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[PATCH v5 13/29] compat_ioctl: move more drivers to compat_ptr_ioctl

by Arnd Bergmann

The .ioctl and .compat_ioctl file operations have the same prototype so they can both point to the same function, which works great almost all the time when all the commands are compatible. One exception is the s390 architecture, where a compat pointer is only 31 bit wide, and converting it into a 64-bit pointer requires calling compat_ptr(). Most drivers here will never run in s390, but since we now have a generic helper for it, it's easy enough to use it consistently. I double-checked all these drivers to ensure that all ioctl arguments are used as pointers or are ignored, but are not interpreted as integer values. Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg(a)mellanox.com> Acked-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter(a)ffwll.ch> Acked-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung(a)kernel.org> Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Acked-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com> Acked-by: Darren Hart (VMware) <dvhart(a)infradead.org> Acked-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron(a)huawei.com> Acked-by: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> --- drivers/android/binder.c | 2 +- drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c | 2 +- drivers/dma-buf/dma-buf.c | 4 +--- drivers/dma-buf/sw_sync.c | 2 +- drivers/dma-buf/sync_file.c | 2 +- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_chardev.c | 2 +- drivers/hid/hidraw.c | 4 +--- drivers/iio/industrialio-core.c | 2 +- drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_main.c | 4 ++-- drivers/media/rc/lirc_dev.c | 4 +--- drivers/mfd/cros_ec_dev.c | 4 +--- drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_host.c | 2 +- drivers/nvdimm/bus.c | 4 ++-- drivers/nvme/host/core.c | 2 +- drivers/pci/switch/switchtec.c | 2 +- drivers/platform/x86/wmi.c | 2 +- drivers/rpmsg/rpmsg_char.c | 4 ++-- drivers/sbus/char/display7seg.c | 2 +- drivers/sbus/char/envctrl.c | 4 +--- drivers/scsi/3w-xxxx.c | 4 +--- drivers/scsi/cxlflash/main.c | 2 +- drivers/scsi/esas2r/esas2r_main.c | 2 +- drivers/scsi/pmcraid.c | 4 +--- drivers/staging/android/ion/ion.c | 4 +--- drivers/staging/vme/devices/vme_user.c | 2 +- drivers/tee/tee_core.c | 2 +- drivers/usb/class/cdc-wdm.c | 2 +- drivers/usb/class/usbtmc.c | 4 +--- drivers/virt/fsl_hypervisor.c | 2 +- fs/btrfs/super.c | 2 +- fs/fuse/dev.c | 2 +- fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c | 2 +- fs/userfaultfd.c | 2 +- net/rfkill/core.c | 2 +- 34 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c index dc1c83eafc22..79955e82544a 100644 --- a/drivers/android/binder.c +++ b/drivers/android/binder.c @@ -6043,7 +6043,7 @@ const struct file_operations binder_fops = { .owner = THIS_MODULE, .poll = binder_poll, .unlocked_ioctl = binder_ioctl, - .compat_ioctl = binder_ioctl, + .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl, .mmap = binder_mmap, .open = binder_open, .flush = binder_flush, diff --git a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c index abc7a7f64d64..ef0e482ee04f 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ static long adf_ctl_ioctl(struct file *fp, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg); static const struct file_operations adf_ctl_ops = { .owner = THIS_MODULE, .unlocked_ioctl = adf_ctl_ioctl, - .compat_ioctl = adf_ctl_ioctl, + .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl, }; struct adf_ctl_drv_info { diff --git a/drivers/dma-buf/dma-buf.c b/drivers/dma-buf/dma-buf.c index f45bfb29ef96..f6d9047b7a69 100644 --- a/drivers/dma-buf/dma-buf.c +++ b/drivers/dma-buf/dma-buf.c @@ -415,9 +415,7 @@ static const struct file_operations dma_buf_fops = { .llseek = dma_buf_llseek, .poll = dma_buf_poll, .unlocked_ioctl = dma_buf_ioctl, -#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT - .compat_ioctl = dma_buf_ioctl, -#endif + .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl, .show_fdinfo = dma_buf_show_fdinfo, }; diff --git a/drivers/dma-buf/sw_sync.c b/drivers/dma-buf/sw_sync.c index 051f6c2873c7..51026cb08801 100644 --- a/drivers/dma-buf/sw_sync.c +++ b/drivers/dma-buf/sw_sync.c @@ -410,5 +410,5 @@ const struct file_operations sw_sync_debugfs_fops = { .open = sw_sync_debugfs_open, .release = sw_sync_debugfs_release, .unlocked_ioctl = sw_sync_ioctl, - .compat_ioctl = sw_sync_ioctl, + .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl, }; diff --git a/drivers/dma-buf/sync_file.c b/drivers/dma-buf/sync_file.c index ee4d1a96d779..85b96757fc76 100644 --- a/drivers/dma-buf/sync_file.c +++ b/drivers/dma-buf/sync_file.c @@ -480,5 +480,5 @@ static const struct file_operations sync_file_fops = { .release = sync_file_release, .poll = sync_file_poll, .unlocked_ioctl = sync_file_ioctl, - .compat_ioctl = sync_file_ioctl, + .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl, }; diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_chardev.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_chardev.c index 26b15cc56c31..ea933d2444bb 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_chardev.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_chardev.c @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ static const char kfd_dev_name[] = "kfd"; static const struct file_operations kfd_fops = { .owner = THIS_MODULE, .unlocked_ioctl = kfd_ioctl, - .compat_ioctl = kfd_ioctl, + .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl, .open = kfd_open, .mmap = kfd_mmap, }; diff --git a/drivers/hid/hidraw.c b/drivers/hid/hidraw.c index 006bd6f4f653..923edc650f46 100644 --- a/drivers/hid/hidraw.c +++ b/drivers/hid/hidraw.c @@ -468,9 +468,7 @@ static const struct file_operations hidraw_ops = { .release = hidraw_release, .unlocked_ioctl = hidraw_ioctl, .fasync = hidraw_fasync, -#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT - .compat_ioctl = hidraw_ioctl, -#endif + .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl, .llseek = noop_llseek, }; diff --git a/drivers/iio/industrialio-core.c b/drivers/iio/industrialio-core.c index 524a686077ca..9dd687534035 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/industrialio-core.c +++ b/drivers/iio/industrialio-core.c @@ -1610,7 +1610,7 @@ static const struct file_operations iio_buffer_fileops = { .owner = THIS_MODULE, .llseek = noop_llseek, .unlocked_ioctl = iio_ioctl, - .compat_ioctl = iio_ioctl, + .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl, }; static int iio_check_unique_scan_index(struct iio_dev *indio_dev) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_main.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_main.c index 11c13c1381cf..d6d2f6c0cd01 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_main.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_main.c @@ -1135,7 +1135,7 @@ static const struct file_operations uverbs_fops = { .release = ib_uverbs_close, .llseek = no_llseek, .unlocked_ioctl = ib_uverbs_ioctl, - .compat_ioctl = ib_uverbs_ioctl, + .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl, }; static const struct file_operations uverbs_mmap_fops = { @@ -1146,7 +1146,7 @@ static const struct file_operations uverbs_mmap_fops = { .release = ib_uverbs_close, .llseek = no_llseek, .unlocked_ioctl = ib_uverbs_ioctl, - .compat_ioctl = ib_uverbs_ioctl, + .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl, }; static int ib_uverbs_get_nl_info(struct ib_device *ibdev, void *client_data, diff --git a/drivers/media/rc/lirc_dev.c b/drivers/media/rc/lirc_dev.c index f078f8a3aec8..9a8c1cf54ac4 100644 --- a/drivers/media/rc/lirc_dev.c +++ b/drivers/media/rc/lirc_dev.c @@ -720,9 +720,7 @@ static const struct file_operations lirc_fops = { .owner = THIS_MODULE, .write = ir_lirc_transmit_ir, .unlocked_ioctl = ir_lirc_ioctl, -#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT - .compat_ioctl = ir_lirc_ioctl, -#endif + .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl, .read = ir_lirc_read, .poll = ir_lirc_poll, .open = ir_lirc_open, diff --git a/drivers/mfd/cros_ec_dev.c b/drivers/mfd/cros_ec_dev.c index 41dccced5026..db1eefcd770b 100644 --- a/drivers/mfd/cros_ec_dev.c +++ b/drivers/mfd/cros_ec_dev.c @@ -239,9 +239,7 @@ static const struct file_operations fops = { .release = ec_device_release, .read = ec_device_read, .unlocked_ioctl = ec_device_ioctl, -#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT - .compat_ioctl = ec_device_ioctl, -#endif + .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl, }; static void cros_ec_class_release(struct device *dev) diff --git a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_host.c b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_host.c index 833e2bd248a5..903e321e8e87 100644 --- a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_host.c +++ b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_host.c @@ -961,7 +961,7 @@ static const struct file_operations vmuser_fops = { .release = vmci_host_close, .poll = vmci_host_poll, .unlocked_ioctl = vmci_host_unlocked_ioctl, - .compat_ioctl = vmci_host_unlocked_ioctl, + .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl, }; static struct miscdevice vmci_host_miscdev = { diff --git a/drivers/nvdimm/bus.c b/drivers/nvdimm/bus.c index 798c5c4aea9c..6ca142d833ab 100644 --- a/drivers/nvdimm/bus.c +++ b/drivers/nvdimm/bus.c @@ -1229,7 +1229,7 @@ static const struct file_operations nvdimm_bus_fops = { .owner = THIS_MODULE, .open = nd_open, .unlocked_ioctl = bus_ioctl, - .compat_ioctl = bus_ioctl, + .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl, .llseek = noop_llseek, }; @@ -1237,7 +1237,7 @@ static const struct file_operations nvdimm_fops = { .owner = THIS_MODULE, .open = nd_open, .unlocked_ioctl = dimm_ioctl, - .compat_ioctl = dimm_ioctl, + .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl, .llseek = noop_llseek, }; diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/core.c b/drivers/nvme/host/core.c index 8f3fbe5ca937..be07bd1f6654 100644 --- a/drivers/nvme/host/core.c +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/core.c @@ -2813,7 +2813,7 @@ static const struct file_operations nvme_dev_fops = { .owner = THIS_MODULE, .open = nvme_dev_open, .unlocked_ioctl = nvme_dev_ioctl, - .compat_ioctl = nvme_dev_ioctl, + .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl, }; static ssize_t nvme_sysfs_reset(struct device *dev, diff --git a/drivers/pci/switch/switchtec.c b/drivers/pci/switch/switchtec.c index 8c94cd3fd1f2..66610f04d76d 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/switch/switchtec.c +++ b/drivers/pci/switch/switchtec.c @@ -1025,7 +1025,7 @@ static const struct file_operations switchtec_fops = { .read = switchtec_dev_read, .poll = switchtec_dev_poll, .unlocked_ioctl = switchtec_dev_ioctl, - .compat_ioctl = switchtec_dev_ioctl, + .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl, }; static void link_event_work(struct work_struct *work) diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/wmi.c b/drivers/platform/x86/wmi.c index 784cea8572c2..d9a0dd94ee62 100644 --- a/drivers/platform/x86/wmi.c +++ b/drivers/platform/x86/wmi.c @@ -913,7 +913,7 @@ static const struct file_operations wmi_fops = { .read = wmi_char_read, .open = wmi_char_open, .unlocked_ioctl = wmi_ioctl, - .compat_ioctl = wmi_ioctl, + .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl, }; static int wmi_dev_probe(struct device *dev) diff --git a/drivers/rpmsg/rpmsg_char.c b/drivers/rpmsg/rpmsg_char.c index eea5ebbb5119..507bfe163883 100644 --- a/drivers/rpmsg/rpmsg_char.c +++ b/drivers/rpmsg/rpmsg_char.c @@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ static const struct file_operations rpmsg_eptdev_fops = { .write_iter = rpmsg_eptdev_write_iter, .poll = rpmsg_eptdev_poll, .unlocked_ioctl = rpmsg_eptdev_ioctl, - .compat_ioctl = rpmsg_eptdev_ioctl, + .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl, }; static ssize_t name_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, @@ -451,7 +451,7 @@ static const struct file_operations rpmsg_ctrldev_fops = { .open = rpmsg_ctrldev_open, .release = rpmsg_ctrldev_release, .unlocked_ioctl = rpmsg_ctrldev_ioctl, - .compat_ioctl = rpmsg_ctrldev_ioctl, + .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl, }; static void rpmsg_ctrldev_release_device(struct device *dev) diff --git a/drivers/sbus/char/display7seg.c b/drivers/sbus/char/display7seg.c index 971fe074d7c9..fad936eb845f 100644 --- a/drivers/sbus/char/display7seg.c +++ b/drivers/sbus/char/display7seg.c @@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ static long d7s_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) static const struct file_operations d7s_fops = { .owner = THIS_MODULE, .unlocked_ioctl = d7s_ioctl, - .compat_ioctl = d7s_ioctl, + .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl, .open = d7s_open, .release = d7s_release, .llseek = noop_llseek, diff --git a/drivers/sbus/char/envctrl.c b/drivers/sbus/char/envctrl.c index a63d5e402ff2..12d66aa61ede 100644 --- a/drivers/sbus/char/envctrl.c +++ b/drivers/sbus/char/envctrl.c @@ -715,9 +715,7 @@ static const struct file_operations envctrl_fops = { .owner = THIS_MODULE, .read = envctrl_read, .unlocked_ioctl = envctrl_ioctl, -#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT - .compat_ioctl = envctrl_ioctl, -#endif + .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl, .open = envctrl_open, .release = envctrl_release, .llseek = noop_llseek, diff --git a/drivers/scsi/3w-xxxx.c b/drivers/scsi/3w-xxxx.c index 2b1e0d503020..fb6444d0409c 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/3w-xxxx.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/3w-xxxx.c @@ -1049,9 +1049,7 @@ static int tw_chrdev_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) static const struct file_operations tw_fops = { .owner = THIS_MODULE, .unlocked_ioctl = tw_chrdev_ioctl, -#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT - .compat_ioctl = tw_chrdev_ioctl, -#endif + .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl, .open = tw_chrdev_open, .release = NULL, .llseek = noop_llseek, diff --git a/drivers/scsi/cxlflash/main.c b/drivers/scsi/cxlflash/main.c index b1f4724efde2..6927654792b0 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/cxlflash/main.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/cxlflash/main.c @@ -3585,7 +3585,7 @@ static const struct file_operations cxlflash_chr_fops = { .owner = THIS_MODULE, .open = cxlflash_chr_open, .unlocked_ioctl = cxlflash_chr_ioctl, - .compat_ioctl = cxlflash_chr_ioctl, + .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl, }; /** diff --git a/drivers/scsi/esas2r/esas2r_main.c b/drivers/scsi/esas2r/esas2r_main.c index fdbda5c05aa0..80c5a235d193 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/esas2r/esas2r_main.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/esas2r/esas2r_main.c @@ -613,7 +613,7 @@ static int __init esas2r_init(void) /* Handle ioctl calls to "/proc/scsi/esas2r/ATTOnode" */ static const struct file_operations esas2r_proc_fops = { - .compat_ioctl = esas2r_proc_ioctl, + .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl, .unlocked_ioctl = esas2r_proc_ioctl, }; diff --git a/drivers/scsi/pmcraid.c b/drivers/scsi/pmcraid.c index 71ff3936da4f..12c4487cb9f6 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/pmcraid.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/pmcraid.c @@ -3973,9 +3973,7 @@ static const struct file_operations pmcraid_fops = { .open = pmcraid_chr_open, .fasync = pmcraid_chr_fasync, .unlocked_ioctl = pmcraid_chr_ioctl, -#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT - .compat_ioctl = pmcraid_chr_ioctl, -#endif + .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl, .llseek = noop_llseek, }; diff --git a/drivers/staging/android/ion/ion.c b/drivers/staging/android/ion/ion.c index 92c2914239e3..1663c163edca 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/android/ion/ion.c +++ b/drivers/staging/android/ion/ion.c @@ -567,9 +567,7 @@ static long ion_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) static const struct file_operations ion_fops = { .owner = THIS_MODULE, .unlocked_ioctl = ion_ioctl, -#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT - .compat_ioctl = ion_ioctl, -#endif + .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl, }; static int debug_shrink_set(void *data, u64 val) diff --git a/drivers/staging/vme/devices/vme_user.c b/drivers/staging/vme/devices/vme_user.c index 6a33aaa1a49f..fd0ea4dbcb91 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/vme/devices/vme_user.c +++ b/drivers/staging/vme/devices/vme_user.c @@ -494,7 +494,7 @@ static const struct file_operations vme_user_fops = { .write = vme_user_write, .llseek = vme_user_llseek, .unlocked_ioctl = vme_user_unlocked_ioctl, - .compat_ioctl = vme_user_unlocked_ioctl, + .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl, .mmap = vme_user_mmap, }; diff --git a/drivers/tee/tee_core.c b/drivers/tee/tee_core.c index 0f16d9ffd8d1..37d22e39fd8d 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/tee_core.c +++ b/drivers/tee/tee_core.c @@ -675,7 +675,7 @@ static const struct file_operations tee_fops = { .open = tee_open, .release = tee_release, .unlocked_ioctl = tee_ioctl, - .compat_ioctl = tee_ioctl, + .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl, }; static void tee_release_device(struct device *dev) diff --git a/drivers/usb/class/cdc-wdm.c b/drivers/usb/class/cdc-wdm.c index a7824a51f86d..3234dc539873 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/class/cdc-wdm.c +++ b/drivers/usb/class/cdc-wdm.c @@ -724,7 +724,7 @@ static const struct file_operations wdm_fops = { .release = wdm_release, .poll = wdm_poll, .unlocked_ioctl = wdm_ioctl, - .compat_ioctl = wdm_ioctl, + .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl, .llseek = noop_llseek, }; diff --git a/drivers/usb/class/usbtmc.c b/drivers/usb/class/usbtmc.c index 4942122b2346..bbd0308b13f5 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/class/usbtmc.c +++ b/drivers/usb/class/usbtmc.c @@ -2220,9 +2220,7 @@ static const struct file_operations fops = { .release = usbtmc_release, .flush = usbtmc_flush, .unlocked_ioctl = usbtmc_ioctl, -#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT - .compat_ioctl = usbtmc_ioctl, -#endif + .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl, .fasync = usbtmc_fasync, .poll = usbtmc_poll, .llseek = default_llseek, diff --git a/drivers/virt/fsl_hypervisor.c b/drivers/virt/fsl_hypervisor.c index 93d5bebf9572..1b0b11b55d2a 100644 --- a/drivers/virt/fsl_hypervisor.c +++ b/drivers/virt/fsl_hypervisor.c @@ -706,7 +706,7 @@ static const struct file_operations fsl_hv_fops = { .poll = fsl_hv_poll, .read = fsl_hv_read, .unlocked_ioctl = fsl_hv_ioctl, - .compat_ioctl = fsl_hv_ioctl, + .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl, }; static struct miscdevice fsl_hv_misc_dev = { diff --git a/fs/btrfs/super.c b/fs/btrfs/super.c index 78de9d5d80c6..f4f792b7379d 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/super.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/super.c @@ -2305,7 +2305,7 @@ static const struct super_operations btrfs_super_ops = { static const struct file_operations btrfs_ctl_fops = { .open = btrfs_control_open, .unlocked_ioctl = btrfs_control_ioctl, - .compat_ioctl = btrfs_control_ioctl, + .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl, .owner = THIS_MODULE, .llseek = noop_llseek, }; diff --git a/fs/fuse/dev.c b/fs/fuse/dev.c index ea8237513dfa..5bb93a3c397e 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/dev.c +++ b/fs/fuse/dev.c @@ -2354,7 +2354,7 @@ const struct file_operations fuse_dev_operations = { .release = fuse_dev_release, .fasync = fuse_dev_fasync, .unlocked_ioctl = fuse_dev_ioctl, - .compat_ioctl = fuse_dev_ioctl, + .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl, }; EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fuse_dev_operations); diff --git a/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c b/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c index 91006f47e420..3f494c8eaf2b 100644 --- a/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c +++ b/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c @@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ static const struct file_operations fanotify_fops = { .fasync = NULL, .release = fanotify_release, .unlocked_ioctl = fanotify_ioctl, - .compat_ioctl = fanotify_ioctl, + .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl, .llseek = noop_llseek, }; diff --git a/fs/userfaultfd.c b/fs/userfaultfd.c index ccbdbd62f0d8..6ec18e0492e6 100644 --- a/fs/userfaultfd.c +++ b/fs/userfaultfd.c @@ -1920,7 +1920,7 @@ static const struct file_operations userfaultfd_fops = { .poll = userfaultfd_poll, .read = userfaultfd_read, .unlocked_ioctl = userfaultfd_ioctl, - .compat_ioctl = userfaultfd_ioctl, + .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl, .llseek = noop_llseek, }; diff --git a/net/rfkill/core.c b/net/rfkill/core.c index f9b08a6d8dbe..c4be6a94ba97 100644 --- a/net/rfkill/core.c +++ b/net/rfkill/core.c @@ -1311,7 +1311,7 @@ static const struct file_operations rfkill_fops = { .release = rfkill_fop_release, #ifdef CONFIG_RFKILL_INPUT .unlocked_ioctl = rfkill_fop_ioctl, - .compat_ioctl = rfkill_fop_ioctl, + .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl, #endif .llseek = no_llseek, }; -- 2.20.0

5 years, 10 months

[RFC 0/7] Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support

by Sumit Garg

Add support for TEE based trusted keys where TEE provides the functionality to seal and unseal trusted keys using hardware unique key. Also, this is an alternative in case platform doesn't possess a TPM device. This series also adds some TEE features like: Patch #1, #2 enables support for registered kernel shared memory with TEE. Patch #3 enables support for private kernel login method required for cases like trusted keys where we don't wan't user-space to directly access TEE service to retrieve trusted key contents. Rest of the patches from #4 to #7 adds support for TEE based trusted keys. This patch-set has been tested with OP-TEE based pseudo TA which can be found here [1]. Looking forward to your valuable feedback/suggestions. [1] https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/pull/3082 Sumit Garg (7): tee: optee: allow kernel pages to register as shm tee: enable support to register kernel memory tee: add private login method for kernel clients KEYS: trusted: Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys KEYS: encrypted: Allow TEE based trusted master keys doc: keys: Document usage of TEE based Trusted Keys MAINTAINERS: Add entry for TEE based Trusted Keys Documentation/security/keys/tee-trusted.rst | 93 +++++ MAINTAINERS | 9 + drivers/tee/optee/call.c | 7 + drivers/tee/tee_core.c | 6 + drivers/tee/tee_shm.c | 16 +- include/keys/tee_trusted.h | 84 ++++ include/keys/trusted-type.h | 1 + include/linux/tee_drv.h | 1 + include/uapi/linux/tee.h | 2 + security/keys/Kconfig | 3 + security/keys/Makefile | 3 + security/keys/encrypted-keys/masterkey_trusted.c | 10 +- security/keys/tee_trusted.c | 506 +++++++++++++++++++++++ 13 files changed, 737 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/security/keys/tee-trusted.rst create mode 100644 include/keys/tee_trusted.h create mode 100644 security/keys/tee_trusted.c -- 2.7.4

5 years, 10 months

[RFC/RFT] KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework

by Sumit Garg

Current trusted keys framework is tightly coupled to use TPM device as an underlying implementation which makes it difficult for implementations like Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) etc. to provide trusked keys support in case platform doesn't posses a TPM device. So this patch tries to add generic trusted keys framework where underlying implemtations like TPM, TEE etc. could be easily plugged-in. Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen(a)linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg(a)linaro.org> --- This patch is an outcome of discussion here [1]. I have tested this framework with trusted keys support provided via TEE but I wasn't able to test it with a TPM device as I don't possess one. It would be really helpful if others could test this patch with a TPM device. Looking forward to your valuable feedback. [1] https://www.mail-archive.com/linux-doc@vger.kernel.org/msg30591.html -Sumit crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c | 2 +- include/keys/trusted-type.h | 45 ++ include/keys/trusted.h | 136 ---- include/keys/trusted_tpm.h | 124 +++ security/keys/Makefile | 2 +- security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 7 + security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-tpm.c | 1063 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted.c | 342 ++++++++ security/keys/trusted.c | 1295 ------------------------------ 9 files changed, 1583 insertions(+), 1433 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 include/keys/trusted.h create mode 100644 include/keys/trusted_tpm.h create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-tpm.c create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted.c delete mode 100644 security/keys/trusted.c diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c index 76d2ce3..ec3f309 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ #include <crypto/sha.h> #include <asm/unaligned.h> #include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h> -#include <keys/trusted.h> +#include <keys/trusted_tpm.h> #include <crypto/asym_tpm_subtype.h> #include <crypto/public_key.h> diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h index a94c03a..5559010 100644 --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h @@ -40,6 +40,51 @@ struct trusted_key_options { uint32_t policyhandle; }; +struct trusted_key_ops { + /* + * flag to indicate if trusted key implementation supports migration + * or not. + */ + unsigned char migratable; + + /* trusted key init */ + int (*init)(void); + + /* seal a trusted key */ + int (*seal)(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob); + + /* unseal a trusted key */ + int (*unseal)(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob); + + /* get random trusted key */ + int (*get_random)(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len); + + /* trusted key cleanup */ + void (*cleanup)(void); +}; + extern struct key_type key_type_trusted; +#if defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) +extern struct trusted_key_ops tpm_trusted_key_ops; +#endif + +#define TRUSTED_DEBUG 0 + +#if TRUSTED_DEBUG +static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p) +{ + pr_info("trusted_key: key_len %d\n", p->key_len); + print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "key ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, + 16, 1, p->key, p->key_len, 0); + pr_info("trusted_key: bloblen %d\n", p->blob_len); + print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "blob ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, + 16, 1, p->blob, p->blob_len, 0); + pr_info("trusted_key: migratable %d\n", p->migratable); +} +#else +static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p) +{ +} +#endif #endif /* _KEYS_TRUSTED_TYPE_H */ diff --git a/include/keys/trusted.h b/include/keys/trusted.h deleted file mode 100644 index 0071298..0000000 --- a/include/keys/trusted.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,136 +0,0 @@ -/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ -#ifndef __TRUSTED_KEY_H -#define __TRUSTED_KEY_H - -/* implementation specific TPM constants */ -#define MAX_BUF_SIZE 1024 -#define TPM_GETRANDOM_SIZE 14 -#define TPM_OSAP_SIZE 36 -#define TPM_OIAP_SIZE 10 -#define TPM_SEAL_SIZE 87 -#define TPM_UNSEAL_SIZE 104 -#define TPM_SIZE_OFFSET 2 -#define TPM_RETURN_OFFSET 6 -#define TPM_DATA_OFFSET 10 - -#define LOAD32(buffer, offset) (ntohl(*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset])) -#define LOAD32N(buffer, offset) (*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset]) -#define LOAD16(buffer, offset) (ntohs(*(uint16_t *)&buffer[offset])) - -struct tpm_buf { - int len; - unsigned char data[MAX_BUF_SIZE]; -}; - -#define INIT_BUF(tb) (tb->len = 0) - -struct osapsess { - uint32_t handle; - unsigned char secret[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; - unsigned char enonce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE]; -}; - -/* discrete values, but have to store in uint16_t for TPM use */ -enum { - SEAL_keytype = 1, - SRK_keytype = 4 -}; - -int TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key, - unsigned int keylen, unsigned char *h1, - unsigned char *h2, unsigned int h3, ...); -int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer, - const uint32_t command, - const unsigned char *ononce, - const unsigned char *key, - unsigned int keylen, ...); - -int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen); -int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce); - -#define TPM_DEBUG 0 - -#if TPM_DEBUG -static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o) -{ - pr_info("trusted_key: sealing key type %d\n", o->keytype); - pr_info("trusted_key: sealing key handle %0X\n", o->keyhandle); - pr_info("trusted_key: pcrlock %d\n", o->pcrlock); - pr_info("trusted_key: pcrinfo %d\n", o->pcrinfo_len); - print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "pcrinfo ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, - 16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0); -} - -static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p) -{ - pr_info("trusted_key: key_len %d\n", p->key_len); - print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "key ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, - 16, 1, p->key, p->key_len, 0); - pr_info("trusted_key: bloblen %d\n", p->blob_len); - print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "blob ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, - 16, 1, p->blob, p->blob_len, 0); - pr_info("trusted_key: migratable %d\n", p->migratable); -} - -static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s) -{ - print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "trusted-key: handle ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, - 16, 1, &s->handle, 4, 0); - pr_info("trusted-key: secret:\n"); - print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, - 16, 1, &s->secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0); - pr_info("trusted-key: enonce:\n"); - print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, - 16, 1, &s->enonce, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0); -} - -static inline void dump_tpm_buf(unsigned char *buf) -{ - int len; - - pr_info("\ntrusted-key: tpm buffer\n"); - len = LOAD32(buf, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET); - print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, buf, len, 0); -} -#else -static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o) -{ -} - -static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p) -{ -} - -static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s) -{ -} - -static inline void dump_tpm_buf(unsigned char *buf) -{ -} -#endif - -static inline void store8(struct tpm_buf *buf, const unsigned char value) -{ - buf->data[buf->len++] = value; -} - -static inline void store16(struct tpm_buf *buf, const uint16_t value) -{ - *(uint16_t *) & buf->data[buf->len] = htons(value); - buf->len += sizeof value; -} - -static inline void store32(struct tpm_buf *buf, const uint32_t value) -{ - *(uint32_t *) & buf->data[buf->len] = htonl(value); - buf->len += sizeof value; -} - -static inline void storebytes(struct tpm_buf *buf, const unsigned char *in, - const int len) -{ - memcpy(buf->data + buf->len, in, len); - buf->len += len; -} -#endif diff --git a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fd9bad2 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h @@ -0,0 +1,124 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef __TRUSTED_TPM_H +#define __TRUSTED_TPM_H + +#include <keys/trusted-type.h> +#include <linux/tpm_command.h> + +/* implementation specific TPM constants */ +#define MAX_BUF_SIZE 1024 +#define TPM_GETRANDOM_SIZE 14 +#define TPM_OSAP_SIZE 36 +#define TPM_OIAP_SIZE 10 +#define TPM_SEAL_SIZE 87 +#define TPM_UNSEAL_SIZE 104 +#define TPM_SIZE_OFFSET 2 +#define TPM_RETURN_OFFSET 6 +#define TPM_DATA_OFFSET 10 + +#define LOAD32(buffer, offset) (ntohl(*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset])) +#define LOAD32N(buffer, offset) (*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset]) +#define LOAD16(buffer, offset) (ntohs(*(uint16_t *)&buffer[offset])) + +struct tpm_buf { + int len; + unsigned char data[MAX_BUF_SIZE]; +}; + +#define INIT_BUF(tb) (tb->len = 0) + +struct osapsess { + uint32_t handle; + unsigned char secret[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; + unsigned char enonce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE]; +}; + +/* discrete values, but have to store in uint16_t for TPM use */ +enum { + SEAL_keytype = 1, + SRK_keytype = 4 +}; + +int TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keylen, unsigned char *h1, + unsigned char *h2, unsigned int h3, ...); +int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer, + const uint32_t command, + const unsigned char *ononce, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keylen, ...); + +int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen); +int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce); + +#define TPM_DEBUG 0 + +#if TPM_DEBUG +static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o) +{ + pr_info("trusted_key: sealing key type %d\n", o->keytype); + pr_info("trusted_key: sealing key handle %0X\n", o->keyhandle); + pr_info("trusted_key: pcrlock %d\n", o->pcrlock); + pr_info("trusted_key: pcrinfo %d\n", o->pcrinfo_len); + print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "pcrinfo ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, + 16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0); +} + +static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s) +{ + print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "trusted-key: handle ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, + 16, 1, &s->handle, 4, 0); + pr_info("trusted-key: secret:\n"); + print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, + 16, 1, &s->secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0); + pr_info("trusted-key: enonce:\n"); + print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, + 16, 1, &s->enonce, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0); +} + +static inline void dump_tpm_buf(unsigned char *buf) +{ + int len; + + pr_info("\ntrusted-key: tpm buffer\n"); + len = LOAD32(buf, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET); + print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, buf, len, 0); +} +#else +static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o) +{ +} + +static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s) +{ +} + +static inline void dump_tpm_buf(unsigned char *buf) +{ +} +#endif + +static inline void store8(struct tpm_buf *buf, const unsigned char value) +{ + buf->data[buf->len++] = value; +} + +static inline void store16(struct tpm_buf *buf, const uint16_t value) +{ + *(uint16_t *) &buf->data[buf->len] = htons(value); + buf->len += sizeof(value); +} + +static inline void store32(struct tpm_buf *buf, const uint32_t value) +{ + *(uint32_t *) &buf->data[buf->len] = htonl(value); + buf->len += sizeof(value); +} + +static inline void storebytes(struct tpm_buf *buf, const unsigned char *in, + const int len) +{ + memcpy(buf->data + buf->len, in, len); + buf->len += len; +} +#endif diff --git a/security/keys/Makefile b/security/keys/Makefile index 9cef540..074f275 100644 --- a/security/keys/Makefile +++ b/security/keys/Makefile @@ -28,5 +28,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE) += keyctl_pkey.o # Key types # obj-$(CONFIG_BIG_KEYS) += big_key.o -obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted.o +obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted-keys/ obj-$(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS) += encrypted-keys/ diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6ecadfb --- /dev/null +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +# +# Makefile for trusted keys +# + +obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted.o \ + trusted-tpm.o diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-tpm.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-tpm.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..933d40a --- /dev/null +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-tpm.c @@ -0,0 +1,1063 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation + * Copyright (c) 2019, Linaro Limited + * + * Author: + * David Safford <safford(a)us.ibm.com> + * Switch to generic trusted key framework: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg(a)linaro.org> + * + * See Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst + */ + +#include <crypto/hash.h> +#include <crypto/hash_info.h> +#include <crypto/sha.h> +#include <keys/trusted_tpm.h> +#include <linux/crypto.h> +#include <linux/err.h> +#include <linux/init.h> +#include <linux/key-type.h> +#include <linux/parser.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/string.h> +#include <linux/tpm.h> + +static const char hmac_alg[] = "hmac(sha1)"; +static const char hash_alg[] = "sha1"; +static struct tpm_chip *chip; +static struct tpm_digest *digests; + +struct sdesc { + struct shash_desc shash; + char ctx[]; +}; + +static struct crypto_shash *hashalg; +static struct crypto_shash *hmacalg; + +static struct sdesc *init_sdesc(struct crypto_shash *alg) +{ + struct sdesc *sdesc; + int size; + + size = sizeof(struct shash_desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(alg); + sdesc = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!sdesc) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + sdesc->shash.tfm = alg; + return sdesc; +} + +static int TSS_sha1(const unsigned char *data, unsigned int datalen, + unsigned char *digest) +{ + struct sdesc *sdesc; + int ret; + + sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg); + if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) { + pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg); + return PTR_ERR(sdesc); + } + + ret = crypto_shash_digest(&sdesc->shash, data, datalen, digest); + kzfree(sdesc); + return ret; +} + +static int TSS_rawhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keylen, ...) +{ + struct sdesc *sdesc; + va_list argp; + unsigned int dlen; + unsigned char *data; + int ret; + + sdesc = init_sdesc(hmacalg); + if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) { + pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hmac_alg); + return PTR_ERR(sdesc); + } + + ret = crypto_shash_setkey(hmacalg, key, keylen); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + + va_start(argp, keylen); + for (;;) { + dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int); + if (dlen == 0) + break; + data = va_arg(argp, unsigned char *); + if (data == NULL) { + ret = -EINVAL; + break; + } + ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, data, dlen); + if (ret < 0) + break; + } + va_end(argp); + if (!ret) + ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, digest); +out: + kzfree(sdesc); + return ret; +} + +/* + * calculate authorization info fields to send to TPM + */ +int TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keylen, unsigned char *h1, + unsigned char *h2, unsigned int h3, ...) +{ + unsigned char paramdigest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; + struct sdesc *sdesc; + unsigned int dlen; + unsigned char *data; + unsigned char c; + int ret; + va_list argp; + + if (!chip) + return -ENODEV; + + sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg); + if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) { + pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg); + return PTR_ERR(sdesc); + } + + c = !!h3; + ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + va_start(argp, h3); + for (;;) { + dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int); + if (dlen == 0) + break; + data = va_arg(argp, unsigned char *); + if (!data) { + ret = -EINVAL; + break; + } + ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, data, dlen); + if (ret < 0) + break; + } + va_end(argp); + if (!ret) + ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, paramdigest); + if (!ret) + ret = TSS_rawhmac(digest, key, keylen, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, + paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h1, + TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h2, 1, &c, 0, 0); +out: + kzfree(sdesc); + return ret; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(TSS_authhmac); + +/* + * verify the AUTH1_COMMAND (Seal) result from TPM + */ +int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer, + const uint32_t command, + const unsigned char *ononce, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keylen, ...) +{ + uint32_t bufsize; + uint16_t tag; + uint32_t ordinal; + uint32_t result; + unsigned char *enonce; + unsigned char *continueflag; + unsigned char *authdata; + unsigned char testhmac[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; + unsigned char paramdigest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; + struct sdesc *sdesc; + unsigned int dlen; + unsigned int dpos; + va_list argp; + int ret; + + if (!chip) + return -ENODEV; + + bufsize = LOAD32(buffer, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET); + tag = LOAD16(buffer, 0); + ordinal = command; + result = LOAD32N(buffer, TPM_RETURN_OFFSET); + if (tag == TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND) + return 0; + if (tag != TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND) + return -EINVAL; + authdata = buffer + bufsize - SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE; + continueflag = authdata - 1; + enonce = continueflag - TPM_NONCE_SIZE; + + sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg); + if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) { + pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg); + return PTR_ERR(sdesc); + } + ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&result, + sizeof(result)); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&ordinal, + sizeof(ordinal)); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + va_start(argp, keylen); + for (;;) { + dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int); + if (dlen == 0) + break; + dpos = va_arg(argp, unsigned int); + ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, buffer + dpos, dlen); + if (ret < 0) + break; + } + va_end(argp); + if (!ret) + ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, paramdigest); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + + ret = TSS_rawhmac(testhmac, key, keylen, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, paramdigest, + TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, + 1, continueflag, 0, 0); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + + if (memcmp(testhmac, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)) + ret = -EINVAL; +out: + kzfree(sdesc); + return ret; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(TSS_checkhmac1); + +/* + * verify the AUTH2_COMMAND (unseal) result from TPM + */ +static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer, + const uint32_t command, + const unsigned char *ononce, + const unsigned char *key1, + unsigned int keylen1, + const unsigned char *key2, + unsigned int keylen2, ...) +{ + uint32_t bufsize; + uint16_t tag; + uint32_t ordinal; + uint32_t result; + unsigned char *enonce1; + unsigned char *continueflag1; + unsigned char *authdata1; + unsigned char *enonce2; + unsigned char *continueflag2; + unsigned char *authdata2; + unsigned char testhmac1[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; + unsigned char testhmac2[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; + unsigned char paramdigest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; + struct sdesc *sdesc; + unsigned int dlen; + unsigned int dpos; + va_list argp; + int ret; + + bufsize = LOAD32(buffer, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET); + tag = LOAD16(buffer, 0); + ordinal = command; + result = LOAD32N(buffer, TPM_RETURN_OFFSET); + + if (tag == TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND) + return 0; + if (tag != TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH2_COMMAND) + return -EINVAL; + authdata1 = buffer + bufsize - (SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + 1 + + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); + authdata2 = buffer + bufsize - (SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); + continueflag1 = authdata1 - 1; + continueflag2 = authdata2 - 1; + enonce1 = continueflag1 - TPM_NONCE_SIZE; + enonce2 = continueflag2 - TPM_NONCE_SIZE; + + sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg); + if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) { + pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg); + return PTR_ERR(sdesc); + } + ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&result, + sizeof(result)); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&ordinal, + sizeof(ordinal)); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + + va_start(argp, keylen2); + for (;;) { + dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int); + if (dlen == 0) + break; + dpos = va_arg(argp, unsigned int); + ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, buffer + dpos, dlen); + if (ret < 0) + break; + } + va_end(argp); + if (!ret) + ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, paramdigest); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + + ret = TSS_rawhmac(testhmac1, key1, keylen1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, + paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce1, + TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 1, continueflag1, 0, 0); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + if (memcmp(testhmac1, authdata1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + ret = TSS_rawhmac(testhmac2, key2, keylen2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, + paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce2, + TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 1, continueflag2, 0, 0); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + if (memcmp(testhmac2, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)) + ret = -EINVAL; +out: + kzfree(sdesc); + return ret; +} + +/* + * For key specific tpm requests, we will generate and send our + * own TPM command packets using the drivers send function. + */ +int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen) +{ + int rc; + + if (!chip) + return -ENODEV; + + dump_tpm_buf(cmd); + rc = tpm_send(chip, cmd, buflen); + dump_tpm_buf(cmd); + if (rc > 0) + /* Can't return positive return codes values to keyctl */ + rc = -EPERM; + return rc; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(trusted_tpm_send); + +/* + * Lock a trusted key, by extending a selected PCR. + * + * Prevents a trusted key that is sealed to PCRs from being accessed. + * This uses the tpm driver's extend function. + */ +static int pcrlock(const int pcrnum) +{ + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + + return tpm_pcr_extend(chip, pcrnum, digests) ? -EINVAL : 0; +} + +/* + * Create an object specific authorisation protocol (OSAP) session + */ +static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s, + const unsigned char *key, uint16_t type, uint32_t handle) +{ + unsigned char enonce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE]; + unsigned char ononce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE]; + int ret; + + ret = tpm_get_random(chip, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) + return ret; + + INIT_BUF(tb); + store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND); + store32(tb, TPM_OSAP_SIZE); + store32(tb, TPM_ORD_OSAP); + store16(tb, type); + store32(tb, handle); + storebytes(tb, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + + ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + s->handle = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET); + memcpy(s->enonce, &(tb->data[TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t)]), + TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + memcpy(enonce, &(tb->data[TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t) + + TPM_NONCE_SIZE]), TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + return TSS_rawhmac(s->secret, key, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, + enonce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 0, 0); +} + +/* + * Create an object independent authorisation protocol (oiap) session + */ +int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce) +{ + int ret; + + if (!chip) + return -ENODEV; + + INIT_BUF(tb); + store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND); + store32(tb, TPM_OIAP_SIZE); + store32(tb, TPM_ORD_OIAP); + ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + *handle = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET); + memcpy(nonce, &tb->data[TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t)], + TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(oiap); + +struct tpm_digests { + unsigned char encauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; + unsigned char pubauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; + unsigned char xorwork[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE * 2]; + unsigned char xorhash[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; + unsigned char nonceodd[TPM_NONCE_SIZE]; +}; + +/* + * Have the TPM seal(encrypt) the trusted key, possibly based on + * Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs). AUTH1 for sealing key. + */ +static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype, + uint32_t keyhandle, const unsigned char *keyauth, + const unsigned char *data, uint32_t datalen, + unsigned char *blob, uint32_t *bloblen, + const unsigned char *blobauth, + const unsigned char *pcrinfo, uint32_t pcrinfosize) +{ + struct osapsess sess; + struct tpm_digests *td; + unsigned char cont; + uint32_t ordinal; + uint32_t pcrsize; + uint32_t datsize; + int sealinfosize; + int encdatasize; + int storedsize; + int ret; + int i; + + /* alloc some work space for all the hashes */ + td = kmalloc(sizeof(*td), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!td) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* get session for sealing key */ + ret = osap(tb, &sess, keyauth, keytype, keyhandle); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + dump_sess(&sess); + + /* calculate encrypted authorization value */ + memcpy(td->xorwork, sess.secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); + memcpy(td->xorwork + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, sess.enonce, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); + ret = TSS_sha1(td->xorwork, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE * 2, td->xorhash); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + + ret = tpm_get_random(chip, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) + goto out; + ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_SEAL); + datsize = htonl(datalen); + pcrsize = htonl(pcrinfosize); + cont = 0; + + /* encrypt data authorization key */ + for (i = 0; i < SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE; ++i) + td->encauth[i] = td->xorhash[i] ^ blobauth[i]; + + /* calculate authorization HMAC value */ + if (pcrinfosize == 0) { + /* no pcr info specified */ + ret = TSS_authhmac(td->pubauth, sess.secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, + sess.enonce, td->nonceodd, cont, + sizeof(uint32_t), &ordinal, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, + td->encauth, sizeof(uint32_t), &pcrsize, + sizeof(uint32_t), &datsize, datalen, data, 0, + 0); + } else { + /* pcr info specified */ + ret = TSS_authhmac(td->pubauth, sess.secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, + sess.enonce, td->nonceodd, cont, + sizeof(uint32_t), &ordinal, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, + td->encauth, sizeof(uint32_t), &pcrsize, + pcrinfosize, pcrinfo, sizeof(uint32_t), + &datsize, datalen, data, 0, 0); + } + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + + /* build and send the TPM request packet */ + INIT_BUF(tb); + store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND); + store32(tb, TPM_SEAL_SIZE + pcrinfosize + datalen); + store32(tb, TPM_ORD_SEAL); + store32(tb, keyhandle); + storebytes(tb, td->encauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); + store32(tb, pcrinfosize); + storebytes(tb, pcrinfo, pcrinfosize); + store32(tb, datalen); + storebytes(tb, data, datalen); + store32(tb, sess.handle); + storebytes(tb, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + store8(tb, cont); + storebytes(tb, td->pubauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); + + ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + + /* calculate the size of the returned Blob */ + sealinfosize = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t)); + encdatasize = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t) + + sizeof(uint32_t) + sealinfosize); + storedsize = sizeof(uint32_t) + sizeof(uint32_t) + sealinfosize + + sizeof(uint32_t) + encdatasize; + + /* check the HMAC in the response */ + ret = TSS_checkhmac1(tb->data, ordinal, td->nonceodd, sess.secret, + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, storedsize, TPM_DATA_OFFSET, 0, + 0); + + /* copy the returned blob to caller */ + if (!ret) { + memcpy(blob, tb->data + TPM_DATA_OFFSET, storedsize); + *bloblen = storedsize; + } +out: + kzfree(td); + return ret; +} + +/* + * use the AUTH2_COMMAND form of unseal, to authorize both key and blob + */ +static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb, + uint32_t keyhandle, const unsigned char *keyauth, + const unsigned char *blob, int bloblen, + const unsigned char *blobauth, + unsigned char *data, unsigned int *datalen) +{ + unsigned char nonceodd[TPM_NONCE_SIZE]; + unsigned char enonce1[TPM_NONCE_SIZE]; + unsigned char enonce2[TPM_NONCE_SIZE]; + unsigned char authdata1[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; + unsigned char authdata2[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; + uint32_t authhandle1 = 0; + uint32_t authhandle2 = 0; + unsigned char cont = 0; + uint32_t ordinal; + uint32_t keyhndl; + int ret; + + /* sessions for unsealing key and data */ + ret = oiap(tb, &authhandle1, enonce1); + if (ret < 0) { + pr_info("trusted_key: oiap failed (%d)\n", ret); + return ret; + } + ret = oiap(tb, &authhandle2, enonce2); + if (ret < 0) { + pr_info("trusted_key: oiap failed (%d)\n", ret); + return ret; + } + + ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_UNSEAL); + keyhndl = htonl(SRKHANDLE); + ret = tpm_get_random(chip, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) { + pr_info("trusted_key: tpm_get_random failed (%d)\n", ret); + return ret; + } + ret = TSS_authhmac(authdata1, keyauth, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, + enonce1, nonceodd, cont, sizeof(uint32_t), + &ordinal, bloblen, blob, 0, 0); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + ret = TSS_authhmac(authdata2, blobauth, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, + enonce2, nonceodd, cont, sizeof(uint32_t), + &ordinal, bloblen, blob, 0, 0); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + /* build and send TPM request packet */ + INIT_BUF(tb); + store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH2_COMMAND); + store32(tb, TPM_UNSEAL_SIZE + bloblen); + store32(tb, TPM_ORD_UNSEAL); + store32(tb, keyhandle); + storebytes(tb, blob, bloblen); + store32(tb, authhandle1); + storebytes(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + store8(tb, cont); + storebytes(tb, authdata1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); + store32(tb, authhandle2); + storebytes(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + store8(tb, cont); + storebytes(tb, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); + + ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); + if (ret < 0) { + pr_info("trusted_key: authhmac failed (%d)\n", ret); + return ret; + } + + *datalen = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET); + ret = TSS_checkhmac2(tb->data, ordinal, nonceodd, + keyauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, + blobauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, + sizeof(uint32_t), TPM_DATA_OFFSET, + *datalen, TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t), 0, + 0); + if (ret < 0) { + pr_info("trusted_key: TSS_checkhmac2 failed (%d)\n", ret); + return ret; + } + memcpy(data, tb->data + TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t), *datalen); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Have the TPM seal(encrypt) the symmetric key + */ +static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, + struct trusted_key_options *o) +{ + struct tpm_buf *tb; + int ret; + + tb = kzalloc(sizeof(*tb), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!tb) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* include migratable flag at end of sealed key */ + p->key[p->key_len] = p->migratable; + + ret = tpm_seal(tb, o->keytype, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth, + p->key, p->key_len + 1, p->blob, &p->blob_len, + o->blobauth, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len); + if (ret < 0) + pr_info("trusted_key: srkseal failed (%d)\n", ret); + + kzfree(tb); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Have the TPM unseal(decrypt) the symmetric key + */ +static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, + struct trusted_key_options *o) +{ + struct tpm_buf *tb; + int ret; + + tb = kzalloc(sizeof(*tb), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!tb) + return -ENOMEM; + + ret = tpm_unseal(tb, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth, p->blob, p->blob_len, + o->blobauth, p->key, &p->key_len); + if (ret < 0) + pr_info("trusted_key: srkunseal failed (%d)\n", ret); + else + /* pull migratable flag out of sealed key */ + p->migratable = p->key[--p->key_len]; + + kzfree(tb); + return ret; +} + +enum { + Opt_err, + Opt_keyhandle, Opt_keyauth, Opt_blobauth, + Opt_pcrinfo, Opt_pcrlock, Opt_migratable, + Opt_hash, + Opt_policydigest, + Opt_policyhandle, +}; + +static const match_table_t key_tokens = { + {Opt_keyhandle, "keyhandle=%s"}, + {Opt_keyauth, "keyauth=%s"}, + {Opt_blobauth, "blobauth=%s"}, + {Opt_pcrinfo, "pcrinfo=%s"}, + {Opt_pcrlock, "pcrlock=%s"}, + {Opt_migratable, "migratable=%s"}, + {Opt_hash, "hash=%s"}, + {Opt_policydigest, "policydigest=%s"}, + {Opt_policyhandle, "policyhandle=%s"}, + {Opt_err, NULL} +}; + +/* can have zero or more token= options */ +static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, + struct trusted_key_options *opt) +{ + substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS]; + char *p = c; + int token; + int res; + unsigned long handle; + unsigned long lock; + unsigned long token_mask = 0; + unsigned int digest_len; + int i; + int tpm2; + + tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(chip); + if (tpm2 < 0) + return tpm2; + + opt->hash = tpm2 ? HASH_ALGO_SHA256 : HASH_ALGO_SHA1; + + while ((p = strsep(&c, " \t"))) { + if (*p == '\0' || *p == ' ' || *p == '\t') + continue; + token = match_token(p, key_tokens, args); + if (test_and_set_bit(token, &token_mask)) + return -EINVAL; + + switch (token) { + case Opt_pcrinfo: + opt->pcrinfo_len = strlen(args[0].from) / 2; + if (opt->pcrinfo_len > MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE) + return -EINVAL; + res = hex2bin(opt->pcrinfo, args[0].from, + opt->pcrinfo_len); + if (res < 0) + return -EINVAL; + break; + case Opt_keyhandle: + res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &handle); + if (res < 0) + return -EINVAL; + opt->keytype = SEAL_keytype; + opt->keyhandle = handle; + break; + case Opt_keyauth: + if (strlen(args[0].from) != 2 * SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE) + return -EINVAL; + res = hex2bin(opt->keyauth, args[0].from, + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); + if (res < 0) + return -EINVAL; + break; + case Opt_blobauth: + if (strlen(args[0].from) != 2 * SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE) + return -EINVAL; + res = hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from, + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); + if (res < 0) + return -EINVAL; + break; + case Opt_migratable: + if (*args[0].from == '0') + pay->migratable = 0; + else + return -EINVAL; + break; + case Opt_pcrlock: + res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lock); + if (res < 0) + return -EINVAL; + opt->pcrlock = lock; + break; + case Opt_hash: + if (test_bit(Opt_policydigest, &token_mask)) + return -EINVAL; + for (i = 0; i < HASH_ALGO__LAST; i++) { + if (!strcmp(args[0].from, hash_algo_name[i])) { + opt->hash = i; + break; + } + } + if (i == HASH_ALGO__LAST) + return -EINVAL; + if (!tpm2 && i != HASH_ALGO_SHA1) { + pr_info("trusted_key: TPM 1.x only supports SHA-1.\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + break; + case Opt_policydigest: + digest_len = hash_digest_size[opt->hash]; + if (!tpm2 || strlen(args[0].from) != (2 * digest_len)) + return -EINVAL; + res = hex2bin(opt->policydigest, args[0].from, + digest_len); + if (res < 0) + return -EINVAL; + opt->policydigest_len = digest_len; + break; + case Opt_policyhandle: + if (!tpm2) + return -EINVAL; + res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &handle); + if (res < 0) + return -EINVAL; + opt->policyhandle = handle; + break; + default: + return -EINVAL; + } + } + return 0; +} + +static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void) +{ + struct trusted_key_options *options; + int tpm2; + + tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(chip); + if (tpm2 < 0) + return NULL; + + options = kzalloc(sizeof(*options), GFP_KERNEL); + if (options) { + /* set any non-zero defaults */ + options->keytype = SRK_keytype; + + if (!tpm2) + options->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE; + } + return options; +} + +static int tpm_tk_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) +{ + struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL; + int ret = 0; + int tpm2; + + tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(chip); + if (tpm2 < 0) + return tpm2; + + options = trusted_options_alloc(); + if (!options) + return -ENOMEM; + + ret = getoptions(datablob, p, options); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + dump_options(options); + + if (!options->keyhandle) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + if (tpm2) + ret = tpm_seal_trusted(chip, p, options); + else + ret = key_seal(p, options); + if (ret < 0) { + pr_info("tpm_trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret); + goto out; + } + + if (options->pcrlock) { + ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock); + if (ret < 0) { + pr_info("tpm_trusted_key: pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret); + goto out; + } + } +out: + kzfree(options); + return ret; +} + +static int tpm_tk_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) +{ + struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL; + int ret = 0; + int tpm2; + + tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(chip); + if (tpm2 < 0) + return tpm2; + + options = trusted_options_alloc(); + if (!options) + return -ENOMEM; + + ret = getoptions(datablob, p, options); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + dump_options(options); + + if (!options->keyhandle) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + if (tpm2) + ret = tpm_unseal_trusted(chip, p, options); + else + ret = key_unseal(p, options); + if (ret < 0) + pr_info("tpm_trusted_key: key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret); + + if (options->pcrlock) { + ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock); + if (ret < 0) { + pr_info("tpm_trusted_key: pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret); + goto out; + } + } +out: + kzfree(options); + return ret; +} + +int tpm_tk_get_random(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len) +{ + return tpm_get_random(chip, key, key_len); +} + +static void trusted_shash_release(void) +{ + if (hashalg) + crypto_free_shash(hashalg); + if (hmacalg) + crypto_free_shash(hmacalg); +} + +static int __init trusted_shash_alloc(void) +{ + int ret; + + hmacalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_alg, 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(hmacalg)) { + pr_info("tpm_trusted_key: could not allocate crypto %s\n", + hmac_alg); + return PTR_ERR(hmacalg); + } + + hashalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_alg, 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(hashalg)) { + pr_info("tpm_trusted_key: could not allocate crypto %s\n", + hash_alg); + ret = PTR_ERR(hashalg); + goto hashalg_fail; + } + + return 0; + +hashalg_fail: + crypto_free_shash(hmacalg); + return ret; +} + +static int __init init_digests(void) +{ + u8 digest[TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; + int ret; + int i; + + ret = tpm_get_random(chip, digest, TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + if (ret < TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE) + return -EFAULT; + + digests = kcalloc(chip->nr_allocated_banks, sizeof(*digests), + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!digests) + return -ENOMEM; + + for (i = 0; i < chip->nr_allocated_banks; i++) + memcpy(digests[i].digest, digest, TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE); + + return 0; +} + +static int __init init_tpm_trusted(void) +{ + int ret; + + chip = tpm_default_chip(); + if (!chip) + return -ENODEV; + + ret = init_digests(); + if (ret < 0) + goto err_put; + ret = trusted_shash_alloc(); + if (ret < 0) + goto err_free; + ret = register_key_type(&key_type_trusted); + if (ret < 0) + goto err_release; + return 0; +err_release: + trusted_shash_release(); +err_free: + kfree(digests); +err_put: + put_device(&chip->dev); + return ret; +} + +static void __exit cleanup_tpm_trusted(void) +{ + if (chip) { + put_device(&chip->dev); + kfree(digests); + trusted_shash_release(); + unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted); + } +} + +struct trusted_key_ops tpm_trusted_key_ops = { + .migratable = 1, /* migratable by default */ + .init = init_tpm_trusted, + .seal = tpm_tk_seal, + .unseal = tpm_tk_unseal, + .get_random = tpm_tk_get_random, + .cleanup = cleanup_tpm_trusted, +}; +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_trusted_key_ops); diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1939df7 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted.c @@ -0,0 +1,342 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation + * Copyright (c) 2019, Linaro Limited + * + * Author: + * David Safford <safford(a)us.ibm.com> + * Added generic trusted key framework: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg(a)linaro.org> + * + * See Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst + */ + +#include <keys/user-type.h> +#include <keys/trusted-type.h> +#include <linux/capability.h> +#include <linux/err.h> +#include <linux/init.h> +#include <linux/key-type.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/parser.h> +#include <linux/rcupdate.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/string.h> +#include <linux/uaccess.h> + +static struct trusted_key_ops *available_tk_ops[] = { +#if defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) + &tpm_trusted_key_ops, +#endif +}; +static struct trusted_key_ops *tk_ops; + +enum { + Opt_err, + Opt_new, Opt_load, Opt_update, +}; + +static const match_table_t key_tokens = { + {Opt_new, "new"}, + {Opt_load, "load"}, + {Opt_update, "update"}, + {Opt_err, NULL} +}; + +/* + * datablob_parse - parse the keyctl data and fill in the + * payload structure + * + * On success returns 0, otherwise -EINVAL. + */ +static int datablob_parse(char *datablob, struct trusted_key_payload *p) +{ + substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS]; + long keylen; + int ret = -EINVAL; + int key_cmd; + char *c; + + /* main command */ + c = strsep(&datablob, " \t"); + if (!c) + return -EINVAL; + key_cmd = match_token(c, key_tokens, args); + switch (key_cmd) { + case Opt_new: + /* first argument is key size */ + c = strsep(&datablob, " \t"); + if (!c) + return -EINVAL; + ret = kstrtol(c, 10, &keylen); + if (ret < 0 || keylen < MIN_KEY_SIZE || keylen > MAX_KEY_SIZE) + return -EINVAL; + p->key_len = keylen; + ret = Opt_new; + break; + case Opt_load: + /* first argument is sealed blob */ + c = strsep(&datablob, " \t"); + if (!c) + return -EINVAL; + p->blob_len = strlen(c) / 2; + if (p->blob_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE) + return -EINVAL; + ret = hex2bin(p->blob, c, p->blob_len); + if (ret < 0) + return -EINVAL; + ret = Opt_load; + break; + case Opt_update: + ret = Opt_update; + break; + case Opt_err: + return -EINVAL; + } + return ret; +} + +static struct trusted_key_payload *trusted_payload_alloc(struct key *key) +{ + struct trusted_key_payload *p = NULL; + int ret; + + ret = key_payload_reserve(key, sizeof(*p)); + if (ret < 0) + return p; + p = kzalloc(sizeof(*p), GFP_KERNEL); + + p->migratable = tk_ops->migratable; + + return p; +} + +/* + * trusted_instantiate - create a new trusted key + * + * Unseal an existing trusted blob or, for a new key, get a + * random key, then seal and create a trusted key-type key, + * adding it to the specified keyring. + * + * On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno. + */ +static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, + struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) +{ + struct trusted_key_payload *payload = NULL; + size_t datalen = prep->datalen; + char *datablob; + int ret = 0; + int key_cmd; + size_t key_len; + + if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) + return -EINVAL; + + datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!datablob) + return -ENOMEM; + memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen); + datablob[datalen] = '\0'; + + payload = trusted_payload_alloc(key); + if (!payload) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + key_cmd = datablob_parse(datablob, payload); + if (key_cmd < 0) { + ret = key_cmd; + goto out; + } + + dump_payload(payload); + + switch (key_cmd) { + case Opt_load: + ret = tk_ops->unseal(payload, datablob); + dump_payload(payload); + if (ret < 0) + pr_info("trusted_key: key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret); + break; + case Opt_new: + key_len = payload->key_len; + ret = tk_ops->get_random(payload->key, key_len); + if (ret != key_len) { + pr_info("trusted_key: key_create failed (%d)\n", ret); + goto out; + } + + ret = tk_ops->seal(payload, datablob); + if (ret < 0) + pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret); + break; + default: + ret = -EINVAL; + } +out: + kzfree(datablob); + if (!ret) + rcu_assign_keypointer(key, payload); + else + kzfree(payload); + return ret; +} + +static void trusted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu) +{ + struct trusted_key_payload *p; + + p = container_of(rcu, struct trusted_key_payload, rcu); + kzfree(p); +} + +/* + * trusted_update - reseal an existing key with new PCR values + */ +static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) +{ + struct trusted_key_payload *p; + struct trusted_key_payload *new_p; + size_t datalen = prep->datalen; + char *datablob; + int ret = 0; + + if (key_is_negative(key)) + return -ENOKEY; + p = key->payload.data[0]; + if (!p->migratable) + return -EPERM; + if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) + return -EINVAL; + + datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!datablob) + return -ENOMEM; + + new_p = trusted_payload_alloc(key); + if (!new_p) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen); + datablob[datalen] = '\0'; + ret = datablob_parse(datablob, new_p); + if (ret != Opt_update) { + ret = -EINVAL; + kzfree(new_p); + goto out; + } + + /* copy old key values, and reseal with new pcrs */ + new_p->migratable = p->migratable; + new_p->key_len = p->key_len; + memcpy(new_p->key, p->key, p->key_len); + dump_payload(p); + dump_payload(new_p); + + ret = tk_ops->seal(new_p, datablob); + if (ret < 0) { + pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret); + kzfree(new_p); + goto out; + } + + rcu_assign_keypointer(key, new_p); + call_rcu(&p->rcu, trusted_rcu_free); +out: + kzfree(datablob); + return ret; +} + +/* + * trusted_read - copy the sealed blob data to userspace in hex. + * On success, return to userspace the trusted key datablob size. + */ +static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, + size_t buflen) +{ + const struct trusted_key_payload *p; + char *ascii_buf; + char *bufp; + int i; + + p = dereference_key_locked(key); + if (!p) + return -EINVAL; + + if (buffer && buflen >= 2 * p->blob_len) { + ascii_buf = kmalloc_array(2, p->blob_len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ascii_buf) + return -ENOMEM; + + bufp = ascii_buf; + for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++) + bufp = hex_byte_pack(bufp, p->blob[i]); + if (copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, 2 * p->blob_len) != 0) { + kzfree(ascii_buf); + return -EFAULT; + } + kzfree(ascii_buf); + } + return 2 * p->blob_len; +} + +/* + * trusted_destroy - clear and free the key's payload + */ +static void trusted_destroy(struct key *key) +{ + kzfree(key->payload.data[0]); +} + +struct key_type key_type_trusted = { + .name = "trusted", + .instantiate = trusted_instantiate, + .update = trusted_update, + .destroy = trusted_destroy, + .describe = user_describe, + .read = trusted_read, +}; +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_trusted); + +static int __init init_trusted(void) +{ + int i, ret = 0; + + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(available_tk_ops); i++) { + tk_ops = available_tk_ops[i]; + + if (!(tk_ops && tk_ops->init && tk_ops->seal && + tk_ops->unseal && tk_ops->get_random)) + continue; + + ret = tk_ops->init(); + if (ret) { + if (tk_ops->cleanup) + tk_ops->cleanup(); + } else { + break; + } + } + + if (ret < 0) + pr_info("trusted_key: init failed (%d)\n", ret); + /* + * encrypted_keys.ko depends on successful load of this module even if + * trusted key implementation is not found. + */ + return 0; +} + +static void __exit cleanup_trusted(void) +{ + if (tk_ops->cleanup) + tk_ops->cleanup(); +} + +late_initcall(init_trusted); +module_exit(cleanup_trusted); + +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c deleted file mode 100644 index 9a94672..0000000 --- a/security/keys/trusted.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1295 +0,0 @@ -// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only -/* - * Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation - * - * Author: - * David Safford <safford(a)us.ibm.com> - * - * See Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst - */ - -#include <crypto/hash_info.h> -#include <linux/uaccess.h> -#include <linux/module.h> -#include <linux/init.h> -#include <linux/slab.h> -#include <linux/parser.h> -#include <linux/string.h> -#include <linux/err.h> -#include <keys/user-type.h> -#include <keys/trusted-type.h> -#include <linux/key-type.h> -#include <linux/rcupdate.h> -#include <linux/crypto.h> -#include <crypto/hash.h> -#include <crypto/sha.h> -#include <linux/capability.h> -#include <linux/tpm.h> -#include <linux/tpm_command.h> - -#include <keys/trusted.h> - -static const char hmac_alg[] = "hmac(sha1)"; -static const char hash_alg[] = "sha1"; -static struct tpm_chip *chip; -static struct tpm_digest *digests; - -struct sdesc { - struct shash_desc shash; - char ctx[]; -}; - -static struct crypto_shash *hashalg; -static struct crypto_shash *hmacalg; - -static struct sdesc *init_sdesc(struct crypto_shash *alg) -{ - struct sdesc *sdesc; - int size; - - size = sizeof(struct shash_desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(alg); - sdesc = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!sdesc) - return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); - sdesc->shash.tfm = alg; - return sdesc; -} - -static int TSS_sha1(const unsigned char *data, unsigned int datalen, - unsigned char *digest) -{ - struct sdesc *sdesc; - int ret; - - sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg); - if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) { - pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg); - return PTR_ERR(sdesc); - } - - ret = crypto_shash_digest(&sdesc->shash, data, datalen, digest); - kzfree(sdesc); - return ret; -} - -static int TSS_rawhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key, - unsigned int keylen, ...) -{ - struct sdesc *sdesc; - va_list argp; - unsigned int dlen; - unsigned char *data; - int ret; - - sdesc = init_sdesc(hmacalg); - if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) { - pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hmac_alg); - return PTR_ERR(sdesc); - } - - ret = crypto_shash_setkey(hmacalg, key, keylen); - if (ret < 0) - goto out; - ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash); - if (ret < 0) - goto out; - - va_start(argp, keylen); - for (;;) { - dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int); - if (dlen == 0) - break; - data = va_arg(argp, unsigned char *); - if (data == NULL) { - ret = -EINVAL; - break; - } - ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, data, dlen); - if (ret < 0) - break; - } - va_end(argp); - if (!ret) - ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, digest); -out: - kzfree(sdesc); - return ret; -} - -/* - * calculate authorization info fields to send to TPM - */ -int TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key, - unsigned int keylen, unsigned char *h1, - unsigned char *h2, unsigned int h3, ...) -{ - unsigned char paramdigest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; - struct sdesc *sdesc; - unsigned int dlen; - unsigned char *data; - unsigned char c; - int ret; - va_list argp; - - if (!chip) - return -ENODEV; - - sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg); - if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) { - pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg); - return PTR_ERR(sdesc); - } - - c = !!h3; - ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash); - if (ret < 0) - goto out; - va_start(argp, h3); - for (;;) { - dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int); - if (dlen == 0) - break; - data = va_arg(argp, unsigned char *); - if (!data) { - ret = -EINVAL; - break; - } - ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, data, dlen); - if (ret < 0) - break; - } - va_end(argp); - if (!ret) - ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, paramdigest); - if (!ret) - ret = TSS_rawhmac(digest, key, keylen, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, - paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h1, - TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h2, 1, &c, 0, 0); -out: - kzfree(sdesc); - return ret; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(TSS_authhmac); - -/* - * verify the AUTH1_COMMAND (Seal) result from TPM - */ -int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer, - const uint32_t command, - const unsigned char *ononce, - const unsigned char *key, - unsigned int keylen, ...) -{ - uint32_t bufsize; - uint16_t tag; - uint32_t ordinal; - uint32_t result; - unsigned char *enonce; - unsigned char *continueflag; - unsigned char *authdata; - unsigned char testhmac[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; - unsigned char paramdigest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; - struct sdesc *sdesc; - unsigned int dlen; - unsigned int dpos; - va_list argp; - int ret; - - if (!chip) - return -ENODEV; - - bufsize = LOAD32(buffer, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET); - tag = LOAD16(buffer, 0); - ordinal = command; - result = LOAD32N(buffer, TPM_RETURN_OFFSET); - if (tag == TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND) - return 0; - if (tag != TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND) - return -EINVAL; - authdata = buffer + bufsize - SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE; - continueflag = authdata - 1; - enonce = continueflag - TPM_NONCE_SIZE; - - sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg); - if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) { - pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg); - return PTR_ERR(sdesc); - } - ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash); - if (ret < 0) - goto out; - ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&result, - sizeof result); - if (ret < 0) - goto out; - ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&ordinal, - sizeof ordinal); - if (ret < 0) - goto out; - va_start(argp, keylen); - for (;;) { - dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int); - if (dlen == 0) - break; - dpos = va_arg(argp, unsigned int); - ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, buffer + dpos, dlen); - if (ret < 0) - break; - } - va_end(argp); - if (!ret) - ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, paramdigest); - if (ret < 0) - goto out; - - ret = TSS_rawhmac(testhmac, key, keylen, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, paramdigest, - TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, - 1, continueflag, 0, 0); - if (ret < 0) - goto out; - - if (memcmp(testhmac, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)) - ret = -EINVAL; -out: - kzfree(sdesc); - return ret; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(TSS_checkhmac1); - -/* - * verify the AUTH2_COMMAND (unseal) result from TPM - */ -static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer, - const uint32_t command, - const unsigned char *ononce, - const unsigned char *key1, - unsigned int keylen1, - const unsigned char *key2, - unsigned int keylen2, ...) -{ - uint32_t bufsize; - uint16_t tag; - uint32_t ordinal; - uint32_t result; - unsigned char *enonce1; - unsigned char *continueflag1; - unsigned char *authdata1; - unsigned char *enonce2; - unsigned char *continueflag2; - unsigned char *authdata2; - unsigned char testhmac1[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; - unsigned char testhmac2[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; - unsigned char paramdigest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; - struct sdesc *sdesc; - unsigned int dlen; - unsigned int dpos; - va_list argp; - int ret; - - bufsize = LOAD32(buffer, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET); - tag = LOAD16(buffer, 0); - ordinal = command; - result = LOAD32N(buffer, TPM_RETURN_OFFSET); - - if (tag == TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND) - return 0; - if (tag != TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH2_COMMAND) - return -EINVAL; - authdata1 = buffer + bufsize - (SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + 1 - + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); - authdata2 = buffer + bufsize - (SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); - continueflag1 = authdata1 - 1; - continueflag2 = authdata2 - 1; - enonce1 = continueflag1 - TPM_NONCE_SIZE; - enonce2 = continueflag2 - TPM_NONCE_SIZE; - - sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg); - if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) { - pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg); - return PTR_ERR(sdesc); - } - ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash); - if (ret < 0) - goto out; - ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&result, - sizeof result); - if (ret < 0) - goto out; - ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&ordinal, - sizeof ordinal); - if (ret < 0) - goto out; - - va_start(argp, keylen2); - for (;;) { - dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int); - if (dlen == 0) - break; - dpos = va_arg(argp, unsigned int); - ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, buffer + dpos, dlen); - if (ret < 0) - break; - } - va_end(argp); - if (!ret) - ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, paramdigest); - if (ret < 0) - goto out; - - ret = TSS_rawhmac(testhmac1, key1, keylen1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, - paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce1, - TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 1, continueflag1, 0, 0); - if (ret < 0) - goto out; - if (memcmp(testhmac1, authdata1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)) { - ret = -EINVAL; - goto out; - } - ret = TSS_rawhmac(testhmac2, key2, keylen2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, - paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce2, - TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 1, continueflag2, 0, 0); - if (ret < 0) - goto out; - if (memcmp(testhmac2, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)) - ret = -EINVAL; -out: - kzfree(sdesc); - return ret; -} - -/* - * For key specific tpm requests, we will generate and send our - * own TPM command packets using the drivers send function. - */ -int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen) -{ - int rc; - - if (!chip) - return -ENODEV; - - dump_tpm_buf(cmd); - rc = tpm_send(chip, cmd, buflen); - dump_tpm_buf(cmd); - if (rc > 0) - /* Can't return positive return codes values to keyctl */ - rc = -EPERM; - return rc; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(trusted_tpm_send); - -/* - * Lock a trusted key, by extending a selected PCR. - * - * Prevents a trusted key that is sealed to PCRs from being accessed. - * This uses the tpm driver's extend function. - */ -static int pcrlock(const int pcrnum) -{ - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) - return -EPERM; - - return tpm_pcr_extend(chip, pcrnum, digests) ? -EINVAL : 0; -} - -/* - * Create an object specific authorisation protocol (OSAP) session - */ -static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s, - const unsigned char *key, uint16_t type, uint32_t handle) -{ - unsigned char enonce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE]; - unsigned char ononce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE]; - int ret; - - ret = tpm_get_random(chip, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); - if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) - return ret; - - INIT_BUF(tb); - store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND); - store32(tb, TPM_OSAP_SIZE); - store32(tb, TPM_ORD_OSAP); - store16(tb, type); - store32(tb, handle); - storebytes(tb, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); - - ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); - if (ret < 0) - return ret; - - s->handle = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET); - memcpy(s->enonce, &(tb->data[TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t)]), - TPM_NONCE_SIZE); - memcpy(enonce, &(tb->data[TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t) + - TPM_NONCE_SIZE]), TPM_NONCE_SIZE); - return TSS_rawhmac(s->secret, key, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, - enonce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 0, 0); -} - -/* - * Create an object independent authorisation protocol (oiap) session - */ -int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce) -{ - int ret; - - if (!chip) - return -ENODEV; - - INIT_BUF(tb); - store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND); - store32(tb, TPM_OIAP_SIZE); - store32(tb, TPM_ORD_OIAP); - ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); - if (ret < 0) - return ret; - - *handle = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET); - memcpy(nonce, &tb->data[TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t)], - TPM_NONCE_SIZE); - return 0; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(oiap); - -struct tpm_digests { - unsigned char encauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; - unsigned char pubauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; - unsigned char xorwork[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE * 2]; - unsigned char xorhash[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; - unsigned char nonceodd[TPM_NONCE_SIZE]; -}; - -/* - * Have the TPM seal(encrypt) the trusted key, possibly based on - * Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs). AUTH1 for sealing key. - */ -static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype, - uint32_t keyhandle, const unsigned char *keyauth, - const unsigned char *data, uint32_t datalen, - unsigned char *blob, uint32_t *bloblen, - const unsigned char *blobauth, - const unsigned char *pcrinfo, uint32_t pcrinfosize) -{ - struct osapsess sess; - struct tpm_digests *td; - unsigned char cont; - uint32_t ordinal; - uint32_t pcrsize; - uint32_t datsize; - int sealinfosize; - int encdatasize; - int storedsize; - int ret; - int i; - - /* alloc some work space for all the hashes */ - td = kmalloc(sizeof *td, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!td) - return -ENOMEM; - - /* get session for sealing key */ - ret = osap(tb, &sess, keyauth, keytype, keyhandle); - if (ret < 0) - goto out; - dump_sess(&sess); - - /* calculate encrypted authorization value */ - memcpy(td->xorwork, sess.secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); - memcpy(td->xorwork + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, sess.enonce, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); - ret = TSS_sha1(td->xorwork, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE * 2, td->xorhash); - if (ret < 0) - goto out; - - ret = tpm_get_random(chip, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); - if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) - goto out; - ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_SEAL); - datsize = htonl(datalen); - pcrsize = htonl(pcrinfosize); - cont = 0; - - /* encrypt data authorization key */ - for (i = 0; i < SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE; ++i) - td->encauth[i] = td->xorhash[i] ^ blobauth[i]; - - /* calculate authorization HMAC value */ - if (pcrinfosize == 0) { - /* no pcr info specified */ - ret = TSS_authhmac(td->pubauth, sess.secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, - sess.enonce, td->nonceodd, cont, - sizeof(uint32_t), &ordinal, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, - td->encauth, sizeof(uint32_t), &pcrsize, - sizeof(uint32_t), &datsize, datalen, data, 0, - 0); - } else { - /* pcr info specified */ - ret = TSS_authhmac(td->pubauth, sess.secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, - sess.enonce, td->nonceodd, cont, - sizeof(uint32_t), &ordinal, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, - td->encauth, sizeof(uint32_t), &pcrsize, - pcrinfosize, pcrinfo, sizeof(uint32_t), - &datsize, datalen, data, 0, 0); - } - if (ret < 0) - goto out; - - /* build and send the TPM request packet */ - INIT_BUF(tb); - store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND); - store32(tb, TPM_SEAL_SIZE + pcrinfosize + datalen); - store32(tb, TPM_ORD_SEAL); - store32(tb, keyhandle); - storebytes(tb, td->encauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); - store32(tb, pcrinfosize); - storebytes(tb, pcrinfo, pcrinfosize); - store32(tb, datalen); - storebytes(tb, data, datalen); - store32(tb, sess.handle); - storebytes(tb, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); - store8(tb, cont); - storebytes(tb, td->pubauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); - - ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); - if (ret < 0) - goto out; - - /* calculate the size of the returned Blob */ - sealinfosize = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t)); - encdatasize = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t) + - sizeof(uint32_t) + sealinfosize); - storedsize = sizeof(uint32_t) + sizeof(uint32_t) + sealinfosize + - sizeof(uint32_t) + encdatasize; - - /* check the HMAC in the response */ - ret = TSS_checkhmac1(tb->data, ordinal, td->nonceodd, sess.secret, - SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, storedsize, TPM_DATA_OFFSET, 0, - 0); - - /* copy the returned blob to caller */ - if (!ret) { - memcpy(blob, tb->data + TPM_DATA_OFFSET, storedsize); - *bloblen = storedsize; - } -out: - kzfree(td); - return ret; -} - -/* - * use the AUTH2_COMMAND form of unseal, to authorize both key and blob - */ -static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb, - uint32_t keyhandle, const unsigned char *keyauth, - const unsigned char *blob, int bloblen, - const unsigned char *blobauth, - unsigned char *data, unsigned int *datalen) -{ - unsigned char nonceodd[TPM_NONCE_SIZE]; - unsigned char enonce1[TPM_NONCE_SIZE]; - unsigned char enonce2[TPM_NONCE_SIZE]; - unsigned char authdata1[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; - unsigned char authdata2[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; - uint32_t authhandle1 = 0; - uint32_t authhandle2 = 0; - unsigned char cont = 0; - uint32_t ordinal; - uint32_t keyhndl; - int ret; - - /* sessions for unsealing key and data */ - ret = oiap(tb, &authhandle1, enonce1); - if (ret < 0) { - pr_info("trusted_key: oiap failed (%d)\n", ret); - return ret; - } - ret = oiap(tb, &authhandle2, enonce2); - if (ret < 0) { - pr_info("trusted_key: oiap failed (%d)\n", ret); - return ret; - } - - ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_UNSEAL); - keyhndl = htonl(SRKHANDLE); - ret = tpm_get_random(chip, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); - if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) { - pr_info("trusted_key: tpm_get_random failed (%d)\n", ret); - return ret; - } - ret = TSS_authhmac(authdata1, keyauth, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, - enonce1, nonceodd, cont, sizeof(uint32_t), - &ordinal, bloblen, blob, 0, 0); - if (ret < 0) - return ret; - ret = TSS_authhmac(authdata2, blobauth, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, - enonce2, nonceodd, cont, sizeof(uint32_t), - &ordinal, bloblen, blob, 0, 0); - if (ret < 0) - return ret; - - /* build and send TPM request packet */ - INIT_BUF(tb); - store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH2_COMMAND); - store32(tb, TPM_UNSEAL_SIZE + bloblen); - store32(tb, TPM_ORD_UNSEAL); - store32(tb, keyhandle); - storebytes(tb, blob, bloblen); - store32(tb, authhandle1); - storebytes(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); - store8(tb, cont); - storebytes(tb, authdata1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); - store32(tb, authhandle2); - storebytes(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); - store8(tb, cont); - storebytes(tb, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); - - ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); - if (ret < 0) { - pr_info("trusted_key: authhmac failed (%d)\n", ret); - return ret; - } - - *datalen = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET); - ret = TSS_checkhmac2(tb->data, ordinal, nonceodd, - keyauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, - blobauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, - sizeof(uint32_t), TPM_DATA_OFFSET, - *datalen, TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t), 0, - 0); - if (ret < 0) { - pr_info("trusted_key: TSS_checkhmac2 failed (%d)\n", ret); - return ret; - } - memcpy(data, tb->data + TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t), *datalen); - return 0; -} - -/* - * Have the TPM seal(encrypt) the symmetric key - */ -static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, - struct trusted_key_options *o) -{ - struct tpm_buf *tb; - int ret; - - tb = kzalloc(sizeof *tb, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!tb) - return -ENOMEM; - - /* include migratable flag at end of sealed key */ - p->key[p->key_len] = p->migratable; - - ret = tpm_seal(tb, o->keytype, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth, - p->key, p->key_len + 1, p->blob, &p->blob_len, - o->blobauth, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len); - if (ret < 0) - pr_info("trusted_key: srkseal failed (%d)\n", ret); - - kzfree(tb); - return ret; -} - -/* - * Have the TPM unseal(decrypt) the symmetric key - */ -static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, - struct trusted_key_options *o) -{ - struct tpm_buf *tb; - int ret; - - tb = kzalloc(sizeof *tb, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!tb) - return -ENOMEM; - - ret = tpm_unseal(tb, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth, p->blob, p->blob_len, - o->blobauth, p->key, &p->key_len); - if (ret < 0) - pr_info("trusted_key: srkunseal failed (%d)\n", ret); - else - /* pull migratable flag out of sealed key */ - p->migratable = p->key[--p->key_len]; - - kzfree(tb); - return ret; -} - -enum { - Opt_err, - Opt_new, Opt_load, Opt_update, - Opt_keyhandle, Opt_keyauth, Opt_blobauth, - Opt_pcrinfo, Opt_pcrlock, Opt_migratable, - Opt_hash, - Opt_policydigest, - Opt_policyhandle, -}; - -static const match_table_t key_tokens = { - {Opt_new, "new"}, - {Opt_load, "load"}, - {Opt_update, "update"}, - {Opt_keyhandle, "keyhandle=%s"}, - {Opt_keyauth, "keyauth=%s"}, - {Opt_blobauth, "blobauth=%s"}, - {Opt_pcrinfo, "pcrinfo=%s"}, - {Opt_pcrlock, "pcrlock=%s"}, - {Opt_migratable, "migratable=%s"}, - {Opt_hash, "hash=%s"}, - {Opt_policydigest, "policydigest=%s"}, - {Opt_policyhandle, "policyhandle=%s"}, - {Opt_err, NULL} -}; - -/* can have zero or more token= options */ -static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, - struct trusted_key_options *opt) -{ - substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS]; - char *p = c; - int token; - int res; - unsigned long handle; - unsigned long lock; - unsigned long token_mask = 0; - unsigned int digest_len; - int i; - int tpm2; - - tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(chip); - if (tpm2 < 0) - return tpm2; - - opt->hash = tpm2 ? HASH_ALGO_SHA256 : HASH_ALGO_SHA1; - - while ((p = strsep(&c, " \t"))) { - if (*p == '\0' || *p == ' ' || *p == '\t') - continue; - token = match_token(p, key_tokens, args); - if (test_and_set_bit(token, &token_mask)) - return -EINVAL; - - switch (token) { - case Opt_pcrinfo: - opt->pcrinfo_len = strlen(args[0].from) / 2; - if (opt->pcrinfo_len > MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE) - return -EINVAL; - res = hex2bin(opt->pcrinfo, args[0].from, - opt->pcrinfo_len); - if (res < 0) - return -EINVAL; - break; - case Opt_keyhandle: - res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &handle); - if (res < 0) - return -EINVAL; - opt->keytype = SEAL_keytype; - opt->keyhandle = handle; - break; - case Opt_keyauth: - if (strlen(args[0].from) != 2 * SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE) - return -EINVAL; - res = hex2bin(opt->keyauth, args[0].from, - SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); - if (res < 0) - return -EINVAL; - break; - case Opt_blobauth: - if (strlen(args[0].from) != 2 * SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE) - return -EINVAL; - res = hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from, - SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); - if (res < 0) - return -EINVAL; - break; - case Opt_migratable: - if (*args[0].from == '0') - pay->migratable = 0; - else - return -EINVAL; - break; - case Opt_pcrlock: - res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lock); - if (res < 0) - return -EINVAL; - opt->pcrlock = lock; - break; - case Opt_hash: - if (test_bit(Opt_policydigest, &token_mask)) - return -EINVAL; - for (i = 0; i < HASH_ALGO__LAST; i++) { - if (!strcmp(args[0].from, hash_algo_name[i])) { - opt->hash = i; - break; - } - } - if (i == HASH_ALGO__LAST) - return -EINVAL; - if (!tpm2 && i != HASH_ALGO_SHA1) { - pr_info("trusted_key: TPM 1.x only supports SHA-1.\n"); - return -EINVAL; - } - break; - case Opt_policydigest: - digest_len = hash_digest_size[opt->hash]; - if (!tpm2 || strlen(args[0].from) != (2 * digest_len)) - return -EINVAL; - res = hex2bin(opt->policydigest, args[0].from, - digest_len); - if (res < 0) - return -EINVAL; - opt->policydigest_len = digest_len; - break; - case Opt_policyhandle: - if (!tpm2) - return -EINVAL; - res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &handle); - if (res < 0) - return -EINVAL; - opt->policyhandle = handle; - break; - default: - return -EINVAL; - } - } - return 0; -} - -/* - * datablob_parse - parse the keyctl data and fill in the - * payload and options structures - * - * On success returns 0, otherwise -EINVAL. - */ -static int datablob_parse(char *datablob, struct trusted_key_payload *p, - struct trusted_key_options *o) -{ - substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS]; - long keylen; - int ret = -EINVAL; - int key_cmd; - char *c; - - /* main command */ - c = strsep(&datablob, " \t"); - if (!c) - return -EINVAL; - key_cmd = match_token(c, key_tokens, args); - switch (key_cmd) { - case Opt_new: - /* first argument is key size */ - c = strsep(&datablob, " \t"); - if (!c) - return -EINVAL; - ret = kstrtol(c, 10, &keylen); - if (ret < 0 || keylen < MIN_KEY_SIZE || keylen > MAX_KEY_SIZE) - return -EINVAL; - p->key_len = keylen; - ret = getoptions(datablob, p, o); - if (ret < 0) - return ret; - ret = Opt_new; - break; - case Opt_load: - /* first argument is sealed blob */ - c = strsep(&datablob, " \t"); - if (!c) - return -EINVAL; - p->blob_len = strlen(c) / 2; - if (p->blob_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE) - return -EINVAL; - ret = hex2bin(p->blob, c, p->blob_len); - if (ret < 0) - return -EINVAL; - ret = getoptions(datablob, p, o); - if (ret < 0) - return ret; - ret = Opt_load; - break; - case Opt_update: - /* all arguments are options */ - ret = getoptions(datablob, p, o); - if (ret < 0) - return ret; - ret = Opt_update; - break; - case Opt_err: - return -EINVAL; - break; - } - return ret; -} - -static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void) -{ - struct trusted_key_options *options; - int tpm2; - - tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(chip); - if (tpm2 < 0) - return NULL; - - options = kzalloc(sizeof *options, GFP_KERNEL); - if (options) { - /* set any non-zero defaults */ - options->keytype = SRK_keytype; - - if (!tpm2) - options->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE; - } - return options; -} - -static struct trusted_key_payload *trusted_payload_alloc(struct key *key) -{ - struct trusted_key_payload *p = NULL; - int ret; - - ret = key_payload_reserve(key, sizeof *p); - if (ret < 0) - return p; - p = kzalloc(sizeof *p, GFP_KERNEL); - if (p) - p->migratable = 1; /* migratable by default */ - return p; -} - -/* - * trusted_instantiate - create a new trusted key - * - * Unseal an existing trusted blob or, for a new key, get a - * random key, then seal and create a trusted key-type key, - * adding it to the specified keyring. - * - * On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno. - */ -static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, - struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) -{ - struct trusted_key_payload *payload = NULL; - struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL; - size_t datalen = prep->datalen; - char *datablob; - int ret = 0; - int key_cmd; - size_t key_len; - int tpm2; - - tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(chip); - if (tpm2 < 0) - return tpm2; - - if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) - return -EINVAL; - - datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!datablob) - return -ENOMEM; - memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen); - datablob[datalen] = '\0'; - - options = trusted_options_alloc(); - if (!options) { - ret = -ENOMEM; - goto out; - } - payload = trusted_payload_alloc(key); - if (!payload) { - ret = -ENOMEM; - goto out; - } - - key_cmd = datablob_parse(datablob, payload, options); - if (key_cmd < 0) { - ret = key_cmd; - goto out; - } - - if (!options->keyhandle) { - ret = -EINVAL; - goto out; - } - - dump_payload(payload); - dump_options(options); - - switch (key_cmd) { - case Opt_load: - if (tpm2) - ret = tpm_unseal_trusted(chip, payload, options); - else - ret = key_unseal(payload, options); - dump_payload(payload); - dump_options(options); - if (ret < 0) - pr_info("trusted_key: key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret); - break; - case Opt_new: - key_len = payload->key_len; - ret = tpm_get_random(chip, payload->key, key_len); - if (ret != key_len) { - pr_info("trusted_key: key_create failed (%d)\n", ret); - goto out; - } - if (tpm2) - ret = tpm_seal_trusted(chip, payload, options); - else - ret = key_seal(payload, options); - if (ret < 0) - pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret); - break; - default: - ret = -EINVAL; - goto out; - } - if (!ret && options->pcrlock) - ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock); -out: - kzfree(datablob); - kzfree(options); - if (!ret) - rcu_assign_keypointer(key, payload); - else - kzfree(payload); - return ret; -} - -static void trusted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu) -{ - struct trusted_key_payload *p; - - p = container_of(rcu, struct trusted_key_payload, rcu); - kzfree(p); -} - -/* - * trusted_update - reseal an existing key with new PCR values - */ -static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) -{ - struct trusted_key_payload *p; - struct trusted_key_payload *new_p; - struct trusted_key_options *new_o; - size_t datalen = prep->datalen; - char *datablob; - int ret = 0; - - if (key_is_negative(key)) - return -ENOKEY; - p = key->payload.data[0]; - if (!p->migratable) - return -EPERM; - if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) - return -EINVAL; - - datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!datablob) - return -ENOMEM; - new_o = trusted_options_alloc(); - if (!new_o) { - ret = -ENOMEM; - goto out; - } - new_p = trusted_payload_alloc(key); - if (!new_p) { - ret = -ENOMEM; - goto out; - } - - memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen); - datablob[datalen] = '\0'; - ret = datablob_parse(datablob, new_p, new_o); - if (ret != Opt_update) { - ret = -EINVAL; - kzfree(new_p); - goto out; - } - - if (!new_o->keyhandle) { - ret = -EINVAL; - kzfree(new_p); - goto out; - } - - /* copy old key values, and reseal with new pcrs */ - new_p->migratable = p->migratable; - new_p->key_len = p->key_len; - memcpy(new_p->key, p->key, p->key_len); - dump_payload(p); - dump_payload(new_p); - - ret = key_seal(new_p, new_o); - if (ret < 0) { - pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret); - kzfree(new_p); - goto out; - } - if (new_o->pcrlock) { - ret = pcrlock(new_o->pcrlock); - if (ret < 0) { - pr_info("trusted_key: pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret); - kzfree(new_p); - goto out; - } - } - rcu_assign_keypointer(key, new_p); - call_rcu(&p->rcu, trusted_rcu_free); -out: - kzfree(datablob); - kzfree(new_o); - return ret; -} - -/* - * trusted_read - copy the sealed blob data to userspace in hex. - * On success, return to userspace the trusted key datablob size. - */ -static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, - size_t buflen) -{ - const struct trusted_key_payload *p; - char *ascii_buf; - char *bufp; - int i; - - p = dereference_key_locked(key); - if (!p) - return -EINVAL; - - if (buffer && buflen >= 2 * p->blob_len) { - ascii_buf = kmalloc_array(2, p->blob_len, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!ascii_buf) - return -ENOMEM; - - bufp = ascii_buf; - for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++) - bufp = hex_byte_pack(bufp, p->blob[i]); - if (copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, 2 * p->blob_len) != 0) { - kzfree(ascii_buf); - return -EFAULT; - } - kzfree(ascii_buf); - } - return 2 * p->blob_len; -} - -/* - * trusted_destroy - clear and free the key's payload - */ -static void trusted_destroy(struct key *key) -{ - kzfree(key->payload.data[0]); -} - -struct key_type key_type_trusted = { - .name = "trusted", - .instantiate = trusted_instantiate, - .update = trusted_update, - .destroy = trusted_destroy, - .describe = user_describe, - .read = trusted_read, -}; - -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_trusted); - -static void trusted_shash_release(void) -{ - if (hashalg) - crypto_free_shash(hashalg); - if (hmacalg) - crypto_free_shash(hmacalg); -} - -static int __init trusted_shash_alloc(void) -{ - int ret; - - hmacalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_alg, 0, 0); - if (IS_ERR(hmacalg)) { - pr_info("trusted_key: could not allocate crypto %s\n", - hmac_alg); - return PTR_ERR(hmacalg); - } - - hashalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_alg, 0, 0); - if (IS_ERR(hashalg)) { - pr_info("trusted_key: could not allocate crypto %s\n", - hash_alg); - ret = PTR_ERR(hashalg); - goto hashalg_fail; - } - - return 0; - -hashalg_fail: - crypto_free_shash(hmacalg); - return ret; -} - -static int __init init_digests(void) -{ - u8 digest[TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; - int ret; - int i; - - ret = tpm_get_random(chip, digest, TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE); - if (ret < 0) - return ret; - if (ret < TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE) - return -EFAULT; - - digests = kcalloc(chip->nr_allocated_banks, sizeof(*digests), - GFP_KERNEL); - if (!digests) - return -ENOMEM; - - for (i = 0; i < chip->nr_allocated_banks; i++) - memcpy(digests[i].digest, digest, TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE); - - return 0; -} - -static int __init init_trusted(void) -{ - int ret; - - /* encrypted_keys.ko depends on successful load of this module even if - * TPM is not used. - */ - chip = tpm_default_chip(); - if (!chip) - return 0; - - ret = init_digests(); - if (ret < 0) - goto err_put; - ret = trusted_shash_alloc(); - if (ret < 0) - goto err_free; - ret = register_key_type(&key_type_trusted); - if (ret < 0) - goto err_release; - return 0; -err_release: - trusted_shash_release(); -err_free: - kfree(digests); -err_put: - put_device(&chip->dev); - return ret; -} - -static void __exit cleanup_trusted(void) -{ - if (chip) { - put_device(&chip->dev); - kfree(digests); - trusted_shash_release(); - unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted); - } -} - -late_initcall(init_trusted); -module_exit(cleanup_trusted); - -MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); -- 2.7.4

5 years, 11 months

[PATCH v7 0/2] fTPM: firmware TPM running in TEE

by Sasha Levin

Changes in v6: - Address comments from Randy Dunlap Sasha Levin (2): fTPM: firmware TPM running in TEE fTPM: add documentation for ftpm driver Documentation/security/tpm/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/security/tpm/tpm_ftpm_tee.rst | 31 ++ drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig | 5 + drivers/char/tpm/Makefile | 1 + drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ftpm_tee.c | 356 ++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ftpm_tee.h | 40 +++ 6 files changed, 434 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/security/tpm/tpm_ftpm_tee.rst create mode 100644 drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ftpm_tee.c create mode 100644 drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ftpm_tee.h -- 2.20.1

5 years, 11 months

[PATCH] tee: optee: add might_sleep for RPC requests

by Rouven Czerwinski

If the kernel is compiled with CONFIG_PREEMPT_VOLUNTARY and OP-TEE is executing a long running workload, the following errors are raised: [ 1705.971228] rcu: INFO: rcu_sched detected stalls on CPUs/tasks: [ 1705.977195] rcu: (detected by 0, t=2102 jiffies, g=51977, q=3) [ 1705.983152] rcu: All QSes seen, last rcu_sched kthread activity 2102 (140596-138494), jiffies_till_next_fqs=1, root ->qsmask 0x0 [ 1705.994729] optee-xtest R running task 0 169 157 0x00000002 While OP-TEE is returning regulary to the kernel due to timer interrrupts, the OPTEE_SMC_FUNC_FOREIGN_INTR case does not contain an explicit rescheduling point. Add a might_sleep() to the RPC request case to ensure that the kernel can reschedule another task if OP-TEE requests RPC handling. Signed-off-by: Rouven Czerwinski <r.czerwinski(a)pengutronix.de> --- drivers/tee/optee/call.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/call.c b/drivers/tee/optee/call.c index aa942703ae65..13b0269a0abc 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/optee/call.c +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/call.c @@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ u32 optee_do_call_with_arg(struct tee_context *ctx, phys_addr_t parg) */ optee_cq_wait_for_completion(&optee->call_queue, &w); } else if (OPTEE_SMC_RETURN_IS_RPC(res.a0)) { + might_sleep(); param.a0 = res.a0; param.a1 = res.a1; param.a2 = res.a2; -- 2.20.1

5 years, 11 months

OP-TEE 3.6.0 is available

by Jerome Forissier

Hi all, OP-TEE 3.6.0 is now ready. Thanks to all of you who have contributed to this new version. Links to commits and pull requests incorporated in this release are in the change log [1]. As usual, I have tagged the relevant Github repositories under OP-TEE/* and linaro-swg/* [2] and I have created stable manifests in manifest.git [3]. [1] https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/blob/3.6.0/CHANGELOG.md [2] https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/releases/tag/3.6.0 https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_client/releases/tag/3.6.0 https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_test/releases/tag/3.6.0 https://github.com/OP-TEE/build/releases/tag/3.6.0 https://github.com/linaro-swg/optee_examples/releases/tag/3.6.0 https://github.com/linaro-swg/optee_benchmark/releases/tag/3.6.0 [3] https://github.com/OP-TEE/manifest/releases/tag/3.6.0 Thanks, -- Jerome

5 years, 11 months

OP-TEE 3.6.0-rc1

by Jerome Forissier

[Sent to all e-mail addresses found in optee_os/MAINTAINERS] Dear OP-TEE users and contributors, FYI, the next OP-TEE release (3.6.0) is scheduled for the end of next week (July 4th) and I plan to create the -rc1 tag next Monday. In the meantime, please update your pending pull requests, help review patches on GitHub, run some tests on master etc. I will let you know when the -rc1 tag is ready for testing, at which point I will collect Tested-by tags in pull request #3099 [1], and merge only bug fixes into master. Thanks for your continued help and support! [2] https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/pull/3099 Regards, -- Jerome

5 years, 11 months

[PATCH v6 0/2] fTPM: firmware TPM running in TEE

by Sasha Levin

Changes in v6: - Address comments from Ilias Apalodimas Sasha Levin (2): fTPM: firmware TPM running in TEE fTPM: add documentation for ftpm driver Documentation/security/tpm/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/security/tpm/tpm_ftpm_tee.rst | 31 ++ drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig | 5 + drivers/char/tpm/Makefile | 1 + drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ftpm_tee.c | 356 ++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ftpm_tee.h | 40 +++ 6 files changed, 434 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/security/tpm/tpm_ftpm_tee.rst create mode 100644 drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ftpm_tee.c create mode 100644 drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ftpm_tee.h -- 2.20.1

5 years, 11 months

[PATCH v6 00/10] TEE mediator (and OP-TEE) support in XEN

by Volodymyr Babchuk

Hello community, This is the next version of OP-TEE support series. In case of any issues with mail (Julien Grall had some troubles with =20 sequences in the patches, thanks to our corporate Exchange, I assume), this series can be pulled from [4]. Note: I deliberately removed Jan Beulich from CC list, because he explicitly indicated that he is not interested in this series ([5]). List of changes is below. More specific changes are described along with the corresponding patches. === v5: - Series rebased to staging branch instead of master one. - OP-TEE protocol headers was taken from OP-TEE tree instead of Linux one - Added acked-by tags - Fixed (and tested) issue when XEN would not boot if it is build with CONFIG_TEE=n ==== v4: - Substantial rework of OP-TEE mediator. Now it tries to return meaningful error codes back to the guest. - OP-TEE mediator does not use struct cpu_user_regs as a storage for parameters and return values when calling OP-TEE. This makes it compatbile with requirement from SMCCC. - tee=native option replaced with tee=optee - Authorship and s-o-b tag reset to my EPAM mail address ==== v3: - Patch "arm: add tee_enabled flag to xen_arch_domainconfig" was squashed into "xen/arm: add generic TEE mediator framework" - I implemented more elaborate error repoting to a guest. Now guest will get meaningful error codes instead of generic ARM_SMCCC_ERR_UNKNOWN_FUNCTION. ==== v2: - Use domain flags insted of domctl interface to enable optee for guests - Remove patch "libxc: add xc_dom_tee_enable(...) function" because of previous change - Mediator now stores own context in arch part of struct domain, so I removed patch "optee: add domain contexts" Per-patch changes are described in corresponding emails. ==== v2: This is v2 of patch series for OP-TEE mediator support in XEN. Changes from v1: - Added domctl interface, so now xl decides what domain should work with TEE - Removed XSM support due to change described above - Patch with OP-TEE mediator was splited to 7 separate patches - Removed patch with call_smccc() function. Now this series depend on Julien Grall's series "xen/arm: SMCCC fixup and improvement" [3] ===== v1: This is follow for patch series [1]. There was lots of discussions for that series and I tried to address all of them in this new patchset. Currently, I had a working solution for OP-TEE virtualization and it is being upstreamed right now ([2]). So, I think it is a good time to introduce support in XEN as well. This series include generic TEE mediator framework and full-scale OP-TEE mediator which is working with mentioned chages in OP-TEE. So, multiple domains can work simultaneously with OP-TEE. I added XSM support, so now it is possible to control which domains can work with TEEs. Also I changed way how TEE discovery is done. Now it is very generic and should support any platform. [1] https://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2017-10/msg01451.html [2] https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/pull/2370 [3] https://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2018-08/msg02138.html [4] https://github.com/lorc/xen/tree/optee_v6 [5] https://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2019-05/msg01805.html Volodymyr Babchuk (10): xen/arm: add generic TEE mediator framework xen/arm: optee: add OP-TEE header files xen/arm: optee: add OP-TEE mediator skeleton xen/arm: optee: add fast calls handling xen/arm: optee: add std call handling xen/arm: optee: add support for RPC SHM buffers xen/arm: optee: add support for arbitrary shared memory xen/arm: optee: add support for RPC commands tools/arm: tee: add "tee" option for xl.cfg tools/arm: optee: create optee firmware node in DT if tee=optee MAINTAINERS | 6 + docs/man/xl.cfg.5.pod.in | 21 + tools/libxl/libxl.h | 5 + tools/libxl/libxl_arm.c | 42 + tools/libxl/libxl_types.idl | 6 + tools/xl/xl_parse.c | 9 + xen/arch/arm/Kconfig | 9 + xen/arch/arm/Makefile | 1 + xen/arch/arm/domain.c | 19 + xen/arch/arm/setup.c | 2 + xen/arch/arm/tee/Kconfig | 4 + xen/arch/arm/tee/Makefile | 2 + xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c | 1540 +++++++++++++++++++++++ xen/arch/arm/tee/tee.c | 98 ++ xen/arch/arm/vsmc.c | 5 + xen/arch/arm/xen.lds.S | 7 + xen/include/asm-arm/domain.h | 4 + xen/include/asm-arm/tee/optee_msg.h | 310 +++++ xen/include/asm-arm/tee/optee_rpc_cmd.h | 318 +++++ xen/include/asm-arm/tee/optee_smc.h | 564 +++++++++ xen/include/asm-arm/tee/tee.h | 112 ++ xen/include/public/arch-arm.h | 6 + 22 files changed, 3090 insertions(+) create mode 100644 xen/arch/arm/tee/Kconfig create mode 100644 xen/arch/arm/tee/Makefile create mode 100644 xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c create mode 100644 xen/arch/arm/tee/tee.c create mode 100644 xen/include/asm-arm/tee/optee_msg.h create mode 100644 xen/include/asm-arm/tee/optee_rpc_cmd.h create mode 100644 xen/include/asm-arm/tee/optee_smc.h create mode 100644 xen/include/asm-arm/tee/tee.h -- 2.21.0

6 years

what are the technical challenges for people developing TEEs and TEE apps?

by Simon Hughes

Hi A number of people are getting interested in developing trusted applications for TEEs (not just for OPTEE) and they want to understand the development and technical challenges that will be encountered. They're looking for technical foresight. I thought we could draw on our OPTEE expertise and look to whether we can develop insights applicable across all TEEs. Practical information about limitations may provide insights. It's a broad question and I don't want to limit the scope to the following list, but here's some guidance on possible key technical factors causing limitations to arise: - Memory footprint. o What's the impact both for volatile and non-volatile? - Code size. o This is a massive issue for the IoT space, less so for edge devices. Does aarch64 v aarch32 have a big impact? How big? What other factors. - Portability. - Software Stack o UEFI/BIOS support for security? o TEE software update mechanism? o Convergence on a standardized bootchain? o Adoption/deployment of Global Platform interface? o Bootloader impact (generally), ATF, u-boot, kernel. - Toolchain support/Developing in languages other than C. o I know OPTEE doesn't support C++. Why? Is there partial support? o I read somewhere GOlang has aarch64 issues for normal world OS. - Normal World OS interworking. o Any standardisation of interfacing to a tee? - Certification/Testing. o Is there a standard toolchain for conformance testing? - Device support. o TPMs. o eSims. - Anything else? Best Simon IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

6 years

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