As all the other places, we grab the lock before manipulate the defer list.
Current implementation may face a race condition.
For example, the potential race would be:
CPU1 CPU2
mem_cgroup_move_account deferred_split_huge_page
list_empty
lock
list_empty
list_add_tail
unlock
lock
# list_empty might not hold anymore
list_add_tail
unlock
When this sequence happens, the list_add_tail() in
mem_cgroup_move_account() corrupt the list since which is already been
added to some split_queue in split_huge_page_to_list().
Besides this, David Rientjes points out the split_queue_len would be in
a wrong state, which would be a significant issue for shrinkers.
Fixes: 87eaceb3faa5 ("mm: thp: make deferred split shrinker memcg aware")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yang <richardw.yang(a)linux.intel.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> [5.4+]
---
v3:
* remove all review/ack tag since rewrite the changelog
* use deferred_split_huge_page as the example of race
* add cc stable 5.4+ tag as suggested by David Rientjes
v2:
* move check on compound outside suggested by Alexander
* an example of the race condition, suggested by Michal
---
mm/memcontrol.c | 18 +++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mm/memcontrol.c b/mm/memcontrol.c
index c5b5f74cfd4d..6450bbe394e2 100644
--- a/mm/memcontrol.c
+++ b/mm/memcontrol.c
@@ -5360,10 +5360,12 @@ static int mem_cgroup_move_account(struct page *page,
}
#ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
- if (compound && !list_empty(page_deferred_list(page))) {
+ if (compound) {
spin_lock(&from->deferred_split_queue.split_queue_lock);
- list_del_init(page_deferred_list(page));
- from->deferred_split_queue.split_queue_len--;
+ if (!list_empty(page_deferred_list(page))) {
+ list_del_init(page_deferred_list(page));
+ from->deferred_split_queue.split_queue_len--;
+ }
spin_unlock(&from->deferred_split_queue.split_queue_lock);
}
#endif
@@ -5377,11 +5379,13 @@ static int mem_cgroup_move_account(struct page *page,
page->mem_cgroup = to;
#ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
- if (compound && list_empty(page_deferred_list(page))) {
+ if (compound) {
spin_lock(&to->deferred_split_queue.split_queue_lock);
- list_add_tail(page_deferred_list(page),
- &to->deferred_split_queue.split_queue);
- to->deferred_split_queue.split_queue_len++;
+ if (list_empty(page_deferred_list(page))) {
+ list_add_tail(page_deferred_list(page),
+ &to->deferred_split_queue.split_queue);
+ to->deferred_split_queue.split_queue_len++;
+ }
spin_unlock(&to->deferred_split_queue.split_queue_lock);
}
#endif
--
2.17.1
As we reset the GPMI block at resume, the timing parameters setup by a
previous exec_op is lost. Rewriting GPMI timing registers on first exec_op
after resume fixes the problem.
Fixes: ef347c0cfd61 ("mtd: rawnand: gpmi: Implement exec_op")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Esben Haabendal <esben(a)geanix.com>
---
drivers/mtd/nand/raw/gpmi-nand/gpmi-nand.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/mtd/nand/raw/gpmi-nand/gpmi-nand.c b/drivers/mtd/nand/raw/gpmi-nand/gpmi-nand.c
index 879df8402446..b9d5d55a5edb 100644
--- a/drivers/mtd/nand/raw/gpmi-nand/gpmi-nand.c
+++ b/drivers/mtd/nand/raw/gpmi-nand/gpmi-nand.c
@@ -2727,6 +2727,10 @@ static int gpmi_pm_resume(struct device *dev)
return ret;
}
+ /* Set flag to get timing setup restored for next exec_op */
+ if (this->hw.clk_rate)
+ this->hw.must_apply_timings = true;
+
/* re-init the BCH registers */
ret = bch_set_geometry(this);
if (ret) {
--
2.25.0
Commit 69f594a38967 ("ptrace: do not audit capability check when outputing /proc/pid/stat")
introduced the ability to opt out of audit messages for accesses to
various proc files since they are not violations of policy.
While doing so it somehow switched the check from ns_capable() to
has_ns_capability{_noaudit}(). That means it switched from checking the
subjective credentials of the task to using the objective credentials. I
couldn't find the original lkml thread and so I don't know why this switch
was done. But it seems wrong since ptrace_has_cap() is currently only used
in ptrace_may_access(). And it's used to check whether the calling task
(subject) has the CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability in the provided user namespace
to operate on the target task (object). According to the cred.h comments
this would mean the subjective credentials of the calling task need to be
used.
This switches it to use security_capable() because we only call
ptrace_has_cap() in ptrace_may_access() and in there we already have a
stable reference to the calling tasks creds under rcu_read_lock() so
there's no need to go through another series of dereferences and rcu
locking done in ns_capable{_noaudit}().
As one example where this might be particularly problematic, Jann pointed
out that in combination with the upcoming IORING_OP_OPENAT feature, this
bug might allow unprivileged users to bypass the capability checks while
asynchronously opening files like /proc/*/mem, because the capability
checks for this would be performed against kernel credentials.
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis(a)redhat.com>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge(a)hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com>
Fixes: 69f594a38967 ("ptrace: do not audit capability check when outputing /proc/pid/stat")
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner(a)ubuntu.com>
---
/* v1 */
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200115171736.16994-1-christian.brauner@ubuntu.c…
/* v2 */
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200116224518.30598-1-christian.brauner@ubuntu.c…
- Christian Brauner <christian.brauner(a)ubuntu.com>:
- fix incorrect CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT, CAPT_OPT_NONE order
/* v3 */
- Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org>:
- remove misleading reference to cread guard mutex from commit message
- replace if-branches with ternary ?: operator
---
kernel/ptrace.c | 14 +++++++-------
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
index cb9ddcc08119..6eb3ccf180e0 100644
--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -264,12 +264,12 @@ static int ptrace_check_attach(struct task_struct *child, bool ignore_state)
return ret;
}
-static int ptrace_has_cap(struct user_namespace *ns, unsigned int mode)
+static int ptrace_has_cap(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
+ unsigned int mode)
{
- if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT)
- return has_ns_capability_noaudit(current, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE);
- else
- return has_ns_capability(current, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE);
+ return security_capable(cred, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE,
+ (mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) ? CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT :
+ CAP_OPT_NONE);
}
/* Returns 0 on success, -errno on denial. */
@@ -321,7 +321,7 @@ static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
gid_eq(caller_gid, tcred->sgid) &&
gid_eq(caller_gid, tcred->gid))
goto ok;
- if (ptrace_has_cap(tcred->user_ns, mode))
+ if (ptrace_has_cap(cred, tcred->user_ns, mode))
goto ok;
rcu_read_unlock();
return -EPERM;
@@ -340,7 +340,7 @@ static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
mm = task->mm;
if (mm &&
((get_dumpable(mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER) &&
- !ptrace_has_cap(mm->user_ns, mode)))
+ !ptrace_has_cap(cred, mm->user_ns, mode)))
return -EPERM;
return security_ptrace_access_check(task, mode);
base-commit: b3a987b0264d3ddbb24293ebff10eddfc472f653
--
2.25.0
Commit 69f594a38967 ("ptrace: do not audit capability check when outputing /proc/pid/stat")
introduced the ability to opt out of audit messages for accesses to
various proc files since they are not violations of policy.
While doing so it somehow switched the check from ns_capable() to
has_ns_capability{_noaudit}(). That means it switched from checking the
subjective credentials of the task to using the objective credentials. I
couldn't find the original lkml thread and so I don't know why this switch
was done. But it seems wrong since ptrace_has_cap() is currently only used
in ptrace_may_access(). And it's used to check whether the calling task
(subject) has the CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability in the provided user namespace
to operate on the target task (object). According to the cred.h comments
this would mean the subjective credentials of the calling task need to be
used.
This switches it to use security_capable() because we only call
ptrace_has_cap() in ptrace_may_access() and in there we already have a
stable reference to the calling tasks creds under cred_guard_mutex so
there's no need to go through another series of dereferences and rcu
locking done in ns_capable{_noaudit}().
As one example where this might be particularly problematic, Jann pointed
out that in combination with the upcoming IORING_OP_OPENAT feature, this
bug might allow unprivileged users to bypass the capability checks while
asynchronously opening files like /proc/*/mem, because the capability
checks for this would be performed against kernel credentials.
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis(a)redhat.com>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge(a)hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com>
Fixes: 69f594a38967 ("ptrace: do not audit capability check when outputing /proc/pid/stat")
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner(a)ubuntu.com>
---
kernel/ptrace.c | 11 ++++++-----
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
index cb9ddcc08119..d146133e97f1 100644
--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -264,12 +264,13 @@ static int ptrace_check_attach(struct task_struct *child, bool ignore_state)
return ret;
}
-static int ptrace_has_cap(struct user_namespace *ns, unsigned int mode)
+static int ptrace_has_cap(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
+ unsigned int mode)
{
if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT)
- return has_ns_capability_noaudit(current, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE);
+ return security_capable(cred, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT);
else
- return has_ns_capability(current, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE);
+ return security_capable(cred, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, CAP_OPT_NONE);
}
/* Returns 0 on success, -errno on denial. */
@@ -321,7 +322,7 @@ static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
gid_eq(caller_gid, tcred->sgid) &&
gid_eq(caller_gid, tcred->gid))
goto ok;
- if (ptrace_has_cap(tcred->user_ns, mode))
+ if (ptrace_has_cap(cred, tcred->user_ns, mode))
goto ok;
rcu_read_unlock();
return -EPERM;
@@ -340,7 +341,7 @@ static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
mm = task->mm;
if (mm &&
((get_dumpable(mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER) &&
- !ptrace_has_cap(mm->user_ns, mode)))
+ !ptrace_has_cap(cred, mm->user_ns, mode)))
return -EPERM;
return security_ptrace_access_check(task, mode);
base-commit: b3a987b0264d3ddbb24293ebff10eddfc472f653
--
2.25.0
Hello,
We ran automated tests on a recent commit from this kernel tree:
Kernel repo: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
Commit: 3c8b6cdc962e - Linux 5.4.13-rc1
The results of these automated tests are provided below.
Overall result: PASSED
Merge: OK
Compile: OK
Tests: OK
All kernel binaries, config files, and logs are available for download here:
https://artifacts.cki-project.org/pipelines/387541
Please reply to this email if you have any questions about the tests that we
ran or if you have any suggestions on how to make future tests more effective.
,-. ,-.
( C ) ( K ) Continuous
`-',-.`-' Kernel
( I ) Integration
`-'
______________________________________________________________________________
Compile testing
---------------
We compiled the kernel for 3 architectures:
aarch64:
make options: -j30 INSTALL_MOD_STRIP=1 targz-pkg
ppc64le:
make options: -j30 INSTALL_MOD_STRIP=1 targz-pkg
x86_64:
make options: -j30 INSTALL_MOD_STRIP=1 targz-pkg
Hardware testing
----------------
We booted each kernel and ran the following tests:
aarch64:
Host 1:
✅ Boot test
✅ Podman system integration test (as root)
✅ Podman system integration test (as user)
✅ LTP
✅ Loopdev Sanity
✅ Memory function: memfd_create
✅ AMTU (Abstract Machine Test Utility)
✅ Networking bridge: sanity
✅ Ethernet drivers sanity
✅ Networking MACsec: sanity
✅ Networking socket: fuzz
✅ Networking sctp-auth: sockopts test
✅ Networking: igmp conformance test
✅ Networking route: pmtu
✅ Networking route_func: local
✅ Networking route_func: forward
✅ Networking TCP: keepalive test
✅ Networking UDP: socket
✅ Networking tunnel: geneve basic test
✅ Networking tunnel: gre basic
✅ L2TP basic test
✅ Networking tunnel: vxlan basic
✅ Networking ipsec: basic netns transport
✅ Networking ipsec: basic netns tunnel
✅ audit: audit testsuite test
✅ httpd: mod_ssl smoke sanity
✅ tuned: tune-processes-through-perf
✅ ALSA PCM loopback test
✅ ALSA Control (mixer) Userspace Element test
✅ storage: SCSI VPD
✅ trace: ftrace/tracer
🚧 ✅ CIFS Connectathon
🚧 ✅ POSIX pjd-fstest suites
🚧 ✅ jvm test suite
🚧 ✅ Memory function: kaslr
🚧 ✅ LTP: openposix test suite
🚧 ✅ Networking vnic: ipvlan/basic
🚧 ✅ iotop: sanity
🚧 ✅ Usex - version 1.9-29
🚧 ✅ storage: dm/common
Host 2:
⚡ Internal infrastructure issues prevented one or more tests (marked
with ⚡⚡⚡) from running on this architecture.
This is not the fault of the kernel that was tested.
✅ Boot test
✅ xfstests: ext4
✅ xfstests: xfs
✅ selinux-policy: serge-testsuite
✅ lvm thinp sanity
⚡⚡⚡ storage: software RAID testing
⚡⚡⚡ stress: stress-ng
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ IPMI driver test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ IPMItool loop stress test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Storage blktests
Host 3:
✅ Boot test
✅ xfstests: ext4
✅ xfstests: xfs
✅ selinux-policy: serge-testsuite
✅ lvm thinp sanity
✅ storage: software RAID testing
✅ stress: stress-ng
🚧 ✅ IPMI driver test
🚧 ✅ IPMItool loop stress test
🚧 ✅ Storage blktests
ppc64le:
Host 1:
⚡ Internal infrastructure issues prevented one or more tests (marked
with ⚡⚡⚡) from running on this architecture.
This is not the fault of the kernel that was tested.
⚡⚡⚡ Boot test
⚡⚡⚡ xfstests: ext4
⚡⚡⚡ xfstests: xfs
⚡⚡⚡ selinux-policy: serge-testsuite
⚡⚡⚡ lvm thinp sanity
⚡⚡⚡ storage: software RAID testing
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ IPMI driver test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ IPMItool loop stress test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Storage blktests
Host 2:
⚡ Internal infrastructure issues prevented one or more tests (marked
with ⚡⚡⚡) from running on this architecture.
This is not the fault of the kernel that was tested.
⚡⚡⚡ Boot test
⚡⚡⚡ Podman system integration test (as root)
⚡⚡⚡ Podman system integration test (as user)
⚡⚡⚡ LTP
⚡⚡⚡ Loopdev Sanity
⚡⚡⚡ Memory function: memfd_create
⚡⚡⚡ AMTU (Abstract Machine Test Utility)
⚡⚡⚡ Networking bridge: sanity
⚡⚡⚡ Ethernet drivers sanity
⚡⚡⚡ Networking MACsec: sanity
⚡⚡⚡ Networking socket: fuzz
⚡⚡⚡ Networking sctp-auth: sockopts test
⚡⚡⚡ Networking route: pmtu
⚡⚡⚡ Networking route_func: local
⚡⚡⚡ Networking route_func: forward
⚡⚡⚡ Networking TCP: keepalive test
⚡⚡⚡ Networking UDP: socket
⚡⚡⚡ Networking tunnel: geneve basic test
⚡⚡⚡ Networking tunnel: gre basic
⚡⚡⚡ L2TP basic test
⚡⚡⚡ Networking tunnel: vxlan basic
⚡⚡⚡ Networking ipsec: basic netns tunnel
⚡⚡⚡ audit: audit testsuite test
⚡⚡⚡ httpd: mod_ssl smoke sanity
⚡⚡⚡ tuned: tune-processes-through-perf
⚡⚡⚡ ALSA PCM loopback test
⚡⚡⚡ ALSA Control (mixer) Userspace Element test
⚡⚡⚡ trace: ftrace/tracer
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ CIFS Connectathon
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ POSIX pjd-fstest suites
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ jvm test suite
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Memory function: kaslr
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ LTP: openposix test suite
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Networking vnic: ipvlan/basic
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ iotop: sanity
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Usex - version 1.9-29
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ storage: dm/common
Host 3:
✅ Boot test
✅ Podman system integration test (as root)
✅ Podman system integration test (as user)
✅ LTP
✅ Loopdev Sanity
✅ Memory function: memfd_create
✅ AMTU (Abstract Machine Test Utility)
✅ Networking bridge: sanity
✅ Ethernet drivers sanity
✅ Networking MACsec: sanity
✅ Networking socket: fuzz
✅ Networking sctp-auth: sockopts test
✅ Networking route: pmtu
✅ Networking route_func: local
✅ Networking route_func: forward
✅ Networking TCP: keepalive test
✅ Networking UDP: socket
✅ Networking tunnel: geneve basic test
✅ Networking tunnel: gre basic
✅ L2TP basic test
✅ Networking tunnel: vxlan basic
✅ Networking ipsec: basic netns tunnel
✅ audit: audit testsuite test
✅ httpd: mod_ssl smoke sanity
✅ tuned: tune-processes-through-perf
✅ ALSA PCM loopback test
✅ ALSA Control (mixer) Userspace Element test
✅ trace: ftrace/tracer
🚧 ✅ CIFS Connectathon
🚧 ✅ POSIX pjd-fstest suites
🚧 ✅ jvm test suite
🚧 ✅ Memory function: kaslr
🚧 ✅ LTP: openposix test suite
🚧 ✅ Networking vnic: ipvlan/basic
🚧 ✅ iotop: sanity
🚧 ✅ Usex - version 1.9-29
🚧 ✅ storage: dm/common
Host 4:
✅ Boot test
✅ xfstests: ext4
✅ xfstests: xfs
✅ selinux-policy: serge-testsuite
✅ lvm thinp sanity
✅ storage: software RAID testing
🚧 ✅ IPMI driver test
🚧 ✅ IPMItool loop stress test
🚧 ✅ Storage blktests
x86_64:
Host 1:
⏱ Boot test
⏱ Storage SAN device stress - mpt3sas driver
Host 2:
⚡ Internal infrastructure issues prevented one or more tests (marked
with ⚡⚡⚡) from running on this architecture.
This is not the fault of the kernel that was tested.
✅ Boot test
✅ xfstests: ext4
✅ xfstests: xfs
✅ selinux-policy: serge-testsuite
✅ lvm thinp sanity
✅ storage: software RAID testing
✅ stress: stress-ng
🚧 ✅ IOMMU boot test
🚧 ✅ IPMI driver test
🚧 ✅ IPMItool loop stress test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Storage blktests
Host 3:
⏱ Boot test
⏱ Storage SAN device stress - megaraid_sas
Host 4:
✅ Boot test
✅ Podman system integration test (as root)
✅ Podman system integration test (as user)
✅ LTP
✅ Loopdev Sanity
✅ Memory function: memfd_create
✅ AMTU (Abstract Machine Test Utility)
✅ Networking bridge: sanity
✅ Ethernet drivers sanity
✅ Networking MACsec: sanity
✅ Networking socket: fuzz
✅ Networking sctp-auth: sockopts test
✅ Networking: igmp conformance test
✅ Networking route: pmtu
✅ Networking route_func: local
✅ Networking route_func: forward
✅ Networking TCP: keepalive test
✅ Networking UDP: socket
✅ Networking tunnel: geneve basic test
✅ Networking tunnel: gre basic
✅ L2TP basic test
✅ Networking tunnel: vxlan basic
✅ Networking ipsec: basic netns transport
✅ Networking ipsec: basic netns tunnel
✅ audit: audit testsuite test
✅ httpd: mod_ssl smoke sanity
✅ tuned: tune-processes-through-perf
✅ pciutils: sanity smoke test
✅ ALSA PCM loopback test
✅ ALSA Control (mixer) Userspace Element test
✅ storage: SCSI VPD
✅ trace: ftrace/tracer
🚧 ✅ CIFS Connectathon
🚧 ✅ POSIX pjd-fstest suites
🚧 ✅ jvm test suite
🚧 ✅ Memory function: kaslr
🚧 ✅ LTP: openposix test suite
🚧 ✅ Networking vnic: ipvlan/basic
🚧 ✅ iotop: sanity
🚧 ✅ Usex - version 1.9-29
🚧 ✅ storage: dm/common
Test sources: https://github.com/CKI-project/tests-beaker
💚 Pull requests are welcome for new tests or improvements to existing tests!
Waived tests
------------
If the test run included waived tests, they are marked with 🚧. Such tests are
executed but their results are not taken into account. Tests are waived when
their results are not reliable enough, e.g. when they're just introduced or are
being fixed.
Testing timeout
---------------
We aim to provide a report within reasonable timeframe. Tests that haven't
finished running are marked with ⏱. Reports for non-upstream kernels have
a Beaker recipe linked to next to each host.
From: Sean Paul <seanpaul(a)chromium.org>
On HDCP disable, clear the repeater bit. This ensures if we connect a
non-repeater sink after a repeater, the bit is in the state we expect.
Fixes: ee5e5e7a5e0f (drm/i915: Add HDCP framework + base implementation)
Cc: Chris Wilson <chris(a)chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Ramalingam C <ramalingam.c(a)intel.com>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter(a)ffwll.ch>
Cc: Sean Paul <seanpaul(a)chromium.org>
Cc: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula(a)linux.intel.com>
Cc: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen(a)linux.intel.com>
Cc: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi(a)intel.com>
Cc: intel-gfx(a)lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v4.17+
Reviewed-by: Ramalingam C <ramalingam.c(a)intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Paul <seanpaul(a)chromium.org>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20191212190230.188505-3-sean@… #v2
Changes in v2:
-Added to the set
Changes in v3:
-None
I had previously agreed that clearing the rep_ctl bits on enable would
also be a good idea. However when I committed that idea to code, it
didn't look right. So let's rely on enables and disables being paired
and everything outside of that will be considered a bug
---
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_hdcp.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_hdcp.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_hdcp.c
index eaab9008feef..c4394c8e10eb 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_hdcp.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_hdcp.c
@@ -773,6 +773,7 @@ static int _intel_hdcp_disable(struct intel_connector *connector)
struct intel_digital_port *intel_dig_port = conn_to_dig_port(connector);
enum port port = intel_dig_port->base.port;
enum transcoder cpu_transcoder = hdcp->cpu_transcoder;
+ u32 repeater_ctl;
int ret;
DRM_DEBUG_KMS("[%s:%d] HDCP is being disabled...\n",
@@ -787,6 +788,10 @@ static int _intel_hdcp_disable(struct intel_connector *connector)
return -ETIMEDOUT;
}
+ repeater_ctl = intel_hdcp_get_repeater_ctl(dev_priv, cpu_transcoder,
+ port);
+ I915_WRITE(HDCP_REP_CTL, I915_READ(HDCP_REP_CTL) & ~repeater_ctl);
+
ret = hdcp->shim->toggle_signalling(intel_dig_port, false);
if (ret) {
DRM_ERROR("Failed to disable HDCP signalling\n");
--
Sean Paul, Software Engineer, Google / Chromium OS