From: Aaron Thompson <dev(a)aaront.org>
If bt_debugfs is not created successfully, which happens if either
CONFIG_DEBUG_FS or CONFIG_DEBUG_FS_ALLOW_ALL is unset, then iso_init()
returns early and does not set iso_inited to true. This means that a
subsequent call to iso_init() will result in duplicate calls to
proto_register(), bt_sock_register(), etc.
With CONFIG_LIST_HARDENED and CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION enabled, the
duplicate call to proto_register() triggers this BUG():
list_add double add: new=ffffffffc0b280d0, prev=ffffffffbab56250,
next=ffffffffc0b280d0.
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:35!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
CPU: 2 PID: 887 Comm: bluetoothd Not tainted 6.10.11-1-ao-desktop #1
RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid_or_report+0x9a/0xa0
...
__list_add_valid_or_report+0x9a/0xa0
proto_register+0x2b5/0x340
iso_init+0x23/0x150 [bluetooth]
set_iso_socket_func+0x68/0x1b0 [bluetooth]
kmem_cache_free+0x308/0x330
hci_sock_sendmsg+0x990/0x9e0 [bluetooth]
__sock_sendmsg+0x7b/0x80
sock_write_iter+0x9a/0x110
do_iter_readv_writev+0x11d/0x220
vfs_writev+0x180/0x3e0
do_writev+0xca/0x100
...
This change removes the early return. The check for iso_debugfs being
NULL was unnecessary, it is always NULL when iso_inited is false.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: ccf74f2390d6 ("Bluetooth: Add BTPROTO_ISO socket type")
Signed-off-by: Aaron Thompson <dev(a)aaront.org>
---
net/bluetooth/iso.c | 6 +-----
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/iso.c b/net/bluetooth/iso.c
index d5e00d0dd1a0..c9eefb43bf47 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/iso.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/iso.c
@@ -2301,13 +2301,9 @@ int iso_init(void)
hci_register_cb(&iso_cb);
- if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(bt_debugfs))
- return 0;
-
- if (!iso_debugfs) {
+ if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(bt_debugfs))
iso_debugfs = debugfs_create_file("iso", 0444, bt_debugfs,
NULL, &iso_debugfs_fops);
- }
iso_inited = true;
--
2.39.5
Oliver reports that the kvm_has_feat() helper is not behaviing as
expected for negative feature. On investigation, the main issue
seems to be caused by the following construct:
(id##_##fld##_SIGNED ? \
get_idreg_field_signed(kvm, id, fld) : \
get_idreg_field_unsigned(kvm, id, fld))
where one side of the expression evaluates as something signed,
and the other as something unsigned. In retrospect, this is totally
braindead, as the compiler converts this into an unsigned expression.
When compared to something that is 0, the test is simply elided.
Epic fail. Similar issue exists in the expand_field_sign() macro.
The correct way to handle this is to chose between signed and unsigned
comparisons, so that both sides of the ternary expression are of the
same type (bool).
In order to keep the code readable (sort of), we introduce new
comparison primitives taking an operator as a parameter, and
rewrite the kvm_has_feat*() helpers in terms of these primitives.
Fixes: c62d7a23b947 ("KVM: arm64: Add feature checking helpers")
Reported-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton(a)linux.dev>
Tested-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton(a)linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz(a)kernel.org>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
---
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 25 +++++++++++++------------
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index aab1e59aa91e..e9e9b57782e4 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -1490,11 +1490,6 @@ void kvm_set_vm_id_reg(struct kvm *kvm, u32 reg, u64 val);
sign_extend64(__val, id##_##fld##_WIDTH - 1); \
})
-#define expand_field_sign(id, fld, val) \
- (id##_##fld##_SIGNED ? \
- __expand_field_sign_signed(id, fld, val) : \
- __expand_field_sign_unsigned(id, fld, val))
-
#define get_idreg_field_unsigned(kvm, id, fld) \
({ \
u64 __val = kvm_read_vm_id_reg((kvm), SYS_##id); \
@@ -1510,20 +1505,26 @@ void kvm_set_vm_id_reg(struct kvm *kvm, u32 reg, u64 val);
#define get_idreg_field_enum(kvm, id, fld) \
get_idreg_field_unsigned(kvm, id, fld)
-#define get_idreg_field(kvm, id, fld) \
+#define kvm_cmp_feat_signed(kvm, id, fld, op, limit) \
+ (get_idreg_field_signed((kvm), id, fld) op __expand_field_sign_signed(id, fld, limit))
+
+#define kvm_cmp_feat_unsigned(kvm, id, fld, op, limit) \
+ (get_idreg_field_unsigned((kvm), id, fld) op __expand_field_sign_unsigned(id, fld, limit))
+
+#define kvm_cmp_feat(kvm, id, fld, op, limit) \
(id##_##fld##_SIGNED ? \
- get_idreg_field_signed(kvm, id, fld) : \
- get_idreg_field_unsigned(kvm, id, fld))
+ kvm_cmp_feat_signed(kvm, id, fld, op, limit) : \
+ kvm_cmp_feat_unsigned(kvm, id, fld, op, limit))
#define kvm_has_feat(kvm, id, fld, limit) \
- (get_idreg_field((kvm), id, fld) >= expand_field_sign(id, fld, limit))
+ kvm_cmp_feat(kvm, id, fld, >=, limit)
#define kvm_has_feat_enum(kvm, id, fld, val) \
- (get_idreg_field_unsigned((kvm), id, fld) == __expand_field_sign_unsigned(id, fld, val))
+ kvm_cmp_feat_unsigned(kvm, id, fld, ==, val)
#define kvm_has_feat_range(kvm, id, fld, min, max) \
- (get_idreg_field((kvm), id, fld) >= expand_field_sign(id, fld, min) && \
- get_idreg_field((kvm), id, fld) <= expand_field_sign(id, fld, max))
+ (kvm_cmp_feat(kvm, id, fld, >=, min) && \
+ kvm_cmp_feat(kvm, id, fld, <=, max))
/* Check for a given level of PAuth support */
#define kvm_has_pauth(k, l) \
--
2.39.2
With the introduction of commit e42ac1418055 ("bpf: Check unsupported ops
from the bpf_struct_ops's cfi_stubs"), a HID-BPF struct_ops containing
a .hid_hw_request() or a .hid_hw_output_report() was failing to load
as the cfi stubs were not defined.
Fix that by defining those simple static functions and restore HID-BPF
functionality.
This was detected with the HID selftests suddenly failing on Linus' tree.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.11+
Fixes: 9286675a2aed ("HID: bpf: add HID-BPF hooks for hid_hw_output_report")
Fixes: 8bd0488b5ea5 ("HID: bpf: add HID-BPF hooks for hid_hw_raw_requests")
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires <bentiss(a)kernel.org>
---
Hi,
This commit should directly go in Linus tree before we start creating
topic branches for 6.13 given that the CI is now failing on our HID
master branch.
Cheers,
Benjamin
---
drivers/hid/bpf/hid_bpf_struct_ops.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/hid/bpf/hid_bpf_struct_ops.c b/drivers/hid/bpf/hid_bpf_struct_ops.c
index cd696c59ba0f..702c22fae136 100644
--- a/drivers/hid/bpf/hid_bpf_struct_ops.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/bpf/hid_bpf_struct_ops.c
@@ -276,9 +276,23 @@ static int __hid_bpf_rdesc_fixup(struct hid_bpf_ctx *ctx)
return 0;
}
+static int __hid_bpf_hw_request(struct hid_bpf_ctx *ctx, unsigned char reportnum,
+ enum hid_report_type rtype, enum hid_class_request reqtype,
+ u64 source)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int __hid_bpf_hw_output_report(struct hid_bpf_ctx *ctx, u64 source)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
static struct hid_bpf_ops __bpf_hid_bpf_ops = {
.hid_device_event = __hid_bpf_device_event,
.hid_rdesc_fixup = __hid_bpf_rdesc_fixup,
+ .hid_hw_request = __hid_bpf_hw_request,
+ .hid_hw_output_report = __hid_bpf_hw_output_report,
};
static struct bpf_struct_ops bpf_hid_bpf_ops = {
---
base-commit: 13882369ceb9b0953f9f5ff8563bbccfd80d0ffd
change-id: 20240927-fix-hid-bpf-stubs-f80591a673c2
Best regards,
--
Benjamin Tissoires <bentiss(a)kernel.org>
The existing code moves VF to the same namespace as the synthetic device
during netvsc_register_vf(). But, if the synthetic device is moved to a
new namespace after the VF registration, the VF won't be moved together.
To make the behavior more consistent, add a namespace check to netvsc_open(),
and move the VF if it is not in the same namespace.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: c0a41b887ce6 ("hv_netvsc: move VF to same namespace as netvsc device")
Signed-off-by: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz(a)microsoft.com>
---
drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc_drv.c | 13 +++++++++++++
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc_drv.c b/drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc_drv.c
index 153b97f8ec0d..9caade092524 100644
--- a/drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc_drv.c
+++ b/drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc_drv.c
@@ -134,6 +134,19 @@ static int netvsc_open(struct net_device *net)
}
if (vf_netdev) {
+ if (!net_eq(dev_net(net), dev_net(vf_netdev))) {
+ ret = dev_change_net_namespace(vf_netdev, dev_net(net),
+ "eth%d");
+ if (ret)
+ netdev_err(vf_netdev,
+ "Cannot move to same namespace as %s: %d\n",
+ net->name, ret);
+ else
+ netdev_info(vf_netdev,
+ "Moved VF to namespace with: %s\n",
+ net->name);
+ }
+
/* Setting synthetic device up transparently sets
* slave as up. If open fails, then slave will be
* still be offline (and not used).
--
2.34.1
During fuzz testing, the following issue was discovered:
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_iter+0x598/0x2a30
_copy_to_iter+0x598/0x2a30
__skb_datagram_iter+0x168/0x1060
skb_copy_datagram_iter+0x5b/0x220
netlink_recvmsg+0x362/0x1700
sock_recvmsg+0x2dc/0x390
__sys_recvfrom+0x381/0x6d0
__x64_sys_recvfrom+0x130/0x200
x64_sys_call+0x32c8/0x3cc0
do_syscall_64+0xd8/0x1c0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x79/0x81
Uninit was stored to memory at:
copy_to_user_state_extra+0xcc1/0x1e00
dump_one_state+0x28c/0x5f0
xfrm_state_walk+0x548/0x11e0
xfrm_dump_sa+0x1e0/0x840
netlink_dump+0x943/0x1c40
__netlink_dump_start+0x746/0xdb0
xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x429/0xc00
netlink_rcv_skb+0x613/0x780
xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x77/0xc0
netlink_unicast+0xe90/0x1280
netlink_sendmsg+0x126d/0x1490
__sock_sendmsg+0x332/0x3d0
____sys_sendmsg+0x863/0xc30
___sys_sendmsg+0x285/0x3e0
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x2d6/0x560
x64_sys_call+0x1316/0x3cc0
do_syscall_64+0xd8/0x1c0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x79/0x81
Uninit was created at:
__kmalloc+0x571/0xd30
attach_auth+0x106/0x3e0
xfrm_add_sa+0x2aa0/0x4230
xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x832/0xc00
netlink_rcv_skb+0x613/0x780
xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x77/0xc0
netlink_unicast+0xe90/0x1280
netlink_sendmsg+0x126d/0x1490
__sock_sendmsg+0x332/0x3d0
____sys_sendmsg+0x863/0xc30
___sys_sendmsg+0x285/0x3e0
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x2d6/0x560
x64_sys_call+0x1316/0x3cc0
do_syscall_64+0xd8/0x1c0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x79/0x81
Bytes 328-379 of 732 are uninitialized
Memory access of size 732 starts at ffff88800e18e000
Data copied to user address 00007ff30f48aff0
CPU: 2 PID: 18167 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.8.11 #1
Hardware name:
QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
Fixes copying of xfrm algorithms where some random
data of the structure fields can end up in userspace.
Padding in structures may be filled with random (possibly sensitve)
data and should never be given directly to user-space.
A similar issue was resolved in the commit
8222d5910dae ("xfrm: Zero padding when dumping algos and encap")
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.
Fixes: c7a5899eb26e ("xfrm: redact SA secret with lockdown confidentiality")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Co-developed-by: Boris Tonofa <b.tonofa(a)ideco.ru>
Signed-off-by: Boris Tonofa <b.tonofa(a)ideco.ru>
Signed-off-by: Petr Vaganov <p.vaganov(a)ideco.ru>
---
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
index 55f039ec3d59..97faeb3574ea 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
@@ -1098,7 +1098,9 @@ static int copy_to_user_auth(struct xfrm_algo_auth *auth, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (!nla)
return -EMSGSIZE;
ap = nla_data(nla);
- memcpy(ap, auth, sizeof(struct xfrm_algo_auth));
+ strscpy_pad(ap->alg_name, auth->alg_name, sizeof(sizeof(ap->alg_name)));
+ ap->alg_key_len = auth->alg_key_len;
+ ap->alg_trunc_len = auth->alg_trunc_len;
if (redact_secret && auth->alg_key_len)
memset(ap->alg_key, 0, (auth->alg_key_len + 7) / 8);
else
--
2.46.1