September 2024 - Linux-stable-mirror

Re: [PATCH v2] mm: vmscan.c: fix OOM on swap stress test

by Chris Li

I forgot to CC stable on this fix. Chris On Thu, Sep 5, 2024 at 1:08 AM Chris Li <chrisl(a)kernel.org> wrote: > > I found a regression on mm-unstable during my swap stress test, > using tmpfs to compile linux. The test OOM very soon after > the make spawns many cc processes. > > It bisects down to this change: 33dfe9204f29b415bbc0abb1a50642d1ba94f5e9 > (mm/gup: clear the LRU flag of a page before adding to LRU batch) > > Yu Zhao propose the fix: "I think this is one of the potential side > effects -- Huge mentioned earlier about isolate_lru_folios():" > > I test that with it the swap stress test no longer OOM. > > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAOUHufYi9h0kz5uW3LHHS3ZrVwEq-kKp8S6N-MZUmErNAXoX… > Fixes: 33dfe9204f29 ("mm/gup: clear the LRU flag of a page before adding to LRU batch") > Suggested-by: Yu Zhao <yuzhao(a)google.com> > Suggested-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd(a)google.com> > Tested-by: Chris Li <chrisl(a)kernel.org> > Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAF8kJuNP5iTj2p07QgHSGOJsiUfYpJ2f4R1Q5-3BN9JiD9… > Signed-off-by: Chris Li <chrisl(a)kernel.org> > --- > Changes in v2: > - Add Closes tag suggested by Yu and Thorsten. > - Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240904-lru-flag-v1-1-36638d6a524c@kernel.org > --- > mm/vmscan.c | 2 +- > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/mm/vmscan.c b/mm/vmscan.c > index a9b6a8196f95..96abf4a52382 100644 > --- a/mm/vmscan.c > +++ b/mm/vmscan.c > @@ -4323,7 +4323,7 @@ static bool sort_folio(struct lruvec *lruvec, struct folio *folio, struct scan_c > } > > /* ineligible */ > - if (zone > sc->reclaim_idx) { > + if (!folio_test_lru(folio) || zone > sc->reclaim_idx) { > gen = folio_inc_gen(lruvec, folio, false); > list_move_tail(&folio->lru, &lrugen->folios[gen][type][zone]); > return true; > > --- > base-commit: 756ca36d643324d028b325a170e73e392b9590cd > change-id: 20240904-lru-flag-2af2f955740e > > Best regards, > -- > Chris Li <chrisl(a)kernel.org> >

9 months, 1 week

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[PATCH] drm/i915/hdcp: fix connector refcounting

by Jani Nikula

We acquire a connector reference before scheduling an HDCP prop work, and expect the work function to release the reference. However, if the work was already queued, it won't be queued multiple times, and the reference is not dropped. Release the reference immediately if the work was already queued. Fixes: a6597faa2d59 ("drm/i915: Protect workers against disappearing connectors") Cc: Sean Paul <seanpaul(a)chromium.org> Cc: Suraj Kandpal <suraj.kandpal(a)intel.com> Cc: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v5.10+ Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula(a)intel.com> --- I don't know that we have any bugs open about this. Or how it would manifest itself. Memory leak on driver unload? I just spotted this while reading the code for other reasons. --- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_hdcp.c | 10 +++++++--- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_hdcp.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_hdcp.c index 2afa92321b08..cad309602617 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_hdcp.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_hdcp.c @@ -1097,7 +1097,8 @@ static void intel_hdcp_update_value(struct intel_connector *connector, hdcp->value = value; if (update_property) { drm_connector_get(&connector->base); - queue_work(i915->unordered_wq, &hdcp->prop_work); + if (!queue_work(i915->unordered_wq, &hdcp->prop_work)) + drm_connector_put(&connector->base); } } @@ -2531,7 +2532,8 @@ void intel_hdcp_update_pipe(struct intel_atomic_state *state, mutex_lock(&hdcp->mutex); hdcp->value = DRM_MODE_CONTENT_PROTECTION_DESIRED; drm_connector_get(&connector->base); - queue_work(i915->unordered_wq, &hdcp->prop_work); + if (!queue_work(i915->unordered_wq, &hdcp->prop_work)) + drm_connector_put(&connector->base); mutex_unlock(&hdcp->mutex); } @@ -2548,7 +2550,9 @@ void intel_hdcp_update_pipe(struct intel_atomic_state *state, */ if (!desired_and_not_enabled && !content_protection_type_changed) { drm_connector_get(&connector->base); - queue_work(i915->unordered_wq, &hdcp->prop_work); + if (!queue_work(i915->unordered_wq, &hdcp->prop_work)) + drm_connector_put(&connector->base); + } } -- 2.39.2

9 months, 1 week

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[PATCH] sched/cputime: Fix mul_u64_u64_div_u64() precision for cputime

by Bao Chenglong

From: Zheng Zucheng <zhengzucheng(a)huawei.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.11-rc2 commit 77baa5bafcbe1b2a15ef9c37232c21279c95481c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/IAIN7J Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- In extreme test scenarios: the 14th field utime in /proc/xx/stat is greater than sum_exec_runtime, utime = 18446744073709518790 ns, rtime = 135989749728000 ns In cputime_adjust() process, stime is greater than rtime due to mul_u64_u64_div_u64() precision problem. before call mul_u64_u64_div_u64(), stime = 175136586720000, rtime = 135989749728000, utime = 1416780000. after call mul_u64_u64_div_u64(), stime = 135989949653530 unsigned reversion occurs because rtime is less than stime. utime = rtime - stime = 135989749728000 - 135989949653530 = -199925530 = (u64)18446744073709518790 Trigger condition: 1). User task run in kernel mode most of time 2). ARM64 architecture 3). TICK_CPU_ACCOUNTING=y CONFIG_VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING_NATIVE is not set Fix mul_u64_u64_div_u64() conversion precision by reset stime to rtime Fixes: 3dc167ba5729 ("sched/cputime: Improve cputime_adjust()") Signed-off-by: Zheng Zucheng <zhengzucheng(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240726023235.217771-1-zhengzucheng@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Zheng Zucheng <zhengzucheng(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/sched/cputime.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/kernel/sched/cputime.c b/kernel/sched/cputime.c index af7952f12e6c..b453f8a6a7c7 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/cputime.c +++ b/kernel/sched/cputime.c @@ -595,6 +595,12 @@ void cputime_adjust(struct task_cputime *curr, struct prev_cputime *prev, } stime = mul_u64_u64_div_u64(stime, rtime, stime + utime); + /* + * Because mul_u64_u64_div_u64() can approximate on some + * achitectures; enforce the constraint that: a*b/(b+c) <= a. + */ + if (unlikely(stime > rtime)) + stime = rtime; update: /* -- 2.34.1

9 months, 1 week

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[PATCH] Revert "ALSA: memalloc: Workaround for Xen PV"

by Ariadne Conill

This patch attempted to work around a DMA issue involving Xen, but causes subtle kernel memory corruption. When I brought up this patch in the XenDevel matrix channel, I was told that it had been requested by the Qubes OS developers because they were trying to fix an issue where the sound stack would fail after a few hours of uptime. They wound up disabling SG buffering entirely instead as a workaround. Accordingly, I propose that we should revert this workaround patch, since it causes kernel memory corruption and that the ALSA and Xen communities should collaborate on fixing the underlying problem in such a way that SG buffering works correctly under Xen. This reverts commit 53466ebdec614f915c691809b0861acecb941e30. Signed-off-by: Ariadne Conill <ariadne(a)ariadne.space> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: xen-devel(a)lists.xenproject.org Cc: alsa-devel(a)alsa-project.org Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai(a)suse.de> --- sound/core/memalloc.c | 87 +++++++++---------------------------------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/core/memalloc.c b/sound/core/memalloc.c index f901504b5afc..81025f50a542 100644 --- a/sound/core/memalloc.c +++ b/sound/core/memalloc.c @@ -541,15 +541,16 @@ static void *snd_dma_noncontig_alloc(struct snd_dma_buffer *dmab, size_t size) struct sg_table *sgt; void *p; -#ifdef CONFIG_SND_DMA_SGBUF - if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XENPV)) - return snd_dma_sg_fallback_alloc(dmab, size); -#endif sgt = dma_alloc_noncontiguous(dmab->dev.dev, size, dmab->dev.dir, DEFAULT_GFP, 0); #ifdef CONFIG_SND_DMA_SGBUF - if (!sgt && !get_dma_ops(dmab->dev.dev)) + if (!sgt && !get_dma_ops(dmab->dev.dev)) { + if (dmab->dev.type == SNDRV_DMA_TYPE_DEV_WC_SG) + dmab->dev.type = SNDRV_DMA_TYPE_DEV_WC_SG_FALLBACK; + else + dmab->dev.type = SNDRV_DMA_TYPE_DEV_SG_FALLBACK; return snd_dma_sg_fallback_alloc(dmab, size); + } #endif if (!sgt) return NULL; @@ -716,38 +717,19 @@ static const struct snd_malloc_ops snd_dma_sg_wc_ops = { /* Fallback SG-buffer allocations for x86 */ struct snd_dma_sg_fallback { - bool use_dma_alloc_coherent; size_t count; struct page **pages; - /* DMA address array; the first page contains #pages in ~PAGE_MASK */ - dma_addr_t *addrs; }; static void __snd_dma_sg_fallback_free(struct snd_dma_buffer *dmab, struct snd_dma_sg_fallback *sgbuf) { - size_t i, size; - - if (sgbuf->pages && sgbuf->addrs) { - i = 0; - while (i < sgbuf->count) { - if (!sgbuf->pages[i] || !sgbuf->addrs[i]) - break; - size = sgbuf->addrs[i] & ~PAGE_MASK; - if (WARN_ON(!size)) - break; - if (sgbuf->use_dma_alloc_coherent) - dma_free_coherent(dmab->dev.dev, size << PAGE_SHIFT, - page_address(sgbuf->pages[i]), - sgbuf->addrs[i] & PAGE_MASK); - else - do_free_pages(page_address(sgbuf->pages[i]), - size << PAGE_SHIFT, false); - i += size; - } - } + bool wc = dmab->dev.type == SNDRV_DMA_TYPE_DEV_WC_SG_FALLBACK; + size_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < sgbuf->count && sgbuf->pages[i]; i++) + do_free_pages(page_address(sgbuf->pages[i]), PAGE_SIZE, wc); kvfree(sgbuf->pages); - kvfree(sgbuf->addrs); kfree(sgbuf); } @@ -756,36 +738,24 @@ static void *snd_dma_sg_fallback_alloc(struct snd_dma_buffer *dmab, size_t size) struct snd_dma_sg_fallback *sgbuf; struct page **pagep, *curp; size_t chunk, npages; - dma_addr_t *addrp; dma_addr_t addr; void *p; - - /* correct the type */ - if (dmab->dev.type == SNDRV_DMA_TYPE_DEV_SG) - dmab->dev.type = SNDRV_DMA_TYPE_DEV_SG_FALLBACK; - else if (dmab->dev.type == SNDRV_DMA_TYPE_DEV_WC_SG) - dmab->dev.type = SNDRV_DMA_TYPE_DEV_WC_SG_FALLBACK; + bool wc = dmab->dev.type == SNDRV_DMA_TYPE_DEV_WC_SG_FALLBACK; sgbuf = kzalloc(sizeof(*sgbuf), GFP_KERNEL); if (!sgbuf) return NULL; - sgbuf->use_dma_alloc_coherent = cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XENPV); size = PAGE_ALIGN(size); sgbuf->count = size >> PAGE_SHIFT; sgbuf->pages = kvcalloc(sgbuf->count, sizeof(*sgbuf->pages), GFP_KERNEL); - sgbuf->addrs = kvcalloc(sgbuf->count, sizeof(*sgbuf->addrs), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!sgbuf->pages || !sgbuf->addrs) + if (!sgbuf->pages) goto error; pagep = sgbuf->pages; - addrp = sgbuf->addrs; - chunk = (PAGE_SIZE - 1) << PAGE_SHIFT; /* to fit in low bits in addrs */ + chunk = size; while (size > 0) { chunk = min(size, chunk); - if (sgbuf->use_dma_alloc_coherent) - p = dma_alloc_coherent(dmab->dev.dev, chunk, &addr, DEFAULT_GFP); - else - p = do_alloc_pages(dmab->dev.dev, chunk, &addr, false); + p = do_alloc_pages(dmab->dev.dev, chunk, &addr, wc); if (!p) { if (chunk <= PAGE_SIZE) goto error; @@ -797,25 +767,17 @@ static void *snd_dma_sg_fallback_alloc(struct snd_dma_buffer *dmab, size_t size) size -= chunk; /* fill pages */ npages = chunk >> PAGE_SHIFT; - *addrp = npages; /* store in lower bits */ curp = virt_to_page(p); - while (npages--) { + while (npages--) *pagep++ = curp++; - *addrp++ |= addr; - addr += PAGE_SIZE; - } } p = vmap(sgbuf->pages, sgbuf->count, VM_MAP, PAGE_KERNEL); if (!p) goto error; - - if (dmab->dev.type == SNDRV_DMA_TYPE_DEV_WC_SG_FALLBACK) - set_pages_array_wc(sgbuf->pages, sgbuf->count); - dmab->private_data = sgbuf; /* store the first page address for convenience */ - dmab->addr = sgbuf->addrs[0] & PAGE_MASK; + dmab->addr = snd_sgbuf_get_addr(dmab, 0); return p; error: @@ -825,23 +787,10 @@ static void *snd_dma_sg_fallback_alloc(struct snd_dma_buffer *dmab, size_t size) static void snd_dma_sg_fallback_free(struct snd_dma_buffer *dmab) { - struct snd_dma_sg_fallback *sgbuf = dmab->private_data; - - if (dmab->dev.type == SNDRV_DMA_TYPE_DEV_WC_SG_FALLBACK) - set_pages_array_wb(sgbuf->pages, sgbuf->count); vunmap(dmab->area); __snd_dma_sg_fallback_free(dmab, dmab->private_data); } -static dma_addr_t snd_dma_sg_fallback_get_addr(struct snd_dma_buffer *dmab, - size_t offset) -{ - struct snd_dma_sg_fallback *sgbuf = dmab->private_data; - size_t index = offset >> PAGE_SHIFT; - - return (sgbuf->addrs[index] & PAGE_MASK) | (offset & ~PAGE_MASK); -} - static int snd_dma_sg_fallback_mmap(struct snd_dma_buffer *dmab, struct vm_area_struct *area) { @@ -856,8 +805,8 @@ static const struct snd_malloc_ops snd_dma_sg_fallback_ops = { .alloc = snd_dma_sg_fallback_alloc, .free = snd_dma_sg_fallback_free, .mmap = snd_dma_sg_fallback_mmap, - .get_addr = snd_dma_sg_fallback_get_addr, /* reuse vmalloc helpers */ + .get_addr = snd_dma_vmalloc_get_addr, .get_page = snd_dma_vmalloc_get_page, .get_chunk_size = snd_dma_vmalloc_get_chunk_size, }; -- 2.39.2

9 months, 1 week

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[Intel-wired-lan][PATCH iwl-net] idpf: use actual mbx receive payload length

by Joshua Hay

When a mailbox message is received, the driver is checking for a non 0 datalen in the controlq descriptor. If it is valid, the payload is attached to the ctlq message to give to the upper layer. However, the payload response size given to the upper layer was taken from the buffer metadata which is _always_ the max buffer size. This meant the API was returning 4K as the payload size for all messages. This went unnoticed since the virtchnl exchange response logic was checking for a response size less than 0 (error), not less than exact size, or not greater than or equal to the max mailbox buffer size (4K). All of these checks will pass in the success case since the size provided is always 4K. However, this breaks anyone that wants to validate the exact response size. Fetch the actual payload length from the value provided in the descriptor data_len field (instead of the buffer metadata). Unfortunately, this means we lose some extra error parsing for variable sized virtchnl responses such as create vport and get ptypes. However, the original checks weren't really helping anyways since the size was _always_ 4K. Fixes: 34c21fa894a1 ("idpf: implement virtchnl transaction manager") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 6.9+ Signed-off-by: Joshua Hay <joshua.a.hay(a)intel.com> Reviewed-by: Przemek Kitszel <przemyslaw.kitszel(a)intel.com> --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c | 9 +-------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c index 70986e12da28..3c0f97650d72 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c @@ -666,7 +666,7 @@ idpf_vc_xn_forward_reply(struct idpf_adapter *adapter, if (ctlq_msg->data_len) { payload = ctlq_msg->ctx.indirect.payload->va; - payload_size = ctlq_msg->ctx.indirect.payload->size; + payload_size = ctlq_msg->data_len; } xn->reply_sz = payload_size; @@ -1295,10 +1295,6 @@ int idpf_send_create_vport_msg(struct idpf_adapter *adapter, err = reply_sz; goto free_vport_params; } - if (reply_sz < IDPF_CTLQ_MAX_BUF_LEN) { - err = -EIO; - goto free_vport_params; - } return 0; @@ -2602,9 +2598,6 @@ int idpf_send_get_rx_ptype_msg(struct idpf_vport *vport) if (reply_sz < 0) return reply_sz; - if (reply_sz < IDPF_CTLQ_MAX_BUF_LEN) - return -EIO; - ptypes_recvd += le16_to_cpu(ptype_info->num_ptypes); if (ptypes_recvd > max_ptype) return -EINVAL; -- 2.39.2

9 months, 1 week

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+ kselftests-mm-fix-wrong-__nr_userfaultfd-value.patch added to mm-hotfixes-unstable branch

by Andrew Morton

The patch titled Subject: kselftests: mm: fix wrong __NR_userfaultfd value has been added to the -mm mm-hotfixes-unstable branch. Its filename is kselftests-mm-fix-wrong-__nr_userfaultfd-value.patch This patch will shortly appear at https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche… This patch will later appear in the mm-hotfixes-unstable branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm Before you just go and hit "reply", please: a) Consider who else should be cc'ed b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's *** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code *** The -mm tree is included into linux-next via the mm-everything branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm and is updated there every 2-3 working days ------------------------------------------------------ From: Muhammad Usama Anjum <usama.anjum(a)collabora.com> Subject: kselftests: mm: fix wrong __NR_userfaultfd value Date: Mon, 23 Sep 2024 10:38:36 +0500 grep -rnIF "#define __NR_userfaultfd" tools/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h:681:#define __NR_userfaultfd 282 arch/x86/include/generated/uapi/asm/unistd_32.h:374:#define __NR_userfaultfd 374 arch/x86/include/generated/uapi/asm/unistd_64.h:327:#define __NR_userfaultfd 323 arch/x86/include/generated/uapi/asm/unistd_x32.h:282:#define __NR_userfaultfd (__X32_SYSCALL_BIT + 323) arch/arm/include/generated/uapi/asm/unistd-eabi.h:347:#define __NR_userfaultfd (__NR_SYSCALL_BASE + 388) arch/arm/include/generated/uapi/asm/unistd-oabi.h:359:#define __NR_userfaultfd (__NR_SYSCALL_BASE + 388) include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h:681:#define __NR_userfaultfd 282 The number is dependent on the architecture. The above data shows that: x86 374 x86_64 323 The value of __NR_userfaultfd was changed to 282 when asm-generic/unistd.h was included. It makes the test to fail every time as the correct number of this syscall on x86_64 is 323. Fix the header to asm/unistd.h. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240923053836.3270393-1-usama.anjum@collabora.com Fixes: a5c6bc590094 ("selftests/mm: remove local __NR_* definitions") Signed-off-by: Muhammad Usama Anjum <usama.anjum(a)collabora.com> Reviewed-by: Shuah Khan <skhan(a)linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com> Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard(a)nvidia.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- tools/testing/selftests/mm/pagemap_ioctl.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/pagemap_ioctl.c~kselftests-mm-fix-wrong-__nr_userfaultfd-value +++ a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/pagemap_ioctl.c @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ #include <sys/ioctl.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <math.h> -#include <asm-generic/unistd.h> +#include <asm/unistd.h> #include <pthread.h> #include <sys/resource.h> #include <assert.h> _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from usama.anjum(a)collabora.com are kselftests-mm-fix-wrong-__nr_userfaultfd-value.patch

9 months, 1 week

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+ compilerh-specify-correct-attribute-for-rodatac_jump_table.patch added to mm-hotfixes-unstable branch

by Andrew Morton

The patch titled Subject: compiler.h: specify correct attribute for .rodata..c_jump_table has been added to the -mm mm-hotfixes-unstable branch. Its filename is compilerh-specify-correct-attribute-for-rodatac_jump_table.patch This patch will shortly appear at https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche… This patch will later appear in the mm-hotfixes-unstable branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm Before you just go and hit "reply", please: a) Consider who else should be cc'ed b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's *** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code *** The -mm tree is included into linux-next via the mm-everything branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm and is updated there every 2-3 working days ------------------------------------------------------ From: Tiezhu Yang <yangtiezhu(a)loongson.cn> Subject: compiler.h: specify correct attribute for .rodata..c_jump_table Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2024 14:27:10 +0800 Currently, there is an assembler message when generating kernel/bpf/core.o under CONFIG_OBJTOOL with LoongArch compiler toolchain: Warning: setting incorrect section attributes for .rodata..c_jump_table This is because the section ".rodata..c_jump_table" should be readonly, but there is a "W" (writable) part of the flags: $ readelf -S kernel/bpf/core.o | grep -A 1 "rodata..c" [34] .rodata..c_j[...] PROGBITS 0000000000000000 0000d2e0 0000000000000800 0000000000000000 WA 0 0 8 There is no above issue on x86 due to the generated section flag is only "A" (allocatable). In order to silence the warning on LoongArch, specify the attribute like ".rodata..c_jump_table,\"a\",@progbits #" explicitly, then the section attribute of ".rodata..c_jump_table" must be readonly in the kernel/bpf/core.o file. Before: $ objdump -h kernel/bpf/core.o | grep -A 1 "rodata..c" 21 .rodata..c_jump_table 00000800 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000d2e0 2**3 CONTENTS, ALLOC, LOAD, RELOC, DATA After: $ objdump -h kernel/bpf/core.o | grep -A 1 "rodata..c" 21 .rodata..c_jump_table 00000800 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000d2e0 2**3 CONTENTS, ALLOC, LOAD, RELOC, READONLY, DATA By the way, AFAICT, maybe the root cause is related with the different compiler behavior of various archs, so to some extent this change is a workaround for LoongArch, and also there is no effect for x86 which is the only port supported by objtool before LoongArch with this patch. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240924062710.1243-1-yangtiezhu@loongson.cn Signed-off-by: Tiezhu Yang <yangtiezhu(a)loongson.cn> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> [6.9+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- include/linux/compiler.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/include/linux/compiler.h~compilerh-specify-correct-attribute-for-rodatac_jump_table +++ a/include/linux/compiler.h @@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ void ftrace_likely_update(struct ftrace_ #define annotate_unreachable() __annotate_unreachable(__COUNTER__) /* Annotate a C jump table to allow objtool to follow the code flow */ -#define __annotate_jump_table __section(".rodata..c_jump_table") +#define __annotate_jump_table __section(".rodata..c_jump_table,\"a\",@progbits #") #else /* !CONFIG_OBJTOOL */ #define annotate_reachable() _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from yangtiezhu(a)loongson.cn are compilerh-specify-correct-attribute-for-rodatac_jump_table.patch

9 months, 1 week

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+ ocfs2-fix-deadlock-in-ocfs2_get_system_file_inode.patch added to mm-hotfixes-unstable branch

by Andrew Morton

The patch titled Subject: ocfs2: fix deadlock in ocfs2_get_system_file_inode has been added to the -mm mm-hotfixes-unstable branch. Its filename is ocfs2-fix-deadlock-in-ocfs2_get_system_file_inode.patch This patch will shortly appear at https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche… This patch will later appear in the mm-hotfixes-unstable branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm Before you just go and hit "reply", please: a) Consider who else should be cc'ed b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's *** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code *** The -mm tree is included into linux-next via the mm-everything branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm and is updated there every 2-3 working days ------------------------------------------------------ From: Mohammed Anees <pvmohammedanees2003(a)gmail.com> Subject: ocfs2: fix deadlock in ocfs2_get_system_file_inode Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2024 09:32:57 +0000 syzbot has found a possible deadlock in ocfs2_get_system_file_inode [1]. The scenario is depicted here, CPU0 CPU1 lock(&ocfs2_file_ip_alloc_sem_key); lock(&osb->system_file_mutex); lock(&ocfs2_file_ip_alloc_sem_key); lock(&osb->system_file_mutex); The function calls which could lead to this are: CPU0 ocfs2_mknod - lock(&ocfs2_file_ip_alloc_sem_key); . . . ocfs2_get_system_file_inode - lock(&osb->system_file_mutex); CPU1 - ocfs2_fill_super - lock(&osb->system_file_mutex); . . . ocfs2_read_virt_blocks - lock(&ocfs2_file_ip_alloc_sem_key); This issue can be resolved by making the down_read -> down_read_try in the ocfs2_read_virt_blocks. [1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=e0055ea09f1f5e6fabdd Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240924093257.7181-1-pvmohammedanees2003@gmail.c… Signed-off-by: Mohammed Anees <pvmohammedanees2003(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi(a)linux.alibaba.com> Reported-by: <syzbot+e0055ea09f1f5e6fabdd(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=e0055ea09f1f5e6fabdd Tested-by: syzbot+e0055ea09f1f5e6fabdd(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark(a)fasheh.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec(a)evilplan.org> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi(a)oracle.com> Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei(a)live.cn> Cc: Gang He <ghe(a)suse.com> Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun(a)huawei.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- fs/ocfs2/extent_map.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/fs/ocfs2/extent_map.c~ocfs2-fix-deadlock-in-ocfs2_get_system_file_inode +++ a/fs/ocfs2/extent_map.c @@ -973,7 +973,13 @@ int ocfs2_read_virt_blocks(struct inode } while (done < nr) { - down_read(&OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_alloc_sem); + if (!down_read_trylock(&OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_alloc_sem)) { + rc = -EAGAIN; + mlog(ML_ERROR, + "Inode #%llu ip_alloc_sem is temporarily unavailable\n", + (unsigned long long)OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_blkno); + break; + } rc = ocfs2_extent_map_get_blocks(inode, v_block + done, &p_block, &p_count, NULL); up_read(&OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_alloc_sem); _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from pvmohammedanees2003(a)gmail.com are ocfs2-fix-deadlock-in-ocfs2_get_system_file_inode.patch ocfs2-fix-typo-in-comment.patch

9 months, 1 week

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+ ocfs2-reserve-space-for-inline-xattr-before-attaching-reflink-tree.patch added to mm-hotfixes-unstable branch

by Andrew Morton

The patch titled Subject: ocfs2: reserve space for inline xattr before attaching reflink tree has been added to the -mm mm-hotfixes-unstable branch. Its filename is ocfs2-reserve-space-for-inline-xattr-before-attaching-reflink-tree.patch This patch will shortly appear at https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche… This patch will later appear in the mm-hotfixes-unstable branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm Before you just go and hit "reply", please: a) Consider who else should be cc'ed b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's *** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code *** The -mm tree is included into linux-next via the mm-everything branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm and is updated there every 2-3 working days ------------------------------------------------------ From: Gautham Ananthakrishna <gautham.ananthakrishna(a)oracle.com> Subject: ocfs2: reserve space for inline xattr before attaching reflink tree Date: Wed, 18 Sep 2024 06:38:44 +0000 One of our customers reported a crash and a corrupted ocfs2 filesystem. The crash was due to the detection of corruption. Upon troubleshooting, the fsck -fn output showed the below corruption [EXTENT_LIST_FREE] Extent list in owner 33080590 claims 230 as the next free chain record, but fsck believes the largest valid value is 227. Clamp the next record value? n The stat output from the debugfs.ocfs2 showed the following corruption where the "Next Free Rec:" had overshot the "Count:" in the root metadata block. Inode: 33080590 Mode: 0640 Generation: 2619713622 (0x9c25a856) FS Generation: 904309833 (0x35e6ac49) CRC32: 00000000 ECC: 0000 Type: Regular Attr: 0x0 Flags: Valid Dynamic Features: (0x16) HasXattr InlineXattr Refcounted Extended Attributes Block: 0 Extended Attributes Inline Size: 256 User: 0 (root) Group: 0 (root) Size: 281320357888 Links: 1 Clusters: 141738 ctime: 0x66911b56 0x316edcb8 -- Fri Jul 12 06:02:30.829349048 2024 atime: 0x66911d6b 0x7f7a28d -- Fri Jul 12 06:11:23.133669517 2024 mtime: 0x66911b56 0x12ed75d7 -- Fri Jul 12 06:02:30.317552087 2024 dtime: 0x0 -- Wed Dec 31 17:00:00 1969 Refcount Block: 2777346 Last Extblk: 2886943 Orphan Slot: 0 Sub Alloc Slot: 0 Sub Alloc Bit: 14 Tree Depth: 1 Count: 227 Next Free Rec: 230 ## Offset Clusters Block# 0 0 2310 2776351 1 2310 2139 2777375 2 4449 1221 2778399 3 5670 731 2779423 4 6401 566 2780447 ....... .... ....... ....... .... ....... The issue was in the reflink workfow while reserving space for inline xattr. The problematic function is ocfs2_reflink_xattr_inline(). By the time this function is called the reflink tree is already recreated at the destination inode from the source inode. At this point, this function reserves space for inline xattrs at the destination inode without even checking if there is space at the root metadata block. It simply reduces the l_count from 243 to 227 thereby making space of 256 bytes for inline xattr whereas the inode already has extents beyond this index (in this case upto 230), thereby causing corruption. The fix for this is to reserve space for inline metadata at the destination inode before the reflink tree gets recreated. The customer has verified the fix. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240918063844.1830332-1-gautham.ananthakrishna@o… Fixes: ef962df057aa ("ocfs2: xattr: fix inlined xattr reflink") Signed-off-by: Gautham Ananthakrishna <gautham.ananthakrishna(a)oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi(a)linux.alibaba.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark(a)fasheh.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec(a)evilplan.org> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi(a)oracle.com> Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei(a)live.cn> Cc: Gang He <ghe(a)suse.com> Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun(a)huawei.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-- fs/ocfs2/xattr.c | 11 +---------- 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) --- a/fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c~ocfs2-reserve-space-for-inline-xattr-before-attaching-reflink-tree +++ a/fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ #include "namei.h" #include "ocfs2_trace.h" #include "file.h" +#include "symlink.h" #include <linux/bio.h> #include <linux/blkdev.h> @@ -4148,8 +4149,9 @@ static int __ocfs2_reflink(struct dentry int ret; struct inode *inode = d_inode(old_dentry); struct buffer_head *new_bh = NULL; + struct ocfs2_inode_info *oi = OCFS2_I(inode); - if (OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_flags & OCFS2_INODE_SYSTEM_FILE) { + if (oi->ip_flags & OCFS2_INODE_SYSTEM_FILE) { ret = -EINVAL; mlog_errno(ret); goto out; @@ -4175,6 +4177,26 @@ static int __ocfs2_reflink(struct dentry goto out_unlock; } + if ((oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_HAS_XATTR_FL) && + (oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_INLINE_XATTR_FL)) { + /* + * Adjust extent record count to reserve space for extended attribute. + * Inline data count had been adjusted in ocfs2_duplicate_inline_data(). + */ + struct ocfs2_inode_info *new_oi = OCFS2_I(new_inode); + + if (!(new_oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_INLINE_DATA_FL) && + !(ocfs2_inode_is_fast_symlink(new_inode))) { + struct ocfs2_dinode *new_di = (struct ocfs2_dinode *)new_bh->b_data; + struct ocfs2_dinode *old_di = (struct ocfs2_dinode *)old_bh->b_data; + struct ocfs2_extent_list *el = &new_di->id2.i_list; + int inline_size = le16_to_cpu(old_di->i_xattr_inline_size); + + le16_add_cpu(&el->l_count, -(inline_size / + sizeof(struct ocfs2_extent_rec))); + } + } + ret = ocfs2_create_reflink_node(inode, old_bh, new_inode, new_bh, preserve); if (ret) { @@ -4182,7 +4204,7 @@ static int __ocfs2_reflink(struct dentry goto inode_unlock; } - if (OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_HAS_XATTR_FL) { + if (oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_HAS_XATTR_FL) { ret = ocfs2_reflink_xattrs(inode, old_bh, new_inode, new_bh, preserve); --- a/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c~ocfs2-reserve-space-for-inline-xattr-before-attaching-reflink-tree +++ a/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c @@ -6511,16 +6511,7 @@ static int ocfs2_reflink_xattr_inline(st } new_oi = OCFS2_I(args->new_inode); - /* - * Adjust extent record count to reserve space for extended attribute. - * Inline data count had been adjusted in ocfs2_duplicate_inline_data(). - */ - if (!(new_oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_INLINE_DATA_FL) && - !(ocfs2_inode_is_fast_symlink(args->new_inode))) { - struct ocfs2_extent_list *el = &new_di->id2.i_list; - le16_add_cpu(&el->l_count, -(inline_size / - sizeof(struct ocfs2_extent_rec))); - } + spin_lock(&new_oi->ip_lock); new_oi->ip_dyn_features |= OCFS2_HAS_XATTR_FL | OCFS2_INLINE_XATTR_FL; new_di->i_dyn_features = cpu_to_le16(new_oi->ip_dyn_features); _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from gautham.ananthakrishna(a)oracle.com are ocfs2-reserve-space-for-inline-xattr-before-attaching-reflink-tree.patch

9 months, 1 week

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+ mm-migrate-annotate-data-race-in-migrate_folio_unmap.patch added to mm-hotfixes-unstable branch

by Andrew Morton

The patch titled Subject: mm: migrate: annotate data-race in migrate_folio_unmap() has been added to the -mm mm-hotfixes-unstable branch. Its filename is mm-migrate-annotate-data-race-in-migrate_folio_unmap.patch This patch will shortly appear at https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche… This patch will later appear in the mm-hotfixes-unstable branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm Before you just go and hit "reply", please: a) Consider who else should be cc'ed b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's *** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code *** The -mm tree is included into linux-next via the mm-everything branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm and is updated there every 2-3 working days ------------------------------------------------------ From: Jeongjun Park <aha310510(a)gmail.com> Subject: mm: migrate: annotate data-race in migrate_folio_unmap() Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2024 22:00:53 +0900 I found a report from syzbot [1] This report shows that the value can be changed, but in reality, the value of __folio_set_movable() cannot be changed because it holds the folio refcount. Therefore, it is appropriate to add an annotate to make KCSAN ignore that data-race. [1] ================================================================== BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __filemap_remove_folio / migrate_pages_batch write to 0xffffea0004b81dd8 of 8 bytes by task 6348 on cpu 0: page_cache_delete mm/filemap.c:153 [inline] __filemap_remove_folio+0x1ac/0x2c0 mm/filemap.c:233 filemap_remove_folio+0x6b/0x1f0 mm/filemap.c:265 truncate_inode_folio+0x42/0x50 mm/truncate.c:178 shmem_undo_range+0x25b/0xa70 mm/shmem.c:1028 shmem_truncate_range mm/shmem.c:1144 [inline] shmem_evict_inode+0x14d/0x530 mm/shmem.c:1272 evict+0x2f0/0x580 fs/inode.c:731 iput_final fs/inode.c:1883 [inline] iput+0x42a/0x5b0 fs/inode.c:1909 dentry_unlink_inode+0x24f/0x260 fs/dcache.c:412 __dentry_kill+0x18b/0x4c0 fs/dcache.c:615 dput+0x5c/0xd0 fs/dcache.c:857 __fput+0x3fb/0x6d0 fs/file_table.c:439 ____fput+0x1c/0x30 fs/file_table.c:459 task_work_run+0x13a/0x1a0 kernel/task_work.c:228 resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:50 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:114 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/entry-common.h:328 [inline] __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:207 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0xbe/0x130 kernel/entry/common.c:218 do_syscall_64+0xd6/0x1c0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:89 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f read to 0xffffea0004b81dd8 of 8 bytes by task 6342 on cpu 1: __folio_test_movable include/linux/page-flags.h:699 [inline] migrate_folio_unmap mm/migrate.c:1199 [inline] migrate_pages_batch+0x24c/0x1940 mm/migrate.c:1797 migrate_pages_sync mm/migrate.c:1963 [inline] migrate_pages+0xff1/0x1820 mm/migrate.c:2072 do_mbind mm/mempolicy.c:1390 [inline] kernel_mbind mm/mempolicy.c:1533 [inline] __do_sys_mbind mm/mempolicy.c:1607 [inline] __se_sys_mbind+0xf76/0x1160 mm/mempolicy.c:1603 __x64_sys_mbind+0x78/0x90 mm/mempolicy.c:1603 x64_sys_call+0x2b4d/0x2d60 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:238 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xc9/0x1c0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f value changed: 0xffff888127601078 -> 0x0000000000000000 Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240924130053.107490-1-aha310510@gmail.com Fixes: 7e2a5e5ab217 ("mm: migrate: use __folio_test_movable()") Signed-off-by: Jeongjun Park <aha310510(a)gmail.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller(a)googlegroups.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com> Cc: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang(a)huawei.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy(a)infradead.org> Cc: Zi Yan <ziy(a)nvidia.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- mm/migrate.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/mm/migrate.c~mm-migrate-annotate-data-race-in-migrate_folio_unmap +++ a/mm/migrate.c @@ -1196,7 +1196,7 @@ static int migrate_folio_unmap(new_folio int rc = -EAGAIN; int old_page_state = 0; struct anon_vma *anon_vma = NULL; - bool is_lru = !__folio_test_movable(src); + bool is_lru = data_race(!__folio_test_movable(src)); bool locked = false; bool dst_locked = false; _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from aha310510(a)gmail.com are mm-migrate-annotate-data-race-in-migrate_folio_unmap.patch mm-percpu-fix-typo-to-pcpu_alloc_noprof-description.patch

9 months, 1 week

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