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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "objtool: Allow alternatives to be ignored" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled objtool: Allow alternatives to be ignored to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: objtool-allow-alternatives-to-be-ignored.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 258c76059cece01bebae098e81bacb1af2edad17 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2018 21:46:24 +0000 Subject: objtool: Allow alternatives to be ignored From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> commit 258c76059cece01bebae098e81bacb1af2edad17 upstream. Getting objtool to understand retpolines is going to be a bit of a challenge. For now, take advantage of the fact that retpolines are patched in with alternatives. Just read the original (sane) non-alternative instruction, and ignore the patched-in retpoline. This allows objtool to understand the control flow *around* the retpoline, even if it can't yet follow what's inside. This means the ORC unwinder will fail to unwind from inside a retpoline, but will work fine otherwise. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: gnomes(a)lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel(a)redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos(a)kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook(a)google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt(a)google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-3-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.… [dwmw2: Applies to tools/objtool/builtin-check.c not check.[ch]] Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- tools/objtool/builtin-check.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 57 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) --- a/tools/objtool/builtin-check.c +++ b/tools/objtool/builtin-check.c @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ struct instruction { unsigned int len, state; unsigned char type; unsigned long immediate; - bool alt_group, visited; + bool alt_group, visited, ignore_alts; struct symbol *call_dest; struct instruction *jump_dest; struct list_head alts; @@ -353,6 +353,40 @@ static void add_ignores(struct objtool_f } /* + * FIXME: For now, just ignore any alternatives which add retpolines. This is + * a temporary hack, as it doesn't allow ORC to unwind from inside a retpoline. + * But it at least allows objtool to understand the control flow *around* the + * retpoline. + */ +static int add_nospec_ignores(struct objtool_file *file) +{ + struct section *sec; + struct rela *rela; + struct instruction *insn; + + sec = find_section_by_name(file->elf, ".rela.discard.nospec"); + if (!sec) + return 0; + + list_for_each_entry(rela, &sec->rela_list, list) { + if (rela->sym->type != STT_SECTION) { + WARN("unexpected relocation symbol type in %s", sec->name); + return -1; + } + + insn = find_insn(file, rela->sym->sec, rela->addend); + if (!insn) { + WARN("bad .discard.nospec entry"); + return -1; + } + + insn->ignore_alts = true; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* * Find the destination instructions for all jumps. */ static int add_jump_destinations(struct objtool_file *file) @@ -435,11 +469,18 @@ static int add_call_destinations(struct dest_off = insn->offset + insn->len + insn->immediate; insn->call_dest = find_symbol_by_offset(insn->sec, dest_off); + /* + * FIXME: Thanks to retpolines, it's now considered + * normal for a function to call within itself. So + * disable this warning for now. + */ +#if 0 if (!insn->call_dest) { WARN_FUNC("can't find call dest symbol at offset 0x%lx", insn->sec, insn->offset, dest_off); return -1; } +#endif } else if (rela->sym->type == STT_SECTION) { insn->call_dest = find_symbol_by_offset(rela->sym->sec, rela->addend+4); @@ -601,12 +642,6 @@ static int add_special_section_alts(stru return ret; list_for_each_entry_safe(special_alt, tmp, &special_alts, list) { - alt = malloc(sizeof(*alt)); - if (!alt) { - WARN("malloc failed"); - ret = -1; - goto out; - } orig_insn = find_insn(file, special_alt->orig_sec, special_alt->orig_off); @@ -617,6 +652,10 @@ static int add_special_section_alts(stru goto out; } + /* Ignore retpoline alternatives. */ + if (orig_insn->ignore_alts) + continue; + new_insn = NULL; if (!special_alt->group || special_alt->new_len) { new_insn = find_insn(file, special_alt->new_sec, @@ -642,6 +681,13 @@ static int add_special_section_alts(stru goto out; } + alt = malloc(sizeof(*alt)); + if (!alt) { + WARN("malloc failed"); + ret = -1; + goto out; + } + alt->insn = new_insn; list_add_tail(&alt->list, &orig_insn->alts); @@ -861,6 +907,10 @@ static int decode_sections(struct objtoo add_ignores(file); + ret = add_nospec_ignores(file); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = add_jump_destinations(file); if (ret) return ret; Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from jpoimboe(a)redhat.com are queue-4.9/x86-spectre-add-boot-time-option-to-select-spectre-v2-mitigation.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-irq32-convert-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/objtool-detect-jumps-to-retpoline-thunks.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-hyperv-convert-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-entry-convert-entry-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/x86-asm-use-register-variable-to-get-stack-pointer-value.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-x86_bug_cpu_insecure.patch queue-4.9/objtool-modules-discard-objtool-annotation-sections-for-modules.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-make-cpu-bugs-sticky.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-ftrace-convert-ftrace-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/objtool-allow-alternatives-to-be-ignored.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-crypto-convert-crypto-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/selftests-x86-add-test_vsyscall.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-xen-convert-xen-hypercall-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpu-merge-bugs.c-and-bugs_64.c.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-checksum32-convert-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-fill-return-stack-buffer-on-vmexit.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-remove-compile-time-warning.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-add-initial-retpoline-support.patch

7 years, 1 month

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/cpu: Implement CPU vulnerabilites sysfs functions" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/cpu: Implement CPU vulnerabilites sysfs functions to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-cpu-implement-cpu-vulnerabilites-sysfs-functions.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 61dc0f555b5c761cdafb0ba5bd41ecf22d68a4c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Date: Sun, 7 Jan 2018 22:48:01 +0100 Subject: x86/cpu: Implement CPU vulnerabilites sysfs functions From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> commit 61dc0f555b5c761cdafb0ba5bd41ecf22d68a4c4 upstream. Implement the CPU vulnerabilty show functions for meltdown, spectre_v1 and spectre_v2. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk(a)oracle.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon(a)arm.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)alien8.de> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180107214913.177414879@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+) --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ config X86 select GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS_MIN_ADJUST select GENERIC_CMOS_UPDATE select GENERIC_CPU_AUTOPROBE + select GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES select GENERIC_EARLY_IOREMAP select GENERIC_FIND_FIRST_BIT select GENERIC_IOMAP --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ */ #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/utsname.h> +#include <linux/cpu.h> #include <asm/bugs.h> #include <asm/processor.h> #include <asm/processor-flags.h> @@ -49,3 +50,31 @@ void __init check_bugs(void) fpu__init_check_bugs(); } + +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS +ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) +{ + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN)) + return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI)) + return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: PTI\n"); + return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n"); +} + +ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) +{ + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1)) + return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); + return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n"); +} + +ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) +{ + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2)) + return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); + return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n"); +} +#endif Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from tglx(a)linutronix.de are queue-4.4/x86-mm-pat-dev-mem-remove-superfluous-error-message.patch queue-4.4/x86-microcode-intel-extend-bdw-late-loading-with-a-revision-check.patch queue-4.4/x86-alternatives-add-missing-n-at-end-of-alternative-inline-asm.patch queue-4.4/sysfs-cpu-fix-typos-in-vulnerability-documentation.patch queue-4.4/locking-mutex-allow-next-waiter-lockless-wakeup.patch queue-4.4/x86-vsdo-fix-build-on-paravirt_clock-y-kvm_guest-n.patch queue-4.4/x86-pti-efi-broken-conversion-from-efi-to-kernel-page-table.patch queue-4.4/x86-documentation-add-pti-description.patch queue-4.4/x86-acpi-handle-sci-interrupts-above-legacy-space-gracefully.patch queue-4.4/x86-cpu-implement-cpu-vulnerabilites-sysfs-functions.patch queue-4.4/futex-replace-barrier-in-unqueue_me-with-read_once.patch queue-4.4/selftests-x86-add-test_vsyscall.patch queue-4.4/sysfs-cpu-add-vulnerability-folder.patch queue-4.4/x86-acpi-reduce-code-duplication-in-mp_override_legacy_irq.patch queue-4.4/x86-alternatives-fix-optimize_nops-checking.patch

7 years, 1 month

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/alternatives: Fix optimize_nops() checking" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/alternatives: Fix optimize_nops() checking to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-alternatives-fix-optimize_nops-checking.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 612e8e9350fd19cae6900cf36ea0c6892d1a0dca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de> Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2018 12:28:16 +0100 Subject: x86/alternatives: Fix optimize_nops() checking From: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de> commit 612e8e9350fd19cae6900cf36ea0c6892d1a0dca upstream. The alternatives code checks only the first byte whether it is a NOP, but with NOPs in front of the payload and having actual instructions after it breaks the "optimized' test. Make sure to scan all bytes before deciding to optimize the NOPs in there. Reported-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2(a)infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos(a)kernel.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi(a)firstfloor.org> Cc: Andrew Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt(a)google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180110112815.mgciyf5acwacphkq@pd.tnic Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c @@ -339,9 +339,12 @@ done: static void __init_or_module optimize_nops(struct alt_instr *a, u8 *instr) { unsigned long flags; + int i; - if (instr[0] != 0x90) - return; + for (i = 0; i < a->padlen; i++) { + if (instr[i] != 0x90) + return; + } local_irq_save(flags); add_nops(instr + (a->instrlen - a->padlen), a->padlen); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from bp(a)suse.de are queue-4.4/x86-microcode-intel-extend-bdw-late-loading-with-a-revision-check.patch queue-4.4/x86-alternatives-fix-optimize_nops-checking.patch

7 years, 1 month

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/alternatives: Add missing '\n' at end of ALTERNATIVE inline asm" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/alternatives: Add missing '\n' at end of ALTERNATIVE inline asm to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-alternatives-add-missing-n-at-end-of-alternative-inline-asm.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From b9e705ef7cfaf22db0daab91ad3cd33b0fa32eb9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2018 14:37:05 +0000 Subject: x86/alternatives: Add missing '\n' at end of ALTERNATIVE inline asm From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> commit b9e705ef7cfaf22db0daab91ad3cd33b0fa32eb9 upstream. Where an ALTERNATIVE is used in the middle of an inline asm block, this would otherwise lead to the following instruction being appended directly to the trailing ".popsection", and a failed compile. Fixes: 9cebed423c84 ("x86, alternative: Use .pushsection/.popsection") Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: gnomes(a)lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel(a)redhat.com> Cc: ak(a)linux.intel.com Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt(a)google.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos(a)kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook(a)google.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180104143710.8961-8-dwmw@amazon.co.uk Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h @@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ static inline int alternatives_text_rese ".popsection\n" \ ".pushsection .altinstr_replacement, \"ax\"\n" \ ALTINSTR_REPLACEMENT(newinstr, feature, 1) \ - ".popsection" + ".popsection\n" #define ALTERNATIVE_2(oldinstr, newinstr1, feature1, newinstr2, feature2)\ OLDINSTR_2(oldinstr, 1, 2) \ @@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ static inline int alternatives_text_rese ".pushsection .altinstr_replacement, \"ax\"\n" \ ALTINSTR_REPLACEMENT(newinstr1, feature1, 1) \ ALTINSTR_REPLACEMENT(newinstr2, feature2, 2) \ - ".popsection" + ".popsection\n" /* * This must be included *after* the definition of ALTERNATIVE due to Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk are queue-4.4/x86-alternatives-add-missing-n-at-end-of-alternative-inline-asm.patch queue-4.4/sysfs-cpu-fix-typos-in-vulnerability-documentation.patch queue-4.4/x86-cpu-implement-cpu-vulnerabilites-sysfs-functions.patch queue-4.4/sysfs-cpu-add-vulnerability-folder.patch queue-4.4/x86-alternatives-fix-optimize_nops-checking.patch

7 years, 1 month

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "sysfs/cpu: Fix typos in vulnerability documentation" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled sysfs/cpu: Fix typos in vulnerability documentation to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: sysfs-cpu-fix-typos-in-vulnerability-documentation.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 9ecccfaa7cb5249bd31bdceb93fcf5bedb8a24d8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2018 15:02:51 +0000 Subject: sysfs/cpu: Fix typos in vulnerability documentation From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> commit 9ecccfaa7cb5249bd31bdceb93fcf5bedb8a24d8 upstream. Fixes: 87590ce6e ("sysfs/cpu: Add vulnerability folder") Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu @@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ What: /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabi /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1 /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2 -Date: Januar 2018 +Date: January 2018 Contact: Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel(a)vger.kernel.org> Description: Information about CPU vulnerabilities @@ -286,4 +286,4 @@ Description: Information about CPU vulne "Not affected" CPU is not affected by the vulnerability "Vulnerable" CPU is affected and no mitigation in effect - "Mitigation: $M" CPU is affetcted and mitigation $M is in effect + "Mitigation: $M" CPU is affected and mitigation $M is in effect Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk are queue-4.4/x86-alternatives-add-missing-n-at-end-of-alternative-inline-asm.patch queue-4.4/sysfs-cpu-fix-typos-in-vulnerability-documentation.patch queue-4.4/x86-cpu-implement-cpu-vulnerabilites-sysfs-functions.patch queue-4.4/sysfs-cpu-add-vulnerability-folder.patch queue-4.4/x86-alternatives-fix-optimize_nops-checking.patch

7 years, 1 month

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "selftests/x86: Add test_vsyscall" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled selftests/x86: Add test_vsyscall to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: selftests-x86-add-test_vsyscall.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 352909b49ba0d74929b96af6dfbefc854ab6ebb5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2018 17:16:51 -0800 Subject: selftests/x86: Add test_vsyscall From: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> commit 352909b49ba0d74929b96af6dfbefc854ab6ebb5 upstream. This tests that the vsyscall entries do what they're expected to do. It also confirms that attempts to read the vsyscall page behave as expected. If changes are made to the vsyscall code or its memory map handling, running this test in all three of vsyscall=none, vsyscall=emulate, and vsyscall=native are helpful. (Because it's easy, this also compares the vsyscall results to their vDSO equivalents.) Note to KAISER backporters: please test this under all three vsyscall modes. Also, in the emulate and native modes, make sure that test_vsyscall_64 agrees with the command line or config option as to which mode you're in. It's quite easy to mess up the kernel such that native mode accidentally emulates or vice versa. Greg, etc: please backport this to all your Meltdown-patched kernels. It'll help make sure the patches didn't regress vsyscalls. CSigned-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa(a)zytor.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd(a)google.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross(a)suse.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/2b9c5a174c1d60fd7774461d518aa75598b1d8fd.151571955… Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- tools/testing/selftests/x86/test_vsyscall.c | 500 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 500 insertions(+) --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/test_vsyscall.c @@ -0,0 +1,500 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ + +#define _GNU_SOURCE + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <sys/time.h> +#include <time.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <sys/syscall.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <dlfcn.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <inttypes.h> +#include <signal.h> +#include <sys/ucontext.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <err.h> +#include <sched.h> +#include <stdbool.h> +#include <setjmp.h> + +#ifdef __x86_64__ +# define VSYS(x) (x) +#else +# define VSYS(x) 0 +#endif + +#ifndef SYS_getcpu +# ifdef __x86_64__ +# define SYS_getcpu 309 +# else +# define SYS_getcpu 318 +# endif +#endif + +static void sethandler(int sig, void (*handler)(int, siginfo_t *, void *), + int flags) +{ + struct sigaction sa; + memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa)); + sa.sa_sigaction = handler; + sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO | flags; + sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask); + if (sigaction(sig, &sa, 0)) + err(1, "sigaction"); +} + +/* vsyscalls and vDSO */ +bool should_read_vsyscall = false; + +typedef long (*gtod_t)(struct timeval *tv, struct timezone *tz); +gtod_t vgtod = (gtod_t)VSYS(0xffffffffff600000); +gtod_t vdso_gtod; + +typedef int (*vgettime_t)(clockid_t, struct timespec *); +vgettime_t vdso_gettime; + +typedef long (*time_func_t)(time_t *t); +time_func_t vtime = (time_func_t)VSYS(0xffffffffff600400); +time_func_t vdso_time; + +typedef long (*getcpu_t)(unsigned *, unsigned *, void *); +getcpu_t vgetcpu = (getcpu_t)VSYS(0xffffffffff600800); +getcpu_t vdso_getcpu; + +static void init_vdso(void) +{ + void *vdso = dlopen("linux-vdso.so.1", RTLD_LAZY | RTLD_LOCAL | RTLD_NOLOAD); + if (!vdso) + vdso = dlopen("linux-gate.so.1", RTLD_LAZY | RTLD_LOCAL | RTLD_NOLOAD); + if (!vdso) { + printf("[WARN]\tfailed to find vDSO\n"); + return; + } + + vdso_gtod = (gtod_t)dlsym(vdso, "__vdso_gettimeofday"); + if (!vdso_gtod) + printf("[WARN]\tfailed to find gettimeofday in vDSO\n"); + + vdso_gettime = (vgettime_t)dlsym(vdso, "__vdso_clock_gettime"); + if (!vdso_gettime) + printf("[WARN]\tfailed to find clock_gettime in vDSO\n"); + + vdso_time = (time_func_t)dlsym(vdso, "__vdso_time"); + if (!vdso_time) + printf("[WARN]\tfailed to find time in vDSO\n"); + + vdso_getcpu = (getcpu_t)dlsym(vdso, "__vdso_getcpu"); + if (!vdso_getcpu) { + /* getcpu() was never wired up in the 32-bit vDSO. */ + printf("[%s]\tfailed to find getcpu in vDSO\n", + sizeof(long) == 8 ? "WARN" : "NOTE"); + } +} + +static int init_vsys(void) +{ +#ifdef __x86_64__ + int nerrs = 0; + FILE *maps; + char line[128]; + bool found = false; + + maps = fopen("/proc/self/maps", "r"); + if (!maps) { + printf("[WARN]\tCould not open /proc/self/maps -- assuming vsyscall is r-x\n"); + should_read_vsyscall = true; + return 0; + } + + while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), maps)) { + char r, x; + void *start, *end; + char name[128]; + if (sscanf(line, "%p-%p %c-%cp %*x %*x:%*x %*u %s", + &start, &end, &r, &x, name) != 5) + continue; + + if (strcmp(name, "[vsyscall]")) + continue; + + printf("\tvsyscall map: %s", line); + + if (start != (void *)0xffffffffff600000 || + end != (void *)0xffffffffff601000) { + printf("[FAIL]\taddress range is nonsense\n"); + nerrs++; + } + + printf("\tvsyscall permissions are %c-%c\n", r, x); + should_read_vsyscall = (r == 'r'); + if (x != 'x') { + vgtod = NULL; + vtime = NULL; + vgetcpu = NULL; + } + + found = true; + break; + } + + fclose(maps); + + if (!found) { + printf("\tno vsyscall map in /proc/self/maps\n"); + should_read_vsyscall = false; + vgtod = NULL; + vtime = NULL; + vgetcpu = NULL; + } + + return nerrs; +#else + return 0; +#endif +} + +/* syscalls */ +static inline long sys_gtod(struct timeval *tv, struct timezone *tz) +{ + return syscall(SYS_gettimeofday, tv, tz); +} + +static inline int sys_clock_gettime(clockid_t id, struct timespec *ts) +{ + return syscall(SYS_clock_gettime, id, ts); +} + +static inline long sys_time(time_t *t) +{ + return syscall(SYS_time, t); +} + +static inline long sys_getcpu(unsigned * cpu, unsigned * node, + void* cache) +{ + return syscall(SYS_getcpu, cpu, node, cache); +} + +static jmp_buf jmpbuf; + +static void sigsegv(int sig, siginfo_t *info, void *ctx_void) +{ + siglongjmp(jmpbuf, 1); +} + +static double tv_diff(const struct timeval *a, const struct timeval *b) +{ + return (double)(a->tv_sec - b->tv_sec) + + (double)((int)a->tv_usec - (int)b->tv_usec) * 1e-6; +} + +static int check_gtod(const struct timeval *tv_sys1, + const struct timeval *tv_sys2, + const struct timezone *tz_sys, + const char *which, + const struct timeval *tv_other, + const struct timezone *tz_other) +{ + int nerrs = 0; + double d1, d2; + + if (tz_other && (tz_sys->tz_minuteswest != tz_other->tz_minuteswest || tz_sys->tz_dsttime != tz_other->tz_dsttime)) { + printf("[FAIL] %s tz mismatch\n", which); + nerrs++; + } + + d1 = tv_diff(tv_other, tv_sys1); + d2 = tv_diff(tv_sys2, tv_other); + printf("\t%s time offsets: %lf %lf\n", which, d1, d2); + + if (d1 < 0 || d2 < 0) { + printf("[FAIL]\t%s time was inconsistent with the syscall\n", which); + nerrs++; + } else { + printf("[OK]\t%s gettimeofday()'s timeval was okay\n", which); + } + + return nerrs; +} + +static int test_gtod(void) +{ + struct timeval tv_sys1, tv_sys2, tv_vdso, tv_vsys; + struct timezone tz_sys, tz_vdso, tz_vsys; + long ret_vdso = -1; + long ret_vsys = -1; + int nerrs = 0; + + printf("[RUN]\ttest gettimeofday()\n"); + + if (sys_gtod(&tv_sys1, &tz_sys) != 0) + err(1, "syscall gettimeofday"); + if (vdso_gtod) + ret_vdso = vdso_gtod(&tv_vdso, &tz_vdso); + if (vgtod) + ret_vsys = vgtod(&tv_vsys, &tz_vsys); + if (sys_gtod(&tv_sys2, &tz_sys) != 0) + err(1, "syscall gettimeofday"); + + if (vdso_gtod) { + if (ret_vdso == 0) { + nerrs += check_gtod(&tv_sys1, &tv_sys2, &tz_sys, "vDSO", &tv_vdso, &tz_vdso); + } else { + printf("[FAIL]\tvDSO gettimeofday() failed: %ld\n", ret_vdso); + nerrs++; + } + } + + if (vgtod) { + if (ret_vsys == 0) { + nerrs += check_gtod(&tv_sys1, &tv_sys2, &tz_sys, "vsyscall", &tv_vsys, &tz_vsys); + } else { + printf("[FAIL]\tvsys gettimeofday() failed: %ld\n", ret_vsys); + nerrs++; + } + } + + return nerrs; +} + +static int test_time(void) { + int nerrs = 0; + + printf("[RUN]\ttest time()\n"); + long t_sys1, t_sys2, t_vdso = 0, t_vsys = 0; + long t2_sys1 = -1, t2_sys2 = -1, t2_vdso = -1, t2_vsys = -1; + t_sys1 = sys_time(&t2_sys1); + if (vdso_time) + t_vdso = vdso_time(&t2_vdso); + if (vtime) + t_vsys = vtime(&t2_vsys); + t_sys2 = sys_time(&t2_sys2); + if (t_sys1 < 0 || t_sys1 != t2_sys1 || t_sys2 < 0 || t_sys2 != t2_sys2) { + printf("[FAIL]\tsyscall failed (ret1:%ld output1:%ld ret2:%ld output2:%ld)\n", t_sys1, t2_sys1, t_sys2, t2_sys2); + nerrs++; + return nerrs; + } + + if (vdso_time) { + if (t_vdso < 0 || t_vdso != t2_vdso) { + printf("[FAIL]\tvDSO failed (ret:%ld output:%ld)\n", t_vdso, t2_vdso); + nerrs++; + } else if (t_vdso < t_sys1 || t_vdso > t_sys2) { + printf("[FAIL]\tvDSO returned the wrong time (%ld %ld %ld)\n", t_sys1, t_vdso, t_sys2); + nerrs++; + } else { + printf("[OK]\tvDSO time() is okay\n"); + } + } + + if (vtime) { + if (t_vsys < 0 || t_vsys != t2_vsys) { + printf("[FAIL]\tvsyscall failed (ret:%ld output:%ld)\n", t_vsys, t2_vsys); + nerrs++; + } else if (t_vsys < t_sys1 || t_vsys > t_sys2) { + printf("[FAIL]\tvsyscall returned the wrong time (%ld %ld %ld)\n", t_sys1, t_vsys, t_sys2); + nerrs++; + } else { + printf("[OK]\tvsyscall time() is okay\n"); + } + } + + return nerrs; +} + +static int test_getcpu(int cpu) +{ + int nerrs = 0; + long ret_sys, ret_vdso = -1, ret_vsys = -1; + + printf("[RUN]\tgetcpu() on CPU %d\n", cpu); + + cpu_set_t cpuset; + CPU_ZERO(&cpuset); + CPU_SET(cpu, &cpuset); + if (sched_setaffinity(0, sizeof(cpuset), &cpuset) != 0) { + printf("[SKIP]\tfailed to force CPU %d\n", cpu); + return nerrs; + } + + unsigned cpu_sys, cpu_vdso, cpu_vsys, node_sys, node_vdso, node_vsys; + unsigned node = 0; + bool have_node = false; + ret_sys = sys_getcpu(&cpu_sys, &node_sys, 0); + if (vdso_getcpu) + ret_vdso = vdso_getcpu(&cpu_vdso, &node_vdso, 0); + if (vgetcpu) + ret_vsys = vgetcpu(&cpu_vsys, &node_vsys, 0); + + if (ret_sys == 0) { + if (cpu_sys != cpu) { + printf("[FAIL]\tsyscall reported CPU %hu but should be %d\n", cpu_sys, cpu); + nerrs++; + } + + have_node = true; + node = node_sys; + } + + if (vdso_getcpu) { + if (ret_vdso) { + printf("[FAIL]\tvDSO getcpu() failed\n"); + nerrs++; + } else { + if (!have_node) { + have_node = true; + node = node_vdso; + } + + if (cpu_vdso != cpu) { + printf("[FAIL]\tvDSO reported CPU %hu but should be %d\n", cpu_vdso, cpu); + nerrs++; + } else { + printf("[OK]\tvDSO reported correct CPU\n"); + } + + if (node_vdso != node) { + printf("[FAIL]\tvDSO reported node %hu but should be %hu\n", node_vdso, node); + nerrs++; + } else { + printf("[OK]\tvDSO reported correct node\n"); + } + } + } + + if (vgetcpu) { + if (ret_vsys) { + printf("[FAIL]\tvsyscall getcpu() failed\n"); + nerrs++; + } else { + if (!have_node) { + have_node = true; + node = node_vsys; + } + + if (cpu_vsys != cpu) { + printf("[FAIL]\tvsyscall reported CPU %hu but should be %d\n", cpu_vsys, cpu); + nerrs++; + } else { + printf("[OK]\tvsyscall reported correct CPU\n"); + } + + if (node_vsys != node) { + printf("[FAIL]\tvsyscall reported node %hu but should be %hu\n", node_vsys, node); + nerrs++; + } else { + printf("[OK]\tvsyscall reported correct node\n"); + } + } + } + + return nerrs; +} + +static int test_vsys_r(void) +{ +#ifdef __x86_64__ + printf("[RUN]\tChecking read access to the vsyscall page\n"); + bool can_read; + if (sigsetjmp(jmpbuf, 1) == 0) { + *(volatile int *)0xffffffffff600000; + can_read = true; + } else { + can_read = false; + } + + if (can_read && !should_read_vsyscall) { + printf("[FAIL]\tWe have read access, but we shouldn't\n"); + return 1; + } else if (!can_read && should_read_vsyscall) { + printf("[FAIL]\tWe don't have read access, but we should\n"); + return 1; + } else { + printf("[OK]\tgot expected result\n"); + } +#endif + + return 0; +} + + +#ifdef __x86_64__ +#define X86_EFLAGS_TF (1UL << 8) +static volatile sig_atomic_t num_vsyscall_traps; + +static unsigned long get_eflags(void) +{ + unsigned long eflags; + asm volatile ("pushfq\n\tpopq %0" : "=rm" (eflags)); + return eflags; +} + +static void set_eflags(unsigned long eflags) +{ + asm volatile ("pushq %0\n\tpopfq" : : "rm" (eflags) : "flags"); +} + +static void sigtrap(int sig, siginfo_t *info, void *ctx_void) +{ + ucontext_t *ctx = (ucontext_t *)ctx_void; + unsigned long ip = ctx->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_RIP]; + + if (((ip ^ 0xffffffffff600000UL) & ~0xfffUL) == 0) + num_vsyscall_traps++; +} + +static int test_native_vsyscall(void) +{ + time_t tmp; + bool is_native; + + if (!vtime) + return 0; + + printf("[RUN]\tchecking for native vsyscall\n"); + sethandler(SIGTRAP, sigtrap, 0); + set_eflags(get_eflags() | X86_EFLAGS_TF); + vtime(&tmp); + set_eflags(get_eflags() & ~X86_EFLAGS_TF); + + /* + * If vsyscalls are emulated, we expect a single trap in the + * vsyscall page -- the call instruction will trap with RIP + * pointing to the entry point before emulation takes over. + * In native mode, we expect two traps, since whatever code + * the vsyscall page contains will be more than just a ret + * instruction. + */ + is_native = (num_vsyscall_traps > 1); + + printf("\tvsyscalls are %s (%d instructions in vsyscall page)\n", + (is_native ? "native" : "emulated"), + (int)num_vsyscall_traps); + + return 0; +} +#endif + +int main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int nerrs = 0; + + init_vdso(); + nerrs += init_vsys(); + + nerrs += test_gtod(); + nerrs += test_time(); + nerrs += test_getcpu(0); + nerrs += test_getcpu(1); + + sethandler(SIGSEGV, sigsegv, 0); + nerrs += test_vsys_r(); + +#ifdef __x86_64__ + nerrs += test_native_vsyscall(); +#endif + + return nerrs ? 1 : 0; +} Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from luto(a)kernel.org are queue-4.4/x86-mm-pat-dev-mem-remove-superfluous-error-message.patch queue-4.4/x86-vsdo-fix-build-on-paravirt_clock-y-kvm_guest-n.patch queue-4.4/x86-pti-efi-broken-conversion-from-efi-to-kernel-page-table.patch queue-4.4/x86-documentation-add-pti-description.patch queue-4.4/selftests-x86-add-test_vsyscall.patch queue-4.4/x86-alternatives-fix-optimize_nops-checking.patch

7 years, 1 month

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/retpoline/xen: Convert Xen hypercall indirect jumps" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/retpoline/xen: Convert Xen hypercall indirect jumps to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-retpoline-xen-convert-xen-hypercall-indirect-jumps.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From ea08816d5b185ab3d09e95e393f265af54560350 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2018 21:46:31 +0000 Subject: x86/retpoline/xen: Convert Xen hypercall indirect jumps From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> commit ea08816d5b185ab3d09e95e393f265af54560350 upstream. Convert indirect call in Xen hypercall to use non-speculative sequence, when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is enabled. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan(a)linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross(a)suse.com> Cc: gnomes(a)lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel(a)redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos(a)kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook(a)google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt(a)google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-10-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h @@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ #include <asm/page.h> #include <asm/pgtable.h> #include <asm/smap.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> #include <xen/interface/xen.h> #include <xen/interface/sched.h> @@ -217,9 +218,9 @@ privcmd_call(unsigned call, __HYPERCALL_5ARG(a1, a2, a3, a4, a5); stac(); - asm volatile("call *%[call]" + asm volatile(CALL_NOSPEC : __HYPERCALL_5PARAM - : [call] "a" (&hypercall_page[call]) + : [thunk_target] "a" (&hypercall_page[call]) : __HYPERCALL_CLOBBER5); clac(); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk are queue-4.14/x86-spectre-add-boot-time-option-to-select-spectre-v2-mitigation.patch queue-4.14/x86-retpoline-irq32-convert-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.14/objtool-detect-jumps-to-retpoline-thunks.patch queue-4.14/x86-cpufeatures-add-x86_bug_spectre_v.patch queue-4.14/x86-retpoline-hyperv-convert-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.14/x86-mm-pti-remove-dead-logic-in-pti_user_pagetable_walk.patch queue-4.14/x86-retpoline-entry-convert-entry-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.14/sysfs-cpu-fix-typos-in-vulnerability-documentation.patch queue-4.14/x86-pti-fix-pcid-and-sanitize-defines.patch queue-4.14/x86-cpu-amd-make-lfence-a-serializing-instruction.patch queue-4.14/x86-retpoline-ftrace-convert-ftrace-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.14/objtool-allow-alternatives-to-be-ignored.patch queue-4.14/x86-cpu-implement-cpu-vulnerabilites-sysfs-functions.patch queue-4.14/x86-retpoline-crypto-convert-crypto-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.14/x86-tboot-unbreak-tboot-with-pti-enabled.patch queue-4.14/x86-retpoline-xen-convert-xen-hypercall-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.14/x86-retpoline-checksum32-convert-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.14/x86-pti-make-unpoison-of-pgd-for-trusted-boot-work-for-real.patch queue-4.14/sysfs-cpu-add-vulnerability-folder.patch queue-4.14/x86-retpoline-fill-return-stack-buffer-on-vmexit.patch queue-4.14/x86-retpoline-remove-compile-time-warning.patch queue-4.14/x86-cpu-amd-use-lfence_rdtsc-in-preference-to-mfence_rdtsc.patch queue-4.14/x86-retpoline-add-initial-retpoline-support.patch

7 years, 1 month

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/retpoline: Remove compile time warning" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/retpoline: Remove compile time warning to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-retpoline-remove-compile-time-warning.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From b8b9ce4b5aec8de9e23cabb0a26b78641f9ab1d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Date: Sun, 14 Jan 2018 22:13:29 +0100 Subject: x86/retpoline: Remove compile time warning From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> commit b8b9ce4b5aec8de9e23cabb0a26b78641f9ab1d6 upstream. Remove the compile time warning when CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y and the compiler does not have retpoline support. Linus rationale for this is: It's wrong because it will just make people turn off RETPOLINE, and the asm updates - and return stack clearing - that are independent of the compiler are likely the most important parts because they are likely the ones easiest to target. And it's annoying because most people won't be able to do anything about it. The number of people building their own compiler? Very small. So if their distro hasn't got a compiler yet (and pretty much nobody does), the warning is just annoying crap. It is already properly reported as part of the sysfs interface. The compile-time warning only encourages bad things. Fixes: 76b043848fd2 ("x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support") Requested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: gnomes(a)lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel(a)redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos(a)kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook(a)google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linux-foundation.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFzWgquv4i6Mab6bASqYXg3ErV3XDFEYf=GEcCDQg5uA… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/Makefile | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/Makefile @@ -240,8 +240,6 @@ ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE RETPOLINE_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-mindirect-branch=thunk-extern -mindirect-branch-register) ifneq ($(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS),) KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS) -DRETPOLINE - else - $(warning CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y, but not supported by the compiler. Toolchain update recommended.) endif endif Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from tglx(a)linutronix.de are queue-4.14/x86-spectre-add-boot-time-option-to-select-spectre-v2-mitigation.patch queue-4.14/x86-retpoline-irq32-convert-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.14/objtool-detect-jumps-to-retpoline-thunks.patch queue-4.14/security-kconfig-correct-the-documentation-reference-for-pti.patch queue-4.14/x86-pti-unbreak-efi-old_memmap.patch queue-4.14/x86-cpufeatures-add-x86_bug_spectre_v.patch queue-4.14/x86-microcode-intel-extend-bdw-late-loading-with-a-revision-check.patch queue-4.14/x86-retpoline-hyperv-convert-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.14/membarrier-disable-preemption-when-calling-smp_call_function_many.patch queue-4.14/x86-mm-pti-remove-dead-logic-in-pti_user_pagetable_walk.patch queue-4.14/x86-retpoline-entry-convert-entry-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.14/sysfs-cpu-fix-typos-in-vulnerability-documentation.patch queue-4.14/x86-pti-fix-pcid-and-sanitize-defines.patch queue-4.14/x86-cpu-amd-make-lfence-a-serializing-instruction.patch queue-4.14/x86-retpoline-ftrace-convert-ftrace-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.14/x86-documentation-add-pti-description.patch queue-4.14/x86-acpi-handle-sci-interrupts-above-legacy-space-gracefully.patch queue-4.14/objtool-allow-alternatives-to-be-ignored.patch queue-4.14/x86-cpu-implement-cpu-vulnerabilites-sysfs-functions.patch queue-4.14/x86-retpoline-crypto-convert-crypto-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.14/selftests-x86-add-test_vsyscall.patch queue-4.14/x86-tboot-unbreak-tboot-with-pti-enabled.patch queue-4.14/x86-retpoline-xen-convert-xen-hypercall-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.14/x86-retpoline-checksum32-convert-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.14/x86-pti-make-unpoison-of-pgd-for-trusted-boot-work-for-real.patch queue-4.14/sysfs-cpu-add-vulnerability-folder.patch queue-4.14/x86-retpoline-fill-return-stack-buffer-on-vmexit.patch queue-4.14/x86-acpi-reduce-code-duplication-in-mp_override_legacy_irq.patch queue-4.14/x86-retpoline-remove-compile-time-warning.patch queue-4.14/x86-alternatives-fix-optimize_nops-checking.patch queue-4.14/x86-cpu-amd-use-lfence_rdtsc-in-preference-to-mfence_rdtsc.patch queue-4.14/x86-retpoline-add-initial-retpoline-support.patch queue-4.14/kdump-write-correct-address-of-mem_section-into-vmcoreinfo.patch queue-4.14/x86-perf-disable-intel_bts-when-pti.patch

7 years, 1 month

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/retpoline/irq32: Convert assembler indirect jumps" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/retpoline/irq32: Convert assembler indirect jumps to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-retpoline-irq32-convert-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 7614e913db1f40fff819b36216484dc3808995d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2018 21:46:33 +0000 Subject: x86/retpoline/irq32: Convert assembler indirect jumps From: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> commit 7614e913db1f40fff819b36216484dc3808995d4 upstream. Convert all indirect jumps in 32bit irq inline asm code to use non speculative sequences. Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan(a)linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Cc: gnomes(a)lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel(a)redhat.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos(a)kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook(a)google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt(a)google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-12-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/kernel/irq_32.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/kernel/irq_32.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/irq_32.c @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ #include <linux/mm.h> #include <asm/apic.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_STACKOVERFLOW @@ -55,11 +56,11 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct irq_stack *, softi static void call_on_stack(void *func, void *stack) { asm volatile("xchgl %%ebx,%%esp \n" - "call *%%edi \n" + CALL_NOSPEC "movl %%ebx,%%esp \n" : "=b" (stack) : "0" (stack), - "D"(func) + [thunk_target] "D"(func) : "memory", "cc", "edx", "ecx", "eax"); } @@ -95,11 +96,11 @@ static inline int execute_on_irq_stack(i call_on_stack(print_stack_overflow, isp); asm volatile("xchgl %%ebx,%%esp \n" - "call *%%edi \n" + CALL_NOSPEC "movl %%ebx,%%esp \n" : "=a" (arg1), "=b" (isp) : "0" (desc), "1" (isp), - "D" (desc->handle_irq) + [thunk_target] "D" (desc->handle_irq) : "memory", "cc", "ecx"); return 1; } Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ak(a)linux.intel.com are queue-4.14/x86-spectre-add-boot-time-option-to-select-spectre-v2-mitigation.patch queue-4.14/x86-retpoline-irq32-convert-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.14/objtool-detect-jumps-to-retpoline-thunks.patch queue-4.14/x86-cpufeatures-add-x86_bug_spectre_v.patch queue-4.14/x86-retpoline-hyperv-convert-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.14/x86-mm-pti-remove-dead-logic-in-pti_user_pagetable_walk.patch queue-4.14/x86-retpoline-entry-convert-entry-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.14/x86-retpoline-ftrace-convert-ftrace-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.14/objtool-allow-alternatives-to-be-ignored.patch queue-4.14/x86-retpoline-crypto-convert-crypto-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.14/x86-retpoline-xen-convert-xen-hypercall-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.14/x86-retpoline-checksum32-convert-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.14/x86-retpoline-fill-return-stack-buffer-on-vmexit.patch queue-4.14/x86-retpoline-remove-compile-time-warning.patch queue-4.14/x86-alternatives-fix-optimize_nops-checking.patch queue-4.14/x86-retpoline-add-initial-retpoline-support.patch

7 years, 1 month

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/retpoline/hyperv: Convert assembler indirect jumps" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/retpoline/hyperv: Convert assembler indirect jumps to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-retpoline-hyperv-convert-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From e70e5892b28c18f517f29ab6e83bd57705104b31 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2018 21:46:30 +0000 Subject: x86/retpoline/hyperv: Convert assembler indirect jumps From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> commit e70e5892b28c18f517f29ab6e83bd57705104b31 upstream. Convert all indirect jumps in hyperv inline asm code to use non-speculative sequences when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is enabled. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan(a)linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Cc: gnomes(a)lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel(a)redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos(a)kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook(a)google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt(a)google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-9-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h | 18 ++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ #include <linux/nmi.h> #include <asm/io.h> #include <asm/hyperv.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> /* * The below CPUID leaves are present if VersionAndFeatures.HypervisorPresent @@ -186,10 +187,11 @@ static inline u64 hv_do_hypercall(u64 co return U64_MAX; __asm__ __volatile__("mov %4, %%r8\n" - "call *%5" + CALL_NOSPEC : "=a" (hv_status), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT, "+c" (control), "+d" (input_address) - : "r" (output_address), "m" (hv_hypercall_pg) + : "r" (output_address), + THUNK_TARGET(hv_hypercall_pg) : "cc", "memory", "r8", "r9", "r10", "r11"); #else u32 input_address_hi = upper_32_bits(input_address); @@ -200,13 +202,13 @@ static inline u64 hv_do_hypercall(u64 co if (!hv_hypercall_pg) return U64_MAX; - __asm__ __volatile__("call *%7" + __asm__ __volatile__(CALL_NOSPEC : "=A" (hv_status), "+c" (input_address_lo), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT : "A" (control), "b" (input_address_hi), "D"(output_address_hi), "S"(output_address_lo), - "m" (hv_hypercall_pg) + THUNK_TARGET(hv_hypercall_pg) : "cc", "memory"); #endif /* !x86_64 */ return hv_status; @@ -227,10 +229,10 @@ static inline u64 hv_do_fast_hypercall8( #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 { - __asm__ __volatile__("call *%4" + __asm__ __volatile__(CALL_NOSPEC : "=a" (hv_status), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT, "+c" (control), "+d" (input1) - : "m" (hv_hypercall_pg) + : THUNK_TARGET(hv_hypercall_pg) : "cc", "r8", "r9", "r10", "r11"); } #else @@ -238,13 +240,13 @@ static inline u64 hv_do_fast_hypercall8( u32 input1_hi = upper_32_bits(input1); u32 input1_lo = lower_32_bits(input1); - __asm__ __volatile__ ("call *%5" + __asm__ __volatile__ (CALL_NOSPEC : "=A"(hv_status), "+c"(input1_lo), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT : "A" (control), "b" (input1_hi), - "m" (hv_hypercall_pg) + THUNK_TARGET(hv_hypercall_pg) : "cc", "edi", "esi"); } #endif Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk are queue-4.14/x86-spectre-add-boot-time-option-to-select-spectre-v2-mitigation.patch queue-4.14/x86-retpoline-irq32-convert-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.14/objtool-detect-jumps-to-retpoline-thunks.patch queue-4.14/x86-cpufeatures-add-x86_bug_spectre_v.patch queue-4.14/x86-retpoline-hyperv-convert-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.14/x86-mm-pti-remove-dead-logic-in-pti_user_pagetable_walk.patch queue-4.14/x86-retpoline-entry-convert-entry-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.14/sysfs-cpu-fix-typos-in-vulnerability-documentation.patch queue-4.14/x86-pti-fix-pcid-and-sanitize-defines.patch queue-4.14/x86-cpu-amd-make-lfence-a-serializing-instruction.patch queue-4.14/x86-retpoline-ftrace-convert-ftrace-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.14/objtool-allow-alternatives-to-be-ignored.patch queue-4.14/x86-cpu-implement-cpu-vulnerabilites-sysfs-functions.patch queue-4.14/x86-retpoline-crypto-convert-crypto-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.14/x86-tboot-unbreak-tboot-with-pti-enabled.patch queue-4.14/x86-retpoline-xen-convert-xen-hypercall-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.14/x86-retpoline-checksum32-convert-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.14/x86-pti-make-unpoison-of-pgd-for-trusted-boot-work-for-real.patch queue-4.14/sysfs-cpu-add-vulnerability-folder.patch queue-4.14/x86-retpoline-fill-return-stack-buffer-on-vmexit.patch queue-4.14/x86-retpoline-remove-compile-time-warning.patch queue-4.14/x86-cpu-amd-use-lfence_rdtsc-in-preference-to-mfence_rdtsc.patch queue-4.14/x86-retpoline-add-initial-retpoline-support.patch

7 years, 1 month

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