October 2024 - Linux-stable-mirror

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] KVM: s390: gaccess: Check if guest address is in memslot" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x e8061f06185be0a06a73760d6526b8b0feadfe52 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024101824-departure-oversight-aa1e@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From e8061f06185be0a06a73760d6526b8b0feadfe52 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nico Boehr <nrb(a)linux.ibm.com> Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2024 17:18:33 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] KVM: s390: gaccess: Check if guest address is in memslot Previously, access_guest_page() did not check whether the given guest address is inside of a memslot. This is not a problem, since kvm_write_guest_page/kvm_read_guest_page return -EFAULT in this case. However, -EFAULT is also returned when copy_to/from_user fails. When emulating a guest instruction, the address being outside a memslot usually means that an addressing exception should be injected into the guest. Failure in copy_to/from_user however indicates that something is wrong in userspace and hence should be handled there. To be able to distinguish these two cases, return PGM_ADDRESSING in access_guest_page() when the guest address is outside guest memory. In access_guest_real(), populate vcpu->arch.pgm.code such that kvm_s390_inject_prog_cond() can be used in the caller for injecting into the guest (if applicable). Since this adds a new return value to access_guest_page(), we need to make sure that other callers are not confused by the new positive return value. There are the following users of access_guest_page(): - access_guest_with_key() does the checking itself (in guest_range_to_gpas()), so this case should never happen. Even if, the handling is set up properly. - access_guest_real() just passes the return code to its callers, which are: - read_guest_real() - see below - write_guest_real() - see below There are the following users of read_guest_real(): - ar_translation() in gaccess.c which already returns PGM_* - setup_apcb10(), setup_apcb00(), setup_apcb11() in vsie.c which always return -EFAULT on read_guest_read() nonzero return - no change - shadow_crycb(), handle_stfle() always present this as validity, this could be handled better but doesn't change current behaviour - no change There are the following users of write_guest_real(): - kvm_s390_store_status_unloaded() always returns -EFAULT on write_guest_real() failure. Fixes: 2293897805c2 ("KVM: s390: add architecture compliant guest access functions") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Nico Boehr <nrb(a)linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <hca(a)linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240917151904.74314-2-nrb@linux.ibm.com Acked-by: Janosch Frank <frankja(a)linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca(a)linux.ibm.com> diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.c b/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.c index e65f597e3044..a688351f4ab5 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.c +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.c @@ -828,6 +828,8 @@ static int access_guest_page(struct kvm *kvm, enum gacc_mode mode, gpa_t gpa, const gfn_t gfn = gpa_to_gfn(gpa); int rc; + if (!gfn_to_memslot(kvm, gfn)) + return PGM_ADDRESSING; if (mode == GACC_STORE) rc = kvm_write_guest_page(kvm, gfn, data, offset, len); else @@ -985,6 +987,8 @@ int access_guest_real(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long gra, gra += fragment_len; data += fragment_len; } + if (rc > 0) + vcpu->arch.pgm.code = rc; return rc; } diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.h b/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.h index b320d12aa049..3fde45a151f2 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.h +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.h @@ -405,11 +405,12 @@ int read_guest_abs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long gpa, void *data, * @len: number of bytes to copy * * Copy @len bytes from @data (kernel space) to @gra (guest real address). - * It is up to the caller to ensure that the entire guest memory range is - * valid memory before calling this function. * Guest low address and key protection are not checked. * - * Returns zero on success or -EFAULT on error. + * Returns zero on success, -EFAULT when copying from @data failed, or + * PGM_ADRESSING in case @gra is outside a memslot. In this case, pgm check info + * is also stored to allow injecting into the guest (if applicable) using + * kvm_s390_inject_prog_cond(). * * If an error occurs data may have been copied partially to guest memory. */ @@ -428,11 +429,12 @@ int write_guest_real(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long gra, void *data, * @len: number of bytes to copy * * Copy @len bytes from @gra (guest real address) to @data (kernel space). - * It is up to the caller to ensure that the entire guest memory range is - * valid memory before calling this function. * Guest key protection is not checked. * - * Returns zero on success or -EFAULT on error. + * Returns zero on success, -EFAULT when copying to @data failed, or + * PGM_ADRESSING in case @gra is outside a memslot. In this case, pgm check info + * is also stored to allow injecting into the guest (if applicable) using + * kvm_s390_inject_prog_cond(). * * If an error occurs data may have been copied partially to kernel space. */

2 months, 3 weeks

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] KVM: s390: gaccess: Check if guest address is in memslot" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x e8061f06185be0a06a73760d6526b8b0feadfe52 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024101823-tractor-twitter-a318@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From e8061f06185be0a06a73760d6526b8b0feadfe52 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nico Boehr <nrb(a)linux.ibm.com> Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2024 17:18:33 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] KVM: s390: gaccess: Check if guest address is in memslot Previously, access_guest_page() did not check whether the given guest address is inside of a memslot. This is not a problem, since kvm_write_guest_page/kvm_read_guest_page return -EFAULT in this case. However, -EFAULT is also returned when copy_to/from_user fails. When emulating a guest instruction, the address being outside a memslot usually means that an addressing exception should be injected into the guest. Failure in copy_to/from_user however indicates that something is wrong in userspace and hence should be handled there. To be able to distinguish these two cases, return PGM_ADDRESSING in access_guest_page() when the guest address is outside guest memory. In access_guest_real(), populate vcpu->arch.pgm.code such that kvm_s390_inject_prog_cond() can be used in the caller for injecting into the guest (if applicable). Since this adds a new return value to access_guest_page(), we need to make sure that other callers are not confused by the new positive return value. There are the following users of access_guest_page(): - access_guest_with_key() does the checking itself (in guest_range_to_gpas()), so this case should never happen. Even if, the handling is set up properly. - access_guest_real() just passes the return code to its callers, which are: - read_guest_real() - see below - write_guest_real() - see below There are the following users of read_guest_real(): - ar_translation() in gaccess.c which already returns PGM_* - setup_apcb10(), setup_apcb00(), setup_apcb11() in vsie.c which always return -EFAULT on read_guest_read() nonzero return - no change - shadow_crycb(), handle_stfle() always present this as validity, this could be handled better but doesn't change current behaviour - no change There are the following users of write_guest_real(): - kvm_s390_store_status_unloaded() always returns -EFAULT on write_guest_real() failure. Fixes: 2293897805c2 ("KVM: s390: add architecture compliant guest access functions") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Nico Boehr <nrb(a)linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <hca(a)linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240917151904.74314-2-nrb@linux.ibm.com Acked-by: Janosch Frank <frankja(a)linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca(a)linux.ibm.com> diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.c b/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.c index e65f597e3044..a688351f4ab5 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.c +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.c @@ -828,6 +828,8 @@ static int access_guest_page(struct kvm *kvm, enum gacc_mode mode, gpa_t gpa, const gfn_t gfn = gpa_to_gfn(gpa); int rc; + if (!gfn_to_memslot(kvm, gfn)) + return PGM_ADDRESSING; if (mode == GACC_STORE) rc = kvm_write_guest_page(kvm, gfn, data, offset, len); else @@ -985,6 +987,8 @@ int access_guest_real(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long gra, gra += fragment_len; data += fragment_len; } + if (rc > 0) + vcpu->arch.pgm.code = rc; return rc; } diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.h b/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.h index b320d12aa049..3fde45a151f2 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.h +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.h @@ -405,11 +405,12 @@ int read_guest_abs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long gpa, void *data, * @len: number of bytes to copy * * Copy @len bytes from @data (kernel space) to @gra (guest real address). - * It is up to the caller to ensure that the entire guest memory range is - * valid memory before calling this function. * Guest low address and key protection are not checked. * - * Returns zero on success or -EFAULT on error. + * Returns zero on success, -EFAULT when copying from @data failed, or + * PGM_ADRESSING in case @gra is outside a memslot. In this case, pgm check info + * is also stored to allow injecting into the guest (if applicable) using + * kvm_s390_inject_prog_cond(). * * If an error occurs data may have been copied partially to guest memory. */ @@ -428,11 +429,12 @@ int write_guest_real(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long gra, void *data, * @len: number of bytes to copy * * Copy @len bytes from @gra (guest real address) to @data (kernel space). - * It is up to the caller to ensure that the entire guest memory range is - * valid memory before calling this function. * Guest key protection is not checked. * - * Returns zero on success or -EFAULT on error. + * Returns zero on success, -EFAULT when copying to @data failed, or + * PGM_ADRESSING in case @gra is outside a memslot. In this case, pgm check info + * is also stored to allow injecting into the guest (if applicable) using + * kvm_s390_inject_prog_cond(). * * If an error occurs data may have been copied partially to kernel space. */

2 months, 3 weeks

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[PATCH 5.10] gfs2: Fix potential glock use-after-free on unmount

by He Zhe

From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba(a)redhat.com> commit 0636b34b44589b142700ac137b5f69802cfe2e37 upstream. When a DLM lockspace is released and there ares still locks in that lockspace, DLM will unlock those locks automatically. Commit fb6791d100d1b started exploiting this behavior to speed up filesystem unmount: gfs2 would simply free glocks it didn't want to unlock and then release the lockspace. This didn't take the bast callbacks for asynchronous lock contention notifications into account, which remain active until until a lock is unlocked or its lockspace is released. To prevent those callbacks from accessing deallocated objects, put the glocks that should not be unlocked on the sd_dead_glocks list, release the lockspace, and only then free those glocks. As an additional measure, ignore unexpected ast and bast callbacks if the receiving glock is dead. Fixes: fb6791d100d1b ("GFS2: skip dlm_unlock calls in unmount") Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba(a)redhat.com> Cc: David Teigland <teigland(a)redhat.com> CVE: CVE-2024-38570 [Zhe: sd_glock_wait in gfs2_glock_free_later is not renamed to sd_kill_wait yet. So still use sd_glock_wait in gfs2_glock_free_later in this case.] Signed-off-by: He Zhe <zhe.he(a)windriver.com> --- fs/gfs2/glock.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- fs/gfs2/glock.h | 1 + fs/gfs2/incore.h | 1 + fs/gfs2/lock_dlm.c | 13 +++++++++++-- fs/gfs2/ops_fstype.c | 1 + fs/gfs2/super.c | 3 --- 6 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/gfs2/glock.c b/fs/gfs2/glock.c index b0f01a8e3776..11206d810344 100644 --- a/fs/gfs2/glock.c +++ b/fs/gfs2/glock.c @@ -159,19 +159,46 @@ static bool glock_blocked_by_withdraw(struct gfs2_glock *gl) return true; } -void gfs2_glock_free(struct gfs2_glock *gl) +static void __gfs2_glock_free(struct gfs2_glock *gl) { - struct gfs2_sbd *sdp = gl->gl_name.ln_sbd; - gfs2_glock_assert_withdraw(gl, atomic_read(&gl->gl_revokes) == 0); rhashtable_remove_fast(&gl_hash_table, &gl->gl_node, ht_parms); smp_mb(); wake_up_glock(gl); call_rcu(&gl->gl_rcu, gfs2_glock_dealloc); +} + +void gfs2_glock_free(struct gfs2_glock *gl) { + struct gfs2_sbd *sdp = gl->gl_name.ln_sbd; + + __gfs2_glock_free(gl); if (atomic_dec_and_test(&sdp->sd_glock_disposal)) wake_up(&sdp->sd_glock_wait); } +void gfs2_glock_free_later(struct gfs2_glock *gl) { + struct gfs2_sbd *sdp = gl->gl_name.ln_sbd; + + spin_lock(&lru_lock); + list_add(&gl->gl_lru, &sdp->sd_dead_glocks); + spin_unlock(&lru_lock); + if (atomic_dec_and_test(&sdp->sd_glock_disposal)) + wake_up(&sdp->sd_glock_wait); +} + +static void gfs2_free_dead_glocks(struct gfs2_sbd *sdp) +{ + struct list_head *list = &sdp->sd_dead_glocks; + + while(!list_empty(list)) { + struct gfs2_glock *gl; + + gl = list_first_entry(list, struct gfs2_glock, gl_lru); + list_del_init(&gl->gl_lru); + __gfs2_glock_free(gl); + } +} + /** * gfs2_glock_hold() - increment reference count on glock * @gl: The glock to hold @@ -2016,6 +2043,8 @@ void gfs2_gl_hash_clear(struct gfs2_sbd *sdp) wait_event_timeout(sdp->sd_glock_wait, atomic_read(&sdp->sd_glock_disposal) == 0, HZ * 600); + gfs2_lm_unmount(sdp); + gfs2_free_dead_glocks(sdp); glock_hash_walk(dump_glock_func, sdp); } diff --git a/fs/gfs2/glock.h b/fs/gfs2/glock.h index 53813364517b..b81b369e7485 100644 --- a/fs/gfs2/glock.h +++ b/fs/gfs2/glock.h @@ -253,6 +253,7 @@ extern void gfs2_glock_finish_truncate(struct gfs2_inode *ip); extern void gfs2_glock_thaw(struct gfs2_sbd *sdp); extern void gfs2_glock_add_to_lru(struct gfs2_glock *gl); extern void gfs2_glock_free(struct gfs2_glock *gl); +extern void gfs2_glock_free_later(struct gfs2_glock *gl); extern int __init gfs2_glock_init(void); extern void gfs2_glock_exit(void); diff --git a/fs/gfs2/incore.h b/fs/gfs2/incore.h index f8858d995b24..44cee9a4eef6 100644 --- a/fs/gfs2/incore.h +++ b/fs/gfs2/incore.h @@ -863,6 +863,7 @@ struct gfs2_sbd { struct gfs2_holder sd_freeze_gh; atomic_t sd_freeze_state; struct mutex sd_freeze_mutex; + struct list_head sd_dead_glocks; char sd_fsname[GFS2_FSNAME_LEN + 3 * sizeof(int) + 2]; char sd_table_name[GFS2_FSNAME_LEN]; diff --git a/fs/gfs2/lock_dlm.c b/fs/gfs2/lock_dlm.c index 5564aa8b4592..9aad03f0dcdf 100644 --- a/fs/gfs2/lock_dlm.c +++ b/fs/gfs2/lock_dlm.c @@ -118,6 +118,11 @@ static void gdlm_ast(void *arg) struct gfs2_glock *gl = arg; unsigned ret = gl->gl_state; + /* If the glock is dead, we only react to a dlm_unlock() reply. */ + if (__lockref_is_dead(&gl->gl_lockref) && + gl->gl_lksb.sb_status != -DLM_EUNLOCK) + return; + gfs2_update_reply_times(gl); BUG_ON(gl->gl_lksb.sb_flags & DLM_SBF_DEMOTED); @@ -168,6 +173,9 @@ static void gdlm_bast(void *arg, int mode) { struct gfs2_glock *gl = arg; + if (__lockref_is_dead(&gl->gl_lockref)) + return; + switch (mode) { case DLM_LOCK_EX: gfs2_glock_cb(gl, LM_ST_UNLOCKED); @@ -286,6 +294,8 @@ static void gdlm_put_lock(struct gfs2_glock *gl) struct lm_lockstruct *ls = &sdp->sd_lockstruct; int error; + BUG_ON(!__lockref_is_dead(&gl->gl_lockref)); + if (gl->gl_lksb.sb_lkid == 0) { gfs2_glock_free(gl); return; @@ -305,7 +315,7 @@ static void gdlm_put_lock(struct gfs2_glock *gl) if (test_bit(SDF_SKIP_DLM_UNLOCK, &sdp->sd_flags) && !gl->gl_lksb.sb_lvbptr) { - gfs2_glock_free(gl); + gfs2_glock_free_later(gl); return; } @@ -315,7 +325,6 @@ static void gdlm_put_lock(struct gfs2_glock *gl) fs_err(sdp, "gdlm_unlock %x,%llx err=%d\n", gl->gl_name.ln_type, (unsigned long long)gl->gl_name.ln_number, error); - return; } } diff --git a/fs/gfs2/ops_fstype.c b/fs/gfs2/ops_fstype.c index 648f7336043f..4a8c070d14cf 100644 --- a/fs/gfs2/ops_fstype.c +++ b/fs/gfs2/ops_fstype.c @@ -141,6 +141,7 @@ static struct gfs2_sbd *init_sbd(struct super_block *sb) init_waitqueue_head(&sdp->sd_log_flush_wait); atomic_set(&sdp->sd_freeze_state, SFS_UNFROZEN); mutex_init(&sdp->sd_freeze_mutex); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sdp->sd_dead_glocks); return sdp; diff --git a/fs/gfs2/super.c b/fs/gfs2/super.c index 8cf4ef61cdc4..039d678b1689 100644 --- a/fs/gfs2/super.c +++ b/fs/gfs2/super.c @@ -662,10 +662,7 @@ static void gfs2_put_super(struct super_block *sb) gfs2_gl_hash_clear(sdp); truncate_inode_pages_final(&sdp->sd_aspace); gfs2_delete_debugfs_file(sdp); - /* Unmount the locking protocol */ - gfs2_lm_unmount(sdp); - /* At this point, we're through participating in the lockspace */ gfs2_sys_fs_del(sdp); free_sbd(sdp); } -- 2.25.1

2 months, 3 weeks

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[PATCH 4.19] net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: Fix out-of-bound access

by hsimeliere.opensource＠witekio.com

From: Joseph Huang <Joseph.Huang(a)garmin.com> commit 528876d867a23b5198022baf2e388052ca67c952 upstream. If an ATU violation was caused by a CPU Load operation, the SPID could be larger than DSA_MAX_PORTS (the size of mv88e6xxx_chip.ports[] array). Fixes: 75c05a74e745 ("net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: Fix counting of ATU violations") Signed-off-by: Joseph Huang <Joseph.Huang(a)garmin.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew(a)lunn.ch> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240819235251.1331763-1-Joseph.Huang@garmin.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Bruno VERNAY <bruno.vernay(a)se.com> Signed-off-by: Hugo SIMELIERE <hsimeliere.opensource(a)witekio.com> --- drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1_atu.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1_atu.c b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1_atu.c index ea243840ee0f..aca35c9d9fbd 100644 --- a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1_atu.c +++ b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1_atu.c @@ -363,7 +363,8 @@ static irqreturn_t mv88e6xxx_g1_atu_prob_irq_thread_fn(int irq, void *dev_id) dev_err_ratelimited(chip->dev, "ATU full violation for %pM portvec %x spid %d\n", entry.mac, entry.portvec, spid); - chip->ports[spid].atu_full_violation++; + if (spid < ARRAY_SIZE(chip->ports)) + chip->ports[spid].atu_full_violation++; } mutex_unlock(&chip->reg_lock); -- 2.43.0

2 months, 3 weeks

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[PATCH 05/13] media: mgb4: protect driver against spectre

by Mauro Carvalho Chehab

Frequency range is set from sysfs via frequency_range_store(), being vulnerable to spectre, as reported by smatch: drivers/media/pci/mgb4/mgb4_cmt.c:231 mgb4_cmt_set_vin_freq_range() warn: potential spectre issue 'cmt_vals_in' [r] drivers/media/pci/mgb4/mgb4_cmt.c:238 mgb4_cmt_set_vin_freq_range() warn: possible spectre second half. 'reg_set' Fix it. Fixes: 0ab13674a9bd ("media: pci: mgb4: Added Digiteq Automotive MGB4 driver") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/media/pci/mgb4/mgb4_cmt.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/media/pci/mgb4/mgb4_cmt.c b/drivers/media/pci/mgb4/mgb4_cmt.c index 70dc78ef193c..a25b68403bc6 100644 --- a/drivers/media/pci/mgb4/mgb4_cmt.c +++ b/drivers/media/pci/mgb4/mgb4_cmt.c @@ -227,6 +227,8 @@ void mgb4_cmt_set_vin_freq_range(struct mgb4_vin_dev *vindev, u32 config; size_t i; + freq_range = array_index_nospec(freq_range, ARRAY_SIZE(cmt_vals_in)); + addr = cmt_addrs_in[vindev->config->id]; reg_set = cmt_vals_in[freq_range]; -- 2.47.0

2 months, 3 weeks

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[PATCH v2] remoteproc: qcom_q6v5_pas: disable auto boot for wpss

by Balaji Pothunoori

Currently, the rproc "atomic_t power" variable is incremented during: a. WPSS rproc auto boot. b. AHB power on for ath11k. During AHB power off (rmmod ath11k_ahb.ko), rproc_shutdown fails to unload the WPSS firmware because the rproc->power value is '2', causing the atomic_dec_and_test(&rproc->power) condition to fail. Consequently, during AHB power on (insmod ath11k_ahb.ko), QMI_WLANFW_HOST_CAP_REQ_V01 fails due to the host and firmware QMI states being out of sync. Fixes: 300ed425dfa9 ("remoteproc: qcom_q6v5_pas: Add SC7280 ADSP, CDSP & WPSS") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Balaji Pothunoori <quic_bpothuno(a)quicinc.com> --- v2: updated commit text. added Fixes/cc:stable tags. drivers/remoteproc/qcom_q6v5_pas.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/remoteproc/qcom_q6v5_pas.c b/drivers/remoteproc/qcom_q6v5_pas.c index ef82835e98a4..05963d7924df 100644 --- a/drivers/remoteproc/qcom_q6v5_pas.c +++ b/drivers/remoteproc/qcom_q6v5_pas.c @@ -1344,7 +1344,7 @@ static const struct adsp_data sc7280_wpss_resource = { .crash_reason_smem = 626, .firmware_name = "wpss.mdt", .pas_id = 6, - .auto_boot = true, + .auto_boot = false, .proxy_pd_names = (char*[]){ "cx", "mx", -- 2.34.1

2 months, 3 weeks

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] mptcp: prevent MPC handshake on port-based signal endpoints" failed to apply to 6.11-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.11-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.11.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 3d041393ea8c815f773020fb4a995331a69c0139 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024101809-refinish-concave-f892@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.11.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 3d041393ea8c815f773020fb4a995331a69c0139 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Date: Mon, 14 Oct 2024 16:06:00 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] mptcp: prevent MPC handshake on port-based signal endpoints Syzkaller reported a lockdep splat: ============================================ WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 6.11.0-rc6-syzkaller-00019-g67784a74e258 #0 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- syz-executor364/5113 is trying to acquire lock: ffff8880449f1958 (k-slock-AF_INET){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] ffff8880449f1958 (k-slock-AF_INET){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: sk_clone_lock+0x2cd/0xf40 net/core/sock.c:2328 but task is already holding lock: ffff88803fe3cb58 (k-slock-AF_INET){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] ffff88803fe3cb58 (k-slock-AF_INET){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: sk_clone_lock+0x2cd/0xf40 net/core/sock.c:2328 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(k-slock-AF_INET); lock(k-slock-AF_INET); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 7 locks held by syz-executor364/5113: #0: ffff8880449f0e18 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1607 [inline] #0: ffff8880449f0e18 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: mptcp_sendmsg+0x153/0x1b10 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1806 #1: ffff88803fe39ad8 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1607 [inline] #1: ffff88803fe39ad8 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: mptcp_sendmsg_fastopen+0x11f/0x530 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1727 #2: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:326 [inline] #2: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:838 [inline] #2: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __ip_queue_xmit+0x5f/0x1b80 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:470 #3: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:326 [inline] #3: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:838 [inline] #3: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: ip_finish_output2+0x45f/0x1390 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:228 #4: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: local_lock_acquire include/linux/local_lock_internal.h:29 [inline] #4: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: process_backlog+0x33b/0x15b0 net/core/dev.c:6104 #5: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:326 [inline] #5: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:838 [inline] #5: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: ip_local_deliver_finish+0x230/0x5f0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:232 #6: ffff88803fe3cb58 (k-slock-AF_INET){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] #6: ffff88803fe3cb58 (k-slock-AF_INET){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: sk_clone_lock+0x2cd/0xf40 net/core/sock.c:2328 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5113 Comm: syz-executor364 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc6-syzkaller-00019-g67784a74e258 #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <IRQ> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:93 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:119 check_deadlock kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3061 [inline] validate_chain+0x15d3/0x5900 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3855 __lock_acquire+0x137a/0x2040 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5142 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5759 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] sk_clone_lock+0x2cd/0xf40 net/core/sock.c:2328 mptcp_sk_clone_init+0x32/0x13c0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:3279 subflow_syn_recv_sock+0x931/0x1920 net/mptcp/subflow.c:874 tcp_check_req+0xfe4/0x1a20 net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c:853 tcp_v4_rcv+0x1c3e/0x37f0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:2267 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x22e/0x440 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:205 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x341/0x5f0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:233 NF_HOOK+0x3a4/0x450 include/linux/netfilter.h:314 NF_HOOK+0x3a4/0x450 include/linux/netfilter.h:314 __netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:5661 [inline] __netif_receive_skb+0x2bf/0x650 net/core/dev.c:5775 process_backlog+0x662/0x15b0 net/core/dev.c:6108 __napi_poll+0xcb/0x490 net/core/dev.c:6772 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6841 [inline] net_rx_action+0x89b/0x1240 net/core/dev.c:6963 handle_softirqs+0x2c4/0x970 kernel/softirq.c:554 do_softirq+0x11b/0x1e0 kernel/softirq.c:455 </IRQ> <TASK> __local_bh_enable_ip+0x1bb/0x200 kernel/softirq.c:382 local_bh_enable include/linux/bottom_half.h:33 [inline] rcu_read_unlock_bh include/linux/rcupdate.h:908 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0x1763/0x3e90 net/core/dev.c:4450 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3105 [inline] neigh_hh_output include/net/neighbour.h:526 [inline] neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:540 [inline] ip_finish_output2+0xd41/0x1390 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:235 ip_local_out net/ipv4/ip_output.c:129 [inline] __ip_queue_xmit+0x118c/0x1b80 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:535 __tcp_transmit_skb+0x2544/0x3b30 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1466 tcp_rcv_synsent_state_process net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6542 [inline] tcp_rcv_state_process+0x2c32/0x4570 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6729 tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x77d/0xc70 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1934 sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:1111 [inline] __release_sock+0x214/0x350 net/core/sock.c:3004 release_sock+0x61/0x1f0 net/core/sock.c:3558 mptcp_sendmsg_fastopen+0x1ad/0x530 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1733 mptcp_sendmsg+0x1884/0x1b10 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1812 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x1a6/0x270 net/socket.c:745 ____sys_sendmsg+0x525/0x7d0 net/socket.c:2597 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2651 [inline] __sys_sendmmsg+0x3b2/0x740 net/socket.c:2737 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2766 [inline] __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2763 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0xa0/0xb0 net/socket.c:2763 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f04fb13a6b9 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 01 1a 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffd651f42d8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000133 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007f04fb13a6b9 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020000d00 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007ffd651f4310 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 0000000020000080 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000000f4240 R13: 00007f04fb187449 R14: 00007ffd651f42f4 R15: 00007ffd651f4300 </TASK> As noted by Cong Wang, the splat is false positive, but the code path leading to the report is an unexpected one: a client is attempting an MPC handshake towards the in-kernel listener created by the in-kernel PM for a port based signal endpoint. Such connection will be never accepted; many of them can make the listener queue full and preventing the creation of MPJ subflow via such listener - its intended role. Explicitly detect this scenario at initial-syn time and drop the incoming MPC request. Fixes: 1729cf186d8a ("mptcp: create the listening socket for new port") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: syzbot+f4aacdfef2c6a6529c3e(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=f4aacdfef2c6a6529c3e Cc: Cong Wang <cong.wang(a)bytedance.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Mat Martineau <martineau(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241014-net-mptcp-mpc-port-endp-v2-1-7faea8e6b6ae… Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> diff --git a/net/mptcp/mib.c b/net/mptcp/mib.c index ad88bd3c58df..19eb9292bd60 100644 --- a/net/mptcp/mib.c +++ b/net/mptcp/mib.c @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ static const struct snmp_mib mptcp_snmp_list[] = { SNMP_MIB_ITEM("MPCapableFallbackSYNACK", MPTCP_MIB_MPCAPABLEACTIVEFALLBACK), SNMP_MIB_ITEM("MPCapableSYNTXDrop", MPTCP_MIB_MPCAPABLEACTIVEDROP), SNMP_MIB_ITEM("MPCapableSYNTXDisabled", MPTCP_MIB_MPCAPABLEACTIVEDISABLED), + SNMP_MIB_ITEM("MPCapableEndpAttempt", MPTCP_MIB_MPCAPABLEENDPATTEMPT), SNMP_MIB_ITEM("MPFallbackTokenInit", MPTCP_MIB_TOKENFALLBACKINIT), SNMP_MIB_ITEM("MPTCPRetrans", MPTCP_MIB_RETRANSSEGS), SNMP_MIB_ITEM("MPJoinNoTokenFound", MPTCP_MIB_JOINNOTOKEN), diff --git a/net/mptcp/mib.h b/net/mptcp/mib.h index 3206cdda8bb1..128282982843 100644 --- a/net/mptcp/mib.h +++ b/net/mptcp/mib.h @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ enum linux_mptcp_mib_field { MPTCP_MIB_MPCAPABLEACTIVEFALLBACK, /* Client-side fallback during 3-way handshake */ MPTCP_MIB_MPCAPABLEACTIVEDROP, /* Client-side fallback due to a MPC drop */ MPTCP_MIB_MPCAPABLEACTIVEDISABLED, /* Client-side disabled due to past issues */ + MPTCP_MIB_MPCAPABLEENDPATTEMPT, /* Prohibited MPC to port-based endp */ MPTCP_MIB_TOKENFALLBACKINIT, /* Could not init/allocate token */ MPTCP_MIB_RETRANSSEGS, /* Segments retransmitted at the MPTCP-level */ MPTCP_MIB_JOINNOTOKEN, /* Received MP_JOIN but the token was not found */ diff --git a/net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c b/net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c index f6f0a38a0750..1a78998fe1f4 100644 --- a/net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c +++ b/net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c @@ -1121,6 +1121,7 @@ static int mptcp_pm_nl_create_listen_socket(struct sock *sk, */ inet_sk_state_store(newsk, TCP_LISTEN); lock_sock(ssk); + WRITE_ONCE(mptcp_subflow_ctx(ssk)->pm_listener, true); err = __inet_listen_sk(ssk, backlog); if (!err) mptcp_event_pm_listener(ssk, MPTCP_EVENT_LISTENER_CREATED); diff --git a/net/mptcp/protocol.h b/net/mptcp/protocol.h index 74417aae08d0..568a72702b08 100644 --- a/net/mptcp/protocol.h +++ b/net/mptcp/protocol.h @@ -535,6 +535,7 @@ struct mptcp_subflow_context { __unused : 8; bool data_avail; bool scheduled; + bool pm_listener; /* a listener managed by the kernel PM? */ u32 remote_nonce; u64 thmac; u32 local_nonce; diff --git a/net/mptcp/subflow.c b/net/mptcp/subflow.c index 25dde81bcb75..6170f2fff71e 100644 --- a/net/mptcp/subflow.c +++ b/net/mptcp/subflow.c @@ -132,6 +132,13 @@ static void subflow_add_reset_reason(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 reason) } } +static int subflow_reset_req_endp(struct request_sock *req, struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + SUBFLOW_REQ_INC_STATS(req, MPTCP_MIB_MPCAPABLEENDPATTEMPT); + subflow_add_reset_reason(skb, MPTCP_RST_EPROHIBIT); + return -EPERM; +} + /* Init mptcp request socket. * * Returns an error code if a JOIN has failed and a TCP reset @@ -165,6 +172,8 @@ static int subflow_check_req(struct request_sock *req, if (opt_mp_capable) { SUBFLOW_REQ_INC_STATS(req, MPTCP_MIB_MPCAPABLEPASSIVE); + if (unlikely(listener->pm_listener)) + return subflow_reset_req_endp(req, skb); if (opt_mp_join) return 0; } else if (opt_mp_join) { @@ -172,6 +181,8 @@ static int subflow_check_req(struct request_sock *req, if (mp_opt.backup) SUBFLOW_REQ_INC_STATS(req, MPTCP_MIB_JOINSYNBACKUPRX); + } else if (unlikely(listener->pm_listener)) { + return subflow_reset_req_endp(req, skb); } if (opt_mp_capable && listener->request_mptcp) {

2 months, 3 weeks

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[PATCH 5.10 5.15 1/3] io_uring/sqpoll: do not allow pinning outside of cpuset

by Felix Moessbauer

commit f011c9cf04c06f16b24f583d313d3c012e589e50 upstream. The submit queue polling threads are userland threads that just never exit to the userland. When creating the thread with IORING_SETUP_SQ_AFF, the affinity of the poller thread is set to the cpu specified in sq_thread_cpu. However, this CPU can be outside of the cpuset defined by the cgroup cpuset controller. This violates the rules defined by the cpuset controller and is a potential issue for realtime applications. In b7ed6d8ffd6 we fixed the default affinity of the poller thread, in case no explicit pinning is required by inheriting the one of the creating task. In case of explicit pinning, the check is more complicated, as also a cpu outside of the parent cpumask is allowed. We implemented this by using cpuset_cpus_allowed (that has support for cgroup cpusets) and testing if the requested cpu is in the set. Fixes: 37d1e2e3642e ("io_uring: move SQPOLL thread io-wq forked worker") Signed-off-by: Felix Moessbauer <felix.moessbauer(a)siemens.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240909150036.55921-1-felix.moessbauer@siemens.c… Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- io_uring/io_uring.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/io_uring/io_uring.c b/io_uring/io_uring.c index 8ed2c65529714..6b6fd244233f8 100644 --- a/io_uring/io_uring.c +++ b/io_uring/io_uring.c @@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ #include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/mman.h> #include <linux/percpu.h> +#include <linux/cpuset.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/blkdev.h> #include <linux/bvec.h> @@ -8746,10 +8747,12 @@ static int io_sq_offload_create(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, return 0; if (p->flags & IORING_SETUP_SQ_AFF) { + struct cpumask allowed_mask; int cpu = p->sq_thread_cpu; ret = -EINVAL; - if (cpu >= nr_cpu_ids || !cpu_online(cpu)) + cpuset_cpus_allowed(current, &allowed_mask); + if (!cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, &allowed_mask)) goto err_sqpoll; sqd->sq_cpu = cpu; } else { -- 2.39.5

2 months, 3 weeks

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[PATCH 5.10 0/1] wifi: rtl8xxxu: Fix the error handling of the probe function

by Daniil Dulov

Svacer reports a NULL-pointer dereference in rtl8xxxu_probe(). After having been compared to a NULL value, pointer hw is passed as 1st parameter in call to ieee80211_free_hw(), where it is dereferenced. The problem is present in 5.10 stable release and can be fixed by the following upstream patch that can be cleanly applied to 5.10 branch.

2 months, 3 weeks

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] tcp: fix mptcp DSS corruption due to large pmtu xmit" failed to apply to 6.11-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.11-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.11.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 4dabcdf581217e60690467a37c956a5b8dbc6bd9 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024101432-shucking-snagged-7c42@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.11.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: 4dabcdf58121 ("tcp: fix mptcp DSS corruption due to large pmtu xmit") 65249feb6b3d ("net: add support for skbs with unreadable frags") thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 4dabcdf581217e60690467a37c956a5b8dbc6bd9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Date: Tue, 8 Oct 2024 13:04:53 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] tcp: fix mptcp DSS corruption due to large pmtu xmit Syzkaller was able to trigger a DSS corruption: TCP: request_sock_subflow_v4: Possible SYN flooding on port [::]:20002. Sending cookies. ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5227 at net/mptcp/protocol.c:695 __mptcp_move_skbs_from_subflow+0x20a9/0x21f0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:695 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5227 Comm: syz-executor350 Not tainted 6.11.0-syzkaller-08829-gaf9c191ac2a0 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/06/2024 RIP: 0010:__mptcp_move_skbs_from_subflow+0x20a9/0x21f0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:695 Code: 0f b6 dc 31 ff 89 de e8 b5 dd ea f5 89 d8 48 81 c4 50 01 00 00 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 cc cc cc cc e8 98 da ea f5 90 <0f> 0b 90 e9 47 ff ff ff e8 8a da ea f5 90 0f 0b 90 e9 99 e0 ff ff RSP: 0018:ffffc90000006db8 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: ffffffff8ba9df18 RBX: 00000000000055f0 RCX: ffff888030023c00 RDX: 0000000000000100 RSI: 00000000000081e5 RDI: 00000000000055f0 RBP: 1ffff110062bf1ae R08: ffffffff8ba9cf12 R09: 1ffff110062bf1b8 R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed10062bf1b9 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: 00000000700cec61 R15: 00000000000081e5 FS: 000055556679c380(0000) GS:ffff8880b8600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000020287000 CR3: 0000000077892000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <IRQ> move_skbs_to_msk net/mptcp/protocol.c:811 [inline] mptcp_data_ready+0x29c/0xa90 net/mptcp/protocol.c:854 subflow_data_ready+0x34a/0x920 net/mptcp/subflow.c:1490 tcp_data_queue+0x20fd/0x76c0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5283 tcp_rcv_established+0xfba/0x2020 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6237 tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x96d/0xc70 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1915 tcp_v4_rcv+0x2dc0/0x37f0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:2350 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x22e/0x440 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:205 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x341/0x5f0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:233 NF_HOOK+0x3a4/0x450 include/linux/netfilter.h:314 NF_HOOK+0x3a4/0x450 include/linux/netfilter.h:314 __netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:5662 [inline] __netif_receive_skb+0x2bf/0x650 net/core/dev.c:5775 process_backlog+0x662/0x15b0 net/core/dev.c:6107 __napi_poll+0xcb/0x490 net/core/dev.c:6771 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6840 [inline] net_rx_action+0x89b/0x1240 net/core/dev.c:6962 handle_softirqs+0x2c5/0x980 kernel/softirq.c:554 do_softirq+0x11b/0x1e0 kernel/softirq.c:455 </IRQ> <TASK> __local_bh_enable_ip+0x1bb/0x200 kernel/softirq.c:382 local_bh_enable include/linux/bottom_half.h:33 [inline] rcu_read_unlock_bh include/linux/rcupdate.h:919 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0x1764/0x3e80 net/core/dev.c:4451 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3094 [inline] neigh_hh_output include/net/neighbour.h:526 [inline] neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:540 [inline] ip_finish_output2+0xd41/0x1390 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:236 ip_local_out net/ipv4/ip_output.c:130 [inline] __ip_queue_xmit+0x118c/0x1b80 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:536 __tcp_transmit_skb+0x2544/0x3b30 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1466 tcp_transmit_skb net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1484 [inline] tcp_mtu_probe net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:2547 [inline] tcp_write_xmit+0x641d/0x6bf0 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:2752 __tcp_push_pending_frames+0x9b/0x360 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:3015 tcp_push_pending_frames include/net/tcp.h:2107 [inline] tcp_data_snd_check net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5714 [inline] tcp_rcv_established+0x1026/0x2020 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6239 tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x96d/0xc70 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1915 sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:1113 [inline] __release_sock+0x214/0x350 net/core/sock.c:3072 release_sock+0x61/0x1f0 net/core/sock.c:3626 mptcp_push_release net/mptcp/protocol.c:1486 [inline] __mptcp_push_pending+0x6b5/0x9f0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1625 mptcp_sendmsg+0x10bb/0x1b10 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1903 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x1a6/0x270 net/socket.c:745 ____sys_sendmsg+0x52a/0x7e0 net/socket.c:2603 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2657 [inline] __sys_sendmsg+0x2aa/0x390 net/socket.c:2686 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7fb06e9317f9 Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffe2cfd4f98 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fb06e97f468 RCX: 00007fb06e9317f9 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000080 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 00007fb06e97f446 R08: 0000555500000000 R09: 0000555500000000 R10: 0000555500000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fb06e97f406 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 00007ffe2cfd4fe0 R15: 0000000000000003 </TASK> Additionally syzkaller provided a nice reproducer. The repro enables pmtu on the loopback device, leading to tcp_mtu_probe() generating very large probe packets. tcp_can_coalesce_send_queue_head() currently does not check for mptcp-level invariants, and allowed the creation of cross-DSS probes, leading to the mentioned corruption. Address the issue teaching tcp_can_coalesce_send_queue_head() about mptcp using the tcp_skb_can_collapse(), also reducing the code duplication. Fixes: 85712484110d ("tcp: coalesce/collapse must respect MPTCP extensions") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: syzbot+d1bff73460e33101f0e7(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://github.com/multipath-tcp/mptcp_net-next/issues/513 Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Acked-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241008-net-mptcp-fallback-fixes-v1-2-c6fb8e93e55… Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c index 4fd746bd4d54..68804fd01daf 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c @@ -2342,10 +2342,7 @@ static bool tcp_can_coalesce_send_queue_head(struct sock *sk, int len) if (len <= skb->len) break; - if (unlikely(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->eor) || - tcp_has_tx_tstamp(skb) || - !skb_pure_zcopy_same(skb, next) || - skb_frags_readable(skb) != skb_frags_readable(next)) + if (tcp_has_tx_tstamp(skb) || !tcp_skb_can_collapse(skb, next)) return false; len -= skb->len;

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Linux-stable-mirror October 2024