Patch series "Fix va_high_addr_switch.sh test failure - again", v1.
There are two issues exist for the va_high_addr_switch test. One issue is
the test return value is ignored in va_high_addr_switch.sh. The second is
the va_high_addr_switch requires 6 hugepages but it requires 5.
Besides that, the nr_hugepages setup in run_vmtests.sh for arm64 can be
done in va_high_addr_switch.sh too.
This patch: (of 3)
The return value should be return value of va_high_addr_switch, otherwise
a test failure would be silently ignored.
Fixes: d9d957bd7b61 ("selftests/mm: alloc hugepages in va_high_addr_switch test")
CC: Luiz Capitulino <luizcap(a)redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chunyu Hu <chuhu(a)redhat.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/mm/va_high_addr_switch.sh | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/va_high_addr_switch.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/mm/va_high_addr_switch.sh
index a7d4b02b21dd..f89fe078a8e6 100755
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/va_high_addr_switch.sh
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/mm/va_high_addr_switch.sh
@@ -114,4 +114,6 @@ save_nr_hugepages
# 4 keep_mapped pages, and one for tmp usage
setup_nr_hugepages 5
./va_high_addr_switch --run-hugetlb
+retcode=$?
restore_nr_hugepages
+exit $retcode
--
2.49.0
This introduces signal->exec_bprm, which is used to
fix the case when at least one of the sibling threads
is traced, and therefore the trace process may dead-lock
in ptrace_attach, but de_thread will need to wait for the
tracer to continue execution.
The solution is to detect this situation and allow
ptrace_attach to continue by temporarily releasing the
cred_guard_mutex, while de_thread() is still waiting for
traced zombies to be eventually released by the tracer.
In the case of the thread group leader we only have to wait
for the thread to become a zombie, which may also need
co-operation from the tracer due to PTRACE_O_TRACEEXIT.
When a tracer wants to ptrace_attach a task that already
is in execve, we simply retry the ptrace_may_access
check while temporarily installing the new credentials
and dumpability which are about to be used after execve
completes. If the ptrace_attach happens on a thread that
is a sibling-thread of the thread doing execve, it is
sufficient to check against the old credentials, as this
thread will be waited for, before the new credentials are
installed.
Other threads die quickly since the cred_guard_mutex is
released, but a deadly signal is already pending. In case
the mutex_lock_killable misses the signal, the non-zero
current->signal->exec_bprm makes sure they release the
mutex immediately and return with -ERESTARTNOINTR.
This means there is no API change, unlike the previous
version of this patch which was discussed here:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/b6537ae6-31b1-5c50-f32b-8b8332ace882@hotmail.d…
See tools/testing/selftests/ptrace/vmaccess.c
for a test case that gets fixed by this change.
Note that since the test case was originally designed to
test the ptrace_attach returning an error in this situation,
the test expectation needed to be adjusted, to allow the
API to succeed at the first attempt.
Signed-off-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger(a)hotmail.de>
---
fs/exec.c | 69 ++++++++++++++++-------
fs/proc/base.c | 6 ++
include/linux/cred.h | 1 +
include/linux/sched/signal.h | 18 ++++++
kernel/cred.c | 28 +++++++--
kernel/ptrace.c | 32 +++++++++++
kernel/seccomp.c | 12 +++-
tools/testing/selftests/ptrace/vmaccess.c | 23 +++++---
8 files changed, 155 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
v10: Changes to previous version, make the PTRACE_ATTACH
retun -EAGAIN, instead of execve return -ERESTARTSYS.
Added some lessions learned to the description.
v11: Check old and new credentials in PTRACE_ATTACH again without
changing the API.
Note: I got actually one response from an automatic checker to the v11 patch,
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/202107121344.wu68hEPF-lkp@intel.com/
which is complaining about:
>> kernel/ptrace.c:425:26: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces) @@ expected struct cred const *old_cred @@ got struct cred const [noderef] __rcu *real_cred @@
417 struct linux_binprm *bprm = task->signal->exec_bprm;
418 const struct cred *old_cred;
419 struct mm_struct *old_mm;
420
421 retval = down_write_killable(&task->signal->exec_update_lock);
422 if (retval)
423 goto unlock_creds;
424 task_lock(task);
> 425 old_cred = task->real_cred;
v12: Essentially identical to v11.
- Fixed a minor merge conflict in linux v5.17, and fixed the
above mentioned nit by adding __rcu to the declaration.
- re-tested the patch with all linux versions from v5.11 to v6.6
v10 was an alternative approach which did imply an API change.
But I would prefer to avoid such an API change.
The difficult part is getting the right dumpability flags assigned
before de_thread starts, hope you like this version.
If not, the v10 is of course also acceptable.
Thanks
Bernd.
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 2f2b0acec4f0..902d3b230485 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1041,11 +1041,13 @@ static int exec_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm)
return 0;
}
-static int de_thread(struct task_struct *tsk)
+static int de_thread(struct task_struct *tsk, struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
struct signal_struct *sig = tsk->signal;
struct sighand_struct *oldsighand = tsk->sighand;
spinlock_t *lock = &oldsighand->siglock;
+ struct task_struct *t = tsk;
+ bool unsafe_execve_in_progress = false;
if (thread_group_empty(tsk))
goto no_thread_group;
@@ -1068,6 +1070,19 @@ static int de_thread(struct task_struct *tsk)
if (!thread_group_leader(tsk))
sig->notify_count--;
+ while_each_thread(tsk, t) {
+ if (unlikely(t->ptrace)
+ && (t != tsk->group_leader || !t->exit_state))
+ unsafe_execve_in_progress = true;
+ }
+
+ if (unlikely(unsafe_execve_in_progress)) {
+ spin_unlock_irq(lock);
+ sig->exec_bprm = bprm;
+ mutex_unlock(&sig->cred_guard_mutex);
+ spin_lock_irq(lock);
+ }
+
while (sig->notify_count) {
__set_current_state(TASK_KILLABLE);
spin_unlock_irq(lock);
@@ -1158,6 +1173,11 @@ static int de_thread(struct task_struct *tsk)
release_task(leader);
}
+ if (unlikely(unsafe_execve_in_progress)) {
+ mutex_lock(&sig->cred_guard_mutex);
+ sig->exec_bprm = NULL;
+ }
+
sig->group_exec_task = NULL;
sig->notify_count = 0;
@@ -1169,6 +1189,11 @@ static int de_thread(struct task_struct *tsk)
return 0;
killed:
+ if (unlikely(unsafe_execve_in_progress)) {
+ mutex_lock(&sig->cred_guard_mutex);
+ sig->exec_bprm = NULL;
+ }
+
/* protects against exit_notify() and __exit_signal() */
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
sig->group_exec_task = NULL;
@@ -1253,6 +1278,24 @@ int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
if (retval)
return retval;
+ /* If the binary is not readable then enforce mm->dumpable=0 */
+ would_dump(bprm, bprm->file);
+ if (bprm->have_execfd)
+ would_dump(bprm, bprm->executable);
+
+ /*
+ * Figure out dumpability. Note that this checking only of current
+ * is wrong, but userspace depends on it. This should be testing
+ * bprm->secureexec instead.
+ */
+ if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP ||
+ is_dumpability_changed(current_cred(), bprm->cred) ||
+ !(uid_eq(current_euid(), current_uid()) &&
+ gid_eq(current_egid(), current_gid())))
+ set_dumpable(bprm->mm, suid_dumpable);
+ else
+ set_dumpable(bprm->mm, SUID_DUMP_USER);
+
/*
* Ensure all future errors are fatal.
*/
@@ -1261,7 +1304,7 @@ int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
/*
* Make this the only thread in the thread group.
*/
- retval = de_thread(me);
+ retval = de_thread(me, bprm);
if (retval)
goto out;
@@ -1284,11 +1327,6 @@ int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
if (retval)
goto out;
- /* If the binary is not readable then enforce mm->dumpable=0 */
- would_dump(bprm, bprm->file);
- if (bprm->have_execfd)
- would_dump(bprm, bprm->executable);
-
/*
* Release all of the old mmap stuff
*/
@@ -1350,18 +1388,6 @@ int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
me->sas_ss_sp = me->sas_ss_size = 0;
- /*
- * Figure out dumpability. Note that this checking only of current
- * is wrong, but userspace depends on it. This should be testing
- * bprm->secureexec instead.
- */
- if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP ||
- !(uid_eq(current_euid(), current_uid()) &&
- gid_eq(current_egid(), current_gid())))
- set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
- else
- set_dumpable(current->mm, SUID_DUMP_USER);
-
perf_event_exec();
__set_task_comm(me, kbasename(bprm->filename), true);
@@ -1480,6 +1506,11 @@ static int prepare_bprm_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (mutex_lock_interruptible(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex))
return -ERESTARTNOINTR;
+ if (unlikely(current->signal->exec_bprm)) {
+ mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+ return -ERESTARTNOINTR;
+ }
+
bprm->cred = prepare_exec_creds();
if (likely(bprm->cred))
return 0;
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index ffd54617c354..0da9adfadb48 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -2788,6 +2788,12 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_write(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
if (rv < 0)
goto out_free;
+ if (unlikely(current->signal->exec_bprm)) {
+ mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+ rv = -ERESTARTNOINTR;
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+
rv = security_setprocattr(PROC_I(inode)->op.lsm,
file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name, page,
count);
diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h
index f923528d5cc4..b01e309f5686 100644
--- a/include/linux/cred.h
+++ b/include/linux/cred.h
@@ -159,6 +159,7 @@ extern const struct cred *get_task_cred(struct task_struct *);
extern struct cred *cred_alloc_blank(void);
extern struct cred *prepare_creds(void);
extern struct cred *prepare_exec_creds(void);
+extern bool is_dumpability_changed(const struct cred *, const struct cred *);
extern int commit_creds(struct cred *);
extern void abort_creds(struct cred *);
extern const struct cred *override_creds(const struct cred *);
diff --git a/include/linux/sched/signal.h b/include/linux/sched/signal.h
index 0014d3adaf84..14df7073a0a8 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched/signal.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched/signal.h
@@ -234,9 +234,27 @@ struct signal_struct {
struct mm_struct *oom_mm; /* recorded mm when the thread group got
* killed by the oom killer */
+ struct linux_binprm *exec_bprm; /* Used to check ptrace_may_access
+ * against new credentials while
+ * de_thread is waiting for other
+ * traced threads to terminate.
+ * Set while de_thread is executing.
+ * The cred_guard_mutex is released
+ * after de_thread() has called
+ * zap_other_threads(), therefore
+ * a fatal signal is guaranteed to be
+ * already pending in the unlikely
+ * event, that
+ * current->signal->exec_bprm happens
+ * to be non-zero after the
+ * cred_guard_mutex was acquired.
+ */
+
struct mutex cred_guard_mutex; /* guard against foreign influences on
* credential calculations
* (notably. ptrace)
+ * Held while execve runs, except when
+ * a sibling thread is being traced.
* Deprecated do not use in new code.
* Use exec_update_lock instead.
*/
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index 98cb4eca23fb..586cb6c7cf6b 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -433,6 +433,28 @@ static bool cred_cap_issubset(const struct cred *set, const struct cred *subset)
return false;
}
+/**
+ * is_dumpability_changed - Will changing creds from old to new
+ * affect the dumpability in commit_creds?
+ *
+ * Return: false - dumpability will not be changed in commit_creds.
+ * Return: true - dumpability will be changed to non-dumpable.
+ *
+ * @old: The old credentials
+ * @new: The new credentials
+ */
+bool is_dumpability_changed(const struct cred *old, const struct cred *new)
+{
+ if (!uid_eq(old->euid, new->euid) ||
+ !gid_eq(old->egid, new->egid) ||
+ !uid_eq(old->fsuid, new->fsuid) ||
+ !gid_eq(old->fsgid, new->fsgid) ||
+ !cred_cap_issubset(old, new))
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+}
+
/**
* commit_creds - Install new credentials upon the current task
* @new: The credentials to be assigned
@@ -467,11 +489,7 @@ int commit_creds(struct cred *new)
get_cred(new); /* we will require a ref for the subj creds too */
/* dumpability changes */
- if (!uid_eq(old->euid, new->euid) ||
- !gid_eq(old->egid, new->egid) ||
- !uid_eq(old->fsuid, new->fsuid) ||
- !gid_eq(old->fsgid, new->fsgid) ||
- !cred_cap_issubset(old, new)) {
+ if (is_dumpability_changed(old, new)) {
if (task->mm)
set_dumpable(task->mm, suid_dumpable);
task->pdeath_signal = 0;
diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
index 443057bee87c..eb1c450bb7d7 100644
--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
#include <linux/signal.h>
#include <linux/uio.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
@@ -435,6 +436,28 @@ static int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task, long request,
if (retval)
goto unlock_creds;
+ if (unlikely(task->in_execve)) {
+ struct linux_binprm *bprm = task->signal->exec_bprm;
+ const struct cred __rcu *old_cred;
+ struct mm_struct *old_mm;
+
+ retval = down_write_killable(&task->signal->exec_update_lock);
+ if (retval)
+ goto unlock_creds;
+ task_lock(task);
+ old_cred = task->real_cred;
+ old_mm = task->mm;
+ rcu_assign_pointer(task->real_cred, bprm->cred);
+ task->mm = bprm->mm;
+ retval = __ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS);
+ rcu_assign_pointer(task->real_cred, old_cred);
+ task->mm = old_mm;
+ task_unlock(task);
+ up_write(&task->signal->exec_update_lock);
+ if (retval)
+ goto unlock_creds;
+ }
+
write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
retval = -EPERM;
if (unlikely(task->exit_state))
@@ -508,6 +531,14 @@ static int ptrace_traceme(void)
{
int ret = -EPERM;
+ if (mutex_lock_interruptible(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex))
+ return -ERESTARTNOINTR;
+
+ if (unlikely(current->signal->exec_bprm)) {
+ mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+ return -ERESTARTNOINTR;
+ }
+
write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
/* Are we already being traced? */
if (!current->ptrace) {
@@ -523,6 +554,7 @@ static int ptrace_traceme(void)
}
}
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+ mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
return ret;
}
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index 255999ba9190..b29bbfa0b044 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -1955,9 +1955,15 @@ static long seccomp_set_mode_filter(unsigned int flags,
* Make sure we cannot change seccomp or nnp state via TSYNC
* while another thread is in the middle of calling exec.
*/
- if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC &&
- mutex_lock_killable(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex))
- goto out_put_fd;
+ if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC) {
+ if (mutex_lock_killable(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex))
+ goto out_put_fd;
+
+ if (unlikely(current->signal->exec_bprm)) {
+ mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+ goto out_put_fd;
+ }
+ }
spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/ptrace/vmaccess.c b/tools/testing/selftests/ptrace/vmaccess.c
index 4db327b44586..3b7d81fb99bb 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/ptrace/vmaccess.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/ptrace/vmaccess.c
@@ -39,8 +39,15 @@ TEST(vmaccess)
f = open(mm, O_RDONLY);
ASSERT_GE(f, 0);
close(f);
- f = kill(pid, SIGCONT);
- ASSERT_EQ(f, 0);
+ f = waitpid(-1, NULL, 0);
+ ASSERT_NE(f, -1);
+ ASSERT_NE(f, 0);
+ ASSERT_NE(f, pid);
+ f = waitpid(-1, NULL, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(f, pid);
+ f = waitpid(-1, NULL, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(f, -1);
+ ASSERT_EQ(errno, ECHILD);
}
TEST(attach)
@@ -57,22 +64,24 @@ TEST(attach)
sleep(1);
k = ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, pid, 0L, 0L);
- ASSERT_EQ(errno, EAGAIN);
- ASSERT_EQ(k, -1);
+ ASSERT_EQ(k, 0);
k = waitpid(-1, &s, WNOHANG);
ASSERT_NE(k, -1);
ASSERT_NE(k, 0);
ASSERT_NE(k, pid);
ASSERT_EQ(WIFEXITED(s), 1);
ASSERT_EQ(WEXITSTATUS(s), 0);
- sleep(1);
- k = ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, pid, 0L, 0L);
+ k = waitpid(-1, &s, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(k, pid);
+ ASSERT_EQ(WIFSTOPPED(s), 1);
+ ASSERT_EQ(WSTOPSIG(s), SIGTRAP);
+ k = ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, pid, 0L, 0L);
ASSERT_EQ(k, 0);
k = waitpid(-1, &s, 0);
ASSERT_EQ(k, pid);
ASSERT_EQ(WIFSTOPPED(s), 1);
ASSERT_EQ(WSTOPSIG(s), SIGSTOP);
- k = ptrace(PTRACE_DETACH, pid, 0L, 0L);
+ k = ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, pid, 0L, 0L);
ASSERT_EQ(k, 0);
k = waitpid(-1, &s, 0);
ASSERT_EQ(k, pid);
--
2.39.2
Hi all,
This patch series introduces improvements to the cgroup selftests by adding
a helper function to better handle asynchronous updates in cgroup statistics.
These changes are especially useful for managing cgroup stats like
memory.stat and cgroup.stat, which can be affected by delays (e.g., RCU
callbacks and asynchronous rstat flushing).
Patch 1/3 adds cg_read_key_long_poll(), a generic helper to poll a numeric
key in a cgroup file until it reaches an expected value or a retry limit is
hit. Patches 2/3 and 3/3 convert existing tests to use this helper, making
them more robust on busy systems.
v5:
- Drop the "/* 3s total */" comment from MEMCG_SOCKSTAT_WAIT_RETRIES as
suggested by Shakeel, so it does not become stale if the wait interval
changes.
- Elaborate in the commit message of patch 3/3 on the rationale behind the
8s timeout in test_kmem_dead_cgroups(), and add a comment next to
KMEM_DEAD_WAIT_RETRIES explaining that it is a generous upper bound
derived from stress testing and not tied to a specific kernel constant.
- Add Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeel.butt(a)linux.dev> to this series.
- Link to v4: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251124123816.486164-1-zhangguopeng@kylinos.cn/
v4:
- Patch 1/3: Add the cg_read_key_long_poll() helper to poll cgroup keys
with retries and configurable intervals.
- Patch 2/3: Update test_memcg_sock() to use cg_read_key_long_poll() for
handling delayed "sock " counter updates in memory.stat.
- Patch 3/3: Replace the sleep-and-retry logic in test_kmem_dead_cgroups()
with cg_read_key_long_poll() for waiting on nr_dying_descendants.
- Link to v3: https://lore.kernel.org/all/p655qedqjaakrnqpytc6dltejfluxo6jrffcltfz2ivonmk…
v3:
- Move MEMCG_SOCKSTAT_WAIT_* defines after the #include block as suggested.
- Link to v2: https://lore.kernel.org/all/5ad2b75f-748a-4e93-8d11-63295bda0cbf@linux.dev/
v2:
- Clarify the rationale for the 3s timeout and mention the periodic rstat
flush interval (FLUSH_TIME = 2 * HZ) in the comment.
- Replace hardcoded retry count and wait interval with macros to avoid
magic numbers and make the timeout calculation explicit.
- Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251119122758.85610-1-ioworker0@gmail.com/
Thanks to Michal Koutný for the suggestion, and to Lance Yang and Shakeel Butt for their reviews and feedback.
Guopeng Zhang (3):
selftests: cgroup: Add cg_read_key_long_poll() to poll a cgroup key
with retries
selftests: cgroup: make test_memcg_sock robust against delayed sock
stats
selftests: cgroup: Replace sleep with cg_read_key_long_poll() for
waiting on nr_dying_descendants
.../selftests/cgroup/lib/cgroup_util.c | 21 ++++++++++++
.../cgroup/lib/include/cgroup_util.h | 5 +++
tools/testing/selftests/cgroup/test_kmem.c | 33 +++++++++----------
.../selftests/cgroup/test_memcontrol.c | 20 ++++++++++-
4 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
--
2.25.1
[ based on kvm/next ]
Unmapping virtual machine guest memory from the host kernel's direct map
is a successful mitigation against Spectre-style transient execution
issues: if the kernel page tables do not contain entries pointing to
guest memory, then any attempted speculative read through the direct map
will necessarily be blocked by the MMU before any observable
microarchitectural side-effects happen. This means that Spectre-gadgets
and similar cannot be used to target virtual machine memory. Roughly
60% of speculative execution issues fall into this category [1, Table
1].
This patch series extends guest_memfd with the ability to remove its
memory from the host kernel's direct map, to be able to attain the above
protection for KVM guests running inside guest_memfd.
Additionally, a Firecracker branch with support for these VMs can be
found on GitHub [2].
For more details, please refer to the v5 cover letter. No substantial
changes in design have taken place since.
See also related write() syscall support in guest_memfd [3] where
the interoperation between the two features is described.
Changes since v7:
- David: separate patches for adding x86 and ARM support
- Dave/Will: drop support for disabling TLB flushes
v7: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20250924151101.2225820-1-patrick.roy@campus.lmu…
v6: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20250912091708.17502-1-roypat@amazon.co.uk
v5: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20250828093902.2719-1-roypat@amazon.co.uk
v4: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20250221160728.1584559-1-roypat@amazon.co.uk
RFCv3: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20241030134912.515725-1-roypat@amazon.co.uk
RFCv2: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20240910163038.1298452-1-roypat@amazon.co.uk
RFCv1: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20240709132041.3625501-1-roypat@amazon.co.uk
[1] https://download.vusec.net/papers/quarantine_raid23.pdf
[2] https://github.com/firecracker-microvm/firecracker/tree/feature/secret-hidi…
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20251114151828.98165-1-kalyazin@amazon.com
Patrick Roy (13):
x86: export set_direct_map_valid_noflush to KVM module
x86/tlb: export flush_tlb_kernel_range to KVM module
mm: introduce AS_NO_DIRECT_MAP
KVM: guest_memfd: Add stub for kvm_arch_gmem_invalidate
KVM: guest_memfd: Add flag to remove from direct map
KVM: x86: define kvm_arch_gmem_supports_no_direct_map()
KVM: arm64: define kvm_arch_gmem_supports_no_direct_map()
KVM: selftests: load elf via bounce buffer
KVM: selftests: set KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD in vm_mem_add() if guest_memfd
!= -1
KVM: selftests: Add guest_memfd based vm_mem_backing_src_types
KVM: selftests: cover GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_NO_DIRECT_MAP in existing
selftests
KVM: selftests: stuff vm_mem_backing_src_type into vm_shape
KVM: selftests: Test guest execution from direct map removed gmem
Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 22 ++++---
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 13 ++++
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 9 +++
arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h | 3 +-
arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 1 +
arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 1 +
include/linux/kvm_host.h | 14 ++++
include/linux/pagemap.h | 16 +++++
include/linux/secretmem.h | 18 ------
include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 1 +
lib/buildid.c | 4 +-
mm/gup.c | 19 ++----
mm/mlock.c | 2 +-
mm/secretmem.c | 8 +--
.../testing/selftests/kvm/guest_memfd_test.c | 17 ++++-
.../testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util.h | 37 ++++++++---
.../testing/selftests/kvm/include/test_util.h | 8 +++
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/elf.c | 8 +--
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/io.c | 23 +++++++
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c | 59 +++++++++--------
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/test_util.c | 8 +++
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86/sev.c | 1 +
.../selftests/kvm/pre_fault_memory_test.c | 1 +
.../selftests/kvm/set_memory_region_test.c | 52 +++++++++++++--
.../kvm/x86/private_mem_conversions_test.c | 7 +-
virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++--
26 files changed, 314 insertions(+), 102 deletions(-)
base-commit: e0c26d47def7382d7dbd9cad58bc653aed75737a
--
2.50.1
Hi,
the kernel selftests do not currently support glibc v2.35 and older.
This is primarily because glibc v2.36 added support for syscall API
functions such as fsopen, move_mount, fsmount, open_tree, and fsconfig,
and those API functions are now used in several tests.
As result, glibc v2.35 and older are no longer supported, at least not
for affected tests.
Historically the selftest framework implemented such functions with
wrappers named sys_<syscall>. This means that sys_<syscall> and <syscall>
functions are now used in parallel.
I see a number of possibilities to solve the problem.
1) Do nothing. Document somewhere that glibc v2.35 and older is not
supported by the kernel selftests.
2) Document that glibc v2.35 and older is not supported, drop
all wrappers implementing the sys_<syscall> functions, and rename
the calling code to <syscall>.
3) Rename all calls to sys_<syscall> to <syscall> and modify the
wrapper code to only implement those functions for glibc v2.35 and
older.
4) Add defines to the existing wrapper code to also define <syscall>
in addition to sys_<syscall>, and leave the code otherwise alone.
What would be the preferred solution ? My personal preference would be 3),
followed by 4).
Thanks,
Guenter
Hi,
This series fixes a verifier issue with bpf_d_path() and adds a
regression test to cover its use within a hook function.
Patch 1 updates the bpf_d_path() helper prototype so that the second
argument is marked as MEM_WRITE. This makes it explicit to the verifier
that the helper writes into the provided buffer.
Patch 2 extends the existing d_path selftest to cover incorrect verifier
assumptions caused by an incorrect function prototype. The test program calls
bpf_d_path() and checks if the first character of the path is '/'.
It ensures the verifier does not assume the buffer remains unwritten.
Changelog
=========
v4:
- Use the fallocate hook instead of an LSM hook to simplify the selftest,
as suggested by Matt and Alexei.
- Add a utility function in test_d_path.c to load the BPF program,
improving code reuse.
v3:
- Switch the pathname prefix loop to use bpf_for() instead of
#pragma unroll, as suggested by Matt.
- Remove /tmp/bpf_d_path_test in the test cleanup path.
- Add the missing Reviewed-by tags.
v2:
- Merge the new test into the existing d_path selftest rather than
creating new files.
- Add PID filtering in the LSM program to avoid nondeterministic failures
due to unrelated processes triggering bprm_check_security.
- Synchronize child execution using a pipe to ensure deterministic
updates to the PID.
Thanks for your time and reviews.
Shuran Liu (2):
bpf: mark bpf_d_path() buffer as writeable
selftests/bpf: add regression test for bpf_d_path()
kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 2 +-
.../testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/d_path.c | 90 +++++++++++++++----
.../testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_d_path.c | 23 +++++
3 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
--
2.52.0