September 2024 - Linux-stable-mirror

[PATCH v2] drm/sti: avoid potential dereference of error pointers

by Ma Ke

The return value of drm_atomic_get_crtc_state() needs to be checked. To avoid use of error pointer 'crtc_state' in case of the failure. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: dd86dc2f9ae1 ("drm/sti: implement atomic_check for the planes") Signed-off-by: Ma Ke <make24(a)iscas.ac.cn> --- Changes in v2: - modified the Fixes tag according to suggestions; - added necessary blank line. --- drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_cursor.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_cursor.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_cursor.c index db0a1eb53532..c59fcb4dca32 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_cursor.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_cursor.c @@ -200,6 +200,9 @@ static int sti_cursor_atomic_check(struct drm_plane *drm_plane, return 0; crtc_state = drm_atomic_get_crtc_state(state, crtc); + if (IS_ERR(crtc_state)) + return PTR_ERR(crtc_state); + mode = &crtc_state->mode; dst_x = new_plane_state->crtc_x; dst_y = new_plane_state->crtc_y; -- 2.25.1

8 months, 2 weeks

2
1
0 0

[PATCH RESEND] drm/sti: avoid potential dereference of error pointers in sti_gdp_atomic_check

by Ma Ke

The return value of drm_atomic_get_crtc_state() needs to be checked. To avoid use of error pointer 'crtc_state' in case of the failure. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: dd86dc2f9ae1 ("drm/sti: implement atomic_check for the planes") Signed-off-by: Ma Ke <make24(a)iscas.ac.cn> --- drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_gdp.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_gdp.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_gdp.c index 43c72c2604a0..f046f5f7ad25 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_gdp.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_gdp.c @@ -638,6 +638,9 @@ static int sti_gdp_atomic_check(struct drm_plane *drm_plane, mixer = to_sti_mixer(crtc); crtc_state = drm_atomic_get_crtc_state(state, crtc); + if (IS_ERR(crtc_state)) + return PTR_ERR(crtc_state); + mode = &crtc_state->mode; dst_x = new_plane_state->crtc_x; dst_y = new_plane_state->crtc_y; -- 2.25.1

8 months, 2 weeks

2
2
0 0

[PATCH] mm: migrate: fix data-race in migrate_folio_unmap()

by Jeongjun Park

I found a report from syzbot [1] When __folio_test_movable() is called in migrate_folio_unmap() to read folio->mapping, a data race occurs because the folio is read without protecting it with folio_lock. This can cause unintended behavior because folio->mapping is initialized to a NULL value. Therefore, I think it is appropriate to call __folio_test_movable() under the protection of folio_lock to prevent data-race. [1] ================================================================== BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __filemap_remove_folio / migrate_pages_batch write to 0xffffea0004b81dd8 of 8 bytes by task 6348 on cpu 0: page_cache_delete mm/filemap.c:153 [inline] __filemap_remove_folio+0x1ac/0x2c0 mm/filemap.c:233 filemap_remove_folio+0x6b/0x1f0 mm/filemap.c:265 truncate_inode_folio+0x42/0x50 mm/truncate.c:178 shmem_undo_range+0x25b/0xa70 mm/shmem.c:1028 shmem_truncate_range mm/shmem.c:1144 [inline] shmem_evict_inode+0x14d/0x530 mm/shmem.c:1272 evict+0x2f0/0x580 fs/inode.c:731 iput_final fs/inode.c:1883 [inline] iput+0x42a/0x5b0 fs/inode.c:1909 dentry_unlink_inode+0x24f/0x260 fs/dcache.c:412 __dentry_kill+0x18b/0x4c0 fs/dcache.c:615 dput+0x5c/0xd0 fs/dcache.c:857 __fput+0x3fb/0x6d0 fs/file_table.c:439 ____fput+0x1c/0x30 fs/file_table.c:459 task_work_run+0x13a/0x1a0 kernel/task_work.c:228 resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:50 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:114 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/entry-common.h:328 [inline] __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:207 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0xbe/0x130 kernel/entry/common.c:218 do_syscall_64+0xd6/0x1c0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:89 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f read to 0xffffea0004b81dd8 of 8 bytes by task 6342 on cpu 1: __folio_test_movable include/linux/page-flags.h:699 [inline] migrate_folio_unmap mm/migrate.c:1199 [inline] migrate_pages_batch+0x24c/0x1940 mm/migrate.c:1797 migrate_pages_sync mm/migrate.c:1963 [inline] migrate_pages+0xff1/0x1820 mm/migrate.c:2072 do_mbind mm/mempolicy.c:1390 [inline] kernel_mbind mm/mempolicy.c:1533 [inline] __do_sys_mbind mm/mempolicy.c:1607 [inline] __se_sys_mbind+0xf76/0x1160 mm/mempolicy.c:1603 __x64_sys_mbind+0x78/0x90 mm/mempolicy.c:1603 x64_sys_call+0x2b4d/0x2d60 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:238 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xc9/0x1c0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f value changed: 0xffff888127601078 -> 0x0000000000000000 Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller(a)googlegroups.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 7e2a5e5ab217 ("mm: migrate: use __folio_test_movable()") Signed-off-by: Jeongjun Park <aha310510(a)gmail.com> --- mm/migrate.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/mm/migrate.c b/mm/migrate.c index 923ea80ba744..e62dac12406b 100644 --- a/mm/migrate.c +++ b/mm/migrate.c @@ -1118,7 +1118,7 @@ static int migrate_folio_unmap(new_folio_t get_new_folio, int rc = -EAGAIN; int old_page_state = 0; struct anon_vma *anon_vma = NULL; - bool is_lru = !__folio_test_movable(src); + bool is_lru; bool locked = false; bool dst_locked = false; @@ -1172,6 +1172,7 @@ static int migrate_folio_unmap(new_folio_t get_new_folio, locked = true; if (folio_test_mlocked(src)) old_page_state |= PAGE_WAS_MLOCKED; + is_lru = !__folio_test_movable(src); if (folio_test_writeback(src)) { /* --

8 months, 2 weeks

3
5
0 0

[PATCH v2] drm/sched: Fix dynamic job-flow control race

by Rob Clark

From: Rob Clark <robdclark(a)chromium.org> Fixes a race condition reported here: https://github.com/AsahiLinux/linux/issues/309#issuecomment-2238968609 The whole premise of lockless access to a single-producer-single- consumer queue is that there is just a single producer and single consumer. That means we can't call drm_sched_can_queue() (which is about queueing more work to the hw, not to the spsc queue) from anywhere other than the consumer (wq). This call in the producer is just an optimization to avoid scheduling the consuming worker if it cannot yet queue more work to the hw. It is safe to drop this optimization to avoid the race condition. Suggested-by: Asahi Lina <lina(a)asahilina.net> Fixes: a78422e9dff3 ("drm/sched: implement dynamic job-flow control") Closes: https://github.com/AsahiLinux/linux/issues/309 Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robdclark(a)chromium.org> --- drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_entity.c | 4 ++-- drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_main.c | 7 ++----- include/drm/gpu_scheduler.h | 2 +- 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_entity.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_entity.c index 58c8161289fe..567e5ace6d0c 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_entity.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_entity.c @@ -380,7 +380,7 @@ static void drm_sched_entity_wakeup(struct dma_fence *f, container_of(cb, struct drm_sched_entity, cb); drm_sched_entity_clear_dep(f, cb); - drm_sched_wakeup(entity->rq->sched, entity); + drm_sched_wakeup(entity->rq->sched); } /** @@ -612,7 +612,7 @@ void drm_sched_entity_push_job(struct drm_sched_job *sched_job) if (drm_sched_policy == DRM_SCHED_POLICY_FIFO) drm_sched_rq_update_fifo(entity, submit_ts); - drm_sched_wakeup(entity->rq->sched, entity); + drm_sched_wakeup(entity->rq->sched); } } EXPORT_SYMBOL(drm_sched_entity_push_job); diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_main.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_main.c index ab53ab486fe6..6f27cab0b76d 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_main.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_main.c @@ -1013,15 +1013,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(drm_sched_job_cleanup); /** * drm_sched_wakeup - Wake up the scheduler if it is ready to queue * @sched: scheduler instance - * @entity: the scheduler entity * * Wake up the scheduler if we can queue jobs. */ -void drm_sched_wakeup(struct drm_gpu_scheduler *sched, - struct drm_sched_entity *entity) +void drm_sched_wakeup(struct drm_gpu_scheduler *sched) { - if (drm_sched_can_queue(sched, entity)) - drm_sched_run_job_queue(sched); + drm_sched_run_job_queue(sched); } /** diff --git a/include/drm/gpu_scheduler.h b/include/drm/gpu_scheduler.h index fe8edb917360..9c437a057e5d 100644 --- a/include/drm/gpu_scheduler.h +++ b/include/drm/gpu_scheduler.h @@ -574,7 +574,7 @@ void drm_sched_entity_modify_sched(struct drm_sched_entity *entity, void drm_sched_tdr_queue_imm(struct drm_gpu_scheduler *sched); void drm_sched_job_cleanup(struct drm_sched_job *job); -void drm_sched_wakeup(struct drm_gpu_scheduler *sched, struct drm_sched_entity *entity); +void drm_sched_wakeup(struct drm_gpu_scheduler *sched); bool drm_sched_wqueue_ready(struct drm_gpu_scheduler *sched); void drm_sched_wqueue_stop(struct drm_gpu_scheduler *sched); void drm_sched_wqueue_start(struct drm_gpu_scheduler *sched); -- 2.46.0

8 months, 2 weeks

3
3
0 0

[PATCH] usb: yurex: make waiting on yurex_write interruptible

by Oliver Neukum

The IO yurex_write() needs to wait for in order to have a device ready for writing again can take a long time time. Consequently the sleep is done in an interruptible state. Therefore others waiting for yurex_write() itself to finish should use mutex_lock_interruptible. Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <oneukum(a)suse.com> Fixes: 6bc235a2e24a5 ("USB: add driver for Meywa-Denki & Kayac YUREX") --- drivers/usb/misc/yurex.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/misc/yurex.c b/drivers/usb/misc/yurex.c index 4a9859e03f6b..0deffdc8205f 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/misc/yurex.c +++ b/drivers/usb/misc/yurex.c @@ -430,7 +430,7 @@ static ssize_t yurex_write(struct file *file, const char __user *user_buffer, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { struct usb_yurex *dev; - int i, set = 0, retval = 0; + int i, set = 0, retval; char buffer[16 + 1]; char *data = buffer; unsigned long long c, c2 = 0; @@ -444,7 +444,10 @@ static ssize_t yurex_write(struct file *file, const char __user *user_buffer, if (count == 0) goto error; - mutex_lock(&dev->io_mutex); + retval = mutex_lock_interruptible(&dev->io_mutex); + if (retval < 0) + return -EINTR; + if (dev->disconnected) { /* already disconnected */ mutex_unlock(&dev->io_mutex); retval = -ENODEV; -- 2.46.1

8 months, 2 weeks

2
2
0 0

[PATCH] zram: don't free statically defined names

by Andrey Skvortsov

The change is similar to that is used in comp_algorithm_set. This is detected by KASAN. ================================================================== Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffffffffc1edc3c8 KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0x0003fffe0f6e1e40-0x0003fffe0f6e1e47] Mem abort info: ESR = 0x0000000096000006 EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 FSC = 0x06: level 2 translation fault Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000006, ISS2 = 0x00000000 CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00000000427dc000 [ffffffffc1edc3c8] pgd=00000000430e7003, p4d=00000000430e7003, pud=00000000430e8003, pmd=0000000000000000 Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000006 [#1] SMP Tainted: [W]=WARN, [C]=CRAP, [N]=TEST Hardware name: Pine64 PinePhone (1.2) (DT) pstate: a0000005 (NzCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : kfree+0x60/0x3a0 lr : zram_destroy_comps+0x98/0x198 [zram] sp : ffff800089b57450 x29: ffff800089b57460 x28: 0000000000000004 x27: ffff800082833010 x26: 1fffe00000c8039c x25: 1fffe00000ba5004 x24: ffff000005d28000 x23: ffff800082533178 x22: ffff80007b71eaa8 x21: ffff000006401ce8 x20: ffff80007b70f7a0 x19: ffffffffc1edc3c0 x18: 1ffff00010506d6b x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: ffff8000808e85e4 x14: ffff8000808e8478 x13: ffff80008003fa50 x12: ffff80008003f87c x11: ffff800080011550 x10: ffff800081ee63f0 x9 : ffff80007b71eaa8 x8 : ffff80008003fa50 x7 : ffff80008003f87c x6 : 00000018a10e2f30 x5 : 00ffffffffffffff x4 : ffff00000ec93200 x3 : ffff00000bbee6e0 x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : fffffdffc0000000 Call trace: kfree+0x60/0x3a0 zram_destroy_comps+0x98/0x198 [zram] zram_reset_device+0x22c/0x4a8 [zram] reset_store+0x1bc/0x2d8 [zram] dev_attr_store+0x44/0x80 sysfs_kf_write+0xfc/0x188 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x28c/0x428 vfs_write+0x4dc/0x9b8 ksys_write+0x100/0x1f8 __arm64_sys_write+0x74/0xb8 invoke_syscall+0xd8/0x260 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xb4/0x240 do_el0_svc+0x48/0x68 el0_svc+0x40/0xc8 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x130 el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x198 Code: b26287e0 d34cfe73 f2dfbfe0 8b131813 (f9400660) ================================================================== Signed-off-by: Andrey Skvortsov <andrej.skvortzov(a)gmail.com> Fixes: 684826f8271a ("zram: free secondary algorithms names") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> --- drivers/block/zram/zram_drv.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/block/zram/zram_drv.c b/drivers/block/zram/zram_drv.c index c3d245617083d..d9d2c36658f59 100644 --- a/drivers/block/zram/zram_drv.c +++ b/drivers/block/zram/zram_drv.c @@ -2116,7 +2116,9 @@ static void zram_destroy_comps(struct zram *zram) } for (prio = ZRAM_SECONDARY_COMP; prio < ZRAM_MAX_COMPS; prio++) { - kfree(zram->comp_algs[prio]); + /* Do not free statically defined compression algorithms */ + if (zram->comp_algs[prio] != default_compressor) + kfree(zram->comp_algs[prio]); zram->comp_algs[prio] = NULL; } -- 2.45.2

8 months, 2 weeks

3
6
0 0

[PATCH v2] zram: don't free statically defined names

by Andrey Skvortsov

The change is similar to that is used in comp_algorithm_set. default_compressor is used for ZRAM_PRIMARY_COMP only, but if CONFIG_ZRAM_MULTI_COMP isn't set, then ZRAM_PRIMARY_COMP and ZRAM_SECONDARY_COMP are the same. This is detected by KASAN. ================================================================== Call trace: kfree+0x60/0x3a0 zram_destroy_comps+0x98/0x198 [zram] zram_reset_device+0x22c/0x4a8 [zram] reset_store+0x1bc/0x2d8 [zram] dev_attr_store+0x44/0x80 sysfs_kf_write+0xfc/0x188 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x28c/0x428 vfs_write+0x4dc/0x9b8 ksys_write+0x100/0x1f8 __arm64_sys_write+0x74/0xb8 invoke_syscall+0xd8/0x260 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xb4/0x240 do_el0_svc+0x48/0x68 el0_svc+0x40/0xc8 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x130 el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x198 ================================================================== Signed-off-by: Andrey Skvortsov <andrej.skvortzov(a)gmail.com> Fixes: 684826f8271a ("zram: free secondary algorithms names") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> --- Changes in v2: - removed comment from source code about freeing statically defined compression - removed part of KASAN report from commit description - added information about CONFIG_ZRAM_MULTI_COMP into commit description drivers/block/zram/zram_drv.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/block/zram/zram_drv.c b/drivers/block/zram/zram_drv.c index c3d245617083d..4a9cdb7fe8878 100644 --- a/drivers/block/zram/zram_drv.c +++ b/drivers/block/zram/zram_drv.c @@ -2116,7 +2116,8 @@ static void zram_destroy_comps(struct zram *zram) } for (prio = ZRAM_SECONDARY_COMP; prio < ZRAM_MAX_COMPS; prio++) { - kfree(zram->comp_algs[prio]); + if (zram->comp_algs[prio] != default_compressor) + kfree(zram->comp_algs[prio]); zram->comp_algs[prio] = NULL; } -- 2.45.2

8 months, 2 weeks

2
1
0 0

[PATCH v2] drm/xe: fix UAF around queue destruction

by Matthew Auld

We currently do stuff like queuing the final destruction step on a random system wq, which will outlive the driver instance. With bad timing we can teardown the driver with one or more work workqueue still being alive leading to various UAF splats. Add a fini step to ensure user queues are properly torn down. At this point GuC should already be nuked so queue itself should no longer be referenced from hw pov. v2 (Matt B) - Looks much safer to use a waitqueue and then just wait for the xa_array to become empty before triggering the drain. Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/xe/kernel/-/issues/2317 Fixes: dd08ebf6c352 ("drm/xe: Introduce a new DRM driver for Intel GPUs") Signed-off-by: Matthew Auld <matthew.auld(a)intel.com> Cc: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost(a)intel.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v6.8+ --- drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_device.c | 6 +++++- drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_device_types.h | 3 +++ drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_guc_submit.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++++- drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_guc_types.h | 2 ++ 4 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_device.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_device.c index cb5a9fd820cf..90b3478ed7cd 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_device.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_device.c @@ -297,6 +297,9 @@ static void xe_device_destroy(struct drm_device *dev, void *dummy) if (xe->unordered_wq) destroy_workqueue(xe->unordered_wq); + if (xe->destroy_wq) + destroy_workqueue(xe->destroy_wq); + ttm_device_fini(&xe->ttm); } @@ -360,8 +363,9 @@ struct xe_device *xe_device_create(struct pci_dev *pdev, xe->preempt_fence_wq = alloc_ordered_workqueue("xe-preempt-fence-wq", 0); xe->ordered_wq = alloc_ordered_workqueue("xe-ordered-wq", 0); xe->unordered_wq = alloc_workqueue("xe-unordered-wq", 0, 0); + xe->destroy_wq = alloc_workqueue("xe-destroy-wq", 0, 0); if (!xe->ordered_wq || !xe->unordered_wq || - !xe->preempt_fence_wq) { + !xe->preempt_fence_wq || !xe->destroy_wq) { /* * Cleanup done in xe_device_destroy via * drmm_add_action_or_reset register above diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_device_types.h b/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_device_types.h index 5ad96d283a71..515385b916cc 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_device_types.h +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_device_types.h @@ -422,6 +422,9 @@ struct xe_device { /** @unordered_wq: used to serialize unordered work, mostly display */ struct workqueue_struct *unordered_wq; + /** @destroy_wq: used to serialize user destroy work, like queue */ + struct workqueue_struct *destroy_wq; + /** @tiles: device tiles */ struct xe_tile tiles[XE_MAX_TILES_PER_DEVICE]; diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_guc_submit.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_guc_submit.c index fbbe6a487bbb..ae2f85cc2d08 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_guc_submit.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_guc_submit.c @@ -276,10 +276,26 @@ static struct workqueue_struct *get_submit_wq(struct xe_guc *guc) } #endif +static void xe_guc_submit_fini(struct xe_guc *guc) +{ + struct xe_device *xe = guc_to_xe(guc); + struct xe_gt *gt = guc_to_gt(guc); + int ret; + + ret = wait_event_timeout( + guc->submission_state.fini_wq, + xa_empty(&guc->submission_state.exec_queue_lookup), HZ * 5); + + drain_workqueue(xe->destroy_wq); + + xe_gt_assert(gt, ret); +} + static void guc_submit_fini(struct drm_device *drm, void *arg) { struct xe_guc *guc = arg; + xe_guc_submit_fini(guc); xa_destroy(&guc->submission_state.exec_queue_lookup); free_submit_wq(guc); } @@ -345,6 +361,8 @@ int xe_guc_submit_init(struct xe_guc *guc, unsigned int num_ids) xa_init(&guc->submission_state.exec_queue_lookup); + init_waitqueue_head(&guc->submission_state.fini_wq); + primelockdep(guc); return drmm_add_action_or_reset(&xe->drm, guc_submit_fini, guc); @@ -361,6 +379,9 @@ static void __release_guc_id(struct xe_guc *guc, struct xe_exec_queue *q, u32 xa xe_guc_id_mgr_release_locked(&guc->submission_state.idm, q->guc->id, q->width); + + if (xa_empty(&guc->submission_state.exec_queue_lookup)) + wake_up(&guc->submission_state.fini_wq); } static int alloc_guc_id(struct xe_guc *guc, struct xe_exec_queue *q) @@ -1268,13 +1289,16 @@ static void __guc_exec_queue_fini_async(struct work_struct *w) static void guc_exec_queue_fini_async(struct xe_exec_queue *q) { + struct xe_guc *guc = exec_queue_to_guc(q); + struct xe_device *xe = guc_to_xe(guc); + INIT_WORK(&q->guc->fini_async, __guc_exec_queue_fini_async); /* We must block on kernel engines so slabs are empty on driver unload */ if (q->flags & EXEC_QUEUE_FLAG_PERMANENT || exec_queue_wedged(q)) __guc_exec_queue_fini_async(&q->guc->fini_async); else - queue_work(system_wq, &q->guc->fini_async); + queue_work(xe->destroy_wq, &q->guc->fini_async); } static void __guc_exec_queue_fini(struct xe_guc *guc, struct xe_exec_queue *q) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_guc_types.h b/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_guc_types.h index 546ac6350a31..69046f698271 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_guc_types.h +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_guc_types.h @@ -81,6 +81,8 @@ struct xe_guc { #endif /** @submission_state.enabled: submission is enabled */ bool enabled; + /** @submission_state.fini_wq: submit fini wait queue */ + wait_queue_head_t fini_wq; } submission_state; /** @hwconfig: Hardware config state */ struct { -- 2.46.1

8 months, 2 weeks

2
1
0 0

[PATCH 1/2] drm/xe/vm: move xa_alloc to prevent UAF

by Matthew Auld

Evil user can guess the next id of the vm before the ioctl completes and then call vm destroy ioctl to trigger UAF since create ioctl is still referencing the same vm. Move the xa_alloc all the way to the end to prevent this. Fixes: dd08ebf6c352 ("drm/xe: Introduce a new DRM driver for Intel GPUs") Signed-off-by: Matthew Auld <matthew.auld(a)intel.com> Cc: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost(a)intel.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v6.8+ --- drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_vm.c | 22 ++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_vm.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_vm.c index a3d7cb7cfd22..f7182ef3d8e6 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_vm.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_vm.c @@ -1765,12 +1765,6 @@ int xe_vm_create_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data, if (IS_ERR(vm)) return PTR_ERR(vm); - mutex_lock(&xef->vm.lock); - err = xa_alloc(&xef->vm.xa, &id, vm, xa_limit_32b, GFP_KERNEL); - mutex_unlock(&xef->vm.lock); - if (err) - goto err_close_and_put; - if (xe->info.has_asid) { down_write(&xe->usm.lock); err = xa_alloc_cyclic(&xe->usm.asid_to_vm, &asid, vm, @@ -1778,12 +1772,11 @@ int xe_vm_create_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data, &xe->usm.next_asid, GFP_KERNEL); up_write(&xe->usm.lock); if (err < 0) - goto err_free_id; + goto err_close_and_put; vm->usm.asid = asid; } - args->vm_id = id; vm->xef = xe_file_get(xef); /* Record BO memory for VM pagetable created against client */ @@ -1796,12 +1789,17 @@ int xe_vm_create_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data, args->reserved[0] = xe_bo_main_addr(vm->pt_root[0]->bo, XE_PAGE_SIZE); #endif - return 0; - -err_free_id: + /* user id alloc must always be last in ioctl to prevent UAF */ mutex_lock(&xef->vm.lock); - xa_erase(&xef->vm.xa, id); + err = xa_alloc(&xef->vm.xa, &id, vm, xa_limit_32b, GFP_KERNEL); mutex_unlock(&xef->vm.lock); + if (err) + goto err_close_and_put; + + args->vm_id = id; + + return 0; + err_close_and_put: xe_vm_close_and_put(vm); -- 2.46.1

8 months, 2 weeks

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RESEND. syzbot: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Read in xlog_pack_data

by Andrey Kalachev

Hi, I found that the syzbot bug 'KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Read in xlog_pack_data' [1] has been fixed in master branch since v6.4-rc6-11-gf1e1765aad7d [2]. But, it still exist in LTS kernels: 5.4, 5.10, 5.15 [3], 6.1 [4] Common c-reproducer code can be found here [5]. I've made backport f1e1765aad7d ("xfs: journal geometry is not properly bounds checked") Patch for v5.15 & v6.1 is same with original upstream code. Patches for v5.4 and v5.10 has some cosmetic variations: `xfs_has_crc(mp)` call replaced by `xfs_sb_version_hascrc(&mp->m_sb)` at most. I would be grateful for any assistance. Regards, AK [1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=b7854dc75e15ffc8c2ae [2] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… [3] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=66f256de193ab682584f [4] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=904ffc7f25c759741787 [5] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/text?tag=ReproC&x=152f7343280000 Reported-by: syzbot+66f256de193ab682584f(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+904ffc7f25c759741787(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com

8 months, 2 weeks

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