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[RFC PATCH v2.1 28/30] selftests/sgx: Test reclaiming of untouched page

by Jarkko Sakkinen

From: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre(a)intel.com> Removing a page from an initialized enclave involves three steps: (1) the user requests changing the page type to PT_TRIM via the SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE ioctl() (2) on success the ENCLU[EACCEPT] instruction is run from within the enclave to accept the page removal (3) the user initiates the actual removal of the page via the SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES ioctl(). Remove a page that has never been accessed. This means that when the first ioctl() requesting page removal arrives, there will be no page table entry, yet a valid page table entry needs to exist for the ENCLU[EACCEPT] function to succeed. In this test it is verified that a page table entry can still be installed for a page that is in the process of being removed. Suggested-by: Haitao Huang <haitao.huang(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre(a)intel.com> --- tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 82 insertions(+) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c index d132e7d32454..c691a4864db8 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c @@ -1816,4 +1816,86 @@ TEST_F(enclave, remove_added_page_invalid_access_after_eaccept) EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, data_start); } +TEST_F(enclave, remove_untouched_page) +{ + struct sgx_enclave_remove_pages remove_ioc; + struct encl_op_eaccept eaccept_op; + struct sgx_enclave_modt modt_ioc; + struct sgx_secinfo secinfo; + unsigned long data_start; + int ret, errno_save; + + ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata)); + + /* + * Hardware (SGX2) and kernel support is needed for this test. Start + * with check that test has a chance of succeeding. + */ + memset(&modt_ioc, 0, sizeof(modt_ioc)); + ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE, &modt_ioc); + + if (ret == -1) { + if (errno == ENOTTY) + SKIP(return, "Kernel does not support SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE ioctl()"); + else if (errno == ENODEV) + SKIP(return, "System does not support SGX2"); + } + + /* + * Invalid parameters were provided during sanity check, + * expect command to fail. + */ + EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1); + + /* SGX2 is supported by kernel and hardware, test can proceed. */ + memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run)); + self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base; + + data_start = self->encl.encl_base + + encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE; + + memset(&modt_ioc, 0, sizeof(modt_ioc)); + memset(&secinfo, 0, sizeof(secinfo)); + + secinfo.flags = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM << 8; + modt_ioc.offset = encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE; + modt_ioc.length = PAGE_SIZE; + modt_ioc.secinfo = (unsigned long)&secinfo; + ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE, &modt_ioc); + errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0; + + EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(modt_ioc.result, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(modt_ioc.count, 4096); + + /* + * Enter enclave via TCS #1 and approve page removal by sending + * EACCEPT for removed page. + */ + + eaccept_op.epc_addr = data_start; + eaccept_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_TRIM | SGX_SECINFO_MODIFIED; + eaccept_op.ret = 0; + eaccept_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EACCEPT; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0); + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0); + + memset(&remove_ioc, 0, sizeof(remove_ioc)); + + remove_ioc.offset = encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE; + remove_ioc.length = PAGE_SIZE; + ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES, &remove_ioc); + errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0; + + EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(remove_ioc.count, 4096); +} + TEST_HARNESS_MAIN -- 2.35.1

3 years, 4 months

1
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[RFC PATCH v2.1 27/30] selftests/sgx: Test invalid access to removed enclave page

by Jarkko Sakkinen

From: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre(a)intel.com> Removing a page from an initialized enclave involves three steps: (1) the user requests changing the page type to SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM via the SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE ioctl(), (2) on success the ENCLU[EACCEPT] instruction is run from within the enclave to accept the page removal, (3) the user initiates the actual removal of the page via the SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES ioctl(). Test two possible invalid accesses during the page removal flow: * Test the behavior when a request to remove the page by changing its type to SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM completes successfully but instead of executing ENCLU[EACCEPT] from within the enclave the enclave attempts to read from the page. Even though the page is accessible from the page table entries its type is SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM and thus not accessible according to SGX. The expected behavior is a page fault with the SGX flag set in the error code. * Test the behavior when the page type is changed successfully and ENCLU[EACCEPT] was run from within the enclave. The final ioctl(), SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES, is omitted and replaced with an attempt to access the page. Even though the page is accessible from the page table entries its type is SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM and thus not accessible according to SGX. The expected behavior is a page fault with the SGX flag set in the error code. Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre(a)intel.com> --- tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c | 247 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 247 insertions(+) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c index 82902dab96bc..d132e7d32454 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c @@ -1569,4 +1569,251 @@ TEST_F(enclave, remove_added_page_no_eaccept) EXPECT_EQ(remove_ioc.count, 0); } +/* + * Request enclave page removal but instead of correctly following with + * EACCEPT a read attempt to page is made from within the enclave. + */ +TEST_F(enclave, remove_added_page_invalid_access) +{ + struct encl_op_get_from_addr get_addr_op; + struct encl_op_put_to_addr put_addr_op; + struct sgx_enclave_modt ioc; + struct sgx_secinfo secinfo; + unsigned long data_start; + int ret, errno_save; + + ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata)); + + memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run)); + self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base; + + /* + * Hardware (SGX2) and kernel support is needed for this test. Start + * with check that test has a chance of succeeding. + */ + memset(&ioc, 0, sizeof(ioc)); + ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE, &ioc); + + if (ret == -1) { + if (errno == ENOTTY) + SKIP(return, "Kernel does not support SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE ioctl()"); + else if (errno == ENODEV) + SKIP(return, "System does not support SGX2"); + } + + /* + * Invalid parameters were provided during sanity check, + * expect command to fail. + */ + EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1); + + /* + * Page that will be removed is the second data page in the .data + * segment. This forms part of the local encl_buffer within the + * enclave. + */ + data_start = self->encl.encl_base + + encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE; + + /* + * Sanity check that page at @data_start is writable before + * removing it. + * + * Start by writing MAGIC to test page. + */ + put_addr_op.value = MAGIC; + put_addr_op.addr = data_start; + put_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_ADDRESS; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + + /* + * Read memory that was just written to, confirming that data + * previously written (MAGIC) is present. + */ + get_addr_op.value = 0; + get_addr_op.addr = data_start; + get_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_ADDRESS; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EQ(get_addr_op.value, MAGIC); + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + + /* Start page removal by requesting change of page type to PT_TRIM. */ + memset(&ioc, 0, sizeof(ioc)); + memset(&secinfo, 0, sizeof(secinfo)); + + secinfo.flags = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM << 8; + ioc.offset = encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE; + ioc.length = PAGE_SIZE; + ioc.secinfo = (unsigned long)&secinfo; + + ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE, &ioc); + errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0; + + EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(ioc.result, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(ioc.count, 4096); + + /* + * Read from page that was just removed. + */ + get_addr_op.value = 0; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + /* + * From kernel perspective the page is present but according to SGX the + * page should not be accessible so a #PF with SGX bit set is + * expected. + */ + + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.function, ERESUME); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 14); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0x8005); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, data_start); +} + +/* + * Request enclave page removal and correctly follow with + * EACCEPT but do not follow with removal ioctl() but instead a read attempt + * to removed page is made from within the enclave. + */ +TEST_F(enclave, remove_added_page_invalid_access_after_eaccept) +{ + struct encl_op_get_from_addr get_addr_op; + struct encl_op_put_to_addr put_addr_op; + struct encl_op_eaccept eaccept_op; + struct sgx_enclave_modt ioc; + struct sgx_secinfo secinfo; + unsigned long data_start; + int ret, errno_save; + + ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata)); + + memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run)); + self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base; + + /* + * Hardware (SGX2) and kernel support is needed for this test. Start + * with check that test has a chance of succeeding. + */ + memset(&ioc, 0, sizeof(ioc)); + ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE, &ioc); + + if (ret == -1) { + if (errno == ENOTTY) + SKIP(return, "Kernel does not support SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE ioctl()"); + else if (errno == ENODEV) + SKIP(return, "System does not support SGX2"); + } + + /* + * Invalid parameters were provided during sanity check, + * expect command to fail. + */ + EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1); + + /* + * Page that will be removed is the second data page in the .data + * segment. This forms part of the local encl_buffer within the + * enclave. + */ + data_start = self->encl.encl_base + + encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE; + + /* + * Sanity check that page at @data_start is writable before + * removing it. + * + * Start by writing MAGIC to test page. + */ + put_addr_op.value = MAGIC; + put_addr_op.addr = data_start; + put_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_ADDRESS; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + + /* + * Read memory that was just written to, confirming that data + * previously written (MAGIC) is present. + */ + get_addr_op.value = 0; + get_addr_op.addr = data_start; + get_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_ADDRESS; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EQ(get_addr_op.value, MAGIC); + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + + /* Start page removal by requesting change of page type to PT_TRIM. */ + memset(&ioc, 0, sizeof(ioc)); + memset(&secinfo, 0, sizeof(secinfo)); + + secinfo.flags = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM << 8; + ioc.offset = encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE; + ioc.length = PAGE_SIZE; + ioc.secinfo = (unsigned long)&secinfo; + + ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE, &ioc); + errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0; + + EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(ioc.result, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(ioc.count, 4096); + + eaccept_op.epc_addr = (unsigned long)data_start; + eaccept_op.ret = 0; + eaccept_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_TRIM | SGX_SECINFO_MODIFIED; + eaccept_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EACCEPT; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0); + + /* Skip ioctl() to remove page. */ + + /* + * Read from page that was just removed. + */ + get_addr_op.value = 0; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + /* + * From kernel perspective the page is present but according to SGX the + * page should not be accessible so a #PF with SGX bit set is + * expected. + */ + + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.function, ERESUME); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 14); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0x8005); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, data_start); +} + TEST_HARNESS_MAIN -- 2.35.1

3 years, 4 months

1
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[RFC PATCH v2.1 26/30] selftests/sgx: Test faulty enclave behavior

by Jarkko Sakkinen

From: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre(a)intel.com> Removing a page from an initialized enclave involves three steps: first the user requests changing the page type to SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM via an ioctl(), on success the ENCLU[EACCEPT] instruction needs to be run from within the enclave to accept the page removal, finally the user requests page removal to be completed via an ioctl(). Only after acceptance (ENCLU[EACCEPT]) from within the enclave can the kernel remove the page from a running enclave. Test the behavior when the user's request to change the page type succeeds, but the ENCLU[EACCEPT] instruction is not run before the ioctl() requesting page removal is run. This should not be permitted. Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre(a)intel.com> --- tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c | 116 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 116 insertions(+) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c index f9872c6746a3..82902dab96bc 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c @@ -1453,4 +1453,120 @@ TEST_F(enclave, tcs_create) munmap(addr, 3 * PAGE_SIZE); } +/* + * Ensure sane behavior if user requests page removal, does not run + * EACCEPT from within enclave but still attempts to finalize page removal + * with the SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES ioctl(). The latter should fail + * because the removal was not EACCEPTed from within the enclave. + */ +TEST_F(enclave, remove_added_page_no_eaccept) +{ + struct sgx_enclave_remove_pages remove_ioc; + struct encl_op_get_from_addr get_addr_op; + struct encl_op_put_to_addr put_addr_op; + struct sgx_enclave_modt modt_ioc; + struct sgx_secinfo secinfo; + unsigned long data_start; + int ret, errno_save; + + ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata)); + + memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run)); + self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base; + + /* + * Hardware (SGX2) and kernel support is needed for this test. Start + * with check that test has a chance of succeeding. + */ + memset(&modt_ioc, 0, sizeof(modt_ioc)); + ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE, &modt_ioc); + + if (ret == -1) { + if (errno == ENOTTY) + SKIP(return, "Kernel does not support SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE ioctl()"); + else if (errno == ENODEV) + SKIP(return, "System does not support SGX2"); + } + + /* + * Invalid parameters were provided during sanity check, + * expect command to fail. + */ + EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1); + + /* + * Page that will be removed is the second data page in the .data + * segment. This forms part of the local encl_buffer within the + * enclave. + */ + data_start = self->encl.encl_base + + encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE; + + /* + * Sanity check that page at @data_start is writable before + * removing it. + * + * Start by writing MAGIC to test page. + */ + put_addr_op.value = MAGIC; + put_addr_op.addr = data_start; + put_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_ADDRESS; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + + /* + * Read memory that was just written to, confirming that data + * previously written (MAGIC) is present. + */ + get_addr_op.value = 0; + get_addr_op.addr = data_start; + get_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_ADDRESS; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EQ(get_addr_op.value, MAGIC); + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + + /* Start page removal by requesting change of page type to PT_TRIM */ + memset(&modt_ioc, 0, sizeof(modt_ioc)); + memset(&secinfo, 0, sizeof(secinfo)); + + secinfo.flags = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM << 8; + modt_ioc.offset = encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE; + modt_ioc.length = PAGE_SIZE; + modt_ioc.secinfo = (unsigned long)&secinfo; + + ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE, &modt_ioc); + errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0; + + EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(modt_ioc.result, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(modt_ioc.count, 4096); + + /* Skip EACCEPT */ + + /* Send final ioctl() to complete page removal */ + memset(&remove_ioc, 0, sizeof(remove_ioc)); + + remove_ioc.offset = encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE; + remove_ioc.length = PAGE_SIZE; + + ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES, &remove_ioc); + errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0; + + /* Operation not permitted since EACCEPT was omitted. */ + EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1); + EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, EPERM); + EXPECT_EQ(remove_ioc.count, 0); +} + TEST_HARNESS_MAIN -- 2.35.1

3 years, 4 months

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[RFC PATCH v2.1 25/30] selftests/sgx: Test complete changing of page type flow

by Jarkko Sakkinen

From: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre(a)intel.com> Support for changing an enclave page's type enables an initialized enclave to be expanded with support for more threads by changing the type of a regular enclave page to that of a Thread Control Structure (TCS). Additionally, being able to change a TCS or regular enclave page's type to be trimmed (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM) initiates the removal of the page from the enclave. Test changing page type to TCS as well as page removal flows in two phases: In the first phase support for a new thread is dynamically added to an initialized enclave and in the second phase the pages associated with the new thread are removed from the enclave. As an additional sanity check after the second phase the page used as a TCS page during the first phase is added back as a regular page and ensured that it can be written to (which is not possible if it was a TCS page). Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre(a)intel.com> --- tools/testing/selftests/sgx/load.c | 41 ++++ tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c | 347 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 389 insertions(+) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/load.c b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/load.c index 006b464c8fc9..94bdeac1cf04 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/load.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/load.c @@ -130,6 +130,47 @@ static bool encl_ioc_add_pages(struct encl *encl, struct encl_segment *seg) return true; } +/* + * Parse the enclave code's symbol table to locate and return address of + * the provided symbol + */ +uint64_t encl_get_entry(struct encl *encl, const char *symbol) +{ + Elf64_Shdr *sections; + Elf64_Sym *symtab; + Elf64_Ehdr *ehdr; + char *sym_names; + int num_sym; + int i; + + ehdr = encl->bin; + sections = encl->bin + ehdr->e_shoff; + + for (i = 0; i < ehdr->e_shnum; i++) { + if (sections[i].sh_type == SHT_SYMTAB) { + symtab = (Elf64_Sym *)((char *)encl->bin + sections[i].sh_offset); + num_sym = sections[i].sh_size / sections[i].sh_entsize; + break; + } + } + + for (i = 0; i < ehdr->e_shnum; i++) { + if (sections[i].sh_type == SHT_STRTAB) { + sym_names = (char *)encl->bin + sections[i].sh_offset; + break; + } + } + + for (i = 0; i < num_sym; i++) { + Elf64_Sym *sym = &symtab[i]; + + if (!strcmp(symbol, sym_names + sym->st_name)) + return (uint64_t)sym->st_value; + } + + return 0; +} + bool encl_load(const char *path, struct encl *encl, unsigned long heap_size) { const char device_path[] = "/dev/sgx_enclave"; diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c index 13542c5de66f..f9872c6746a3 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c @@ -1106,4 +1106,351 @@ TEST_F(enclave, augment_via_eaccept) munmap(addr, PAGE_SIZE); } +/* + * SGX2 page type modification test in two phases: + * Phase 1: + * Create a new TCS, consisting out of three new pages (stack page with regular + * page type, SSA page with regular page type, and TCS page with TCS page + * type) in an initialized enclave and run a simple workload within it. + * Phase 2: + * Remove the three pages added in phase 1, add a new regular page at the + * same address that previously hosted the TCS page and verify that it can + * be modified. + */ +TEST_F(enclave, tcs_create) +{ + struct encl_op_init_tcs_page init_tcs_page_op; + struct sgx_enclave_remove_pages remove_ioc; + struct encl_op_get_from_addr get_addr_op; + struct encl_op_put_to_addr put_addr_op; + struct encl_op_get_from_buf get_buf_op; + struct encl_op_put_to_buf put_buf_op; + void *addr, *tcs, *stack_end, *ssa; + struct encl_op_eaccept eaccept_op; + struct sgx_enclave_modt modt_ioc; + struct sgx_secinfo secinfo; + size_t total_size = 0; + uint64_t val_64; + int errno_save; + int ret, i; + + ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, + _metadata)); + + memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run)); + self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base; + + /* + * Hardware (SGX2) and kernel support is needed for this test. Start + * with check that test has a chance of succeeding. + */ + memset(&modt_ioc, 0, sizeof(modt_ioc)); + ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE, &modt_ioc); + + if (ret == -1) { + if (errno == ENOTTY) + SKIP(return, "Kernel does not support SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE ioctl()"); + else if (errno == ENODEV) + SKIP(return, "System does not support SGX2"); + } + + /* + * Invalid parameters were provided during sanity check, + * expect command to fail. + */ + EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1); + + /* + * Add three regular pages via EAUG: one will be the TCS stack, one + * will be the TCS SSA, and one will be the new TCS. The stack and + * SSA will remain as regular pages, the TCS page will need its + * type changed after populated with needed data. + */ + for (i = 0; i < self->encl.nr_segments; i++) { + struct encl_segment *seg = &self->encl.segment_tbl[i]; + + total_size += seg->size; + } + + /* + * Actual enclave size is expected to be larger than the loaded + * test enclave since enclave size must be a power of 2 in bytes while + * test_encl does not consume it all. + */ + EXPECT_LT(total_size + 3 * PAGE_SIZE, self->encl.encl_size); + + /* + * mmap() three pages at end of existing enclave to be used for the + * three new pages. + */ + addr = mmap((void *)self->encl.encl_base + total_size, 3 * PAGE_SIZE, + PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED | MAP_FIXED, + self->encl.fd, 0); + EXPECT_NE(addr, MAP_FAILED); + + self->run.exception_vector = 0; + self->run.exception_error_code = 0; + self->run.exception_addr = 0; + + stack_end = (void *)self->encl.encl_base + total_size; + tcs = (void *)self->encl.encl_base + total_size + PAGE_SIZE; + ssa = (void *)self->encl.encl_base + total_size + 2 * PAGE_SIZE; + + /* + * Run EACCEPT on each new page to trigger the + * EACCEPT->(#PF)->EAUG->EACCEPT(again without a #PF) flow. + */ + + eaccept_op.epc_addr = (unsigned long)stack_end; + eaccept_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_R | SGX_SECINFO_W | SGX_SECINFO_REG | SGX_SECINFO_PENDING; + eaccept_op.ret = 0; + eaccept_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EACCEPT; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + if (self->run.exception_vector == 14 && + self->run.exception_error_code == 4 && + self->run.exception_addr == (unsigned long)stack_end) { + munmap(addr, 3 * PAGE_SIZE); + SKIP(return, "Kernel does not support adding pages to initialized enclave"); + } + + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0); + + eaccept_op.epc_addr = (unsigned long)ssa; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0); + + eaccept_op.epc_addr = (unsigned long)tcs; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0); + + /* + * Three new pages added to enclave. Now populate the TCS page with + * needed data. This should be done from within enclave. Provide + * the function that will do the actual data population with needed + * data. + */ + + /* + * New TCS will use the "encl_dyn_entry" entrypoint that expects + * stack to begin in page before TCS page. + */ + val_64 = encl_get_entry(&self->encl, "encl_dyn_entry"); + EXPECT_NE(val_64, 0); + + init_tcs_page_op.tcs_page = (unsigned long)tcs; + init_tcs_page_op.ssa = (unsigned long)total_size + 2 * PAGE_SIZE; + init_tcs_page_op.entry = val_64; + init_tcs_page_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_INIT_TCS_PAGE; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&init_tcs_page_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + + /* Change TCS page type to TCS. */ + memset(&modt_ioc, 0, sizeof(modt_ioc)); + memset(&secinfo, 0, sizeof(secinfo)); + + secinfo.flags = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TCS << 8; + modt_ioc.offset = total_size + PAGE_SIZE; + modt_ioc.length = PAGE_SIZE; + modt_ioc.secinfo = (unsigned long)&secinfo; + + ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE, &modt_ioc); + errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0; + + EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(modt_ioc.result, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(modt_ioc.count, 4096); + + /* EACCEPT new TCS page from enclave. */ + eaccept_op.epc_addr = (unsigned long)tcs; + eaccept_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_TCS | SGX_SECINFO_MODIFIED; + eaccept_op.ret = 0; + eaccept_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EACCEPT; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0); + + /* Run workload from new TCS. */ + self->run.tcs = (unsigned long)tcs; + + /* + * Simple workload to write to data buffer and read value back. + */ + put_buf_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_BUFFER; + put_buf_op.value = MAGIC; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_buf_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + + get_buf_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_BUFFER; + get_buf_op.value = 0; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_buf_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EQ(get_buf_op.value, MAGIC); + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + + /* + * Phase 2 of test: + * Remove pages associated with new TCS, create a regular page + * where TCS page used to be and verify it can be used as a regular + * page. + */ + + /* Start page removal by requesting change of page type to PT_TRIM. */ + memset(&modt_ioc, 0, sizeof(modt_ioc)); + memset(&secinfo, 0, sizeof(secinfo)); + + secinfo.flags = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM << 8; + modt_ioc.offset = total_size; + modt_ioc.length = 3 * PAGE_SIZE; + modt_ioc.secinfo = (unsigned long)&secinfo; + + ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE, &modt_ioc); + errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0; + + EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(modt_ioc.result, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(modt_ioc.count, 3 * PAGE_SIZE); + + /* + * Enter enclave via TCS #1 and approve page removal by sending + * EACCEPT for each of three removed pages. + */ + self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base; + + eaccept_op.epc_addr = (unsigned long)stack_end; + eaccept_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_TRIM | SGX_SECINFO_MODIFIED; + eaccept_op.ret = 0; + eaccept_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EACCEPT; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0); + + eaccept_op.epc_addr = (unsigned long)tcs; + eaccept_op.ret = 0; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0); + + eaccept_op.epc_addr = (unsigned long)ssa; + eaccept_op.ret = 0; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0); + + /* Send final ioctl() to complete page removal. */ + memset(&remove_ioc, 0, sizeof(remove_ioc)); + + remove_ioc.offset = total_size; + remove_ioc.length = 3 * PAGE_SIZE; + + ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES, &remove_ioc); + errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0; + + EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(remove_ioc.count, 3 * PAGE_SIZE); + + /* + * Enter enclave via TCS #1 and access location where TCS #3 was to + * trigger dynamic add of regular page at that location. + */ + eaccept_op.epc_addr = (unsigned long)tcs; + eaccept_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_R | SGX_SECINFO_W | SGX_SECINFO_REG | SGX_SECINFO_PENDING; + eaccept_op.ret = 0; + eaccept_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EACCEPT; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0); + + /* + * New page should be accessible from within enclave - write to it. + */ + put_addr_op.value = MAGIC; + put_addr_op.addr = (unsigned long)tcs; + put_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_ADDRESS; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + + /* + * Read memory from newly added page that was just written to, + * confirming that data previously written (MAGIC) is present. + */ + get_addr_op.value = 0; + get_addr_op.addr = (unsigned long)tcs; + get_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_ADDRESS; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EQ(get_addr_op.value, MAGIC); + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + + munmap(addr, 3 * PAGE_SIZE); +} + TEST_HARNESS_MAIN diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.h b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.h index b45c52ec7ab3..fc585be97e2f 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.h +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.h @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ void encl_delete(struct encl *ctx); bool encl_load(const char *path, struct encl *encl, unsigned long heap_size); bool encl_measure(struct encl *encl); bool encl_build(struct encl *encl); +uint64_t encl_get_entry(struct encl *encl, const char *symbol); int sgx_enter_enclave(void *rdi, void *rsi, long rdx, u32 function, void *r8, void *r9, struct sgx_enclave_run *run); -- 2.35.1

3 years, 4 months

1
0
0 0

[RFC PATCH v2.1 24/30] selftests/sgx: Introduce TCS initialization enclave operation

by Jarkko Sakkinen

From: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre(a)intel.com> The Thread Control Structure (TCS) contains meta-data used by the hardware to save and restore thread specific information when entering/exiting the enclave. A TCS can be added to an initialized enclave by first adding a new regular enclave page, initializing the content of the new page from within the enclave, and then changing that page's type to a TCS. Support the initialization of a TCS from within the enclave. The variable information needed that should be provided from outside the enclave is the address of the TCS, address of the State Save Area (SSA), and the entry point that the thread should use to enter the enclave. With this information provided all needed fields of a TCS can be initialized. Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre(a)intel.com> --- tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h | 8 +++++++ tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h index b638eb98c80c..d8587c971941 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ enum encl_op_type { ENCL_OP_NOP, ENCL_OP_EACCEPT, ENCL_OP_EMODPE, + ENCL_OP_INIT_TCS_PAGE, ENCL_OP_MAX, }; @@ -68,4 +69,11 @@ struct encl_op_emodpe { uint64_t flags; }; +struct encl_op_init_tcs_page { + struct encl_op_header header; + uint64_t tcs_page; + uint64_t ssa; + uint64_t entry; +}; + #endif /* DEFINES_H */ diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c index 5b6c65331527..c0d6397295e3 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c @@ -57,6 +57,35 @@ static void *memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, size_t n) return dest; } +static void *memset(void *dest, int c, size_t n) +{ + size_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) + ((char *)dest)[i] = c; + + return dest; +} + +static void do_encl_init_tcs_page(void *_op) +{ + struct encl_op_init_tcs_page *op = _op; + void *tcs = (void *)op->tcs_page; + uint32_t val_32; + + memset(tcs, 0, 16); /* STATE and FLAGS */ + memcpy(tcs + 16, &op->ssa, 8); /* OSSA */ + memset(tcs + 24, 0, 4); /* CSSA */ + val_32 = 1; + memcpy(tcs + 28, &val_32, 4); /* NSSA */ + memcpy(tcs + 32, &op->entry, 8); /* OENTRY */ + memset(tcs + 40, 0, 24); /* AEP, OFSBASE, OGSBASE */ + val_32 = 0xFFFFFFFF; + memcpy(tcs + 64, &val_32, 4); /* FSLIMIT */ + memcpy(tcs + 68, &val_32, 4); /* GSLIMIT */ + memset(tcs + 72, 0, 4024); /* Reserved */ +} + static void do_encl_op_put_to_buf(void *op) { struct encl_op_put_to_buf *op2 = op; @@ -100,6 +129,7 @@ void encl_body(void *rdi, void *rsi) do_encl_op_nop, do_encl_eaccept, do_encl_emodpe, + do_encl_init_tcs_page, }; struct encl_op_header *op = (struct encl_op_header *)rdi; -- 2.35.1

3 years, 4 months

1
0
0 0

[RFC PATCH v2.1 23/30] selftests/sgx: Introduce dynamic entry point

by Jarkko Sakkinen

From: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre(a)intel.com> The test enclave (test_encl.elf) is built with two initialized Thread Control Structures (TCS) included in the binary. Both TCS are initialized with the same entry point, encl_entry, that correctly computes the absolute address of the stack based on the stack of each TCS that is also built into the binary. A new TCS can be added dynamically to the enclave and requires to be initialized with an entry point used to enter the enclave. Since the existing entry point, encl_entry, assumes that the TCS and its stack exists at particular offsets within the binary it is not able to handle a dynamically added TCS and its stack. Introduce a new entry point, encl_dyn_entry, that initializes the absolute address of that thread's stack to the address immediately preceding the TCS itself. It is now possible to dynamically add a contiguous memory region to the enclave with the new stack preceding the new TCS. With the new TCS initialized with encl_dyn_entry as entry point the absolute address of the stack is computed correctly on entry. Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre(a)intel.com> --- tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl_bootstrap.S | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl_bootstrap.S b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl_bootstrap.S index 82fb0dfcbd23..03ae0f57e29d 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl_bootstrap.S +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl_bootstrap.S @@ -45,6 +45,12 @@ encl_entry: # TCS #2. By adding the value of encl_stack to it, we get # the absolute address for the stack. lea (encl_stack)(%rbx), %rax + jmp encl_entry_core +encl_dyn_entry: + # Entry point for dynamically created TCS page expected to follow + # its stack directly. + lea -1(%rbx), %rax +encl_entry_core: xchg %rsp, %rax push %rax -- 2.35.1

3 years, 4 months

1
0
0 0

[RFC PATCH v2.1 19/30] selftests/sgx: Test two different SGX2 EAUG flows

by Jarkko Sakkinen

From: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre(a)intel.com> Enclave pages can be added to an initialized enclave when an address belonging to the enclave but without a backing page is accessed from within the enclave. Accessing memory without a backing enclave page from within an enclave can be in different ways: 1) Pre-emptively run ENCLU[EACCEPT]. Since the addition of a page always needs to be accepted by the enclave via ENCLU[EACCEPT] this flow is efficient since the first execution of ENCLU[EACCEPT] triggers the addition of the page and when execution returns to the same instruction the second execution would be successful as an acceptance of the page. 2) A direct read or write. The flow where a direct read or write triggers the page addition execution cannot resume from the instruction (read/write) that triggered the fault but instead the enclave needs to be entered at a different entry point to run needed ENCLU[EACCEPT] before execution can return to the original entry point and the read/write instruction that faulted. Add tests for both flows. Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre(a)intel.com> --- tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c | 243 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 243 insertions(+) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c index ea5f2e064687..13542c5de66f 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c @@ -86,6 +86,15 @@ static bool vdso_get_symtab(void *addr, struct vdso_symtab *symtab) return true; } +static inline int sgx2_supported(void) +{ + unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx; + + __cpuid_count(SGX_CPUID, 0x0, eax, ebx, ecx, edx); + + return eax & 0x2; +} + static unsigned long elf_sym_hash(const char *name) { unsigned long h = 0, high; @@ -863,4 +872,238 @@ TEST_F(enclave, epcm_permissions) EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); } +/* + * Test the addition of pages to an initialized enclave via writing to + * a page belonging to the enclave's address space but was not added + * during enclave creation. + */ +TEST_F(enclave, augment) +{ + struct encl_op_get_from_addr get_addr_op; + struct encl_op_put_to_addr put_addr_op; + struct encl_op_eaccept eaccept_op; + size_t total_size = 0; + void *addr; + int i; + + if (!sgx2_supported()) + SKIP(return, "SGX2 not supported"); + + ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata)); + + memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run)); + self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base; + + for (i = 0; i < self->encl.nr_segments; i++) { + struct encl_segment *seg = &self->encl.segment_tbl[i]; + + total_size += seg->size; + } + + /* + * Actual enclave size is expected to be larger than the loaded + * test enclave since enclave size must be a power of 2 in bytes + * and test_encl does not consume it all. + */ + EXPECT_LT(total_size + PAGE_SIZE, self->encl.encl_size); + + /* + * Create memory mapping for the page that will be added. New + * memory mapping is for one page right after all existing + * mappings. + */ + addr = mmap((void *)self->encl.encl_base + total_size, PAGE_SIZE, + PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC, + MAP_SHARED | MAP_FIXED, self->encl.fd, 0); + EXPECT_NE(addr, MAP_FAILED); + + self->run.exception_vector = 0; + self->run.exception_error_code = 0; + self->run.exception_addr = 0; + + /* + * Attempt to write to the new page from within enclave. + * Expected to fail since page is not (yet) part of the enclave. + * The first #PF will trigger the addition of the page to the + * enclave, but since the new page needs an EACCEPT from within the + * enclave before it can be used it would not be possible + * to successfully return to the failing instruction. This is the + * cause of the second #PF captured here having the SGX bit set, + * it is from hardware preventing the page from being used. + */ + put_addr_op.value = MAGIC; + put_addr_op.addr = (unsigned long)addr; + put_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_ADDRESS; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.function, ERESUME); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 14); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, (unsigned long)addr); + + if (self->run.exception_error_code == 0x6) { + munmap(addr, PAGE_SIZE); + SKIP(return, "Kernel does not support adding pages to initialized enclave"); + } + + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0x8007); + + self->run.exception_vector = 0; + self->run.exception_error_code = 0; + self->run.exception_addr = 0; + + /* Handle AEX by running EACCEPT from new entry point. */ + self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base + PAGE_SIZE; + + eaccept_op.epc_addr = self->encl.encl_base + total_size; + eaccept_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_R | SGX_SECINFO_W | SGX_SECINFO_REG | SGX_SECINFO_PENDING; + eaccept_op.ret = 0; + eaccept_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EACCEPT; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0); + + /* Can now return to main TCS to resume execution. */ + self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base; + + EXPECT_EQ(vdso_sgx_enter_enclave((unsigned long)&put_addr_op, 0, 0, + ERESUME, 0, 0, + &self->run), + 0); + + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + + /* + * Read memory from newly added page that was just written to, + * confirming that data previously written (MAGIC) is present. + */ + get_addr_op.value = 0; + get_addr_op.addr = (unsigned long)addr; + get_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_ADDRESS; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EQ(get_addr_op.value, MAGIC); + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + + munmap(addr, PAGE_SIZE); +} + +/* + * Test for the addition of pages to an initialized enclave via a + * pre-emptive run of EACCEPT on page to be added. + */ +TEST_F(enclave, augment_via_eaccept) +{ + struct encl_op_get_from_addr get_addr_op; + struct encl_op_put_to_addr put_addr_op; + struct encl_op_eaccept eaccept_op; + size_t total_size = 0; + void *addr; + int i; + + if (!sgx2_supported()) + SKIP(return, "SGX2 not supported"); + + ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata)); + + memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run)); + self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base; + + for (i = 0; i < self->encl.nr_segments; i++) { + struct encl_segment *seg = &self->encl.segment_tbl[i]; + + total_size += seg->size; + } + + /* + * Actual enclave size is expected to be larger than the loaded + * test enclave since enclave size must be a power of 2 in bytes while + * test_encl does not consume it all. + */ + EXPECT_LT(total_size + PAGE_SIZE, self->encl.encl_size); + + /* + * mmap() a page at end of existing enclave to be used for dynamic + * EPC page. + */ + + addr = mmap((void *)self->encl.encl_base + total_size, PAGE_SIZE, + PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC, MAP_SHARED | MAP_FIXED, + self->encl.fd, 0); + EXPECT_NE(addr, MAP_FAILED); + + self->run.exception_vector = 0; + self->run.exception_error_code = 0; + self->run.exception_addr = 0; + + /* + * Run EACCEPT on new page to trigger the #PF->EAUG->EACCEPT(again + * without a #PF). All should be transparent to userspace. + */ + eaccept_op.epc_addr = self->encl.encl_base + total_size; + eaccept_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_R | SGX_SECINFO_W | SGX_SECINFO_REG | SGX_SECINFO_PENDING; + eaccept_op.ret = 0; + eaccept_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EACCEPT; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + if (self->run.exception_vector == 14 && + self->run.exception_error_code == 4 && + self->run.exception_addr == self->encl.encl_base + total_size) { + munmap(addr, PAGE_SIZE); + SKIP(return, "Kernel does not support adding pages to initialized enclave"); + } + + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0); + + /* + * New page should be accessible from within enclave - attempt to + * write to it. + */ + put_addr_op.value = MAGIC; + put_addr_op.addr = (unsigned long)addr; + put_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_ADDRESS; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + + /* + * Read memory from newly added page that was just written to, + * confirming that data previously written (MAGIC) is present. + */ + get_addr_op.value = 0; + get_addr_op.addr = (unsigned long)addr; + get_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_ADDRESS; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EQ(get_addr_op.value, MAGIC); + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + + munmap(addr, PAGE_SIZE); +} + TEST_HARNESS_MAIN -- 2.35.1

3 years, 4 months

1
0
0 0

[RFC PATCH v2.1 16/30] selftests/sgx: Add test for TCS page permission changes

by Jarkko Sakkinen

From: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre(a)intel.com> Kernel should not allow permission changes on TCS pages. Add test to confirm this behavior. Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre(a)intel.com> --- tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 74 insertions(+) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c index aec3355d2ace..ea5f2e064687 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c @@ -121,6 +121,24 @@ static Elf64_Sym *vdso_symtab_get(struct vdso_symtab *symtab, const char *name) return NULL; } +/* + * Return the offset in the enclave where the TCS segment can be found. + * The first RW segment loaded is the TCS. + */ +static off_t encl_get_tcs_offset(struct encl *encl) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < encl->nr_segments; i++) { + struct encl_segment *seg = &encl->segment_tbl[i]; + + if (i == 0 && seg->prot == (PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE)) + return seg->offset; + } + + return -1; +} + /* * Return the offset in the enclave where the data segment can be found. * The first RW segment loaded is the TCS, skip that to get info on the @@ -567,6 +585,62 @@ TEST_F(enclave, pte_permissions) EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); } +/* + * Modifying permissions of TCS page should not be possible. + */ +TEST_F(enclave, tcs_permissions) +{ + struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm ioc; + struct sgx_secinfo secinfo; + int ret, errno_save; + + ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata)); + + memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run)); + self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base; + + memset(&ioc, 0, sizeof(ioc)); + memset(&secinfo, 0, sizeof(secinfo)); + + /* + * Ensure kernel supports needed ioctl() and system supports needed + * commands. + */ + + ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS, &ioc); + errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0; + + /* + * Invalid parameters were provided during sanity check, + * expect command to fail. + */ + ASSERT_EQ(ret, -1); + + /* ret == -1 */ + if (errno_save == ENOTTY) + SKIP(return, + "Kernel does not support SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS ioctl()"); + else if (errno_save == ENODEV) + SKIP(return, "System does not support SGX2"); + + /* + * Attempt to make TCS page read-only. This is not allowed and + * should be prevented by the kernel. + */ + secinfo.flags = PROT_READ; + ioc.offset = encl_get_tcs_offset(&self->encl); + ioc.length = PAGE_SIZE; + ioc.secinfo = (unsigned long)&secinfo; + + ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS, &ioc); + errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0; + + EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1); + EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, EINVAL); + EXPECT_EQ(ioc.result, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(ioc.count, 0); +} + /* * Enclave page permission test. * -- 2.35.1

3 years, 4 months

1
0
0 0

[RFC PATCH v2.1 15/30] selftests/sgx: Add test for EPCM permission changes

by Jarkko Sakkinen

From: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre(a)intel.com> EPCM permission changes could be made from within (to relax permissions) or out (to restrict permissions) the enclave. Kernel support is needed when permissions are restricted to be able to call the privileged ENCLS[EMODPR] instruction and ensure PTEs allowing the restricted permissions are flushed. EPCM permissions can be relaxed via ENCLU[EMODPE] from within the enclave but the enclave still depends on the kernel to install PTEs with the new permissions. Add a test that exercises a few of the enclave page permission flows: 1) Test starts with a RW (from enclave and kernel perspective) enclave page that is mapped via a RW VMA. 2) Use the SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS ioctl() to restrict the enclave (EPCM) page permissions to read-only (kernel removes PTE in the process). 3) Run ENCLU[EACCEPT] from within the enclave to accept the new page permissions. 4) Attempt to write to the enclave page from within the enclave - this should fail with a page fault on the PTE since the page table entry accurately reflects the (read-only) EPCM permissions. 5) Restore EPCM permissions to RW by running ENCLU[EMODPE] from within the enclave. 6) Attempt to write to the enclave page from within the enclave - this should fail again with a page fault because even though the EPCM permissions are RW the PTE does not yet reflect that. 7) Use the SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS ioctl() to inform the kernel of new page permissions and PTEs will accurately reflect RW EPCM permissions. 8) Writing to enclave page from within enclave succeeds. Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre(a)intel.com> --- tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h | 15 ++ tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c | 234 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c | 38 ++++ 3 files changed, 287 insertions(+) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h index 02d775789ea7..b638eb98c80c 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h @@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ enum encl_op_type { ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_ADDRESS, ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_ADDRESS, ENCL_OP_NOP, + ENCL_OP_EACCEPT, + ENCL_OP_EMODPE, ENCL_OP_MAX, }; @@ -53,4 +55,17 @@ struct encl_op_get_from_addr { uint64_t addr; }; +struct encl_op_eaccept { + struct encl_op_header header; + uint64_t epc_addr; + uint64_t flags; + uint64_t ret; +}; + +struct encl_op_emodpe { + struct encl_op_header header; + uint64_t epc_addr; + uint64_t flags; +}; + #endif /* DEFINES_H */ diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c index dd74fa42302e..aec3355d2ace 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c @@ -25,6 +25,18 @@ static const uint64_t MAGIC = 0x1122334455667788ULL; static const uint64_t MAGIC2 = 0x8877665544332211ULL; vdso_sgx_enter_enclave_t vdso_sgx_enter_enclave; +/* + * Security Information (SECINFO) data structure needed by a few SGX + * instructions (eg. ENCLU[EACCEPT] and ENCLU[EMODPE]) holds meta-data + * about an enclave page. &enum sgx_secinfo_page_state specifies the + * secinfo flags used for page state. + */ +enum sgx_secinfo_page_state { + SGX_SECINFO_PENDING = (1 << 3), + SGX_SECINFO_MODIFIED = (1 << 4), + SGX_SECINFO_PR = (1 << 5), +}; + struct vdso_symtab { Elf64_Sym *elf_symtab; const char *elf_symstrtab; @@ -555,4 +567,226 @@ TEST_F(enclave, pte_permissions) EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); } +/* + * Enclave page permission test. + * + * Modify and restore enclave page's EPCM (enclave) permissions from + * outside enclave (ENCLS[EMODPR] via kernel) as well as from within + * enclave (via ENCLU[EMODPE]). Kernel should ensure PTE permissions + * are the same as the EPCM permissions so check for page fault if + * VMA allows access but EPCM and PTE does not. + */ +TEST_F(enclave, epcm_permissions) +{ + struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm restrict_ioc; + struct encl_op_get_from_addr get_addr_op; + struct encl_op_put_to_addr put_addr_op; + struct encl_op_eaccept eaccept_op; + struct encl_op_emodpe emodpe_op; + struct sgx_secinfo secinfo; + unsigned long data_start; + int ret, errno_save; + + ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata)); + + memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run)); + self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base; + + /* + * Ensure kernel supports needed ioctl() and system supports needed + * commands. + */ + memset(&restrict_ioc, 0, sizeof(restrict_ioc)); + memset(&secinfo, 0, sizeof(secinfo)); + + ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS, + &restrict_ioc); + errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0; + + /* + * Invalid parameters were provided during sanity check, + * expect command to fail. + */ + ASSERT_EQ(ret, -1); + + /* ret == -1 */ + if (errno_save == ENOTTY) + SKIP(return, + "Kernel does not support SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS ioctl()"); + else if (errno_save == ENODEV) + SKIP(return, "System does not support SGX2"); + + /* + * Page that will have its permissions changed is the second data + * page in the .data segment. This forms part of the local encl_buffer + * within the enclave. + * + * At start of test @data_start should have EPCM as well as PTE + * permissions of RW. + */ + + data_start = self->encl.encl_base + + encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE; + + /* + * Sanity check that page at @data_start is writable before making + * any changes to page permissions. + * + * Start by writing MAGIC to test page. + */ + put_addr_op.value = MAGIC; + put_addr_op.addr = data_start; + put_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_ADDRESS; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + + /* + * Read memory that was just written to, confirming that + * page is writable. + */ + get_addr_op.value = 0; + get_addr_op.addr = data_start; + get_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_ADDRESS; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EQ(get_addr_op.value, MAGIC); + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + + /* + * Change EPCM permissions to read-only, PTE entry flushed by + * kernel in the process. + */ + memset(&restrict_ioc, 0, sizeof(restrict_ioc)); + memset(&secinfo, 0, sizeof(secinfo)); + + secinfo.flags = PROT_READ; + restrict_ioc.offset = encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE; + restrict_ioc.length = PAGE_SIZE; + restrict_ioc.secinfo = (unsigned long)&secinfo; + + ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS, + &restrict_ioc); + errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0; + + EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(restrict_ioc.result, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(restrict_ioc.count, 4096); + + /* + * EPCM permissions changed from kernel, need to EACCEPT from enclave. + */ + eaccept_op.epc_addr = data_start; + eaccept_op.flags = PROT_READ | SGX_SECINFO_REG | SGX_SECINFO_PR; + eaccept_op.ret = 0; + eaccept_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EACCEPT; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0); + + /* + * EPCM permissions of page is now read-only, expect #PF + * on PTE (not EPCM) when attempting to write to page from + * within enclave. + */ + put_addr_op.value = MAGIC2; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.function, ERESUME); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 14); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0x7); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, data_start); + + self->run.exception_vector = 0; + self->run.exception_error_code = 0; + self->run.exception_addr = 0; + + /* + * Received AEX but cannot return to enclave at same entrypoint, + * need different TCS from where EPCM permission can be made writable + * again. + */ + self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base + PAGE_SIZE; + + /* + * Enter enclave at new TCS to change EPCM permissions to be + * writable again and thus fix the page fault that triggered the + * AEX. + */ + + emodpe_op.epc_addr = data_start; + emodpe_op.flags = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE; + emodpe_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EMODPE; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&emodpe_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + + /* + * Attempt to return to main TCS to resume execution at faulting + * instruction, but PTE should still prevent writing to the page. + */ + self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base; + + EXPECT_EQ(vdso_sgx_enter_enclave((unsigned long)&put_addr_op, 0, 0, + ERESUME, 0, 0, + &self->run), + 0); + + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.function, ERESUME); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 14); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0x7); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, data_start); + + self->run.exception_vector = 0; + self->run.exception_error_code = 0; + self->run.exception_addr = 0; + + /* + * Wrong page permissions that caused original fault has + * now been fixed via EPCM permissions as well as PTE. + * Resume execution in main TCS to re-attempt the memory access. + */ + self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base; + + EXPECT_EQ(vdso_sgx_enter_enclave((unsigned long)&put_addr_op, 0, 0, + ERESUME, 0, 0, + &self->run), + 0); + + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + + get_addr_op.value = 0; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EQ(get_addr_op.value, MAGIC2); + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.user_data, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); +} + TEST_HARNESS_MAIN diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c index 4fca01cfd898..5b6c65331527 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c @@ -11,6 +11,42 @@ */ static uint8_t encl_buffer[8192] = { 1 }; +enum sgx_enclu_function { + EACCEPT = 0x5, + EMODPE = 0x6, +}; + +static void do_encl_emodpe(void *_op) +{ + struct sgx_secinfo secinfo __aligned(sizeof(struct sgx_secinfo)) = {0}; + struct encl_op_emodpe *op = _op; + + secinfo.flags = op->flags; + + asm volatile(".byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xd7" + : + : "a" (EMODPE), + "b" (&secinfo), + "c" (op->epc_addr)); +} + +static void do_encl_eaccept(void *_op) +{ + struct sgx_secinfo secinfo __aligned(sizeof(struct sgx_secinfo)) = {0}; + struct encl_op_eaccept *op = _op; + int rax; + + secinfo.flags = op->flags; + + asm volatile(".byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xd7" + : "=a" (rax) + : "a" (EACCEPT), + "b" (&secinfo), + "c" (op->epc_addr)); + + op->ret = rax; +} + static void *memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, size_t n) { size_t i; @@ -62,6 +98,8 @@ void encl_body(void *rdi, void *rsi) do_encl_op_put_to_addr, do_encl_op_get_from_addr, do_encl_op_nop, + do_encl_eaccept, + do_encl_emodpe, }; struct encl_op_header *op = (struct encl_op_header *)rdi; -- 2.35.1

3 years, 4 months

1
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0 0

[PATCH] userfaultfd/selftests: fix uninitialized_var.cocci warning

by Guo Zhengkui

fix following coccicheck warning: tools/testing/selftests/vm/userfaultfd.c:556:23-24: WARNING this kind of initialization is deprecated `unsigned long page_nr = *(&page_nr)` has the same form of uninitialized_var() macro. I remove the redundant assignement. It has been tested with gcc (Debian 8.3.0-6) 8.3.0. The patch which removed uninitialized_var() is: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20121028102007.GA7547@gmail.com/ And there is very few "/* GCC */" comments in the Linux kernel code now. Signed-off-by: Guo Zhengkui <guozhengkui(a)vivo.com> --- tools/testing/selftests/vm/userfaultfd.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/userfaultfd.c b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/userfaultfd.c index fe404398c65a..203c4a2c2109 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/userfaultfd.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/userfaultfd.c @@ -553,7 +553,7 @@ static void continue_range(int ufd, __u64 start, __u64 len) static void *locking_thread(void *arg) { unsigned long cpu = (unsigned long) arg; - unsigned long page_nr = *(&(page_nr)); /* uninitialized warning */ + unsigned long page_nr; unsigned long long count; if (!(bounces & BOUNCE_RANDOM)) { -- 2.20.1

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