From: "Serge E. Hallyn" serge@hallyn.com

[ Upstream commit db2e718a47984b9d71ed890eb2ea36ecf150de18 ]

cap_setfcap is required to create file capabilities.

Since commit 8db6c34f1dbc ("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities"), a process running as uid 0 but without cap_setfcap is able to work around this as follows: unshare a new user namespace which maps parent uid 0 into the child namespace.

While this task will not have new capabilities against the parent namespace, there is a loophole due to the way namespaced file capabilities are represented as xattrs. File capabilities valid in userns 1 are distinguished from file capabilities valid in userns 2 by the kuid which underlies uid 0. Therefore the restricted root process can unshare a new self-mapping namespace, add a namespaced file capability onto a file, then use that file capability in the parent namespace.

To prevent that, do not allow mapping parent uid 0 if the process which opened the uid_map file does not have CAP_SETFCAP, which is the capability for setting file capabilities.

As a further wrinkle: a task can unshare its user namespace, then open its uid_map file itself, and map (only) its own uid. In this case we do not have the credential from before unshare, which was potentially more restricted. So, when creating a user namespace, we record whether the creator had CAP_SETFCAP. Then we can use that during map_write().

With this patch:

1. Unprivileged user can still unshare -Ur

ubuntu@caps:~$ unshare -Ur root@caps:~# logout

2. Root user can still unshare -Ur

ubuntu@caps:~$ sudo bash root@caps:/home/ubuntu# unshare -Ur root@caps:/home/ubuntu# logout

3. Root user without CAP_SETFCAP cannot unshare -Ur:

root@caps:/home/ubuntu# /sbin/capsh --drop=cap_setfcap -- root@caps:/home/ubuntu# /sbin/setcap cap_setfcap=p /sbin/setcap unable to set CAP_SETFCAP effective capability: Operation not permitted root@caps:/home/ubuntu# unshare -Ur unshare: write failed /proc/self/uid_map: Operation not permitted

Note: an alternative solution would be to allow uid 0 mappings by processes without CAP_SETFCAP, but to prevent such a namespace from writing any file capabilities. This approach can be seen at [1].

Background history: commit 95ebabde382 ("capabilities: Don't allow writing ambiguous v3 file capabilities") tried to fix the issue by preventing v3 fscaps to be written to disk when the root uid would map to the same uid in nested user namespaces. This led to regressions for various workloads. For example, see [2]. Ultimately this is a valid use-case we have to support meaning we had to revert this change in 3b0c2d3eaa83 ("Revert 95ebabde382c ("capabilities: Don't allow writing ambiguous v3 file capabilities")").

Link: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sergeh/linux.git/log/?h=2021... [1] Link: https://github.com/containers/buildah/issues/3071 [2] Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn serge@hallyn.com Reviewed-by: Andrew G. Morgan morgan@kernel.org Tested-by: Christian Brauner christian.brauner@ubuntu.com Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner christian.brauner@ubuntu.com Tested-by: Giuseppe Scrivano gscrivan@redhat.com Cc: Eric Biederman ebiederm@xmission.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- include/linux/user_namespace.h | 3 ++ include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 3 +- kernel/user_namespace.c | 65 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 3 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/user_namespace.h b/include/linux/user_namespace.h index 6ef1c7109fc4..7616c7bf4b24 100644 --- a/include/linux/user_namespace.h +++ b/include/linux/user_namespace.h @@ -64,6 +64,9 @@ struct user_namespace { kgid_t group; struct ns_common ns; unsigned long flags; + /* parent_could_setfcap: true if the creator if this ns had CAP_SETFCAP + * in its effective capability set at the child ns creation time. */ + bool parent_could_setfcap;

#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS /* List of joinable keyrings in this namespace. Modification access of diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h index c6ca33034147..2ddb4226cd23 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h @@ -335,7 +335,8 @@ struct vfs_ns_cap_data {

#define CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL 30

-/* Set or remove capabilities on files */ +/* Set or remove capabilities on files. + Map uid=0 into a child user namespace. */

#define CAP_SETFCAP 31

diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c index e703d5d9cbe8..ce396ea4de60 100644 --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c @@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ int create_user_ns(struct cred *new) if (!ns) goto fail_dec;

+ ns->parent_could_setfcap = cap_raised(new->cap_effective, CAP_SETFCAP); ret = ns_alloc_inum(&ns->ns); if (ret) goto fail_free; @@ -841,6 +842,60 @@ static int sort_idmaps(struct uid_gid_map *map) return 0; }

+/** + * verify_root_map() - check the uid 0 mapping + * @file: idmapping file + * @map_ns: user namespace of the target process + * @new_map: requested idmap + * + * If a process requests mapping parent uid 0 into the new ns, verify that the + * process writing the map had the CAP_SETFCAP capability as the target process + * will be able to write fscaps that are valid in ancestor user namespaces. + * + * Return: true if the mapping is allowed, false if not. + */ +static bool verify_root_map(const struct file *file, + struct user_namespace *map_ns, + struct uid_gid_map *new_map) +{ + int idx; + const struct user_namespace *file_ns = file->f_cred->user_ns; + struct uid_gid_extent *extent0 = NULL; + + for (idx = 0; idx < new_map->nr_extents; idx++) { + if (new_map->nr_extents <= UID_GID_MAP_MAX_BASE_EXTENTS) + extent0 = &new_map->extent[idx]; + else + extent0 = &new_map->forward[idx]; + if (extent0->lower_first == 0) + break; + + extent0 = NULL; + } + + if (!extent0) + return true; + + if (map_ns == file_ns) { + /* The process unshared its ns and is writing to its own + * /proc/self/uid_map. User already has full capabilites in + * the new namespace. Verify that the parent had CAP_SETFCAP + * when it unshared. + * */ + if (!file_ns->parent_could_setfcap) + return false; + } else { + /* Process p1 is writing to uid_map of p2, who is in a child + * user namespace to p1's. Verify that the opener of the map + * file has CAP_SETFCAP against the parent of the new map + * namespace */ + if (!file_ns_capable(file, map_ns->parent, CAP_SETFCAP)) + return false; + } + + return true; +} + static ssize_t map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos, int cap_setid, @@ -848,7 +903,7 @@ static ssize_t map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, struct uid_gid_map *parent_map) { struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data; - struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private; + struct user_namespace *map_ns = seq->private; struct uid_gid_map new_map; unsigned idx; struct uid_gid_extent extent; @@ -895,7 +950,7 @@ static ssize_t map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, /* * Adjusting namespace settings requires capabilities on the target. */ - if (cap_valid(cap_setid) && !file_ns_capable(file, ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (cap_valid(cap_setid) && !file_ns_capable(file, map_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) goto out;

/* Parse the user data */ @@ -965,7 +1020,7 @@ static ssize_t map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,

ret = -EPERM; /* Validate the user is allowed to use user id's mapped to. */ - if (!new_idmap_permitted(file, ns, cap_setid, &new_map)) + if (!new_idmap_permitted(file, map_ns, cap_setid, &new_map)) goto out;

ret = -EPERM; @@ -1086,6 +1141,10 @@ static bool new_idmap_permitted(const struct file *file, struct uid_gid_map *new_map) { const struct cred *cred = file->f_cred; + + if (cap_setid == CAP_SETUID && !verify_root_map(file, ns, new_map)) + return false; + /* Don't allow mappings that would allow anything that wouldn't * be allowed without the establishment of unprivileged mappings. */

From: Vasily Averin vvs@virtuozzo.com

[ Upstream commit 1974c45dd7745e999b9387be3d8fdcb27a5b1721 ]

slabinfo.py script does not work with actual kernel version.

First, it was unable to recognise SLUB susbsytem, and when I specified it manually it failed again with

AttributeError: 'struct page' has no member 'obj_cgroups'

.. and then again with

File "tools/cgroup/memcg_slabinfo.py", line 221, in main memcg.kmem_caches.address_of_(), AttributeError: 'struct mem_cgroup' has no member 'kmem_caches'

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cec1a75e-43b4-3d64-2084-d9f98fda037f@virtuozzo.com Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin vvs@virtuozzo.com Tested-by: Roman Gushchin guro@fb.com Acked-by: Roman Gushchin guro@fb.com Cc: Michal Hocko mhocko@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton akpm@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- tools/cgroup/memcg_slabinfo.py | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tools/cgroup/memcg_slabinfo.py b/tools/cgroup/memcg_slabinfo.py index c4225ed63565..1600b17dbb8a 100644 --- a/tools/cgroup/memcg_slabinfo.py +++ b/tools/cgroup/memcg_slabinfo.py @@ -128,9 +128,9 @@ def detect_kernel_config():

cfg['nr_nodes'] = prog['nr_online_nodes'].value_()

- if prog.type('struct kmem_cache').members[1][1] == 'flags': + if prog.type('struct kmem_cache').members[1].name == 'flags': cfg['allocator'] = 'SLUB' - elif prog.type('struct kmem_cache').members[1][1] == 'batchcount': + elif prog.type('struct kmem_cache').members[1].name == 'batchcount': cfg['allocator'] = 'SLAB' else: err('Can't determine the slab allocator') @@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ def main(): # look over all slab pages, belonging to non-root memcgs # and look for objects belonging to the given memory cgroup for page in for_each_slab_page(prog): - objcg_vec_raw = page.obj_cgroups.value_() + objcg_vec_raw = page.memcg_data.value_() if objcg_vec_raw == 0: continue cache = page.slab_cache @@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ def main(): addr = cache.value_() caches[addr] = cache # clear the lowest bit to get the true obj_cgroups - objcg_vec = Object(prog, page.obj_cgroups.type_, + objcg_vec = Object(prog, 'struct obj_cgroup **', value=objcg_vec_raw & ~1)

if addr not in stats: