The patch below does not apply to the 4.14-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From ca8b19d61e3fce5d2d7790cde27a0b57bcb3f341 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lukas Wunner <lukas(a)wunner.de>
Date: Mon, 25 May 2020 14:25:01 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] spi: dw: Fix controller unregister order
The Designware SPI driver uses devm_spi_register_controller() on bind.
As a consequence, on unbind, __device_release_driver() first invokes
dw_spi_remove_host() before unregistering the SPI controller via
devres_release_all().
This order is incorrect: dw_spi_remove_host() shuts down the chip,
rendering the SPI bus inaccessible even though the SPI controller is
still registered. When the SPI controller is subsequently unregistered,
it unbinds all its slave devices. Because their drivers cannot access
the SPI bus, e.g. to quiesce interrupts, the slave devices may be left
in an improper state.
As a rule, devm_spi_register_controller() must not be used if the
->remove() hook performs teardown steps which shall be performed after
unregistering the controller and specifically after unbinding of slaves.
Fix by reverting to the non-devm variant of spi_register_controller().
An alternative approach would be to use device-managed functions for all
steps in dw_spi_remove_host(), e.g. by calling devm_add_action_or_reset()
on probe. However that approach would add more LoC to the driver and
it wouldn't lend itself as well to backporting to stable.
Fixes: 04f421e7b0b1 ("spi: dw: use managed resources")
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas(a)wunner.de>
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko(a)linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v3.14+
Cc: Baruch Siach <baruch(a)tkos.co.il>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/3fff8cb8ae44a9893840d0688be15bb88c090a14.15904084…
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie(a)kernel.org>
diff --git a/drivers/spi/spi-dw.c b/drivers/spi/spi-dw.c
index 31e3f866d11a..780ffad64a91 100644
--- a/drivers/spi/spi-dw.c
+++ b/drivers/spi/spi-dw.c
@@ -526,7 +526,7 @@ int dw_spi_add_host(struct device *dev, struct dw_spi *dws)
}
}
- ret = devm_spi_register_controller(dev, master);
+ ret = spi_register_controller(master);
if (ret) {
dev_err(&master->dev, "problem registering spi master\n");
goto err_dma_exit;
@@ -550,6 +550,8 @@ void dw_spi_remove_host(struct dw_spi *dws)
{
dw_spi_debugfs_remove(dws);
+ spi_unregister_controller(dws->master);
+
if (dws->dma_ops && dws->dma_ops->dma_exit)
dws->dma_ops->dma_exit(dws);
The patch below does not apply to the 5.7-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From f5f27b79eab80de0287c243a22169e4876b08d5e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Franck LENORMAND <franck.lenormand(a)nxp.com>
Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2020 00:00:05 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] firmware: imx: scu: Fix corruption of header
The header of the message to send can be changed if the
response is longer than the request:
- 1st word, the header is sent
- the remaining words of the message are sent
- the response is received asynchronously during the
execution of the loop, changing the size field in
the header
- the for loop test the termination condition using
the corrupted header
It is the case for the API build_info which has just a
header as request but 3 words in response.
This issue is fixed storing the header locally instead of
using a pointer on it.
Fixes: edbee095fafb (firmware: imx: add SCU firmware driver support)
Signed-off-by: Franck LENORMAND <franck.lenormand(a)nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Leonard Crestez <leonard.crestez(a)nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez <leonard.crestez(a)nxp.com>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Dong Aisheng <aisheng.dong(a)nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo <shawnguo(a)kernel.org>
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/imx-scu.c b/drivers/firmware/imx/imx-scu.c
index e94a5585b698..b3da2e193ad2 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/imx/imx-scu.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/imx-scu.c
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ static void imx_scu_rx_callback(struct mbox_client *c, void *msg)
static int imx_scu_ipc_write(struct imx_sc_ipc *sc_ipc, void *msg)
{
- struct imx_sc_rpc_msg *hdr = msg;
+ struct imx_sc_rpc_msg hdr = *(struct imx_sc_rpc_msg *)msg;
struct imx_sc_chan *sc_chan;
u32 *data = msg;
int ret;
@@ -166,13 +166,13 @@ static int imx_scu_ipc_write(struct imx_sc_ipc *sc_ipc, void *msg)
int i;
/* Check size */
- if (hdr->size > IMX_SC_RPC_MAX_MSG)
+ if (hdr.size > IMX_SC_RPC_MAX_MSG)
return -EINVAL;
- dev_dbg(sc_ipc->dev, "RPC SVC %u FUNC %u SIZE %u\n", hdr->svc,
- hdr->func, hdr->size);
+ dev_dbg(sc_ipc->dev, "RPC SVC %u FUNC %u SIZE %u\n", hdr.svc,
+ hdr.func, hdr.size);
- size = sc_ipc->fast_ipc ? 1 : hdr->size;
+ size = sc_ipc->fast_ipc ? 1 : hdr.size;
for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
sc_chan = &sc_ipc->chans[i % 4];
The patch below does not apply to the 4.14-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From d90ca42012db2863a9a30b564a2ace6016594bda Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Longpeng(Mike)" <longpeng2(a)huawei.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2020 15:05:01 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] crypto: virtio: Fix dest length calculation in
__virtio_crypto_skcipher_do_req()
The src/dst length is not aligned with AES_BLOCK_SIZE(which is 16) in some
testcases in tcrypto.ko.
For example, the src/dst length of one of cts(cbc(aes))'s testcase is 17, the
crypto_virtio driver will set @src_data_len=16 but @dst_data_len=17 in this
case and get a wrong at then end.
SRC: pp pp pp pp pp pp pp pp pp pp pp pp pp pp pp pp pp (17 bytes)
EXP: cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc pp (17 bytes)
DST: cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc 00 (pollute the last bytes)
(pp: plaintext cc:ciphertext)
Fix this issue by limit the length of dest buffer.
Fixes: dbaf0624ffa5 ("crypto: add virtio-crypto driver")
Cc: Gonglei <arei.gonglei(a)huawei.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang(a)redhat.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem(a)davemloft.net>
Cc: virtualization(a)lists.linux-foundation.org
Cc: linux-kernel(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Longpeng(Mike) <longpeng2(a)huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200602070501.2023-4-longpeng2@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst(a)redhat.com>
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_algs.c b/drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_algs.c
index 52261b6c247e..cb8a6ea2a4bc 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_algs.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_algs.c
@@ -407,6 +407,7 @@ __virtio_crypto_skcipher_do_req(struct virtio_crypto_sym_request *vc_sym_req,
goto free;
}
+ dst_len = min_t(unsigned int, req->cryptlen, dst_len);
pr_debug("virtio_crypto: src_len: %u, dst_len: %llu\n",
req->cryptlen, dst_len);
From: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck(a)intel.com>
commit 17fae1294ad9d711b2c3dd0edef479d40c76a5e8 upstream
An interesting thing happened when a guest Linux instance took
a machine check. The VMM unmapped the bad page from guest physical
space and passed the machine check to the guest.
Linux took all the normal actions to offline the page from the process
that was using it. But then guest Linux crashed because it said there
was a second machine check inside the kernel with this stack trace:
do_memory_failure
set_mce_nospec
set_memory_uc
_set_memory_uc
change_page_attr_set_clr
cpa_flush
clflush_cache_range_opt
This was odd, because a CLFLUSH instruction shouldn't raise a machine
check (it isn't consuming the data). Further investigation showed that
the VMM had passed in another machine check because is appeared that the
guest was accessing the bad page.
Fix is to check the scope of the poison by checking the MCi_MISC register.
If the entire page is affected, then unmap the page. If only part of the
page is affected, then mark the page as uncacheable.
This assumes that VMMs will do the logical thing and pass in the "whole
page scope" via the MCi_MISC register (since they unmapped the entire
page).
Reported-by: Jue Wang <juew(a)google.com>
Tested-by: Jue Wang <juew(a)google.com>
Fixes: 284ce4011ba6 ("x86/memory_failure: Introduce {set, clear}_mce_nospec()")
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck(a)intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck(a)intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200520163546.GA7977@agluck-desk2.amr.corp.intel…
---
arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h | 19 +++++++++++++------
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c | 11 +++++++++--
include/linux/set_memory.h | 2 +-
3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h
index 2ee8e469dcf5..162128cdfbf2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h
@@ -85,28 +85,35 @@ void set_kernel_text_rw(void);
void set_kernel_text_ro(void);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
-static inline int set_mce_nospec(unsigned long pfn)
+/*
+ * Prevent speculative access to the page by either unmapping
+ * it (if we do not require access to any part of the page) or
+ * marking it uncacheable (if we want to try to retrieve data
+ * from non-poisoned lines in the page).
+ */
+static inline int set_mce_nospec(unsigned long pfn, bool unmap)
{
unsigned long decoy_addr;
int rc;
/*
- * Mark the linear address as UC to make sure we don't log more
- * errors because of speculative access to the page.
* We would like to just call:
- * set_memory_uc((unsigned long)pfn_to_kaddr(pfn), 1);
+ * set_memory_XX((unsigned long)pfn_to_kaddr(pfn), 1);
* but doing that would radically increase the odds of a
* speculative access to the poison page because we'd have
* the virtual address of the kernel 1:1 mapping sitting
* around in registers.
* Instead we get tricky. We create a non-canonical address
* that looks just like the one we want, but has bit 63 flipped.
- * This relies on set_memory_uc() properly sanitizing any __pa()
+ * This relies on set_memory_XX() properly sanitizing any __pa()
* results with __PHYSICAL_MASK or PTE_PFN_MASK.
*/
decoy_addr = (pfn << PAGE_SHIFT) + (PAGE_OFFSET ^ BIT(63));
- rc = set_memory_uc(decoy_addr, 1);
+ if (unmap)
+ rc = set_memory_np(decoy_addr, 1);
+ else
+ rc = set_memory_uc(decoy_addr, 1);
if (rc)
pr_warn("Could not invalidate pfn=0x%lx from 1:1 map\n", pfn);
return rc;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c
index aecb15ba66cd..fd76e3733dd3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c
@@ -533,6 +533,13 @@ bool mce_is_memory_error(struct mce *m)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mce_is_memory_error);
+static bool whole_page(struct mce *m)
+{
+ if (!mca_cfg.ser || !(m->status & MCI_STATUS_MISCV))
+ return true;
+ return MCI_MISC_ADDR_LSB(m->misc) >= PAGE_SHIFT;
+}
+
bool mce_is_correctable(struct mce *m)
{
if (m->cpuvendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD && m->status & MCI_STATUS_DEFERRED)
@@ -601,7 +608,7 @@ static int srao_decode_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long val,
if (mce_usable_address(mce) && (mce->severity == MCE_AO_SEVERITY)) {
pfn = mce->addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
if (!memory_failure(pfn, 0))
- set_mce_nospec(pfn);
+ set_mce_nospec(pfn, whole_page(mce));
}
return NOTIFY_OK;
@@ -1103,7 +1110,7 @@ static int do_memory_failure(struct mce *m)
if (ret)
pr_err("Memory error not recovered");
else
- set_mce_nospec(m->addr >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+ set_mce_nospec(m->addr >> PAGE_SHIFT, whole_page(m));
return ret;
}
diff --git a/include/linux/set_memory.h b/include/linux/set_memory.h
index 86281ac7c305..860e0f843c12 100644
--- a/include/linux/set_memory.h
+++ b/include/linux/set_memory.h
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ static inline int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page)
#endif
#ifndef set_mce_nospec
-static inline int set_mce_nospec(unsigned long pfn)
+static inline int set_mce_nospec(unsigned long pfn, bool unmap)
{
return 0;
}
--
2.21.1
The patch below does not apply to the 4.19-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From d90ca42012db2863a9a30b564a2ace6016594bda Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Longpeng(Mike)" <longpeng2(a)huawei.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2020 15:05:01 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] crypto: virtio: Fix dest length calculation in
__virtio_crypto_skcipher_do_req()
The src/dst length is not aligned with AES_BLOCK_SIZE(which is 16) in some
testcases in tcrypto.ko.
For example, the src/dst length of one of cts(cbc(aes))'s testcase is 17, the
crypto_virtio driver will set @src_data_len=16 but @dst_data_len=17 in this
case and get a wrong at then end.
SRC: pp pp pp pp pp pp pp pp pp pp pp pp pp pp pp pp pp (17 bytes)
EXP: cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc pp (17 bytes)
DST: cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc 00 (pollute the last bytes)
(pp: plaintext cc:ciphertext)
Fix this issue by limit the length of dest buffer.
Fixes: dbaf0624ffa5 ("crypto: add virtio-crypto driver")
Cc: Gonglei <arei.gonglei(a)huawei.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang(a)redhat.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem(a)davemloft.net>
Cc: virtualization(a)lists.linux-foundation.org
Cc: linux-kernel(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Longpeng(Mike) <longpeng2(a)huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200602070501.2023-4-longpeng2@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst(a)redhat.com>
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_algs.c b/drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_algs.c
index 52261b6c247e..cb8a6ea2a4bc 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_algs.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_algs.c
@@ -407,6 +407,7 @@ __virtio_crypto_skcipher_do_req(struct virtio_crypto_sym_request *vc_sym_req,
goto free;
}
+ dst_len = min_t(unsigned int, req->cryptlen, dst_len);
pr_debug("virtio_crypto: src_len: %u, dst_len: %llu\n",
req->cryptlen, dst_len);
The patch below does not apply to the 5.7-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From 17fae1294ad9d711b2c3dd0edef479d40c76a5e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tony Luck <tony.luck(a)intel.com>
Date: Wed, 20 May 2020 09:35:46 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] x86/{mce,mm}: Unmap the entire page if the whole page is
affected and poisoned
An interesting thing happened when a guest Linux instance took a machine
check. The VMM unmapped the bad page from guest physical space and
passed the machine check to the guest.
Linux took all the normal actions to offline the page from the process
that was using it. But then guest Linux crashed because it said there
was a second machine check inside the kernel with this stack trace:
do_memory_failure
set_mce_nospec
set_memory_uc
_set_memory_uc
change_page_attr_set_clr
cpa_flush
clflush_cache_range_opt
This was odd, because a CLFLUSH instruction shouldn't raise a machine
check (it isn't consuming the data). Further investigation showed that
the VMM had passed in another machine check because is appeared that the
guest was accessing the bad page.
Fix is to check the scope of the poison by checking the MCi_MISC register.
If the entire page is affected, then unmap the page. If only part of the
page is affected, then mark the page as uncacheable.
This assumes that VMMs will do the logical thing and pass in the "whole
page scope" via the MCi_MISC register (since they unmapped the entire
page).
[ bp: Adjust to x86/entry changes. ]
Fixes: 284ce4011ba6 ("x86/memory_failure: Introduce {set, clear}_mce_nospec()")
Reported-by: Jue Wang <juew(a)google.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck(a)intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Jue Wang <juew(a)google.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200520163546.GA7977@agluck-desk2.amr.corp.intel…
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h
index ec2c0a094b5d..5948218f35c5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h
@@ -86,28 +86,35 @@ int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page);
extern int kernel_set_to_readonly;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
-static inline int set_mce_nospec(unsigned long pfn)
+/*
+ * Prevent speculative access to the page by either unmapping
+ * it (if we do not require access to any part of the page) or
+ * marking it uncacheable (if we want to try to retrieve data
+ * from non-poisoned lines in the page).
+ */
+static inline int set_mce_nospec(unsigned long pfn, bool unmap)
{
unsigned long decoy_addr;
int rc;
/*
- * Mark the linear address as UC to make sure we don't log more
- * errors because of speculative access to the page.
* We would like to just call:
- * set_memory_uc((unsigned long)pfn_to_kaddr(pfn), 1);
+ * set_memory_XX((unsigned long)pfn_to_kaddr(pfn), 1);
* but doing that would radically increase the odds of a
* speculative access to the poison page because we'd have
* the virtual address of the kernel 1:1 mapping sitting
* around in registers.
* Instead we get tricky. We create a non-canonical address
* that looks just like the one we want, but has bit 63 flipped.
- * This relies on set_memory_uc() properly sanitizing any __pa()
+ * This relies on set_memory_XX() properly sanitizing any __pa()
* results with __PHYSICAL_MASK or PTE_PFN_MASK.
*/
decoy_addr = (pfn << PAGE_SHIFT) + (PAGE_OFFSET ^ BIT(63));
- rc = set_memory_uc(decoy_addr, 1);
+ if (unmap)
+ rc = set_memory_np(decoy_addr, 1);
+ else
+ rc = set_memory_uc(decoy_addr, 1);
if (rc)
pr_warn("Could not invalidate pfn=0x%lx from 1:1 map\n", pfn);
return rc;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c
index 30413325de22..ce9120c4f740 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c
@@ -520,6 +520,14 @@ bool mce_is_memory_error(struct mce *m)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mce_is_memory_error);
+static bool whole_page(struct mce *m)
+{
+ if (!mca_cfg.ser || !(m->status & MCI_STATUS_MISCV))
+ return true;
+
+ return MCI_MISC_ADDR_LSB(m->misc) >= PAGE_SHIFT;
+}
+
bool mce_is_correctable(struct mce *m)
{
if (m->cpuvendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD && m->status & MCI_STATUS_DEFERRED)
@@ -573,7 +581,7 @@ static int uc_decode_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long val,
pfn = mce->addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
if (!memory_failure(pfn, 0)) {
- set_mce_nospec(pfn);
+ set_mce_nospec(pfn, whole_page(mce));
mce->kflags |= MCE_HANDLED_UC;
}
@@ -1173,11 +1181,12 @@ static void kill_me_maybe(struct callback_head *cb)
int flags = MF_ACTION_REQUIRED;
pr_err("Uncorrected hardware memory error in user-access at %llx", p->mce_addr);
- if (!(p->mce_status & MCG_STATUS_RIPV))
+
+ if (!p->mce_ripv)
flags |= MF_MUST_KILL;
if (!memory_failure(p->mce_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT, flags)) {
- set_mce_nospec(p->mce_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+ set_mce_nospec(p->mce_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT, p->mce_whole_page);
return;
}
@@ -1331,7 +1340,8 @@ void noinstr do_machine_check(struct pt_regs *regs)
BUG_ON(!on_thread_stack() || !user_mode(regs));
current->mce_addr = m.addr;
- current->mce_status = m.mcgstatus;
+ current->mce_ripv = !!(m.mcgstatus & MCG_STATUS_RIPV);
+ current->mce_whole_page = whole_page(&m);
current->mce_kill_me.func = kill_me_maybe;
if (kill_it)
current->mce_kill_me.func = kill_me_now;
diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index c5d96e3e7fff..62c1de522fc5 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -1304,7 +1304,9 @@ struct task_struct {
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE
u64 mce_addr;
- u64 mce_status;
+ __u64 mce_ripv : 1,
+ mce_whole_page : 1,
+ __mce_reserved : 62;
struct callback_head mce_kill_me;
#endif
diff --git a/include/linux/set_memory.h b/include/linux/set_memory.h
index 86281ac7c305..860e0f843c12 100644
--- a/include/linux/set_memory.h
+++ b/include/linux/set_memory.h
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ static inline int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page)
#endif
#ifndef set_mce_nospec
-static inline int set_mce_nospec(unsigned long pfn)
+static inline int set_mce_nospec(unsigned long pfn, bool unmap)
{
return 0;
}