commit 73254a297c2dd094abec7c9efee32455ae875bdf upstream.
The io_register_iowq_max_workers() function calls io_put_sq_data(),
which acquires the sqd->lock without releasing the uring_lock.
Similar to the commit 009ad9f0c6ee ("io_uring: drop ctx->uring_lock
before acquiring sqd->lock"), this can lead to a potential deadlock
situation.
To resolve this issue, the uring_lock is released before calling
io_put_sq_data(), and then it is re-acquired after the function call.
This change ensures that the locks are acquired in the correct
order, preventing the possibility of a deadlock.
Suggested-by: Maximilian Heyne <mheyne(a)amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: Hagar Hemdan <hagarhem(a)amazon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240604130527.3597-1-hagarhem@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk>
[Hagar: Modified to apply on v5.15]
Signed-off-by: Hagar Hemdan <hagarhem(a)amazon.com>
---
io_uring/io_uring.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/io_uring/io_uring.c b/io_uring/io_uring.c
index f1ab0cd98727..3dbc704c7001 100644
--- a/io_uring/io_uring.c
+++ b/io_uring/io_uring.c
@@ -10818,8 +10818,10 @@ static int io_register_iowq_max_workers(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx,
}
if (sqd) {
+ mutex_unlock(&ctx->uring_lock);
mutex_unlock(&sqd->lock);
io_put_sq_data(sqd);
+ mutex_lock(&ctx->uring_lock);
}
if (copy_to_user(arg, new_count, sizeof(new_count)))
@@ -10844,8 +10846,11 @@ static int io_register_iowq_max_workers(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx,
return 0;
err:
if (sqd) {
+ mutex_unlock(&ctx->uring_lock);
mutex_unlock(&sqd->lock);
io_put_sq_data(sqd);
+ mutex_lock(&ctx->uring_lock);
+
}
return ret;
}
--
2.40.1
commit 73254a297c2dd094abec7c9efee32455ae875bdf upstream.
The io_register_iowq_max_workers() function calls io_put_sq_data(),
which acquires the sqd->lock without releasing the uring_lock.
Similar to the commit 009ad9f0c6ee ("io_uring: drop ctx->uring_lock
before acquiring sqd->lock"), this can lead to a potential deadlock
situation.
To resolve this issue, the uring_lock is released before calling
io_put_sq_data(), and then it is re-acquired after the function call.
This change ensures that the locks are acquired in the correct
order, preventing the possibility of a deadlock.
Suggested-by: Maximilian Heyne <mheyne(a)amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: Hagar Hemdan <hagarhem(a)amazon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240604130527.3597-1-hagarhem@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk>
[Hagar: Modified to apply on v6.1]
Signed-off-by: Hagar Hemdan <hagarhem(a)amazon.com>
---
io_uring/io_uring.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/io_uring/io_uring.c b/io_uring/io_uring.c
index 92c1aa8f3501..4f0ae938b146 100644
--- a/io_uring/io_uring.c
+++ b/io_uring/io_uring.c
@@ -3921,8 +3921,10 @@ static __cold int io_register_iowq_max_workers(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx,
}
if (sqd) {
+ mutex_unlock(&ctx->uring_lock);
mutex_unlock(&sqd->lock);
io_put_sq_data(sqd);
+ mutex_lock(&ctx->uring_lock);
}
if (copy_to_user(arg, new_count, sizeof(new_count)))
@@ -3947,8 +3949,11 @@ static __cold int io_register_iowq_max_workers(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx,
return 0;
err:
if (sqd) {
+ mutex_unlock(&ctx->uring_lock);
mutex_unlock(&sqd->lock);
io_put_sq_data(sqd);
+ mutex_lock(&ctx->uring_lock);
+
}
return ret;
}
--
2.40.1
commit 73254a297c2dd094abec7c9efee32455ae875bdf upstream.
The io_register_iowq_max_workers() function calls io_put_sq_data(),
which acquires the sqd->lock without releasing the uring_lock.
Similar to the commit 009ad9f0c6ee ("io_uring: drop ctx->uring_lock
before acquiring sqd->lock"), this can lead to a potential deadlock
situation.
To resolve this issue, the uring_lock is released before calling
io_put_sq_data(), and then it is re-acquired after the function call.
This change ensures that the locks are acquired in the correct
order, preventing the possibility of a deadlock.
Suggested-by: Maximilian Heyne <mheyne(a)amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: Hagar Hemdan <hagarhem(a)amazon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240604130527.3597-1-hagarhem@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk>
[Hagar: Modified to apply on v6.6]
Signed-off-by: Hagar Hemdan <hagarhem(a)amazon.com>
---
io_uring/io_uring.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/io_uring/io_uring.c b/io_uring/io_uring.c
index 484c9bcbee77..70dd6a5b9647 100644
--- a/io_uring/io_uring.c
+++ b/io_uring/io_uring.c
@@ -4358,8 +4358,10 @@ static __cold int io_register_iowq_max_workers(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx,
}
if (sqd) {
+ mutex_unlock(&ctx->uring_lock);
mutex_unlock(&sqd->lock);
io_put_sq_data(sqd);
+ mutex_lock(&ctx->uring_lock);
}
if (copy_to_user(arg, new_count, sizeof(new_count)))
@@ -4384,8 +4386,11 @@ static __cold int io_register_iowq_max_workers(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx,
return 0;
err:
if (sqd) {
+ mutex_unlock(&ctx->uring_lock);
mutex_unlock(&sqd->lock);
io_put_sq_data(sqd);
+ mutex_lock(&ctx->uring_lock);
+
}
return ret;
}
--
2.40.1
Kexec bypasses EFI's switch to virtual mode. In exchange, it has its own
routine, kexec_enter_virtual_mode(), that replays the mappings made by
the original kernel. Unfortunately, the function fails to reinstate
EFI's memory attributes and runtime memory protections, which would've
otherwise been set after entering virtual mode. Remediate this by
calling efi_runtime_update_mappings() from it.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 18141e89a76c ("x86/efi: Add support for EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE")
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Saenz Julienne <nsaenz(a)amazon.com>
---
Notes:
- I tested the Memory Attributes path using QEMU/OVMF.
- Although care is taken to make sure the memory backing the EFI Memory
Attributes table is preserved during runtime and reachable after kexec
(see efi_memattr_init()). I don't see the same happening for the EFI
properties table. Maybe it's just unnecessary as there's an assumption
that the table will fall in memory preserved during runtime? Or for
another reason? Otherwise, we'd need to make sure it isn't possible to
set EFI_NX_PE_DATA on kexec.
arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
index 88a96816de9a..b9b17892c495 100644
--- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
+++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
@@ -784,6 +784,7 @@ static void __init kexec_enter_virtual_mode(void)
efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings();
efi_native_runtime_setup();
+ efi_runtime_update_mappings();
#endif
}
--
2.40.1
From: Mingcong Bai <jeffbai(a)aosc.io>
[ Upstream commit de156f3cf70e17dc6ff4c3c364bb97a6db961ffd ]
Xiaomi Book Pro 14 2022 (MIA2210-AD) requires a quirk entry for its
internal microphone to be enabled.
This is likely due to similar reasons as seen previously on Redmi Book
14/15 Pro 2022 models (since they likely came with similar firmware):
- commit dcff8b7ca92d ("ASoC: amd: yc: Add Xiaomi Redmi Book Pro 15 2022
into DMI table")
- commit c1dd6bf61997 ("ASoC: amd: yc: Add Xiaomi Redmi Book Pro 14 2022
into DMI table")
A quirk would likely be needed for Xiaomi Book Pro 15 2022 models, too.
However, I do not have such device on hand so I will leave it for now.
Signed-off-by: Mingcong Bai <jeffbai(a)aosc.io>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241106024052.15748-1-jeffbai@aosc.io
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: WangYuli <wangyuli(a)uniontech.com>
---
sound/soc/amd/yc/acp6x-mach.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/sound/soc/amd/yc/acp6x-mach.c b/sound/soc/amd/yc/acp6x-mach.c
index 76f5d926d1ea..e027bc1d35f4 100644
--- a/sound/soc/amd/yc/acp6x-mach.c
+++ b/sound/soc/amd/yc/acp6x-mach.c
@@ -381,6 +381,13 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id yc_acp_quirk_table[] = {
DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "Redmi Book Pro 15 2022"),
}
},
+ {
+ .driver_data = &acp6x_card,
+ .matches = {
+ DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_VENDOR, "TIMI"),
+ DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "Xiaomi Book Pro 14 2022"),
+ }
+ },
{
.driver_data = &acp6x_card,
.matches = {
--
2.45.2
From: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever(a)oracle.com>
[ Upstream commit 202f39039a11402dcbcd5fece8d9fa6be83f49ae ]
According to RFC 8881, all minor versions of NFSv4 support PUTPUBFH.
Replace the XDR decoder for PUTPUBFH with a "noop" since we no
longer want the minorversion check, and PUTPUBFH has no arguments to
decode. (Ideally nfsd4_decode_noop should really be called
nfsd4_decode_void).
PUTPUBFH should now behave just like PUTROOTFH.
Reported-by: Cedric Blancher <cedric.blancher(a)gmail.com>
Fixes: e1a90ebd8b23 ("NFSD: Combine decode operations for v4 and v4.1")
Cc: Dan Shelton <dan.f.shelton(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Roland Mainz <roland.mainz(a)nrubsig.org>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
[ cel: adjusted to apply to origin/linux-5.4.y ]
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever(a)oracle.com>
---
fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 10 +---------
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 9 deletions(-)
In response to:
https://lore.kernel.org/stable/2024100703-decorated-bodacious-fa3c@gregkh/
here is a version of upstream commit 202f39039a11 ("NFSD: Fix
NFSv4's PUTPUBFH operation") that applies to both origin/linux-5.4.y
and origin/linux-4.19.y.
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
index 1d24fff2709c..55b18c145390 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
@@ -1068,14 +1068,6 @@ nfsd4_decode_putfh(struct nfsd4_compoundargs *argp, struct nfsd4_putfh *putfh)
DECODE_TAIL;
}
-static __be32
-nfsd4_decode_putpubfh(struct nfsd4_compoundargs *argp, void *p)
-{
- if (argp->minorversion == 0)
- return nfs_ok;
- return nfserr_notsupp;
-}
-
static __be32
nfsd4_decode_read(struct nfsd4_compoundargs *argp, struct nfsd4_read *read)
{
@@ -1825,7 +1817,7 @@ static const nfsd4_dec nfsd4_dec_ops[] = {
[OP_OPEN_CONFIRM] = (nfsd4_dec)nfsd4_decode_open_confirm,
[OP_OPEN_DOWNGRADE] = (nfsd4_dec)nfsd4_decode_open_downgrade,
[OP_PUTFH] = (nfsd4_dec)nfsd4_decode_putfh,
- [OP_PUTPUBFH] = (nfsd4_dec)nfsd4_decode_putpubfh,
+ [OP_PUTPUBFH] = (nfsd4_dec)nfsd4_decode_noop,
[OP_PUTROOTFH] = (nfsd4_dec)nfsd4_decode_noop,
[OP_READ] = (nfsd4_dec)nfsd4_decode_read,
[OP_READDIR] = (nfsd4_dec)nfsd4_decode_readdir,
--
2.47.0
This patch series is to fix bugs for below 2 APIs:
pci_epc_destroy()
pci_epc_remove_epf()
Signed-off-by: Zijun Hu <quic_zijuhu(a)quicinc.com>
---
Changes in v2:
- Correct title and commit messages, and remove RFC tag
- Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241102-epc_rfc-v1-0-5026322df5bc@quicinc.com
---
Zijun Hu (2):
PCI: endpoint: Fix API pci_epc_destroy() releasing domain_nr ID faults
PCI: endpoint: Fix API pci_epc_remove_epf() cleaning up wrong EPC of EPF
drivers/pci/endpoint/pci-epc-core.c | 11 +++++------
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
---
base-commit: ad5df4a631fa7eeb8eb212d21ab3f6979fd1926e
change-id: 20241102-epc_rfc-e1d9d03d5101
Best regards,
--
Zijun Hu <quic_zijuhu(a)quicinc.com>