November 2018 - Linux-stable-mirror

[PATCH 4.4/4.9] configfs: replace strncpy with memcpy

by Nobuhiro Iwamatsu

From: Guenter Roeck <linux(a)roeck-us.net> commit 1823342a1f2b47a4e6f5667f67cd28ab6bc4d6cd upstream. gcc 8.1.0 complains: fs/configfs/symlink.c:67:3: warning: 'strncpy' output truncated before terminating nul copying as many bytes from a string as its length fs/configfs/symlink.c: In function 'configfs_get_link': fs/configfs/symlink.c:63:13: note: length computed here Using strncpy() is indeed less than perfect since the length of data to be copied has already been determined with strlen(). Replace strncpy() with memcpy() to address the warning and optimize the code a little. Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux(a)roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch(a)lst.de> Signed-off-by: Nobuhiro Iwamatsu <nobuhiro.iwamatsu(a)cybertrust.co.jp> --- fs/configfs/symlink.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/configfs/symlink.c b/fs/configfs/symlink.c index 0525ebc3aea2..66e8c5d58b21 100644 --- a/fs/configfs/symlink.c +++ b/fs/configfs/symlink.c @@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ static void fill_item_path(struct config_item * item, char * buffer, int length) /* back up enough to print this bus id with '/' */ length -= cur; - strncpy(buffer + length,config_item_name(p),cur); + memcpy(buffer + length, config_item_name(p), cur); *(buffer + --length) = '/'; } } -- 2.18.0

5 years, 11 months

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[PATCH] xfs: truncate transaction does not modify the inobt

by Amir Goldstein

From: Brian Foster <bfoster(a)redhat.com> The truncate transaction does not ever modify the inode btree, but includes an associated log reservation. Update xfs_calc_itruncate_reservation() to remove the reservation associated with inobt updates. [Amir: This commit was merged for kernel v4.16 and a twin commit was merged for xfsprogs v4.16. As a result, a small xfs filesystem formatted with features -m rmapbt=1,reflink=1 using mkfs.xfs version >= v4.16 cannot be mounted with kernel < v4.16. For example, xfstests generic/17{1,2,3} format a small fs and when trying to mount it, they fail with an assert on this very demonic line: XFS (vdc): Log size 3075 blocks too small, minimum size is 3717 blocks XFS (vdc): AAIEEE! Log failed size checks. Abort! XFS: Assertion failed: 0, file: src/linux/fs/xfs/xfs_log.c, line: 666 The simple solution for stable kernels is to apply this patch, because mkfs.xfs v4.16 is already in the wild, so we have to assume that xfs filesystems with a "too small" log exist. Regardless, xfsprogs maintainers should also consider reverting the twin patch to stop creating those filesystems for the sake of users with unpatched kernels.] Signed-off-by: Brian Foster <bfoster(a)redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner(a)redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong(a)oracle.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v4.9+ Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il(a)gmail.com> --- Darrick/Dave, It took me a while to figure out what was going on with my test systems when small test partitions (10G) stopped working with older kernels. Please bless this change for stable and consider the remedie for mkfs.xfs I verified that patch cleanly applies to stable kernels 4.14.y and 4.9.y and that I can mount a filsystem created with new mkfs.xfs. I am now running quick tests on stable 4.14.y with configs 4k, 1k, reflink,reflink+overlay to verify no regressions from this patch. Thanks, Amir. fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_trans_resv.c | 9 +-------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_trans_resv.c b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_trans_resv.c index 6bd916bd35e2..48eff18c5496 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_trans_resv.c +++ b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_trans_resv.c @@ -232,8 +232,6 @@ xfs_calc_write_reservation( * the super block to reflect the freed blocks: sector size * worst case split in allocation btrees per extent assuming 4 extents: * 4 exts * 2 trees * (2 * max depth - 1) * block size - * the inode btree: max depth * blocksize - * the allocation btrees: 2 trees * (max depth - 1) * block size */ STATIC uint xfs_calc_itruncate_reservation( @@ -245,12 +243,7 @@ xfs_calc_itruncate_reservation( XFS_FSB_TO_B(mp, 1))), (xfs_calc_buf_res(9, mp->m_sb.sb_sectsize) + xfs_calc_buf_res(xfs_allocfree_log_count(mp, 4), - XFS_FSB_TO_B(mp, 1)) + - xfs_calc_buf_res(5, 0) + - xfs_calc_buf_res(xfs_allocfree_log_count(mp, 1), - XFS_FSB_TO_B(mp, 1)) + - xfs_calc_buf_res(2 + mp->m_ialloc_blks + - mp->m_in_maxlevels, 0))); + XFS_FSB_TO_B(mp, 1)))); } /* -- 2.17.1

5 years, 11 months

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[PATCH] libnvdimm: Fix __nd_ioctl() to check error in cmd_rc

by Toshi Kani

ndctl zero-labels completes with a large number of zeroed nmems when it fails to do zeroing on a protected NVDIMM. # ndctl zero-labels nmem1 zeroed 65504 nmems When an ACPI call completes with error, xlat_status() called from acpi_nfit_ctl() sets error to *cmd_rc. __nd_ioctl(), however, does not check this error and returns with success. Fix __nd_ioctl() to check this error in cmd_rc. Fixes: 006358b35c73a ("libnvdimm: add support for clear poison list and badblocks for device dax") Reported-by: Robert Elliott <elliott(a)hpe.com> Signed-off-by: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani(a)hpe.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Cc: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma(a)intel.com> Cc: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang(a)intel.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> --- drivers/nvdimm/bus.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/nvdimm/bus.c b/drivers/nvdimm/bus.c index f1fb39921236..af12817d8a02 100644 --- a/drivers/nvdimm/bus.c +++ b/drivers/nvdimm/bus.c @@ -1050,6 +1050,10 @@ static int __nd_ioctl(struct nvdimm_bus *nvdimm_bus, struct nvdimm *nvdimm, rc = nd_desc->ndctl(nd_desc, nvdimm, cmd, buf, buf_len, &cmd_rc); if (rc < 0) goto out_unlock; + if (cmd_rc < 0) { + rc = cmd_rc; + goto out_unlock; + } if (!nvdimm && cmd == ND_CMD_CLEAR_ERROR && cmd_rc >= 0) { struct nd_cmd_clear_error *clear_err = buf;

5 years, 11 months

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+ ubsan-dont-mark-__ubsan_handle_builtin_unreachable-as-noreturn.patch added to -mm tree

by akpm＠linux-foundation.org

The patch titled Subject: lib/ubsan.c: don't mark __ubsan_handle_builtin_unreachable as noreturn has been added to the -mm tree. Its filename is ubsan-dont-mark-__ubsan_handle_builtin_unreachable-as-noreturn.patch This patch should soon appear at http://ozlabs.org/~akpm/mmots/broken-out/ubsan-dont-mark-__ubsan_handle_bui… and later at http://ozlabs.org/~akpm/mmotm/broken-out/ubsan-dont-mark-__ubsan_handle_bui… Before you just go and hit "reply", please: a) Consider who else should be cc'ed b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's *** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code *** The -mm tree is included into linux-next and is updated there every 3-4 working days ------------------------------------------------------ From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> Subject: lib/ubsan.c: don't mark __ubsan_handle_builtin_unreachable as noreturn gcc-8 complains about the prototype for this function: lib/ubsan.c:432:1: error: ignoring attribute 'noreturn' in declaration of a built-in function '__ubsan_handle_builtin_unreachable' because it conflicts with attribute 'const' [-Werror=attributes] This is actually a GCC's bug. In GCC internals __ubsan_handle_builtin_unreachable() declared with both 'noreturn' and 'const' attributes instead of only 'noreturn': https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=84210 Workaround this by removing the noreturn attribute. [aryabinin: add information about GCC bug in changelog] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181107144516.4587-1-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin(a)virtuozzo.com> Acked-by: Olof Johansson <olof(a)lixom.net> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- lib/ubsan.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/lib/ubsan.c~ubsan-dont-mark-__ubsan_handle_builtin_unreachable-as-noreturn +++ a/lib/ubsan.c @@ -427,8 +427,7 @@ void __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds( EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds); -void __noreturn -__ubsan_handle_builtin_unreachable(struct unreachable_data *data) +void __ubsan_handle_builtin_unreachable(struct unreachable_data *data) { unsigned long flags; _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from arnd(a)arndb.de are ubsan-dont-mark-__ubsan_handle_builtin_unreachable-as-noreturn.patch vfs-replace-current_kernel_time64-with-ktime-equivalent.patch

5 years, 11 months

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[PATCH V2] x86/speculation: Support Enhanced IBRS on future CPUs

by Sai Praneeth Prakhya

From: Sai Praneeth <sai.praneeth.prakhya(a)intel.com> [ Upstream commit 706d51681d636a0c4a5ef53395ec3b803e45ed4d ] Future Intel processors will support "Enhanced IBRS" which is an "always on" mode i.e. IBRS bit in SPEC_CTRL MSR is enabled once and never disabled. >From the specification [1]: "With enhanced IBRS, the predicted targets of indirect branches executed cannot be controlled by software that was executed in a less privileged predictor mode or on another logical processor. As a result, software operating on a processor with enhanced IBRS need not use WRMSR to set IA32_SPEC_CTRL.IBRS after every transition to a more privileged predictor mode. Software can isolate predictor modes effectively simply by setting the bit once. Software need not disable enhanced IBRS prior to entering a sleep state such as MWAIT or HLT." If Enhanced IBRS is supported by the processor then use it as the preferred spectre v2 mitigation mechanism instead of Retpoline. Intel's Retpoline white paper [2] states: "Retpoline is known to be an effective branch target injection (Spectre variant 2) mitigation on Intel processors belonging to family 6 (enumerated by the CPUID instruction) that do not have support for enhanced IBRS. On processors that support enhanced IBRS, it should be used for mitigation instead of retpoline." The reason why Enhanced IBRS is the recommended mitigation on processors which support it is that these processors also support CET which provides a defense against ROP attacks. Retpoline is very similar to ROP techniques and might trigger false positives in the CET defense. If Enhanced IBRS is selected as the mitigation technique for spectre v2, the IBRS bit in SPEC_CTRL MSR is set once at boot time and never cleared. Kernel also has to make sure that IBRS bit remains set after VMEXIT because the guest might have cleared the bit. This is already covered by the existing x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest() and x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host() speculation control functions. Enhanced IBRS still requires IBPB for full mitigation. [1] Speculative-Execution-Side-Channel-Mitigations.pdf [2] Retpoline-A-Branch-Target-Injection-Mitigation.pdf Both documents are available at: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199511 Originally-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: Tim C Chen <tim.c.chen(a)intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)intel.com> Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar(a)intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++-- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 3 +++ 4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) Changes from upstream: ---------------------- 1. Use bit 30 of word 7 in cpufeatures for X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED as bit 29 is now used by L1TF. 2. Fix some trivial line fuzzing. Based on kernel version: ------------------------ Linux 4.9.135 Changes from V1->V2: -------------------- 1. Fix the format of commit log, as suggested by Greg KH, to follow standard procedure. diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index f6d1bc93589c..c56c24347f15 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -213,6 +213,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_STIBP ( 7*32+27) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */ #define X86_FEATURE_ZEN ( 7*32+28) /* "" CPU is AMD family 0x17 (Zen) */ #define X86_FEATURE_L1TF_PTEINV ( 7*32+29) /* "" L1TF workaround PTE inversion */ +#define X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED ( 7*32+30) /* Enhanced IBRS */ /* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */ #define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW ( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 8b38df98548e..1b4132161c1f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -215,6 +215,7 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation { SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC, SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD, SPECTRE_V2_IBRS, + SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED, }; /* The Speculative Store Bypass disable variants */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 8103adacbc83..6221166e3fca 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -139,6 +139,7 @@ static const char *spectre_v2_strings[] = { [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL_AMD] = "Vulnerable: Minimal AMD ASM retpoline", [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC] = "Mitigation: Full generic retpoline", [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD] = "Mitigation: Full AMD retpoline", + [SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS", }; #undef pr_fmt @@ -340,6 +341,13 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE: case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO: + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED)) { + mode = SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED; + /* Force it so VMEXIT will restore correctly */ + x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS; + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base); + goto specv2_set_mode; + } if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) goto retpoline_auto; break; @@ -377,6 +385,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE); } +specv2_set_mode: spectre_v2_enabled = mode; pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]); @@ -399,9 +408,16 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) /* * Retpoline means the kernel is safe because it has no indirect - * branches. But firmware isn't, so use IBRS to protect that. + * branches. Enhanced IBRS protects firmware too, so, enable restricted + * speculation around firmware calls only when Enhanced IBRS isn't + * supported. + * + * Use "mode" to check Enhanced IBRS instead of boot_cpu_has(), because + * the user might select retpoline on the kernel command line and if + * the CPU supports Enhanced IBRS, kernel might un-intentionally not + * enable IBRS around firmware calls. */ - if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) { + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) && mode != SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED) { setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); pr_info("Enabling Restricted Speculation for firmware calls\n"); } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index dc0850bb74be..3c01610c5ba9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -959,6 +959,9 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1); setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2); + if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL) + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED); + if (x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_meltdown)) return; -- 2.7.4

5 years, 11 months

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[PATCH] x86/speculation: Support Enhanced IBRS on future CPUs

by Sai Praneeth Prakhya

From: Sai Praneeth <sai.praneeth.prakhya(a)intel.com> [ Upstream commit 706d51681d636a0c4a5ef53395ec3b803e45ed4d ] Changes from upstream: ---------------------- 1. Use bit 30 of word 7 in cpufeatures for X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED as bit 29 is now used by L1TF. 2. Fix some trivial line fuzzing. Based on kernel version: ------------------------ Linux 4.9.135 Commit message from upstream: ----------------------------- Future Intel processors will support "Enhanced IBRS" which is an "always on" mode i.e. IBRS bit in SPEC_CTRL MSR is enabled once and never disabled. >From the specification [1]: "With enhanced IBRS, the predicted targets of indirect branches executed cannot be controlled by software that was executed in a less privileged predictor mode or on another logical processor. As a result, software operating on a processor with enhanced IBRS need not use WRMSR to set IA32_SPEC_CTRL.IBRS after every transition to a more privileged predictor mode. Software can isolate predictor modes effectively simply by setting the bit once. Software need not disable enhanced IBRS prior to entering a sleep state such as MWAIT or HLT." If Enhanced IBRS is supported by the processor then use it as the preferred spectre v2 mitigation mechanism instead of Retpoline. Intel's Retpoline white paper [2] states: "Retpoline is known to be an effective branch target injection (Spectre variant 2) mitigation on Intel processors belonging to family 6 (enumerated by the CPUID instruction) that do not have support for enhanced IBRS. On processors that support enhanced IBRS, it should be used for mitigation instead of retpoline." The reason why Enhanced IBRS is the recommended mitigation on processors which support it is that these processors also support CET which provides a defense against ROP attacks. Retpoline is very similar to ROP techniques and might trigger false positives in the CET defense. If Enhanced IBRS is selected as the mitigation technique for spectre v2, the IBRS bit in SPEC_CTRL MSR is set once at boot time and never cleared. Kernel also has to make sure that IBRS bit remains set after VMEXIT because the guest might have cleared the bit. This is already covered by the existing x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest() and x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host() speculation control functions. Enhanced IBRS still requires IBPB for full mitigation. [1] Speculative-Execution-Side-Channel-Mitigations.pdf [2] Retpoline-A-Branch-Target-Injection-Mitigation.pdf Both documents are available at: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199511 Originally-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: Tim C Chen <tim.c.chen(a)intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)intel.com> Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar(a)intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++-- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 3 +++ 4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index f6d1bc93589c..c56c24347f15 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -213,6 +213,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_STIBP ( 7*32+27) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */ #define X86_FEATURE_ZEN ( 7*32+28) /* "" CPU is AMD family 0x17 (Zen) */ #define X86_FEATURE_L1TF_PTEINV ( 7*32+29) /* "" L1TF workaround PTE inversion */ +#define X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED ( 7*32+30) /* Enhanced IBRS */ /* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */ #define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW ( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 8b38df98548e..1b4132161c1f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -215,6 +215,7 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation { SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC, SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD, SPECTRE_V2_IBRS, + SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED, }; /* The Speculative Store Bypass disable variants */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 8103adacbc83..6221166e3fca 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -139,6 +139,7 @@ static const char *spectre_v2_strings[] = { [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL_AMD] = "Vulnerable: Minimal AMD ASM retpoline", [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC] = "Mitigation: Full generic retpoline", [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD] = "Mitigation: Full AMD retpoline", + [SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS", }; #undef pr_fmt @@ -340,6 +341,13 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE: case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO: + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED)) { + mode = SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED; + /* Force it so VMEXIT will restore correctly */ + x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS; + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base); + goto specv2_set_mode; + } if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) goto retpoline_auto; break; @@ -377,6 +385,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE); } +specv2_set_mode: spectre_v2_enabled = mode; pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]); @@ -399,9 +408,16 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) /* * Retpoline means the kernel is safe because it has no indirect - * branches. But firmware isn't, so use IBRS to protect that. + * branches. Enhanced IBRS protects firmware too, so, enable restricted + * speculation around firmware calls only when Enhanced IBRS isn't + * supported. + * + * Use "mode" to check Enhanced IBRS instead of boot_cpu_has(), because + * the user might select retpoline on the kernel command line and if + * the CPU supports Enhanced IBRS, kernel might un-intentionally not + * enable IBRS around firmware calls. */ - if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) { + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) && mode != SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED) { setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); pr_info("Enabling Restricted Speculation for firmware calls\n"); } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index dc0850bb74be..3c01610c5ba9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -959,6 +959,9 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1); setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2); + if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL) + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED); + if (x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_meltdown)) return; -- 2.7.4

5 years, 11 months

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[PATCH] rtc: hctosys: Add missing range error reporting

by Maciej W. Rozycki

Fix an issue with the 32-bit range error path in `rtc_hctosys' where no error code is set and consequently the successful preceding call result from `rtc_read_time' is propagated to `rtc_hctosys_ret'. This in turn makes any subsequent call to `hctosys_show' incorrectly report in sysfs that the system time has been set from this RTC while it has not. Set the error to ERANGE then if we can't express the result due to an overflow. Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro(a)linux-mips.org> Fixes: b3a5ac42ab18 ("rtc: hctosys: Ensure system time doesn't overflow time_t") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 4.17+ --- drivers/rtc/hctosys.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) linux-rtc-hctosys-range.diff Index: linux-20181008-swarm64-eb/drivers/rtc/hctosys.c =================================================================== --- linux-20181008-swarm64-eb.orig/drivers/rtc/hctosys.c +++ linux-20181008-swarm64-eb/drivers/rtc/hctosys.c @@ -50,8 +50,10 @@ static int __init rtc_hctosys(void) tv64.tv_sec = rtc_tm_to_time64(&tm); #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32 - if (tv64.tv_sec > INT_MAX) + if (tv64.tv_sec > INT_MAX) { + err = -ERANGE; goto err_read; + } #endif err = do_settimeofday64(&tv64);

5 years, 11 months

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[PATCH 1/2] arm64: dts: mt7622: fix console output issue on rfb1

by Ryder Lee

The issue was introduced by Kernel CI: https://kernelci.org/boot/id/5bbdcbad59b5146fc5b43592/ Fix this by using a 'stdout-path' property that points to the device. Fixes: c0d9f9ad4f76 ("arm64: dts: mt7622: add earlycon to mt7622-rfb1 board") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ryder Lee <ryder.lee(a)mediatek.com> --- arch/arm64/boot/dts/mediatek/mt7622-rfb1.dts | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/mediatek/mt7622-rfb1.dts b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/mediatek/mt7622-rfb1.dts index dcad086..3f78334 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/mediatek/mt7622-rfb1.dts +++ b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/mediatek/mt7622-rfb1.dts @@ -17,8 +17,13 @@ model = "MediaTek MT7622 RFB1 board"; compatible = "mediatek,mt7622-rfb1", "mediatek,mt7622"; + aliases { + serial0 = &uart0; + }; + chosen { - bootargs = "earlycon=uart8250,mmio32,0x11002000 console=ttyS0,115200n1 swiotlb=512"; + stdout-path = "serial0:115200n8"; + bootargs = "earlycon=uart8250,mmio32,0x11002000 swiotlb=512"; }; cpus { -- 1.9.1

5 years, 11 months

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[PATCH] drm/i915/ringbuffer: Delay after EMIT_INVALIDATE for gen4/gen5

by Chris Wilson

Exercising the gpu reloc path strenuously revealed an issue where the updated relocations (from MI_STORE_DWORD_IMM) were not being observed upon execution. After some experiments with adding pipecontrols (a lot of pipecontrols (32) as gen4/5 do not have a bit to wait on earlier pipe controls or even the current on), it was discovered that we merely needed to delay the EMIT_INVALIDATE by several flushes. It is important to note that it is the EMIT_INVALIDATE as opposed to the EMIT_FLUSH that needs the delay as opposed to what one might first expect -- that the delay is required for the TLB invalidation to take effect (one presumes to purge any CS buffers) as opposed to a delay after flushing to ensure the writes have landed before triggering invalidation. Testcase: igt/gem_tiled_fence_blits Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <chris(a)chris-wilson.co.uk> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org --- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_ringbuffer.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_ringbuffer.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_ringbuffer.c index b8a7a014d46d..87eebc13c0d8 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_ringbuffer.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_ringbuffer.c @@ -91,6 +91,7 @@ static int gen4_render_ring_flush(struct i915_request *rq, u32 mode) { u32 cmd, *cs; + int i; /* * read/write caches: @@ -127,12 +128,45 @@ gen4_render_ring_flush(struct i915_request *rq, u32 mode) cmd |= MI_INVALIDATE_ISP; } - cs = intel_ring_begin(rq, 2); + i = 2; + if (mode & EMIT_INVALIDATE) + i += 20; + + cs = intel_ring_begin(rq, i); if (IS_ERR(cs)) return PTR_ERR(cs); *cs++ = cmd; - *cs++ = MI_NOOP; + + /* + * A random delay to let the CS invalidate take effect? Without this + * delay, the GPU relocation path fails as the CS does not see + * the updated contents. Just as important, if we apply the flushes + * to the EMIT_FLUSH branch (i.e. immediately after the relocation + * write and before the invalidate on the next batch), the relocations + * still fail. This implies that is a delay following invalidation + * that is required to reset the caches as opposed to a delay to + * ensure the memory is written. + */ + if (mode & EMIT_INVALIDATE) { + *cs++ = GFX_OP_PIPE_CONTROL(4) | PIPE_CONTROL_QW_WRITE; + *cs++ = i915_ggtt_offset(rq->engine->scratch) | + PIPE_CONTROL_GLOBAL_GTT; + *cs++ = 0; + *cs++ = 0; + + for (i = 0; i < 12; i++) + *cs++ = MI_FLUSH; + + *cs++ = GFX_OP_PIPE_CONTROL(4) | PIPE_CONTROL_QW_WRITE; + *cs++ = i915_ggtt_offset(rq->engine->scratch) | + PIPE_CONTROL_GLOBAL_GTT; + *cs++ = 0; + *cs++ = 0; + } + + *cs++ = cmd; + intel_ring_advance(rq, cs); return 0; -- 2.19.1

5 years, 11 months

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patch "USB: quirks: Add no-lpm quirk for Raydium touchscreens" added to usb-linus

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled USB: quirks: Add no-lpm quirk for Raydium touchscreens to my usb git tree which can be found at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/usb.git in the usb-linus branch. The patch will show up in the next release of the linux-next tree (usually sometime within the next 24 hours during the week.) The patch will hopefully also be merged in Linus's tree for the next -rc kernel release. If you have any questions about this process, please let me know. >From deefd24228a172d1b27d4a9adbfd2cdacd60ae64 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng(a)canonical.com> Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2018 13:33:15 +0800 Subject: USB: quirks: Add no-lpm quirk for Raydium touchscreens Raydium USB touchscreen fails to set config if LPM is enabled: [ 2.030658] usb 1-8: New USB device found, idVendor=2386, idProduct=3119 [ 2.030659] usb 1-8: New USB device strings: Mfr=1, Product=2, SerialNumber=0 [ 2.030660] usb 1-8: Product: Raydium Touch System [ 2.030661] usb 1-8: Manufacturer: Raydium Corporation [ 7.132209] usb 1-8: can't set config #1, error -110 Same behavior can be observed on 2386:3114. Raydium claims the touchscreen supports LPM under Windows, so I used Microsoft USB Test Tools (MUTT) [1] to check its LPM status. MUTT shows that the LPM doesn't work under Windows, either. So let's just disable LPM for Raydium touchscreens. [1] https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/usbcon/usb-test-t… Signed-off-by: Kai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng(a)canonical.com> Cc: stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/usb/core/quirks.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/core/quirks.c b/drivers/usb/core/quirks.c index 64df444af229..f9ff03e6af93 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/core/quirks.c +++ b/drivers/usb/core/quirks.c @@ -420,6 +420,11 @@ static const struct usb_device_id usb_quirk_list[] = { { USB_DEVICE(0x2040, 0x7200), .driver_info = USB_QUIRK_CONFIG_INTF_STRINGS }, + /* Raydium Touchscreen */ + { USB_DEVICE(0x2386, 0x3114), .driver_info = USB_QUIRK_NO_LPM }, + + { USB_DEVICE(0x2386, 0x3119), .driver_info = USB_QUIRK_NO_LPM }, + /* DJI CineSSD */ { USB_DEVICE(0x2ca3, 0x0031), .driver_info = USB_QUIRK_NO_LPM }, -- 2.19.1

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Linux-stable-mirror November 2018