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[PATCH net 1/2] net: mscc: ocelot: delete PVID VLAN when readding it as non-PVID

by Vladimir Oltean

The following set of commands: ip link add br0 type bridge vlan_filtering 1 # vlan_default_pvid 1 is implicit ip link set swp0 master br0 bridge vlan add dev swp0 vid 1 should result in the dropping of untagged and 802.1p-tagged traffic, but we see that it continues to be accepted. Whereas, had we deleted VID 1 instead, the aforementioned dropping would have worked This is because the ANA_PORT_DROP_CFG update logic doesn't run, because ocelot_vlan_add() only calls ocelot_port_set_pvid() if the new VLAN has the BRIDGE_VLAN_INFO_PVID flag. Similar to other drivers like mt7530_port_vlan_add() which handle this case correctly, we need to test whether the VLAN we're changing used to have the BRIDGE_VLAN_INFO_PVID flag, but lost it now. That amounts to a PVID deletion and should be treated as such. Regarding blame attribution: this never worked properly since the introduction of bridge VLAN filtering in commit 7142529f1688 ("net: mscc: ocelot: add VLAN filtering"). However, there was a significant paradigm shift which aligned the ANA_PORT_DROP_CFG register with the PVID concept rather than with the native VLAN concept, and that change wasn't targeted for 'stable'. Realistically, that is as far as this fix needs to be propagated to. Fixes: be0576fed6d3 ("net: mscc: ocelot: move the logic to drop 802.1p traffic to the pvid deletion") Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean(a)nxp.com> --- drivers/net/ethernet/mscc/ocelot.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mscc/ocelot.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mscc/ocelot.c index ef93df520887..08bee56aea35 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mscc/ocelot.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mscc/ocelot.c @@ -830,6 +830,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(ocelot_vlan_prepare); int ocelot_vlan_add(struct ocelot *ocelot, int port, u16 vid, bool pvid, bool untagged) { + struct ocelot_port *ocelot_port = ocelot->ports[port]; int err; /* Ignore VID 0 added to our RX filter by the 8021q module, since @@ -849,6 +850,11 @@ int ocelot_vlan_add(struct ocelot *ocelot, int port, u16 vid, bool pvid, ocelot_bridge_vlan_find(ocelot, vid)); if (err) return err; + } else if (ocelot_port->pvid_vlan && + ocelot_bridge_vlan_find(ocelot, vid) == ocelot_port->pvid_vlan) { + err = ocelot_port_set_pvid(ocelot, port, NULL); + if (err) + return err; } /* Untagged egress vlan clasification */ -- 2.43.0

8 months, 1 week

[PATCH v2 security-next 0/4] Introducing Hornet LSM

by Blaise Boscaccy

This patch series introduces the Hornet LSM. The goal of Hornet is to provide a signature verification mechanism for eBPF programs. eBPF has similar requirements to that of modules when it comes to loading: find symbol addresses, fix up ELF relocations, some struct field offset handling stuff called CO-RE (compile-once run-anywhere), and some other miscellaneous bookkeeping. During eBPF program compilation, pseudo-values get written to the immediate operands of instructions. During loading, those pseudo-values get rewritten with concrete addresses or data applicable to the currently running system, e.g., a kallsyms address or an fd for a map. This needs to happen before the instructions for a bpf program are loaded into the kernel via the bpf() syscall. Unlike modules, an in-kernel loader unfortunately doesn't exist. Typically, the instruction rewriting is done dynamically in userspace via libbpf. Since the relocations and instruction modifications are happening in userspace, and their values may change depending upon the running system, this breaks known signature verification mechanisms. Light skeleton programs were introduced in order to support early loading of eBPF programs along with user-mode drivers. They utilize a separate eBPF program that can load a target eBPF program and perform all necessary relocations in-kernel without needing a working userspace. Light skeletons were mentioned as a possible path forward for signature verification. Hornet takes a simple approach to light-skeleton-based eBPF signature verification. A PKCS#7 signature of a data buffer containing the raw instructions of an eBPF program, followed by the initial values of any maps used by the program is used. A utility script is provided to parse and extract the contents of autogenerated header files created via bpftool. That payload can then be signed and appended to the light skeleton executable. Maps are frozen to prevent TOCTOU bugs where a sufficiently privileged user could rewrite map data between the calls to BPF_PROG_LOAD and BPF_PROG_RUN. Additionally, both sparse-array-based and fd_array_cnt-based map fd arrays are supported for signature verification. References: [1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220209054315.73833-1-alexei.starovoitov@gmail… [2] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAADnVQ+wPK1KKZhCgb-Nnf0Xfjk8M1UpX5fnXC=cBzdEYb… Change list: - v1 -> v2 - Jargon clarification, maintainer entry and a few cosmetic fixes Revisions: - v1 https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250321164537.16719-1-bboscaccy@linux.microsof… Blaise Boscaccy (4): security: Hornet LSM hornet: Introduce sign-ebpf hornet: Add a light-skeleton data extactor script selftests/hornet: Add a selftest for the Hornet LSM Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/Hornet.rst | 53 +++ Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst | 1 + MAINTAINERS | 9 + crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 10 + include/linux/kernel_read_file.h | 1 + include/linux/verification.h | 1 + include/uapi/linux/lsm.h | 1 + scripts/Makefile | 1 + scripts/hornet/Makefile | 5 + scripts/hornet/extract-skel.sh | 29 ++ scripts/hornet/sign-ebpf.c | 411 +++++++++++++++++++ security/Kconfig | 3 +- security/Makefile | 1 + security/hornet/Kconfig | 11 + security/hornet/Makefile | 4 + security/hornet/hornet_lsm.c | 239 +++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/Makefile | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/hornet/Makefile | 51 +++ tools/testing/selftests/hornet/loader.c | 21 + tools/testing/selftests/hornet/trivial.bpf.c | 33 ++ 20 files changed, 885 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/Hornet.rst create mode 100644 scripts/hornet/Makefile create mode 100755 scripts/hornet/extract-skel.sh create mode 100644 scripts/hornet/sign-ebpf.c create mode 100644 security/hornet/Kconfig create mode 100644 security/hornet/Makefile create mode 100644 security/hornet/hornet_lsm.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/hornet/Makefile create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/hornet/loader.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/hornet/trivial.bpf.c -- 2.48.1

8 months, 1 week

[PATCH v12 net-next 0/5] DUALPI2 patch

by chia-yu.chang＠nokia-bell-labs.com

From: Chia-Yu Chang <chia-yu.chang(a)nokia-bell-labs.com> Hello, Please find the DualPI2 patch v12. v12 (22-Apr-2025) - Remove anonymous struct in sch_dualpi2.c (Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com>) - Replace u32/u8 with uint and s32 with int in tc spec document (Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com>) - Introduce get_memory_limit function to handle potential overflow when multipling limit with MTU (Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com>) - Double the packet length to further include packet overhead in memory_limit (Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com>) - Remove the check of qdisc_qlen(sch) when calling qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog (Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com>) v11 (15-Apr-2025) - Replace hstimer_init with hstimer_setup in sch_dualpi2.c v10 (25-Mar-2025) - Remove leftover include in include/linux/netdevice.h and anonymous struct in sch_dualpi2.c (Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com>) - Use kfree_skb_reason() and add SKB_DROP_REASON_DUALPI2_STEP_DROP drop reason (Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com>) - Split sch_dualpi2.c into 3 patches (and overall 5 patches): Struct definition & parsing, Dump stats & configuration, Enqueue/Dequeue (Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com>) v9 (16-Mar-2025) - Fix mem_usage error in previous version - Add min_qlen_step to the dualpi2 attribute as the minimum queue length in number of packets in the L-queue to start step threshold marking. In previous versions, this value was fixed to 2, so the step threshold was applied to mark packets in the L queue only when the queue length of the L queue was greater than or equal to 2 packets. This will cause larger queuing delays for L4S traffic at low rates (<20Mbps). So we parameterize it and change the default value to 0. Comparison of tcp_1down run 'HTB 20Mbit + DUALPI2 + 10ms base delay' Old versions: avg median # data pts Ping (ms) ICMP : 11.55 11.70 ms 350 TCP upload avg : 18.96 N/A Mbits/s 350 TCP upload sum : 18.96 N/A Mbits/s 350 New version (v9): avg median # data pts Ping (ms) ICMP : 10.81 10.70 ms 350 TCP upload avg : 18.91 N/A Mbits/s 350 TCP upload sum : 18.91 N/A Mbits/s 350 Comparison of tcp_1down run 'HTB 10Mbit + DUALPI2 + 10ms base delay' Old versions: avg median # data pts Ping (ms) ICMP : 12.61 12.80 ms 350 TCP upload avg : 9.48 N/A Mbits/s 350 TCP upload sum : 9.48 N/A Mbits/s 350 New version (v9): avg median # data pts Ping (ms) ICMP : 11.06 10.80 ms 350 TCP upload avg : 9.43 N/A Mbits/s 350 TCP upload sum : 9.43 N/A Mbits/s 350 Comparison of tcp_1down run 'HTB 10Mbit + DUALPI2 + 10ms base delay' Old versions: avg median # data pts Ping (ms) ICMP : 40.86 37.45 ms 350 TCP upload avg : 0.88 N/A Mbits/s 350 TCP upload sum : 0.88 N/A Mbits/s 350 TCP upload::1 : 0.88 0.97 Mbits/s 350 New version (v9): avg median # data pts Ping (ms) ICMP : 11.07 10.40 ms 350 TCP upload avg : 0.55 N/A Mbits/s 350 TCP upload sum : 0.55 N/A Mbits/s 350 TCP upload::1 : 0.55 0.59 Mbits/s 350 v8 (11-Mar-2025) - Fix warning messages in v7 v7 (07-Mar-2025) - Separate into 3 patches to avoid mixing changes of documentation, selftest, and code. (Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong(a)gmail.com>) v6 (04-Mar-2025) - Add modprobe for dulapi2 in tc-testing script tc-testing/tdc.sh (Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org>) - Update test cases in dualpi2.json - Update commit message v5 (22-Feb-2025) - A comparison was done between MQ + DUALPI2, MQ + FQ_PIE, MQ + FQ_CODEL: Unshaped 1gigE with 4 download streams test: - Summary of tcp_4down run 'MQ + FQ_CODEL': avg median # data pts Ping (ms) ICMP : 1.19 1.34 ms 349 TCP download avg : 235.42 N/A Mbits/s 349 TCP download sum : 941.68 N/A Mbits/s 349 TCP download::1 : 235.19 235.39 Mbits/s 349 TCP download::2 : 235.03 235.35 Mbits/s 349 TCP download::3 : 236.89 235.44 Mbits/s 349 TCP download::4 : 234.57 235.19 Mbits/s 349 - Summary of tcp_4down run 'MQ + FQ_PIE' avg median # data pts Ping (ms) ICMP : 1.21 1.37 ms 350 TCP download avg : 235.42 N/A Mbits/s 350 TCP download sum : 941.61 N/A Mbits/s 350 TCP download::1 : 232.54 233.13 Mbits/s 350 TCP download::2 : 232.52 232.80 Mbits/s 350 TCP download::3 : 233.14 233.78 Mbits/s 350 TCP download::4 : 243.41 241.48 Mbits/s 350 - Summary of tcp_4down run 'MQ + DUALPI2' avg median # data pts Ping (ms) ICMP : 1.19 1.34 ms 349 TCP download avg : 235.42 N/A Mbits/s 349 TCP download sum : 941.68 N/A Mbits/s 349 TCP download::1 : 235.19 235.39 Mbits/s 349 TCP download::2 : 235.03 235.35 Mbits/s 349 TCP download::3 : 236.89 235.44 Mbits/s 349 TCP download::4 : 234.57 235.19 Mbits/s 349 Unshaped 1gigE with 128 download streams test: - Summary of tcp_128down run 'MQ + FQ_CODEL': avg median # data pts Ping (ms) ICMP : 1.88 1.86 ms 350 TCP download avg : 7.39 N/A Mbits/s 350 TCP download sum : 946.47 N/A Mbits/s 350 - Summary of tcp_128down run 'MQ + FQ_PIE': avg median # data pts Ping (ms) ICMP : 1.88 1.86 ms 350 TCP download avg : 7.39 N/A Mbits/s 350 TCP download sum : 946.47 N/A Mbits/s 350 - Summary of tcp_128down run 'MQ + DUALPI2': avg median # data pts Ping (ms) ICMP : 1.88 1.86 ms 350 TCP download avg : 7.39 N/A Mbits/s 350 TCP download sum : 946.47 N/A Mbits/s 350 Unshaped 10gigE with 4 download streams test: - Summary of tcp_4down run 'MQ + FQ_CODEL': avg median # data pts Ping (ms) ICMP : 0.22 0.23 ms 350 TCP download avg : 2354.08 N/A Mbits/s 350 TCP download sum : 9416.31 N/A Mbits/s 350 TCP download::1 : 2353.65 2352.81 Mbits/s 350 TCP download::2 : 2354.54 2354.21 Mbits/s 350 TCP download::3 : 2353.56 2353.78 Mbits/s 350 TCP download::4 : 2354.56 2354.45 Mbits/s 350 - Summary of tcp_4down run 'MQ + FQ_PIE': avg median # data pts Ping (ms) ICMP : 0.20 0.19 ms 350 TCP download avg : 2354.76 N/A Mbits/s 350 TCP download sum : 9419.04 N/A Mbits/s 350 TCP download::1 : 2354.77 2353.89 Mbits/s 350 TCP download::2 : 2353.41 2354.29 Mbits/s 350 TCP download::3 : 2356.18 2354.19 Mbits/s 350 TCP download::4 : 2354.68 2353.15 Mbits/s 350 - Summary of tcp_4down run 'MQ + DUALPI2': avg median # data pts Ping (ms) ICMP : 0.24 0.24 ms 350 TCP download avg : 2354.11 N/A Mbits/s 350 TCP download sum : 9416.43 N/A Mbits/s 350 TCP download::1 : 2354.75 2353.93 Mbits/s 350 TCP download::2 : 2353.15 2353.75 Mbits/s 350 TCP download::3 : 2353.49 2353.72 Mbits/s 350 TCP download::4 : 2355.04 2353.73 Mbits/s 350 Unshaped 10gigE with 128 download streams test: - Summary of tcp_128down run 'MQ + FQ_CODEL': avg median # data pts Ping (ms) ICMP : 7.57 8.69 ms 350 TCP download avg : 73.97 N/A Mbits/s 350 TCP download sum : 9467.82 N/A Mbits/s 350 - Summary of tcp_128down run 'MQ + FQ_PIE': avg median # data pts Ping (ms) ICMP : 7.82 8.91 ms 350 TCP download avg : 73.97 N/A Mbits/s 350 TCP download sum : 9468.42 N/A Mbits/s 350 - Summary of tcp_128down run 'MQ + DUALPI2': avg median # data pts Ping (ms) ICMP : 6.87 7.93 ms 350 TCP download avg : 73.95 N/A Mbits/s 350 TCP download sum : 9465.87 N/A Mbits/s 350 From the results shown above, we see small differences between combinations. - Update commit message to include results of no_split_gso and split_gso (Dave Taht <dave.taht(a)gmail.com> and Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com>) - Add memlimit in the dualpi2 attribute, and add memory_used, max_memory_used, memory_limit in dualpi2 stats (Dave Taht <dave.taht(a)gmail.com>) - Update note in sch_dualpi2.c related to BBRv3 status (Dave Taht <dave.taht(a)gmail.com>) - Update license identifier (Dave Taht <dave.taht(a)gmail.com>) - Add selftest in tools/testing/selftests/tc-testing (Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong(a)gmail.com>) - Use netlink policies for parameter checks (Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs(a)mojatatu.com>) - Modify texts & fix typos in Documentation/netlink/specs/tc.yaml (Dave Taht <dave.taht(a)gmail.com>) - Add descriptions of packet counter statistics and the reset function of sch_dualpi2.c - Fix step_thresh in packets - Update code comments in sch_dualpi2.c v4 (22-Oct-2024) - Update statement in Kconfig for DualPI2 (Stephen Hemminger <stephen(a)networkplumber.org>) - Put a blank line after #define in sch_dualpi2.c (Stephen Hemminger <stephen(a)networkplumber.org>) - Fix line length warning. v3 (19-Oct-2024) - Fix compilaiton error - Update Documentation/netlink/specs/tc.yaml (Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org>) v2 (18-Oct-2024) - Add Documentation/netlink/specs/tc.yaml (Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org>) - Use dualpi2 instead of skb prefix (Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs(a)mojatatu.com>) - Replace nla_parse_nested_deprecated with nla_parse_nested (Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs(a)mojatatu.com>) - Fix line length warning For more details of DualPI2, please refer IETF RFC9332 (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9332). Best regards, Chia-Yu Chia-Yu Chang (4): Documentation: netlink: specs: tc: Add DualPI2 specification selftests/tc-testing: Add selftests for qdisc DualPI2 sched: Struct definition and parsing of dualpi2 qdisc sched: Dump configuration and statistics of dualpi2 qdisc Koen De Schepper (1): sched: Add enqueue/dequeue of dualpi2 qdisc Documentation/netlink/specs/tc.yaml | 144 +++ include/net/dropreason-core.h | 6 + include/uapi/linux/pkt_sched.h | 39 + net/sched/Kconfig | 12 + net/sched/Makefile | 1 + net/sched/sch_dualpi2.c | 1096 +++++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/tc-testing/config | 1 + .../tc-testing/tc-tests/qdiscs/dualpi2.json | 149 +++ tools/testing/selftests/tc-testing/tdc.sh | 1 + 9 files changed, 1449 insertions(+) create mode 100644 net/sched/sch_dualpi2.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/tc-testing/tc-tests/qdiscs/dualpi2.json -- 2.34.1

8 months, 1 week

[PATCH net-next v4 0/3] Fix netdevim to correctly mark NAPI IDs

by Joe Damato

Greetings: Welcome to v4. This series fixes netdevsim to correctly set the NAPI ID on the skb. This is helpful for writing tests around features that use SO_INCOMING_NAPI_ID. In addition to the netdevsim fix in patch 1, patches 2 & 3 do some self test refactoring and add a test for NAPI IDs. The test itself (patch 3) introduces a C helper because apparently python doesn't have socket.SO_INCOMING_NAPI_ID. Thanks, Joe v4: - Updated the macro guard in patch 2 - Removed the remote deploy from patch 3 v3: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20250418013719.12094-1-jdamato@fastly.com/ - Dropped patch 3 from v2 as it is no longer necessary. - Patch 3 from this series (which was patch 4 in the v2) - Sorted .gitignore alphabetically - added cfg.remote_deploy so the test supports real remote machines - Dropped the NetNSEnter as it is unnecessary - Fixed a string interpolation issue that Paolo hit with his Python version v2: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20250417013301.39228-1-jdamato@fastly.com/ - No longer an RFC - Minor whitespace change in patch 1 (no functional change). - Patches 2-4 new in v2 rfcv1: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20250329000030.39543-1-jdamato@fastly.com/ Joe Damato (3): netdevsim: Mark NAPI ID on skb in nsim_rcv selftests: drv-net: Factor out ksft C helpers selftests: drv-net: Test that NAPI ID is non-zero drivers/net/netdevsim/netdev.c | 2 + .../testing/selftests/drivers/net/.gitignore | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/drivers/net/Makefile | 6 +- tools/testing/selftests/drivers/net/ksft.h | 56 +++++++++++++ .../testing/selftests/drivers/net/napi_id.py | 23 +++++ .../selftests/drivers/net/napi_id_helper.c | 83 +++++++++++++++++++ .../selftests/drivers/net/xdp_helper.c | 49 +---------- 7 files changed, 172 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/drivers/net/ksft.h create mode 100755 tools/testing/selftests/drivers/net/napi_id.py create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/drivers/net/napi_id_helper.c base-commit: cd7276ecac9c64c80433fbcff2e35aceaea6f477 -- 2.43.0

8 months, 1 week

[PATCH v12 00/28] riscv control-flow integrity for usermode

by Deepak Gupta

Basics and overview =================== Software with larger attack surfaces (e.g. network facing apps like databases, browsers or apps relying on browser runtimes) suffer from memory corruption issues which can be utilized by attackers to bend control flow of the program to eventually gain control (by making their payload executable). Attackers are able to perform such attacks by leveraging call-sites which rely on indirect calls or return sites which rely on obtaining return address from stack memory. To mitigate such attacks, risc-v extension zicfilp enforces that all indirect calls must land on a landing pad instruction `lpad` else cpu will raise software check exception (a new cpu exception cause code on riscv). Similarly for return flow, risc-v extension zicfiss extends architecture with - `sspush` instruction to push return address on a shadow stack - `sspopchk` instruction to pop return address from shadow stack and compare with input operand (i.e. return address on stack) - `sspopchk` to raise software check exception if comparision above was a mismatch - Protection mechanism using which shadow stack is not writeable via regular store instructions More information an details can be found at extensions github repo [1]. Equivalent to landing pad (zicfilp) on x86 is `ENDBRANCH` instruction in Intel CET [3] and branch target identification (BTI) [4] on arm. Similarly x86's Intel CET has shadow stack [5] and arm64 has guarded control stack (GCS) [6] which are very similar to risc-v's zicfiss shadow stack. x86 and arm64 support for user mode shadow stack is already in mainline. Kernel awareness for user control flow integrity ================================================ This series picks up Samuel Holland's envcfg changes [2] as well. So if those are being applied independently, they should be removed from this series. Enabling: In order to maintain compatibility and not break anything in user mode, kernel doesn't enable control flow integrity cpu extensions on binary by default. Instead exposes a prctl interface to enable, disable and lock the shadow stack or landing pad feature for a task. This allows userspace (loader) to enumerate if all objects in its address space are compiled with shadow stack and landing pad support and accordingly enable the feature. Additionally if a subsequent `dlopen` happens on a library, user mode can take a decision again to disable the feature (if incoming library is not compiled with support) OR terminate the task (if user mode policy is strict to have all objects in address space to be compiled with control flow integirty cpu feature). prctl to enable shadow stack results in allocating shadow stack from virtual memory and activating for user address space. x86 and arm64 are also following same direction due to similar reason(s). clone/fork: On clone and fork, cfi state for task is inherited by child. Shadow stack is part of virtual memory and is a writeable memory from kernel perspective (writeable via a restricted set of instructions aka shadow stack instructions) Thus kernel changes ensure that this memory is converted into read-only when fork/clone happens and COWed when fault is taken due to sspush, sspopchk or ssamoswap. In case `CLONE_VM` is specified and shadow stack is to be enabled, kernel will automatically allocate a shadow stack for that clone call. map_shadow_stack: x86 introduced `map_shadow_stack` system call to allow user space to explicitly map shadow stack memory in its address space. It is useful to allocate shadow for different contexts managed by a single thread (green threads or contexts) risc-v implements this system call as well. signal management: If shadow stack is enabled for a task, kernel performs an asynchronous control flow diversion to deliver the signal and eventually expects userspace to issue sigreturn so that original execution can be resumed. Even though resume context is prepared by kernel, it is in user space memory and is subject to memory corruption and corruption bugs can be utilized by attacker in this race window to perform arbitrary sigreturn and eventually bypass cfi mechanism. Another issue is how to ensure that cfi related state on sigcontext area is not trampled by legacy apps or apps compiled with old kernel headers. In order to mitigate control-flow hijacting, kernel prepares a token and place it on shadow stack before signal delivery and places address of token in sigcontext structure. During sigreturn, kernel obtains address of token from sigcontext struture, reads token from shadow stack and validates it and only then allow sigreturn to succeed. Compatiblity issue is solved by adopting dynamic sigcontext management introduced for vector extension. This series re-factor the code little bit to allow future sigcontext management easy (as proposed by Andy Chiu from SiFive) config and compilation: Introduce a new risc-v config option `CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI`. Selecting this config option picks the kernel support for user control flow integrity. This optin is presented only if toolchain has shadow stack and landing pad support. And is on purpose guarded by toolchain support. Reason being that eventually vDSO also needs to be compiled in with shadow stack and landing pad support. vDSO compile patches are not included as of now because landing pad labeling scheme is yet to settle for usermode runtime. To get more information on kernel interactions with respect to zicfilp and zicfiss, patch series adds documentation for `zicfilp` and `zicfiss` in following: Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfiss.rst Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfilp.rst How to test this series ======================= Toolchain --------- $ git clone git@github.com:sifive/riscv-gnu-toolchain.git -b cfi-dev $ riscv-gnu-toolchain/configure --prefix=<path-to-where-to-build> --with-arch=rv64gc_zicfilp_zicfiss --enable-linux --disable-gdb --with-extra-multilib-test="rv64gc_zicfilp_zicfiss-lp64d:-static" $ make -j$(nproc) Qemu ---- Get the lastest qemu $ cd qemu $ mkdir build $ cd build $ ../configure --target-list=riscv64-softmmu $ make -j$(nproc) Opensbi ------- $ git clone git@github.com:deepak0414/opensbi.git -b v6_cfi_spec_split_opensbi $ make CROSS_COMPILE=<your riscv toolchain> -j$(nproc) PLATFORM=generic Linux ----- Running defconfig is fine. CFI is enabled by default if the toolchain supports it. $ make ARCH=riscv CROSS_COMPILE=<path-to-cfi-riscv-gnu-toolchain>/build/bin/riscv64-unknown-linux-gnu- -j$(nproc) defconfig $ make ARCH=riscv CROSS_COMPILE=<path-to-cfi-riscv-gnu-toolchain>/build/bin/riscv64-unknown-linux-gnu- -j$(nproc) In case you're building your own rootfs using toolchain, please make sure you pick following patch to ensure that vDSO compiled with lpad and shadow stack. "arch/riscv: compile vdso with landing pad" Branch where above patch can be picked https://github.com/deepak0414/linux-riscv-cfi/tree/vdso_user_cfi_v6.12-rc1 Running ------- Modify your qemu command to have: -bios <path-to-cfi-opensbi>/build/platform/generic/firmware/fw_dynamic.bin -cpu rv64,zicfilp=true,zicfiss=true,zimop=true,zcmop=true vDSO related Opens (in the flux) ================================= I am listing these opens for laying out plan and what to expect in future patch sets. And of course for the sake of discussion. Shadow stack and landing pad enabling in vDSO ---------------------------------------------- vDSO must have shadow stack and landing pad support compiled in for task to have shadow stack and landing pad support. This patch series doesn't enable that (yet). Enabling shadow stack support in vDSO should be straight forward (intend to do that in next versions of patch set). Enabling landing pad support in vDSO requires some collaboration with toolchain folks to follow a single label scheme for all object binaries. This is necessary to ensure that all indirect call-sites are setting correct label and target landing pads are decorated with same label scheme. How many vDSOs --------------- Shadow stack instructions are carved out of zimop (may be operations) and if CPU doesn't implement zimop, they're illegal instructions. Kernel could be running on a CPU which may or may not implement zimop. And thus kernel will have to carry 2 different vDSOs and expose the appropriate one depending on whether CPU implements zimop or not. References ========== [1] - https://github.com/riscv/riscv-cfi [2] - https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240814081126.956287-1-samuel.holland@sifive.c… [3] - https://lwn.net/Articles/889475/ [4] - https://developer.arm.com/documentation/109576/0100/Branch-Target-Identific… [5] - https://www.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/catc17-i… [6] - https://lwn.net/Articles/940403/ --- changelog --------- v12: - It seems like I had accidently squashed arch agnostic indirect branch tracking prctl and riscv implementation of those prctls. Split them again. - set_shstk_status/set_indir_lp_status perform CSR writes only when CPU support is available. As suggested by Zong Li. - Some minor clean up in kselftests as suggested by Zong Li. v11: - patch "arch/riscv: compile vdso with landing pad" was unconditionally selecting `_zicfilp` for vDSO compile. fixed that. Changed `lpad 1` to to `lpad 0`. v10: - dropped "mm: helper `is_shadow_stack_vma` to check shadow stack vma". This patch is not that interesting to this patch series for risc-v. There are instances in arch directories where VM_SHADOW_STACK flag is anyways used. Dropping this patch to expedite merging in riscv tree. - Took suggestions from `Clement` on "riscv: zicfiss / zicfilp enumeration" to validate presence of cfi based on config. - Added a patch for vDSO to have `lpad 0`. I had omitted this earlier to make sure we add single vdso object with cfi enabled. But a vdso object with scheme of zero labeled landing pad is least common denominator and should work with all objects of zero labeled as well as function-signature labeled objects. v9: - rebased on master (39a803b754d5 fix braino in "9p: fix ->rename_sem exclusion") - dropped "mm: Introduce ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK" (master has it from arm64/gcs) - dropped "prctl: arch-agnostic prctl for shadow stack" (master has it from arm64/gcs) v8: - rebased on palmer/for-next - dropped samuel holland's `envcfg` context switch patches. they are in parlmer/for-next v7: - Removed "riscv/Kconfig: enable HAVE_EXIT_THREAD for riscv" Instead using `deactivate_mm` flow to clean up. see here for more context https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230908203655.543765-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.… - Changed the header include in `kselftest`. Hopefully this fixes compile issue faced by Zong Li at SiFive. - Cleaned up an orphaned change to `mm/mmap.c` in below patch "riscv/mm : ensure PROT_WRITE leads to VM_READ | VM_WRITE" - Lock interfaces for shadow stack and indirect branch tracking expect arg == 0 Any future evolution of this interface should accordingly define how arg should be setup. - `mm/map.c` has an instance of using `VM_SHADOW_STACK`. Fixed it to use helper `is_shadow_stack_vma`. - Link to v6: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241008-v5_user_cfi_series-v6-0-60d9fe073f37@riv… v6: - Picked up Samuel Holland's changes as is with `envcfg` placed in `thread` instead of `thread_info` - fixed unaligned newline escapes in kselftest - cleaned up messages in kselftest and included test output in commit message - fixed a bug in clone path reported by Zong Li - fixed a build issue if CONFIG_RISCV_ISA_V is not selected (this was introduced due to re-factoring signal context management code) v5: - rebased on v6.12-rc1 - Fixed schema related issues in device tree file - Fixed some of the documentation related issues in zicfilp/ss.rst (style issues and added index) - added `SHADOW_STACK_SET_MARKER` so that implementation can define base of shadow stack. - Fixed warnings on definitions added in usercfi.h when CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI is not selected. - Adopted context header based signal handling as proposed by Andy Chiu - Added support for enabling kernel mode access to shadow stack using FWFT (https://github.com/riscv-non-isa/riscv-sbi-doc/blob/master/src/ext-firmware…) - Link to v5: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241001-v5_user_cfi_series-v1-0-3ba65b6e550f@riv… (Note: I had an issue in my workflow due to which version number wasn't picked up correctly while sending out patches) v4: - rebased on 6.11-rc6 - envcfg: Converged with Samuel Holland's patches for envcfg management on per- thread basis. - vma_is_shadow_stack is renamed to is_vma_shadow_stack - picked up Mark Brown's `ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK` patch - signal context: using extended context management to maintain compatibility. - fixed `-Wmissing-prototypes` compiler warnings for prctl functions - Documentation fixes and amending typos. - Link to v4: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240912231650.3740732-1-debug@rivosinc.com/ v3: - envcfg logic to pick up base envcfg had a bug where `ENVCFG_CBZE` could have been picked on per task basis, even though CPU didn't implement it. Fixed in this series. - dt-bindings As suggested, split into separate commit. fixed the messaging that spec is in public review - arch_is_shadow_stack change arch_is_shadow_stack changed to vma_is_shadow_stack - hwprobe zicfiss / zicfilp if present will get enumerated in hwprobe - selftests As suggested, added object and binary filenames to .gitignore Selftest binary anyways need to be compiled with cfi enabled compiler which will make sure that landing pad and shadow stack are enabled. Thus removed separate enable/disable tests. Cleaned up tests a bit. - Link to v3: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240403234054.2020347-1-debug@rivosinc.com/ v2: - Using config `CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI`, kernel support for riscv control flow integrity for user mode programs can be compiled in the kernel. - Enabling of control flow integrity for user programs is left to user runtime - This patch series introduces arch agnostic `prctls` to enable shadow stack and indirect branch tracking. And implements them on riscv. --- --- Changes in v12: - EDITME: describe what is new in this series revision. - EDITME: use bulletpoints and terse descriptions. - Link to v11: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250310-v5_user_cfi_series-v11-0-86b36cbfb910@ri… Changes in v11: - EDITME: describe what is new in this series revision. - EDITME: use bulletpoints and terse descriptions. - Link to v10: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250210-v5_user_cfi_series-v10-0-163dcfa31c60@ri… --- Andy Chiu (1): riscv: signal: abstract header saving for setup_sigcontext Clément Léger (1): riscv: Add Firmware Feature SBI extensions definitions Deepak Gupta (25): mm: VM_SHADOW_STACK definition for riscv dt-bindings: riscv: zicfilp and zicfiss in dt-bindings (extensions.yaml) riscv: zicfiss / zicfilp enumeration riscv: zicfiss / zicfilp extension csr and bit definitions riscv: usercfi state for task and save/restore of CSR_SSP on trap entry/exit riscv/mm : ensure PROT_WRITE leads to VM_READ | VM_WRITE riscv mm: manufacture shadow stack pte riscv mmu: teach pte_mkwrite to manufacture shadow stack PTEs riscv mmu: write protect and shadow stack riscv/mm: Implement map_shadow_stack() syscall riscv/shstk: If needed allocate a new shadow stack on clone riscv: Implements arch agnostic shadow stack prctls prctl: arch-agnostic prctl for indirect branch tracking riscv: Implements arch agnostic indirect branch tracking prctls riscv/traps: Introduce software check exception riscv/signal: save and restore of shadow stack for signal riscv/kernel: update __show_regs to print shadow stack register riscv/ptrace: riscv cfi status and state via ptrace and in core files riscv/hwprobe: zicfilp / zicfiss enumeration in hwprobe riscv: enable kernel access to shadow stack memory via FWFT sbi call riscv: kernel command line option to opt out of user cfi riscv: create a config for shadow stack and landing pad instr support riscv: Documentation for landing pad / indirect branch tracking riscv: Documentation for shadow stack on riscv kselftest/riscv: kselftest for user mode cfi Jim Shu (1): arch/riscv: compile vdso with landing pad Documentation/arch/riscv/index.rst | 2 + Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfilp.rst | 115 +++++ Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfiss.rst | 176 +++++++ .../devicetree/bindings/riscv/extensions.yaml | 14 + arch/riscv/Kconfig | 20 + arch/riscv/Makefile | 5 +- arch/riscv/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h | 1 + arch/riscv/include/asm/assembler.h | 44 ++ arch/riscv/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 13 + arch/riscv/include/asm/csr.h | 16 + arch/riscv/include/asm/entry-common.h | 2 + arch/riscv/include/asm/hwcap.h | 2 + arch/riscv/include/asm/mman.h | 25 + arch/riscv/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 7 + arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h | 30 +- arch/riscv/include/asm/processor.h | 2 + arch/riscv/include/asm/sbi.h | 26 + arch/riscv/include/asm/thread_info.h | 3 + arch/riscv/include/asm/usercfi.h | 89 ++++ arch/riscv/include/asm/vector.h | 3 + arch/riscv/include/uapi/asm/hwprobe.h | 2 + arch/riscv/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h | 22 + arch/riscv/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h | 1 + arch/riscv/kernel/Makefile | 1 + arch/riscv/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 8 + arch/riscv/kernel/cpufeature.c | 13 + arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S | 31 +- arch/riscv/kernel/head.S | 12 + arch/riscv/kernel/process.c | 26 +- arch/riscv/kernel/ptrace.c | 83 ++++ arch/riscv/kernel/signal.c | 142 +++++- arch/riscv/kernel/sys_hwprobe.c | 2 + arch/riscv/kernel/sys_riscv.c | 10 + arch/riscv/kernel/traps.c | 43 ++ arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c | 530 +++++++++++++++++++++ arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/Makefile | 12 + arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/flush_icache.S | 4 + arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/getcpu.S | 4 + arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/rt_sigreturn.S | 4 + arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/sys_hwprobe.S | 4 + arch/riscv/mm/init.c | 2 +- arch/riscv/mm/pgtable.c | 17 + include/linux/cpu.h | 4 + include/linux/mm.h | 7 + include/uapi/linux/elf.h | 1 + include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 27 ++ kernel/sys.c | 30 ++ tools/testing/selftests/riscv/Makefile | 2 +- tools/testing/selftests/riscv/cfi/.gitignore | 3 + tools/testing/selftests/riscv/cfi/Makefile | 10 + tools/testing/selftests/riscv/cfi/cfi_rv_test.h | 82 ++++ tools/testing/selftests/riscv/cfi/riscv_cfi_test.c | 78 +++ tools/testing/selftests/riscv/cfi/shadowstack.c | 385 +++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/riscv/cfi/shadowstack.h | 27 ++ 54 files changed, 2195 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) --- base-commit: 39a803b754d5224a3522016b564113ee1e4091b2 change-id: 20240930-v5_user_cfi_series-3dc332f8f5b2 -- - debug

8 months, 1 week

[PATCH bpf-next v2] bpf: Allow XDP dev-bound programs to perform XDP_REDIRECT into maps

by Lorenzo Bianconi

In the current implementation if the program is dev-bound to a specific device, it will not be possible to perform XDP_REDIRECT into a DEVMAP or CPUMAP even if the program is running in the driver NAPI context and it is not attached to any map entry. This seems in contrast with the explanation available in bpf_prog_map_compatible routine. Fix the issue introducing __bpf_prog_map_compatible utility routine in order to avoid bpf_prog_is_dev_bound() check running bpf_check_tail_call() at program load time (bpf_prog_select_runtime()). Continue forbidding to attach a dev-bound program to XDP maps (BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY, BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP and BPF_MAP_TYPE_CPUMAP). Fixes: 3d76a4d3d4e59 ("bpf: XDP metadata RX kfuncs") Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo(a)kernel.org> --- Changes in v2: - Introduce __bpf_prog_map_compatible() utility routine in order to skip bpf_prog_is_dev_bound check in bpf_check_tail_call() - Extend xdp_metadata selftest - Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250422-xdp-prog-bound-fix-v1-1-0b581fa186fe@ker… --- kernel/bpf/core.c | 27 +++++++++++++--------- .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/xdp_metadata.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/xdp_metadata.c | 13 +++++++++++ 3 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c index ba6b6118cf504041278d05417c4212d57be6fca0..a3e571688421196c3ceaed62b3b59b62a0258a8c 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/core.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c @@ -2358,8 +2358,8 @@ static unsigned int __bpf_prog_ret0_warn(const void *ctx, return 0; } -bool bpf_prog_map_compatible(struct bpf_map *map, - const struct bpf_prog *fp) +static bool __bpf_prog_map_compatible(struct bpf_map *map, + const struct bpf_prog *fp) { enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(fp); bool ret; @@ -2368,14 +2368,6 @@ bool bpf_prog_map_compatible(struct bpf_map *map, if (fp->kprobe_override) return false; - /* XDP programs inserted into maps are not guaranteed to run on - * a particular netdev (and can run outside driver context entirely - * in the case of devmap and cpumap). Until device checks - * are implemented, prohibit adding dev-bound programs to program maps. - */ - if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(aux)) - return false; - spin_lock(&map->owner.lock); if (!map->owner.type) { /* There's no owner yet where we could check for @@ -2409,6 +2401,19 @@ bool bpf_prog_map_compatible(struct bpf_map *map, return ret; } +bool bpf_prog_map_compatible(struct bpf_map *map, const struct bpf_prog *fp) +{ + /* XDP programs inserted into maps are not guaranteed to run on + * a particular netdev (and can run outside driver context entirely + * in the case of devmap and cpumap). Until device checks + * are implemented, prohibit adding dev-bound programs to program maps. + */ + if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(fp->aux)) + return false; + + return __bpf_prog_map_compatible(map, fp); +} + static int bpf_check_tail_call(const struct bpf_prog *fp) { struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = fp->aux; @@ -2421,7 +2426,7 @@ static int bpf_check_tail_call(const struct bpf_prog *fp) if (!map_type_contains_progs(map)) continue; - if (!bpf_prog_map_compatible(map, fp)) { + if (!__bpf_prog_map_compatible(map, fp)) { ret = -EINVAL; goto out; } diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/xdp_metadata.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/xdp_metadata.c index 3d47878ef6bfb55c236dc9df2c100fcc449f8de3..19f92affc2daa23fdd869554e7a0475b86350a4f 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/xdp_metadata.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/xdp_metadata.c @@ -351,9 +351,10 @@ void test_xdp_metadata(void) struct xdp_metadata2 *bpf_obj2 = NULL; struct xdp_metadata *bpf_obj = NULL; struct bpf_program *new_prog, *prog; + struct bpf_devmap_val devmap_e = {}; + struct bpf_map *prog_arr, *devmap; struct nstoken *tok = NULL; __u32 queue_id = QUEUE_ID; - struct bpf_map *prog_arr; struct xsk tx_xsk = {}; struct xsk rx_xsk = {}; __u32 val, key = 0; @@ -409,6 +410,13 @@ void test_xdp_metadata(void) bpf_program__set_ifindex(prog, rx_ifindex); bpf_program__set_flags(prog, BPF_F_XDP_DEV_BOUND_ONLY); + /* Make sure we can load a dev-bound program that performs + * XDP_REDIRECT into a devmap. + */ + new_prog = bpf_object__find_program_by_name(bpf_obj->obj, "redirect"); + bpf_program__set_ifindex(new_prog, rx_ifindex); + bpf_program__set_flags(new_prog, BPF_F_XDP_DEV_BOUND_ONLY); + if (!ASSERT_OK(xdp_metadata__load(bpf_obj), "load skeleton")) goto out; @@ -423,6 +431,18 @@ void test_xdp_metadata(void) "update prog_arr")) goto out; + /* Make sure we can't add dev-bound programs to devmaps. */ + devmap = bpf_object__find_map_by_name(bpf_obj->obj, "dev_map"); + if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(devmap, "no dev_map found")) + goto out; + + devmap_e.bpf_prog.fd = val; + if (!ASSERT_ERR(bpf_map__update_elem(devmap, &key, sizeof(key), + &devmap_e, sizeof(devmap_e), + BPF_ANY), + "update dev_map")) + goto out; + /* Attach BPF program to RX interface. */ ret = bpf_xdp_attach(rx_ifindex, diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/xdp_metadata.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/xdp_metadata.c index 31ca229bb3c0f182483334a4ab0bd204acae20f3..09bb8a038d528cf26c5b314cc927915ac2796bf0 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/xdp_metadata.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/xdp_metadata.c @@ -19,6 +19,13 @@ struct { __type(value, __u32); } prog_arr SEC(".maps"); +struct { + __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP); + __uint(key_size, sizeof(__u32)); + __uint(value_size, sizeof(struct bpf_devmap_val)); + __uint(max_entries, 1); +} dev_map SEC(".maps"); + extern int bpf_xdp_metadata_rx_timestamp(const struct xdp_md *ctx, __u64 *timestamp) __ksym; extern int bpf_xdp_metadata_rx_hash(const struct xdp_md *ctx, __u32 *hash, @@ -95,4 +102,10 @@ int rx(struct xdp_md *ctx) return bpf_redirect_map(&xsk, ctx->rx_queue_index, XDP_PASS); } +SEC("xdp") +int redirect(struct xdp_md *ctx) +{ + return bpf_redirect_map(&dev_map, ctx->rx_queue_index, XDP_PASS); +} + char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL"; --- base-commit: 5cffad0a5c8f0cc53ce9fe7cff7bc67c3a97c406 change-id: 20250422-xdp-prog-bound-fix-9f30f3e134aa Best regards, -- Lorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo(a)kernel.org>

8 months, 1 week

[PATCH net 1/2] net/devmem: Reject insufficiently large dmabuf pools

by Cosmin Ratiu

Drivers that are told to allocate RX buffers from pools of DMA memory should have enough memory in the pool to satisfy projected allocation requests (a function of ring size, MTU & other parameters). If there's not enough memory, RX ring refill might fail later at inconvenient times (e.g. during NAPI poll). This commit adds a check at dmabuf pool init time that compares the amount of memory in the underlying chunk pool (configured by the user space application providing dmabuf memory) with the desired pool size (previously set by the driver) and fails with an error message if chunk memory isn't enough. Fixes: 0f9214046893 ("memory-provider: dmabuf devmem memory provider") Signed-off-by: Cosmin Ratiu <cratiu(a)nvidia.com> --- net/core/devmem.c | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/core/devmem.c b/net/core/devmem.c index 6e27a47d0493..651cd55ebb28 100644 --- a/net/core/devmem.c +++ b/net/core/devmem.c @@ -299,6 +299,7 @@ net_devmem_bind_dmabuf(struct net_device *dev, unsigned int dmabuf_fd, int mp_dmabuf_devmem_init(struct page_pool *pool) { struct net_devmem_dmabuf_binding *binding = pool->mp_priv; + size_t size; if (!binding) return -EINVAL; @@ -312,6 +313,16 @@ int mp_dmabuf_devmem_init(struct page_pool *pool) if (pool->p.order != 0) return -E2BIG; + /* Validate that the underlying dmabuf has enough memory to satisfy + * requested pool size. + */ + size = gen_pool_size(binding->chunk_pool) >> PAGE_SHIFT; + if (size < pool->p.pool_size) { + pr_warn("%s: Insufficient dmabuf memory (%zu pages) to satisfy pool_size (%u pages)\n", + __func__, size, pool->p.pool_size); + return -ENOMEM; + } + net_devmem_dmabuf_binding_get(binding); return 0; } -- 2.45.0

8 months, 1 week

[PATCH v1] selftests: iou-zcrx: Get the page size at runtime

by Haiyue Wang

Use the API `sysconf()` to query page size at runtime, instead of using hard code number 4096. And use `posix_memalign` to allocate the page size aligned momory. Signed-off-by: Haiyue Wang <haiyuewa(a)163.com> --- .../selftests/drivers/net/hw/iou-zcrx.c | 23 ++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/drivers/net/hw/iou-zcrx.c b/tools/testing/selftests/drivers/net/hw/iou-zcrx.c index c26b4180eddd..8aa426014c87 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/drivers/net/hw/iou-zcrx.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/drivers/net/hw/iou-zcrx.c @@ -37,8 +37,8 @@ #include <liburing.h> -#define PAGE_SIZE (4096) -#define AREA_SIZE (8192 * PAGE_SIZE) +static long page_size; +#define AREA_SIZE (8192 * page_size) #define SEND_SIZE (512 * 4096) #define min(a, b) \ ({ \ @@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ static int cfg_oneshot_recvs; static int cfg_send_size = SEND_SIZE; static struct sockaddr_in6 cfg_addr; -static char payload[SEND_SIZE] __attribute__((aligned(PAGE_SIZE))); +static char *payload; static void *area_ptr; static void *ring_ptr; static size_t ring_size; @@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ static inline size_t get_refill_ring_size(unsigned int rq_entries) ring_size = rq_entries * sizeof(struct io_uring_zcrx_rqe); /* add space for the header (head/tail/etc.) */ - ring_size += PAGE_SIZE; - return ALIGN_UP(ring_size, 4096); + ring_size += page_size; + return ALIGN_UP(ring_size, page_size); } static void setup_zcrx(struct io_uring *ring) @@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ static void process_accept(struct io_uring *ring, struct io_uring_cqe *cqe) connfd = cqe->res; if (cfg_oneshot) - add_recvzc_oneshot(ring, connfd, PAGE_SIZE); + add_recvzc_oneshot(ring, connfd, page_size); else add_recvzc(ring, connfd); } @@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ static void process_recvzc(struct io_uring *ring, struct io_uring_cqe *cqe) if (cfg_oneshot) { if (cqe->res == 0 && cqe->flags == 0 && cfg_oneshot_recvs) { - add_recvzc_oneshot(ring, connfd, PAGE_SIZE); + add_recvzc_oneshot(ring, connfd, page_size); cfg_oneshot_recvs--; } } else if (!(cqe->flags & IORING_CQE_F_MORE)) { @@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ static void usage(const char *filepath) static void parse_opts(int argc, char **argv) { - const int max_payload_len = sizeof(payload) - + const int max_payload_len = SEND_SIZE - sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) - sizeof(struct tcphdr) - 40 /* max tcp options */; @@ -443,6 +443,13 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) const char *cfg_test = argv[argc - 1]; int i; + page_size = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE); + if (page_size < 0) + return 1; + + if (posix_memalign((void **)&payload, page_size, SEND_SIZE)) + return 1; + parse_opts(argc, argv); for (i = 0; i < SEND_SIZE; i++) -- 2.49.0

8 months, 1 week

Call for Participation: Automated Testing Summit 2025 @ OSS NA

by Gustavo Padovan

The Automated Testing Summit (ATS) 2025 will be held as a co-located event at the Open Source Summit North America, and we’re now accepting talk proposals! https://events.linuxfoundation.org/open-source-summit-north-america/feature… 📅 Date: June 26, 2025 📍 Location: Denver, CO, USA Hosted by KernelCI, ATS is a technical summit focused on the challenges of testing and quality assurance in the Linux ecosystem — especially in upstream kernel development, embedded systems, cloud environments, and CI integration. This is a great opportunity to share your work on: * Kernel and userspace test frameworks * Lab infrastructure and automation * CI/CD pipelines for Linux * Fuzzing, performance testing, and debugging tools * Sharing and standardizing test results across systems Whether you’re working on kernel testing, running tests on hardware labs, developing QA tools, or building infrastructure that scales across projects, ATS is the place to collaborate and move the ecosystem forward. Submit your talk by May 18, 2025: 👉 Call for Proposals (CFP): https://sessionize.com/atsna2025 We hope to see you in Denver! — The KernelCI Team

8 months, 1 week

[PATCH v13 00/28] riscv control-flow integrity for usermode

by Deepak Gupta

Basics and overview =================== Software with larger attack surfaces (e.g. network facing apps like databases, browsers or apps relying on browser runtimes) suffer from memory corruption issues which can be utilized by attackers to bend control flow of the program to eventually gain control (by making their payload executable). Attackers are able to perform such attacks by leveraging call-sites which rely on indirect calls or return sites which rely on obtaining return address from stack memory. To mitigate such attacks, risc-v extension zicfilp enforces that all indirect calls must land on a landing pad instruction `lpad` else cpu will raise software check exception (a new cpu exception cause code on riscv). Similarly for return flow, risc-v extension zicfiss extends architecture with - `sspush` instruction to push return address on a shadow stack - `sspopchk` instruction to pop return address from shadow stack and compare with input operand (i.e. return address on stack) - `sspopchk` to raise software check exception if comparision above was a mismatch - Protection mechanism using which shadow stack is not writeable via regular store instructions More information an details can be found at extensions github repo [1]. Equivalent to landing pad (zicfilp) on x86 is `ENDBRANCH` instruction in Intel CET [3] and branch target identification (BTI) [4] on arm. Similarly x86's Intel CET has shadow stack [5] and arm64 has guarded control stack (GCS) [6] which are very similar to risc-v's zicfiss shadow stack. x86 and arm64 support for user mode shadow stack is already in mainline. Kernel awareness for user control flow integrity ================================================ This series picks up Samuel Holland's envcfg changes [2] as well. So if those are being applied independently, they should be removed from this series. Enabling: In order to maintain compatibility and not break anything in user mode, kernel doesn't enable control flow integrity cpu extensions on binary by default. Instead exposes a prctl interface to enable, disable and lock the shadow stack or landing pad feature for a task. This allows userspace (loader) to enumerate if all objects in its address space are compiled with shadow stack and landing pad support and accordingly enable the feature. Additionally if a subsequent `dlopen` happens on a library, user mode can take a decision again to disable the feature (if incoming library is not compiled with support) OR terminate the task (if user mode policy is strict to have all objects in address space to be compiled with control flow integirty cpu feature). prctl to enable shadow stack results in allocating shadow stack from virtual memory and activating for user address space. x86 and arm64 are also following same direction due to similar reason(s). clone/fork: On clone and fork, cfi state for task is inherited by child. Shadow stack is part of virtual memory and is a writeable memory from kernel perspective (writeable via a restricted set of instructions aka shadow stack instructions) Thus kernel changes ensure that this memory is converted into read-only when fork/clone happens and COWed when fault is taken due to sspush, sspopchk or ssamoswap. In case `CLONE_VM` is specified and shadow stack is to be enabled, kernel will automatically allocate a shadow stack for that clone call. map_shadow_stack: x86 introduced `map_shadow_stack` system call to allow user space to explicitly map shadow stack memory in its address space. It is useful to allocate shadow for different contexts managed by a single thread (green threads or contexts) risc-v implements this system call as well. signal management: If shadow stack is enabled for a task, kernel performs an asynchronous control flow diversion to deliver the signal and eventually expects userspace to issue sigreturn so that original execution can be resumed. Even though resume context is prepared by kernel, it is in user space memory and is subject to memory corruption and corruption bugs can be utilized by attacker in this race window to perform arbitrary sigreturn and eventually bypass cfi mechanism. Another issue is how to ensure that cfi related state on sigcontext area is not trampled by legacy apps or apps compiled with old kernel headers. In order to mitigate control-flow hijacting, kernel prepares a token and place it on shadow stack before signal delivery and places address of token in sigcontext structure. During sigreturn, kernel obtains address of token from sigcontext struture, reads token from shadow stack and validates it and only then allow sigreturn to succeed. Compatiblity issue is solved by adopting dynamic sigcontext management introduced for vector extension. This series re-factor the code little bit to allow future sigcontext management easy (as proposed by Andy Chiu from SiFive) config and compilation: Introduce a new risc-v config option `CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI`. Selecting this config option picks the kernel support for user control flow integrity. This optin is presented only if toolchain has shadow stack and landing pad support. And is on purpose guarded by toolchain support. Reason being that eventually vDSO also needs to be compiled in with shadow stack and landing pad support. vDSO compile patches are not included as of now because landing pad labeling scheme is yet to settle for usermode runtime. To get more information on kernel interactions with respect to zicfilp and zicfiss, patch series adds documentation for `zicfilp` and `zicfiss` in following: Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfiss.rst Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfilp.rst How to test this series ======================= Toolchain --------- $ git clone git@github.com:sifive/riscv-gnu-toolchain.git -b cfi-dev $ riscv-gnu-toolchain/configure --prefix=<path-to-where-to-build> --with-arch=rv64gc_zicfilp_zicfiss --enable-linux --disable-gdb --with-extra-multilib-test="rv64gc_zicfilp_zicfiss-lp64d:-static" $ make -j$(nproc) Qemu ---- Get the lastest qemu $ cd qemu $ mkdir build $ cd build $ ../configure --target-list=riscv64-softmmu $ make -j$(nproc) Opensbi ------- $ git clone git@github.com:deepak0414/opensbi.git -b v6_cfi_spec_split_opensbi $ make CROSS_COMPILE=<your riscv toolchain> -j$(nproc) PLATFORM=generic Linux ----- Running defconfig is fine. CFI is enabled by default if the toolchain supports it. $ make ARCH=riscv CROSS_COMPILE=<path-to-cfi-riscv-gnu-toolchain>/build/bin/riscv64-unknown-linux-gnu- -j$(nproc) defconfig $ make ARCH=riscv CROSS_COMPILE=<path-to-cfi-riscv-gnu-toolchain>/build/bin/riscv64-unknown-linux-gnu- -j$(nproc) In case you're building your own rootfs using toolchain, please make sure you pick following patch to ensure that vDSO compiled with lpad and shadow stack. "arch/riscv: compile vdso with landing pad" Branch where above patch can be picked https://github.com/deepak0414/linux-riscv-cfi/tree/vdso_user_cfi_v6.12-rc1 Running ------- Modify your qemu command to have: -bios <path-to-cfi-opensbi>/build/platform/generic/firmware/fw_dynamic.bin -cpu rv64,zicfilp=true,zicfiss=true,zimop=true,zcmop=true vDSO related Opens (in the flux) ================================= I am listing these opens for laying out plan and what to expect in future patch sets. And of course for the sake of discussion. Shadow stack and landing pad enabling in vDSO ---------------------------------------------- vDSO must have shadow stack and landing pad support compiled in for task to have shadow stack and landing pad support. This patch series doesn't enable that (yet). Enabling shadow stack support in vDSO should be straight forward (intend to do that in next versions of patch set). Enabling landing pad support in vDSO requires some collaboration with toolchain folks to follow a single label scheme for all object binaries. This is necessary to ensure that all indirect call-sites are setting correct label and target landing pads are decorated with same label scheme. How many vDSOs --------------- Shadow stack instructions are carved out of zimop (may be operations) and if CPU doesn't implement zimop, they're illegal instructions. Kernel could be running on a CPU which may or may not implement zimop. And thus kernel will have to carry 2 different vDSOs and expose the appropriate one depending on whether CPU implements zimop or not. References ========== [1] - https://github.com/riscv/riscv-cfi [2] - https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240814081126.956287-1-samuel.holland@sifive.c… [3] - https://lwn.net/Articles/889475/ [4] - https://developer.arm.com/documentation/109576/0100/Branch-Target-Identific… [5] - https://www.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/catc17-i… [6] - https://lwn.net/Articles/940403/ To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> To: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)redhat.com> To: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)alien8.de> To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)linux.intel.com> To: x86(a)kernel.org To: H. Peter Anvin <hpa(a)zytor.com> To: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> To: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett(a)oracle.com> To: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka(a)suse.cz> To: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes(a)oracle.com> To: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley(a)sifive.com> To: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer(a)dabbelt.com> To: Albert Ou <aou(a)eecs.berkeley.edu> To: Conor Dooley <conor(a)kernel.org> To: Rob Herring <robh(a)kernel.org> To: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk+dt(a)kernel.org> To: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> To: Christian Brauner <brauner(a)kernel.org> To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> To: Oleg Nesterov <oleg(a)redhat.com> To: Eric Biederman <ebiederm(a)xmission.com> To: Kees Cook <kees(a)kernel.org> To: Jonathan Corbet <corbet(a)lwn.net> To: Shuah Khan <shuah(a)kernel.org> To: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> To: Conor Dooley <conor+dt(a)kernel.org> To: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda(a)kernel.org> To: Alex Gaynor <alex.gaynor(a)gmail.com> To: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng(a)gmail.com> To: Gary Guo <gary(a)garyguo.net> To: Björn Roy Baron <bjorn3_gh(a)protonmail.com> To: Benno Lossin <benno.lossin(a)proton.me> To: Andreas Hindborg <a.hindborg(a)kernel.org> To: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl(a)google.com> To: Trevor Gross <tmgross(a)umich.edu> Cc: linux-kernel(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-fsdevel(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm(a)kvack.org Cc: linux-riscv(a)lists.infradead.org Cc: devicetree(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kselftest(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: alistair.francis(a)wdc.com Cc: richard.henderson(a)linaro.org Cc: jim.shu(a)sifive.com Cc: andybnac(a)gmail.com Cc: kito.cheng(a)sifive.com Cc: charlie(a)rivosinc.com Cc: atishp(a)rivosinc.com Cc: evan(a)rivosinc.com Cc: cleger(a)rivosinc.com Cc: alexghiti(a)rivosinc.com Cc: samitolvanen(a)google.com Cc: broonie(a)kernel.org Cc: rick.p.edgecombe(a)intel.com Cc: rust-for-linux(a)vger.kernel.org changelog --------- v13: - cpu_supports_shadow_stack/cpu_supports_indirect_br_lp_instr uses riscv_has_extension_unlikely() - uses nops(count) to create nop slide - RISCV_ACQUIRE_BARRIER is not needed in `amo_user_shstk`. Removed it - changed ternaries to simply use implicit casting to convert to bool. - kernel command line allows to disable zicfilp and zicfiss independently. updated kernel-parameters.txt. - ptrace user abi for cfi uses bitmasks instead of bitfields. Added ptrace kselftest. - cosmetic and grammatical changes to documentation. v12: - It seems like I had accidently squashed arch agnostic indirect branch tracking prctl and riscv implementation of those prctls. Split them again. - set_shstk_status/set_indir_lp_status perform CSR writes only when CPU support is available. As suggested by Zong Li. - Some minor clean up in kselftests as suggested by Zong Li. v11: - patch "arch/riscv: compile vdso with landing pad" was unconditionally selecting `_zicfilp` for vDSO compile. fixed that. Changed `lpad 1` to to `lpad 0`. v10: - dropped "mm: helper `is_shadow_stack_vma` to check shadow stack vma". This patch is not that interesting to this patch series for risc-v. There are instances in arch directories where VM_SHADOW_STACK flag is anyways used. Dropping this patch to expedite merging in riscv tree. - Took suggestions from `Clement` on "riscv: zicfiss / zicfilp enumeration" to validate presence of cfi based on config. - Added a patch for vDSO to have `lpad 0`. I had omitted this earlier to make sure we add single vdso object with cfi enabled. But a vdso object with scheme of zero labeled landing pad is least common denominator and should work with all objects of zero labeled as well as function-signature labeled objects. v9: - rebased on master (39a803b754d5 fix braino in "9p: fix ->rename_sem exclusion") - dropped "mm: Introduce ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK" (master has it from arm64/gcs) - dropped "prctl: arch-agnostic prctl for shadow stack" (master has it from arm64/gcs) v8: - rebased on palmer/for-next - dropped samuel holland's `envcfg` context switch patches. they are in parlmer/for-next v7: - Removed "riscv/Kconfig: enable HAVE_EXIT_THREAD for riscv" Instead using `deactivate_mm` flow to clean up. see here for more context https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230908203655.543765-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.… - Changed the header include in `kselftest`. Hopefully this fixes compile issue faced by Zong Li at SiFive. - Cleaned up an orphaned change to `mm/mmap.c` in below patch "riscv/mm : ensure PROT_WRITE leads to VM_READ | VM_WRITE" - Lock interfaces for shadow stack and indirect branch tracking expect arg == 0 Any future evolution of this interface should accordingly define how arg should be setup. - `mm/map.c` has an instance of using `VM_SHADOW_STACK`. Fixed it to use helper `is_shadow_stack_vma`. - Link to v6: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241008-v5_user_cfi_series-v6-0-60d9fe073f37@riv… v6: - Picked up Samuel Holland's changes as is with `envcfg` placed in `thread` instead of `thread_info` - fixed unaligned newline escapes in kselftest - cleaned up messages in kselftest and included test output in commit message - fixed a bug in clone path reported by Zong Li - fixed a build issue if CONFIG_RISCV_ISA_V is not selected (this was introduced due to re-factoring signal context management code) v5: - rebased on v6.12-rc1 - Fixed schema related issues in device tree file - Fixed some of the documentation related issues in zicfilp/ss.rst (style issues and added index) - added `SHADOW_STACK_SET_MARKER` so that implementation can define base of shadow stack. - Fixed warnings on definitions added in usercfi.h when CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI is not selected. - Adopted context header based signal handling as proposed by Andy Chiu - Added support for enabling kernel mode access to shadow stack using FWFT (https://github.com/riscv-non-isa/riscv-sbi-doc/blob/master/src/ext-firmware…) - Link to v5: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241001-v5_user_cfi_series-v1-0-3ba65b6e550f@riv… (Note: I had an issue in my workflow due to which version number wasn't picked up correctly while sending out patches) v4: - rebased on 6.11-rc6 - envcfg: Converged with Samuel Holland's patches for envcfg management on per- thread basis. - vma_is_shadow_stack is renamed to is_vma_shadow_stack - picked up Mark Brown's `ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK` patch - signal context: using extended context management to maintain compatibility. - fixed `-Wmissing-prototypes` compiler warnings for prctl functions - Documentation fixes and amending typos. - Link to v4: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240912231650.3740732-1-debug@rivosinc.com/ v3: - envcfg logic to pick up base envcfg had a bug where `ENVCFG_CBZE` could have been picked on per task basis, even though CPU didn't implement it. Fixed in this series. - dt-bindings As suggested, split into separate commit. fixed the messaging that spec is in public review - arch_is_shadow_stack change arch_is_shadow_stack changed to vma_is_shadow_stack - hwprobe zicfiss / zicfilp if present will get enumerated in hwprobe - selftests As suggested, added object and binary filenames to .gitignore Selftest binary anyways need to be compiled with cfi enabled compiler which will make sure that landing pad and shadow stack are enabled. Thus removed separate enable/disable tests. Cleaned up tests a bit. - Link to v3: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240403234054.2020347-1-debug@rivosinc.com/ v2: - Using config `CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI`, kernel support for riscv control flow integrity for user mode programs can be compiled in the kernel. - Enabling of control flow integrity for user programs is left to user runtime - This patch series introduces arch agnostic `prctls` to enable shadow stack and indirect branch tracking. And implements them on riscv. --- Changes in v13: - changelog posted just below cover letter - Link to v12: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250314-v5_user_cfi_series-v12-0-e51202b53138@ri… Changes in v12: - changelog posted just below cover letter - Link to v11: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250310-v5_user_cfi_series-v11-0-86b36cbfb910@ri… Changes in v11: - changelog posted just below cover letter - Link to v10: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250210-v5_user_cfi_series-v10-0-163dcfa31c60@ri… --- Andy Chiu (1): riscv: signal: abstract header saving for setup_sigcontext Clément Léger (1): riscv: Add Firmware Feature SBI extensions definitions Deepak Gupta (25): mm: VM_SHADOW_STACK definition for riscv dt-bindings: riscv: zicfilp and zicfiss in dt-bindings (extensions.yaml) riscv: zicfiss / zicfilp enumeration riscv: zicfiss / zicfilp extension csr and bit definitions riscv: usercfi state for task and save/restore of CSR_SSP on trap entry/exit riscv/mm : ensure PROT_WRITE leads to VM_READ | VM_WRITE riscv mm: manufacture shadow stack pte riscv mmu: teach pte_mkwrite to manufacture shadow stack PTEs riscv mmu: write protect and shadow stack riscv/mm: Implement map_shadow_stack() syscall riscv/shstk: If needed allocate a new shadow stack on clone riscv: Implements arch agnostic shadow stack prctls prctl: arch-agnostic prctl for indirect branch tracking riscv: Implements arch agnostic indirect branch tracking prctls riscv/traps: Introduce software check exception riscv/signal: save and restore of shadow stack for signal riscv/kernel: update __show_regs to print shadow stack register riscv/ptrace: riscv cfi status and state via ptrace and in core files riscv/hwprobe: zicfilp / zicfiss enumeration in hwprobe riscv: kernel command line option to opt out of user cfi riscv: enable kernel access to shadow stack memory via FWFT sbi call riscv: create a config for shadow stack and landing pad instr support riscv: Documentation for landing pad / indirect branch tracking riscv: Documentation for shadow stack on riscv kselftest/riscv: kselftest for user mode cfi Jim Shu (1): arch/riscv: compile vdso with landing pad Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 8 + Documentation/arch/riscv/index.rst | 2 + Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfilp.rst | 115 +++++ Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfiss.rst | 179 +++++++ .../devicetree/bindings/riscv/extensions.yaml | 14 + arch/riscv/Kconfig | 20 + arch/riscv/Makefile | 5 +- arch/riscv/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h | 1 + arch/riscv/include/asm/assembler.h | 44 ++ arch/riscv/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 12 + arch/riscv/include/asm/csr.h | 16 + arch/riscv/include/asm/entry-common.h | 2 + arch/riscv/include/asm/hwcap.h | 2 + arch/riscv/include/asm/mman.h | 25 + arch/riscv/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 7 + arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h | 30 +- arch/riscv/include/asm/processor.h | 2 + arch/riscv/include/asm/sbi.h | 26 + arch/riscv/include/asm/thread_info.h | 3 + arch/riscv/include/asm/usercfi.h | 96 ++++ arch/riscv/include/asm/vector.h | 3 + arch/riscv/include/uapi/asm/hwprobe.h | 2 + arch/riscv/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h | 34 ++ arch/riscv/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h | 1 + arch/riscv/kernel/Makefile | 1 + arch/riscv/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 8 + arch/riscv/kernel/cpufeature.c | 13 + arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S | 28 +- arch/riscv/kernel/head.S | 23 + arch/riscv/kernel/process.c | 26 +- arch/riscv/kernel/ptrace.c | 95 ++++ arch/riscv/kernel/signal.c | 142 +++++- arch/riscv/kernel/sys_hwprobe.c | 2 + arch/riscv/kernel/sys_riscv.c | 10 + arch/riscv/kernel/traps.c | 43 ++ arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c | 545 +++++++++++++++++++++ arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/Makefile | 6 + arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/flush_icache.S | 4 + arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/getcpu.S | 4 + arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/rt_sigreturn.S | 4 + arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/sys_hwprobe.S | 4 + arch/riscv/mm/init.c | 2 +- arch/riscv/mm/pgtable.c | 17 + include/linux/cpu.h | 4 + include/linux/mm.h | 7 + include/uapi/linux/elf.h | 1 + include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 27 + kernel/sys.c | 30 ++ tools/testing/selftests/riscv/Makefile | 2 +- tools/testing/selftests/riscv/cfi/.gitignore | 3 + tools/testing/selftests/riscv/cfi/Makefile | 10 + tools/testing/selftests/riscv/cfi/cfi_rv_test.h | 82 ++++ tools/testing/selftests/riscv/cfi/riscv_cfi_test.c | 171 +++++++ tools/testing/selftests/riscv/cfi/shadowstack.c | 385 +++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/riscv/cfi/shadowstack.h | 27 + 55 files changed, 2346 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) --- base-commit: 39a803b754d5224a3522016b564113ee1e4091b2 change-id: 20240930-v5_user_cfi_series-3dc332f8f5b2 -- - debug

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