQUIRED_MASK15 0 #define REQUIRED_MASK16 (NEED_LA57) #define REQUIRED_MASK17 0 -#define REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 18) +#define REQUIRED_MASK18 0 +#define REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19) #endif /* _ASM_X86_REQUIRED_FEATURES_H */ --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -769,6 +769,7 @@ void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) cpuid_count(0x00000007, 0, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); c->x86_capability[CPUID_7_0_EBX] = ebx; c->x86_capability[CPUID_7_ECX] = ecx; + c->x86_capability[CPUID_7_EDX] = edx; } /* Extended state features: level 0x0000000d */ --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c @@ -21,8 +21,6 @@ struct cpuid_bit { static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits[] = { { X86_FEATURE_APERFMPERF, CPUID_ECX, 0, 0x00000006, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_EPB, CPUID_ECX, 3, 0x00000006, 0 }, - { X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW, CPUID_EDX, 2, 0x00000007, 0 }, - { X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS, CPUID_EDX, 3, 0x00000007, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_CAT_L3, CPUID_EBX, 1, 0x00000010, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_CAT_L2, CPUID_EBX, 2, 0x00000010, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_CDP_L3, CPUID_ECX, 2, 0x00000010, 1 }, Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk are queue-4.15/x86pti_Do_not_enable_PTI_on_CPUs_which_are_not_vulnerable_to_Meltdown.patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeature_Blacklist_SPEC_CTRLPRED_CMD_on_early_Spectre_v2_microcodes.patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeatures_Add_Intel_feature_bits_for_Speculation_Control.patch queue-4.15/KVM_VMX_Make_indirect_call_speculation_safe.patch queue-4.15/x86msr_Add_definitions_for_new_speculation_control_MSRs.patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeatures_Add_CPUID_7_EDX_CPUID_leaf.patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeatures_Add_AMD_feature_bits_for_Speculation_Control.patch queue-4.15/x86speculation_Add_basic_IBPB_(Indirect_Branch_Prediction_Barrier)_support.patch queue-4.15/x86speculation_Simplify_indirect_branch_prediction_barrier().patch queue-4.15/KVM_x86_Make_indirect_calls_in_emulator_speculation_safe.patch queue-4.15/x86retpoline_Simplify_vmexit_fill_RSB().patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeatures_Clean_up_Spectre_v2_related_CPUID_flags.patch

7 years, 3 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL/PRED_CMD on early Spectre v2 microcodes" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL/PRED_CMD on early Spectre v2 microcodes to the 4.15-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86cpufeature_Blacklist_SPEC_CTRLPRED_CMD_on_early_Spectre_v2_microcodes.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.15 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. Subject: x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL/PRED_CMD on early Spectre v2 microcodes From: David Woodhouse dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk Date: Thu Jan 25 16:14:14 2018 +0000 From: David Woodhouse dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk commit a5b2966364538a0e68c9fa29bc0a3a1651799035 This doesn't refuse to load the affected microcodes; it just refuses to use the Spectre v2 mitigation features if they're detected, by clearing the appropriate feature bits. The AMD CPUID bits are handled here too, because hypervisors *may* have been exposing those bits even on Intel chips, for fine-grained control of what's available. It is non-trivial to use x86_match_cpu() for this table because that doesn't handle steppings. And the approach taken in commit bd9240a18 almost made me lose my lunch. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: gnomes(a)lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: ak(a)linux.intel.com Cc: ashok.raj(a)intel.com Cc: dave.hansen(a)intel.com Cc: karahmed(a)amazon.de Cc: arjan(a)linux.intel.com Cc: torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org Cc: peterz(a)infradead.org Cc: bp(a)alien8.de Cc: pbonzini(a)redhat.com Cc: tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com Cc: gregkh(a)linux-foundation.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1516896855-7642-7-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 66 insertions(+) --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c @@ -102,6 +102,59 @@ static void probe_xeon_phi_r3mwait(struc ELF_HWCAP2 |= HWCAP2_RING3MWAIT; } +/* + * Early microcode releases for the Spectre v2 mitigation were broken. + * Information taken from; + * - https://newsroom.intel.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2018/01/microcode-up… + * - https://kb.vmware.com/s/article/52345 + * - Microcode revisions observed in the wild + * - Release note from 20180108 microcode release + */ +struct sku_microcode { + u8 model; + u8 stepping; + u32 microcode; +}; +static const struct sku_microcode spectre_bad_microcodes[] = { + { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP, 0x0B, 0x84 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP, 0x0A, 0x84 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP, 0x09, 0x84 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE, 0x0A, 0x84 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE, 0x09, 0x84 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X, 0x03, 0x0100013e }, + { INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X, 0x04, 0x0200003c }, + { INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_MOBILE, 0x03, 0xc2 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP, 0x03, 0xc2 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_CORE, 0x04, 0x28 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_GT3E, 0x01, 0x1b }, + { INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D, 0x02, 0x14 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D, 0x03, 0x07000011 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X, 0x01, 0x0b000025 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_ULT, 0x01, 0x21 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_GT3E, 0x01, 0x18 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_CORE, 0x03, 0x23 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X, 0x02, 0x3b }, + { INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X, 0x04, 0x10 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_IVYBRIDGE_X, 0x04, 0x42a }, + /* Updated in the 20180108 release; blacklist until we know otherwise */ + { INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GEMINI_LAKE, 0x01, 0x22 }, + /* Observed in the wild */ + { INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE_X, 0x06, 0x61b }, + { INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE_X, 0x07, 0x712 }, +}; + +static bool bad_spectre_microcode(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(spectre_bad_microcodes); i++) { + if (c->x86_model == spectre_bad_microcodes[i].model && + c->x86_mask == spectre_bad_microcodes[i].stepping) + return (c->microcode <= spectre_bad_microcodes[i].microcode); + } + return false; +} + static void early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { u64 misc_enable; @@ -122,6 +175,19 @@ static void early_init_intel(struct cpui if (c->x86 >= 6 && !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IA64)) c->microcode = intel_get_microcode_revision(); + if ((cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) || + cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP) || + cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SPEC_CTRL) || + cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_PRED_CMD) || + cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP)) && bad_spectre_microcode(c)) { + pr_warn("Intel Spectre v2 broken microcode detected; disabling SPEC_CTRL\n"); + clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL); + clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP); + clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SPEC_CTRL); + clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_PRED_CMD); + clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP); + } + /* * Atom erratum AAE44/AAF40/AAG38/AAH41: * Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk are queue-4.15/x86pti_Do_not_enable_PTI_on_CPUs_which_are_not_vulnerable_to_Meltdown.patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeature_Blacklist_SPEC_CTRLPRED_CMD_on_early_Spectre_v2_microcodes.patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeatures_Add_Intel_feature_bits_for_Speculation_Control.patch queue-4.15/KVM_VMX_Make_indirect_call_speculation_safe.patch queue-4.15/x86msr_Add_definitions_for_new_speculation_control_MSRs.patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeatures_Add_CPUID_7_EDX_CPUID_leaf.patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeatures_Add_AMD_feature_bits_for_Speculation_Control.patch queue-4.15/x86speculation_Add_basic_IBPB_(Indirect_Branch_Prediction_Barrier)_support.patch queue-4.15/x86speculation_Simplify_indirect_branch_prediction_barrier().patch queue-4.15/KVM_x86_Make_indirect_calls_in_emulator_speculation_safe.patch queue-4.15/x86retpoline_Simplify_vmexit_fill_RSB().patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeatures_Clean_up_Spectre_v2_related_CPUID_flags.patch

7 years, 3 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/cpu/bugs: Make retpoline module warning conditional" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/cpu/bugs: Make retpoline module warning conditional to the 4.15-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86cpubugs_Make_retpoline_module_warning_conditional.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.15 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. Subject: x86/cpu/bugs: Make retpoline module warning conditional From: Thomas Gleixner tglx(a)linutronix.de Date: Sat Jan 27 15:45:14 2018 +0100 From: Thomas Gleixner tglx(a)linutronix.de commit e383095c7fe8d218e00ec0f83e4b95ed4e627b02 If sysfs is disabled and RETPOLINE not defined: arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c:97:13: warning: ‘spectre_v2_bad_module’ defined but not used [-Wunused-variable] static bool spectre_v2_bad_module; Hide it. Fixes: caf7501a1b4e ("module/retpoline: Warn about missing retpoline in module") Reported-by: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)alien8.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2(a)infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 14 +++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -94,9 +94,10 @@ static const char *spectre_v2_strings[] #define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V2 : " fmt static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled = SPECTRE_V2_NONE; -static bool spectre_v2_bad_module; #ifdef RETPOLINE +static bool spectre_v2_bad_module; + bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline) { if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_NONE || has_retpoline) @@ -106,6 +107,13 @@ bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpol spectre_v2_bad_module = true; return false; } + +static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void) +{ + return spectre_v2_bad_module ? " - vulnerable module loaded" : ""; +} +#else +static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void) { return ""; } #endif static void __init spec2_print_if_insecure(const char *reason) @@ -300,7 +308,7 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct devic return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled], - boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) ? ", IPBP" : "", - spectre_v2_bad_module ? " - vulnerable module loaded" : ""); + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) ? ", IBPB" : "", + spectre_v2_module_string()); } #endif Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from bp(a)alien8.de are queue-4.15/x86pti_Do_not_enable_PTI_on_CPUs_which_are_not_vulnerable_to_Meltdown.patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeature_Blacklist_SPEC_CTRLPRED_CMD_on_early_Spectre_v2_microcodes.patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeatures_Add_Intel_feature_bits_for_Speculation_Control.patch queue-4.15/x86msr_Add_definitions_for_new_speculation_control_MSRs.patch queue-4.15/x86alternative_Print_unadorned_pointers.patch queue-4.15/x86cpubugs_Make_retpoline_module_warning_conditional.patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeatures_Add_CPUID_7_EDX_CPUID_leaf.patch queue-4.15/x86bugs_Drop_one_mitigation_from_dmesg.patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeatures_Add_AMD_feature_bits_for_Speculation_Control.patch queue-4.15/x86speculation_Add_basic_IBPB_(Indirect_Branch_Prediction_Barrier)_support.patch queue-4.15/x86speculation_Simplify_indirect_branch_prediction_barrier().patch queue-4.15/x86nospec_Fix_header_guards_names.patch queue-4.15/x86retpoline_Simplify_vmexit_fill_RSB().patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeatures_Clean_up_Spectre_v2_related_CPUID_flags.patch

7 years, 3 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/bugs: Drop one "mitigation" from dmesg" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/bugs: Drop one "mitigation" from dmesg to the 4.15-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86bugs_Drop_one_mitigation_from_dmesg.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.15 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. Subject: x86/bugs: Drop one "mitigation" from dmesg From: Borislav Petkov bp(a)suse.de Date: Fri Jan 26 13:11:39 2018 +0100 From: Borislav Petkov bp(a)suse.de commit 55fa19d3e51f33d9cd4056d25836d93abf9438db Make [ 0.031118] Spectre V2 mitigation: Mitigation: Full generic retpoline into [ 0.031118] Spectre V2: Mitigation: Full generic retpoline to reduce the mitigation mitigations strings. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: riel(a)redhat.com Cc: ak(a)linux.intel.com Cc: peterz(a)infradead.org Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2(a)infradead.org> Cc: jikos(a)kernel.org Cc: luto(a)amacapital.net Cc: dave.hansen(a)intel.com Cc: torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org Cc: keescook(a)google.com Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Cc: tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com Cc: pjt(a)google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180126121139.31959-5-bp@alien8.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ static const char *spectre_v2_strings[] }; #undef pr_fmt -#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V2 mitigation: " fmt +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V2 : " fmt static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled = SPECTRE_V2_NONE; static bool spectre_v2_bad_module; Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from bp(a)suse.de are queue-4.15/x86pti_Do_not_enable_PTI_on_CPUs_which_are_not_vulnerable_to_Meltdown.patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeatures_Add_Intel_feature_bits_for_Speculation_Control.patch queue-4.15/x86alternative_Print_unadorned_pointers.patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeatures_Add_CPUID_7_EDX_CPUID_leaf.patch queue-4.15/x86bugs_Drop_one_mitigation_from_dmesg.patch queue-4.15/x86speculation_Simplify_indirect_branch_prediction_barrier().patch queue-4.15/x86nospec_Fix_header_guards_names.patch queue-4.15/x86retpoline_Simplify_vmexit_fill_RSB().patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeatures_Clean_up_Spectre_v2_related_CPUID_flags.patch

7 years, 3 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/alternative: Print unadorned pointers" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/alternative: Print unadorned pointers to the 4.15-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86alternative_Print_unadorned_pointers.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.15 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. Subject: x86/alternative: Print unadorned pointers From: Borislav Petkov bp(a)suse.de Date: Fri Jan 26 13:11:36 2018 +0100 From: Borislav Petkov bp(a)suse.de commit 0e6c16c652cadaffd25a6bb326ec10da5bcec6b4 After commit ad67b74d2469 ("printk: hash addresses printed with %p") pointers are being hashed when printed. However, this makes the alternative debug output completely useless. Switch to %px in order to see the unadorned kernel pointers. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: riel(a)redhat.com Cc: ak(a)linux.intel.com Cc: peterz(a)infradead.org Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2(a)infradead.org> Cc: jikos(a)kernel.org Cc: luto(a)amacapital.net Cc: dave.hansen(a)intel.com Cc: torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org Cc: keescook(a)google.com Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Cc: tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com Cc: gregkh(a)linux-foundation.org Cc: pjt(a)google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180126121139.31959-2-bp@alien8.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 14 +++++++------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c @@ -298,7 +298,7 @@ recompute_jump(struct alt_instr *a, u8 * tgt_rip = next_rip + o_dspl; n_dspl = tgt_rip - orig_insn; - DPRINTK("target RIP: %p, new_displ: 0x%x", tgt_rip, n_dspl); + DPRINTK("target RIP: %px, new_displ: 0x%x", tgt_rip, n_dspl); if (tgt_rip - orig_insn >= 0) { if (n_dspl - 2 <= 127) @@ -355,7 +355,7 @@ static void __init_or_module noinline op add_nops(instr + (a->instrlen - a->padlen), a->padlen); local_irq_restore(flags); - DUMP_BYTES(instr, a->instrlen, "%p: [%d:%d) optimized NOPs: ", + DUMP_BYTES(instr, a->instrlen, "%px: [%d:%d) optimized NOPs: ", instr, a->instrlen - a->padlen, a->padlen); } @@ -376,7 +376,7 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_alt u8 *instr, *replacement; u8 insnbuf[MAX_PATCH_LEN]; - DPRINTK("alt table %p -> %p", start, end); + DPRINTK("alt table %px, -> %px", start, end); /* * The scan order should be from start to end. A later scanned * alternative code can overwrite previously scanned alternative code. @@ -400,14 +400,14 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_alt continue; } - DPRINTK("feat: %d*32+%d, old: (%p, len: %d), repl: (%p, len: %d), pad: %d", + DPRINTK("feat: %d*32+%d, old: (%px len: %d), repl: (%px, len: %d), pad: %d", a->cpuid >> 5, a->cpuid & 0x1f, instr, a->instrlen, replacement, a->replacementlen, a->padlen); - DUMP_BYTES(instr, a->instrlen, "%p: old_insn: ", instr); - DUMP_BYTES(replacement, a->replacementlen, "%p: rpl_insn: ", replacement); + DUMP_BYTES(instr, a->instrlen, "%px: old_insn: ", instr); + DUMP_BYTES(replacement, a->replacementlen, "%px: rpl_insn: ", replacement); memcpy(insnbuf, replacement, a->replacementlen); insnbuf_sz = a->replacementlen; @@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_alt a->instrlen - a->replacementlen); insnbuf_sz += a->instrlen - a->replacementlen; } - DUMP_BYTES(insnbuf, insnbuf_sz, "%p: final_insn: ", instr); + DUMP_BYTES(insnbuf, insnbuf_sz, "%px: final_insn: ", instr); text_poke_early(instr, insnbuf, insnbuf_sz); } Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from bp(a)suse.de are queue-4.15/x86pti_Do_not_enable_PTI_on_CPUs_which_are_not_vulnerable_to_Meltdown.patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeatures_Add_Intel_feature_bits_for_Speculation_Control.patch queue-4.15/x86alternative_Print_unadorned_pointers.patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeatures_Add_CPUID_7_EDX_CPUID_leaf.patch queue-4.15/x86bugs_Drop_one_mitigation_from_dmesg.patch queue-4.15/x86speculation_Simplify_indirect_branch_prediction_barrier().patch queue-4.15/x86nospec_Fix_header_guards_names.patch queue-4.15/x86retpoline_Simplify_vmexit_fill_RSB().patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeatures_Clean_up_Spectre_v2_related_CPUID_flags.patch

7 years, 3 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "KVM: x86: Make indirect calls in emulator speculation safe" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled KVM: x86: Make indirect calls in emulator speculation safe to the 4.15-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: KVM_x86_Make_indirect_calls_in_emulator_speculation_safe.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.15 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. Subject: KVM: x86: Make indirect calls in emulator speculation safe From: Peter Zijlstra peterz(a)infradead.org Date: Thu Jan 25 10:58:13 2018 +0100 From: Peter Zijlstra peterz(a)infradead.org commit 1a29b5b7f347a1a9230c1e0af5b37e3e571588ab Replace the indirect calls with CALL_NOSPEC. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz(a)infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange(a)redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj(a)intel.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima(a)intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2(a)infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: rga(a)amazon.de Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)intel.com> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick(a)intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Cc: Jason Baron <jbaron(a)akamai.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Cc: Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven(a)intel.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180125095843.595615683@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ #include <asm/kvm_emulate.h> #include <linux/stringify.h> #include <asm/debugreg.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> #include "x86.h" #include "tss.h" @@ -1021,8 +1022,8 @@ static __always_inline u8 test_cc(unsign void (*fop)(void) = (void *)em_setcc + 4 * (condition & 0xf); flags = (flags & EFLAGS_MASK) | X86_EFLAGS_IF; - asm("push %[flags]; popf; call *%[fastop]" - : "=a"(rc) : [fastop]"r"(fop), [flags]"r"(flags)); + asm("push %[flags]; popf; " CALL_NOSPEC + : "=a"(rc) : [thunk_target]"r"(fop), [flags]"r"(flags)); return rc; } @@ -5335,9 +5336,9 @@ static int fastop(struct x86_emulate_ctx if (!(ctxt->d & ByteOp)) fop += __ffs(ctxt->dst.bytes) * FASTOP_SIZE; - asm("push %[flags]; popf; call *%[fastop]; pushf; pop %[flags]\n" + asm("push %[flags]; popf; " CALL_NOSPEC " ; pushf; pop %[flags]\n" : "+a"(ctxt->dst.val), "+d"(ctxt->src.val), [flags]"+D"(flags), - [fastop]"+S"(fop), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT + [thunk_target]"+S"(fop), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT : "c"(ctxt->src2.val)); ctxt->eflags = (ctxt->eflags & ~EFLAGS_MASK) | (flags & EFLAGS_MASK); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from peterz(a)infradead.org are queue-4.15/x86pti_Do_not_enable_PTI_on_CPUs_which_are_not_vulnerable_to_Meltdown.patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeature_Blacklist_SPEC_CTRLPRED_CMD_on_early_Spectre_v2_microcodes.patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeatures_Add_Intel_feature_bits_for_Speculation_Control.patch queue-4.15/KVM_VMX_Make_indirect_call_speculation_safe.patch queue-4.15/x86msr_Add_definitions_for_new_speculation_control_MSRs.patch queue-4.15/x86alternative_Print_unadorned_pointers.patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeatures_Add_CPUID_7_EDX_CPUID_leaf.patch queue-4.15/x86bugs_Drop_one_mitigation_from_dmesg.patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeatures_Add_AMD_feature_bits_for_Speculation_Control.patch queue-4.15/x86speculation_Add_basic_IBPB_(Indirect_Branch_Prediction_Barrier)_support.patch queue-4.15/x86speculation_Simplify_indirect_branch_prediction_barrier().patch queue-4.15/x86nospec_Fix_header_guards_names.patch queue-4.15/KVM_x86_Make_indirect_calls_in_emulator_speculation_safe.patch queue-4.15/x86retpoline_Simplify_vmexit_fill_RSB().patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeatures_Clean_up_Spectre_v2_related_CPUID_flags.patch

7 years, 3 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "module/retpoline: Warn about missing retpoline in module" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled module/retpoline: Warn about missing retpoline in module to the 4.15-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: moduleretpoline_Warn_about_missing_retpoline_in_module.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.15 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. Subject: module/retpoline: Warn about missing retpoline in module From: Andi Kleen ak(a)linux.intel.com Date: Thu Jan 25 15:50:28 2018 -0800 From: Andi Kleen ak(a)linux.intel.com commit caf7501a1b4ec964190f31f9c3f163de252273b8 There's a risk that a kernel which has full retpoline mitigations becomes vulnerable when a module gets loaded that hasn't been compiled with the right compiler or the right option. To enable detection of that mismatch at module load time, add a module info string "retpoline" at build time when the module was compiled with retpoline support. This only covers compiled C source, but assembler source or prebuilt object files are not checked. If a retpoline enabled kernel detects a non retpoline protected module at load time, print a warning and report it in the sysfs vulnerability file. [ tglx: Massaged changelog ] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2(a)infradead.org> Cc: gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org Cc: torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org Cc: jeyu(a)kernel.org Cc: arjan(a)linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180125235028.31211-1-andi@firstfloor.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 17 ++++++++++++++++- include/linux/module.h | 9 +++++++++ kernel/module.c | 11 +++++++++++ scripts/mod/modpost.c | 9 +++++++++ 4 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/utsname.h> #include <linux/cpu.h> +#include <linux/module.h> #include <asm/nospec-branch.h> #include <asm/cmdline.h> @@ -93,6 +94,19 @@ static const char *spectre_v2_strings[] #define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V2 mitigation: " fmt static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled = SPECTRE_V2_NONE; +static bool spectre_v2_bad_module; + +#ifdef RETPOLINE +bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline) +{ + if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_NONE || has_retpoline) + return true; + + pr_err("System may be vunerable to spectre v2\n"); + spectre_v2_bad_module = true; + return false; +} +#endif static void __init spec2_print_if_insecure(const char *reason) { @@ -278,6 +292,7 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct devic if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2)) return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); - return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled]); + return sprintf(buf, "%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled], + spectre_v2_bad_module ? " - vulnerable module loaded" : ""); } #endif --- a/include/linux/module.h +++ b/include/linux/module.h @@ -801,6 +801,15 @@ static inline void module_bug_finalize(c static inline void module_bug_cleanup(struct module *mod) {} #endif /* CONFIG_GENERIC_BUG */ +#ifdef RETPOLINE +extern bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline); +#else +static inline bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline) +{ + return true; +} +#endif + #ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG static inline bool module_sig_ok(struct module *module) { --- a/kernel/module.c +++ b/kernel/module.c @@ -2863,6 +2863,15 @@ static int check_modinfo_livepatch(struc } #endif /* CONFIG_LIVEPATCH */ +static void check_modinfo_retpoline(struct module *mod, struct load_info *info) +{ + if (retpoline_module_ok(get_modinfo(info, "retpoline"))) + return; + + pr_warn("%s: loading module not compiled with retpoline compiler.\n", + mod->name); +} + /* Sets info->hdr and info->len. */ static int copy_module_from_user(const void __user *umod, unsigned long len, struct load_info *info) @@ -3029,6 +3038,8 @@ static int check_modinfo(struct module * add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_OOT_MODULE, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK); } + check_modinfo_retpoline(mod, info); + if (get_modinfo(info, "staging")) { add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_CRAP, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK); pr_warn("%s: module is from the staging directory, the quality " --- a/scripts/mod/modpost.c +++ b/scripts/mod/modpost.c @@ -2165,6 +2165,14 @@ static void add_intree_flag(struct buffe buf_printf(b, "\nMODULE_INFO(intree, \"Y\");\n"); } +/* Cannot check for assembler */ +static void add_retpoline(struct buffer *b) +{ + buf_printf(b, "\n#ifdef RETPOLINE\n"); + buf_printf(b, "MODULE_INFO(retpoline, \"Y\");\n"); + buf_printf(b, "#endif\n"); +} + static void add_staging_flag(struct buffer *b, const char *name) { static const char *staging_dir = "drivers/staging"; @@ -2506,6 +2514,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) err |= check_modname_len(mod); add_header(&buf, mod); add_intree_flag(&buf, !external_module); + add_retpoline(&buf); add_staging_flag(&buf, mod->name); err |= add_versions(&buf, mod); add_depends(&buf, mod, modules); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ak(a)linux.intel.com are queue-4.15/x86pti_Do_not_enable_PTI_on_CPUs_which_are_not_vulnerable_to_Meltdown.patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeature_Blacklist_SPEC_CTRLPRED_CMD_on_early_Spectre_v2_microcodes.patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeatures_Add_Intel_feature_bits_for_Speculation_Control.patch queue-4.15/KVM_VMX_Make_indirect_call_speculation_safe.patch queue-4.15/x86msr_Add_definitions_for_new_speculation_control_MSRs.patch queue-4.15/x86alternative_Print_unadorned_pointers.patch queue-4.15/x86cpubugs_Make_retpoline_module_warning_conditional.patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeatures_Add_CPUID_7_EDX_CPUID_leaf.patch queue-4.15/x86bugs_Drop_one_mitigation_from_dmesg.patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeatures_Add_AMD_feature_bits_for_Speculation_Control.patch queue-4.15/moduleretpoline_Warn_about_missing_retpoline_in_module.patch queue-4.15/x86speculation_Add_basic_IBPB_(Indirect_Branch_Prediction_Barrier)_support.patch queue-4.15/x86speculation_Simplify_indirect_branch_prediction_barrier().patch queue-4.15/x86nospec_Fix_header_guards_names.patch queue-4.15/KVM_x86_Make_indirect_calls_in_emulator_speculation_safe.patch queue-4.15/x86retpoline_Simplify_vmexit_fill_RSB().patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeatures_Clean_up_Spectre_v2_related_CPUID_flags.patch

7 years, 3 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "KVM: VMX: Make indirect call speculation safe" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled KVM: VMX: Make indirect call speculation safe to the 4.15-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: KVM_VMX_Make_indirect_call_speculation_safe.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.15 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. Subject: KVM: VMX: Make indirect call speculation safe From: Peter Zijlstra peterz(a)infradead.org Date: Thu Jan 25 10:58:14 2018 +0100 From: Peter Zijlstra peterz(a)infradead.org commit c940a3fb1e2e9b7d03228ab28f375fb5a47ff699 Replace indirect call with CALL_NOSPEC. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz(a)infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange(a)redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj(a)intel.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima(a)intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2(a)infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: rga(a)amazon.de Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)intel.com> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick(a)intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Cc: Jason Baron <jbaron(a)akamai.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Cc: Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven(a)intel.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180125095843.645776917@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c @@ -9129,14 +9129,14 @@ static void vmx_handle_external_intr(str #endif "pushf\n\t" __ASM_SIZE(push) " $%c[cs]\n\t" - "call *%[entry]\n\t" + CALL_NOSPEC : #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 [sp]"=&r"(tmp), #endif ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT : - [entry]"r"(entry), + THUNK_TARGET(entry), [ss]"i"(__KERNEL_DS), [cs]"i"(__KERNEL_CS) ); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from peterz(a)infradead.org are queue-4.15/x86pti_Do_not_enable_PTI_on_CPUs_which_are_not_vulnerable_to_Meltdown.patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeature_Blacklist_SPEC_CTRLPRED_CMD_on_early_Spectre_v2_microcodes.patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeatures_Add_Intel_feature_bits_for_Speculation_Control.patch queue-4.15/KVM_VMX_Make_indirect_call_speculation_safe.patch queue-4.15/x86msr_Add_definitions_for_new_speculation_control_MSRs.patch queue-4.15/x86alternative_Print_unadorned_pointers.patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeatures_Add_CPUID_7_EDX_CPUID_leaf.patch queue-4.15/x86bugs_Drop_one_mitigation_from_dmesg.patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeatures_Add_AMD_feature_bits_for_Speculation_Control.patch queue-4.15/x86speculation_Add_basic_IBPB_(Indirect_Branch_Prediction_Barrier)_support.patch queue-4.15/x86speculation_Simplify_indirect_branch_prediction_barrier().patch queue-4.15/x86nospec_Fix_header_guards_names.patch queue-4.15/KVM_x86_Make_indirect_calls_in_emulator_speculation_safe.patch queue-4.15/x86retpoline_Simplify_vmexit_fill_RSB().patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeatures_Clean_up_Spectre_v2_related_CPUID_flags.patch

7 years, 3 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/speculation: Add basic IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier) support" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/speculation: Add basic IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier) support to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86speculation_Add_basic_IBPB_(Indirect_Branch_Prediction_Barrier)_support.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. Subject: x86/speculation: Add basic IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier) support From: David Woodhouse dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk Date: Thu Jan 25 16:14:15 2018 +0000 From: David Woodhouse dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk commit 20ffa1caecca4db8f79fe665acdeaa5af815a24d Expose indirect_branch_prediction_barrier() for use in subsequent patches. [ tglx: Add IBPB status to spectre_v2 sysfs file ] Co-developed-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed(a)amazon.de> Signed-off-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed(a)amazon.de> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Cc: gnomes(a)lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: ak(a)linux.intel.com Cc: ashok.raj(a)intel.com Cc: dave.hansen(a)intel.com Cc: arjan(a)linux.intel.com Cc: torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org Cc: peterz(a)infradead.org Cc: bp(a)alien8.de Cc: pbonzini(a)redhat.com Cc: tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com Cc: gregkh(a)linux-foundation.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1516896855-7642-8-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 13 +++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 10 +++++++++- 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -210,6 +210,8 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_MBA ( 7*32+18) /* Memory Bandwidth Allocation */ #define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW ( 7*32+19) /* Fill RSB on context switches */ +#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB ( 7*32+21) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier enabled*/ + /* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */ #define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW ( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */ #define X86_FEATURE_VNMI ( 8*32+ 1) /* Intel Virtual NMI */ --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -218,5 +218,18 @@ static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void) #endif } +static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void) +{ + asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("", + "movl %[msr], %%ecx\n\t" + "movl %[val], %%eax\n\t" + "movl $0, %%edx\n\t" + "wrmsr", + X86_FEATURE_IBPB) + : : [msr] "i" (MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD), + [val] "i" (PRED_CMD_IBPB) + : "eax", "ecx", "edx", "memory"); +} + #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ #endif /* __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__ */ --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -263,6 +263,13 @@ retpoline_auto: setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW); pr_info("Filling RSB on context switch\n"); } + + /* Initialize Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier if supported */ + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) || + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_PRED_CMD)) { + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB); + pr_info("Enabling Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n"); + } } #undef pr_fmt @@ -292,7 +299,8 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct devic if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2)) return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); - return sprintf(buf, "%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled], + return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled], + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) ? ", IPBP" : "", spectre_v2_bad_module ? " - vulnerable module loaded" : ""); } #endif Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from karahmed(a)amazon.de are queue-4.14/x86pti_Do_not_enable_PTI_on_CPUs_which_are_not_vulnerable_to_Meltdown.patch queue-4.14/x86cpufeature_Blacklist_SPEC_CTRLPRED_CMD_on_early_Spectre_v2_microcodes.patch queue-4.14/x86cpufeatures_Add_Intel_feature_bits_for_Speculation_Control.patch queue-4.14/x86msr_Add_definitions_for_new_speculation_control_MSRs.patch queue-4.14/x86cpufeatures_Add_CPUID_7_EDX_CPUID_leaf.patch queue-4.14/x86cpufeatures_Add_AMD_feature_bits_for_Speculation_Control.patch queue-4.14/x86speculation_Add_basic_IBPB_(Indirect_Branch_Prediction_Barrier)_support.patch queue-4.14/x86speculation_Simplify_indirect_branch_prediction_barrier().patch queue-4.14/x86retpoline_Simplify_vmexit_fill_RSB().patch queue-4.14/x86cpufeatures_Clean_up_Spectre_v2_related_CPUID_flags.patch

7 years, 3 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/speculation: Simplify indirect_branch_prediction_barrier()" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/speculation: Simplify indirect_branch_prediction_barrier() to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86speculation_Simplify_indirect_branch_prediction_barrier().patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. Subject: x86/speculation: Simplify indirect_branch_prediction_barrier() From: Borislav Petkov bp(a)suse.de Date: Sat Jan 27 16:24:34 2018 +0000 From: Borislav Petkov bp(a)suse.de commit 64e16720ea0879f8ab4547e3b9758936d483909b Make it all a function which does the WRMSR instead of having a hairy inline asm. [dwmw2: export it, fix CONFIG_RETPOLINE issues] Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: ak(a)linux.intel.com Cc: dave.hansen(a)intel.com Cc: karahmed(a)amazon.de Cc: arjan(a)linux.intel.com Cc: torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org Cc: peterz(a)infradead.org Cc: bp(a)alien8.de Cc: pbonzini(a)redhat.com Cc: tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com Cc: gregkh(a)linux-foundation.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517070274-12128-4-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 13 ++++--------- arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 3 +++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 6 ++++++ 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -164,15 +164,10 @@ static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void) static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void) { - asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("", - "movl %[msr], %%ecx\n\t" - "movl %[val], %%eax\n\t" - "movl $0, %%edx\n\t" - "wrmsr", - X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB) - : : [msr] "i" (MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD), - [val] "i" (PRED_CMD_IBPB) - : "eax", "ecx", "edx", "memory"); + alternative_input("", + "call __ibp_barrier", + X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB, + ASM_NO_INPUT_CLOBBER("eax", "ecx", "edx", "memory")); } #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h @@ -970,4 +970,7 @@ bool xen_set_default_idle(void); void stop_this_cpu(void *dummy); void df_debug(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code); + +void __ibp_barrier(void); + #endif /* _ASM_X86_PROCESSOR_H */ --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -311,3 +311,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct devic spectre_v2_module_string()); } #endif + +void __ibp_barrier(void) +{ + __wrmsr(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_IBPB, 0); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__ibp_barrier); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from bp(a)suse.de are queue-4.14/x86pti_Do_not_enable_PTI_on_CPUs_which_are_not_vulnerable_to_Meltdown.patch queue-4.14/x86cpufeatures_Add_Intel_feature_bits_for_Speculation_Control.patch queue-4.14/x86alternative_Print_unadorned_pointers.patch queue-4.14/x86cpufeatures_Add_CPUID_7_EDX_CPUID_leaf.patch queue-4.14/x86bugs_Drop_one_mitigation_from_dmesg.patch queue-4.14/x86speculation_Simplify_indirect_branch_prediction_barrier().patch queue-4.14/x86nospec_Fix_header_guards_names.patch queue-4.14/x86retpoline_Simplify_vmexit_fill_RSB().patch queue-4.14/x86cpufeatures_Clean_up_Spectre_v2_related_CPUID_flags.patch

7 years, 3 months

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