January 2025 - Linux-stable-mirror

[PATCH AUTOSEL 6.6 1/9] x86/kexec: Allocate PGD for x86_64 transition page tables separately

by Sasha Levin

From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> [ Upstream commit 4b5bc2ec9a239bce261ffeafdd63571134102323 ] Now that the following fix: d0ceea662d45 ("x86/mm: Add _PAGE_NOPTISHADOW bit to avoid updating userspace page tables") stops kernel_ident_mapping_init() from scribbling over the end of a 4KiB PGD by assuming the following 4KiB will be a userspace PGD, there's no good reason for the kexec PGD to be part of a single 8KiB allocation with the control_code_page. ( It's not clear that that was the reason for x86_64 kexec doing it that way in the first place either; there were no comments to that effect and it seems to have been the case even before PTI came along. It looks like it was just a happy accident which prevented memory corruption on kexec. ) Either way, it definitely isn't needed now. Just allocate the PGD separately on x86_64, like i386 already does. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe(a)redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal(a)redhat.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung(a)redhat.com> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm(a)xmission.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb(a)kernel.org> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa(a)zytor.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241205153343.3275139-6-dwmw2@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h | 18 +++++++++--- arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++-------------- 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h index c9f6a6c5de3cf..d54dd7084a3e1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ # define PAGES_NR 4 #endif +# define KEXEC_CONTROL_PAGE_SIZE 4096 # define KEXEC_CONTROL_CODE_MAX_SIZE 2048 #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ @@ -44,7 +45,6 @@ struct kimage; /* Maximum address we can use for the control code buffer */ # define KEXEC_CONTROL_MEMORY_LIMIT TASK_SIZE -# define KEXEC_CONTROL_PAGE_SIZE 4096 /* The native architecture */ # define KEXEC_ARCH KEXEC_ARCH_386 @@ -59,9 +59,6 @@ struct kimage; /* Maximum address we can use for the control pages */ # define KEXEC_CONTROL_MEMORY_LIMIT (MAXMEM-1) -/* Allocate one page for the pdp and the second for the code */ -# define KEXEC_CONTROL_PAGE_SIZE (4096UL + 4096UL) - /* The native architecture */ # define KEXEC_ARCH KEXEC_ARCH_X86_64 #endif @@ -146,6 +143,19 @@ struct kimage_arch { }; #else struct kimage_arch { + /* + * This is a kimage control page, as it must not overlap with either + * source or destination address ranges. + */ + pgd_t *pgd; + /* + * The virtual mapping of the control code page itself is used only + * during the transition, while the current kernel's pages are all + * in place. Thus the intermediate page table pages used to map it + * are not control pages, but instead just normal pages obtained + * with get_zeroed_page(). And have to be tracked (below) so that + * they can be freed. + */ p4d_t *p4d; pud_t *pud; pmd_t *pmd; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c index 2fa12d1dc6760..8509d809a9f1b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c @@ -149,7 +149,8 @@ static void free_transition_pgtable(struct kimage *image) image->arch.pte = NULL; } -static int init_transition_pgtable(struct kimage *image, pgd_t *pgd) +static int init_transition_pgtable(struct kimage *image, pgd_t *pgd, + unsigned long control_page) { pgprot_t prot = PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC_NOENC; unsigned long vaddr, paddr; @@ -160,7 +161,7 @@ static int init_transition_pgtable(struct kimage *image, pgd_t *pgd) pte_t *pte; vaddr = (unsigned long)relocate_kernel; - paddr = __pa(page_address(image->control_code_page)+PAGE_SIZE); + paddr = control_page; pgd += pgd_index(vaddr); if (!pgd_present(*pgd)) { p4d = (p4d_t *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL); @@ -219,7 +220,7 @@ static void *alloc_pgt_page(void *data) return p; } -static int init_pgtable(struct kimage *image, unsigned long start_pgtable) +static int init_pgtable(struct kimage *image, unsigned long control_page) { struct x86_mapping_info info = { .alloc_pgt_page = alloc_pgt_page, @@ -228,12 +229,12 @@ static int init_pgtable(struct kimage *image, unsigned long start_pgtable) .kernpg_flag = _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC, }; unsigned long mstart, mend; - pgd_t *level4p; int result; int i; - level4p = (pgd_t *)__va(start_pgtable); - clear_page(level4p); + image->arch.pgd = alloc_pgt_page(image); + if (!image->arch.pgd) + return -ENOMEM; if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) { info.page_flag |= _PAGE_ENC; @@ -247,8 +248,8 @@ static int init_pgtable(struct kimage *image, unsigned long start_pgtable) mstart = pfn_mapped[i].start << PAGE_SHIFT; mend = pfn_mapped[i].end << PAGE_SHIFT; - result = kernel_ident_mapping_init(&info, - level4p, mstart, mend); + result = kernel_ident_mapping_init(&info, image->arch.pgd, + mstart, mend); if (result) return result; } @@ -263,8 +264,8 @@ static int init_pgtable(struct kimage *image, unsigned long start_pgtable) mstart = image->segment[i].mem; mend = mstart + image->segment[i].memsz; - result = kernel_ident_mapping_init(&info, - level4p, mstart, mend); + result = kernel_ident_mapping_init(&info, image->arch.pgd, + mstart, mend); if (result) return result; @@ -274,15 +275,19 @@ static int init_pgtable(struct kimage *image, unsigned long start_pgtable) * Prepare EFI systab and ACPI tables for kexec kernel since they are * not covered by pfn_mapped. */ - result = map_efi_systab(&info, level4p); + result = map_efi_systab(&info, image->arch.pgd); if (result) return result; - result = map_acpi_tables(&info, level4p); + result = map_acpi_tables(&info, image->arch.pgd); if (result) return result; - return init_transition_pgtable(image, level4p); + /* + * This must be last because the intermediate page table pages it + * allocates will not be control pages and may overlap the image. + */ + return init_transition_pgtable(image, image->arch.pgd, control_page); } static void load_segments(void) @@ -299,14 +304,14 @@ static void load_segments(void) int machine_kexec_prepare(struct kimage *image) { - unsigned long start_pgtable; + unsigned long control_page; int result; /* Calculate the offsets */ - start_pgtable = page_to_pfn(image->control_code_page) << PAGE_SHIFT; + control_page = page_to_pfn(image->control_code_page) << PAGE_SHIFT; /* Setup the identity mapped 64bit page table */ - result = init_pgtable(image, start_pgtable); + result = init_pgtable(image, control_page); if (result) return result; @@ -360,13 +365,12 @@ void machine_kexec(struct kimage *image) #endif } - control_page = page_address(image->control_code_page) + PAGE_SIZE; + control_page = page_address(image->control_code_page); __memcpy(control_page, relocate_kernel, KEXEC_CONTROL_CODE_MAX_SIZE); page_list[PA_CONTROL_PAGE] = virt_to_phys(control_page); page_list[VA_CONTROL_PAGE] = (unsigned long)control_page; - page_list[PA_TABLE_PAGE] = - (unsigned long)__pa(page_address(image->control_code_page)); + page_list[PA_TABLE_PAGE] = (unsigned long)__pa(image->arch.pgd); if (image->type == KEXEC_TYPE_DEFAULT) page_list[PA_SWAP_PAGE] = (page_to_pfn(image->swap_page) @@ -574,8 +578,7 @@ static void kexec_mark_crashkres(bool protect) /* Don't touch the control code page used in crash_kexec().*/ control = PFN_PHYS(page_to_pfn(kexec_crash_image->control_code_page)); - /* Control code page is located in the 2nd page. */ - kexec_mark_range(crashk_res.start, control + PAGE_SIZE - 1, protect); + kexec_mark_range(crashk_res.start, control - 1, protect); control += KEXEC_CONTROL_PAGE_SIZE; kexec_mark_range(control, crashk_res.end, protect); } -- 2.39.5

4 months, 1 week

1
8
0 0

[PATCH AUTOSEL 6.12 01/14] ASoC: SOF: Intel: hda-dai: Ensure DAI widget is valid during params

by Sasha Levin

From: Bard Liao <yung-chuan.liao(a)linux.intel.com> [ Upstream commit 569922b82ca660f8b24e705f6cf674e6b1f99cc7 ] Each cpu DAI should associate with a widget. However, the topology might not create the right number of DAI widgets for aggregated amps. And it will cause NULL pointer deference. Check that the DAI widget associated with the CPU DAI is valid to prevent NULL pointer deference due to missing DAI widgets in topologies with aggregated amps. Signed-off-by: Bard Liao <yung-chuan.liao(a)linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ranjani Sridharan <ranjani.sridharan(a)linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Péter Ujfalusi <peter.ujfalusi(a)linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Liam Girdwood <liam.r.girdwood(a)intel.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241203104853.56956-1-yung-chuan.liao@linux.intel… Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- sound/soc/sof/intel/hda-dai.c | 12 ++++++++++++ sound/soc/sof/intel/hda.c | 5 +++++ 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+) diff --git a/sound/soc/sof/intel/hda-dai.c b/sound/soc/sof/intel/hda-dai.c index 82f46ecd94301..2e58a264da556 100644 --- a/sound/soc/sof/intel/hda-dai.c +++ b/sound/soc/sof/intel/hda-dai.c @@ -503,6 +503,12 @@ int sdw_hda_dai_hw_params(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream, int ret; int i; + if (!w) { + dev_err(cpu_dai->dev, "%s widget not found, check amp link num in the topology\n", + cpu_dai->name); + return -EINVAL; + } + ops = hda_dai_get_ops(substream, cpu_dai); if (!ops) { dev_err(cpu_dai->dev, "DAI widget ops not set\n"); @@ -582,6 +588,12 @@ int sdw_hda_dai_hw_params(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream, */ for_each_rtd_cpu_dais(rtd, i, dai) { w = snd_soc_dai_get_widget(dai, substream->stream); + if (!w) { + dev_err(cpu_dai->dev, + "%s widget not found, check amp link num in the topology\n", + dai->name); + return -EINVAL; + } ipc4_copier = widget_to_copier(w); memcpy(&ipc4_copier->dma_config_tlv[cpu_dai_id], dma_config_tlv, sizeof(*dma_config_tlv)); diff --git a/sound/soc/sof/intel/hda.c b/sound/soc/sof/intel/hda.c index 70fc08c8fc99e..f10ed4d102501 100644 --- a/sound/soc/sof/intel/hda.c +++ b/sound/soc/sof/intel/hda.c @@ -63,6 +63,11 @@ static int sdw_params_stream(struct device *dev, struct snd_soc_dapm_widget *w = snd_soc_dai_get_widget(d, params_data->substream->stream); struct snd_sof_dai_config_data data = { 0 }; + if (!w) { + dev_err(dev, "%s widget not found, check amp link num in the topology\n", + d->name); + return -EINVAL; + } data.dai_index = (params_data->link_id << 8) | d->id; data.dai_data = params_data->alh_stream_id; data.dai_node_id = data.dai_data; -- 2.39.5

4 months, 1 week

1
13
0 0

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.4 1/7] tun: fix group permission check

by Sasha Levin

From: Stas Sergeev <stsp2(a)yandex.ru> [ Upstream commit 3ca459eaba1bf96a8c7878de84fa8872259a01e3 ] Currently tun checks the group permission even if the user have matched. Besides going against the usual permission semantic, this has a very interesting implication: if the tun group is not among the supplementary groups of the tun user, then effectively no one can access the tun device. CAP_SYS_ADMIN still can, but its the same as not setting the tun ownership. This patch relaxes the group checking so that either the user match or the group match is enough. This avoids the situation when no one can access the device even though the ownership is properly set. Also I simplified the logic by removing the redundant inversions: tun_not_capable() --> !tun_capable() Signed-off-by: Stas Sergeev <stsp2(a)yandex.ru> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb(a)google.com> Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang(a)redhat.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241205073614.294773-1-stsp2@yandex.ru Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/net/tun.c | 14 +++++++++----- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/tun.c b/drivers/net/tun.c index 0adce9bf7a1e5..87cc7d778c3cf 100644 --- a/drivers/net/tun.c +++ b/drivers/net/tun.c @@ -636,14 +636,18 @@ static u16 tun_select_queue(struct net_device *dev, struct sk_buff *skb, return ret; } -static inline bool tun_not_capable(struct tun_struct *tun) +static inline bool tun_capable(struct tun_struct *tun) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct net *net = dev_net(tun->dev); - return ((uid_valid(tun->owner) && !uid_eq(cred->euid, tun->owner)) || - (gid_valid(tun->group) && !in_egroup_p(tun->group))) && - !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN); + if (ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) + return 1; + if (uid_valid(tun->owner) && uid_eq(cred->euid, tun->owner)) + return 1; + if (gid_valid(tun->group) && in_egroup_p(tun->group)) + return 1; + return 0; } static void tun_set_real_num_queues(struct tun_struct *tun) @@ -2838,7 +2842,7 @@ static int tun_set_iff(struct net *net, struct file *file, struct ifreq *ifr) !!(tun->flags & IFF_MULTI_QUEUE)) return -EINVAL; - if (tun_not_capable(tun)) + if (!tun_capable(tun)) return -EPERM; err = security_tun_dev_open(tun->security); if (err < 0) -- 2.39.5

4 months, 1 week

1
6
0 0

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.10 01/12] tun: fix group permission check

by Sasha Levin

From: Stas Sergeev <stsp2(a)yandex.ru> [ Upstream commit 3ca459eaba1bf96a8c7878de84fa8872259a01e3 ] Currently tun checks the group permission even if the user have matched. Besides going against the usual permission semantic, this has a very interesting implication: if the tun group is not among the supplementary groups of the tun user, then effectively no one can access the tun device. CAP_SYS_ADMIN still can, but its the same as not setting the tun ownership. This patch relaxes the group checking so that either the user match or the group match is enough. This avoids the situation when no one can access the device even though the ownership is properly set. Also I simplified the logic by removing the redundant inversions: tun_not_capable() --> !tun_capable() Signed-off-by: Stas Sergeev <stsp2(a)yandex.ru> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb(a)google.com> Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang(a)redhat.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241205073614.294773-1-stsp2@yandex.ru Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/net/tun.c | 14 +++++++++----- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/tun.c b/drivers/net/tun.c index c34c6f0d23efe..52ea9f81d388b 100644 --- a/drivers/net/tun.c +++ b/drivers/net/tun.c @@ -586,14 +586,18 @@ static u16 tun_select_queue(struct net_device *dev, struct sk_buff *skb, return ret; } -static inline bool tun_not_capable(struct tun_struct *tun) +static inline bool tun_capable(struct tun_struct *tun) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct net *net = dev_net(tun->dev); - return ((uid_valid(tun->owner) && !uid_eq(cred->euid, tun->owner)) || - (gid_valid(tun->group) && !in_egroup_p(tun->group))) && - !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN); + if (ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) + return 1; + if (uid_valid(tun->owner) && uid_eq(cred->euid, tun->owner)) + return 1; + if (gid_valid(tun->group) && in_egroup_p(tun->group)) + return 1; + return 0; } static void tun_set_real_num_queues(struct tun_struct *tun) @@ -2772,7 +2776,7 @@ static int tun_set_iff(struct net *net, struct file *file, struct ifreq *ifr) !!(tun->flags & IFF_MULTI_QUEUE)) return -EINVAL; - if (tun_not_capable(tun)) + if (!tun_capable(tun)) return -EPERM; err = security_tun_dev_open(tun->security); if (err < 0) -- 2.39.5

4 months, 1 week

1
11
0 0

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.15 01/14] tun: fix group permission check

by Sasha Levin

From: Stas Sergeev <stsp2(a)yandex.ru> [ Upstream commit 3ca459eaba1bf96a8c7878de84fa8872259a01e3 ] Currently tun checks the group permission even if the user have matched. Besides going against the usual permission semantic, this has a very interesting implication: if the tun group is not among the supplementary groups of the tun user, then effectively no one can access the tun device. CAP_SYS_ADMIN still can, but its the same as not setting the tun ownership. This patch relaxes the group checking so that either the user match or the group match is enough. This avoids the situation when no one can access the device even though the ownership is properly set. Also I simplified the logic by removing the redundant inversions: tun_not_capable() --> !tun_capable() Signed-off-by: Stas Sergeev <stsp2(a)yandex.ru> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb(a)google.com> Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang(a)redhat.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241205073614.294773-1-stsp2@yandex.ru Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/net/tun.c | 14 +++++++++----- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/tun.c b/drivers/net/tun.c index 959ca6b9cd138..a85f743aa1573 100644 --- a/drivers/net/tun.c +++ b/drivers/net/tun.c @@ -575,14 +575,18 @@ static u16 tun_select_queue(struct net_device *dev, struct sk_buff *skb, return ret; } -static inline bool tun_not_capable(struct tun_struct *tun) +static inline bool tun_capable(struct tun_struct *tun) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct net *net = dev_net(tun->dev); - return ((uid_valid(tun->owner) && !uid_eq(cred->euid, tun->owner)) || - (gid_valid(tun->group) && !in_egroup_p(tun->group))) && - !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN); + if (ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) + return 1; + if (uid_valid(tun->owner) && uid_eq(cred->euid, tun->owner)) + return 1; + if (gid_valid(tun->group) && in_egroup_p(tun->group)) + return 1; + return 0; } static void tun_set_real_num_queues(struct tun_struct *tun) @@ -2718,7 +2722,7 @@ static int tun_set_iff(struct net *net, struct file *file, struct ifreq *ifr) !!(tun->flags & IFF_MULTI_QUEUE)) return -EINVAL; - if (tun_not_capable(tun)) + if (!tun_capable(tun)) return -EPERM; err = security_tun_dev_open(tun->security); if (err < 0) -- 2.39.5

4 months, 1 week

1
13
0 0

[PATCH AUTOSEL 6.1 01/17] tun: fix group permission check

by Sasha Levin

From: Stas Sergeev <stsp2(a)yandex.ru> [ Upstream commit 3ca459eaba1bf96a8c7878de84fa8872259a01e3 ] Currently tun checks the group permission even if the user have matched. Besides going against the usual permission semantic, this has a very interesting implication: if the tun group is not among the supplementary groups of the tun user, then effectively no one can access the tun device. CAP_SYS_ADMIN still can, but its the same as not setting the tun ownership. This patch relaxes the group checking so that either the user match or the group match is enough. This avoids the situation when no one can access the device even though the ownership is properly set. Also I simplified the logic by removing the redundant inversions: tun_not_capable() --> !tun_capable() Signed-off-by: Stas Sergeev <stsp2(a)yandex.ru> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb(a)google.com> Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang(a)redhat.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241205073614.294773-1-stsp2@yandex.ru Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/net/tun.c | 14 +++++++++----- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/tun.c b/drivers/net/tun.c index ea98d93138c12..a6c9f9062dbd4 100644 --- a/drivers/net/tun.c +++ b/drivers/net/tun.c @@ -574,14 +574,18 @@ static u16 tun_select_queue(struct net_device *dev, struct sk_buff *skb, return ret; } -static inline bool tun_not_capable(struct tun_struct *tun) +static inline bool tun_capable(struct tun_struct *tun) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct net *net = dev_net(tun->dev); - return ((uid_valid(tun->owner) && !uid_eq(cred->euid, tun->owner)) || - (gid_valid(tun->group) && !in_egroup_p(tun->group))) && - !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN); + if (ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) + return 1; + if (uid_valid(tun->owner) && uid_eq(cred->euid, tun->owner)) + return 1; + if (gid_valid(tun->group) && in_egroup_p(tun->group)) + return 1; + return 0; } static void tun_set_real_num_queues(struct tun_struct *tun) @@ -2767,7 +2771,7 @@ static int tun_set_iff(struct net *net, struct file *file, struct ifreq *ifr) !!(tun->flags & IFF_MULTI_QUEUE)) return -EINVAL; - if (tun_not_capable(tun)) + if (!tun_capable(tun)) return -EPERM; err = security_tun_dev_open(tun->security); if (err < 0) -- 2.39.5

4 months, 1 week

1
16
0 0

[PATCH AUTOSEL 6.6 01/19] wifi: rtw89: add crystal_cap check to avoid setting as overflow value

by Sasha Levin

From: Chih-Kang Chang <gary.chang(a)realtek.com> [ Upstream commit 7b98caea39676561f22db58752551161bb36462b ] In the original flow, the crystal_cap might be calculated as a negative value and set as an overflow value. Therefore, we added a check to limit the calculated crystal_cap value. Additionally, we shrank the crystal_cap adjustment according to specific CFO. Signed-off-by: Chih-Kang Chang <gary.chang(a)realtek.com> Signed-off-by: Ping-Ke Shih <pkshih(a)realtek.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241128055433.11851-7-pkshih@realtek.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw89/phy.c | 11 ++++++----- drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw89/phy.h | 2 +- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw89/phy.c b/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw89/phy.c index fac83b718a30c..457c1dd31bf9d 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw89/phy.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw89/phy.c @@ -2438,7 +2438,6 @@ static void rtw89_phy_cfo_set_crystal_cap(struct rtw89_dev *rtwdev, if (!force && cfo->crystal_cap == crystal_cap) return; - crystal_cap = clamp_t(u8, crystal_cap, 0, 127); if (chip->chip_id == RTL8852A || chip->chip_id == RTL8851B) { rtw89_phy_cfo_set_xcap_reg(rtwdev, true, crystal_cap); rtw89_phy_cfo_set_xcap_reg(rtwdev, false, crystal_cap); @@ -2552,7 +2551,7 @@ static void rtw89_phy_cfo_crystal_cap_adjust(struct rtw89_dev *rtwdev, s32 curr_cfo) { struct rtw89_cfo_tracking_info *cfo = &rtwdev->cfo_tracking; - s8 crystal_cap = cfo->crystal_cap; + int crystal_cap = cfo->crystal_cap; s32 cfo_abs = abs(curr_cfo); int sign; @@ -2569,15 +2568,17 @@ static void rtw89_phy_cfo_crystal_cap_adjust(struct rtw89_dev *rtwdev, } sign = curr_cfo > 0 ? 1 : -1; if (cfo_abs > CFO_TRK_STOP_TH_4) - crystal_cap += 7 * sign; + crystal_cap += 3 * sign; else if (cfo_abs > CFO_TRK_STOP_TH_3) - crystal_cap += 5 * sign; - else if (cfo_abs > CFO_TRK_STOP_TH_2) crystal_cap += 3 * sign; + else if (cfo_abs > CFO_TRK_STOP_TH_2) + crystal_cap += 1 * sign; else if (cfo_abs > CFO_TRK_STOP_TH_1) crystal_cap += 1 * sign; else return; + + crystal_cap = clamp(crystal_cap, 0, 127); rtw89_phy_cfo_set_crystal_cap(rtwdev, (u8)crystal_cap, false); rtw89_debug(rtwdev, RTW89_DBG_CFO, "X_cap{Curr,Default}={0x%x,0x%x}\n", diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw89/phy.h b/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw89/phy.h index d6dc0cbbae43b..15ed23fa4218f 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw89/phy.h +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw89/phy.h @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ #define CFO_TRK_STOP_TH_4 (30 << 2) #define CFO_TRK_STOP_TH_3 (20 << 2) #define CFO_TRK_STOP_TH_2 (10 << 2) -#define CFO_TRK_STOP_TH_1 (00 << 2) +#define CFO_TRK_STOP_TH_1 (03 << 2) #define CFO_TRK_STOP_TH (2 << 2) #define CFO_SW_COMP_FINE_TUNE (2 << 2) #define CFO_PERIOD_CNT 15 -- 2.39.5

4 months, 1 week

1
18
0 0

[PATCH AUTOSEL 6.12 01/29] wifi: rtw89: add crystal_cap check to avoid setting as overflow value

by Sasha Levin

From: Chih-Kang Chang <gary.chang(a)realtek.com> [ Upstream commit 7b98caea39676561f22db58752551161bb36462b ] In the original flow, the crystal_cap might be calculated as a negative value and set as an overflow value. Therefore, we added a check to limit the calculated crystal_cap value. Additionally, we shrank the crystal_cap adjustment according to specific CFO. Signed-off-by: Chih-Kang Chang <gary.chang(a)realtek.com> Signed-off-by: Ping-Ke Shih <pkshih(a)realtek.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241128055433.11851-7-pkshih@realtek.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw89/phy.c | 11 ++++++----- drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw89/phy.h | 2 +- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw89/phy.c b/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw89/phy.c index 4b47b45f897cb..5c31639b4cade 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw89/phy.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw89/phy.c @@ -3892,7 +3892,6 @@ static void rtw89_phy_cfo_set_crystal_cap(struct rtw89_dev *rtwdev, if (!force && cfo->crystal_cap == crystal_cap) return; - crystal_cap = clamp_t(u8, crystal_cap, 0, 127); if (chip->chip_id == RTL8852A || chip->chip_id == RTL8851B) { rtw89_phy_cfo_set_xcap_reg(rtwdev, true, crystal_cap); rtw89_phy_cfo_set_xcap_reg(rtwdev, false, crystal_cap); @@ -4015,7 +4014,7 @@ static void rtw89_phy_cfo_crystal_cap_adjust(struct rtw89_dev *rtwdev, s32 curr_cfo) { struct rtw89_cfo_tracking_info *cfo = &rtwdev->cfo_tracking; - s8 crystal_cap = cfo->crystal_cap; + int crystal_cap = cfo->crystal_cap; s32 cfo_abs = abs(curr_cfo); int sign; @@ -4036,15 +4035,17 @@ static void rtw89_phy_cfo_crystal_cap_adjust(struct rtw89_dev *rtwdev, } sign = curr_cfo > 0 ? 1 : -1; if (cfo_abs > CFO_TRK_STOP_TH_4) - crystal_cap += 7 * sign; + crystal_cap += 3 * sign; else if (cfo_abs > CFO_TRK_STOP_TH_3) - crystal_cap += 5 * sign; - else if (cfo_abs > CFO_TRK_STOP_TH_2) crystal_cap += 3 * sign; + else if (cfo_abs > CFO_TRK_STOP_TH_2) + crystal_cap += 1 * sign; else if (cfo_abs > CFO_TRK_STOP_TH_1) crystal_cap += 1 * sign; else return; + + crystal_cap = clamp(crystal_cap, 0, 127); rtw89_phy_cfo_set_crystal_cap(rtwdev, (u8)crystal_cap, false); rtw89_debug(rtwdev, RTW89_DBG_CFO, "X_cap{Curr,Default}={0x%x,0x%x}\n", diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw89/phy.h b/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw89/phy.h index 7e335c02ee6fb..9bb9c9c8e7a1b 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw89/phy.h +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw89/phy.h @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ #define CFO_TRK_STOP_TH_4 (30 << 2) #define CFO_TRK_STOP_TH_3 (20 << 2) #define CFO_TRK_STOP_TH_2 (10 << 2) -#define CFO_TRK_STOP_TH_1 (00 << 2) +#define CFO_TRK_STOP_TH_1 (03 << 2) #define CFO_TRK_STOP_TH (2 << 2) #define CFO_SW_COMP_FINE_TUNE (2 << 2) #define CFO_PERIOD_CNT 15 -- 2.39.5

4 months, 1 week

1
28
0 0

[PATCH AUTOSEL 6.13 01/35] wifi: ath12k: Fix for out-of bound access error

by Sasha Levin

From: Karol Przybylski <karprzy7(a)gmail.com> [ Upstream commit eb8c0534713865d190856f10bfc97cf0b88475b1 ] Selfgen stats are placed in a buffer using print_array_to_buf_index() function. Array length parameter passed to the function is too big, resulting in possible out-of bound memory error. Decreasing buffer size by one fixes faulty upper bound of passed array. Discovered in coverity scan, CID 1600742 and CID 1600758 Signed-off-by: Karol Przybylski <karprzy7(a)gmail.com> Acked-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241105101132.374372-1-karprzy7@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jeff Johnson <quic_jjohnson(a)quicinc.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath12k/debugfs_htt_stats.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath12k/debugfs_htt_stats.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath12k/debugfs_htt_stats.c index c9980c0193d1d..43ea87e981f42 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath12k/debugfs_htt_stats.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath12k/debugfs_htt_stats.c @@ -1562,7 +1562,8 @@ ath12k_htt_print_tx_selfgen_ac_stats_tlv(const void *tag_buf, u16 tag_len, le32_to_cpu(htt_stats_buf->ac_mu_mimo_ndp)); len += print_array_to_buf_index(buf, len, "ac_mu_mimo_brpollX_tried = ", 1, htt_stats_buf->ac_mu_mimo_brpoll, - ATH12K_HTT_TX_NUM_AC_MUMIMO_USER_STATS, "\n\n"); + ATH12K_HTT_TX_NUM_AC_MUMIMO_USER_STATS - 1, + "\n\n"); stats_req->buf_len = len; } @@ -1590,7 +1591,7 @@ ath12k_htt_print_tx_selfgen_ax_stats_tlv(const void *tag_buf, u16 tag_len, le32_to_cpu(htt_stats_buf->ax_mu_mimo_ndp)); len += print_array_to_buf_index(buf, len, "ax_mu_mimo_brpollX_tried = ", 1, htt_stats_buf->ax_mu_mimo_brpoll, - ATH12K_HTT_TX_NUM_AX_MUMIMO_USER_STATS, "\n"); + ATH12K_HTT_TX_NUM_AX_MUMIMO_USER_STATS - 1, "\n"); len += scnprintf(buf + len, buf_len - len, "ax_basic_trigger = %u\n", le32_to_cpu(htt_stats_buf->ax_basic_trigger)); len += scnprintf(buf + len, buf_len - len, "ax_ulmumimo_total_trigger = %u\n", -- 2.39.5

4 months, 1 week

1
34
0 0

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.4 1/2] printk: Fix signed integer overflow when defining LOG_BUF_LEN_MAX

by Sasha Levin

From: Kuan-Wei Chiu <visitorckw(a)gmail.com> [ Upstream commit 3d6f83df8ff2d5de84b50377e4f0d45e25311c7a ] Shifting 1 << 31 on a 32-bit int causes signed integer overflow, which leads to undefined behavior. To prevent this, cast 1 to u32 before performing the shift, ensuring well-defined behavior. This change explicitly avoids any potential overflow by ensuring that the shift occurs on an unsigned 32-bit integer. Signed-off-by: Kuan-Wei Chiu <visitorckw(a)gmail.com> Acked-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek(a)suse.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240928113608.1438087-1-visitorckw@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- kernel/printk/printk.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/printk/printk.c b/kernel/printk/printk.c index ae1a97dd0c3cb..f6e1e154d9c18 100644 --- a/kernel/printk/printk.c +++ b/kernel/printk/printk.c @@ -457,7 +457,7 @@ static u32 clear_idx; /* record buffer */ #define LOG_ALIGN __alignof__(struct printk_log) #define __LOG_BUF_LEN (1 << CONFIG_LOG_BUF_SHIFT) -#define LOG_BUF_LEN_MAX (u32)(1 << 31) +#define LOG_BUF_LEN_MAX ((u32)1 << 31) static char __log_buf[__LOG_BUF_LEN] __aligned(LOG_ALIGN); static char *log_buf = __log_buf; static u32 log_buf_len = __LOG_BUF_LEN; -- 2.39.5

4 months, 1 week

1
1
0 0

2025

2024

2023

2022

2021

2020

2019

2018

2017

Linux-stable-mirror January 2025