- Linux-stable-mirror - lists.linaro.org

[PATCH] ARC: AXS10x/HSDK: Allow U-Boot to pass MAC-address to the kernel

by Alexey Brodkin

Otherwise kernel uses random MAC which is not very conveniet. With that change in place use might set desired MAC in U-Boot with "setenv ethaddr 11:22:33:44:55:66", save environment and then from boot to boot the same MAC will be used by the kernel. One other note for this to happen it's required to pass board's .dtb in U-Boot's "bootm" command like that: ------------------->8----------------- bootm 0x82000000 - 0x84000000 ------------------->8----------------- Here 0x82000000 is location of uImage while 0x80000000 is location of either axs10x.dtb or hsdk.dtb previously loaded from SD-card, USB storage or TFTP server. Signed-off-by: Alexey Brodkin <abrodkin(a)synopsys.com> Cc: Rob Herring <robh+dt(a)kernel.org> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 4.14 Cc: devicetree(a)vger.kernel.org --- arch/arc/boot/dts/axs10x_mb.dtsi | 7 ++++++- arch/arc/boot/dts/hsdk.dts | 7 ++++++- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arc/boot/dts/axs10x_mb.dtsi b/arch/arc/boot/dts/axs10x_mb.dtsi index 47b74fbc403c..37bafd44e36d 100644 --- a/arch/arc/boot/dts/axs10x_mb.dtsi +++ b/arch/arc/boot/dts/axs10x_mb.dtsi @@ -9,6 +9,10 @@ */ / { + aliases { + ethernet = &gmac; + }; + axs10x_mb { compatible = "simple-bus"; #address-cells = <1>; @@ -68,7 +72,7 @@ }; }; - ethernet@0x18000 { + gmac: ethernet@0x18000 { #interrupt-cells = <1>; compatible = "snps,dwmac"; reg = < 0x18000 0x2000 >; @@ -81,6 +85,7 @@ max-speed = <100>; resets = <&creg_rst 5>; reset-names = "stmmaceth"; + mac-address = [00 00 00 00 00 00]; /* Filled in by U-Boot */ }; ehci@0x40000 { diff --git a/arch/arc/boot/dts/hsdk.dts b/arch/arc/boot/dts/hsdk.dts index 006aa3de5348..d00f283094d3 100644 --- a/arch/arc/boot/dts/hsdk.dts +++ b/arch/arc/boot/dts/hsdk.dts @@ -25,6 +25,10 @@ bootargs = "earlycon=uart8250,mmio32,0xf0005000,115200n8 console=ttyS0,115200n8 debug print-fatal-signals=1"; }; + aliases { + ethernet = &gmac; + }; + cpus { #address-cells = <1>; #size-cells = <0>; @@ -163,7 +167,7 @@ #clock-cells = <0>; }; - ethernet@8000 { + gmac: ethernet@8000 { #interrupt-cells = <1>; compatible = "snps,dwmac"; reg = <0x8000 0x2000>; @@ -176,6 +180,7 @@ phy-handle = <&phy0>; resets = <&cgu_rst HSDK_ETH_RESET>; reset-names = "stmmaceth"; + mac-address = [00 00 00 00 00 00]; /* Filled in by U-Boot */ mdio { #address-cells = <1>; -- 2.17.1

7 years, 4 months

3
2
0 0

[PATCH] x86/irqflags: provide a declaration for native_save_fl

by Nick Desaulniers

Fixes commit d0a8d9378d16 ("x86/paravirt: Make native_save_fl() extern inline"). It was reported that the above commit was causing users of gcc < 4.9 to observe -Werror=missing-prototypes errors. Indeed, it seems that: extern inline unsigned long native_save_fl(void) { return 0; } compiled with -Werror=missing-prototypes produces this warning in gcc < 4.9, but not gcc >= 4.9. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 4.17, 4.14, 4.9, 4.4 Reported-by: David Laight <david.laight(a)aculab.com> Reported-by: Jean Delvare <jdelvare(a)suse.de> Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers(a)google.com> --- arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h index c4fc17220df9..c14f2a74b2be 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h @@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ * Interrupt control: */ +/* Declaration required for gcc < 4.9 to prevent -Werror=missing-prototypes */ +extern inline unsigned long native_save_fl(void); extern inline unsigned long native_save_fl(void) { unsigned long flags; -- 2.18.0.597.ga71716f1ad-goog

7 years, 4 months

3
2
0 0

Dear Beneficiary, FINAL NOTICE..28

by Paul

Attention: stable(a)vger.kernel.org, FINAL NOTICE We have been instructed to arrange your funds/payment via Online Banking & Loaded ATM Cards delivery to you. Your response very urgent for more details! Sincerely yours, Eddie. P.

7 years, 4 months

1
0
0 0

[PATCH RT 03/22] futex: Avoid violating the 10th rule of futex

by Julia Cartwright

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> 4.9.115-rt94-rc1 stable review patch. If you have any objection to the inclusion of this patch, let me know. --- 8< --- 8< --- 8< --- [ Upstream commit c1e2f0eaf015fb7076d51a339011f2383e6dd389 ] Julia reported futex state corruption in the following scenario: waiter waker stealer (prio > waiter) futex(WAIT_REQUEUE_PI, uaddr, uaddr2, timeout=[N ms]) futex_wait_requeue_pi() futex_wait_queue_me() freezable_schedule() <scheduled out> futex(LOCK_PI, uaddr2) futex(CMP_REQUEUE_PI, uaddr, uaddr2, 1, 0) /* requeues waiter to uaddr2 */ futex(UNLOCK_PI, uaddr2) wake_futex_pi() cmp_futex_value_locked(uaddr2, waiter) wake_up_q() <woken by waker> <hrtimer_wakeup() fires, clears sleeper->task> futex(LOCK_PI, uaddr2) __rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock() try_to_take_rt_mutex() /* steals lock */ rt_mutex_set_owner(lock, stealer) <preempted> <scheduled in> rt_mutex_wait_proxy_lock() __rt_mutex_slowlock() try_to_take_rt_mutex() /* fails, lock held by stealer */ if (timeout && !timeout->task) return -ETIMEDOUT; fixup_owner() /* lock wasn't acquired, so, fixup_pi_state_owner skipped */ return -ETIMEDOUT; /* At this point, we've returned -ETIMEDOUT to userspace, but the * futex word shows waiter to be the owner, and the pi_mutex has * stealer as the owner */ futex_lock(LOCK_PI, uaddr2) -> bails with EDEADLK, futex word says we're owner. And suggested that what commit: 73d786bd043e ("futex: Rework inconsistent rt_mutex/futex_q state") removes from fixup_owner() looks to be just what is needed. And indeed it is -- I completely missed that requeue_pi could also result in this case. So we need to restore that, except that subsequent patches, like commit: 16ffa12d7425 ("futex: Pull rt_mutex_futex_unlock() out from under hb->lock") changed all the locking rules. Even without that, the sequence: - if (rt_mutex_futex_trylock(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex)) { - locked = 1; - goto out; - } - raw_spin_lock_irq(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock); - owner = rt_mutex_owner(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex); - if (!owner) - owner = rt_mutex_next_owner(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex); - raw_spin_unlock_irq(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock); - ret = fixup_pi_state_owner(uaddr, q, owner); already suggests there were races; otherwise we'd never have to look at next_owner. So instead of doing 3 consecutive wait_lock sections with who knows what races, we do it all in a single section. Additionally, the usage of pi_state->owner in fixup_owner() was only safe because only the rt_mutex owner would modify it, which this additional case wrecks. Luckily the values can only change away and not to the value we're testing, this means we can do a speculative test and double check once we have the wait_lock. Fixes: 73d786bd043e ("futex: Rework inconsistent rt_mutex/futex_q state") Reported-by: Julia Cartwright <julia(a)ni.com> Reported-by: Gratian Crisan <gratian.crisan(a)ni.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz(a)infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Tested-by: Julia Cartwright <julia(a)ni.com> Tested-by: Gratian Crisan <gratian.crisan(a)ni.com> Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart(a)infradead.org> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171208124939.7livp7no2ov65rrc@hirez.programming… Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy(a)linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Julia Cartwright <julia(a)ni.com> --- kernel/futex.c | 83 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- kernel/locking/rtmutex.c | 26 ++++++++--- kernel/locking/rtmutex_common.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/futex.c b/kernel/futex.c index 270148be5647..cdd68ba6e3a6 100644 --- a/kernel/futex.c +++ b/kernel/futex.c @@ -2287,21 +2287,17 @@ static void unqueue_me_pi(struct futex_q *q) spin_unlock(q->lock_ptr); } -/* - * Fixup the pi_state owner with the new owner. - * - * Must be called with hash bucket lock held and mm->sem held for non - * private futexes. - */ static int fixup_pi_state_owner(u32 __user *uaddr, struct futex_q *q, - struct task_struct *newowner) + struct task_struct *argowner) { - u32 newtid = task_pid_vnr(newowner) | FUTEX_WAITERS; struct futex_pi_state *pi_state = q->pi_state; u32 uval, uninitialized_var(curval), newval; - struct task_struct *oldowner; + struct task_struct *oldowner, *newowner; + u32 newtid; int ret; + lockdep_assert_held(q->lock_ptr); + raw_spin_lock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock); oldowner = pi_state->owner; @@ -2310,11 +2306,17 @@ static int fixup_pi_state_owner(u32 __user *uaddr, struct futex_q *q, newtid |= FUTEX_OWNER_DIED; /* - * We are here either because we stole the rtmutex from the - * previous highest priority waiter or we are the highest priority - * waiter but have failed to get the rtmutex the first time. + * We are here because either: + * + * - we stole the lock and pi_state->owner needs updating to reflect + * that (@argowner == current), * - * We have to replace the newowner TID in the user space variable. + * or: + * + * - someone stole our lock and we need to fix things to point to the + * new owner (@argowner == NULL). + * + * Either way, we have to replace the TID in the user space variable. * This must be atomic as we have to preserve the owner died bit here. * * Note: We write the user space value _before_ changing the pi_state @@ -2327,6 +2329,42 @@ static int fixup_pi_state_owner(u32 __user *uaddr, struct futex_q *q, * in the PID check in lookup_pi_state. */ retry: + if (!argowner) { + if (oldowner != current) { + /* + * We raced against a concurrent self; things are + * already fixed up. Nothing to do. + */ + ret = 0; + goto out_unlock; + } + + if (__rt_mutex_futex_trylock(&pi_state->pi_mutex)) { + /* We got the lock after all, nothing to fix. */ + ret = 0; + goto out_unlock; + } + + /* + * Since we just failed the trylock; there must be an owner. + */ + newowner = rt_mutex_owner(&pi_state->pi_mutex); + BUG_ON(!newowner); + } else { + WARN_ON_ONCE(argowner != current); + if (oldowner == current) { + /* + * We raced against a concurrent self; things are + * already fixed up. Nothing to do. + */ + ret = 0; + goto out_unlock; + } + newowner = argowner; + } + + newtid = task_pid_vnr(newowner) | FUTEX_WAITERS; + if (get_futex_value_locked(&uval, uaddr)) goto handle_fault; @@ -2427,15 +2465,28 @@ static int fixup_owner(u32 __user *uaddr, struct futex_q *q, int locked) * Got the lock. We might not be the anticipated owner if we * did a lock-steal - fix up the PI-state in that case: * - * We can safely read pi_state->owner without holding wait_lock - * because we now own the rt_mutex, only the owner will attempt - * to change it. + * Speculative pi_state->owner read (we don't hold wait_lock); + * since we own the lock pi_state->owner == current is the + * stable state, anything else needs more attention. */ if (q->pi_state->owner != current) ret = fixup_pi_state_owner(uaddr, q, current); goto out; } + /* + * If we didn't get the lock; check if anybody stole it from us. In + * that case, we need to fix up the uval to point to them instead of + * us, otherwise bad things happen. [10] + * + * Another speculative read; pi_state->owner == current is unstable + * but needs our attention. + */ + if (q->pi_state->owner == current) { + ret = fixup_pi_state_owner(uaddr, q, NULL); + goto out; + } + /* * Paranoia check. If we did not take the lock, then we should not be * the owner of the rt_mutex. diff --git a/kernel/locking/rtmutex.c b/kernel/locking/rtmutex.c index 3a8b5d44aaf8..57361d631749 100644 --- a/kernel/locking/rtmutex.c +++ b/kernel/locking/rtmutex.c @@ -1849,6 +1849,19 @@ rt_mutex_slowlock(struct rt_mutex *lock, int state, return ret; } +static inline int __rt_mutex_slowtrylock(struct rt_mutex *lock) +{ + int ret = try_to_take_rt_mutex(lock, current, NULL); + + /* + * try_to_take_rt_mutex() sets the lock waiters bit + * unconditionally. Clean this up. + */ + fixup_rt_mutex_waiters(lock); + + return ret; +} + /* * Slow path try-lock function: */ @@ -1871,13 +1884,7 @@ static inline int rt_mutex_slowtrylock(struct rt_mutex *lock) */ raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&lock->wait_lock, flags); - ret = try_to_take_rt_mutex(lock, current, NULL); - - /* - * try_to_take_rt_mutex() sets the lock waiters bit - * unconditionally. Clean this up. - */ - fixup_rt_mutex_waiters(lock); + ret = __rt_mutex_slowtrylock(lock); raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&lock->wait_lock, flags); @@ -2102,6 +2109,11 @@ int __sched rt_mutex_futex_trylock(struct rt_mutex *lock) return rt_mutex_slowtrylock(lock); } +int __sched __rt_mutex_futex_trylock(struct rt_mutex *lock) +{ + return __rt_mutex_slowtrylock(lock); +} + /** * rt_mutex_timed_lock - lock a rt_mutex interruptible * the timeout structure is provided diff --git a/kernel/locking/rtmutex_common.h b/kernel/locking/rtmutex_common.h index 64d89d780059..50c0a1043556 100644 --- a/kernel/locking/rtmutex_common.h +++ b/kernel/locking/rtmutex_common.h @@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ extern bool rt_mutex_cleanup_proxy_lock(struct rt_mutex *lock, struct rt_mutex_waiter *waiter); extern int rt_mutex_futex_trylock(struct rt_mutex *l); +extern int __rt_mutex_futex_trylock(struct rt_mutex *l); extern void rt_mutex_futex_unlock(struct rt_mutex *lock); extern bool __rt_mutex_futex_unlock(struct rt_mutex *lock, -- 2.18.0

7 years, 4 months

1
0
0 0

[PATCH RT 02/22] futex: Fix more put_pi_state() vs. exit_pi_state_list() races

by Julia Cartwright

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> 4.9.115-rt94-rc1 stable review patch. If you have any objection to the inclusion of this patch, let me know. --- 8< --- 8< --- 8< --- [ Upstream commit 51d00899f7e6ded15c89cb4e2cb11a35283bac81 ] Dmitry (through syzbot) reported being able to trigger the WARN in get_pi_state() and a use-after-free on: raw_spin_lock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock); Both are due to this race: exit_pi_state_list() put_pi_state() lock(&curr->pi_lock) while() { pi_state = list_first_entry(head); hb = hash_futex(&pi_state->key); unlock(&curr->pi_lock); dec_and_test(&pi_state->refcount); lock(&hb->lock) lock(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock) // uaf if pi_state free'd lock(&curr->pi_lock); .... unlock(&curr->pi_lock); get_pi_state(); // WARN; refcount==0 The problem is we take the reference count too late, and don't allow it being 0. Fix it by using inc_not_zero() and simply retrying the loop when we fail to get a refcount. In that case put_pi_state() should remove the entry from the list. Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz(a)infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: Gratian Crisan <gratian.crisan(a)ni.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: dvhart(a)infradead.org Cc: syzbot <bot+2af19c9e1ffe4d4ee1d16c56ae7580feaee75765(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Cc: syzkaller-bugs(a)googlegroups.com Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Fixes: c74aef2d06a9 ("futex: Fix pi_state->owner serialization") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171031101853.xpfh72y643kdfhjs@hirez.programming.… Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy(a)linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Julia Cartwright <julia(a)ni.com> --- kernel/futex.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/futex.c b/kernel/futex.c index 47e42faad6c5..270148be5647 100644 --- a/kernel/futex.c +++ b/kernel/futex.c @@ -899,11 +899,27 @@ void exit_pi_state_list(struct task_struct *curr) */ raw_spin_lock_irq(&curr->pi_lock); while (!list_empty(head)) { - next = head->next; pi_state = list_entry(next, struct futex_pi_state, list); key = pi_state->key; hb = hash_futex(&key); + + /* + * We can race against put_pi_state() removing itself from the + * list (a waiter going away). put_pi_state() will first + * decrement the reference count and then modify the list, so + * its possible to see the list entry but fail this reference + * acquire. + * + * In that case; drop the locks to let put_pi_state() make + * progress and retry the loop. + */ + if (!atomic_inc_not_zero(&pi_state->refcount)) { + raw_spin_unlock_irq(&curr->pi_lock); + cpu_relax(); + raw_spin_lock_irq(&curr->pi_lock); + continue; + } raw_spin_unlock_irq(&curr->pi_lock); spin_lock(&hb->lock); @@ -914,10 +930,12 @@ void exit_pi_state_list(struct task_struct *curr) * task still owns the PI-state: */ if (head->next != next) { + /* retain curr->pi_lock for the loop invariant */ raw_spin_unlock(&curr->pi_lock); raw_spin_unlock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock); spin_unlock(&hb->lock); raw_spin_lock_irq(&curr->pi_lock); + put_pi_state(pi_state); continue; } @@ -925,9 +943,8 @@ void exit_pi_state_list(struct task_struct *curr) WARN_ON(list_empty(&pi_state->list)); list_del_init(&pi_state->list); pi_state->owner = NULL; - raw_spin_unlock(&curr->pi_lock); - get_pi_state(pi_state); + raw_spin_unlock(&curr->pi_lock); raw_spin_unlock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock); spin_unlock(&hb->lock); -- 2.18.0

7 years, 4 months

1
0
0 0

[PATCH RT 01/22] futex: Fix pi_state->owner serialization

by Julia Cartwright

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> 4.9.115-rt94-rc1 stable review patch. If you have any objection to the inclusion of this patch, let me know. --- 8< --- 8< --- 8< --- [ Upstream commit c74aef2d06a9f59cece89093eecc552933cba72a ] There was a reported suspicion about a race between exit_pi_state_list() and put_pi_state(). The same report mentioned the comment with put_pi_state() said it should be called with hb->lock held, and it no longer is in all places. As it turns out, the pi_state->owner serialization is indeed broken. As per the new rules: 734009e96d19 ("futex: Change locking rules") pi_state->owner should be serialized by pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock. For the sites setting pi_state->owner we already hold wait_lock (where required) but exit_pi_state_list() and put_pi_state() were not and raced on clearing it. Fixes: 734009e96d19 ("futex: Change locking rules") Reported-by: Gratian Crisan <gratian.crisan(a)ni.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz(a)infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: dvhart(a)infradead.org Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170922154806.jd3ffltfk24m4o4y@hirez.programming… Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy(a)linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Julia Cartwright <julia(a)ni.com> --- kernel/futex.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/futex.c b/kernel/futex.c index 8ab0ddd4cf8f..47e42faad6c5 100644 --- a/kernel/futex.c +++ b/kernel/futex.c @@ -819,8 +819,6 @@ static void get_pi_state(struct futex_pi_state *pi_state) /* * Drops a reference to the pi_state object and frees or caches it * when the last reference is gone. - * - * Must be called with the hb lock held. */ static void put_pi_state(struct futex_pi_state *pi_state) { @@ -835,16 +833,22 @@ static void put_pi_state(struct futex_pi_state *pi_state) * and has cleaned up the pi_state already */ if (pi_state->owner) { - raw_spin_lock_irq(&pi_state->owner->pi_lock); - list_del_init(&pi_state->list); - raw_spin_unlock_irq(&pi_state->owner->pi_lock); + struct task_struct *owner; - rt_mutex_proxy_unlock(&pi_state->pi_mutex, pi_state->owner); + raw_spin_lock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock); + owner = pi_state->owner; + if (owner) { + raw_spin_lock(&owner->pi_lock); + list_del_init(&pi_state->list); + raw_spin_unlock(&owner->pi_lock); + } + rt_mutex_proxy_unlock(&pi_state->pi_mutex, owner); + raw_spin_unlock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock); } - if (current->pi_state_cache) + if (current->pi_state_cache) { kfree(pi_state); - else { + } else { /* * pi_state->list is already empty. * clear pi_state->owner. @@ -903,14 +907,15 @@ void exit_pi_state_list(struct task_struct *curr) raw_spin_unlock_irq(&curr->pi_lock); spin_lock(&hb->lock); - - raw_spin_lock_irq(&curr->pi_lock); + raw_spin_lock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock); + raw_spin_lock(&curr->pi_lock); /* * We dropped the pi-lock, so re-check whether this * task still owns the PI-state: */ if (head->next != next) { - raw_spin_unlock_irq(&curr->pi_lock); + raw_spin_unlock(&curr->pi_lock); + raw_spin_unlock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock); spin_unlock(&hb->lock); raw_spin_lock_irq(&curr->pi_lock); continue; @@ -920,9 +925,10 @@ void exit_pi_state_list(struct task_struct *curr) WARN_ON(list_empty(&pi_state->list)); list_del_init(&pi_state->list); pi_state->owner = NULL; - raw_spin_unlock_irq(&curr->pi_lock); + raw_spin_unlock(&curr->pi_lock); get_pi_state(pi_state); + raw_spin_unlock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock); spin_unlock(&hb->lock); rt_mutex_futex_unlock(&pi_state->pi_mutex); @@ -1204,6 +1210,10 @@ static int attach_to_pi_owner(u32 uval, union futex_key *key, WARN_ON(!list_empty(&pi_state->list)); list_add(&pi_state->list, &p->pi_state_list); + /* + * Assignment without holding pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock is safe + * because there is no concurrency as the object is not published yet. + */ pi_state->owner = p; raw_spin_unlock_irq(&p->pi_lock); -- 2.18.0

7 years, 4 months

1
0
0 0

[PATCH] stop_machine: Disable preemption after queueing stopper threads

by Isaac J. Manjarres

This commit: 9fb8d5dc4b64 ("stop_machine, Disable preemption when waking two stopper threads") does not fully address the race condition that can occur as follows: On one CPU, call it CPU 3, thread 1 invokes cpu_stop_queue_two_works(2, 3,...), and the execution is such that thread 1 queues the works for migration/2 and migration/3, and is preempted after releasing the locks for migration/2 and migration/3, but before waking the threads. Then, On CPU 2, a kworker, call it thread 2, is running, and it invokes cpu_stop_queue_two_works(1, 2,...), such that thread 2 queues the works for migration/1 and migration/2. Meanwhile, on CPU 3, thread 1 resumes execution, and wakes migration/2 and migration/3. This means that when CPU 2 releases the locks for migration/1 and migration/2, but before it wakes those threads, it can be preempted by migration/2. If thread 2 is preempted by migration/2, then migration/2 will execute the first work item successfully, since migration/3 was woken up by CPU 3, but when it goes to execute the second work item, it disables preemption, calls multi_cpu_stop(), and thus, CPU 2 will wait forever for migration/1, which should have been woken up by thread 2. However migration/1 cannot be woken up by thread 2, since it is a kworker, so it is affine to CPU 2, but CPU 2 is running migration/2 with preemption disabled, so thread 2 will never run. Disable preemption after queueing works for stopper threads to ensure that the operation of queueing the works and waking the stopper threads is atomic. Fixes: 9fb8d5dc4b64 ("stop_machine, Disable preemption when waking two stopper threads") Co-Developed-by: Prasad Sodagudi <psodagud(a)codeaurora.org> Co-Developed-by: Pavankumar Kondeti <pkondeti(a)codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Isaac J. Manjarres <isaacm(a)codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Prasad Sodagudi <psodagud(a)codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Pavankumar Kondeti <pkondeti(a)codeaurora.org> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org --- kernel/stop_machine.c | 10 +++++++++- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/stop_machine.c b/kernel/stop_machine.c index 1ff523d..e190d1e 100644 --- a/kernel/stop_machine.c +++ b/kernel/stop_machine.c @@ -260,6 +260,15 @@ static int cpu_stop_queue_two_works(int cpu1, struct cpu_stop_work *work1, err = 0; __cpu_stop_queue_work(stopper1, work1, &wakeq); __cpu_stop_queue_work(stopper2, work2, &wakeq); + /* + * The waking up of stopper threads has to happen + * in the same scheduling context as the queueing. + * Otherwise, there is a possibility of one of the + * above stoppers being woken up by another CPU, + * and preempting us. This will cause us to n ot + * wake up the other stopper forever. + */ + preempt_disable(); unlock: raw_spin_unlock(&stopper2->lock); raw_spin_unlock_irq(&stopper1->lock); @@ -271,7 +280,6 @@ static int cpu_stop_queue_two_works(int cpu1, struct cpu_stop_work *work1, } if (!err) { - preempt_disable(); wake_up_q(&wakeq); preempt_enable(); } -- The Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc. is a member of the Code Aurora Forum, a Linux Foundation Collaborative Project

7 years, 4 months

7
11
0 0

[PATCH] powerpc/fadump: handle crash memory ranges array overflow

by Hari Bathini

Crash memory ranges is an array of memory ranges of the crashing kernel to be exported as a dump via /proc/vmcore file. The size of the array is set based on INIT_MEMBLOCK_REGIONS, which works alright in most cases where memblock memory regions count is less than INIT_MEMBLOCK_REGIONS value. But this count can grow beyond INIT_MEMBLOCK_REGIONS value since commit 142b45a72e22 ("memblock: Add array resizing support"). On large memory systems with a few DLPAR operations, the memblock memory regions count could be larger than INIT_MEMBLOCK_REGIONS value. On such systems, registering fadump results in crash or other system failures like below: task: c00007f39a290010 ti: c00000000b738000 task.ti: c00000000b738000 NIP: c000000000047df4 LR: c0000000000f9e58 CTR: c00000000010f180 REGS: c00000000b73b570 TRAP: 0300 Tainted: G L X (4.4.140+) MSR: 8000000000009033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 22004484 XER: 20000000 CFAR: c000000000008500 DAR: 000007a450000000 DSISR: 40000000 SOFTE: 0 GPR00: c0000000000f9e58 c00000000b73b7f0 c000000000f09a00 000000000000001a GPR04: c00007f3bf774c90 0000000000000004 c000000000eb9a00 0000000000000800 GPR08: 0000000000000804 000007a450000000 c000000000fa9a00 c00007ffb169ca20 GPR12: 0000000022004482 c00000000fa12c00 c00007f3a0ea97a8 0000000000000000 GPR16: c00007f3a0ea9a50 c00000000b73bd60 0000000000000118 000000000001fe80 GPR20: 0000000000000118 0000000000000000 c000000000b8c980 00000000000000d0 GPR24: 000007ffb0b10000 c00007ffb169c980 0000000000000000 c000000000b8c980 GPR28: 0000000000000004 c00007ffb169c980 000000000000001a c00007ffb169c980 NIP [c000000000047df4] smp_send_reschedule+0x24/0x80 LR [c0000000000f9e58] resched_curr+0x138/0x160 Call Trace: [c00000000b73b7f0] [c0000000000f9e58] resched_curr+0x138/0x160 (unreliable) [c00000000b73b820] [c0000000000fb538] check_preempt_curr+0xc8/0xf0 [c00000000b73b850] [c0000000000fb598] ttwu_do_wakeup+0x38/0x150 [c00000000b73b890] [c0000000000fc9c4] try_to_wake_up+0x224/0x4d0 [c00000000b73b900] [c00000000011ef34] __wake_up_common+0x94/0x100 [c00000000b73b960] [c00000000034a78c] ep_poll_callback+0xac/0x1c0 [c00000000b73b9b0] [c00000000011ef34] __wake_up_common+0x94/0x100 [c00000000b73ba10] [c00000000011f810] __wake_up_sync_key+0x70/0xa0 [c00000000b73ba60] [c00000000067c3e8] sock_def_readable+0x58/0xa0 [c00000000b73ba90] [c0000000007848ac] unix_stream_sendmsg+0x2dc/0x4c0 [c00000000b73bb70] [c000000000675a38] sock_sendmsg+0x68/0xa0 [c00000000b73bba0] [c00000000067673c] ___sys_sendmsg+0x2cc/0x2e0 [c00000000b73bd30] [c000000000677dbc] __sys_sendmsg+0x5c/0xc0 [c00000000b73bdd0] [c0000000006789bc] SyS_socketcall+0x36c/0x3f0 [c00000000b73be30] [c000000000009488] system_call+0x3c/0x100 Instruction dump: 4e800020 60000000 60420000 3c4c00ec 38421c30 7c0802a6 f8010010 60000000 3d42000a e92ab420 2fa90000 4dde0020 <e9290000> 2fa90000 419e0044 7c0802a6 ---[ end trace a6d1dd4bab5f8253 ]--- as array index overflow is not checked for while setting up crash memory ranges causing memory corruption. To resolve this issue, resize crash memory ranges array on hitting array size limit. But without a hard limit on the number of crash memory ranges, there is a possibility of program headers count overflow in the /proc/vmcore ELF file while exporting each of this memory ranges as PT_LOAD segments. To reduce the likelihood of such scenario, fold adjacent memory ranges to minimize the total number of crash memory ranges. Fixes: 2df173d9e85d ("fadump: Initialize elfcore header and add PT_LOAD program headers.") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: Mahesh Salgaonkar <mahesh(a)linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Hari Bathini <hbathini(a)linux.ibm.com> --- arch/powerpc/include/asm/fadump.h | 2 + arch/powerpc/kernel/fadump.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/fadump.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/fadump.h index 5a23010..ff708b3 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/fadump.h +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/fadump.h @@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ struct fadump_crash_info_header { }; /* Crash memory ranges */ -#define INIT_CRASHMEM_RANGES (INIT_MEMBLOCK_REGIONS + 2) +#define INIT_CRASHMEM_RANGES INIT_MEMBLOCK_REGIONS struct fad_crash_memory_ranges { unsigned long long base; diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/fadump.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/fadump.c index 07e8396..1c1df4f 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/fadump.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/fadump.c @@ -47,7 +47,9 @@ static struct fadump_mem_struct fdm; static const struct fadump_mem_struct *fdm_active; static DEFINE_MUTEX(fadump_mutex); -struct fad_crash_memory_ranges crash_memory_ranges[INIT_CRASHMEM_RANGES]; +struct fad_crash_memory_ranges init_crash_memory_ranges[INIT_CRASHMEM_RANGES]; +int max_crash_mem_ranges = INIT_CRASHMEM_RANGES; +struct fad_crash_memory_ranges *crash_memory_ranges = init_crash_memory_ranges; int crash_mem_ranges; /* Scan the Firmware Assisted dump configuration details. */ @@ -871,14 +873,65 @@ static int __init process_fadump(const struct fadump_mem_struct *fdm_active) static inline void fadump_add_crash_memory(unsigned long long base, unsigned long long end) { + u64 start, size; + bool is_adjacent = false; + if (base == end) return; + /* + * Fold adjacent memory ranges to bring down the memory ranges/ + * PT_LOAD segments count. + */ + if (crash_mem_ranges) { + start = crash_memory_ranges[crash_mem_ranges-1].base; + size = crash_memory_ranges[crash_mem_ranges-1].size; + + if ((start + size) == base) + is_adjacent = true; + } + + if (!is_adjacent) { + /* resize the array on reaching the limit */ + if (crash_mem_ranges == max_crash_mem_ranges) { + u64 old_size, new_max; + struct fad_crash_memory_ranges *new_array; + + old_size = max_crash_mem_ranges; + old_size *= sizeof(struct fad_crash_memory_ranges); + + new_max = max_crash_mem_ranges + INIT_CRASHMEM_RANGES; + size = new_max * sizeof(struct fad_crash_memory_ranges); + + pr_debug("Resizing crash memory ranges count from %d to %d\n", + max_crash_mem_ranges, new_max); + + new_array = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (new_array == NULL) { + pr_warn("Insufficient memory for setting up crash memory ranges\n"); + return; + } + + /* + * Copy the old memory ranges into the new array before + * free'ing it. + */ + memcpy(new_array, crash_memory_ranges, old_size); + if (crash_memory_ranges != init_crash_memory_ranges) + kfree(crash_memory_ranges); + + crash_memory_ranges = new_array; + max_crash_mem_ranges = new_max; + } + start = base; + crash_memory_ranges[crash_mem_ranges].base = start; + crash_mem_ranges++; + } + + crash_memory_ranges[crash_mem_ranges-1].size = (end - start); + pr_debug("crash_memory_range[%d] [%#016llx-%#016llx], %#llx bytes\n", - crash_mem_ranges, base, end - 1, (end - base)); - crash_memory_ranges[crash_mem_ranges].base = base; - crash_memory_ranges[crash_mem_ranges].size = end - base; - crash_mem_ranges++; + (crash_mem_ranges - 1), start, end - 1, (end - start)); } static void fadump_exclude_reserved_area(unsigned long long start,

7 years, 4 months

4
3
0 0

[PATCH v2] zram: remove BD_CAP_SYNCHRONOUS_IO with writeback feature

by Minchan Kim

If zram supports writeback feature, it's no longer a BD_CAP_SYNCHRONOUS_IO device beause zram does asynchronous IO operations for incompressible pages. Do not pretend to be synchronous IO device. It makes the system very sluggish due to waiting for IO completion from upper layers. Furthermore, it causes a user-after-free problem because swap thinks the opearion is done when the IO functions returns so it can free the page (e.g., lock_page_or_retry and goto out_release in do_swap_page) but in fact, IO is asynchronous so the driver could access a just freed page afterward. This patch fixes the problem. BUG: Bad page state in process qemu-system-x86 pfn:3dfab21 page:ffffdfb137eac840 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x1 flags: 0x17fffc000000008(uptodate) raw: 017fffc000000008 dead000000000100 dead000000000200 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: PAGE_FLAGS_CHECK_AT_PREP flag set bad because of flags: 0x8(uptodate) Modules linked in: lz4 lz4_compress zram zsmalloc intel_rapl sb_edac x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel bin fmt_misc pcbc aesni_intel aes_x86_64 crypto_simd cryptd iTCO_wdt glue_helper iTCO_vendor_support intel_cstate lpc_ich mei_me intel_uncore intel_rapl_perf pcspkr joydev sg mfd_core ioatdma mei wmi evdev ipmi_si ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler acpi_power_meter acpi_pad button ip_tables x_tables autofs4 ext4 crc32c_generic crc16 mbcache jbd2 fscrypto hid_generic usbhid hid sd_mod xhci_pci ehci_pci ahci libahci xhci_hcd ehci_hcd libata igb i2c_algo_bit crc32c_intel scsi_mod i2c_i8 01 dca usbcore CPU: 4 PID: 1039 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Tainted: G B 4.18.0-rc5+ #1 Hardware name: Supermicro Super Server/X10SRL-F, BIOS 2.0b 05/02/2017 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x5c/0x7b bad_page+0xba/0x120 get_page_from_freelist+0x1016/0x1250 __alloc_pages_nodemask+0xfa/0x250 alloc_pages_vma+0x7c/0x1c0 do_swap_page+0x347/0x920 ? __update_load_avg_se.isra.38+0x1eb/0x1f0 ? cpumask_next_wrap+0x3d/0x60 __handle_mm_fault+0x7b4/0x1110 ? update_load_avg+0x5ea/0x720 handle_mm_fault+0xfc/0x1f0 __get_user_pages+0x12f/0x690 get_user_pages_unlocked+0x148/0x1f0 __gfn_to_pfn_memslot+0xff/0x3c0 [kvm] try_async_pf+0x87/0x230 [kvm] tdp_page_fault+0x132/0x290 [kvm] ? vmexit_fill_RSB+0xc/0x30 [kvm_intel] kvm_mmu_page_fault+0x74/0x570 [kvm] ? vmexit_fill_RSB+0xc/0x30 [kvm_intel] ? vmexit_fill_RSB+0x18/0x30 [kvm_intel] ? vmexit_fill_RSB+0xc/0x30 [kvm_intel] ? vmexit_fill_RSB+0x18/0x30 [kvm_intel] ? vmexit_fill_RSB+0xc/0x30 [kvm_intel] ? vmexit_fill_RSB+0x18/0x30 [kvm_intel] ? vmexit_fill_RSB+0xc/0x30 [kvm_intel] ? vmexit_fill_RSB+0x18/0x30 [kvm_intel] ? vmexit_fill_RSB+0xc/0x30 [kvm_intel] ? vmexit_fill_RSB+0x18/0x30 [kvm_intel] ? vmexit_fill_RSB+0xc/0x30 [kvm_intel] ? vmx_vcpu_run+0x375/0x620 [kvm_intel] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x9b3/0x1990 [kvm] ? __update_load_avg_se.isra.38+0x1eb/0x1f0 ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x388/0x5d0 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x388/0x5d0 [kvm] ? __switch_to+0x395/0x450 ? __switch_to+0x395/0x450 do_vfs_ioctl+0xa2/0x630 ? __schedule+0x3fd/0x890 ksys_ioctl+0x70/0x80 ? exit_to_usermode_loop+0xca/0xf0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x55/0x100 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7fb30361add7 Code: 00 00 00 48 8b 05 c1 80 2b 00 64 c7 00 26 00 00 00 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 91 80 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fb2e97f98b8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000ae80 RCX: 00007fb30361add7 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000ae80 RDI: 0000000000000015 RBP: 00005652b984e0f0 R08: 00005652b7d513d0 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007fb308c66000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00005652b984e0f0 * from v1 - description correction - Andrew - add comment about removing BDI_CAP_SYNCHRONOUS_IO Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/0516ae2d-b0fd-92c5-aa92-112ba7bd32fc@contabo.d… Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180802051112.86174-1-minchan@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Minchan Kim <minchan(a)kernel.org> Reported-by: Tino Lehnig <tino.lehnig(a)contabo.de> Tested-by: Tino Lehnig <tino.lehnig(a)contabo.de> Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky.work(a)gmail.com> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> [4.15+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- drivers/block/zram/zram_drv.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/block/zram/zram_drv.c b/drivers/block/zram/zram_drv.c index 7436b2d27fa3..82aa1a1f383a 100644 --- a/drivers/block/zram/zram_drv.c +++ b/drivers/block/zram/zram_drv.c @@ -298,7 +298,8 @@ static void reset_bdev(struct zram *zram) zram->backing_dev = NULL; zram->old_block_size = 0; zram->bdev = NULL; - + zram->disk->queue->backing_dev_info->capabilities |= + BDI_CAP_SYNCHRONOUS_IO; kvfree(zram->bitmap); zram->bitmap = NULL; } @@ -400,6 +401,18 @@ static ssize_t backing_dev_store(struct device *dev, zram->backing_dev = backing_dev; zram->bitmap = bitmap; zram->nr_pages = nr_pages; + /* + * With writeback feature, zram does asynchronous IO so it's no longer + * synchronous device so let's remove synchronous io flag. Othewise, + * upper layer(e.g., swap) could wait IO completion rather than + * (submit and return), which will cause system sluggish. + * Furthermore, when the IO function returns(e.g., swap_readpage), + * upper layer expects IO was done so it could deallocate the page + * freely but in fact, IO is going on so finally could cause + * use-after-free when the IO is really done. + */ + zram->disk->queue->backing_dev_info->capabilities &= + ~BDI_CAP_SYNCHRONOUS_IO; up_write(&zram->init_lock); pr_info("setup backing device %s\n", file_name); -- 2.18.0.597.ga71716f1ad-goog

7 years, 4 months

1
0
0 0

[PATCH 1/2] zram: remove BD_CAP_SYNCHRONOUS_IO with writeback feature

by Minchan Kim

If zram supports writeback feature, it's no more syncrhonous device beause zram does synchronous IO opeation for incompressible page. Do not pretend to be syncrhonous IO device. It makes system very sluggish as waiting IO completion from upper layer. Furthermore, it makes user-after-free problem because swap think the opearion is done when the IO functions returns so it could free page by will(e.g., lock_page_or_retry and goto out_release in do_swap_page) but in fact, IO is asynchrnous so driver could access just freed page afterward. This patch fixes the problem. BUG: Bad page state in process qemu-system-x86 pfn:3dfab21 page:ffffdfb137eac840 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x1 flags: 0x17fffc000000008(uptodate) raw: 017fffc000000008 dead000000000100 dead000000000200 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: PAGE_FLAGS_CHECK_AT_PREP flag set bad because of flags: 0x8(uptodate) Modules linked in: lz4 lz4_compress zram zsmalloc intel_rapl sb_edac x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel bin fmt_misc pcbc aesni_intel aes_x86_64 crypto_simd cryptd iTCO_wdt glue_helper iTCO_vendor_support intel_cstate lpc_ich mei_me intel_uncore intel_rapl_perf pcspkr joydev sg mfd_core ioatdma mei wmi evdev ipmi_si ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler acpi_power_meter acpi_pad button ip_tables x_tables autofs4 ext4 crc32c_generic crc16 mbcache jbd2 fscrypto hid_generic usbhid hid sd_mod xhci_pci ehci_pci ahci libahci xhci_hcd ehci_hcd libata igb i2c_algo_bit crc32c_intel scsi_mod i2c_i8 01 dca usbcore CPU: 4 PID: 1039 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Tainted: G B 4.18.0-rc5+ #1 Hardware name: Supermicro Super Server/X10SRL-F, BIOS 2.0b 05/02/2017 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x5c/0x7b bad_page+0xba/0x120 get_page_from_freelist+0x1016/0x1250 __alloc_pages_nodemask+0xfa/0x250 alloc_pages_vma+0x7c/0x1c0 do_swap_page+0x347/0x920 ? __update_load_avg_se.isra.38+0x1eb/0x1f0 ? cpumask_next_wrap+0x3d/0x60 __handle_mm_fault+0x7b4/0x1110 ? update_load_avg+0x5ea/0x720 handle_mm_fault+0xfc/0x1f0 __get_user_pages+0x12f/0x690 get_user_pages_unlocked+0x148/0x1f0 __gfn_to_pfn_memslot+0xff/0x3c0 [kvm] try_async_pf+0x87/0x230 [kvm] tdp_page_fault+0x132/0x290 [kvm] ? vmexit_fill_RSB+0xc/0x30 [kvm_intel] kvm_mmu_page_fault+0x74/0x570 [kvm] ? vmexit_fill_RSB+0xc/0x30 [kvm_intel] ? vmexit_fill_RSB+0x18/0x30 [kvm_intel] ? vmexit_fill_RSB+0xc/0x30 [kvm_intel] ? vmexit_fill_RSB+0x18/0x30 [kvm_intel] ? vmexit_fill_RSB+0xc/0x30 [kvm_intel] ? vmexit_fill_RSB+0x18/0x30 [kvm_intel] ? vmexit_fill_RSB+0xc/0x30 [kvm_intel] ? vmexit_fill_RSB+0x18/0x30 [kvm_intel] ? vmexit_fill_RSB+0xc/0x30 [kvm_intel] ? vmexit_fill_RSB+0x18/0x30 [kvm_intel] ? vmexit_fill_RSB+0xc/0x30 [kvm_intel] ? vmx_vcpu_run+0x375/0x620 [kvm_intel] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x9b3/0x1990 [kvm] ? __update_load_avg_se.isra.38+0x1eb/0x1f0 ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x388/0x5d0 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x388/0x5d0 [kvm] ? __switch_to+0x395/0x450 ? __switch_to+0x395/0x450 do_vfs_ioctl+0xa2/0x630 ? __schedule+0x3fd/0x890 ksys_ioctl+0x70/0x80 ? exit_to_usermode_loop+0xca/0xf0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x55/0x100 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7fb30361add7 Code: 00 00 00 48 8b 05 c1 80 2b 00 64 c7 00 26 00 00 00 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 91 80 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fb2e97f98b8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000ae80 RCX: 00007fb30361add7 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000ae80 RDI: 0000000000000015 RBP: 00005652b984e0f0 R08: 00005652b7d513d0 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007fb308c66000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00005652b984e0f0 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/0516ae2d-b0fd-92c5-aa92-112ba7bd32fc@contabo.d… Reported-by: Tino Lehnig <tino.lehnig(a)contabo.de> Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky.work(a)gmail.com> Cc: Tino Lehnig <tino.lehnig(a)contabo.de> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v4.15+ Tested-by: Tino Lehnig <tino.lehnig(a)contabo.de> Signed-off-by: Minchan Kim <minchan(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/block/zram/zram_drv.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/block/zram/zram_drv.c b/drivers/block/zram/zram_drv.c index 7436b2d27fa3..0b6eda1bd77a 100644 --- a/drivers/block/zram/zram_drv.c +++ b/drivers/block/zram/zram_drv.c @@ -298,7 +298,8 @@ static void reset_bdev(struct zram *zram) zram->backing_dev = NULL; zram->old_block_size = 0; zram->bdev = NULL; - + zram->disk->queue->backing_dev_info->capabilities |= + BDI_CAP_SYNCHRONOUS_IO; kvfree(zram->bitmap); zram->bitmap = NULL; } @@ -400,6 +401,8 @@ static ssize_t backing_dev_store(struct device *dev, zram->backing_dev = backing_dev; zram->bitmap = bitmap; zram->nr_pages = nr_pages; + zram->disk->queue->backing_dev_info->capabilities &= + ~BDI_CAP_SYNCHRONOUS_IO; up_write(&zram->init_lock); pr_info("setup backing device %s\n", file_name); -- 2.18.0.597.ga71716f1ad-goog

7 years, 4 months

3
11
0 0

2025

2024

2023

2022

2021

2020

2019

2018

2017

Linux-stable-mirror