From: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski(a)linaro.org>
The output of ".%03u" with the unsigned int in range [0, 4294966295] may
get truncated if the target buffer is not 12 bytes. This can't really
happen here as the 'remainder' variable cannot exceed 999 but the
compiler doesn't know it. To make it happy just increase the buffer to
where the warning goes away.
Fixes: 3c9f3681d0b4 ("[SCSI] lib: add generic helper to print sizes rounded to the correct SI range")
Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski(a)linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andy(a)kernel.org>
Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <James.Bottomley(a)HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees(a)kernel.org>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
Changes in v2:
- improve the commit message
lib/string_helpers.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/lib/string_helpers.c b/lib/string_helpers.c
index 4f887aa62fa0..91fa37b5c510 100644
--- a/lib/string_helpers.c
+++ b/lib/string_helpers.c
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ int string_get_size(u64 size, u64 blk_size, const enum string_size_units units,
static const unsigned int rounding[] = { 500, 50, 5 };
int i = 0, j;
u32 remainder = 0, sf_cap;
- char tmp[8];
+ char tmp[12];
const char *unit;
tmp[0] = '\0';
--
2.45.2
This patch series is to fix bugs for below 2 APIs:
pci_epc_destroy()
pci_epc_remove_epf()
Signed-off-by: Zijun Hu <quic_zijuhu(a)quicinc.com>
---
Zijun Hu (2):
PCI: endpoint: Fix API pci_epc_destroy() releasing domain_nr ID faults
PCI: endpoint: Fix that API pci_epc_remove_epf() cleans up wrong EPC of EPF
drivers/pci/endpoint/pci-epc-core.c | 11 +++++------
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
---
base-commit: 11066801dd4b7c4d75fce65c812723a80c1481ae
change-id: 20241102-epc_rfc-e1d9d03d5101
Best regards,
--
Zijun Hu <quic_zijuhu(a)quicinc.com>
In an event where the platform running the device control plane
is rebooted, reset is detected on the driver. It releases
all the resources and waits for the reset to complete. Once the
reset is done, it tries to build the resources back. At this
time if the device control plane is not yet started, then
the driver timeouts on the virtchnl message and retries to
establish the mailbox again.
In the retry flow, mailbox is deinitialized but the mailbox
workqueue is still alive and polling for the mailbox message.
This results in accessing the released control queue leading to
null-ptr-deref. Fix it by unrolling the work queue cancellation
and mailbox deinitialization in the reverse order which they got
initialized.
Fixes: 4930fbf419a7 ("idpf: add core init and interrupt request")
Fixes: 34c21fa894a1 ("idpf: implement virtchnl transaction manager")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 6.9+
Reviewed-by: Tarun K Singh <tarun.k.singh(a)intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Pavan Kumar Linga <pavan.kumar.linga(a)intel.com>
---
v2:
- remove changes which are not fixes for the actual issue from this patch
---
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_lib.c | 1 +
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c | 1 -
2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_lib.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_lib.c
index c3848e10e7db..b4fbb99bfad2 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_lib.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_lib.c
@@ -1786,6 +1786,7 @@ static int idpf_init_hard_reset(struct idpf_adapter *adapter)
*/
err = idpf_vc_core_init(adapter);
if (err) {
+ cancel_delayed_work_sync(&adapter->mbx_task);
idpf_deinit_dflt_mbx(adapter);
goto unlock_mutex;
}
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c
index 3be883726b87..e7eee571d908 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c
@@ -3070,7 +3070,6 @@ int idpf_vc_core_init(struct idpf_adapter *adapter)
adapter->state = __IDPF_VER_CHECK;
if (adapter->vcxn_mngr)
idpf_vc_xn_shutdown(adapter->vcxn_mngr);
- idpf_deinit_dflt_mbx(adapter);
set_bit(IDPF_HR_DRV_LOAD, adapter->flags);
queue_delayed_work(adapter->vc_event_wq, &adapter->vc_event_task,
msecs_to_jiffies(task_delay));
--
2.43.0
If the KVP (or VSS) daemon starts before the VMBus channel's ringbuffer is
fully initialized, we can hit the panic below:
hv_utils: Registering HyperV Utility Driver
hv_vmbus: registering driver hv_utils
...
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
CPU: 44 UID: 0 PID: 2552 Comm: hv_kvp_daemon Tainted: G E 6.11.0-rc3+ #1
RIP: 0010:hv_pkt_iter_first+0x12/0xd0
Call Trace:
...
vmbus_recvpacket
hv_kvp_onchannelcallback
vmbus_on_event
tasklet_action_common
tasklet_action
handle_softirqs
irq_exit_rcu
sysvec_hyperv_stimer0
</IRQ>
<TASK>
asm_sysvec_hyperv_stimer0
...
kvp_register_done
hvt_op_read
vfs_read
ksys_read
__x64_sys_read
This can happen because the KVP/VSS channel callback can be invoked
even before the channel is fully opened:
1) as soon as hv_kvp_init() -> hvutil_transport_init() creates
/dev/vmbus/hv_kvp, the kvp daemon can open the device file immediately and
register itself to the driver by writing a message KVP_OP_REGISTER1 to the
file (which is handled by kvp_on_msg() ->kvp_handle_handshake()) and
reading the file for the driver's response, which is handled by
hvt_op_read(), which calls hvt->on_read(), i.e. kvp_register_done().
2) the problem with kvp_register_done() is that it can cause the
channel callback to be called even before the channel is fully opened,
and when the channel callback is starting to run, util_probe()->
vmbus_open() may have not initialized the ringbuffer yet, so the
callback can hit the panic of NULL pointer dereference.
To reproduce the panic consistently, we can add a "ssleep(10)" for KVP in
__vmbus_open(), just before the first hv_ringbuffer_init(), and then we
unload and reload the driver hv_utils, and run the daemon manually within
the 10 seconds.
Fix the panic by checking the channel state in the channel callback.
To avoid the race condition with __vmbus_open(), we disable and enable
the channel callback temporarily in __vmbus_open().
The channel callbacks of the other VMBus devices don't need to check
the channel state since they can't run before the channels are fully
initialized.
Note: we would also need to fix the fcopy driver code, but that has
been removed in commit ec314f61e4fc ("Drivers: hv: Remove fcopy driver") in
the mainline kernel since v6.10. For old 6.x LTS kernels, and the 5.x
and 4.x LTS kernels, the fcopy driver needs to be fixed when the
fix is backported to the stable kernel branches.
Fixes: e0fa3e5e7df6 ("Drivers: hv: utils: fix a race on userspace daemons registration")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dexuan Cui <decui(a)microsoft.com>
---
drivers/hv/channel.c | 11 +++++++++++
drivers/hv/hv_kvp.c | 3 +++
drivers/hv/hv_snapshot.c | 3 +++
3 files changed, 17 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/hv/channel.c b/drivers/hv/channel.c
index fb8cd8469328..685e407a3fdf 100644
--- a/drivers/hv/channel.c
+++ b/drivers/hv/channel.c
@@ -657,6 +657,14 @@ static int __vmbus_open(struct vmbus_channel *newchannel,
return -ENOMEM;
}
+ /*
+ * The channel callbacks of KVP/VSS may run before __vmbus_open()
+ * finishes (see kvp_register_done() -> ... -> kvp_poll_wrapper()), so
+ * they check newchannel->state to tell the ringbuffer has been fully
+ * initialized or not. Disable and enable the tasklet to avoid the race.
+ */
+ tasklet_disable(&newchannel->callback_event);
+
newchannel->state = CHANNEL_OPENING_STATE;
newchannel->onchannel_callback = onchannelcallback;
newchannel->channel_callback_context = context;
@@ -750,6 +758,8 @@ static int __vmbus_open(struct vmbus_channel *newchannel,
}
newchannel->state = CHANNEL_OPENED_STATE;
+ tasklet_enable(&newchannel->callback_event);
+
kfree(open_info);
return 0;
@@ -766,6 +776,7 @@ static int __vmbus_open(struct vmbus_channel *newchannel,
hv_ringbuffer_cleanup(&newchannel->inbound);
vmbus_free_requestor(&newchannel->requestor);
newchannel->state = CHANNEL_OPEN_STATE;
+ tasklet_enable(&newchannel->callback_event);
return err;
}
diff --git a/drivers/hv/hv_kvp.c b/drivers/hv/hv_kvp.c
index d35b60c06114..ec098067e579 100644
--- a/drivers/hv/hv_kvp.c
+++ b/drivers/hv/hv_kvp.c
@@ -662,6 +662,9 @@ void hv_kvp_onchannelcallback(void *context)
if (kvp_transaction.state > HVUTIL_READY)
return;
+ if (channel->state != CHANNEL_OPENED_STATE)
+ return;
+
if (vmbus_recvpacket(channel, recv_buffer, HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE * 4, &recvlen, &requestid)) {
pr_err_ratelimited("KVP request received. Could not read into recv buf\n");
return;
diff --git a/drivers/hv/hv_snapshot.c b/drivers/hv/hv_snapshot.c
index 0d2184be1691..f7924c2fc62e 100644
--- a/drivers/hv/hv_snapshot.c
+++ b/drivers/hv/hv_snapshot.c
@@ -301,6 +301,9 @@ void hv_vss_onchannelcallback(void *context)
if (vss_transaction.state > HVUTIL_READY)
return;
+ if (channel->state != CHANNEL_OPENED_STATE)
+ return;
+
if (vmbus_recvpacket(channel, recv_buffer, VSS_MAX_PKT_SIZE, &recvlen, &requestid)) {
pr_err_ratelimited("VSS request received. Could not read into recv buf\n");
return;
--
2.25.1
Setting TPM_CHIP_FLAG_SUSPENDED in the end of tpm_pm_suspend() can be racy
according, as this leaves window for tpm_hwrng_read() to be called while
the operation is in progress. The recent bug report gives also evidence of
this behaviour.
Aadress this by locking the TPM chip before checking any chip->flags both
in tpm_pm_suspend() and tpm_hwrng_read(). Move TPM_CHIP_FLAG_SUSPENDED
check inside tpm_get_random() so that it will be always checked only when
the lock is reserved.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.4+
Fixes: 99d464506255 ("tpm: Prevent hwrng from activating during resume")
Reported-by: Mike Seo <mikeseohyungjin(a)gmail.com>
Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=219383
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org>
---
v3:
- Check TPM_CHIP_FLAG_SUSPENDED inside tpm_get_random() so that it is
also done under the lock (suggested by Jerry Snitselaar).
v2:
- Addressed my own remark:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/D59JAI6RR2CD.G5E5T4ZCZ49W@kernel.or…
---
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c | 4 ----
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------
2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
index 1ff99a7091bb..7df7abaf3e52 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
@@ -525,10 +525,6 @@ static int tpm_hwrng_read(struct hwrng *rng, void *data, size_t max, bool wait)
{
struct tpm_chip *chip = container_of(rng, struct tpm_chip, hwrng);
- /* Give back zero bytes, as TPM chip has not yet fully resumed: */
- if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_SUSPENDED)
- return 0;
-
return tpm_get_random(chip, data, max);
}
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
index 8134f002b121..b1daa0d7b341 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
@@ -370,6 +370,13 @@ int tpm_pm_suspend(struct device *dev)
if (!chip)
return -ENODEV;
+ rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip);
+ if (rc) {
+ /* Can be safely set out of locks, as no action cannot race: */
+ chip->flags |= TPM_CHIP_FLAG_SUSPENDED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_ALWAYS_POWERED)
goto suspended;
@@ -377,21 +384,19 @@ int tpm_pm_suspend(struct device *dev)
!pm_suspend_via_firmware())
goto suspended;
- rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip);
- if (!rc) {
- if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) {
- tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
- tpm2_shutdown(chip, TPM2_SU_STATE);
- } else {
- rc = tpm1_pm_suspend(chip, tpm_suspend_pcr);
- }
-
- tpm_put_ops(chip);
+ if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) {
+ tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
+ tpm2_shutdown(chip, TPM2_SU_STATE);
+ goto suspended;
}
+ rc = tpm1_pm_suspend(chip, tpm_suspend_pcr);
+
suspended:
chip->flags |= TPM_CHIP_FLAG_SUSPENDED;
+ tpm_put_ops(chip);
+out:
if (rc)
dev_err(dev, "Ignoring error %d while suspending\n", rc);
return 0;
@@ -440,11 +445,18 @@ int tpm_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *out, size_t max)
if (!chip)
return -ENODEV;
+ /* Give back zero bytes, as TPM chip has not yet fully resumed: */
+ if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_SUSPENDED) {
+ rc = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2)
rc = tpm2_get_random(chip, out, max);
else
rc = tpm1_get_random(chip, out, max);
+out:
tpm_put_ops(chip);
return rc;
}
--
2.47.0
The patch titled
Subject: ucounts: fix counter leak in inc_rlimit_get_ucounts()
has been added to the -mm mm-hotfixes-unstable branch. Its filename is
ucounts-fix-counter-leak-in-inc_rlimit_get_ucounts.patch
This patch will shortly appear at
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche…
This patch will later appear in the mm-hotfixes-unstable branch at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Before you just go and hit "reply", please:
a) Consider who else should be cc'ed
b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well
c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a
reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's
*** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code ***
The -mm tree is included into linux-next via the mm-everything
branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
and is updated there every 2-3 working days
------------------------------------------------------
From: Andrei Vagin <avagin(a)google.com>
Subject: ucounts: fix counter leak in inc_rlimit_get_ucounts()
Date: Fri, 1 Nov 2024 19:19:40 +0000
The inc_rlimit_get_ucounts() increments the specified rlimit counter and
then checks its limit. If the value exceeds the limit, the function
returns an error without decrementing the counter.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241101191940.3211128-1-roman.gushchin@linux.dev
Fixes: 15bc01effefe ("ucounts: Fix signal ucount refcounting")
Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin(a)google.com>
Co-developed-by: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin(a)linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin(a)linux.dev>
Tested-by: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin(a)linux.dev>
Acked-by: Alexey Gladkov <legion(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin(a)google.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm(a)xmission.com>
Cc: Alexey Gladkov <legion(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg(a)redhat.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
kernel/ucount.c | 3 +--
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/ucount.c~ucounts-fix-counter-leak-in-inc_rlimit_get_ucounts
+++ a/kernel/ucount.c
@@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ long inc_rlimit_get_ucounts(struct ucoun
for (iter = ucounts; iter; iter = iter->ns->ucounts) {
long new = atomic_long_add_return(1, &iter->rlimit[type]);
if (new < 0 || (!override_rlimit && (new > max)))
- goto unwind;
+ goto dec_unwind;
if (iter == ucounts)
ret = new;
max = get_userns_rlimit_max(iter->ns, type);
@@ -335,7 +335,6 @@ long inc_rlimit_get_ucounts(struct ucoun
dec_unwind:
dec = atomic_long_sub_return(1, &iter->rlimit[type]);
WARN_ON_ONCE(dec < 0);
-unwind:
do_dec_rlimit_put_ucounts(ucounts, iter, type);
return 0;
}
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from avagin(a)google.com are
ucounts-fix-counter-leak-in-inc_rlimit_get_ucounts.patch
From: Andrei Vagin <avagin(a)google.com>
The inc_rlimit_get_ucounts() increments the specified rlimit counter and
then checks its limit. If the value exceeds the limit, the function
returns an error without decrementing the counter.
v2: changed the goto label name [Roman]
Fixes: 15bc01effefe ("ucounts: Fix signal ucount refcounting")
Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin(a)google.com>
Co-developed-by: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin(a)linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin(a)linux.dev>
Tested-by: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin(a)linux.dev>
Acked-by: Alexey Gladkov <legion(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin(a)google.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm(a)xmission.com>
Cc: Alexey Gladkov <legion(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg(a)redhat.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
---
kernel/ucount.c | 3 +--
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/ucount.c b/kernel/ucount.c
index 8c07714ff27d..9469102c5ac0 100644
--- a/kernel/ucount.c
+++ b/kernel/ucount.c
@@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ long inc_rlimit_get_ucounts(struct ucounts *ucounts, enum rlimit_type type)
for (iter = ucounts; iter; iter = iter->ns->ucounts) {
long new = atomic_long_add_return(1, &iter->rlimit[type]);
if (new < 0 || new > max)
- goto unwind;
+ goto dec_unwind;
if (iter == ucounts)
ret = new;
max = get_userns_rlimit_max(iter->ns, type);
@@ -334,7 +334,6 @@ long inc_rlimit_get_ucounts(struct ucounts *ucounts, enum rlimit_type type)
dec_unwind:
dec = atomic_long_sub_return(1, &iter->rlimit[type]);
WARN_ON_ONCE(dec < 0);
-unwind:
do_dec_rlimit_put_ucounts(ucounts, iter, type);
return 0;
}
--
2.47.0.163.g1226f6d8fa-goog