August 2025 - Linux-kselftest-mirror

by Thomas Weißschuh

Various cleanups to the generic vDSO infrastructure and a patch for ARM which was never applied. This series has one trivial syntactic conflict with "dso/datastore: Allow prefaulting by mlockall()" [0] and a semantic one with "sparc64: vdso: Switch to generic vDSO library" [1], which still uses the removed GENERIC_VDSO_DATA_STORE. [0] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20250812-vdso-mlockall-v1-0-2f49ba7cf819@linut… [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20250815-vdso-sparc64-generic-2-v2-0-b5ff80672… Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <thomas.weissschuh(a)linutronix.de> --- Rasmus Villemoes (1): ARM: VDSO: remove cntvct_ok global variable Thomas Weißschuh (10): vdso/datastore: Gate time data behind CONFIG_GENERIC_GETTIMEOFDAY vdso: Move ENABLE_COMPAT_VDSO from core to arm64 vdso/gettimeofday: Remove !CONFIG_TIME_NS stubs time: Build generic update_vsyscall() only with generic time vDSO riscv: vdso: Untangle kconfig logic vdso: Drop kconfig GENERIC_VDSO_32 vdso: Drop kconfig GENERIC_COMPAT_VDSO vdso: Drop kconfig GENERIC_VDSO_DATA_STORE vdso: Drop kconfig GENERIC_VDSO_TIME_NS vdso: Gate VDSO_GETRANDOM behind HAVE_GENERIC_VDSO arch/Kconfig | 2 +- arch/arm/include/asm/vdso/vsyscall.h | 2 -- arch/arm/kernel/vdso.c | 10 +++------ arch/arm/mm/Kconfig | 2 -- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 3 --- arch/arm64/include/asm/vdso/compat_barrier.h | 7 +++--- arch/arm64/include/asm/vdso/compat_gettimeofday.h | 6 ++--- arch/arm64/include/asm/vdso/gettimeofday.h | 8 +++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/vdso32/Makefile | 1 - arch/loongarch/Kconfig | 2 -- arch/mips/Kconfig | 1 - arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 2 -- arch/riscv/Kconfig | 12 +++++----- arch/s390/Kconfig | 2 -- arch/x86/Kconfig | 3 --- include/asm-generic/vdso/vsyscall.h | 4 ---- include/vdso/datapage.h | 9 +------- init/Kconfig | 2 +- kernel/time/Makefile | 2 +- lib/vdso/Kconfig | 25 +-------------------- lib/vdso/Makefile | 2 +- lib/vdso/datastore.c | 6 ++--- lib/vdso/gettimeofday.c | 27 ----------------------- tools/testing/selftests/pidfd/config | 1 - 24 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 110 deletions(-) --- base-commit: 3cd1f6bc6aa056cfd32946f9ce0aa3eb3db180e8 change-id: 20250825-vdso-cleanups-fd6fbb32fc19 Best regards, -- Thomas Weißschuh <thomas.weissschuh(a)linutronix.de>

1 month, 1 week

3
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[PATCH 0/7] tools/nolibc: reduce __nolibc_enosys() fallbacks

by Thomas Weißschuh

The __nolibc_enosys() fallback is used when the UAPI headers do not provide a certain syscall number or any possible fallback syscall. This is either because the syscall definition is fairly new and nolibc tries to be compatible with old UAPI headers or an architecture does not support a syscall at all. Many of these __nolibc_enosys() fallbacks have become unnecessary. Either because the "new" syscalls or not so new anymore or real fallbacks have been implemented in the meantime. Unnecessary usages of __nolibc_enosys() as it is not obvious anymore if a given function is really implemented on all architectures. Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <linux(a)weissschuh.net> --- Thomas Weißschuh (7): tools/nolibc: remove __nolibc_enosys() fallback from time64-related functions tools/nolibc: remove __nolibc_enosys() fallback from *at() functions tools/nolibc: remove __nolibc_enosys() fallback from dup2() tools/nolibc: remove __nolibc_enosys() fallback from fork functions tools/nolibc: fold llseek fallback into lseek() kselftest/arm64: tpidr2: Switch to waitpid() over wait4() tools/nolibc: drop wait4() support tools/include/nolibc/poll.h | 4 +- tools/include/nolibc/sys.h | 90 +++++++++--------------------- tools/include/nolibc/sys/timerfd.h | 8 +-- tools/include/nolibc/sys/wait.h | 17 ------ tools/include/nolibc/time.h | 8 +-- tools/testing/selftests/arm64/abi/tpidr2.c | 6 +- 6 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 99 deletions(-) --- base-commit: 850047b19741490631855a475ccaa3ed29316039 change-id: 20250821-nolibc-enosys-2b2ec0b505ba Best regards, -- Thomas Weißschuh <linux(a)weissschuh.net>

1 month, 1 week

5
13
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[PATCH v3 0/3] VMM can handle guest SEA via KVM_EXIT_ARM_SEA

by Jiaqi Yan

Problem ======= When host APEI is unable to claim a synchronous external abort (SEA) during guest abort, today KVM directly injects an asynchronous SError into the VCPU then resumes it. The injected SError usually results in unpleasant guest kernel panic. One of the major situation of guest SEA is when VCPU consumes recoverable uncorrected memory error (UER), which is not uncommon at all in modern datacenter servers with large amounts of physical memory. Although SError and guest panic is sufficient to stop the propagation of corrupted memory, there is room to recover from an UER in a more graceful manner. Proposed Solution ================= The idea is, we can replay the SEA to the faulting VCPU. If the memory error consumption or the fault that cause SEA is not from guest kernel, the blast radius can be limited to the poison-consuming guest process, while the VM can keep running. In addition, instead of doing under the hood without involving userspace, there are benefits to redirect the SEA to VMM: - VM customers care about the disruptions caused by memory errors, and VMM usually has the responsibility to start the process of notifying the customers of memory error events in their VMs. For example some cloud provider emits a critical log in their observability UI [1], and provides a playbook for customers on how to mitigate disruptions to their workloads. - VMM can protect future memory error consumption by unmapping the poisoned pages from stage-2 page table with KVM userfault [2], or by splitting the memslot that contains the poisoned pages. - VMM can keep track of SEA events in the VM. When VMM thinks the status on the host or the VM is bad enough, e.g. number of distinct SEAs exceeds a threshold, it can restart the VM on another healthy host. - Behavior parity with x86 architecture. When machine check exception (MCE) is caused by VCPU, kernel or KVM signals userspace SIGBUS to let VMM either recover from the MCE, or terminate itself with VM. The prior RFC proposes to implement SIGBUS on arm64 as well, but Marc preferred KVM exit over signal [3]. However, implementation aside, returning SEA to VMM is on par with returning MCE to VMM. Once SEA is redirected to VMM, among other actions, VMM is encouraged to inject external aborts into the faulting VCPU. New UAPIs ========= This patchset introduces following userspace-visible changes to empower VMM to control what happens for SEA on guest memory: - KVM_CAP_ARM_SEA_TO_USER. While taking SEA, if userspace has enabled this new capability at VM creation, and the SEA is not owned by kernel allocated memory, instead of injecting SError, return KVM_EXIT_ARM_SEA to userspace. - KVM_EXIT_ARM_SEA. This is the VM exit reason VMM gets. The details about the SEA is provided in arm_sea as much as possible, including sanitized ESR value at EL2, faulting guest virtual and physical addresses if available. * From v2 [4]: - Rebased on "[PATCH] KVM: arm64: nv: Handle SEAs due to VNCR redirection" [5] and kvmarm/next commit 7b8346bd9fce ("KVM: arm64: Don't attempt vLPI mappings when vPE allocation is disabled") - Took the host_owns_sea implementation from Oliver [6, 7]. - Excluded the guest SEA injection patches. - Updated selftest. * From v1 [8]: - Rebased on commit 4d62121ce9b5 ("KVM: arm64: vgic-debug: Avoid dereferencing NULL ITE pointer"). - Sanitize ESR_EL2 before reporting it to userspace. - Do not do KVM_EXIT_ARM_SEA when SEA is caused by memory allocated to stage-2 translation table. [1] https://cloud.google.com/solutions/sap/docs/manage-host-errors [2] https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20250109204929.1106563-1-jthoughton@google.com [3] https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/86pljbqqh0.wl-maz@kernel.org [4] https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20250604050902.3944054-1-jiaqiyan@google.com/ [5] https://lore.kernel.org/kvmarm/20250729182342.3281742-1-oliver.upton@linux.… [6] https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/aHFohmTb9qR_JG1E@linux.dev/#t [7] https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/aHK-DPufhLy5Dtuk@linux.dev/ [8] https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20250505161412.1926643-1-jiaqiyan@google.com Jiaqi Yan (3): KVM: arm64: VM exit to userspace to handle SEA KVM: selftests: Test for KVM_EXIT_ARM_SEA Documentation: kvm: new UAPI for handling SEA Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 61 ++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 + arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c | 5 + arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c | 68 +++- include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 10 + tools/arch/arm64/include/asm/esr.h | 2 + tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile.kvm | 1 + .../testing/selftests/kvm/arm64/sea_to_user.c | 327 ++++++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c | 1 + 9 files changed, 476 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/arm64/sea_to_user.c -- 2.50.1.565.gc32cd1483b-goog

1 month, 2 weeks

1
5
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[PATCH bpf-next v2 0/3] selftests/bpf: benchmark all symbols for kprobe-multi

by Menglong Dong

Add the benchmark testcase "kprobe-multi-all", which will hook all the kernel functions during the testing. This series is separated out from [1]. Changes since V1: * introduce trace_blacklist instead of copy-pasting strcmp in the 2nd patch * use fprintf() instead of printf() in 3rd patch Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250817024607.296117-1-dongml2@chinatelecom.cn/ [1] Menglong Dong (3): selftests/bpf: move get_ksyms and get_addrs to trace_helpers.c selftests/bpf: skip recursive functions for kprobe_multi selftests/bpf: add benchmark testing for kprobe-multi-all tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bench.c | 4 + .../selftests/bpf/benchs/bench_trigger.c | 53 ++++ .../selftests/bpf/benchs/run_bench_trigger.sh | 4 +- .../bpf/prog_tests/kprobe_multi_test.c | 220 +--------------- .../selftests/bpf/progs/trigger_bench.c | 12 + tools/testing/selftests/bpf/trace_helpers.c | 234 ++++++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/bpf/trace_helpers.h | 3 + 7 files changed, 311 insertions(+), 219 deletions(-) -- 2.51.0

1 month, 2 weeks

4
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[PATCH] KVM: selftests: fix irqfd_test on arm64

by Sebastian Ott

irqfd_test on arm triggers the following assertion: ==== Test Assertion Failure ==== include/kvm_util.h:527: !ret pid=3643 tid=3643 errno=11 - Resource temporarily unavailable 1 0x00000000004026d7: kvm_irqfd at kvm_util.h:527 2 0x0000000000402083: main at irqfd_test.c:100 3 0x0000ffffa5aab587: ?? ??:0 4 0x0000ffffa5aab65f: ?? ??:0 5 0x000000000040236f: _start at ??:? KVM_IRQFD failed, rc: -1 errno: 11 (Resource temporarily unavailable) Fix this by setting up a vgic for the vm. Signed-off-by: Sebastian Ott <sebott(a)redhat.com> --- tools/testing/selftests/kvm/irqfd_test.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/irqfd_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/irqfd_test.c index 7c301b4c7005..f7b8766e9d42 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/irqfd_test.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/irqfd_test.c @@ -8,7 +8,11 @@ #include <stdint.h> #include <sys/sysinfo.h> +#include "processor.h" #include "kvm_util.h" +#ifdef __aarch64__ +#include "vgic.h" +#endif static struct kvm_vm *vm1; static struct kvm_vm *vm2; @@ -86,14 +90,30 @@ static void juggle_eventfd_primary(struct kvm_vm *vm, int eventfd) kvm_irqfd(vm, GSI_BASE_PRIMARY + 1, eventfd, KVM_IRQFD_FLAG_DEASSIGN); } +static struct kvm_vm *test_vm_create(void) +{ +#ifdef __aarch64__ + struct kvm_vm *vm; + struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu; + int gic_fd; + + vm = vm_create_with_one_vcpu(&vcpu, NULL); + gic_fd = vgic_v3_setup(vm, 1, 64); + __TEST_REQUIRE(gic_fd >= 0, "Failed to create vgic-v3"); + + return vm; +#endif + return vm_create(1); +} + int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { pthread_t racing_thread; int r, i; /* Create "full" VMs, as KVM_IRQFD requires an in-kernel IRQ chip. */ - vm1 = vm_create(1); - vm2 = vm_create(1); + vm1 = test_vm_create(); + vm2 = test_vm_create(); WRITE_ONCE(__eventfd, kvm_new_eventfd()); -- 2.51.0

1 month, 2 weeks

4
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[PATCH RFC 0/4] landlock: add LANDLOCK_SCOPE_MEMFD_EXEC execution

by Abhinav Saxena

This patch series introduces LANDLOCK_SCOPE_MEMFD_EXEC, a new Landlock scoping mechanism that restricts execution of anonymous memory file descriptors (memfd) created via memfd_create(2). This addresses security gaps where processes can bypass W^X policies and execute arbitrary code through anonymous memory objects. Fixes: https://github.com/landlock-lsm/linux/issues/37 SECURITY PROBLEM ================ Current Landlock filesystem restrictions do not cover memfd objects, allowing processes to: 1. Read-to-execute bypass: Create writable memfd, inject code, then execute via mmap(PROT_EXEC) or direct execve() 2. Anonymous execution: Execute code without touching the filesystem via execve("/proc/self/fd/N") where N is a memfd descriptor 3. Cross-domain access violations: Pass memfd between processes to bypass domain restrictions These scenarios can occur in sandboxed environments where filesystem access is restricted but memfd creation remains possible. IMPLEMENTATION ============== The implementation adds hierarchical execution control through domain scoping: Core Components: - is_memfd_file(): Reliable memfd detection via "memfd:" dentry prefix - domain_is_scoped(): Cross-domain hierarchy checking (moved to domain.c) - LSM hooks: mmap_file, file_mprotect, bprm_creds_for_exec - Creation-time restrictions: hook_file_alloc_security Security Matrix: Execution decisions follow domain hierarchy rules preventing both same-domain bypass attempts and cross-domain access violations while preserving legitimate hierarchical access patterns. Domain Hierarchy with LANDLOCK_SCOPE_MEMFD_EXEC: =============================================== Root (no domain) - No restrictions | +-- Domain A [SCOPE_MEMFD_EXEC] Layer 1 | +-- memfd_A (tagged with Domain A as creator) | | | +-- Domain A1 (child) [NO SCOPE] Layer 2 | | +-- Inherits Layer 1 restrictions from parent | | +-- memfd_A1 (can create, inherits restrictions) | | +-- Domain A1a [SCOPE_MEMFD_EXEC] Layer 3 | | +-- memfd_A1a (tagged with Domain A1a) | | | +-- Domain A2 (child) [SCOPE_MEMFD_EXEC] Layer 2 | +-- memfd_A2 (tagged with Domain A2 as creator) | +-- CANNOT access memfd_A1 (different subtree) | +-- Domain B [SCOPE_MEMFD_EXEC] Layer 1 +-- memfd_B (tagged with Domain B as creator) +-- CANNOT access ANY memfd from Domain A subtree Execution Decision Matrix: ======================== Executor-> | A | A1 | A1a | A2 | B | Root Creator | | | | | | ------------|-----|----|-----|----|----|----- Domain A | X | X | X | X | X | Y Domain A1 | Y | X | X | X | X | Y Domain A1a | Y | Y | X | X | X | Y Domain A2 | Y | X | X | X | X | Y Domain B | X | X | X | X | X | Y Root | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y Legend: Y = Execution allowed, X = Execution denied Scenarios Covered: - Direct mmap(PROT_EXEC) on memfd files - Two-stage mmap(PROT_READ) + mprotect(PROT_EXEC) bypass attempts - execve("/proc/self/fd/N") anonymous execution - execveat() and fexecve() file descriptor execution - Cross-process memfd inheritance and IPC passing TESTING ======= All patches have been validated with: - scripts/checkpatch.pl --strict (clean) - Selftests covering same-domain restrictions, cross-domain hierarchy enforcement, and regular file isolation - KUnit tests for memfd detection edge cases DISCLAIMER ========== My understanding of Landlock scoping semantics may be limited, but this implementation reflects my current understanding based on available documentation and code analysis. I welcome feedback and corrections regarding the scoping logic and domain hierarchy enforcement. Signed-off-by: Abhinav Saxena <xandfury(a)gmail.com> --- Abhinav Saxena (4): landlock: add LANDLOCK_SCOPE_MEMFD_EXEC scope landlock: implement memfd detection landlock: add memfd exec LSM hooks and scoping selftests/landlock: add memfd execution tests include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 5 + security/landlock/.kunitconfig | 1 + security/landlock/audit.c | 4 + security/landlock/audit.h | 1 + security/landlock/cred.c | 14 - security/landlock/domain.c | 67 ++++ security/landlock/domain.h | 4 + security/landlock/fs.c | 405 ++++++++++++++++++++- security/landlock/limits.h | 2 +- security/landlock/task.c | 67 ---- .../selftests/landlock/scoped_memfd_exec_test.c | 325 +++++++++++++++++ 11 files changed, 812 insertions(+), 83 deletions(-) --- base-commit: 5b74b2eff1eeefe43584e5b7b348c8cd3b723d38 change-id: 20250716-memfd-exec-ac0d582018c3 Best regards, -- Abhinav Saxena <xandfury(a)gmail.com>

1 month, 3 weeks

3
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[PATCH v3 0/9] rust: use `kernel::{fmt,prelude::fmt!}`

by Tamir Duberstein

This is series 2a/5 of the migration to `core::ffi::CStr`[0]. 20250704-core-cstr-prepare-v1-0-a91524037783(a)gmail.com. This series depends on the prior series[0] and is intended to go through the rust tree to reduce the number of release cycles required to complete the work. Subsystem maintainers: I would appreciate your `Acked-by`s so that this can be taken through Miguel's tree (where the other series must go). [0] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250704-core-cstr-prepare-v1-0-a91524037783@gm… Signed-off-by: Tamir Duberstein <tamird(a)gmail.com> --- Changes in v3: - Add a patch to address new code in device.rs. - Drop incorrectly applied Acked-by tags from Danilo. - Link to v2: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250719-core-cstr-fanout-1-v2-0-1ab5ba189c6e@gma… Changes in v2: - Rebase on rust-next. - Drop pin-init patch, which is no longer needed. - Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250709-core-cstr-fanout-1-v1-0-64308e7203fc@gma… --- Tamir Duberstein (9): gpu: nova-core: use `kernel::{fmt,prelude::fmt!}` rust: alloc: use `kernel::{fmt,prelude::fmt!}` rust: block: use `kernel::{fmt,prelude::fmt!}` rust: device: use `kernel::{fmt,prelude::fmt!}` rust: file: use `kernel::{fmt,prelude::fmt!}` rust: kunit: use `kernel::{fmt,prelude::fmt!}` rust: seq_file: use `kernel::{fmt,prelude::fmt!}` rust: sync: use `kernel::{fmt,prelude::fmt!}` rust: device: use `kernel::{fmt,prelude::fmt!}` drivers/block/rnull.rs | 2 +- drivers/gpu/nova-core/gpu.rs | 3 +-- drivers/gpu/nova-core/regs/macros.rs | 6 +++--- rust/kernel/alloc/kbox.rs | 2 +- rust/kernel/alloc/kvec.rs | 2 +- rust/kernel/alloc/kvec/errors.rs | 2 +- rust/kernel/block/mq.rs | 2 +- rust/kernel/block/mq/gen_disk.rs | 2 +- rust/kernel/block/mq/raw_writer.rs | 3 +-- rust/kernel/device.rs | 6 +++--- rust/kernel/device/property.rs | 23 ++++++++++++----------- rust/kernel/fs/file.rs | 5 +++-- rust/kernel/kunit.rs | 8 ++++---- rust/kernel/seq_file.rs | 6 +++--- rust/kernel/sync/arc.rs | 2 +- scripts/rustdoc_test_gen.rs | 2 +- 16 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-) --- base-commit: 8f5ae30d69d7543eee0d70083daf4de8fe15d585 change-id: 20250709-core-cstr-fanout-1-f20611832272 Best regards, -- Tamir Duberstein <tamird(a)gmail.com>

1 month, 3 weeks

3
12
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[PATCH 0/2] eventpoll: Fix epoll_wait() report false negative

by Nam Cao

Hi, While staring at epoll, I noticed ep_events_available() looks wrong. I wrote a small program to confirm, and yes it is definitely wrong. This series adds a reproducer to kselftest, and fix the bug. Nam Cao (2): selftests/eventpoll: Add test for multiple waiters eventpoll: Fix epoll_wait() report false negative fs/eventpoll.c | 16 +------ .../filesystems/epoll/epoll_wakeup_test.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) -- 2.39.5

1 month, 4 weeks

5
15
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[PATCH v7 0/6] mm/memfd: introduce MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC

by jeffxu＠chromium.org

From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu(a)google.com> Since Linux introduced the memfd feature, memfd have always had their execute bit set, and the memfd_create() syscall doesn't allow setting it differently. However, in a secure by default system, such as ChromeOS, (where all executables should come from the rootfs, which is protected by Verified boot), this executable nature of memfd opens a door for NoExec bypass and enables “confused deputy attack”. E.g, in VRP bug [1]: cros_vm process created a memfd to share the content with an external process, however the memfd is overwritten and used for executing arbitrary code and root escalation. [2] lists more VRP in this kind. On the other hand, executable memfd has its legit use, runc uses memfd’s seal and executable feature to copy the contents of the binary then execute them, for such system, we need a solution to differentiate runc's use of executable memfds and an attacker's [3]. To address those above, this set of patches add following: 1> Let memfd_create() set X bit at creation time. 2> Let memfd to be sealed for modifying X bit. 3> A new pid namespace sysctl: vm.memfd_noexec to control the behavior of X bit.For example, if a container has vm.memfd_noexec=2, then memfd_create() without MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL will be rejected. 4> A new security hook in memfd_create(). This make it possible to a new LSM, which rejects or allows executable memfd based on its security policy. Change history: v7: - patch 2/6: remove #ifdef and MAX_PATH (memfd_test.c). - patch 3/6: check capability (CAP_SYS_ADMIN) from userns instead of global ns (pid_sysctl.h). Add a tab (pid_namespace.h). - patch 5/6: remove #ifdef (memfd_test.c) - patch 6/6: remove unneeded security_move_mount(security.c). v6:https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20221206150233.1963717-1-jeffxu@google.com/ - Address comment and move "#ifdef CONFIG_" from .c file to pid_sysctl.h v5:https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20221206152358.1966099-1-jeffxu@google.com/ - Pass vm.memfd_noexec from current ns to child ns. - Fix build issue detected by kernel test robot. - Add missing security.c v3:https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20221202013404.163143-1-jeffxu@google.com/ - Address API design comments in v2. - Let memfd_create() to set X bit at creation time. - A new pid namespace sysctl: vm.memfd_noexec to control behavior of X bit. - A new security hook in memfd_create(). v2:https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220805222126.142525-1-jeffxu@google.com/ - address comments in V1. - add sysctl (vm.mfd_noexec) to set the default file permissions of memfd_create to be non-executable. v1:https://lwn.net/Articles/890096/ [1] https://crbug.com/1305411 [2] https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/list?q=type%3Dbug-security%20me… [3] https://lwn.net/Articles/781013/ Daniel Verkamp (2): mm/memfd: add F_SEAL_EXEC selftests/memfd: add tests for F_SEAL_EXEC Jeff Xu (4): mm/memfd: add MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC mm/memfd: Add write seals when apply SEAL_EXEC to executable memfd selftests/memfd: add tests for MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL MFD_EXEC mm/memfd: security hook for memfd_create include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 1 + include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 4 + include/linux/pid_namespace.h | 19 ++ include/linux/security.h | 6 + include/uapi/linux/fcntl.h | 1 + include/uapi/linux/memfd.h | 4 + kernel/pid_namespace.c | 5 + kernel/pid_sysctl.h | 59 ++++ mm/memfd.c | 61 +++- mm/shmem.c | 6 + security/security.c | 5 + tools/testing/selftests/memfd/fuse_test.c | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c | 341 ++++++++++++++++++++- 13 files changed, 510 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) create mode 100644 kernel/pid_sysctl.h base-commit: eb7081409f94a9a8608593d0fb63a1aa3d6f95d8 -- 2.39.0.rc1.256.g54fd8350bd-goog

1 month, 4 weeks

9
25
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[PATCH] selftests: riscv: Add README for RISC-V KSelfTest

by Bala-Vignesh-Reddy

Add a README file for RISC-V specific kernel selftests under tools/testing/selftests/riscv/. This mirrors the existing README for arm64, providing clear guidance on how the tests are architecture specific and skipped on non-riscv systems. It also includes standard make commands for building, running and installing the tests, along with a reference to general kselftest documentation. Signed-off-by: Bala-Vignesh-Reddy <reddybalavignesh9979(a)gmail.com> --- tools/testing/selftests/riscv/README | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/riscv/README diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/riscv/README b/tools/testing/selftests/riscv/README new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..443da395da68 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/riscv/README @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +KSelfTest RISC-V +================ + +- These tests are riscv specific and so not built or run but just skipped + completely when env-variable ARCH is found to be different than 'riscv'. + +- Holding true the above, RISC-V KSFT tests can be run within the + KSelfTest framework using standard Linux top-level-makefile targets: + + $ make TARGETS=riscv kselftest-clean + $ make TARGETS=riscv kselftest + + or + + $ make -C tools/testing/selftests TARGETS=riscv \ + INSTALL_PATH=<your-installation-path> install + + or, alternatively, only specific riscv/ subtargets can be picked: + + $ make -C tools/testing/selftests TARGETS=riscv RISCV_SUBTARGETS="mm vector" \ + INSTALL_PATH=<your-installation-path> install + + Further details on building and running KSFT can be found in: + Documentation/dev-tools/kselftest.rst -- 2.43.0

2 months

3
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2025

2024

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