From: Martin Wilck <martin.wilck(a)suse.com>
[ Upstream commit 10157b1fc1a762293381e9145041253420dfc6ad ]
When a host is configured with a few LUNs and I/O is running, injecting FC
faults repeatedly leads to path recovery problems. The LUNs have 4 paths
each and 3 of them come back active after say an FC fault which makes 2 of
the paths go down, instead of all 4. This happens after several iterations
of continuous FC faults.
Reason here is that we're returning an I/O error whenever we're
encountering sense code 06/04/0a (LOGICAL UNIT NOT ACCESSIBLE, ASYMMETRIC
ACCESS STATE TRANSITION) instead of retrying.
[mwilck: The original patch was developed by Rajashekhar M A and Hannes
Reinecke. I moved the code to alua_check_sense() as suggested by Mike
Christie [1]. Evan Milne had raised the question whether pg->state should
be set to transitioning in the UA case [2]. I believe that doing this is
correct. SCSI_ACCESS_STATE_TRANSITIONING by itself doesn't cause I/O
errors. Our handler schedules an RTPG, which will only result in an I/O
error condition if the transitioning timeout expires.]
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/0bc96e82-fdda-4187-148d-5b34f81d4942@oracle.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAGtn9r=kicnTDE2o7Gt5Y=yoidHYD7tG8XdMHEBJTBraVE…
Co-developed-by: Rajashekhar M A <rajs(a)netapp.com>
Co-developed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare(a)suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare(a)suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Martin Wilck <martin.wilck(a)suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240514140344.19538-1-mwilck@suse.com
Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal <dlemoal(a)kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch(a)lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <michael.christie(a)oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen(a)oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org>
---
drivers/scsi/device_handler/scsi_dh_alua.c | 31 +++++++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/device_handler/scsi_dh_alua.c b/drivers/scsi/device_handler/scsi_dh_alua.c
index a9c4a5e2ccb90..60792f257c235 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/device_handler/scsi_dh_alua.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/device_handler/scsi_dh_alua.c
@@ -406,28 +406,40 @@ static char print_alua_state(unsigned char state)
}
}
-static enum scsi_disposition alua_check_sense(struct scsi_device *sdev,
- struct scsi_sense_hdr *sense_hdr)
+static void alua_handle_state_transition(struct scsi_device *sdev)
{
struct alua_dh_data *h = sdev->handler_data;
struct alua_port_group *pg;
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ pg = rcu_dereference(h->pg);
+ if (pg)
+ pg->state = SCSI_ACCESS_STATE_TRANSITIONING;
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ alua_check(sdev, false);
+}
+
+static enum scsi_disposition alua_check_sense(struct scsi_device *sdev,
+ struct scsi_sense_hdr *sense_hdr)
+{
switch (sense_hdr->sense_key) {
case NOT_READY:
if (sense_hdr->asc == 0x04 && sense_hdr->ascq == 0x0a) {
/*
* LUN Not Accessible - ALUA state transition
*/
- rcu_read_lock();
- pg = rcu_dereference(h->pg);
- if (pg)
- pg->state = SCSI_ACCESS_STATE_TRANSITIONING;
- rcu_read_unlock();
- alua_check(sdev, false);
+ alua_handle_state_transition(sdev);
return NEEDS_RETRY;
}
break;
case UNIT_ATTENTION:
+ if (sense_hdr->asc == 0x04 && sense_hdr->ascq == 0x0a) {
+ /*
+ * LUN Not Accessible - ALUA state transition
+ */
+ alua_handle_state_transition(sdev);
+ return NEEDS_RETRY;
+ }
if (sense_hdr->asc == 0x29 && sense_hdr->ascq == 0x00) {
/*
* Power On, Reset, or Bus Device Reset.
@@ -494,7 +506,8 @@ static int alua_tur(struct scsi_device *sdev)
retval = scsi_test_unit_ready(sdev, ALUA_FAILOVER_TIMEOUT * HZ,
ALUA_FAILOVER_RETRIES, &sense_hdr);
- if (sense_hdr.sense_key == NOT_READY &&
+ if ((sense_hdr.sense_key == NOT_READY ||
+ sense_hdr.sense_key == UNIT_ATTENTION) &&
sense_hdr.asc == 0x04 && sense_hdr.ascq == 0x0a)
return SCSI_DH_RETRY;
else if (retval)
--
2.43.0
From: Martin Wilck <martin.wilck(a)suse.com>
[ Upstream commit 10157b1fc1a762293381e9145041253420dfc6ad ]
When a host is configured with a few LUNs and I/O is running, injecting FC
faults repeatedly leads to path recovery problems. The LUNs have 4 paths
each and 3 of them come back active after say an FC fault which makes 2 of
the paths go down, instead of all 4. This happens after several iterations
of continuous FC faults.
Reason here is that we're returning an I/O error whenever we're
encountering sense code 06/04/0a (LOGICAL UNIT NOT ACCESSIBLE, ASYMMETRIC
ACCESS STATE TRANSITION) instead of retrying.
[mwilck: The original patch was developed by Rajashekhar M A and Hannes
Reinecke. I moved the code to alua_check_sense() as suggested by Mike
Christie [1]. Evan Milne had raised the question whether pg->state should
be set to transitioning in the UA case [2]. I believe that doing this is
correct. SCSI_ACCESS_STATE_TRANSITIONING by itself doesn't cause I/O
errors. Our handler schedules an RTPG, which will only result in an I/O
error condition if the transitioning timeout expires.]
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/0bc96e82-fdda-4187-148d-5b34f81d4942@oracle.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAGtn9r=kicnTDE2o7Gt5Y=yoidHYD7tG8XdMHEBJTBraVE…
Co-developed-by: Rajashekhar M A <rajs(a)netapp.com>
Co-developed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare(a)suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare(a)suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Martin Wilck <martin.wilck(a)suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240514140344.19538-1-mwilck@suse.com
Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal <dlemoal(a)kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch(a)lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <michael.christie(a)oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen(a)oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org>
---
drivers/scsi/device_handler/scsi_dh_alua.c | 31 +++++++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/device_handler/scsi_dh_alua.c b/drivers/scsi/device_handler/scsi_dh_alua.c
index a226dc1b65d71..4eb0837298d4d 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/device_handler/scsi_dh_alua.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/device_handler/scsi_dh_alua.c
@@ -414,28 +414,40 @@ static char print_alua_state(unsigned char state)
}
}
-static enum scsi_disposition alua_check_sense(struct scsi_device *sdev,
- struct scsi_sense_hdr *sense_hdr)
+static void alua_handle_state_transition(struct scsi_device *sdev)
{
struct alua_dh_data *h = sdev->handler_data;
struct alua_port_group *pg;
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ pg = rcu_dereference(h->pg);
+ if (pg)
+ pg->state = SCSI_ACCESS_STATE_TRANSITIONING;
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ alua_check(sdev, false);
+}
+
+static enum scsi_disposition alua_check_sense(struct scsi_device *sdev,
+ struct scsi_sense_hdr *sense_hdr)
+{
switch (sense_hdr->sense_key) {
case NOT_READY:
if (sense_hdr->asc == 0x04 && sense_hdr->ascq == 0x0a) {
/*
* LUN Not Accessible - ALUA state transition
*/
- rcu_read_lock();
- pg = rcu_dereference(h->pg);
- if (pg)
- pg->state = SCSI_ACCESS_STATE_TRANSITIONING;
- rcu_read_unlock();
- alua_check(sdev, false);
+ alua_handle_state_transition(sdev);
return NEEDS_RETRY;
}
break;
case UNIT_ATTENTION:
+ if (sense_hdr->asc == 0x04 && sense_hdr->ascq == 0x0a) {
+ /*
+ * LUN Not Accessible - ALUA state transition
+ */
+ alua_handle_state_transition(sdev);
+ return NEEDS_RETRY;
+ }
if (sense_hdr->asc == 0x29 && sense_hdr->ascq == 0x00) {
/*
* Power On, Reset, or Bus Device Reset.
@@ -502,7 +514,8 @@ static int alua_tur(struct scsi_device *sdev)
retval = scsi_test_unit_ready(sdev, ALUA_FAILOVER_TIMEOUT * HZ,
ALUA_FAILOVER_RETRIES, &sense_hdr);
- if (sense_hdr.sense_key == NOT_READY &&
+ if ((sense_hdr.sense_key == NOT_READY ||
+ sense_hdr.sense_key == UNIT_ATTENTION) &&
sense_hdr.asc == 0x04 && sense_hdr.ascq == 0x0a)
return SCSI_DH_RETRY;
else if (retval)
--
2.43.0
From: Martin Wilck <martin.wilck(a)suse.com>
[ Upstream commit 10157b1fc1a762293381e9145041253420dfc6ad ]
When a host is configured with a few LUNs and I/O is running, injecting FC
faults repeatedly leads to path recovery problems. The LUNs have 4 paths
each and 3 of them come back active after say an FC fault which makes 2 of
the paths go down, instead of all 4. This happens after several iterations
of continuous FC faults.
Reason here is that we're returning an I/O error whenever we're
encountering sense code 06/04/0a (LOGICAL UNIT NOT ACCESSIBLE, ASYMMETRIC
ACCESS STATE TRANSITION) instead of retrying.
[mwilck: The original patch was developed by Rajashekhar M A and Hannes
Reinecke. I moved the code to alua_check_sense() as suggested by Mike
Christie [1]. Evan Milne had raised the question whether pg->state should
be set to transitioning in the UA case [2]. I believe that doing this is
correct. SCSI_ACCESS_STATE_TRANSITIONING by itself doesn't cause I/O
errors. Our handler schedules an RTPG, which will only result in an I/O
error condition if the transitioning timeout expires.]
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/0bc96e82-fdda-4187-148d-5b34f81d4942@oracle.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAGtn9r=kicnTDE2o7Gt5Y=yoidHYD7tG8XdMHEBJTBraVE…
Co-developed-by: Rajashekhar M A <rajs(a)netapp.com>
Co-developed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare(a)suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare(a)suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Martin Wilck <martin.wilck(a)suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240514140344.19538-1-mwilck@suse.com
Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal <dlemoal(a)kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch(a)lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <michael.christie(a)oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen(a)oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org>
---
drivers/scsi/device_handler/scsi_dh_alua.c | 31 +++++++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/device_handler/scsi_dh_alua.c b/drivers/scsi/device_handler/scsi_dh_alua.c
index a226dc1b65d71..4eb0837298d4d 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/device_handler/scsi_dh_alua.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/device_handler/scsi_dh_alua.c
@@ -414,28 +414,40 @@ static char print_alua_state(unsigned char state)
}
}
-static enum scsi_disposition alua_check_sense(struct scsi_device *sdev,
- struct scsi_sense_hdr *sense_hdr)
+static void alua_handle_state_transition(struct scsi_device *sdev)
{
struct alua_dh_data *h = sdev->handler_data;
struct alua_port_group *pg;
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ pg = rcu_dereference(h->pg);
+ if (pg)
+ pg->state = SCSI_ACCESS_STATE_TRANSITIONING;
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ alua_check(sdev, false);
+}
+
+static enum scsi_disposition alua_check_sense(struct scsi_device *sdev,
+ struct scsi_sense_hdr *sense_hdr)
+{
switch (sense_hdr->sense_key) {
case NOT_READY:
if (sense_hdr->asc == 0x04 && sense_hdr->ascq == 0x0a) {
/*
* LUN Not Accessible - ALUA state transition
*/
- rcu_read_lock();
- pg = rcu_dereference(h->pg);
- if (pg)
- pg->state = SCSI_ACCESS_STATE_TRANSITIONING;
- rcu_read_unlock();
- alua_check(sdev, false);
+ alua_handle_state_transition(sdev);
return NEEDS_RETRY;
}
break;
case UNIT_ATTENTION:
+ if (sense_hdr->asc == 0x04 && sense_hdr->ascq == 0x0a) {
+ /*
+ * LUN Not Accessible - ALUA state transition
+ */
+ alua_handle_state_transition(sdev);
+ return NEEDS_RETRY;
+ }
if (sense_hdr->asc == 0x29 && sense_hdr->ascq == 0x00) {
/*
* Power On, Reset, or Bus Device Reset.
@@ -502,7 +514,8 @@ static int alua_tur(struct scsi_device *sdev)
retval = scsi_test_unit_ready(sdev, ALUA_FAILOVER_TIMEOUT * HZ,
ALUA_FAILOVER_RETRIES, &sense_hdr);
- if (sense_hdr.sense_key == NOT_READY &&
+ if ((sense_hdr.sense_key == NOT_READY ||
+ sense_hdr.sense_key == UNIT_ATTENTION) &&
sense_hdr.asc == 0x04 && sense_hdr.ascq == 0x0a)
return SCSI_DH_RETRY;
else if (retval)
--
2.43.0
Provide a concrete example of how to specify what stable series should be
targeted for change inclusion. Looking around on the stable mailing list this
seems like a common practice already, so let mention that in the documentation
as well (but worded so it is not interpreted as the only way to do so).
Reviewed-by: Paul Barker <paul.barker.ct(a)bp.renesas.com>
Signed-off-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu(a)suse.com>
---
Change from v1:
- "asks that the patch to be included in..." is edit to "asks that the
patch is included in..." for better wording (Paul)
---
Documentation/process/stable-kernel-rules.rst | 11 +++++++----
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/process/stable-kernel-rules.rst b/Documentation/process/stable-kernel-rules.rst
index edf90bbe30f4..d22aa2280f6e 100644
--- a/Documentation/process/stable-kernel-rules.rst
+++ b/Documentation/process/stable-kernel-rules.rst
@@ -57,10 +57,13 @@ options for cases where a mainlined patch needs adjustments to apply in older
series (for example due to API changes).
When using option 2 or 3 you can ask for your change to be included in specific
-stable series. When doing so, ensure the fix or an equivalent is applicable,
-submitted, or already present in all newer stable trees still supported. This is
-meant to prevent regressions that users might later encounter on updating, if
-e.g. a fix merged for 5.19-rc1 would be backported to 5.10.y, but not to 5.15.y.
+stable series, one way to do so is by specifying the target series in the
+subject prefix (e.g. '[PATCH stable 5.15 5.10]' asks that the patch is
+included in both 5.10.y and 5.15.y). When doing so, ensure the fix or an
+equivalent is applicable, submitted, or already present in all newer stable
+trees still supported. This is meant to prevent regressions that users might
+later encounter on updating, if e.g. a fix merged for 5.19-rc1 would be
+backported to 5.10.y, but not to 5.15.y.
.. _option_1:
--
2.45.2
Test the vesa_attributes field in struct screen_info for compatibility
with VGA hardware. Vesafb currently tests bit 1 in screen_info's
capabilities field, It sets the framebuffer address size and is
unrelated to VGA.
Section 4.4 of the Vesa VBE 2.0 specifications defines that bit 5 in
the mode's attributes field signals VGA compatibility. The mode is
compatible with VGA hardware if the bit is clear. In that case, the
driver can access VGA state of the VBE's underlying hardware. The
vesafb driver uses this feature to program the color LUT in palette
modes. Without, colors might be incorrect.
The problem got introduced in commit 89ec4c238e7a ("[PATCH] vesafb: Fix
incorrect logo colors in x86_64"). It incorrectly stores the mode
attributes in the screen_info's capabilities field and updates vesafb
accordingly. Later, commit 5e8ddcbe8692 ("Video mode probing support for
the new x86 setup code") fixed the screen_info, but did not update vesafb.
Color output still tends to work, because bit 1 in capabilities is
usually 0.
Besides fixing the bug in vesafb, this commit introduces a helper that
reads the correct bit from screen_info.
v2:
- clarify comment on non-VGA modes (Helge)
Signed-off-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann(a)suse.de>
Fixes: 5e8ddcbe8692 ("Video mode probing support for the new x86 setup code")
Reviewed-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm(a)redhat.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.23+
---
drivers/video/fbdev/vesafb.c | 2 +-
include/linux/screen_info.h | 10 ++++++++++
2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/video/fbdev/vesafb.c b/drivers/video/fbdev/vesafb.c
index 8ab64ae4cad3e..5a161750a3aee 100644
--- a/drivers/video/fbdev/vesafb.c
+++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/vesafb.c
@@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ static int vesafb_probe(struct platform_device *dev)
if (si->orig_video_isVGA != VIDEO_TYPE_VLFB)
return -ENODEV;
- vga_compat = (si->capabilities & 2) ? 0 : 1;
+ vga_compat = !__screen_info_vbe_mode_nonvga(si);
vesafb_fix.smem_start = si->lfb_base;
vesafb_defined.bits_per_pixel = si->lfb_depth;
if (15 == vesafb_defined.bits_per_pixel)
diff --git a/include/linux/screen_info.h b/include/linux/screen_info.h
index 75303c126285a..d21f8e4e9f4a4 100644
--- a/include/linux/screen_info.h
+++ b/include/linux/screen_info.h
@@ -49,6 +49,16 @@ static inline u64 __screen_info_lfb_size(const struct screen_info *si, unsigned
return lfb_size;
}
+static inline bool __screen_info_vbe_mode_nonvga(const struct screen_info *si)
+{
+ /*
+ * VESA modes typically run on VGA hardware. Set bit 5 signal that this
+ * is not the case. Drivers can then not make use of VGA resources. See
+ * Sec 4.4 of the VBE 2.0 spec.
+ */
+ return si->vesa_attributes & BIT(5);
+}
+
static inline unsigned int __screen_info_video_type(unsigned int type)
{
switch (type) {
--
2.45.2
[ Upstream commit 237f3cf13b20db183d3706d997eedc3c49eacd44 ]
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com>
syzbot reported an illegal copy in xsk_setsockopt() [1]
Make sure to validate setsockopt() @optlen parameter.
[1]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in copy_from_sockptr_offset include/linux/sockptr.h:49 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in copy_from_sockptr include/linux/sockptr.h:55 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in xsk_setsockopt+0x909/0xa40 net/xdp/xsk.c:1420
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888028c6cde3 by task syz-executor.0/7549
CPU: 0 PID: 7549 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.8.0-syzkaller-08951-gfe46a7dd189e #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline]
print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488
kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601
copy_from_sockptr_offset include/linux/sockptr.h:49 [inline]
copy_from_sockptr include/linux/sockptr.h:55 [inline]
xsk_setsockopt+0x909/0xa40 net/xdp/xsk.c:1420
do_sock_setsockopt+0x3af/0x720 net/socket.c:2311
__sys_setsockopt+0x1ae/0x250 net/socket.c:2334
__do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2343 [inline]
__se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2340 [inline]
__x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0xd0 net/socket.c:2340
do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x240
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75
RIP: 0033:0x7fb40587de69
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 e1 20 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fb40665a0c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fb4059abf80 RCX: 00007fb40587de69
RDX: 0000000000000005 RSI: 000000000000011b RDI: 0000000000000006
RBP: 00007fb4058ca47a R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000020001980 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007fb4059abf80 R15: 00007fff57ee4d08
</TASK>
Allocated by task 7549:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:370 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0x98/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:387
kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:211 [inline]
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:3966 [inline]
__kmalloc+0x233/0x4a0 mm/slub.c:3979
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:632 [inline]
__cgroup_bpf_run_filter_setsockopt+0xd2f/0x1040 kernel/bpf/cgroup.c:1869
do_sock_setsockopt+0x6b4/0x720 net/socket.c:2293
__sys_setsockopt+0x1ae/0x250 net/socket.c:2334
__do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2343 [inline]
__se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2340 [inline]
__x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0xd0 net/socket.c:2340
do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x240
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888028c6cde0
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8
The buggy address is located 1 bytes to the right of
allocated 2-byte region [ffff888028c6cde0, ffff888028c6cde2)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page:ffffea0000a31b00 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888028c6c9c0 pfn:0x28c6c
anon flags: 0xfff00000000800(slab|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
page_type: 0xffffffff()
raw: 00fff00000000800 ffff888014c41280 0000000000000000 dead000000000001
raw: ffff888028c6c9c0 0000000080800057 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page_owner tracks the page as allocated
page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x112cc0(GFP_USER|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY), pid 6648, tgid 6644 (syz-executor.0), ts 133906047828, free_ts 133859922223
set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:31 [inline]
post_alloc_hook+0x1ea/0x210 mm/page_alloc.c:1533
prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1540 [inline]
get_page_from_freelist+0x33ea/0x3580 mm/page_alloc.c:3311
__alloc_pages+0x256/0x680 mm/page_alloc.c:4569
__alloc_pages_node include/linux/gfp.h:238 [inline]
alloc_pages_node include/linux/gfp.h:261 [inline]
alloc_slab_page+0x5f/0x160 mm/slub.c:2175
allocate_slab mm/slub.c:2338 [inline]
new_slab+0x84/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:2391
___slab_alloc+0xc73/0x1260 mm/slub.c:3525
__slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3610 [inline]
__slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3663 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3835 [inline]
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:3965 [inline]
__kmalloc_node+0x2db/0x4e0 mm/slub.c:3973
kmalloc_node include/linux/slab.h:648 [inline]
__vmalloc_area_node mm/vmalloc.c:3197 [inline]
__vmalloc_node_range+0x5f9/0x14a0 mm/vmalloc.c:3392
__vmalloc_node mm/vmalloc.c:3457 [inline]
vzalloc+0x79/0x90 mm/vmalloc.c:3530
bpf_check+0x260/0x19010 kernel/bpf/verifier.c:21162
bpf_prog_load+0x1667/0x20f0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:2895
__sys_bpf+0x4ee/0x810 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5631
__do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5738 [inline]
__se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5736 [inline]
__x64_sys_bpf+0x7c/0x90 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5736
do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x240
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75
page last free pid 6650 tgid 6647 stack trace:
reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:24 [inline]
free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1140 [inline]
free_unref_page_prepare+0x95d/0xa80 mm/page_alloc.c:2346
free_unref_page_list+0x5a3/0x850 mm/page_alloc.c:2532
release_pages+0x2117/0x2400 mm/swap.c:1042
tlb_batch_pages_flush mm/mmu_gather.c:98 [inline]
tlb_flush_mmu_free mm/mmu_gather.c:293 [inline]
tlb_flush_mmu+0x34d/0x4e0 mm/mmu_gather.c:300
tlb_finish_mmu+0xd4/0x200 mm/mmu_gather.c:392
exit_mmap+0x4b6/0xd40 mm/mmap.c:3300
__mmput+0x115/0x3c0 kernel/fork.c:1345
exit_mm+0x220/0x310 kernel/exit.c:569
do_exit+0x99e/0x27e0 kernel/exit.c:865
do_group_exit+0x207/0x2c0 kernel/exit.c:1027
get_signal+0x176e/0x1850 kernel/signal.c:2907
arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x96/0x860 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:310
exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:105 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/entry-common.h:328 [inline]
__syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:201 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0xc9/0x360 kernel/entry/common.c:212
do_syscall_64+0x10a/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:89
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff888028c6cc80: fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc
ffff888028c6cd00: fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc 06 fc fc fc
>ffff888028c6cd80: fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc 02 fc fc fc
^
ffff888028c6ce00: fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc
ffff888028c6ce80: fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc
Fixes: 423f38329d26 ("xsk: add umem fill queue support and mmap")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller(a)googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com>
Cc: "Björn Töpel" <bjorn(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Magnus Karlsson <magnus.karlsson(a)intel.com>
Cc: Maciej Fijalkowski <maciej.fijalkowski(a)intel.com>
Cc: Jonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon(a)gmail.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240404202738.3634547-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org>
[shung-hsi.yu: two additional changes not present in the original
1. Check optlen in the XDP_UMEM_REG case as well. It was added in commit
c05cd36458147 ("xsk: add support to allow unaligned chunk placement") but
seems like too big of a change for stable
2. copy_from_sockptr() in the context was replace copy_from_usr()
because commit a7b75c5a8c414 ("net: pass a sockptr_t into
->setsockopt") was not present]
Signed-off-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu(a)suse.com>
---
Resend because the last submission was done prior to 5.4 receiving the fix,
hence was dropped from Greg's tree[1].
1: https://lore.kernel.org/stable/2024061329-pregnancy-rumbling-74b2@gregkh/
---
net/xdp/xsk.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/xdp/xsk.c b/net/xdp/xsk.c
index 6bb0649c028c..d5a9c43930de 100644
--- a/net/xdp/xsk.c
+++ b/net/xdp/xsk.c
@@ -515,6 +515,8 @@ static int xsk_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
struct xdp_umem_reg mr;
struct xdp_umem *umem;
+ if (optlen < sizeof(mr))
+ return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&mr, optval, sizeof(mr)))
return -EFAULT;
@@ -542,6 +544,8 @@ static int xsk_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
struct xsk_queue **q;
int entries;
+ if (optlen < sizeof(entries))
+ return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&entries, optval, sizeof(entries)))
return -EFAULT;
--
2.45.1
From: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov(a)gmail.com>
commit 0774d19038c496f0c3602fb505c43e1b2d8eed85 upstream.
If an input device declares too many capability bits then modalias
string for such device may become too long and not fit into uevent
buffer, resulting in failure of sending said uevent. This, in turn,
may prevent userspace from recognizing existence of such devices.
This is typically not a concern for real hardware devices as they have
limited number of keys, but happen with synthetic devices such as
ones created by xen-kbdfront driver, which creates devices as being
capable of delivering all possible keys, since it doesn't know what
keys the backend may produce.
To deal with such devices input core will attempt to trim key data,
in the hope that the rest of modalias string will fit in the given
buffer. When trimming key data it will indicate that it is not
complete by placing "+," sign, resulting in conversions like this:
old: k71,72,73,74,78,7A,7B,7C,7D,8E,9E,A4,AD,E0,E1,E4,F8,174,
new: k71,72,73,74,78,7A,7B,7C,+,
This should allow existing udev rules continue to work with existing
devices, and will also allow writing more complex rules that would
recognize trimmed modalias and check input device characteristics by
other means (for example by parsing KEY= data in uevent or parsing
input device sysfs attributes).
Note that the driver core may try adding more uevent environment
variables once input core is done adding its own, so when forming
modalias we can not use the entire available buffer, so we reduce
it by somewhat an arbitrary amount (96 bytes).
Reported-by: Jason Andryuk <jandryuk(a)gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer(a)who-t.net>
Tested-by: Jason Andryuk <jandryuk(a)gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ZjAWMQCJdrxZkvkB@google.com
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov(a)gmail.com>
[ Apply to linux-5.15.y ]
Signed-off-by: Jason Andryuk <jason.andryuk(a)amd.com>
---
Built with 5.15 and 4.19. Tested on 5.15.
Drop const from struct input_dev *id
Declare i outside loop:
drivers/input/input.c: In function ‘input_print_modalias_parts’:
drivers/input/input.c:1393:25: error: ‘for’ loop initial declarations are only allowed in C99 or C11 mode
1393 | for (int i = size - 1 - remainder - 3; i >= 0; i--) {
| ^~~
---
drivers/input/input.c | 105 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 90 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/input/input.c b/drivers/input/input.c
index 5ca3f11d2d75..171f71bd4c2a 100644
--- a/drivers/input/input.c
+++ b/drivers/input/input.c
@@ -1360,19 +1360,19 @@ static int input_print_modalias_bits(char *buf, int size,
char name, unsigned long *bm,
unsigned int min_bit, unsigned int max_bit)
{
- int len = 0, i;
+ int bit = min_bit;
+ int len = 0;
len += snprintf(buf, max(size, 0), "%c", name);
- for (i = min_bit; i < max_bit; i++)
- if (bm[BIT_WORD(i)] & BIT_MASK(i))
- len += snprintf(buf + len, max(size - len, 0), "%X,", i);
+ for_each_set_bit_from(bit, bm, max_bit)
+ len += snprintf(buf + len, max(size - len, 0), "%X,", bit);
return len;
}
-static int input_print_modalias(char *buf, int size, struct input_dev *id,
- int add_cr)
+static int input_print_modalias_parts(char *buf, int size, int full_len,
+ struct input_dev *id)
{
- int len;
+ int len, klen, remainder, space;
len = snprintf(buf, max(size, 0),
"input:b%04Xv%04Xp%04Xe%04X-",
@@ -1381,8 +1381,49 @@ static int input_print_modalias(char *buf, int size, struct input_dev *id,
len += input_print_modalias_bits(buf + len, size - len,
'e', id->evbit, 0, EV_MAX);
- len += input_print_modalias_bits(buf + len, size - len,
+
+ /*
+ * Calculate the remaining space in the buffer making sure we
+ * have place for the terminating 0.
+ */
+ space = max(size - (len + 1), 0);
+
+ klen = input_print_modalias_bits(buf + len, size - len,
'k', id->keybit, KEY_MIN_INTERESTING, KEY_MAX);
+ len += klen;
+
+ /*
+ * If we have more data than we can fit in the buffer, check
+ * if we can trim key data to fit in the rest. We will indicate
+ * that key data is incomplete by adding "+" sign at the end, like
+ * this: * "k1,2,3,45,+,".
+ *
+ * Note that we shortest key info (if present) is "k+," so we
+ * can only try to trim if key data is longer than that.
+ */
+ if (full_len && size < full_len + 1 && klen > 3) {
+ remainder = full_len - len;
+ /*
+ * We can only trim if we have space for the remainder
+ * and also for at least "k+," which is 3 more characters.
+ */
+ if (remainder <= space - 3) {
+ int i;
+ /*
+ * We are guaranteed to have 'k' in the buffer, so
+ * we need at least 3 additional bytes for storing
+ * "+," in addition to the remainder.
+ */
+ for (i = size - 1 - remainder - 3; i >= 0; i--) {
+ if (buf[i] == 'k' || buf[i] == ',') {
+ strcpy(buf + i + 1, "+,");
+ len = i + 3; /* Not counting '\0' */
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
len += input_print_modalias_bits(buf + len, size - len,
'r', id->relbit, 0, REL_MAX);
len += input_print_modalias_bits(buf + len, size - len,
@@ -1398,12 +1439,25 @@ static int input_print_modalias(char *buf, int size, struct input_dev *id,
len += input_print_modalias_bits(buf + len, size - len,
'w', id->swbit, 0, SW_MAX);
- if (add_cr)
- len += snprintf(buf + len, max(size - len, 0), "\n");
-
return len;
}
+static int input_print_modalias(char *buf, int size, struct input_dev *id)
+{
+ int full_len;
+
+ /*
+ * Printing is done in 2 passes: first one figures out total length
+ * needed for the modalias string, second one will try to trim key
+ * data in case when buffer is too small for the entire modalias.
+ * If the buffer is too small regardless, it will fill as much as it
+ * can (without trimming key data) into the buffer and leave it to
+ * the caller to figure out what to do with the result.
+ */
+ full_len = input_print_modalias_parts(NULL, 0, 0, id);
+ return input_print_modalias_parts(buf, size, full_len, id);
+}
+
static ssize_t input_dev_show_modalias(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr,
char *buf)
@@ -1411,7 +1465,9 @@ static ssize_t input_dev_show_modalias(struct device *dev,
struct input_dev *id = to_input_dev(dev);
ssize_t len;
- len = input_print_modalias(buf, PAGE_SIZE, id, 1);
+ len = input_print_modalias(buf, PAGE_SIZE, id);
+ if (len < PAGE_SIZE - 2)
+ len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len, "\n");
return min_t(int, len, PAGE_SIZE);
}
@@ -1623,6 +1679,23 @@ static int input_add_uevent_bm_var(struct kobj_uevent_env *env,
return 0;
}
+/*
+ * This is a pretty gross hack. When building uevent data the driver core
+ * may try adding more environment variables to kobj_uevent_env without
+ * telling us, so we have no idea how much of the buffer we can use to
+ * avoid overflows/-ENOMEM elsewhere. To work around this let's artificially
+ * reduce amount of memory we will use for the modalias environment variable.
+ *
+ * The potential additions are:
+ *
+ * SEQNUM=18446744073709551615 - (%llu - 28 bytes)
+ * HOME=/ (6 bytes)
+ * PATH=/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin (34 bytes)
+ *
+ * 68 bytes total. Allow extra buffer - 96 bytes
+ */
+#define UEVENT_ENV_EXTRA_LEN 96
+
static int input_add_uevent_modalias_var(struct kobj_uevent_env *env,
struct input_dev *dev)
{
@@ -1632,9 +1705,11 @@ static int input_add_uevent_modalias_var(struct kobj_uevent_env *env,
return -ENOMEM;
len = input_print_modalias(&env->buf[env->buflen - 1],
- sizeof(env->buf) - env->buflen,
- dev, 0);
- if (len >= (sizeof(env->buf) - env->buflen))
+ (int)sizeof(env->buf) - env->buflen -
+ UEVENT_ENV_EXTRA_LEN,
+ dev);
+ if (len >= ((int)sizeof(env->buf) - env->buflen -
+ UEVENT_ENV_EXTRA_LEN))
return -ENOMEM;
env->buflen += len;
--
2.40.1
The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 6f4d93b78ade0a4c2cafd587f7b429ce95abb02e
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024061759-decoy-condiment-7d57@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
6f4d93b78ade ("gve: Clear napi->skb before dev_kfree_skb_any()")
1344e751e910 ("gve: Add RX context.")
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 6f4d93b78ade0a4c2cafd587f7b429ce95abb02e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ziwei Xiao <ziweixiao(a)google.com>
Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2024 00:16:54 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] gve: Clear napi->skb before dev_kfree_skb_any()
gve_rx_free_skb incorrectly leaves napi->skb referencing an skb after it
is freed with dev_kfree_skb_any(). This can result in a subsequent call
to napi_get_frags returning a dangling pointer.
Fix this by clearing napi->skb before the skb is freed.
Fixes: 9b8dd5e5ea48 ("gve: DQO: Add RX path")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Shailend Chand <shailend(a)google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ziwei Xiao <ziweixiao(a)google.com>
Reviewed-by: Harshitha Ramamurthy <hramamurthy(a)google.com>
Reviewed-by: Shailend Chand <shailend(a)google.com>
Reviewed-by: Praveen Kaligineedi <pkaligineedi(a)google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240612001654.923887-1-ziweixiao@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org>
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/google/gve/gve_rx_dqo.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/google/gve/gve_rx_dqo.c
index c1c912de59c7..1154c1d8f66f 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/google/gve/gve_rx_dqo.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/google/gve/gve_rx_dqo.c
@@ -647,11 +647,13 @@ static void gve_rx_skb_hash(struct sk_buff *skb,
skb_set_hash(skb, le32_to_cpu(compl_desc->hash), hash_type);
}
-static void gve_rx_free_skb(struct gve_rx_ring *rx)
+static void gve_rx_free_skb(struct napi_struct *napi, struct gve_rx_ring *rx)
{
if (!rx->ctx.skb_head)
return;
+ if (rx->ctx.skb_head == napi->skb)
+ napi->skb = NULL;
dev_kfree_skb_any(rx->ctx.skb_head);
rx->ctx.skb_head = NULL;
rx->ctx.skb_tail = NULL;
@@ -950,7 +952,7 @@ int gve_rx_poll_dqo(struct gve_notify_block *block, int budget)
err = gve_rx_dqo(napi, rx, compl_desc, complq->head, rx->q_num);
if (err < 0) {
- gve_rx_free_skb(rx);
+ gve_rx_free_skb(napi, rx);
u64_stats_update_begin(&rx->statss);
if (err == -ENOMEM)
rx->rx_skb_alloc_fail++;
@@ -993,7 +995,7 @@ int gve_rx_poll_dqo(struct gve_notify_block *block, int budget)
/* gve_rx_complete_skb() will consume skb if successful */
if (gve_rx_complete_skb(rx, napi, compl_desc, feat) != 0) {
- gve_rx_free_skb(rx);
+ gve_rx_free_skb(napi, rx);
u64_stats_update_begin(&rx->statss);
rx->rx_desc_err_dropped_pkt++;
u64_stats_update_end(&rx->statss);