This patch series extends the sev_init2 and the sev_smoke test to
exercise the SEV-SNP VM launch workflow.
Primarily, it introduces the architectural defines, its support in the SEV
library and extends the tests to interact with the SEV-SNP ioctl()
wrappers.
Patch 1 - Do not advertize SNP on incompatible firmware
Patch 2 - SNP test for KVM_SEV_INIT2
Patch 3 - Add VMGEXIT helper
Patch 4 - Introduce SEV+ VM type check
Patch 5 - SNP iotcl() plumbing for the SEV library
Patch 6 - Force set GUEST_MEMFD for SNP
Patch 7 - Cleanups of smoke test - Decouple policy from type
Patch 8 - SNP smoke test
v4:
1. Remove SNP FW API version check in the test and ensure the KVM
capability advertizes the presence of the feature. Retain the minimum
version definitions to exercise these API versions in the smoke test.
2. Retained only the SNP smoke test and SNP_INIT2 test
3. The SNP architectural defined merged with SNP_INIT2 test patch
4. SNP shutdown merged with SNP smoke test patch
5. Add SEV VM type check to abstract comparisons and reduce clutter
6. Define a SNP default policy which sets bits based on the presence of
SMT
7. Decouple privatization and encryption for it to be SNP agnostic
8. Assert for only positive tests using vm_ioctl()
9. Dropped tested-by tags
In summary - based on comments from Sean, I have primarily reduced the
scope of this patch series to focus on breaking down the SNP smoke test
patch (v3 - patch2) to first introduce SEV-SNP support and use this
interface to extend the sev_init2 and the sev_smoke test.
The rest of the v3 patchset that introduces ioctl, pre fault, fallocate
and negative tests, will be re-worked and re-introduced subsequently in
future patch series post addressing the issues discussed.
v3:
https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20240905124107.6954-1-pratikrajesh.sampat@amd.c…
1. Remove the assignments for the prefault and fallocate test type
enums.
2. Fix error message for sev launch measure and finish.
3. Collect tested-by tags [Peter, Srikanth]
Any feedback/review is highly appreciated!
Pratik R. Sampat (8):
KVM: SEV: Disable SEV-SNP on FW validation failure
KVM: selftests: SEV-SNP test for KVM_SEV_INIT2
KVM: selftests: Add VMGEXIT helper
KVM: selftests: Introduce SEV VM type check
KVM: selftests: Add library support for interacting with SNP
KVM: selftests: Force GUEST_MEMFD flag for SNP VM type
KVM: selftests: Abstractions for SEV to decouple policy from type
KVM: selftests: Add a basic SEV-SNP smoke test
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 4 +-
drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c | 6 ++
include/linux/psp-sev.h | 3 +
.../selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/processor.h | 1 +
.../selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h | 55 ++++++++++-
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c | 7 +-
.../selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/processor.c | 4 +-
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c | 98 ++++++++++++++++++-
.../selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_init2_tests.c | 13 +++
.../selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_smoke_test.c | 96 ++++++++++++++----
10 files changed, 258 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
--
2.43.0
The new option controls tests run on boot or module load. With the new
debugfs "run" dentry allowing to run tests on demand, an ability to disable
automatic tests run becomes a useful option in case of intrusive tests.
The option is set to true by default to preserve the existent behavior. It
can be overridden by either the corresponding module option or by the
corresponding config build option.
Signed-off-by: Stanislav Kinsburskii <skinsburskii(a)linux.microsoft.com>
---
include/kunit/test.h | 4 +++-
lib/kunit/Kconfig | 12 ++++++++++++
lib/kunit/debugfs.c | 2 +-
lib/kunit/executor.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
lib/kunit/test.c | 6 ++++--
5 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/kunit/test.h b/include/kunit/test.h
index 34b71e42fb10..58dbab60f853 100644
--- a/include/kunit/test.h
+++ b/include/kunit/test.h
@@ -312,6 +312,7 @@ static inline void kunit_set_failure(struct kunit *test)
}
bool kunit_enabled(void);
+bool kunit_autorun(void);
const char *kunit_action(void);
const char *kunit_filter_glob(void);
char *kunit_filter(void);
@@ -334,7 +335,8 @@ kunit_filter_suites(const struct kunit_suite_set *suite_set,
int *err);
void kunit_free_suite_set(struct kunit_suite_set suite_set);
-int __kunit_test_suites_init(struct kunit_suite * const * const suites, int num_suites);
+int __kunit_test_suites_init(struct kunit_suite * const * const suites, int num_suites,
+ bool run_tests);
void __kunit_test_suites_exit(struct kunit_suite **suites, int num_suites);
diff --git a/lib/kunit/Kconfig b/lib/kunit/Kconfig
index 34d7242d526d..a97897edd964 100644
--- a/lib/kunit/Kconfig
+++ b/lib/kunit/Kconfig
@@ -81,4 +81,16 @@ config KUNIT_DEFAULT_ENABLED
In most cases this should be left as Y. Only if additional opt-in
behavior is needed should this be set to N.
+config KUNIT_AUTORUN_ENABLED
+ bool "Default value of kunit.autorun"
+ default y
+ help
+ Sets the default value of kunit.autorun. If set to N then KUnit
+ tests will not run after initialization unless kunit.autorun=1 is
+ passed to the kernel command line. The test can still be run manually
+ via debugfs interface.
+
+ In most cases this should be left as Y. Only if additional opt-in
+ behavior is needed should this be set to N.
+
endif # KUNIT
diff --git a/lib/kunit/debugfs.c b/lib/kunit/debugfs.c
index d548750a325a..9df064f40d98 100644
--- a/lib/kunit/debugfs.c
+++ b/lib/kunit/debugfs.c
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ static ssize_t debugfs_run(struct file *file,
struct inode *f_inode = file->f_inode;
struct kunit_suite *suite = (struct kunit_suite *) f_inode->i_private;
- __kunit_test_suites_init(&suite, 1);
+ __kunit_test_suites_init(&suite, 1, true);
return count;
}
diff --git a/lib/kunit/executor.c b/lib/kunit/executor.c
index 34b7b6833df3..340723571b0f 100644
--- a/lib/kunit/executor.c
+++ b/lib/kunit/executor.c
@@ -29,6 +29,22 @@ const char *kunit_action(void)
return action_param;
}
+/*
+ * Run KUnit tests after initialization
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_KUNIT_AUTORUN_ENABLED
+static bool autorun_param = true;
+#else
+static bool autorun_param;
+#endif
+module_param_named(autorun, autorun_param, bool, 0);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(autorun, "Run KUnit tests after initialization");
+
+bool kunit_autorun(void)
+{
+ return autorun_param;
+}
+
static char *filter_glob_param;
static char *filter_param;
static char *filter_action_param;
@@ -266,7 +282,7 @@ void kunit_exec_run_tests(struct kunit_suite_set *suite_set, bool builtin)
pr_info("1..%zu\n", num_suites);
}
- __kunit_test_suites_init(suite_set->start, num_suites);
+ __kunit_test_suites_init(suite_set->start, num_suites, kunit_autorun());
}
void kunit_exec_list_tests(struct kunit_suite_set *suite_set, bool include_attr)
diff --git a/lib/kunit/test.c b/lib/kunit/test.c
index 089c832e3cdb..146d1b48a096 100644
--- a/lib/kunit/test.c
+++ b/lib/kunit/test.c
@@ -708,7 +708,8 @@ bool kunit_enabled(void)
return enable_param;
}
-int __kunit_test_suites_init(struct kunit_suite * const * const suites, int num_suites)
+int __kunit_test_suites_init(struct kunit_suite * const * const suites, int num_suites,
+ bool run_tests)
{
unsigned int i;
@@ -731,7 +732,8 @@ int __kunit_test_suites_init(struct kunit_suite * const * const suites, int num_
for (i = 0; i < num_suites; i++) {
kunit_init_suite(suites[i]);
- kunit_run_tests(suites[i]);
+ if (run_tests)
+ kunit_run_tests(suites[i]);
}
static_branch_dec(&kunit_running);
Android uses the ashmem driver [1] for creating shared memory regions
between processes. The ashmem driver exposes an ioctl command for
processes to restrict the permissions an ashmem buffer can be mapped
with.
Buffers are created with the ability to be mapped as readable, writable,
and executable. Processes remove the ability to map some ashmem buffers
as executable to ensure that those buffers cannot be used to inject
malicious code for another process to run. Other buffers retain their
ability to be mapped as executable, as these buffers can be used for
just-in-time (JIT) compilation. So there is a need to be able to remove
the ability to map a buffer as executable on a per-buffer basis.
Android is currently trying to migrate towards replacing its ashmem
driver usage with memfd. Part of the transition involved introducing a
library that serves to abstract away how shared memory regions are
allocated (i.e. ashmem vs memfd). This allows clients to use a single
interface for restricting how a buffer can be mapped without having to
worry about how it is handled for ashmem (through the ioctl
command mentioned earlier) or memfd (through file seals).
While memfd has support for preventing buffers from being mapped as
writable beyond a certain point in time (thanks to
F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE), it does not have a similar interface to prevent
buffers from being mapped as executable beyond a certain point.
However, that could be implemented as a file seal (F_SEAL_FUTURE_EXEC)
which works similarly to F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE.
F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE was chosen as a template for how this new seal
should behave, instead of F_SEAL_WRITE, for the following reasons:
1. Having the new seal behave like F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE matches the
behavior that was present with ashmem. This aids in seamlessly
transitioning clients away from ashmem to memfd.
2. Making the new seal behave like F_SEAL_WRITE would mean that no
mappings that could become executable in the future (i.e. via
mprotect()) can exist when the seal is applied. However, there are
known cases (e.g. CursorWindow [2]) where restrictions are applied
on how a buffer can be mapped after a mapping has already been made.
That mapping may have VM_MAYEXEC set, which would not allow the seal
to be applied successfully.
Therefore, the F_SEAL_FUTURE_EXEC seal was designed to have the same
semantics as F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE.
Note: this series depends on Lorenzo's work [3], [4], [5] from Andrew
Morton's mm-unstable branch [6], which reworks memfd's file seal checks,
allowing for newer file seals to be implemented in a cleaner fashion.
Changes from v1 ==> v2:
- Changed the return code to be -EPERM instead of -EACCES when
attempting to map an exec sealed file with PROT_EXEC to align
to mmap()'s man page. Thank you Kalesh Singh for spotting this!
- Rebased on top of Lorenzo's work to cleanup memfd file seal checks in
mmap() ([3], [4], and [5]). Thank you for this Lorenzo!
- Changed to deny PROT_EXEC mappings only if the mapping is shared,
instead of for both shared and private mappings, after discussing
this with Lorenzo.
Opens:
- Lorenzo brought up that this patch may negatively impact the usage of
MFD_NOEXEC_SCOPE_NOEXEC_ENFORCED [7]. However, it is not clear to me
why that is the case. At the moment, my intent is for the executable
permissions of the file to be disjoint from the ability to create
executable mappings.
Links:
[1] https://cs.android.com/android/kernel/superproject/+/common-android-mainlin…
[2] https://developer.android.com/reference/android/database/CursorWindow
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/all/cover.1732804776.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com/
[4] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241206212846.210835-1-lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
[5] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/7dee6c5d-480b-4c24-b98e-6fa47dbd8a23@lucifer.local
[6] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm.git/tree/?h=mm-unst…
[7] https://lore.kernel.org/all/3a53b154-1e46-45fb-a559-65afa7a8a788@lucifer.lo…
Links to previous versions:
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241206010930.3871336-1-isaacmanjarres@google.…
Isaac J. Manjarres (2):
mm/memfd: Add support for F_SEAL_FUTURE_EXEC to memfd
selftests/memfd: Add tests for F_SEAL_FUTURE_EXEC
include/uapi/linux/fcntl.h | 1 +
mm/memfd.c | 39 ++++++++++-
tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c | 79 ++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 118 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--
2.47.1.613.gc27f4b7a9f-goog
After reviewing the code, it was found that these macros are never
referenced in the code. Just remove them.
Signed-off-by: Ba Jing <bajing(a)cmss.chinamobile.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/ptrace_test.c | 2 --
1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/ptrace_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/ptrace_test.c
index a19db4d0b3bd..8f31b673ff2d 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/ptrace_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/ptrace_test.c
@@ -22,8 +22,6 @@
/* Copied from security/yama/yama_lsm.c */
#define YAMA_SCOPE_DISABLED 0
#define YAMA_SCOPE_RELATIONAL 1
-#define YAMA_SCOPE_CAPABILITY 2
-#define YAMA_SCOPE_NO_ATTACH 3
static void create_domain(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata)
{
--
2.33.0
This patch allows progs to elide a null check on statically known map
lookup keys. In other words, if the verifier can statically prove that
the lookup will be in-bounds, allow the prog to drop the null check.
This is useful for two reasons:
1. Large numbers of nullness checks (especially when they cannot fail)
unnecessarily pushes prog towards BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_JMP_SEQ.
2. It forms a tighter contract between programmer and verifier.
For (1), bpftrace is starting to make heavier use of percpu scratch
maps. As a result, for user scripts with large number of unrolled loops,
we are starting to hit jump complexity verification errors. These
percpu lookups cannot fail anyways, as we only use static key values.
Eliding nullness probably results in less work for verifier as well.
For (2), percpu scratch maps are often used as a larger stack, as the
currrent stack is limited to 512 bytes. In these situations, it is
desirable for the programmer to express: "this lookup should never fail,
and if it does, it means I messed up the code". By omitting the null
check, the programmer can "ask" the verifier to double check the logic.
=== Changelog ===
Changes in v6:
* Use is_spilled_scalar_reg() helper and remove unnecessary comment
* Add back deleted selftest with different helper to dirty dst buffer
* Check size of spill is exactly key_size and update selftests
* Read slot_type from correct offset into the spi
* Rewrite selftests in C where possible
* Mark constant map keys as precise
Changes in v5:
* Dropped all acks
* Use s64 instead of long for const_map_key
* Ensure stack slot contains spilled reg before accessing spilled_ptr
* Ensure spilled reg is a scalar before accessing tnum const value
* Fix verifier selftest for 32-bit write to write at 8 byte alignment
to ensure spill is tracked
* Introduce more precise tracking of helper stack accesses
* Do constant map key extraction as part of helper argument processing
and then remove duplicated stack checks
* Use ret_flag instead of regs[BPF_REG_0].type
* Handle STACK_ZERO
* Fix bug in bpf_load_hdr_opt() arg annotation
Changes in v4:
* Only allow for CAP_BPF
* Add test for stack growing upwards
* Improve comment about stack growing upwards
Changes in v3:
* Check if stack is (erroneously) growing upwards
* Mention in commit message why existing tests needed change
Changes in v2:
* Added a check for when R2 is not a ptr to stack
* Added a check for when stack is uninitialized (no stack slot yet)
* Updated existing tests to account for null elision
* Added test case for when R2 can be both const and non-const
Daniel Xu (5):
bpf: verifier: Add missing newline on verbose() call
bpf: tcp: Mark bpf_load_hdr_opt() arg2 as read-write
bpf: verifier: Refactor helper access type tracking
bpf: verifier: Support eliding map lookup nullness
bpf: selftests: verifier: Add nullness elision tests
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 139 +++++++++++----
net/core/filter.c | 2 +-
.../testing/selftests/bpf/progs/dynptr_fail.c | 6 +-
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/iters.c | 14 +-
.../selftests/bpf/progs/map_kptr_fail.c | 2 +-
.../selftests/bpf/progs/test_global_func10.c | 2 +-
.../selftests/bpf/progs/uninit_stack.c | 5 +-
.../bpf/progs/verifier_array_access.c | 168 ++++++++++++++++++
.../bpf/progs/verifier_basic_stack.c | 2 +-
.../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_const_or.c | 4 +-
.../progs/verifier_helper_access_var_len.c | 12 +-
.../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_int_ptr.c | 2 +-
.../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_map_in_map.c | 2 +-
.../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_mtu.c | 2 +-
.../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_raw_stack.c | 4 +-
.../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c | 2 +-
.../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_var_off.c | 8 +-
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/calls.c | 2 +-
.../testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/map_kptr.c | 2 +-
19 files changed, 311 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-)
--
2.47.1
Reverse the order in which
the PML log is read to align more closely to the hardware. It should
not affect regular users of the dirty logging but it fixes a unit test
specific assumption in the dirty_log_test dirty-ring mode.
Best regards,
Maxim Levitsky
Maxim Levitsky (2):
KVM: VMX: refactor PML terminology
KVM: VMX: read the PML log in the same order as it was written
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++------------
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 5 ++++-
4 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
--
2.26.3