July 2023 - Linux-stable-mirror

by Greg Kroah-Hartman

I'm announcing the release of the 6.1.41 kernel. All AMD processor users of the 6.1 kernel series who have not updated their microcode to the latest version, must upgrade. The updated 6.1.y git tree can be found at: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git linux-6.1.y and can be browsed at the normal kernel.org git web browser: https://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git;a=summary thanks, greg k-h ------------ Makefile | 2 arch/x86/include/asm/microcode.h | 1 arch/x86/include/asm/microcode_amd.h | 2 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 1 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 199 ++++++++++++++++++++++------------- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 2 6 files changed, 134 insertions(+), 73 deletions(-) Borislav Petkov (AMD) (2): x86/cpu/amd: Move the errata checking functionality up x86/cpu/amd: Add a Zenbleed fix Greg Kroah-Hartman (1): Linux 6.1.41

1 year, 11 months

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Linux 6.4.6

by Greg Kroah-Hartman

I'm announcing the release of the 6.4.6 kernel. All AMD processor users of the 6.4 kernel series who have not updated their microcode to the latest version, must upgrade. The updated 6.4.y git tree can be found at: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git linux-6.4.y and can be browsed at the normal kernel.org git web browser: https://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git;a=summary thanks, greg k-h ------------ Makefile | 2 arch/x86/include/asm/microcode.h | 1 arch/x86/include/asm/microcode_amd.h | 2 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 1 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 199 ++++++++++++++++++++++------------- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 2 6 files changed, 134 insertions(+), 73 deletions(-) Borislav Petkov (AMD) (2): x86/cpu/amd: Move the errata checking functionality up x86/cpu/amd: Add a Zenbleed fix Greg Kroah-Hartman (1): Linux 6.4.6

1 year, 11 months

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+ mm-fix-memory-ordering-for-mm_lock_seq-and-vm_lock_seq.patch added to mm-hotfixes-unstable branch

by Andrew Morton

The patch titled Subject: mm: Fix memory ordering for mm_lock_seq and vm_lock_seq has been added to the -mm mm-hotfixes-unstable branch. Its filename is mm-fix-memory-ordering-for-mm_lock_seq-and-vm_lock_seq.patch This patch will shortly appear at https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche… This patch will later appear in the mm-hotfixes-unstable branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm Before you just go and hit "reply", please: a) Consider who else should be cc'ed b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's *** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code *** The -mm tree is included into linux-next via the mm-everything branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm and is updated there every 2-3 working days ------------------------------------------------------ From: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> Subject: mm: Fix memory ordering for mm_lock_seq and vm_lock_seq Date: Sat, 22 Jul 2023 00:51:07 +0200 mm->mm_lock_seq effectively functions as a read/write lock; therefore it must be used with acquire/release semantics. A specific example is the interaction between userfaultfd_register() and lock_vma_under_rcu(). userfaultfd_register() does the following from the point where it changes a VMA's flags to the point where concurrent readers are permitted again (in a simple scenario where only a single private VMA is accessed and no merging/splitting is involved): userfaultfd_register userfaultfd_set_vm_flags vm_flags_reset vma_start_write down_write(&vma->vm_lock->lock) vma->vm_lock_seq = mm_lock_seq [marks VMA as busy] up_write(&vma->vm_lock->lock) vm_flags_init [sets VM_UFFD_* in __vm_flags] vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx = ctx mmap_write_unlock vma_end_write_all WRITE_ONCE(mm->mm_lock_seq, mm->mm_lock_seq + 1) [unlocks VMA] There are no memory barriers in between the __vm_flags update and the mm->mm_lock_seq update that unlocks the VMA, so the unlock can be reordered to above the `vm_flags_init()` call, which means from the perspective of a concurrent reader, a VMA can be marked as a userfaultfd VMA while it is not VMA-locked. That's bad, we definitely need a store-release for the unlock operation. The non-atomic write to vma->vm_lock_seq in vma_start_write() is mostly fine because all accesses to vma->vm_lock_seq that matter are always protected by the VMA lock. There is a racy read in vma_start_read() though that can tolerate false-positives, so we should be using WRITE_ONCE() to keep things tidy and data-race-free (including for KCSAN). On the other side, lock_vma_under_rcu() works as follows in the relevant region for locking and userfaultfd check: lock_vma_under_rcu vma_start_read vma->vm_lock_seq == READ_ONCE(vma->vm_mm->mm_lock_seq) [early bailout] down_read_trylock(&vma->vm_lock->lock) vma->vm_lock_seq == READ_ONCE(vma->vm_mm->mm_lock_seq) [main check] userfaultfd_armed checks vma->vm_flags & __VM_UFFD_FLAGS Here, the interesting aspect is how far down the mm->mm_lock_seq read can be reordered - if this read is reordered down below the vma->vm_flags access, this could cause lock_vma_under_rcu() to partly operate on information that was read while the VMA was supposed to be locked. To prevent this kind of downwards bleeding of the mm->mm_lock_seq read, we need to read it with a load-acquire. Some of the comment wording is based on suggestions by Suren. BACKPORT WARNING: One of the functions changed by this patch (which I've written against Linus' tree) is vma_try_start_write(), but this function no longer exists in mm/mm-everything. I don't know whether the merged version of this patch will be ordered before or after the patch that removes vma_try_start_write(). If you're backporting this patch to a tree with vma_try_start_write(), make sure this patch changes that function. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230721225107.942336-1-jannh@google.com Fixes: 5e31275cc997 ("mm: add per-VMA lock and helper functions to control it") Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb(a)google.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- include/linux/mm.h | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++------ include/linux/mm_types.h | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/mmap_lock.h | 10 ++++++++-- 3 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) --- a/include/linux/mmap_lock.h~mm-fix-memory-ordering-for-mm_lock_seq-and-vm_lock_seq +++ a/include/linux/mmap_lock.h @@ -76,8 +76,14 @@ static inline void mmap_assert_write_loc static inline void vma_end_write_all(struct mm_struct *mm) { mmap_assert_write_locked(mm); - /* No races during update due to exclusive mmap_lock being held */ - WRITE_ONCE(mm->mm_lock_seq, mm->mm_lock_seq + 1); + /* + * Nobody can concurrently modify mm->mm_lock_seq due to exclusive + * mmap_lock being held. + * We need RELEASE semantics here to ensure that preceding stores into + * the VMA take effect before we unlock it with this store. + * Pairs with ACQUIRE semantics in vma_start_read(). + */ + smp_store_release(&mm->mm_lock_seq, mm->mm_lock_seq + 1); } #else static inline void vma_end_write_all(struct mm_struct *mm) {} --- a/include/linux/mm.h~mm-fix-memory-ordering-for-mm_lock_seq-and-vm_lock_seq +++ a/include/linux/mm.h @@ -641,8 +641,14 @@ static inline void vma_numab_state_free( */ static inline bool vma_start_read(struct vm_area_struct *vma) { - /* Check before locking. A race might cause false locked result. */ - if (vma->vm_lock_seq == READ_ONCE(vma->vm_mm->mm_lock_seq)) + /* + * Check before locking. A race might cause false locked result. + * We can use READ_ONCE() for the mm_lock_seq here, and don't need + * ACQUIRE semantics, because this is just a lockless check whose result + * we don't rely on for anything - the mm_lock_seq read against which we + * need ordering is below. + */ + if (READ_ONCE(vma->vm_lock_seq) == READ_ONCE(vma->vm_mm->mm_lock_seq)) return false; if (unlikely(down_read_trylock(&vma->vm_lock->lock) == 0)) @@ -653,8 +659,13 @@ static inline bool vma_start_read(struct * False unlocked result is impossible because we modify and check * vma->vm_lock_seq under vma->vm_lock protection and mm->mm_lock_seq * modification invalidates all existing locks. + * + * We must use ACQUIRE semantics for the mm_lock_seq so that if we are + * racing with vma_end_write_all(), we only start reading from the VMA + * after it has been unlocked. + * This pairs with RELEASE semantics in vma_end_write_all(). */ - if (unlikely(vma->vm_lock_seq == READ_ONCE(vma->vm_mm->mm_lock_seq))) { + if (unlikely(vma->vm_lock_seq == smp_load_acquire(&vma->vm_mm->mm_lock_seq))) { up_read(&vma->vm_lock->lock); return false; } @@ -676,7 +687,7 @@ static bool __is_vma_write_locked(struct * current task is holding mmap_write_lock, both vma->vm_lock_seq and * mm->mm_lock_seq can't be concurrently modified. */ - *mm_lock_seq = READ_ONCE(vma->vm_mm->mm_lock_seq); + *mm_lock_seq = vma->vm_mm->mm_lock_seq; return (vma->vm_lock_seq == *mm_lock_seq); } @@ -688,7 +699,13 @@ static inline void vma_start_write(struc return; down_write(&vma->vm_lock->lock); - vma->vm_lock_seq = mm_lock_seq; + /* + * We should use WRITE_ONCE() here because we can have concurrent reads + * from the early lockless pessimistic check in vma_start_read(). + * We don't really care about the correctness of that early check, but + * we should use WRITE_ONCE() for cleanliness and to keep KCSAN happy. + */ + WRITE_ONCE(vma->vm_lock_seq, mm_lock_seq); up_write(&vma->vm_lock->lock); } @@ -702,7 +719,7 @@ static inline bool vma_try_start_write(s if (!down_write_trylock(&vma->vm_lock->lock)) return false; - vma->vm_lock_seq = mm_lock_seq; + WRITE_ONCE(vma->vm_lock_seq, mm_lock_seq); up_write(&vma->vm_lock->lock); return true; } --- a/include/linux/mm_types.h~mm-fix-memory-ordering-for-mm_lock_seq-and-vm_lock_seq +++ a/include/linux/mm_types.h @@ -514,6 +514,20 @@ struct vm_area_struct { }; #ifdef CONFIG_PER_VMA_LOCK + /* + * Can only be written (using WRITE_ONCE()) while holding both: + * - mmap_lock (in write mode) + * - vm_lock->lock (in write mode) + * Can be read reliably while holding one of: + * - mmap_lock (in read or write mode) + * - vm_lock->lock (in read or write mode) + * Can be read unreliably (using READ_ONCE()) for pessimistic bailout + * while holding nothing (except RCU to keep the VMA struct allocated). + * + * This sequence counter is explicitly allowed to overflow; sequence + * counter reuse can only lead to occasional unnecessary use of the + * slowpath. + */ int vm_lock_seq; struct vma_lock *vm_lock; @@ -679,6 +693,20 @@ struct mm_struct { * by mmlist_lock */ #ifdef CONFIG_PER_VMA_LOCK + /* + * This field has lock-like semantics, meaning it is sometimes + * accessed with ACQUIRE/RELEASE semantics. + * Roughly speaking, incrementing the sequence number is + * equivalent to releasing locks on VMAs; reading the sequence + * number can be part of taking a read lock on a VMA. + * + * Can be modified under write mmap_lock using RELEASE + * semantics. + * Can be read with no other protection when holding write + * mmap_lock. + * Can be read with ACQUIRE semantics if not holding write + * mmap_lock. + */ int mm_lock_seq; #endif _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from jannh(a)google.com are mm-fix-memory-ordering-for-mm_lock_seq-and-vm_lock_seq.patch

1 year, 11 months

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+ revert-um-use-swap-to-make-code-cleaner.patch added to mm-hotfixes-unstable branch

by Andrew Morton

The patch titled Subject: Revert "um: Use swap() to make code cleaner" has been added to the -mm mm-hotfixes-unstable branch. Its filename is revert-um-use-swap-to-make-code-cleaner.patch This patch will shortly appear at https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche… This patch will later appear in the mm-hotfixes-unstable branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm Before you just go and hit "reply", please: a) Consider who else should be cc'ed b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's *** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code *** The -mm tree is included into linux-next via the mm-everything branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm and is updated there every 2-3 working days ------------------------------------------------------ From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko(a)linux.intel.com> Subject: Revert "um: Use swap() to make code cleaner" Date: Mon, 24 Jul 2023 17:31:31 +0300 This reverts commit 9b0da3f22307af693be80f5d3a89dc4c7f360a85. The sigio.c is clearly user space code which is handled by arch/um/scripts/Makefile.rules (see USER_OBJS rule). The above mentioned commit simply broke this agreement, we may not use Linux kernel internal headers in them without thorough thinking. Hence, revert the wrong commit. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230724143131.30090-1-andriy.shevchenko@linux.in… Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko(a)linux.intel.com> Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp(a)intel.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202307212304.cH79zJp1-lkp@intel.com/ Cc: Anton Ivanov <anton.ivanov(a)cambridgegreys.com> Cc: Herve Codina <herve.codina(a)bootlin.com> Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes(a)sipsolutions.net> Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux(a)rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard(a)nod.at> Cc: Yang Guang <yang.guang5(a)zte.com.cn> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- arch/um/os-Linux/sigio.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) --- a/arch/um/os-Linux/sigio.c~revert-um-use-swap-to-make-code-cleaner +++ a/arch/um/os-Linux/sigio.c @@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ * Copyright (C) 2002 - 2008 Jeff Dike (jdike(a){addtoit,linux.intel}.com) */ -#include <linux/minmax.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <errno.h> #include <fcntl.h> @@ -51,7 +50,7 @@ static struct pollfds all_sigio_fds; static int write_sigio_thread(void *unused) { - struct pollfds *fds; + struct pollfds *fds, tmp; struct pollfd *p; int i, n, respond_fd; char c; @@ -78,7 +77,9 @@ static int write_sigio_thread(void *unus "write_sigio_thread : " "read on socket failed, " "err = %d\n", errno); - swap(current_poll, next_poll); + tmp = current_poll; + current_poll = next_poll; + next_poll = tmp; respond_fd = sigio_private[1]; } else { _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from andriy.shevchenko(a)linux.intel.com are revert-um-use-swap-to-make-code-cleaner.patch kernelh-split-out-count_args-and-concatenate-to-argsh.patch x86-asm-replace-custom-count_args-concatenate-implementations.patch arm64-smccc-replace-custom-count_args-concatenate-implementations.patch genetlink-replace-custom-concatenate-implementation.patch

1 year, 11 months

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[PATCH v2 2/5] smack: Handle SMACK64TRANSMUTE in smack_inode_setsecurity()

by Roberto Sassu

From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu(a)huawei.com> If the SMACK64TRANSMUTE xattr is provided, and the inode is a directory, update the in-memory inode flags by setting SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 5c6d1125f8db ("Smack: Transmute labels on specified directories") # v2.6.38.x Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu(a)huawei.com> --- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index e599ce9453c..9eae830527d 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -2804,6 +2804,15 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, if (value == NULL || size > SMK_LONGLABEL || size == 0) return -EINVAL; + if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_TRANSMUTE) == 0) { + if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) || size != TRANS_TRUE_SIZE || + strncmp(value, TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0) + return -EINVAL; + + nsp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE; + return 0; + } + skp = smk_import_entry(value, size); if (IS_ERR(skp)) return PTR_ERR(skp); -- 2.34.1

1 year, 11 months

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[PATCH v2 1/5] smack: Set SMACK64TRANSMUTE only for dirs in smack_inode_setxattr()

by Roberto Sassu

From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu(a)huawei.com> Since the SMACK64TRANSMUTE xattr makes sense only for directories, enforce this restriction in smack_inode_setxattr(). Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 5c6d1125f8db ("Smack: Transmute labels on specified directories") # v2.6.38.x Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu(a)huawei.com> --- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 679156601a1..e599ce9453c 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -1262,7 +1262,8 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, check_star = 1; } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) { check_priv = 1; - if (size != TRANS_TRUE_SIZE || + if (!S_ISDIR(d_backing_inode(dentry)->i_mode) || + size != TRANS_TRUE_SIZE || strncmp(value, TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0) rc = -EINVAL; } else -- 2.34.1

1 year, 11 months

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[PATCH net 2/2] can: raw: fix lockdep issue in raw_release()

by Marc Kleine-Budde

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> syzbot complained about a lockdep issue [1] Since raw_bind() and raw_setsockopt() first get RTNL before locking the socket, we must adopt the same order in raw_release() [1] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.5.0-rc1-syzkaller-00192-g78adb4bcf99e #0 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ syz-executor.0/14110 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88804e4b6130 (sk_lock-AF_CAN){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1708 [inline] ffff88804e4b6130 (sk_lock-AF_CAN){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: raw_bind+0xb1/0xab0 net/can/raw.c:435 but task is already holding lock: ffffffff8e3df368 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: raw_bind+0xa7/0xab0 net/can/raw.c:434 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:603 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x181/0x1340 kernel/locking/mutex.c:747 raw_release+0x1c6/0x9b0 net/can/raw.c:391 __sock_release+0xcd/0x290 net/socket.c:654 sock_close+0x1c/0x20 net/socket.c:1386 __fput+0x3fd/0xac0 fs/file_table.c:384 task_work_run+0x14d/0x240 kernel/task_work.c:179 resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:49 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:171 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x210/0x240 kernel/entry/common.c:204 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:286 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d/0x50 kernel/entry/common.c:297 do_syscall_64+0x44/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd -> #0 (sk_lock-AF_CAN){+.+.}-{0:0}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3142 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3261 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3876 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x2e3d/0x5de0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5144 lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5761 [inline] lock_acquire+0x1ae/0x510 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5726 lock_sock_nested+0x3a/0xf0 net/core/sock.c:3492 lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1708 [inline] raw_bind+0xb1/0xab0 net/can/raw.c:435 __sys_bind+0x1ec/0x220 net/socket.c:1792 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1803 [inline] __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1801 [inline] __x64_sys_bind+0x72/0xb0 net/socket.c:1801 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x38/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(rtnl_mutex); lock(sk_lock-AF_CAN); lock(rtnl_mutex); lock(sk_lock-AF_CAN); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by syz-executor.0/14110: stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 14110 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc1-syzkaller-00192-g78adb4bcf99e #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/03/2023 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x1b0 lib/dump_stack.c:106 check_noncircular+0x311/0x3f0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2195 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3142 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3261 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3876 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x2e3d/0x5de0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5144 lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5761 [inline] lock_acquire+0x1ae/0x510 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5726 lock_sock_nested+0x3a/0xf0 net/core/sock.c:3492 lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1708 [inline] raw_bind+0xb1/0xab0 net/can/raw.c:435 __sys_bind+0x1ec/0x220 net/socket.c:1792 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1803 [inline] __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1801 [inline] __x64_sys_bind+0x72/0xb0 net/socket.c:1801 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x38/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7fd89007cb29 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 e1 20 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fd890d2a0c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000031 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fd89019bf80 RCX: 00007fd89007cb29 RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020000040 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007fd8900c847a R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007fd89019bf80 R15: 00007ffebf8124f8 </TASK> Fixes: ee8b94c8510c ("can: raw: fix receiver memory leak") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller(a)googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Cc: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang(a)huawei.com> Cc: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan(a)hartkopp.net> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl(a)pengutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230720114438.172434-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl(a)pengutronix.de> --- net/can/raw.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/can/raw.c b/net/can/raw.c index 2302e4882967..ba6b52b1d776 100644 --- a/net/can/raw.c +++ b/net/can/raw.c @@ -386,9 +386,9 @@ static int raw_release(struct socket *sock) list_del(&ro->notifier); spin_unlock(&raw_notifier_lock); + rtnl_lock(); lock_sock(sk); - rtnl_lock(); /* remove current filters & unregister */ if (ro->bound) { if (ro->dev) @@ -405,12 +405,13 @@ static int raw_release(struct socket *sock) ro->dev = NULL; ro->count = 0; free_percpu(ro->uniq); - rtnl_unlock(); sock_orphan(sk); sock->sk = NULL; release_sock(sk); + rtnl_unlock(); + sock_put(sk); return 0; -- 2.40.1

1 year, 11 months

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[PATCH v8 0/9] Update AUX invalidation sequence

by Andi Shyti

Hi, as there are new hardware directives, we need a little adaptation for the AUX invalidation sequence. In this version we support all the engines affected by this change. The stable backport has some challenges because the original patch that this series fixes has had more changes in between. This patch is slowly exploding with code refactorings and features added and fixed. Thanks a lot Nirmoy, Andrzej and Matt for your review and for the fruitful discussions! Thanks, Andi Changelog: ========= v7 -> v8 - Removed the aux invalidation from the device info and added a helper function, instead (patch 2). - Use "MTL and beyond" instead of "MTL+" in comments. - Use the "gen12_" prefix instead of "intel_". - In patch 6 return an int error instead of an error embedded in the pointer in the intel_emit_pipe_control_cs() function and propagate the error to the upper layers. v6 -> v7 - Fix correct sequence applied to the correct engine. A little confusion promptly cought by Nirmoy when applying to the VD engine the sequence belonging to the compute engines. Thanks a lot, Nirmoy! v5 -> v6 - Fixed ccs flush in the engines VE and BCS. They are sent as a separate command instead of added in the pipe control. - Separated the CCS flusing in the pipe control patch with the quiescing of the memory. They were meant to be on separate patch already in the previous verision, but apparently I squashed them by mistake. v4 -> v5 - The AUX CCS is added as a device property instead of checking against FLAT CCS. This adds the new HAS_AUX_CCS check (Patch 2, new). - little and trivial refactoring here and there. - extended the flags{0,1}/bit_group_{0,1} renaming to other functions. - Created an intel_emit_pipe_control_cs() wrapper for submitting the pipe control. - Quiesce memory for all the engines, not just RCS (Patch 6, new). - The PIPE_CONTROL_CCS_FLUSH is added to all the engines. - Remove redundant EMIT_FLUSH_CCS mode flag. - Remove unnecessary NOOPs from the command streamer for invalidating the CCS table. - Use INVALID_MMIO_REG and gen12_get_aux_inv_reg() instad of __MMIO(0) and reg.reg. - Remove useless wrapper and just use gen12_get_aux_inv_reg(). v3 -> v4 - A trivial patch 3 is added to rename the flags with bit_group_{0,1} to align with the datasheet naming. - Patch 4 fixes a confusion I made where the CCS flag was applied to the wrong bit group. v2 -> v3 - added r-b from Nirmoy in patch 1 and 4. - added patch 3 which enables the ccs_flush in the control pipe for mtl+ compute and render engines. - added redundant checks in patch 2 for enabling the EMIT_FLUSH flag. v1 -> v2 - add a clean up preliminary patch for the existing registers - add support for more engines - add the Fixes tag Andi Shyti (7): drm/i915/gt: Cleanup aux invalidation registers drm/i915: Add the gen12_needs_ccs_aux_inv helper drm/i915/gt: Rename flags with bit_group_X according to the datasheet drm/i915/gt: Enable the CCS_FLUSH bit in the pipe control drm/i915/gt: Refactor intel_emit_pipe_control_cs() in a single function drm/i915/gt: Ensure memory quiesced before invalidation for all engines drm/i915/gt: Support aux invalidation on all engines Jonathan Cavitt (2): drm/i915/gt: Ensure memory quiesced before invalidation drm/i915/gt: Poll aux invalidation register bit on invalidation drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/gen8_engine_cs.c | 198 ++++++++++++------- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/gen8_engine_cs.h | 21 +- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/intel_gpu_commands.h | 2 + drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/intel_gt_regs.h | 16 +- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/intel_lrc.c | 17 +- 5 files changed, 155 insertions(+), 99 deletions(-) -- 2.40.1

1 year, 11 months

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[PATCH] mt76: mt7615: do not advertise 5 GHz on first phy of MT7615D (DBDC)

by Paul Fertser

On DBDC devices the first (internal) phy is only capable of using 2.4 GHz band, and the 5 GHz band is exposed via a separate phy object, so avoid the false advertising. Reported-by: Rani Hod <rani.hod(a)gmail.com> Closes: https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/pull/12361 Fixes: 7660a1bd0c22 ("mt76: mt7615: register ext_phy if DBDC is detected") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Fertser <fercerpav(a)gmail.com> --- drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt7615/eeprom.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt7615/eeprom.c b/drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt7615/eeprom.c index 68e88224b8b1..ccedea7e8a50 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt7615/eeprom.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt7615/eeprom.c @@ -128,12 +128,12 @@ mt7615_eeprom_parse_hw_band_cap(struct mt7615_dev *dev) case MT_EE_5GHZ: dev->mphy.cap.has_5ghz = true; break; - case MT_EE_2GHZ: - dev->mphy.cap.has_2ghz = true; - break; case MT_EE_DBDC: dev->dbdc_support = true; fallthrough; + case MT_EE_2GHZ: + dev->mphy.cap.has_2ghz = true; + break; default: dev->mphy.cap.has_2ghz = true; dev->mphy.cap.has_5ghz = true; -- 2.34.1

1 year, 11 months

5
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[PATCH v2] drm/i915/dpt: Use shmem for dpt objects

by Radhakrishna Sripada

Dpt objects that are created from internal get evicted when there is memory pressure and do not get restored when pinned during scanout. The pinned page table entries look corrupted and programming the display engine with the incorrect pte's result in DE throwing pipe faults. Create DPT objects from shmem and mark the object as dirty when pinning so that the object is restored when shrinker evicts an unpinned buffer object. v2: Unconditionally mark the dpt objects dirty during pinning(Chris). Fixes: 0dc987b699ce ("drm/i915/display: Add smem fallback allocation for dpt") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v6.0+ Cc: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin(a)linux.intel.com> Suggested-by: Chris Wilson <chris.p.wilson(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Fei Yang <fei.yang(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Radhakrishna Sripada <radhakrishna.sripada(a)intel.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dpt.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dpt.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dpt.c index 7c5fddb203ba..fbfd8f959f17 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dpt.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dpt.c @@ -166,6 +166,8 @@ struct i915_vma *intel_dpt_pin(struct i915_address_space *vm) i915_vma_get(vma); } + dpt->obj->mm.dirty = true; + atomic_dec(&i915->gpu_error.pending_fb_pin); intel_runtime_pm_put(&i915->runtime_pm, wakeref); @@ -261,7 +263,7 @@ intel_dpt_create(struct intel_framebuffer *fb) dpt_obj = i915_gem_object_create_stolen(i915, size); if (IS_ERR(dpt_obj) && !HAS_LMEM(i915)) { drm_dbg_kms(&i915->drm, "Allocating dpt from smem\n"); - dpt_obj = i915_gem_object_create_internal(i915, size); + dpt_obj = i915_gem_object_create_shmem(i915, size); } if (IS_ERR(dpt_obj)) return ERR_CAST(dpt_obj); -- 2.34.1

1 year, 11 months

4
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