October 2019 - Linux-stable-mirror

[PATCH 3/6] USB: iowarrior: fix use-after-free after driver unbind

by Johan Hovold

Make sure to stop also the asynchronous write URBs on disconnect() to avoid use-after-free in the completion handler after driver unbind. Fixes: 946b960d13c1 ("USB: add driver for iowarrior devices.") Cc: stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # 2.6.21: 51a2f077c44e ("USB: introduce usb_anchor") Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/usb/misc/iowarrior.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/misc/iowarrior.c b/drivers/usb/misc/iowarrior.c index 6841267820c6..f405fa734bcc 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/misc/iowarrior.c +++ b/drivers/usb/misc/iowarrior.c @@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ struct iowarrior { char chip_serial[9]; /* the serial number string of the chip connected */ int report_size; /* number of bytes in a report */ u16 product_id; + struct usb_anchor submitted; }; /*--------------*/ @@ -425,11 +426,13 @@ static ssize_t iowarrior_write(struct file *file, retval = -EFAULT; goto error; } + usb_anchor_urb(int_out_urb, &dev->submitted); retval = usb_submit_urb(int_out_urb, GFP_KERNEL); if (retval) { dev_dbg(&dev->interface->dev, "submit error %d for urb nr.%d\n", retval, atomic_read(&dev->write_busy)); + usb_unanchor_urb(int_out_urb); goto error; } /* submit was ok */ @@ -770,6 +773,8 @@ static int iowarrior_probe(struct usb_interface *interface, iface_desc = interface->cur_altsetting; dev->product_id = le16_to_cpu(udev->descriptor.idProduct); + init_usb_anchor(&dev->submitted); + res = usb_find_last_int_in_endpoint(iface_desc, &dev->int_in_endpoint); if (res) { dev_err(&interface->dev, "no interrupt-in endpoint found\n"); @@ -885,6 +890,7 @@ static void iowarrior_disconnect(struct usb_interface *interface) Deleting the device is postponed until close() was called. */ usb_kill_urb(dev->int_in_urb); + usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&dev->submitted); wake_up_interruptible(&dev->read_wait); wake_up_interruptible(&dev->write_wait); mutex_unlock(&dev->mutex); -- 2.23.0

5 years

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[PATCH 2/6] USB: iowarrior: fix use-after-free on release

by Johan Hovold

The driver was accessing its struct usb_interface from its release() callback without holding a reference. This would lead to a use-after-free whenever debugging was enabled and the device was disconnected while its character device was open. Fixes: 549e83500b80 ("USB: iowarrior: Convert local dbg macro to dev_dbg") Cc: stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # 3.16 Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/usb/misc/iowarrior.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/misc/iowarrior.c b/drivers/usb/misc/iowarrior.c index 4fe1d3267b3c..6841267820c6 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/misc/iowarrior.c +++ b/drivers/usb/misc/iowarrior.c @@ -243,6 +243,7 @@ static inline void iowarrior_delete(struct iowarrior *dev) kfree(dev->int_in_buffer); usb_free_urb(dev->int_in_urb); kfree(dev->read_queue); + usb_put_intf(dev->interface); kfree(dev); } @@ -764,7 +765,7 @@ static int iowarrior_probe(struct usb_interface *interface, init_waitqueue_head(&dev->write_wait); dev->udev = udev; - dev->interface = interface; + dev->interface = usb_get_intf(interface); iface_desc = interface->cur_altsetting; dev->product_id = le16_to_cpu(udev->descriptor.idProduct); -- 2.23.0

5 years

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[PATCH 1/6] USB: iowarrior: fix use-after-free on disconnect

by Johan Hovold

A recent fix addressing a deadlock on disconnect introduced a new bug by moving the present flag out of the critical section protected by the driver-data mutex. This could lead to a racing release() freeing the driver data before disconnect() is done with it. Due to insufficient locking a related use-after-free could be triggered also before the above mentioned commit. Specifically, the driver needs to hold the driver-data mutex also while checking the opened flag at disconnect(). Fixes: c468a8aa790e ("usb: iowarrior: fix deadlock on disconnect") Fixes: 946b960d13c1 ("USB: add driver for iowarrior devices.") Cc: stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # 2.6.21 Reported-by: syzbot+0761012cebf7bdb38137(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/usb/misc/iowarrior.c | 7 +++---- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/misc/iowarrior.c b/drivers/usb/misc/iowarrior.c index f5bed9f29e56..4fe1d3267b3c 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/misc/iowarrior.c +++ b/drivers/usb/misc/iowarrior.c @@ -866,8 +866,6 @@ static void iowarrior_disconnect(struct usb_interface *interface) dev = usb_get_intfdata(interface); mutex_lock(&iowarrior_open_disc_lock); usb_set_intfdata(interface, NULL); - /* prevent device read, write and ioctl */ - dev->present = 0; minor = dev->minor; mutex_unlock(&iowarrior_open_disc_lock); @@ -878,8 +876,7 @@ static void iowarrior_disconnect(struct usb_interface *interface) mutex_lock(&dev->mutex); /* prevent device read, write and ioctl */ - - mutex_unlock(&dev->mutex); + dev->present = 0; if (dev->opened) { /* There is a process that holds a filedescriptor to the device , @@ -889,8 +886,10 @@ static void iowarrior_disconnect(struct usb_interface *interface) usb_kill_urb(dev->int_in_urb); wake_up_interruptible(&dev->read_wait); wake_up_interruptible(&dev->write_wait); + mutex_unlock(&dev->mutex); } else { /* no process is using the device, cleanup now */ + mutex_unlock(&dev->mutex); iowarrior_delete(dev); } -- 2.23.0

5 years

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[PATCH for-4.19 1/4] staging: erofs: fix an error handling in erofs_readdir()

by Gao Xiang

commit acb383f1dcb4f1e79b66d4be3a0b6f519a957b0d upstream. Richard observed a forever loop of erofs_read_raw_page() [1] which can be generated by forcely setting ->u.i_blkaddr to 0xdeadbeef (as my understanding block layer can handle access beyond end of device correctly). After digging into that, it seems the problem is highly related with directories and then I found the root cause is an improper error handling in erofs_readdir(). Let's fix it now. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/1163995781.68824.1566084358245.JavaMail.zimbra@no… Reported-by: Richard Weinberger <richard(a)nod.at> Fixes: 3aa8ec716e52 ("staging: erofs: add directory operations") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # 4.19+ Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Gao Xiang <gaoxiang25(a)huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190818125457.25906-1-hsiangkao@aol.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> [ Gao Xiang: Since earlier kernels don't define EFSCORRUPTED, let's use original error code instead. ] Signed-off-by: Gao Xiang <gaoxiang25(a)huawei.com> --- Compared with 5.3.y series, "staging: erofs: avoid endless loop of invalid lookback distance 0" isn't included in this series since 4.19 is quite different from the current code, no simple fix for this (used for corruptted images). I will try a full fix later. drivers/staging/erofs/dir.c | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/staging/erofs/dir.c b/drivers/staging/erofs/dir.c index 0a089cf5c78f..fe6683effd05 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/erofs/dir.c +++ b/drivers/staging/erofs/dir.c @@ -100,8 +100,15 @@ static int erofs_readdir(struct file *f, struct dir_context *ctx) unsigned nameoff, maxsize; dentry_page = read_mapping_page(mapping, i, NULL); - if (IS_ERR(dentry_page)) - continue; + if (dentry_page == ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM)) { + err = -ENOMEM; + break; + } else if (IS_ERR(dentry_page)) { + errln("fail to readdir of logical block %u of nid %llu", + i, EROFS_V(dir)->nid); + err = PTR_ERR(dentry_page); + break; + } lock_page(dentry_page); de = (struct erofs_dirent *)kmap(dentry_page); -- 2.17.1

5 years

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[PATCH for-5.3 1/5] staging: erofs: fix an error handling in erofs_readdir()

by Gao Xiang

commit acb383f1dcb4f1e79b66d4be3a0b6f519a957b0d upstream. Richard observed a forever loop of erofs_read_raw_page() [1] which can be generated by forcely setting ->u.i_blkaddr to 0xdeadbeef (as my understanding block layer can handle access beyond end of device correctly). After digging into that, it seems the problem is highly related with directories and then I found the root cause is an improper error handling in erofs_readdir(). Let's fix it now. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/1163995781.68824.1566084358245.JavaMail.zimbra@no… Reported-by: Richard Weinberger <richard(a)nod.at> Fixes: 3aa8ec716e52 ("staging: erofs: add directory operations") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # 4.19+ Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Gao Xiang <gaoxiang25(a)huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190818125457.25906-1-hsiangkao@aol.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> [ Gao Xiang: Since earlier kernels don't define EFSCORRUPTED, let's use original error code instead. ] Signed-off-by: Gao Xiang <gaoxiang25(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/staging/erofs/dir.c | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/staging/erofs/dir.c b/drivers/staging/erofs/dir.c index dbf6a151886c..b11cecd0a21d 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/erofs/dir.c +++ b/drivers/staging/erofs/dir.c @@ -99,8 +99,15 @@ static int erofs_readdir(struct file *f, struct dir_context *ctx) unsigned int nameoff, maxsize; dentry_page = read_mapping_page(mapping, i, NULL); - if (IS_ERR(dentry_page)) - continue; + if (dentry_page == ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM)) { + err = -ENOMEM; + break; + } else if (IS_ERR(dentry_page)) { + errln("fail to readdir of logical block %u of nid %llu", + i, EROFS_V(dir)->nid); + err = PTR_ERR(dentry_page); + break; + } de = (struct erofs_dirent *)kmap(dentry_page); -- 2.17.1

5 years

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[PATCH v2] PCI: rcar: Fix writing the MACCTLR register value

by Yoshihiro Shimoda

According to the R-Car Gen2/3 manual, the bit 0 of MACCTLR register should be written to 0 because the register is set to 1 on reset. To avoid unexpected behaviors from this incorrect setting, this patch fixes it. Fixes: b3327f7fae66 ("PCI: rcar: Try increasing PCIe link speed to 5 GT/s at boot") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v4.9+ Signed-off-by: Yoshihiro Shimoda <yoshihiro.shimoda.uh(a)renesas.com> Reviewed-by: Sergei Shtylyov <sergei.shtylyov(a)cogentembedded.com> --- Changes from v1: - Fix commit log. - Add Sergei-san's Reviewed-by. https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11179279/ drivers/pci/controller/pcie-rcar.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/pci/controller/pcie-rcar.c b/drivers/pci/controller/pcie-rcar.c index f6a669a..9eb9b25 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/controller/pcie-rcar.c +++ b/drivers/pci/controller/pcie-rcar.c @@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ #define LINK_SPEED_2_5GTS (1 << 16) #define LINK_SPEED_5_0GTS (2 << 16) #define MACCTLR 0x011058 +#define MACCTLR_RESERVED BIT(0) #define SPEED_CHANGE BIT(24) #define SCRAMBLE_DISABLE BIT(27) #define PMSR 0x01105c @@ -427,7 +428,8 @@ static void rcar_pcie_force_speedup(struct rcar_pcie *pcie) rcar_pci_write_reg(pcie, macsr, MACSR); /* Start link speed change */ - rcar_rmw32(pcie, MACCTLR, SPEED_CHANGE, SPEED_CHANGE); + rcar_rmw32(pcie, MACCTLR, SPEED_CHANGE | MACCTLR_RESERVED, + SPEED_CHANGE); while (timeout--) { macsr = rcar_pci_read_reg(pcie, MACSR); -- 2.7.4

5 years

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[PATCH] coresight: etm4x: Use explicit barriers on enable/disable

by Mathieu Poirier

From: Andrew Murray <andrew.murray(a)arm.com> commit 1004ce4c255fc3eb3ad9145ddd53547d1b7ce327 upstream Synchronization is recommended before disabling the trace registers to prevent any start or stop points being speculative at the point of disabling the unit (section 7.3.77 of ARM IHI 0064D). Synchronization is also recommended after programming the trace registers to ensure all updates are committed prior to normal code resuming (section 4.3.7 of ARM IHI 0064D). Let's ensure these syncronization points are present in the code and clearly commented. Note that we could rely on the barriers in CS_LOCK and coresight_disclaim_device_unlocked or the context switch to user space - however coresight may be of use in the kernel. On armv8 the mb macro is defined as dsb(sy) - Given that the etm4x is only used on armv8 let's directly use dsb(sy) instead of mb(). This removes some ambiguity and makes it easier to correlate the code with the TRM. Signed-off-by: Andrew Murray <andrew.murray(a)arm.com> Reviewed-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose(a)arm.com> [Fixed capital letter for "use" in title] Signed-off-by: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier(a)linaro.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190829202842.580-11-mathieu.poirier@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 4.9+ Signed-off-by: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier(a)linaro.org> --- drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm4x.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm4x.c b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm4x.c index da27f8edba50..44d6c29e2644 100644 --- a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm4x.c +++ b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm4x.c @@ -181,6 +181,12 @@ static void etm4_enable_hw(void *info) if (coresight_timeout(drvdata->base, TRCSTATR, TRCSTATR_IDLE_BIT, 0)) dev_err(drvdata->dev, "timeout while waiting for Idle Trace Status\n"); + /* + * As recommended by section 4.3.7 ("Synchronization when using the + * memory-mapped interface") of ARM IHI 0064D + */ + dsb(sy); + isb(); CS_LOCK(drvdata->base); @@ -323,8 +329,12 @@ static void etm4_disable_hw(void *info) /* EN, bit[0] Trace unit enable bit */ control &= ~0x1; - /* make sure everything completes before disabling */ - mb(); + /* + * Make sure everything completes before disabling, as recommended + * by section 7.3.77 ("TRCVICTLR, ViewInst Main Control Register, + * SSTATUS") of ARM IHI 0064D + */ + dsb(sy); isb(); writel_relaxed(control, drvdata->base + TRCPRGCTLR); -- 2.17.1

5 years

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[PATCH for-stable-4.19] arm64/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option

by Ard Biesheuvel

From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> [ Upstream commit a111b7c0f20e13b54df2fa959b3dc0bdf1925ae6 ] Configure arm64 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option. This affects Meltdown, Spectre v2, and Speculative Store Bypass. The default behavior is unchanged. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> [will: reorder checks so KASLR implies KPTI and SSBS is affected by cmdline] Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon(a)arm.com> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel(a)linaro.org> --- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 8 +++++--- arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 6 +++++- arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 8 +++++++- 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index cc2f5c9a8161..16607b178b47 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -2503,8 +2503,8 @@ http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git mitigations= - [X86,PPC,S390] Control optional mitigations for CPU - vulnerabilities. This is a set of curated, + [X86,PPC,S390,ARM64] Control optional mitigations for + CPU vulnerabilities. This is a set of curated, arch-independent options, each of which is an aggregation of existing arch-specific options. @@ -2513,12 +2513,14 @@ improves system performance, but it may also expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities. Equivalent to: nopti [X86,PPC] + kpti=0 [ARM64] nospectre_v1 [PPC] nobp=0 [S390] nospectre_v1 [X86] - nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390] + nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390,ARM64] spectre_v2_user=off [X86] spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC] + ssbd=force-off [ARM64] l1tf=off [X86] mds=off [X86] diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c index c623b58a7e2b..e53d7f2edcdb 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ #include <linux/arm-smccc.h> #include <linux/psci.h> #include <linux/types.h> +#include <linux/cpu.h> #include <asm/cpu.h> #include <asm/cputype.h> #include <asm/cpufeature.h> @@ -355,6 +356,9 @@ static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible()); + if (cpu_mitigations_off()) + ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE; + /* delay setting __ssb_safe until we get a firmware response */ if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), entry->midr_range_list)) this_cpu_safe = true; @@ -572,7 +576,7 @@ check_branch_predictor(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope) } /* forced off */ - if (__nospectre_v2) { + if (__nospectre_v2 || cpu_mitigations_off()) { pr_info_once("spectrev2 mitigation disabled by command line option\n"); __hardenbp_enab = false; return false; diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c index e93bbadc0cf1..04e660debd42 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ #include <linux/stop_machine.h> #include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/mm.h> +#include <linux/cpu.h> #include <asm/cpu.h> #include <asm/cpufeature.h> #include <asm/cpu_ops.h> @@ -907,7 +908,7 @@ static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A73), { /* sentinel */ } }; - char const *str = "command line option"; + char const *str = "kpti command line option"; bool meltdown_safe; meltdown_safe = is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), kpti_safe_list); @@ -937,6 +938,11 @@ static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, } } + if (cpu_mitigations_off() && !__kpti_forced) { + str = "mitigations=off"; + __kpti_forced = -1; + } + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0)) { pr_info_once("kernel page table isolation disabled by kernel configuration\n"); return false; -- 2.20.1

5 years

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[PATCH for-stable-4.19] arm64: Use firmware to detect CPUs that are not affected by Spectre-v2

by Ard Biesheuvel

From: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier(a)arm.com> [ Upstream commit 517953c2c47f9c00a002f588ac856a5bc70cede3 ] The SMCCC ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 service can indicate that although the firmware knows about the Spectre-v2 mitigation, this particular CPU is not vulnerable, and it is thus not necessary to call the firmware on this CPU. Let's use this information to our benefit. Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier(a)arm.com> Signed-off-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton(a)arm.com> Reviewed-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara(a)arm.com> Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas(a)arm.com> Tested-by: Stefan Wahren <stefan.wahren(a)i2se.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon(a)arm.com> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel(a)linaro.org> --- arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 32 ++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c index a9ad932160cc..c623b58a7e2b 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c @@ -198,22 +198,36 @@ static int detect_harden_bp_fw(void) case PSCI_CONDUIT_HVC: arm_smccc_1_1_hvc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID, ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, &res); - if ((int)res.a0 < 0) + switch ((int)res.a0) { + case 1: + /* Firmware says we're just fine */ + return 0; + case 0: + cb = call_hvc_arch_workaround_1; + /* This is a guest, no need to patch KVM vectors */ + smccc_start = NULL; + smccc_end = NULL; + break; + default: return -1; - cb = call_hvc_arch_workaround_1; - /* This is a guest, no need to patch KVM vectors */ - smccc_start = NULL; - smccc_end = NULL; + } break; case PSCI_CONDUIT_SMC: arm_smccc_1_1_smc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID, ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, &res); - if ((int)res.a0 < 0) + switch ((int)res.a0) { + case 1: + /* Firmware says we're just fine */ + return 0; + case 0: + cb = call_smc_arch_workaround_1; + smccc_start = __smccc_workaround_1_smc_start; + smccc_end = __smccc_workaround_1_smc_end; + break; + default: return -1; - cb = call_smc_arch_workaround_1; - smccc_start = __smccc_workaround_1_smc_start; - smccc_end = __smccc_workaround_1_smc_end; + } break; default: -- 2.20.1

5 years

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[PATCH 4.4, 4.9] crypto: caam - fix concurrency issue in givencrypt descriptor

by Horia Geantă

commit 48f89d2a2920166c35b1c0b69917dbb0390ebec7 upstream. IV transfer from ofifo to class2 (set up at [29][30]) is not guaranteed to be scheduled before the data transfer from ofifo to external memory (set up at [38]: [29] 10FA0004 ld: ind-nfifo (len=4) imm [30] 81F00010 <nfifo_entry: ofifo->class2 type=msg len=16> [31] 14820004 ld: ccb2-datasz len=4 offs=0 imm [32] 00000010 data:0x00000010 [33] 8210010D operation: cls1-op aes cbc init-final enc [34] A8080B04 math: (seqin + math0)->vseqout len=4 [35] 28000010 seqfifold: skip len=16 [36] A8080A04 math: (seqin + math0)->vseqin len=4 [37] 2F1E0000 seqfifold: both msg1->2-last2-last1 len=vseqinsz [38] 69300000 seqfifostr: msg len=vseqoutsz [39] 5C20000C seqstr: ccb2 ctx len=12 offs=0 If ofifo -> external memory transfer happens first, DECO will hang (issuing a Watchdog Timeout error, if WDOG is enabled) waiting for data availability in ofifo for the ofifo -> c2 ififo transfer. Make sure IV transfer happens first by waiting for all CAAM internal transfers to end before starting payload transfer. New descriptor with jump command inserted at [37]: [..] [36] A8080A04 math: (seqin + math0)->vseqin len=4 [37] A1000401 jump: jsl1 all-match[!nfifopend] offset=[01] local->[38] [38] 2F1E0000 seqfifold: both msg1->2-last2-last1 len=vseqinsz [39] 69300000 seqfifostr: msg len=vseqoutsz [40] 5C20000C seqstr: ccb2 ctx len=12 offs=0 [Note: the issue is present in the descriptor from the very beginning (cf. Fixes tag). However I've marked it v4.19+ since it's the oldest maintained kernel that the patch applies clean against.] Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v4.19+ Fixes: 1acebad3d8db8 ("crypto: caam - faster aead implementation") Signed-off-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta(a)nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> [Horia: backport to v4.4, v4.9] Signed-off-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta(a)nxp.com> --- drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c | 11 ++++++++++- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c index f8ac768ed5d7..413e1f35773f 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c @@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ #define DESC_AEAD_BASE (4 * CAAM_CMD_SZ) #define DESC_AEAD_ENC_LEN (DESC_AEAD_BASE + 11 * CAAM_CMD_SZ) #define DESC_AEAD_DEC_LEN (DESC_AEAD_BASE + 15 * CAAM_CMD_SZ) -#define DESC_AEAD_GIVENC_LEN (DESC_AEAD_ENC_LEN + 9 * CAAM_CMD_SZ) +#define DESC_AEAD_GIVENC_LEN (DESC_AEAD_ENC_LEN + 10 * CAAM_CMD_SZ) /* Note: Nonce is counted in enckeylen */ #define DESC_AEAD_CTR_RFC3686_LEN (4 * CAAM_CMD_SZ) @@ -474,6 +474,7 @@ static int aead_set_sh_desc(struct crypto_aead *aead) u32 geniv, moveiv; u32 ctx1_iv_off = 0; u32 *desc; + u32 *wait_cmd; const bool ctr_mode = ((ctx->class1_alg_type & OP_ALG_AAI_MASK) == OP_ALG_AAI_CTR_MOD128); const bool is_rfc3686 = alg->caam.rfc3686; @@ -736,6 +737,14 @@ static int aead_set_sh_desc(struct crypto_aead *aead) /* Will read cryptlen */ append_math_add(desc, VARSEQINLEN, SEQINLEN, REG0, CAAM_CMD_SZ); + + /* + * Wait for IV transfer (ofifo -> class2) to finish before starting + * ciphertext transfer (ofifo -> external memory). + */ + wait_cmd = append_jump(desc, JUMP_JSL | JUMP_TEST_ALL | JUMP_COND_NIFP); + set_jump_tgt_here(desc, wait_cmd); + append_seq_fifo_load(desc, 0, FIFOLD_CLASS_BOTH | KEY_VLF | FIFOLD_TYPE_MSG1OUT2 | FIFOLD_TYPE_LASTBOTH); append_seq_fifo_store(desc, 0, FIFOST_TYPE_MESSAGE_DATA | KEY_VLF); -- 2.17.1

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Linux-stable-mirror October 2019