3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

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From: Jouni Hogander jouni.hogander@unikie.com

commit 9ebd796e24008f33f06ebea5a5e6aceb68b51794 upstream.

Slcan_open doesn't clean-up device which registration failed from the slcan_devs device list. On next open this list is iterated and freed device is accessed. Fix this by calling slc_free_netdev in error path.

Driver/net/can/slcan.c is derived from slip.c. Use-after-free error was identified in slip_open by syzboz. Same bug is in slcan.c. Here is the trace from the Syzbot slip report:

__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x197/0x210 lib/dump_stack.c:118 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xd4/0x30b mm/kasan/report.c:374 __kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x41 mm/kasan/report.c:506 kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:634 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:132 sl_sync drivers/net/slip/slip.c:725 [inline] slip_open+0xecd/0x11b7 drivers/net/slip/slip.c:801 tty_ldisc_open.isra.0+0xa3/0x110 drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:469 tty_set_ldisc+0x30e/0x6b0 drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:596 tiocsetd drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2334 [inline] tty_ioctl+0xe8d/0x14f0 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2594 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:46 [inline] file_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:509 [inline] do_vfs_ioctl+0xdb6/0x13e0 fs/ioctl.c:696 ksys_ioctl+0xab/0xd0 fs/ioctl.c:713 __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:720 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:718 [inline] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x73/0xb0 fs/ioctl.c:718 do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x760 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

Fixes: ed50e1600b44 ("slcan: Fix memory leak in error path") Cc: Wolfgang Grandegger wg@grandegger.com Cc: Marc Kleine-Budde mkl@pengutronix.de Cc: David Miller davem@davemloft.net Cc: Oliver Hartkopp socketcan@hartkopp.net Cc: Lukas Bulwahn lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jouni Hogander jouni.hogander@unikie.com Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp socketcan@hartkopp.net Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde mkl@pengutronix.de [bwh: Backported to 3.16: slc_free_netdev() calls free_netdev() here, so delete the direct call to free_netdev()] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- --- a/drivers/net/can/slcan.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/slcan.c @@ -620,7 +620,7 @@ err_free_chan: sl->tty = NULL; tty->disc_data = NULL; clear_bit(SLF_INUSE, &sl->flags); - free_netdev(sl->dev); + slc_free_netdev(sl->dev);

err_exit: rtnl_unlock();

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From: Jouni Hogander jouni.hogander@unikie.com

commit 3b5a39979dafea9d0cd69c7ae06088f7a84cdafa upstream.

Driver/net/can/slcan.c is derived from slip.c. Memory leak was detected by Syzkaller in slcan. Same issue exists in slip.c and this patch is addressing the leak in slip.c.

Here is the slcan memory leak trace reported by Syzkaller:

BUG: memory leak unreferenced object 0xffff888067f65500 (size 4096): comm "syz-executor043", pid 454, jiffies 4294759719 (age 11.930s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 73 6c 63 61 6e 30 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 slcan0.......... 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ backtrace: [<00000000a06eec0d>] __kmalloc+0x18b/0x2c0 [<0000000083306e66>] kvmalloc_node+0x3a/0xc0 [<000000006ac27f87>] alloc_netdev_mqs+0x17a/0x1080 [<0000000061a996c9>] slcan_open+0x3ae/0x9a0 [<000000001226f0f9>] tty_ldisc_open.isra.1+0x76/0xc0 [<0000000019289631>] tty_set_ldisc+0x28c/0x5f0 [<000000004de5a617>] tty_ioctl+0x48d/0x1590 [<00000000daef496f>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x1c7/0x1510 [<0000000059068dbc>] ksys_ioctl+0x99/0xb0 [<000000009a6eb334>] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x78/0xb0 [<0000000053d0332e>] do_syscall_64+0x16f/0x580 [<0000000021b83b99>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [<000000008ea75434>] 0xfffffffffffffff

Cc: "David S. Miller" davem@davemloft.net Cc: Oliver Hartkopp socketcan@hartkopp.net Cc: Lukas Bulwahn lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jouni Hogander jouni.hogander@unikie.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- drivers/net/slip/slip.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/drivers/net/slip/slip.c +++ b/drivers/net/slip/slip.c @@ -867,6 +867,7 @@ err_free_chan: sl->tty = NULL; tty->disc_data = NULL; clear_bit(SLF_INUSE, &sl->flags); + free_netdev(sl->dev);

err_exit: rtnl_unlock();

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From: yangerkun yangerkun@huawei.com

commit f596c87005f7b1baeb7d62d9a9e25d68c3dfae10 upstream.

As the description before netdev_run_todo, we cannot call free_netdev before rtnl_unlock, fix it by reorder the code.

Signed-off-by: yangerkun yangerkun@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Oliver Hartkopp socketcan@hartkopp.net Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net [bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- drivers/net/slip/slip.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/net/slip/slip.c +++ b/drivers/net/slip/slip.c @@ -867,7 +867,10 @@ err_free_chan: sl->tty = NULL; tty->disc_data = NULL; clear_bit(SLF_INUSE, &sl->flags); + /* do not call free_netdev before rtnl_unlock */ + rtnl_unlock(); sl_free_netdev(sl->dev); + return err;

err_exit: rtnl_unlock();

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From: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com

commit 48a322b6f9965b2f1e4ce81af972f0e287b07ed0 upstream.

kobject_put() should only be called in error path.

Fixes: b8eb718348b8 ("net-sysfs: Fix reference count leak in rx|netdev_queue_add_kobject") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com Cc: Jouni Hogander jouni.hogander@unikie.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- net/core/net-sysfs.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/net/core/net-sysfs.c +++ b/net/core/net-sysfs.c @@ -1158,6 +1158,7 @@ static int netdev_queue_add_kobject(stru #endif

kobject_uevent(kobj, KOBJ_ADD); + return 0;

err: kobject_put(kobj);

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From: Jouni Hogander jouni.hogander@unikie.com

commit ddd9b5e3e765d8ed5a35786a6cb00111713fe161 upstream.

Dev_hold has to be called always in rx_queue_add_kobject. Otherwise usage count drops below 0 in case of failure in kobject_init_and_add.

Fixes: b8eb718348b8 ("net-sysfs: Fix reference count leak in rx|netdev_queue_add_kobject") Reported-by: syzbot syzbot+30209ea299c09d8785c9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: Tetsuo Handa penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp Cc: David Miller davem@davemloft.net Cc: Lukas Bulwahn lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jouni Hogander jouni.hogander@unikie.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net [bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- net/core/net-sysfs.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/net/core/net-sysfs.c +++ b/net/core/net-sysfs.c @@ -782,14 +782,17 @@ static int rx_queue_add_kobject(struct n struct kobject *kobj = &queue->kobj; int error = 0;

+ /* Kobject_put later will trigger rx_queue_release call which + * decreases dev refcount: Take that reference here + */ + dev_hold(queue->dev); + kobj->kset = net->queues_kset; error = kobject_init_and_add(kobj, &rx_queue_ktype, NULL, "rx-%u", index); if (error) goto err;

- dev_hold(queue->dev); - if (net->sysfs_rx_queue_group) { error = sysfs_create_group(kobj, net->sysfs_rx_queue_group); if (error)

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From: Richard Guy Briggs rgb@redhat.com

commit d950f84c1c6658faec2ecbf5b09f7e7191953394 upstream.

Convert WARN_ONCE() to printk() in selinux_nlmsg_perm().

After conversion from audit_log() in commit e173fb26, WARN_ONCE() was deemed too alarmist, so switch it to printk().

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs rgb@redhat.com [PM: Changed to printk(WARNING) so we catch all of the different invalid netlink messages. In Richard's defense, he brought this point up earlier, but I didn't understand his point at the time.] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore pmoore@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -4683,9 +4683,10 @@ static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct soc err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm); if (err) { if (err == -EINVAL) { - WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_nlmsg_perm: unrecognized netlink message:" - " protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%hu\n", - sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type, sksec->sclass); + printk(KERN_WARNING + "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message:" + " protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%hu\n", + sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type, sksec->sclass); if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown()) err = 0; }

3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

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From: Vladis Dronov vdronov@redhat.com

commit 76319946f321e30872dd72af7de867cb26e7a373 upstream.

Any process is able to send netlink messages with invalid types. Make the warning rate-limited to prevent too much log spam.

The warning is supposed to help to find misbehaving programs, so print the triggering command name and pid.

Reported-by: Florian Weimer fweimer@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov vdronov@redhat.com [PM: subject line tweak to make checkpatch.pl happy] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore pmoore@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -4683,11 +4683,12 @@ static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct soc err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm); if (err) { if (err == -EINVAL) { - printk(KERN_WARNING - "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message:" - " protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s\n", + pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: unrecognized netlink" + " message: protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s" + " pig=%d comm=%s\n", sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type, - secclass_map[sksec->sclass - 1].name); + secclass_map[sksec->sclass - 1].name, + task_pid_nr(current), current->comm); if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown()) err = 0; }

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From: David Mosberger davidm@egauge.net

commit 98b74b0ee57af1bcb6e8b2e76e707a71c5ef8ec9 upstream.

usb_submit_urb() may take quite long to execute. For example, a single sg list may have 30 or more entries, possibly leading to that many calls to DMA-map pages. This can cause interrupt latency of several hundred micro-seconds.

Avoid the problem by releasing the io->lock spinlock and re-enabling interrupts before calling usb_submit_urb(). This opens races with usb_sg_cancel() and sg_complete(). Handle those races by using usb_block_urb() to stop URBs from being submitted after usb_sg_cancel() or sg_complete() with error.

Note that usb_unlink_urb() is guaranteed to return -ENODEV if !io->urbs[i]->dev and since the -ENODEV case is already handled, we don't have to check for !io->urbs[i]->dev explicitly.

Before this change, reading 512MB from an ext3 filesystem on a USB memory stick showed a throughput of 12 MB/s with about 500 missed deadlines.

With this change, reading the same file gave the same throughput but only one or two missed deadlines.

Signed-off-by: David Mosberger davidm@egauge.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- drivers/usb/core/message.c | 15 +++++++-------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/usb/core/message.c +++ b/drivers/usb/core/message.c @@ -306,9 +306,10 @@ static void sg_complete(struct urb *urb) */ spin_unlock(&io->lock); for (i = 0, found = 0; i < io->entries; i++) { - if (!io->urbs[i] || !io->urbs[i]->dev) + if (!io->urbs[i]) continue; if (found) { + usb_block_urb(io->urbs[i]); retval = usb_unlink_urb(io->urbs[i]); if (retval != -EINPROGRESS && retval != -ENODEV && @@ -519,12 +520,10 @@ void usb_sg_wait(struct usb_sg_request * int retval;

io->urbs[i]->dev = io->dev; - retval = usb_submit_urb(io->urbs[i], GFP_ATOMIC); - - /* after we submit, let completions or cancellations fire; - * we handshake using io->status. - */ spin_unlock_irq(&io->lock); + + retval = usb_submit_urb(io->urbs[i], GFP_NOIO); + switch (retval) { /* maybe we retrying will recover */ case -ENXIO: /* hc didn't queue this one */ @@ -594,8 +593,8 @@ void usb_sg_cancel(struct usb_sg_request for (i = 0; i < io->entries; i++) { int retval;

- if (!io->urbs[i]->dev) - continue; + usb_block_urb(io->urbs[i]); + retval = usb_unlink_urb(io->urbs[i]); if (retval != -EINPROGRESS && retval != -ENODEV

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From: Alan Stern stern@rowland.harvard.edu

commit 056ad39ee9253873522f6469c3364964a322912b upstream.

FuzzUSB (a variant of syzkaller) found a free-while-still-in-use bug in the USB scatter-gather library:

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in atomic_read include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h:26 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in usb_hcd_unlink_urb+0x5f/0x170 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1607 Read of size 4 at addr ffff888065379610 by task kworker/u4:1/27

CPU: 1 PID: 27 Comm: kworker/u4:1 Not tainted 5.5.11 #2 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: scsi_tmf_2 scmd_eh_abort_handler Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0xce/0x128 lib/dump_stack.c:118 print_address_description.constprop.4+0x21/0x3c0 mm/kasan/report.c:374 __kasan_report+0x153/0x1cb mm/kasan/report.c:506 kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:639 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:185 [inline] check_memory_region+0x152/0x1b0 mm/kasan/generic.c:192 __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:95 atomic_read include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h:26 [inline] usb_hcd_unlink_urb+0x5f/0x170 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1607 usb_unlink_urb+0x72/0xb0 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:657 usb_sg_cancel+0x14e/0x290 drivers/usb/core/message.c:602 usb_stor_stop_transport+0x5e/0xa0 drivers/usb/storage/transport.c:937

This bug occurs when cancellation of the S-G transfer races with transfer completion. When that happens, usb_sg_cancel() may continue to access the transfer's URBs after usb_sg_wait() has freed them.

The bug is caused by the fact that usb_sg_cancel() does not take any sort of reference to the transfer, and so there is nothing to prevent the URBs from being deallocated while the routine is trying to use them. The fix is to take such a reference by incrementing the transfer's io->count field while the cancellation is in progres and decrementing it afterward. The transfer's URBs are not deallocated until io->complete is triggered, which happens when io->count reaches zero.

Signed-off-by: Alan Stern stern@rowland.harvard.edu Reported-and-tested-by: Kyungtae Kim kt0755@gmail.com CC: stable@vger.kernel.org

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/Pine.LNX.4.44L0.2003281615140.14837-100000@netride... Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- drivers/usb/core/message.c | 9 ++++++++- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/usb/core/message.c +++ b/drivers/usb/core/message.c @@ -584,12 +584,13 @@ void usb_sg_cancel(struct usb_sg_request int i, retval;

spin_lock_irqsave(&io->lock, flags); - if (io->status) { + if (io->status || io->count == 0) { spin_unlock_irqrestore(&io->lock, flags); return; } /* shut everything down */ io->status = -ECONNRESET; + io->count++; /* Keep the request alive until we're done */ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&io->lock, flags);

for (i = io->entries - 1; i >= 0; --i) { @@ -603,6 +604,12 @@ void usb_sg_cancel(struct usb_sg_request dev_warn(&io->dev->dev, "%s, unlink --> %d\n", __func__, retval); } + + spin_lock_irqsave(&io->lock, flags); + io->count--; + if (!io->count) + complete(&io->complete); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&io->lock, flags); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(usb_sg_cancel);

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From: Dan Carpenter dan.carpenter@oracle.com

commit 28d76df18f0ad5bcf5fa48510b225f0ed262a99b upstream.

Tom Hatskevich reported that we look up "iocp" then, in the called functions we do a second copy_from_user() and look it up again. The problem that could cause is:

drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.c 674 /* All of these commands require an interrupt or 675 * are unknown/illegal. 676 */ 677 if ((ret = mptctl_syscall_down(iocp, nonblock)) != 0) ^^^^ We take this lock.

678 return ret; 679 680 if (cmd == MPTFWDOWNLOAD) 681 ret = mptctl_fw_download(arg); ^^^ Then the user memory changes and we look up "iocp" again but a different one so now we are holding the incorrect lock and have a race condition.

682 else if (cmd == MPTCOMMAND) 683 ret = mptctl_mpt_command(arg);

The security impact of this bug is not as bad as it could have been because these operations are all privileged and root already has enormous destructive power. But it's still worth fixing.

This patch passes the "iocp" pointer to the functions to avoid the second lookup. That deletes 100 lines of code from the driver so it's a nice clean up as well.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200114123414.GA7957@kadam Reported-by: Tom Hatskevich tom2001tom.23@gmail.com Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter dan.carpenter@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen martin.petersen@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.c | 213 ++++++++------------------------ 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+), 163 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.c +++ b/drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.c @@ -100,19 +100,19 @@ struct buflist { * Function prototypes. Called from OS entry point mptctl_ioctl. * arg contents specific to function. */ -static int mptctl_fw_download(unsigned long arg); -static int mptctl_getiocinfo(unsigned long arg, unsigned int cmd); -static int mptctl_gettargetinfo(unsigned long arg); -static int mptctl_readtest(unsigned long arg); -static int mptctl_mpt_command(unsigned long arg); -static int mptctl_eventquery(unsigned long arg); -static int mptctl_eventenable(unsigned long arg); -static int mptctl_eventreport(unsigned long arg); -static int mptctl_replace_fw(unsigned long arg); - -static int mptctl_do_reset(unsigned long arg); -static int mptctl_hp_hostinfo(unsigned long arg, unsigned int cmd); -static int mptctl_hp_targetinfo(unsigned long arg); +static int mptctl_fw_download(MPT_ADAPTER *iocp, unsigned long arg); +static int mptctl_getiocinfo(MPT_ADAPTER *iocp, unsigned long arg, unsigned int cmd); +static int mptctl_gettargetinfo(MPT_ADAPTER *iocp, unsigned long arg); +static int mptctl_readtest(MPT_ADAPTER *iocp, unsigned long arg); +static int mptctl_mpt_command(MPT_ADAPTER *iocp, unsigned long arg); +static int mptctl_eventquery(MPT_ADAPTER *iocp, unsigned long arg); +static int mptctl_eventenable(MPT_ADAPTER *iocp, unsigned long arg); +static int mptctl_eventreport(MPT_ADAPTER *iocp, unsigned long arg); +static int mptctl_replace_fw(MPT_ADAPTER *iocp, unsigned long arg); + +static int mptctl_do_reset(MPT_ADAPTER *iocp, unsigned long arg); +static int mptctl_hp_hostinfo(MPT_ADAPTER *iocp, unsigned long arg, unsigned int cmd); +static int mptctl_hp_targetinfo(MPT_ADAPTER *iocp, unsigned long arg);

static int mptctl_probe(struct pci_dev *, const struct pci_device_id *); static void mptctl_remove(struct pci_dev *); @@ -123,8 +123,8 @@ static long compat_mpctl_ioctl(struct fi /* * Private function calls. */ -static int mptctl_do_mpt_command(struct mpt_ioctl_command karg, void __user *mfPtr); -static int mptctl_do_fw_download(int ioc, char __user *ufwbuf, size_t fwlen); +static int mptctl_do_mpt_command(MPT_ADAPTER *iocp, struct mpt_ioctl_command karg, void __user *mfPtr); +static int mptctl_do_fw_download(MPT_ADAPTER *iocp, char __user *ufwbuf, size_t fwlen); static MptSge_t *kbuf_alloc_2_sgl(int bytes, u32 dir, int sge_offset, int *frags, struct buflist **blp, dma_addr_t *sglbuf_dma, MPT_ADAPTER *ioc); static void kfree_sgl(MptSge_t *sgl, dma_addr_t sgl_dma, @@ -656,19 +656,19 @@ __mptctl_ioctl(struct file *file, unsign * by TM and FW reloads. */ if ((cmd & ~IOCSIZE_MASK) == (MPTIOCINFO & ~IOCSIZE_MASK)) { - return mptctl_getiocinfo(arg, _IOC_SIZE(cmd)); + return mptctl_getiocinfo(iocp, arg, _IOC_SIZE(cmd)); } else if (cmd == MPTTARGETINFO) { - return mptctl_gettargetinfo(arg); + return mptctl_gettargetinfo(iocp, arg); } else if (cmd == MPTTEST) { - return mptctl_readtest(arg); + return mptctl_readtest(iocp, arg); } else if (cmd == MPTEVENTQUERY) { - return mptctl_eventquery(arg); + return mptctl_eventquery(iocp, arg); } else if (cmd == MPTEVENTENABLE) { - return mptctl_eventenable(arg); + return mptctl_eventenable(iocp, arg); } else if (cmd == MPTEVENTREPORT) { - return mptctl_eventreport(arg); + return mptctl_eventreport(iocp, arg); } else if (cmd == MPTFWREPLACE) { - return mptctl_replace_fw(arg); + return mptctl_replace_fw(iocp, arg); }

/* All of these commands require an interrupt or @@ -678,15 +678,15 @@ __mptctl_ioctl(struct file *file, unsign return ret;

if (cmd == MPTFWDOWNLOAD) - ret = mptctl_fw_download(arg); + ret = mptctl_fw_download(iocp, arg); else if (cmd == MPTCOMMAND) - ret = mptctl_mpt_command(arg); + ret = mptctl_mpt_command(iocp, arg); else if (cmd == MPTHARDRESET) - ret = mptctl_do_reset(arg); + ret = mptctl_do_reset(iocp, arg); else if ((cmd & ~IOCSIZE_MASK) == (HP_GETHOSTINFO & ~IOCSIZE_MASK)) - ret = mptctl_hp_hostinfo(arg, _IOC_SIZE(cmd)); + ret = mptctl_hp_hostinfo(iocp, arg, _IOC_SIZE(cmd)); else if (cmd == HP_GETTARGETINFO) - ret = mptctl_hp_targetinfo(arg); + ret = mptctl_hp_targetinfo(iocp, arg); else ret = -EINVAL;

@@ -705,11 +705,10 @@ mptctl_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned return ret; }

-static int mptctl_do_reset(unsigned long arg) +static int mptctl_do_reset(MPT_ADAPTER *iocp, unsigned long arg) { struct mpt_ioctl_diag_reset __user *urinfo = (void __user *) arg; struct mpt_ioctl_diag_reset krinfo; - MPT_ADAPTER *iocp;

if (copy_from_user(&krinfo, urinfo, sizeof(struct mpt_ioctl_diag_reset))) { printk(KERN_ERR MYNAM "%s@%d::mptctl_do_reset - " @@ -718,12 +717,6 @@ static int mptctl_do_reset(unsigned long return -EFAULT; }

- if (mpt_verify_adapter(krinfo.hdr.iocnum, &iocp) < 0) { - printk(KERN_DEBUG MYNAM "%s@%d::mptctl_do_reset - ioc%d not found!\n", - __FILE__, __LINE__, krinfo.hdr.iocnum); - return -ENODEV; /* (-6) No such device or address */ - } - dctlprintk(iocp, printk(MYIOC_s_DEBUG_FMT "mptctl_do_reset called.\n", iocp->name));

@@ -754,7 +747,7 @@ static int mptctl_do_reset(unsigned long * -ENOMSG if FW upload returned bad status */ static int -mptctl_fw_download(unsigned long arg) +mptctl_fw_download(MPT_ADAPTER *iocp, unsigned long arg) { struct mpt_fw_xfer __user *ufwdl = (void __user *) arg; struct mpt_fw_xfer kfwdl; @@ -766,7 +759,7 @@ mptctl_fw_download(unsigned long arg) return -EFAULT; }

- return mptctl_do_fw_download(kfwdl.iocnum, kfwdl.bufp, kfwdl.fwlen); + return mptctl_do_fw_download(iocp, kfwdl.bufp, kfwdl.fwlen); }

/*=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=*/ @@ -784,11 +777,10 @@ mptctl_fw_download(unsigned long arg) * -ENOMSG if FW upload returned bad status */ static int -mptctl_do_fw_download(int ioc, char __user *ufwbuf, size_t fwlen) +mptctl_do_fw_download(MPT_ADAPTER *iocp, char __user *ufwbuf, size_t fwlen) { FWDownload_t *dlmsg; MPT_FRAME_HDR *mf; - MPT_ADAPTER *iocp; FWDownloadTCSGE_t *ptsge; MptSge_t *sgl, *sgIn; char *sgOut; @@ -808,17 +800,10 @@ mptctl_do_fw_download(int ioc, char __us pFWDownloadReply_t ReplyMsg = NULL; unsigned long timeleft;

- if (mpt_verify_adapter(ioc, &iocp) < 0) { - printk(KERN_DEBUG MYNAM "ioctl_fwdl - ioc%d not found!\n", - ioc); - return -ENODEV; /* (-6) No such device or address */ - } else { - - /* Valid device. Get a message frame and construct the FW download message. - */ - if ((mf = mpt_get_msg_frame(mptctl_id, iocp)) == NULL) - return -EAGAIN; - } + /* Valid device. Get a message frame and construct the FW download message. + */ + if ((mf = mpt_get_msg_frame(mptctl_id, iocp)) == NULL) + return -EAGAIN;

dctlprintk(iocp, printk(MYIOC_s_DEBUG_FMT "mptctl_do_fwdl called. mptctl_id = %xh.\n", iocp->name, mptctl_id)); @@ -826,8 +811,6 @@ mptctl_do_fw_download(int ioc, char __us iocp->name, ufwbuf)); dctlprintk(iocp, printk(MYIOC_s_DEBUG_FMT "DbG: kfwdl.fwlen = %d\n", iocp->name, (int)fwlen)); - dctlprintk(iocp, printk(MYIOC_s_DEBUG_FMT "DbG: kfwdl.ioc = %04xh\n", - iocp->name, ioc));

dlmsg = (FWDownload_t*) mf; ptsge = (FWDownloadTCSGE_t *) &dlmsg->SGL; @@ -1234,13 +1217,11 @@ kfree_sgl(MptSge_t *sgl, dma_addr_t sgl_ * -ENODEV if no such device/adapter */ static int -mptctl_getiocinfo (unsigned long arg, unsigned int data_size) +mptctl_getiocinfo (MPT_ADAPTER *ioc, unsigned long arg, unsigned int data_size) { struct mpt_ioctl_iocinfo __user *uarg = (void __user *) arg; struct mpt_ioctl_iocinfo *karg; - MPT_ADAPTER *ioc; struct pci_dev *pdev; - int iocnum; unsigned int port; int cim_rev; struct scsi_device *sdev; @@ -1276,14 +1257,6 @@ mptctl_getiocinfo (unsigned long arg, un return -EFAULT; }

- if (((iocnum = mpt_verify_adapter(karg->hdr.iocnum, &ioc)) < 0) || - (ioc == NULL)) { - printk(KERN_DEBUG MYNAM "%s::mptctl_getiocinfo() @%d - ioc%d not found!\n", - __FILE__, __LINE__, iocnum); - kfree(karg); - return -ENODEV; - } - /* Verify the data transfer size is correct. */ if (karg->hdr.maxDataSize != data_size) { printk(MYIOC_s_ERR_FMT "%s@%d::mptctl_getiocinfo - " @@ -1389,15 +1362,13 @@ mptctl_getiocinfo (unsigned long arg, un * -ENODEV if no such device/adapter */ static int -mptctl_gettargetinfo (unsigned long arg) +mptctl_gettargetinfo (MPT_ADAPTER *ioc, unsigned long arg) { struct mpt_ioctl_targetinfo __user *uarg = (void __user *) arg; struct mpt_ioctl_targetinfo karg; - MPT_ADAPTER *ioc; VirtDevice *vdevice; char *pmem; int *pdata; - int iocnum; int numDevices = 0; int lun; int maxWordsLeft; @@ -1412,13 +1383,6 @@ mptctl_gettargetinfo (unsigned long arg) return -EFAULT; }

- if (((iocnum = mpt_verify_adapter(karg.hdr.iocnum, &ioc)) < 0) || - (ioc == NULL)) { - printk(KERN_DEBUG MYNAM "%s::mptctl_gettargetinfo() @%d - ioc%d not found!\n", - __FILE__, __LINE__, iocnum); - return -ENODEV; - } - dctlprintk(ioc, printk(MYIOC_s_DEBUG_FMT "mptctl_gettargetinfo called.\n", ioc->name)); /* Get the port number and set the maximum number of bytes @@ -1514,12 +1478,10 @@ mptctl_gettargetinfo (unsigned long arg) * -ENODEV if no such device/adapter */ static int -mptctl_readtest (unsigned long arg) +mptctl_readtest (MPT_ADAPTER *ioc, unsigned long arg) { struct mpt_ioctl_test __user *uarg = (void __user *) arg; struct mpt_ioctl_test karg; - MPT_ADAPTER *ioc; - int iocnum;

if (copy_from_user(&karg, uarg, sizeof(struct mpt_ioctl_test))) { printk(KERN_ERR MYNAM "%s@%d::mptctl_readtest - " @@ -1528,13 +1490,6 @@ mptctl_readtest (unsigned long arg) return -EFAULT; }

- if (((iocnum = mpt_verify_adapter(karg.hdr.iocnum, &ioc)) < 0) || - (ioc == NULL)) { - printk(KERN_DEBUG MYNAM "%s::mptctl_readtest() @%d - ioc%d not found!\n", - __FILE__, __LINE__, iocnum); - return -ENODEV; - } - dctlprintk(ioc, printk(MYIOC_s_DEBUG_FMT "mptctl_readtest called.\n", ioc->name)); /* Fill in the data and return the structure to the calling @@ -1575,12 +1530,10 @@ mptctl_readtest (unsigned long arg) * -ENODEV if no such device/adapter */ static int -mptctl_eventquery (unsigned long arg) +mptctl_eventquery (MPT_ADAPTER *ioc, unsigned long arg) { struct mpt_ioctl_eventquery __user *uarg = (void __user *) arg; struct mpt_ioctl_eventquery karg; - MPT_ADAPTER *ioc; - int iocnum;

if (copy_from_user(&karg, uarg, sizeof(struct mpt_ioctl_eventquery))) { printk(KERN_ERR MYNAM "%s@%d::mptctl_eventquery - " @@ -1589,13 +1542,6 @@ mptctl_eventquery (unsigned long arg) return -EFAULT; }

- if (((iocnum = mpt_verify_adapter(karg.hdr.iocnum, &ioc)) < 0) || - (ioc == NULL)) { - printk(KERN_DEBUG MYNAM "%s::mptctl_eventquery() @%d - ioc%d not found!\n", - __FILE__, __LINE__, iocnum); - return -ENODEV; - } - dctlprintk(ioc, printk(MYIOC_s_DEBUG_FMT "mptctl_eventquery called.\n", ioc->name)); karg.eventEntries = MPTCTL_EVENT_LOG_SIZE; @@ -1614,12 +1560,10 @@ mptctl_eventquery (unsigned long arg)

/*=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=*/ static int -mptctl_eventenable (unsigned long arg) +mptctl_eventenable (MPT_ADAPTER *ioc, unsigned long arg) { struct mpt_ioctl_eventenable __user *uarg = (void __user *) arg; struct mpt_ioctl_eventenable karg; - MPT_ADAPTER *ioc; - int iocnum;

if (copy_from_user(&karg, uarg, sizeof(struct mpt_ioctl_eventenable))) { printk(KERN_ERR MYNAM "%s@%d::mptctl_eventenable - " @@ -1628,13 +1572,6 @@ mptctl_eventenable (unsigned long arg) return -EFAULT; }

- if (((iocnum = mpt_verify_adapter(karg.hdr.iocnum, &ioc)) < 0) || - (ioc == NULL)) { - printk(KERN_DEBUG MYNAM "%s::mptctl_eventenable() @%d - ioc%d not found!\n", - __FILE__, __LINE__, iocnum); - return -ENODEV; - } - dctlprintk(ioc, printk(MYIOC_s_DEBUG_FMT "mptctl_eventenable called.\n", ioc->name)); if (ioc->events == NULL) { @@ -1662,12 +1599,10 @@ mptctl_eventenable (unsigned long arg)

/*=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=*/ static int -mptctl_eventreport (unsigned long arg) +mptctl_eventreport (MPT_ADAPTER *ioc, unsigned long arg) { struct mpt_ioctl_eventreport __user *uarg = (void __user *) arg; struct mpt_ioctl_eventreport karg; - MPT_ADAPTER *ioc; - int iocnum; int numBytes, maxEvents, max;

if (copy_from_user(&karg, uarg, sizeof(struct mpt_ioctl_eventreport))) { @@ -1677,12 +1612,6 @@ mptctl_eventreport (unsigned long arg) return -EFAULT; }

- if (((iocnum = mpt_verify_adapter(karg.hdr.iocnum, &ioc)) < 0) || - (ioc == NULL)) { - printk(KERN_DEBUG MYNAM "%s::mptctl_eventreport() @%d - ioc%d not found!\n", - __FILE__, __LINE__, iocnum); - return -ENODEV; - } dctlprintk(ioc, printk(MYIOC_s_DEBUG_FMT "mptctl_eventreport called.\n", ioc->name));

@@ -1716,12 +1645,10 @@ mptctl_eventreport (unsigned long arg)

/*=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=*/ static int -mptctl_replace_fw (unsigned long arg) +mptctl_replace_fw (MPT_ADAPTER *ioc, unsigned long arg) { struct mpt_ioctl_replace_fw __user *uarg = (void __user *) arg; struct mpt_ioctl_replace_fw karg; - MPT_ADAPTER *ioc; - int iocnum; int newFwSize;

if (copy_from_user(&karg, uarg, sizeof(struct mpt_ioctl_replace_fw))) { @@ -1731,13 +1658,6 @@ mptctl_replace_fw (unsigned long arg) return -EFAULT; }

- if (((iocnum = mpt_verify_adapter(karg.hdr.iocnum, &ioc)) < 0) || - (ioc == NULL)) { - printk(KERN_DEBUG MYNAM "%s::mptctl_replace_fw() @%d - ioc%d not found!\n", - __FILE__, __LINE__, iocnum); - return -ENODEV; - } - dctlprintk(ioc, printk(MYIOC_s_DEBUG_FMT "mptctl_replace_fw called.\n", ioc->name)); /* If caching FW, Free the old FW image @@ -1789,12 +1709,10 @@ mptctl_replace_fw (unsigned long arg) * -ENOMEM if memory allocation error */ static int -mptctl_mpt_command (unsigned long arg) +mptctl_mpt_command (MPT_ADAPTER *ioc, unsigned long arg) { struct mpt_ioctl_command __user *uarg = (void __user *) arg; struct mpt_ioctl_command karg; - MPT_ADAPTER *ioc; - int iocnum; int rc;

@@ -1805,14 +1723,7 @@ mptctl_mpt_command (unsigned long arg) return -EFAULT; }

- if (((iocnum = mpt_verify_adapter(karg.hdr.iocnum, &ioc)) < 0) || - (ioc == NULL)) { - printk(KERN_DEBUG MYNAM "%s::mptctl_mpt_command() @%d - ioc%d not found!\n", - __FILE__, __LINE__, iocnum); - return -ENODEV; - } - - rc = mptctl_do_mpt_command (karg, &uarg->MF); + rc = mptctl_do_mpt_command (ioc, karg, &uarg->MF);

return rc; } @@ -1830,9 +1741,8 @@ mptctl_mpt_command (unsigned long arg) * -EPERM if SCSI I/O and target is untagged */ static int -mptctl_do_mpt_command (struct mpt_ioctl_command karg, void __user *mfPtr) +mptctl_do_mpt_command (MPT_ADAPTER *ioc, struct mpt_ioctl_command karg, void __user *mfPtr) { - MPT_ADAPTER *ioc; MPT_FRAME_HDR *mf = NULL; MPIHeader_t *hdr; char *psge; @@ -1841,7 +1751,7 @@ mptctl_do_mpt_command (struct mpt_ioctl_ dma_addr_t dma_addr_in; dma_addr_t dma_addr_out; int sgSize = 0; /* Num SG elements */ - int iocnum, flagsLength; + int flagsLength; int sz, rc = 0; int msgContext; u16 req_idx; @@ -1856,13 +1766,6 @@ mptctl_do_mpt_command (struct mpt_ioctl_ bufIn.kptr = bufOut.kptr = NULL; bufIn.len = bufOut.len = 0;

- if (((iocnum = mpt_verify_adapter(karg.hdr.iocnum, &ioc)) < 0) || - (ioc == NULL)) { - printk(KERN_DEBUG MYNAM "%s::mptctl_do_mpt_command() @%d - ioc%d not found!\n", - __FILE__, __LINE__, iocnum); - return -ENODEV; - } - spin_lock_irqsave(&ioc->taskmgmt_lock, flags); if (ioc->ioc_reset_in_progress) { spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ioc->taskmgmt_lock, flags); @@ -2418,17 +2321,15 @@ done_free_mem: * -ENOMEM if memory allocation error */ static int -mptctl_hp_hostinfo(unsigned long arg, unsigned int data_size) +mptctl_hp_hostinfo(MPT_ADAPTER *ioc, unsigned long arg, unsigned int data_size) { hp_host_info_t __user *uarg = (void __user *) arg; - MPT_ADAPTER *ioc; struct pci_dev *pdev; char *pbuf=NULL; dma_addr_t buf_dma; hp_host_info_t karg; CONFIGPARMS cfg; ConfigPageHeader_t hdr; - int iocnum; int rc, cim_rev; ToolboxIstwiReadWriteRequest_t *IstwiRWRequest; MPT_FRAME_HDR *mf = NULL; @@ -2452,12 +2353,6 @@ mptctl_hp_hostinfo(unsigned long arg, un return -EFAULT; }

- if (((iocnum = mpt_verify_adapter(karg.hdr.iocnum, &ioc)) < 0) || - (ioc == NULL)) { - printk(KERN_DEBUG MYNAM "%s::mptctl_hp_hostinfo() @%d - ioc%d not found!\n", - __FILE__, __LINE__, iocnum); - return -ENODEV; - } dctlprintk(ioc, printk(MYIOC_s_DEBUG_FMT ": mptctl_hp_hostinfo called.\n", ioc->name));

@@ -2670,15 +2565,13 @@ retry_wait: * -ENOMEM if memory allocation error */ static int -mptctl_hp_targetinfo(unsigned long arg) +mptctl_hp_targetinfo(MPT_ADAPTER *ioc, unsigned long arg) { hp_target_info_t __user *uarg = (void __user *) arg; SCSIDevicePage0_t *pg0_alloc; SCSIDevicePage3_t *pg3_alloc; - MPT_ADAPTER *ioc; MPT_SCSI_HOST *hd = NULL; hp_target_info_t karg; - int iocnum; int data_sz; dma_addr_t page_dma; CONFIGPARMS cfg; @@ -2692,12 +2585,6 @@ mptctl_hp_targetinfo(unsigned long arg) return -EFAULT; }

- if (((iocnum = mpt_verify_adapter(karg.hdr.iocnum, &ioc)) < 0) || - (ioc == NULL)) { - printk(KERN_DEBUG MYNAM "%s::mptctl_hp_targetinfo() @%d - ioc%d not found!\n", - __FILE__, __LINE__, iocnum); - return -ENODEV; - } if (karg.hdr.id >= MPT_MAX_FC_DEVICES) return -EINVAL; dctlprintk(ioc, printk(MYIOC_s_DEBUG_FMT "mptctl_hp_targetinfo called.\n", @@ -2865,7 +2752,7 @@ compat_mptfwxfer_ioctl(struct file *filp kfw.fwlen = kfw32.fwlen; kfw.bufp = compat_ptr(kfw32.bufp);

- ret = mptctl_do_fw_download(kfw.iocnum, kfw.bufp, kfw.fwlen); + ret = mptctl_do_fw_download(iocp, kfw.bufp, kfw.fwlen);

mutex_unlock(&iocp->ioctl_cmds.mutex);

@@ -2919,7 +2806,7 @@ compat_mpt_command(struct file *filp, un

/* Pass new structure to do_mpt_command */ - ret = mptctl_do_mpt_command (karg, &uarg->MF); + ret = mptctl_do_mpt_command (iocp, karg, &uarg->MF);

mutex_unlock(&iocp->ioctl_cmds.mutex);

3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Qing Xu m1s5p6688@gmail.com

commit 3a9b153c5591548612c3955c9600a98150c81875 upstream.

mwifiex_ret_wmm_get_status() calls memcpy() without checking the destination size.Since the source is given from remote AP which contains illegal wmm elements , this may trigger a heap buffer overflow. Fix it by putting the length check before calling memcpy().

Signed-off-by: Qing Xu m1s5p6688@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo kvalo@codeaurora.org [bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust filename] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- drivers/net/wireless/mwifiex/wmm.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/net/wireless/mwifiex/wmm.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/mwifiex/wmm.c @@ -791,6 +791,10 @@ int mwifiex_ret_wmm_get_status(struct mw wmm_param_ie->qos_info_bitmap & IEEE80211_WMM_IE_AP_QOSINFO_PARAM_SET_CNT_MASK);

+ if (wmm_param_ie->vend_hdr.len + 2 > + sizeof(struct ieee_types_wmm_parameter)) + break; + memcpy((u8 *) &priv->curr_bss_params.bss_descriptor. wmm_ie, wmm_param_ie, wmm_param_ie->vend_hdr.len + 2);

3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Akinobu Mita akinobu.mita@gmail.com

commit 46f69e6a6bbbf3858617c8729e31895846c15a79 upstream.

This prevents integer overflow when converting the request queue's max_sectors from sectors to bytes. However, this is a preparation for extending the data type of max_sectors in struct Scsi_Host and scsi_host_template. So, it is impossible to happen this integer overflow for now, because SCSI low-level drivers can not specify max_sectors greater than 0xffff due to the data type limitation.

Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita akinobu.mita@gmail.com Acked by: Douglas Gilbert dgilbert@interlog.com Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig hch@lst.de Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- drivers/scsi/sg.c | 17 +++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/scsi/sg.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/sg.c @@ -865,6 +865,15 @@ static int srp_done(Sg_fd *sfp, Sg_reque return ret; }

+static int max_sectors_bytes(struct request_queue *q) +{ + unsigned int max_sectors = queue_max_sectors(q); + + max_sectors = min_t(unsigned int, max_sectors, INT_MAX >> 9); + + return max_sectors << 9; +} + static long sg_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd_in, unsigned long arg) { @@ -1004,7 +1013,7 @@ sg_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int if (val < 0) return -EINVAL; val = min_t(int, val, - queue_max_sectors(sdp->device->request_queue) * 512); + max_sectors_bytes(sdp->device->request_queue)); if (val != sfp->reserve.bufflen) { if (sg_res_in_use(sfp) || sfp->mmap_called) return -EBUSY; @@ -1014,7 +1023,7 @@ sg_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int return 0; case SG_GET_RESERVED_SIZE: val = min_t(int, sfp->reserve.bufflen, - queue_max_sectors(sdp->device->request_queue) * 512); + max_sectors_bytes(sdp->device->request_queue)); return put_user(val, ip); case SG_SET_COMMAND_Q: result = get_user(val, ip); @@ -1154,7 +1163,7 @@ sg_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int return -ENODEV; return scsi_ioctl(sdp->device, cmd_in, p); case BLKSECTGET: - return put_user(queue_max_sectors(sdp->device->request_queue) * 512, + return put_user(max_sectors_bytes(sdp->device->request_queue), ip); case BLKTRACESETUP: return blk_trace_setup(sdp->device->request_queue, @@ -2170,7 +2179,7 @@ sg_add_sfp(Sg_device * sdp, int dev) sg_big_buff = def_reserved_size;

bufflen = min_t(int, sg_big_buff, - queue_max_sectors(sdp->device->request_queue) * 512); + max_sectors_bytes(sdp->device->request_queue)); sg_build_reserve(sfp, bufflen); SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(3, printk("sg_add_sfp: bufflen=%d, k_use_sg=%d\n", sfp->reserve.bufflen, sfp->reserve.k_use_sg));

3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hannes Reinecke hare@suse.de

commit 1bc0eb0446158cc76562176b80623aa119afee5b upstream.

The 'reserved' page array is used as a short-cut for mapping data, saving us to allocate pages per request. However, the 'reserved' array is only capable of holding one request, so this patch introduces a mutex for protect 'sg_fd' against concurrent accesses.

Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke hare@suse.com Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn jthumshirn@suse.de Tested-by: Johannes Thumshirn jthumshirn@suse.de Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig hch@lst.de Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen martin.petersen@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

[toddpoynor@google.com: backport to 3.18-4.9, fixup for bad ioctl SG_SET_FORCE_LOW_DMA code removed in later versions and not modified by the original patch.]

Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke hare@suse.com Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn jthumshirn@suse.de Tested-by: Johannes Thumshirn jthumshirn@suse.de Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig hch@lst.de Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen martin.petersen@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Todd Poynor toddpoynor@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- drivers/scsi/sg.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/scsi/sg.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/sg.c @@ -150,6 +150,7 @@ typedef struct sg_fd { /* holds the sta struct sg_device *parentdp; /* owning device */ wait_queue_head_t read_wait; /* queue read until command done */ rwlock_t rq_list_lock; /* protect access to list in req_arr */ + struct mutex f_mutex; /* protect against changes in this fd */ int timeout; /* defaults to SG_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT */ int timeout_user; /* defaults to SG_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_USER */ Sg_scatter_hold reserve; /* buffer held for this file descriptor */ @@ -163,6 +164,7 @@ typedef struct sg_fd { /* holds the sta unsigned char next_cmd_len; /* 0: automatic, >0: use on next write() */ char keep_orphan; /* 0 -> drop orphan (def), 1 -> keep for read() */ char mmap_called; /* 0 -> mmap() never called on this fd */ + char res_in_use; /* 1 -> 'reserve' array in use */ struct kref f_ref; struct execute_work ew; } Sg_fd; @@ -206,7 +208,6 @@ static void sg_remove_sfp(struct kref *) static Sg_request *sg_get_rq_mark(Sg_fd * sfp, int pack_id); static Sg_request *sg_add_request(Sg_fd * sfp); static int sg_remove_request(Sg_fd * sfp, Sg_request * srp); -static int sg_res_in_use(Sg_fd * sfp); static Sg_device *sg_get_dev(int dev); static void sg_device_destroy(struct kref *kref);

@@ -652,6 +653,7 @@ sg_write(struct file *filp, const char _ } buf += SZ_SG_HEADER; __get_user(opcode, buf); + mutex_lock(&sfp->f_mutex); if (sfp->next_cmd_len > 0) { cmd_size = sfp->next_cmd_len; sfp->next_cmd_len = 0; /* reset so only this write() effected */ @@ -660,6 +662,7 @@ sg_write(struct file *filp, const char _ if ((opcode >= 0xc0) && old_hdr.twelve_byte) cmd_size = 12; } + mutex_unlock(&sfp->f_mutex); SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(4, printk( "sg_write: scsi opcode=0x%02x, cmd_size=%d\n", (int) opcode, cmd_size)); /* Determine buffer size. */ @@ -758,7 +761,7 @@ sg_new_write(Sg_fd *sfp, struct file *fi sg_remove_request(sfp, srp); return -EINVAL; /* either MMAP_IO or DIRECT_IO (not both) */ } - if (sg_res_in_use(sfp)) { + if (sfp->res_in_use) { sg_remove_request(sfp, srp); return -EBUSY; /* reserve buffer already being used */ } @@ -933,7 +936,7 @@ sg_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int return result; if (val) { sfp->low_dma = 1; - if ((0 == sfp->low_dma) && (0 == sg_res_in_use(sfp))) { + if ((0 == sfp->low_dma) && !sfp->res_in_use) { val = (int) sfp->reserve.bufflen; sg_remove_scat(&sfp->reserve); sg_build_reserve(sfp, val); @@ -1008,12 +1011,18 @@ sg_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int return -EINVAL; val = min_t(int, val, max_sectors_bytes(sdp->device->request_queue)); + mutex_lock(&sfp->f_mutex); if (val != sfp->reserve.bufflen) { - if (sg_res_in_use(sfp) || sfp->mmap_called) + if (sfp->mmap_called || + sfp->res_in_use) { + mutex_unlock(&sfp->f_mutex); return -EBUSY; + } + sg_remove_scat(&sfp->reserve); sg_build_reserve(sfp, val); } + mutex_unlock(&sfp->f_mutex); return 0; case SG_GET_RESERVED_SIZE: val = min_t(int, sfp->reserve.bufflen, @@ -1752,13 +1761,22 @@ sg_start_req(Sg_request *srp, unsigned c md = &map_data;

if (md) { - if (!sg_res_in_use(sfp) && dxfer_len <= rsv_schp->bufflen) + mutex_lock(&sfp->f_mutex); + if (dxfer_len <= rsv_schp->bufflen && + !sfp->res_in_use) { + sfp->res_in_use = 1; sg_link_reserve(sfp, srp, dxfer_len); - else { + } else if ((hp->flags & SG_FLAG_MMAP_IO) && sfp->res_in_use) { + mutex_unlock(&sfp->f_mutex); + return -EBUSY; + } else { res = sg_build_indirect(req_schp, sfp, dxfer_len); - if (res) + if (res) { + mutex_unlock(&sfp->f_mutex); return res; + } } + mutex_unlock(&sfp->f_mutex);

md->pages = req_schp->pages; md->page_order = req_schp->page_order; @@ -2155,6 +2173,7 @@ sg_add_sfp(Sg_device * sdp, int dev) rwlock_init(&sfp->rq_list_lock);

kref_init(&sfp->f_ref); + mutex_init(&sfp->f_mutex); sfp->timeout = SG_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT; sfp->timeout_user = SG_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_USER; sfp->force_packid = SG_DEF_FORCE_PACK_ID; @@ -2229,20 +2248,6 @@ sg_remove_sfp(struct kref *kref) schedule_work(&sfp->ew.work); }

-static int -sg_res_in_use(Sg_fd * sfp) -{ - const Sg_request *srp; - unsigned long iflags; - - read_lock_irqsave(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags); - for (srp = sfp->headrp; srp; srp = srp->nextrp) - if (srp->res_used) - break; - read_unlock_irqrestore(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags); - return srp ? 1 : 0; -} - #ifdef CONFIG_SCSI_PROC_FS static int sg_idr_max_id(int id, void *p, void *data)

3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Todd Poynor toddpoynor@google.com

commit 6a8dadcca81fceff9976e8828cceb072873b7bd5 upstream.

Take f_mutex around mmap() processing to protect against races with the SG_SET_RESERVED_SIZE ioctl. Ensure the reserve buffer length remains consistent during the mapping operation, and set the "mmap called" flag to prevent further changes to the reserved buffer size as an atomic operation with the mapping.

[mkp: fixed whitespace]

Signed-off-by: Todd Poynor toddpoynor@google.com Acked-by: Douglas Gilbert dgilbert@interlog.com Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen martin.petersen@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- drivers/scsi/sg.c | 12 +++++++++--- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/scsi/sg.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/sg.c @@ -1310,6 +1310,7 @@ sg_mmap(struct file *filp, struct vm_are unsigned long req_sz, len, sa; Sg_scatter_hold *rsv_schp; int k, length; + int ret = 0;

if ((!filp) || (!vma) || (!(sfp = (Sg_fd *) filp->private_data))) return -ENXIO; @@ -1319,8 +1320,11 @@ sg_mmap(struct file *filp, struct vm_are if (vma->vm_pgoff) return -EINVAL; /* want no offset */ rsv_schp = &sfp->reserve; - if (req_sz > rsv_schp->bufflen) - return -ENOMEM; /* cannot map more than reserved buffer */ + mutex_lock(&sfp->f_mutex); + if (req_sz > rsv_schp->bufflen) { + ret = -ENOMEM; /* cannot map more than reserved buffer */ + goto out; + }

sa = vma->vm_start; length = 1 << (PAGE_SHIFT + rsv_schp->page_order); @@ -1334,7 +1338,9 @@ sg_mmap(struct file *filp, struct vm_are vma->vm_flags |= VM_IO | VM_DONTEXPAND | VM_DONTDUMP; vma->vm_private_data = sfp; vma->vm_ops = &sg_mmap_vm_ops; - return 0; +out: + mutex_unlock(&sfp->f_mutex); + return ret; }

static void

3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

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From: Hannes Reinecke hare@suse.de

commit 136e57bf43dc4babbfb8783abbf707d483cacbe3 upstream.

Unused.

Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke hare@suse.com Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn jthumshirn@suse.de Tested-by: Johannes Thumshirn jthumshirn@suse.de Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig hch@lst.de Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen martin.petersen@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- drivers/scsi/sg.c | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/scsi/sg.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/sg.c @@ -154,7 +154,6 @@ typedef struct sg_fd { /* holds the sta int timeout; /* defaults to SG_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT */ int timeout_user; /* defaults to SG_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_USER */ Sg_scatter_hold reserve; /* buffer held for this file descriptor */ - unsigned save_scat_len; /* original length of trunc. scat. element */ Sg_request *headrp; /* head of request slist, NULL->empty */ struct fasync_struct *async_qp; /* used by asynchronous notification */ Sg_request req_arr[SG_MAX_QUEUE]; /* used as singly-linked list */ @@ -2069,7 +2068,6 @@ sg_unlink_reserve(Sg_fd * sfp, Sg_reques req_schp->pages = NULL; req_schp->page_order = 0; req_schp->sglist_len = 0; - sfp->save_scat_len = 0; srp->res_used = 0; /* Called without mutex lock to avoid deadlock */ sfp->res_in_use = 0;

3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dan Carpenter dan.carpenter@oracle.com

commit bd46fc406b30d1db1aff8dabaff8d18bb423fdcf upstream.

If "val" is SG_MAX_QUEUE then we are one element beyond the end of the "rinfo" array so the > should be >=.

Fixes: 109bade9c625 ("scsi: sg: use standard lists for sg_requests") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter dan.carpenter@oracle.com Acked-by: Douglas Gilbert dgilbert@interlog.com Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen martin.petersen@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- drivers/scsi/sg.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/scsi/sg.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/sg.c @@ -1072,7 +1072,7 @@ sg_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int read_lock_irqsave(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags); val = 0; list_for_each_entry(srp, &sfp->rq_list, entry) { - if (val > SG_MAX_QUEUE) + if (val >= SG_MAX_QUEUE) break; memset(&rinfo[val], 0, SZ_SG_REQ_INFO); rinfo[val].req_state = srp->done + 1;

3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

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From: Hannes Reinecke hare@suse.de

commit 3e0097499839e0fe3af380410eababe5a47c4cf9 upstream.

When calling SG_GET_REQUEST_TABLE ioctl only a half-filled table is returned; the remaining part will then contain stale kernel memory information. This patch zeroes out the entire table to avoid this issue.

Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke hare@suse.com Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche bart.vanassche@wdc.com Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig hch@lst.de Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen martin.petersen@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- drivers/scsi/sg.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/scsi/sg.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/sg.c @@ -881,7 +881,6 @@ sg_fill_request_table(Sg_fd *sfp, sg_req list_for_each_entry(srp, &sfp->rq_list, entry) { if (val > SG_MAX_QUEUE) break; - memset(&rinfo[val], 0, SZ_SG_REQ_INFO); rinfo[val].req_state = srp->done + 1; rinfo[val].problem = srp->header.masked_status & @@ -1098,8 +1097,8 @@ sg_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int else { sg_req_info_t *rinfo;

- rinfo = kmalloc(SZ_SG_REQ_INFO * SG_MAX_QUEUE, - GFP_KERNEL); + rinfo = kzalloc(SZ_SG_REQ_INFO * SG_MAX_QUEUE, + GFP_KERNEL); if (!rinfo) return -ENOMEM; read_lock_irqsave(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);

3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hannes Reinecke hare@suse.de

commit 745dfa0d8ec26b24f3304459ff6e9eacc5c8351b upstream.

The ioctl SET_FORCE_LOW_DMA has never worked since the initial git check-in, and the respective setting is nowadays handled correctly. So disable it entirely.

Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke hare@suse.com Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn jthumshirn@suse.de Tested-by: Johannes Thumshirn jthumshirn@suse.de Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig hch@lst.de Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen martin.petersen@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org [bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- drivers/scsi/sg.c | 30 +++++++++--------------------- include/scsi/sg.h | 1 - 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/scsi/sg.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/sg.c @@ -157,7 +157,6 @@ typedef struct sg_fd { /* holds the sta struct list_head rq_list; /* head of request list */ struct fasync_struct *async_qp; /* used by asynchronous notification */ Sg_request req_arr[SG_MAX_QUEUE]; /* used as singly-linked list */ - char low_dma; /* as in parent but possibly overridden to 1 */ char force_packid; /* 1 -> pack_id input to read(), 0 -> ignored */ char cmd_q; /* 1 -> allow command queuing, 0 -> don't */ unsigned char next_cmd_len; /* 0: automatic, >0: use on next write() */ @@ -963,24 +962,14 @@ sg_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int /* strange ..., for backward compatibility */ return sfp->timeout_user; case SG_SET_FORCE_LOW_DMA: - result = get_user(val, ip); - if (result) - return result; - if (val) { - sfp->low_dma = 1; - if ((0 == sfp->low_dma) && !sfp->res_in_use) { - val = (int) sfp->reserve.bufflen; - sg_remove_scat(&sfp->reserve); - sg_build_reserve(sfp, val); - } - } else { - if (atomic_read(&sdp->detaching)) - return -ENODEV; - sfp->low_dma = sdp->device->host->unchecked_isa_dma; - } + /* + * N.B. This ioctl never worked properly, but failed to + * return an error value. So returning '0' to keep compability + * with legacy applications. + */ return 0; case SG_GET_LOW_DMA: - return put_user((int) sfp->low_dma, ip); + return put_user((int) sdp->device->host->unchecked_isa_dma, ip); case SG_GET_SCSI_ID: if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, p, sizeof (sg_scsi_id_t))) return -EFAULT; @@ -1890,6 +1879,7 @@ sg_build_indirect(Sg_scatter_hold * schp int sg_tablesize = sfp->parentdp->sg_tablesize; int blk_size = buff_size, order; gfp_t gfp_mask = GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_COMP | __GFP_NOWARN; + struct sg_device *sdp = sfp->parentdp;

if (blk_size < 0) return -EFAULT; @@ -1914,7 +1904,7 @@ sg_build_indirect(Sg_scatter_hold * schp scatter_elem_sz_prev = num; }

- if (sfp->low_dma) + if (sdp->device->host->unchecked_isa_dma) gfp_mask |= GFP_DMA;

if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) @@ -2168,8 +2158,6 @@ sg_add_sfp(Sg_device * sdp, int dev) sfp->timeout = SG_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT; sfp->timeout_user = SG_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_USER; sfp->force_packid = SG_DEF_FORCE_PACK_ID; - sfp->low_dma = (SG_DEF_FORCE_LOW_DMA == 0) ? - sdp->device->host->unchecked_isa_dma : 1; sfp->cmd_q = SG_DEF_COMMAND_Q; sfp->keep_orphan = SG_DEF_KEEP_ORPHAN; sfp->parentdp = sdp; @@ -2627,7 +2615,7 @@ static void sg_proc_debug_helper(struct jiffies_to_msecs(fp->timeout), fp->reserve.bufflen, (int) fp->reserve.k_use_sg, - (int) fp->low_dma); + (int) sdp->device->host->unchecked_isa_dma); seq_printf(s, " cmd_q=%d f_packid=%d k_orphan=%d closed=0\n", (int) fp->cmd_q, (int) fp->force_packid, (int) fp->keep_orphan); --- a/include/scsi/sg.h +++ b/include/scsi/sg.h @@ -234,7 +234,6 @@ typedef struct sg_req_info { /* used by #define SG_DEFAULT_RETRIES 0

/* Defaults, commented if they differ from original sg driver */ -#define SG_DEF_FORCE_LOW_DMA 0 /* was 1 -> memory below 16MB on i386 */ #define SG_DEF_FORCE_PACK_ID 0 #define SG_DEF_KEEP_ORPHAN 0 #define SG_DEF_RESERVED_SIZE SG_SCATTER_SZ /* load time option */

3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

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From: Hannes Reinecke hare@suse.de

commit 97d27b0dd015e980ade63fda111fd1353276e28b upstream.

sg_remove_sfp_usercontext() is clearing any sg requests, but needs to take 'rq_list_lock' when modifying the list.

Reported-by: Christoph Hellwig hch@lst.de Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke hare@suse.com Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn jthumshirn@suse.de Tested-by: Johannes Thumshirn jthumshirn@suse.de Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig hch@lst.de Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen martin.petersen@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin alexander.levin@microsoft.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- drivers/scsi/sg.c | 12 ++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/scsi/sg.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/sg.c @@ -561,6 +561,7 @@ sg_read(struct file *filp, char __user * } else count = (old_hdr->result == 0) ? 0 : -EIO; sg_finish_rem_req(srp); + sg_remove_request(sfp, srp); retval = count; free_old_hdr: kfree(old_hdr); @@ -601,6 +602,7 @@ sg_new_read(Sg_fd * sfp, char __user *bu } err_out: err2 = sg_finish_rem_req(srp); + sg_remove_request(sfp, srp); return err ? : err2 ? : count; }

@@ -835,6 +837,7 @@ sg_common_write(Sg_fd * sfp, Sg_request if (k) { SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(1, printk("sg_common_write: start_req err=%d\n", k)); sg_finish_rem_req(srp); + sg_remove_request(sfp, srp); return k; /* probably out of space --> ENOMEM */ } if (atomic_read(&sdp->detaching)) { @@ -844,6 +847,7 @@ sg_common_write(Sg_fd * sfp, Sg_request }

sg_finish_rem_req(srp); + sg_remove_request(sfp, srp); return -ENODEV; }

@@ -1367,6 +1371,7 @@ sg_rq_end_io_usercontext(struct work_str struct sg_fd *sfp = srp->parentfp;

sg_finish_rem_req(srp); + sg_remove_request(sfp, srp); kref_put(&sfp->f_ref, sg_remove_sfp); }

@@ -1876,8 +1881,6 @@ sg_finish_rem_req(Sg_request *srp) else sg_remove_scat(req_schp);

- sg_remove_request(sfp, srp); - return ret; }

@@ -2211,12 +2214,17 @@ sg_remove_sfp_usercontext(struct work_st struct sg_fd *sfp = container_of(work, struct sg_fd, ew.work); struct sg_device *sdp = sfp->parentdp; Sg_request *srp; + unsigned long iflags;

/* Cleanup any responses which were never read(). */ + write_lock_irqsave(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags); while (!list_empty(&sfp->rq_list)) { srp = list_first_entry(&sfp->rq_list, Sg_request, entry); sg_finish_rem_req(srp); + list_del(&srp->entry); + srp->parentfp = NULL; } + write_unlock_irqrestore(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);

if (sfp->reserve.bufflen > 0) { SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(6,

3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

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From: Johannes Thumshirn jthumshirn@suse.de

commit 14074aba4bcda3764c9a702b276308b89901d5b6 upstream.

dxfer_len is an unsigned int and we always assign a value > 0 to it, so it doesn't make any sense to check if it is < 0. We can't really check dxferp as well as we have both NULL and not NULL cases in the possible call paths.

So just return true for SG_DXFER_FROM_DEV transfer in sg_is_valid_dxfer().

Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn jthumshirn@suse.de Reported-by: Colin Ian King colin.king@canonical.com Reported-by: Dan Carpenter dan.carpenter@oracle.com Cc: Douglas Gilbert dgilbert@interlog.com Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen martin.petersen@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- drivers/scsi/sg.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/scsi/sg.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/sg.c @@ -796,8 +796,11 @@ static bool sg_is_valid_dxfer(sg_io_hdr_ return false; return true; case SG_DXFER_FROM_DEV: - if (hp->dxfer_len < 0) - return false; + /* + * for SG_DXFER_FROM_DEV we always set dxfer_len to > 0. dxferp + * can either be NULL or != NULL so there's no point in checking + * it either. So just return true. + */ return true; case SG_DXFER_TO_DEV: case SG_DXFER_TO_FROM_DEV:

3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

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From: Johannes Thumshirn jthumshirn@suse.de

commit 48ae8484e9fc324b4968d33c585e54bc98e44d61 upstream.

If the list search in sg_get_rq_mark() fails to find a valid request, we return a bogus element. This then can later lead to a GPF in sg_remove_scat().

So don't return bogus Sg_requests in sg_get_rq_mark() but NULL in case the list search doesn't find a valid request.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn jthumshirn@suse.de Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov andreyknvl@google.com Cc: Hannes Reinecke hare@suse.de Cc: Christoph Hellwig hch@lst.de Cc: Doug Gilbert dgilbert@interlog.com Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke hare@suse.de Acked-by: Doug Gilbert dgilbert@interlog.com Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen martin.petersen@oracle.com Cc: Tony Battersby tonyb@cybernetics.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- drivers/scsi/sg.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/scsi/sg.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/sg.c @@ -2085,11 +2085,12 @@ sg_get_rq_mark(Sg_fd * sfp, int pack_id) if ((1 == resp->done) && (!resp->sg_io_owned) && ((-1 == pack_id) || (resp->header.pack_id == pack_id))) { resp->done = 2; /* guard against other readers */ - break; + write_unlock_irqrestore(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags); + return resp; } } write_unlock_irqrestore(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags); - return resp; + return NULL; }

/* always adds to end of list */

3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

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From: Li Bin huawei.libin@huawei.com

commit 849f8583e955dbe3a1806e03ecacd5e71cce0a08 upstream.

If the dxfer_len is greater than 256M then the request is invalid and we need to call sg_remove_request in sg_common_write.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1586777361-17339-1-git-send-email-huawei.libin@hua... Fixes: f930c7043663 ("scsi: sg: only check for dxfer_len greater than 256M") Acked-by: Douglas Gilbert dgilbert@interlog.com Signed-off-by: Li Bin huawei.libin@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen martin.petersen@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- drivers/scsi/sg.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/scsi/sg.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/sg.c @@ -808,8 +808,10 @@ sg_common_write(Sg_fd * sfp, Sg_request SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(4, printk("sg_common_write: scsi opcode=0x%02x, cmd_size=%d\n", (int) cmnd[0], (int) hp->cmd_len));

- if (hp->dxfer_len >= SZ_256M) + if (hp->dxfer_len >= SZ_256M) { + sg_remove_request(sfp, srp); return -EINVAL; + }

k = sg_start_req(srp, cmnd); if (k) {

3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

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From: "Eric W. Biederman" ebiederm@xmission.com

commit d1e7fd6462ca9fc76650fbe6ca800e35b24267da upstream.

Replace the 32bit exec_id with a 64bit exec_id to make it impossible to wrap the exec_id counter. With care an attacker can cause exec_id wrap and send arbitrary signals to a newly exec'd parent. This bypasses the signal sending checks if the parent changes their credentials during exec.

The severity of this problem can been seen that in my limited testing of a 32bit exec_id it can take as little as 19s to exec 65536 times. Which means that it can take as little as 14 days to wrap a 32bit exec_id. Adam Zabrocki has succeeded wrapping the self_exe_id in 7 days. Even my slower timing is in the uptime of a typical server. Which means self_exec_id is simply a speed bump today, and if exec gets noticably faster self_exec_id won't even be a speed bump.

Extending self_exec_id to 64bits introduces a problem on 32bit architectures where reading self_exec_id is no longer atomic and can take two read instructions. Which means that is is possible to hit a window where the read value of exec_id does not match the written value. So with very lucky timing after this change this still remains expoiltable.

I have updated the update of exec_id on exec to use WRITE_ONCE and the read of exec_id in do_notify_parent to use READ_ONCE to make it clear that there is no locking between these two locations.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/kernel-hardening/20200324215049.GA3710@pi3.com.pl Fixes: 2.3.23pre2 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" ebiederm@xmission.com [bwh: Backported to 3.16: - Use ACCESS_ONCE() - Adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- fs/exec.c | 2 +- include/linux/sched.h | 4 ++-- kernel/signal.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/exec.c +++ b/fs/exec.c @@ -1182,7 +1182,7 @@ void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm

/* An exec changes our domain. We are no longer part of the thread group */ - current->self_exec_id++; + ACCESS_ONCE(current->self_exec_id) = current->self_exec_id + 1; flush_signal_handlers(current, 0); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(setup_new_exec); --- a/include/linux/sched.h +++ b/include/linux/sched.h @@ -1427,8 +1427,8 @@ struct task_struct { struct seccomp seccomp;

/* Thread group tracking */ - u32 parent_exec_id; - u32 self_exec_id; + u64 parent_exec_id; + u64 self_exec_id; /* Protection of (de-)allocation: mm, files, fs, tty, keyrings, mems_allowed, * mempolicy */ spinlock_t alloc_lock; --- a/kernel/signal.c +++ b/kernel/signal.c @@ -1679,7 +1679,7 @@ bool do_notify_parent(struct task_struct * This is only possible if parent == real_parent. * Check if it has changed security domain. */ - if (tsk->parent_exec_id != tsk->parent->self_exec_id) + if (tsk->parent_exec_id != ACCESS_ONCE(tsk->parent->self_exec_id)) sig = SIGCHLD; }

3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

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From: Tahsin Erdogan tahsin@google.com

This is just a small part of commit dec214d00e0d7 "ext4: xattr inode deduplication" that makes checks for metadata_csum feature safer and is actually needed by following fixes.

Signed-off-by: Tahsin Erdogan tahsin@google.com Acked-by: Jan Kara jack@suse.cz [bwh: Ported to 3.16: Use EXT4_HAS_RO_COMPAT_FEATURE()] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- --- a/fs/ext4/ext4.h +++ b/fs/ext4/ext4.h @@ -2411,21 +2411,24 @@ extern void ext4_group_desc_csum_set(str extern int ext4_register_li_request(struct super_block *sb, ext4_group_t first_not_zeroed);

-static inline int ext4_has_group_desc_csum(struct super_block *sb) -{ - return EXT4_HAS_RO_COMPAT_FEATURE(sb, - EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_GDT_CSUM) || - (EXT4_SB(sb)->s_chksum_driver != NULL); -} - static inline int ext4_has_metadata_csum(struct super_block *sb) { WARN_ON_ONCE(EXT4_HAS_RO_COMPAT_FEATURE(sb, EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_METADATA_CSUM) && !EXT4_SB(sb)->s_chksum_driver);

- return (EXT4_SB(sb)->s_chksum_driver != NULL); + return EXT4_HAS_RO_COMPAT_FEATURE(sb, + EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_METADATA_CSUM) && + (EXT4_SB(sb)->s_chksum_driver != NULL); +} + +static inline int ext4_has_group_desc_csum(struct super_block *sb) +{ + return EXT4_HAS_RO_COMPAT_FEATURE(sb, + EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_GDT_CSUM) || + ext4_has_metadata_csum(sb); } + static inline ext4_fsblk_t ext4_blocks_count(struct ext4_super_block *es) { return ((ext4_fsblk_t)le32_to_cpu(es->s_blocks_count_hi) << 32) |

3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

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From: Colin Ian King colin.king@canonical.com

commit fbbbbd2f28aec991f3fbc248df211550fbdfd58c upstream.

There are two cases where u32 variables n and err are being checked for less than zero error values, the checks is always false because the variables are not signed. Fix this by making the variables ints.

Addresses-Coverity: ("Unsigned compared against 0") Fixes: 345c0dbf3a30 ("ext4: protect journal inode's blocks using block_validity") Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King colin.king@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o tytso@mit.edu Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- fs/ext4/block_validity.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/fs/ext4/block_validity.c +++ b/fs/ext4/block_validity.c @@ -142,7 +142,8 @@ static int ext4_protect_reserved_inode(s struct inode *inode; struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb); struct ext4_map_blocks map; - u32 i = 0, err = 0, num, n; + u32 i = 0, num; + int err = 0, n;

if ((ino < EXT4_ROOT_INO) || (ino > le32_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_inodes_count)))

3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

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From: Theodore Ts'o tytso@mit.edu

commit 0a944e8a6c66ca04c7afbaa17e22bf208a8b37f0 upstream.

Since the journal inode is already checked when we added it to the block validity's system zone, if we check it again, we'll just trigger a failure.

This was causing failures like this:

[ 53.897001] EXT4-fs error (device sda): ext4_find_extent:909: inode #8: comm jbd2/sda-8: pblk 121667583 bad header/extent: invalid extent entries - magic f30a, entries 8, max 340(340), depth 0(0) [ 53.931430] jbd2_journal_bmap: journal block not found at offset 49 on sda-8 [ 53.938480] Aborting journal on device sda-8.

... but only if the system was under enough memory pressure that logical->physical mapping for the journal inode gets pushed out of the extent cache. (This is why it wasn't noticed earlier.)

Fixes: 345c0dbf3a30 ("ext4: protect journal inode's blocks using block_validity") Reported-by: Dan Rue dan.rue@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o tytso@mit.edu Tested-by: Naresh Kamboju naresh.kamboju@linaro.org [bwh: Backported to 3.16: Use EXT4_HAS_COMPAT_FEATURE()] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- --- a/fs/ext4/extents.c +++ b/fs/ext4/extents.c @@ -503,10 +503,15 @@ __read_extent_tree_block(const char *fun } if (buffer_verified(bh) && !(flags & EXT4_EX_FORCE_CACHE)) return bh; - err = __ext4_ext_check(function, line, inode, - ext_block_hdr(bh), depth, pblk); - if (err) - goto errout; + if (!EXT4_HAS_COMPAT_FEATURE(inode->i_sb, + EXT4_FEATURE_COMPAT_HAS_JOURNAL) || + (inode->i_ino != + le32_to_cpu(EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_es->s_journal_inum))) { + err = __ext4_ext_check(function, line, inode, + ext_block_hdr(bh), depth, pblk); + if (err) + goto errout; + } set_buffer_verified(bh); /* * If this is a leaf block, cache all of its entries

3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

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From: Jia Zhang qianyue.zj@alibaba-inc.com

commit b399151cb48db30ad1e0e93dd40d68c6d007b637 upstream.

x86_mask is a confusing name which is hard to associate with the processor's stepping.

Additionally, correct an indent issue in lib/cpu.c.

Signed-off-by: Jia Zhang qianyue.zj@alibaba-inc.com [ Updated it to more recent kernels. ] Cc: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: Peter Zijlstra peterz@infradead.org Cc: Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de Cc: bp@alien8.de Cc: tony.luck@intel.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1514771530-70829-1-git-send-email-qianyue.zj@alibab... Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar mingo@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org [bwh: Backported to 3.16: - Drop changes in arch/x86/lib/cpu.c - Adjust filenames, context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/amd_nb.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets_32.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 28 +++++++++++----------- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/centaur.c | 4 ++-- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 8 +++---- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cyrix.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c | 18 +++++++------- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c | 4 ++-- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/main.c | 4 ++-- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_p6.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/proc.c | 4 ++-- arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S | 4 ++-- arch/x86/kernel/mpparse.c | 2 +- drivers/char/hw_random/via-rng.c | 2 +- drivers/cpufreq/acpi-cpufreq.c | 2 +- drivers/cpufreq/longhaul.c | 6 ++--- drivers/cpufreq/p4-clockmod.c | 2 +- drivers/cpufreq/powernow-k7.c | 2 +- drivers/cpufreq/speedstep-centrino.c | 4 ++-- drivers/cpufreq/speedstep-lib.c | 6 ++--- drivers/crypto/padlock-aes.c | 2 +- drivers/edac/amd64_edac.c | 2 +- drivers/edac/mce_amd.c | 2 +- drivers/hwmon/coretemp.c | 6 ++--- drivers/hwmon/hwmon-vid.c | 2 +- drivers/hwmon/k10temp.c | 2 +- drivers/hwmon/k8temp.c | 2 +- drivers/video/fbdev/geode/video_gx.c | 2 +- 33 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ static inline unsigned int acpi_processo if (boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x0F && boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD && boot_cpu_data.x86_model <= 0x05 && - boot_cpu_data.x86_mask < 0x0A) + boot_cpu_data.x86_stepping < 0x0A) return 1; else if (amd_e400_c1e_detected) return 1; --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h @@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ struct cpuinfo_x86 { __u8 x86; /* CPU family */ __u8 x86_vendor; /* CPU vendor */ __u8 x86_model; - __u8 x86_mask; + __u8 x86_stepping; #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 char wp_works_ok; /* It doesn't on 386's */

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/amd_nb.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/amd_nb.c @@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ int amd_cache_northbridges(void) if (boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x10 && boot_cpu_data.x86_model >= 0x8 && (boot_cpu_data.x86_model > 0x9 || - boot_cpu_data.x86_mask >= 0x1)) + boot_cpu_data.x86_stepping >= 0x1)) amd_northbridges.flags |= AMD_NB_L3_INDEX_DISABLE;

if (boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x15) --- a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets_32.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets_32.c @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ void foo(void) OFFSET(CPUINFO_x86, cpuinfo_x86, x86); OFFSET(CPUINFO_x86_vendor, cpuinfo_x86, x86_vendor); OFFSET(CPUINFO_x86_model, cpuinfo_x86, x86_model); - OFFSET(CPUINFO_x86_mask, cpuinfo_x86, x86_mask); + OFFSET(CPUINFO_x86_stepping, cpuinfo_x86, x86_stepping); OFFSET(CPUINFO_cpuid_level, cpuinfo_x86, cpuid_level); OFFSET(CPUINFO_x86_capability, cpuinfo_x86, x86_capability); OFFSET(CPUINFO_x86_vendor_id, cpuinfo_x86, x86_vendor_id); --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c @@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ static void init_amd_k6(struct cpuinfo_x return; }

- if (c->x86_model == 6 && c->x86_mask == 1) { + if (c->x86_model == 6 && c->x86_stepping == 1) { const int K6_BUG_LOOP = 1000000; int n; void (*f_vide)(void); @@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ static void init_amd_k6(struct cpuinfo_x

/* K6 with old style WHCR */ if (c->x86_model < 8 || - (c->x86_model == 8 && c->x86_mask < 8)) { + (c->x86_model == 8 && c->x86_stepping < 8)) { /* We can only write allocate on the low 508Mb */ if (mbytes > 508) mbytes = 508; @@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ static void init_amd_k6(struct cpuinfo_x return; }

- if ((c->x86_model == 8 && c->x86_mask > 7) || + if ((c->x86_model == 8 && c->x86_stepping > 7) || c->x86_model == 9 || c->x86_model == 13) { /* The more serious chips .. */

@@ -190,12 +190,12 @@ static void amd_k7_smp_check(struct cpui * but they are not certified as MP capable. */ /* Athlon 660/661 is valid. */ - if ((c->x86_model == 6) && ((c->x86_mask == 0) || - (c->x86_mask == 1))) + if ((c->x86_model == 6) && ((c->x86_stepping == 0) || + (c->x86_stepping == 1))) return;

/* Duron 670 is valid */ - if ((c->x86_model == 7) && (c->x86_mask == 0)) + if ((c->x86_model == 7) && (c->x86_stepping == 0)) return;

/* @@ -205,8 +205,8 @@ static void amd_k7_smp_check(struct cpui * See http://www.heise.de/newsticker/data/jow-18.10.01-000 for * more. */ - if (((c->x86_model == 6) && (c->x86_mask >= 2)) || - ((c->x86_model == 7) && (c->x86_mask >= 1)) || + if (((c->x86_model == 6) && (c->x86_stepping >= 2)) || + ((c->x86_model == 7) && (c->x86_stepping >= 1)) || (c->x86_model > 7)) if (cpu_has_mp) return; @@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ static void init_amd_k7(struct cpuinfo_x * are more robust with CLK_CTL set to 200xxxxx instead of 600xxxxx * As per AMD technical note 27212 0.2 */ - if ((c->x86_model == 8 && c->x86_mask >= 1) || (c->x86_model > 8)) { + if ((c->x86_model == 8 && c->x86_stepping >= 1) || (c->x86_model > 8)) { rdmsr(MSR_K7_CLK_CTL, l, h); if ((l & 0xfff00000) != 0x20000000) { printk(KERN_INFO @@ -514,7 +514,7 @@ static void early_init_amd(struct cpuinf /* Set MTRR capability flag if appropriate */ if (c->x86 == 5) if (c->x86_model == 13 || c->x86_model == 9 || - (c->x86_model == 8 && c->x86_mask >= 8)) + (c->x86_model == 8 && c->x86_stepping >= 8)) set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_K6_MTRR); #endif #if defined(CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC) && defined(CONFIG_PCI) @@ -561,7 +561,7 @@ static void init_amd_zn(struct cpuinfo_x * Fix erratum 1076: CPB feature bit not being set in CPUID. It affects * all up to and including B1. */ - if (c->x86_model <= 1 && c->x86_mask <= 1) + if (c->x86_model <= 1 && c->x86_stepping <= 1) set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CPB); }

@@ -810,11 +810,11 @@ static unsigned int amd_size_cache(struc /* AMD errata T13 (order #21922) */ if ((c->x86 == 6)) { /* Duron Rev A0 */ - if (c->x86_model == 3 && c->x86_mask == 0) + if (c->x86_model == 3 && c->x86_stepping == 0) size = 64; /* Tbird rev A1/A2 */ if (c->x86_model == 4 && - (c->x86_mask == 0 || c->x86_mask == 1)) + (c->x86_stepping == 0 || c->x86_stepping == 1)) size = 256; } return size; @@ -951,7 +951,7 @@ static bool cpu_has_amd_erratum(struct c }

/* OSVW unavailable or ID unknown, match family-model-stepping range */ - ms = (cpu->x86_model << 4) | cpu->x86_mask; + ms = (cpu->x86_model << 4) | cpu->x86_stepping; while ((range = *erratum++)) if ((cpu->x86 == AMD_MODEL_RANGE_FAMILY(range)) && (ms >= AMD_MODEL_RANGE_START(range)) && --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/centaur.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/centaur.c @@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ static void init_centaur(struct cpuinfo_ clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_TSC); break; case 8: - switch (c->x86_mask) { + switch (c->x86_stepping) { default: name = "2"; break; @@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ centaur_size_cache(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c * - Note, it seems this may only be in engineering samples. */ if ((c->x86 == 6) && (c->x86_model == 9) && - (c->x86_mask == 1) && (size == 65)) + (c->x86_stepping == 1) && (size == 65)) size -= 1; return size; } --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -659,7 +659,7 @@ void cpu_detect(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) cpuid(0x00000001, &tfms, &misc, &junk, &cap0); c->x86 = (tfms >> 8) & 0xf; c->x86_model = (tfms >> 4) & 0xf; - c->x86_mask = tfms & 0xf; + c->x86_stepping = tfms & 0xf;

if (c->x86 == 0xf) c->x86 += (tfms >> 20) & 0xff; @@ -1095,7 +1095,7 @@ static void identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_ c->loops_per_jiffy = loops_per_jiffy; c->x86_cache_size = 0; c->x86_vendor = X86_VENDOR_UNKNOWN; - c->x86_model = c->x86_mask = 0; /* So far unknown... */ + c->x86_model = c->x86_stepping = 0; /* So far unknown... */ c->x86_vendor_id[0] = '\0'; /* Unset */ c->x86_model_id[0] = '\0'; /* Unset */ c->x86_max_cores = 1; @@ -1356,8 +1356,8 @@ void print_cpu_info(struct cpuinfo_x86 *

printk(KERN_CONT " (fam: %02x, model: %02x", c->x86, c->x86_model);

- if (c->x86_mask || c->cpuid_level >= 0) - printk(KERN_CONT ", stepping: %02x)\n", c->x86_mask); + if (c->x86_stepping || c->cpuid_level >= 0) + printk(KERN_CONT ", stepping: %02x)\n", c->x86_stepping); else printk(KERN_CONT ")\n");

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cyrix.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cyrix.c @@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ static void init_cyrix(struct cpuinfo_x8

/* common case step number/rev -- exceptions handled below */ c->x86_model = (dir1 >> 4) + 1; - c->x86_mask = dir1 & 0xf; + c->x86_stepping = dir1 & 0xf;

/* Now cook; the original recipe is by Channing Corn, from Cyrix. * We do the same thing for each generation: we work out --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c @@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ static bool bad_spectre_microcode(struct

for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(spectre_bad_microcodes); i++) { if (c->x86_model == spectre_bad_microcodes[i].model && - c->x86_mask == spectre_bad_microcodes[i].stepping) + c->x86_stepping == spectre_bad_microcodes[i].stepping) return (c->microcode <= spectre_bad_microcodes[i].microcode); } return false; @@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ static void early_init_intel(struct cpui * need the microcode to have already been loaded... so if it is * not, recommend a BIOS update and disable large pages. */ - if (c->x86 == 6 && c->x86_model == 0x1c && c->x86_mask <= 2 && + if (c->x86 == 6 && c->x86_model == 0x1c && c->x86_stepping <= 2 && c->microcode < 0x20e) { printk(KERN_WARNING "Atom PSE erratum detected, BIOS microcode update recommended\n"); clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_PSE); @@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ static void early_init_intel(struct cpui

/* CPUID workaround for 0F33/0F34 CPU */ if (c->x86 == 0xF && c->x86_model == 0x3 - && (c->x86_mask == 0x3 || c->x86_mask == 0x4)) + && (c->x86_stepping == 0x3 || c->x86_stepping == 0x4)) c->x86_phys_bits = 36;

/* @@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ int ppro_with_ram_bug(void) if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL && boot_cpu_data.x86 == 6 && boot_cpu_data.x86_model == 1 && - boot_cpu_data.x86_mask < 8) { + boot_cpu_data.x86_stepping < 8) { printk(KERN_INFO "Pentium Pro with Errata#50 detected. Taking evasive action.\n"); return 1; } @@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ static void intel_smp_check(struct cpuin * Mask B, Pentium, but not Pentium MMX */ if (c->x86 == 5 && - c->x86_mask >= 1 && c->x86_mask <= 4 && + c->x86_stepping >= 1 && c->x86_stepping <= 4 && c->x86_model <= 3) { /* * Remember we have B step Pentia with bugs @@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ static void intel_workarounds(struct cpu * SEP CPUID bug: Pentium Pro reports SEP but doesn't have it until * model 3 mask 3 */ - if ((c->x86<<8 | c->x86_model<<4 | c->x86_mask) < 0x633) + if ((c->x86<<8 | c->x86_model<<4 | c->x86_stepping) < 0x633) clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SEP);

/* @@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ static void intel_workarounds(struct cpu * P4 Xeon errata 037 workaround. * Hardware prefetcher may cause stale data to be loaded into the cache. */ - if ((c->x86 == 15) && (c->x86_model == 1) && (c->x86_mask == 1)) { + if ((c->x86 == 15) && (c->x86_model == 1) && (c->x86_stepping == 1)) { if (msr_set_bit(MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE, MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_PREFETCH_DISABLE_BIT) > 0) { @@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ static void intel_workarounds(struct cpu * Specification Update"). */ if (cpu_has_apic && (c->x86<<8 | c->x86_model<<4) == 0x520 && - (c->x86_mask < 0x6 || c->x86_mask == 0xb)) + (c->x86_stepping < 0x6 || c->x86_stepping == 0xb)) set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_11AP);

@@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ static void init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x8 case 6: if (l2 == 128) p = "Celeron (Mendocino)"; - else if (c->x86_mask == 0 || c->x86_mask == 5) + else if (c->x86_stepping == 0 || c->x86_stepping == 5) p = "Celeron-A"; break;

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c @@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ static bool is_blacklisted(unsigned int */ if (c->x86 == 6 && c->x86_model == 0x4F && - c->x86_mask == 0x01 && + c->x86_stepping == 0x01 && llc_size_per_core > 2621440 && c->microcode < 0x0b000021) { pr_err_once("Erratum BDF90: late loading with revision < 0x0b000021 (0x%x) disabled.\n", c->microcode); @@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ static enum ucode_state request_microcod return UCODE_NFOUND;

sprintf(name, "intel-ucode/%02x-%02x-%02x", - c->x86, c->x86_model, c->x86_mask); + c->x86, c->x86_model, c->x86_stepping);

if (request_firmware_direct(&firmware, name, device)) { pr_debug("data file %s load failed\n", name); --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c @@ -791,7 +791,7 @@ int generic_validate_add_page(unsigned l */ if (is_cpu(INTEL) && boot_cpu_data.x86 == 6 && boot_cpu_data.x86_model == 1 && - boot_cpu_data.x86_mask <= 7) { + boot_cpu_data.x86_stepping <= 7) { if (base & ((1 << (22 - PAGE_SHIFT)) - 1)) { pr_warning("mtrr: base(0x%lx000) is not 4 MiB aligned\n", base); return -EINVAL; --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/main.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/main.c @@ -688,8 +688,8 @@ void __init mtrr_bp_init(void) if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL && boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0xF && boot_cpu_data.x86_model == 0x3 && - (boot_cpu_data.x86_mask == 0x3 || - boot_cpu_data.x86_mask == 0x4)) + (boot_cpu_data.x86_stepping == 0x3 || + boot_cpu_data.x86_stepping == 0x4)) phys_addr = 36;

size_or_mask = SIZE_OR_MASK_BITS(phys_addr); --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel.c @@ -2192,7 +2192,7 @@ static int intel_snb_pebs_broken(int cpu break;

case 45: /* SNB-EP */ - switch (cpu_data(cpu).x86_mask) { + switch (cpu_data(cpu).x86_stepping) { case 6: rev = 0x618; break; case 7: rev = 0x70c; break; } --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c @@ -763,7 +763,7 @@ void intel_pmu_lbr_init_atom(void) * on PMU interrupt */ if (boot_cpu_data.x86_model == 28 - && boot_cpu_data.x86_mask < 10) { + && boot_cpu_data.x86_stepping < 10) { pr_cont("LBR disabled due to erratum"); return; } --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_p6.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_p6.c @@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ static __initconst const struct x86_pmu

static __init void p6_pmu_rdpmc_quirk(void) { - if (boot_cpu_data.x86_mask < 9) { + if (boot_cpu_data.x86_stepping < 9) { /* * PPro erratum 26; fixed in stepping 9 and above. */ --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/proc.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/proc.c @@ -69,8 +69,8 @@ static int show_cpuinfo(struct seq_file c->x86_model, c->x86_model_id[0] ? c->x86_model_id : "unknown");

- if (c->x86_mask || c->cpuid_level >= 0) - seq_printf(m, "stepping\t: %d\n", c->x86_mask); + if (c->x86_stepping || c->cpuid_level >= 0) + seq_printf(m, "stepping\t: %d\n", c->x86_stepping); else seq_printf(m, "stepping\t: unknown\n"); if (c->microcode) --- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ #define X86 new_cpu_data+CPUINFO_x86 #define X86_VENDOR new_cpu_data+CPUINFO_x86_vendor #define X86_MODEL new_cpu_data+CPUINFO_x86_model -#define X86_MASK new_cpu_data+CPUINFO_x86_mask +#define X86_STEPPING new_cpu_data+CPUINFO_x86_stepping #define X86_HARD_MATH new_cpu_data+CPUINFO_hard_math #define X86_CPUID new_cpu_data+CPUINFO_cpuid_level #define X86_CAPABILITY new_cpu_data+CPUINFO_x86_capability @@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ enable_paging: shrb $4,%al movb %al,X86_MODEL andb $0x0f,%cl # mask mask revision - movb %cl,X86_MASK + movb %cl,X86_STEPPING movl %edx,X86_CAPABILITY

is486: --- a/arch/x86/kernel/mpparse.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/mpparse.c @@ -409,7 +409,7 @@ static inline void __init construct_defa processor.apicver = mpc_default_type > 4 ? 0x10 : 0x01; processor.cpuflag = CPU_ENABLED; processor.cpufeature = (boot_cpu_data.x86 << 8) | - (boot_cpu_data.x86_model << 4) | boot_cpu_data.x86_mask; + (boot_cpu_data.x86_model << 4) | boot_cpu_data.x86_stepping; processor.featureflag = boot_cpu_data.x86_capability[0]; processor.reserved[0] = 0; processor.reserved[1] = 0; --- a/drivers/char/hw_random/via-rng.c +++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/via-rng.c @@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ static int via_rng_init(struct hwrng *rn /* Enable secondary noise source on CPUs where it is present. */

/* Nehemiah stepping 8 and higher */ - if ((c->x86_model == 9) && (c->x86_mask > 7)) + if ((c->x86_model == 9) && (c->x86_stepping > 7)) lo |= VIA_NOISESRC2;

/* Esther */ --- a/drivers/cpufreq/acpi-cpufreq.c +++ b/drivers/cpufreq/acpi-cpufreq.c @@ -628,7 +628,7 @@ static int acpi_cpufreq_blacklist(struct if (c->x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL) { if ((c->x86 == 15) && (c->x86_model == 6) && - (c->x86_mask == 8)) { + (c->x86_stepping == 8)) { printk(KERN_INFO "acpi-cpufreq: Intel(R) " "Xeon(R) 7100 Errata AL30, processors may " "lock up on frequency changes: disabling " --- a/drivers/cpufreq/longhaul.c +++ b/drivers/cpufreq/longhaul.c @@ -786,7 +786,7 @@ static int longhaul_cpu_init(struct cpuf break;

case 7: - switch (c->x86_mask) { + switch (c->x86_stepping) { case 0: longhaul_version = TYPE_LONGHAUL_V1; cpu_model = CPU_SAMUEL2; @@ -798,7 +798,7 @@ static int longhaul_cpu_init(struct cpuf break; case 1 ... 15: longhaul_version = TYPE_LONGHAUL_V2; - if (c->x86_mask < 8) { + if (c->x86_stepping < 8) { cpu_model = CPU_SAMUEL2; cpuname = "C3 'Samuel 2' [C5B]"; } else { @@ -825,7 +825,7 @@ static int longhaul_cpu_init(struct cpuf numscales = 32; memcpy(mults, nehemiah_mults, sizeof(nehemiah_mults)); memcpy(eblcr, nehemiah_eblcr, sizeof(nehemiah_eblcr)); - switch (c->x86_mask) { + switch (c->x86_stepping) { case 0 ... 1: cpu_model = CPU_NEHEMIAH; cpuname = "C3 'Nehemiah A' [C5XLOE]"; --- a/drivers/cpufreq/p4-clockmod.c +++ b/drivers/cpufreq/p4-clockmod.c @@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ static int cpufreq_p4_cpu_init(struct cp #endif

/* Errata workaround */ - cpuid = (c->x86 << 8) | (c->x86_model << 4) | c->x86_mask; + cpuid = (c->x86 << 8) | (c->x86_model << 4) | c->x86_stepping; switch (cpuid) { case 0x0f07: case 0x0f0a: --- a/drivers/cpufreq/powernow-k7.c +++ b/drivers/cpufreq/powernow-k7.c @@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ static int check_powernow(void) return 0; }

- if ((c->x86_model == 6) && (c->x86_mask == 0)) { + if ((c->x86_model == 6) && (c->x86_stepping == 0)) { printk(KERN_INFO PFX "K7 660[A0] core detected, " "enabling errata workarounds\n"); have_a0 = 1; --- a/drivers/cpufreq/speedstep-centrino.c +++ b/drivers/cpufreq/speedstep-centrino.c @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ struct cpu_id { __u8 x86; /* CPU family */ __u8 x86_model; /* model */ - __u8 x86_mask; /* stepping */ + __u8 x86_stepping; /* stepping */ };

enum { @@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ static int centrino_verify_cpu_id(const { if ((c->x86 == x->x86) && (c->x86_model == x->x86_model) && - (c->x86_mask == x->x86_mask)) + (c->x86_stepping == x->x86_stepping)) return 1; return 0; } --- a/drivers/cpufreq/speedstep-lib.c +++ b/drivers/cpufreq/speedstep-lib.c @@ -270,9 +270,9 @@ unsigned int speedstep_detect_processor( ebx = cpuid_ebx(0x00000001); ebx &= 0x000000FF;

- pr_debug("ebx value is %x, x86_mask is %x\n", ebx, c->x86_mask); + pr_debug("ebx value is %x, x86_stepping is %x\n", ebx, c->x86_stepping);

- switch (c->x86_mask) { + switch (c->x86_stepping) { case 4: /* * B-stepping [M-P4-M] @@ -359,7 +359,7 @@ unsigned int speedstep_detect_processor( msr_lo, msr_hi); if ((msr_hi & (1<<18)) && (relaxed_check ? 1 : (msr_hi & (3<<24)))) { - if (c->x86_mask == 0x01) { + if (c->x86_stepping == 0x01) { pr_debug("early PIII version\n"); return SPEEDSTEP_CPU_PIII_C_EARLY; } else --- a/drivers/crypto/padlock-aes.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/padlock-aes.c @@ -535,7 +535,7 @@ static int __init padlock_init(void)

printk(KERN_NOTICE PFX "Using VIA PadLock ACE for AES algorithm.\n");

- if (c->x86 == 6 && c->x86_model == 15 && c->x86_mask == 2) { + if (c->x86 == 6 && c->x86_model == 15 && c->x86_stepping == 2) { ecb_fetch_blocks = MAX_ECB_FETCH_BLOCKS; cbc_fetch_blocks = MAX_CBC_FETCH_BLOCKS; printk(KERN_NOTICE PFX "VIA Nano stepping 2 detected: enabling workaround.\n"); --- a/drivers/edac/amd64_edac.c +++ b/drivers/edac/amd64_edac.c @@ -2576,7 +2576,7 @@ static struct amd64_family_type *per_fam struct amd64_family_type *fam_type = NULL;

pvt->ext_model = boot_cpu_data.x86_model >> 4; - pvt->stepping = boot_cpu_data.x86_mask; + pvt->stepping = boot_cpu_data.x86_stepping; pvt->model = boot_cpu_data.x86_model; pvt->fam = boot_cpu_data.x86;

--- a/drivers/edac/mce_amd.c +++ b/drivers/edac/mce_amd.c @@ -744,7 +744,7 @@ int amd_decode_mce(struct notifier_block

pr_emerg(HW_ERR "CPU:%d (%x:%x:%x) MC%d_STATUS[%s|%s|%s|%s|%s", m->extcpu, - c->x86, c->x86_model, c->x86_mask, + c->x86, c->x86_model, c->x86_stepping, m->bank, ((m->status & MCI_STATUS_OVER) ? "Over" : "-"), ((m->status & MCI_STATUS_UC) ? "UE" : "CE"), --- a/drivers/hwmon/coretemp.c +++ b/drivers/hwmon/coretemp.c @@ -268,13 +268,13 @@ static int adjust_tjmax(struct cpuinfo_x for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tjmax_model_table); i++) { const struct tjmax_model *tm = &tjmax_model_table[i]; if (c->x86_model == tm->model && - (tm->mask == ANY || c->x86_mask == tm->mask)) + (tm->mask == ANY || c->x86_stepping == tm->mask)) return tm->tjmax; }

/* Early chips have no MSR for TjMax */

- if (c->x86_model == 0xf && c->x86_mask < 4) + if (c->x86_model == 0xf && c->x86_stepping < 4) usemsr_ee = 0;

if (c->x86_model > 0xe && usemsr_ee) { @@ -426,7 +426,7 @@ static int chk_ucode_version(unsigned in * Readings might stop update when processor visited too deep sleep, * fixed for stepping D0 (6EC). */ - if (c->x86_model == 0xe && c->x86_mask < 0xc && c->microcode < 0x39) { + if (c->x86_model == 0xe && c->x86_stepping < 0xc && c->microcode < 0x39) { pr_err("Errata AE18 not fixed, update BIOS or microcode of the CPU!\n"); return -ENODEV; } --- a/drivers/hwmon/hwmon-vid.c +++ b/drivers/hwmon/hwmon-vid.c @@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ u8 vid_which_vrm(void) if (c->x86 < 6) /* Any CPU with family lower than 6 */ return 0; /* doesn't have VID */

- vrm_ret = find_vrm(c->x86, c->x86_model, c->x86_mask, c->x86_vendor); + vrm_ret = find_vrm(c->x86, c->x86_model, c->x86_stepping, c->x86_vendor); if (vrm_ret == 134) vrm_ret = get_via_model_d_vrm(); if (vrm_ret == 0) --- a/drivers/hwmon/k10temp.c +++ b/drivers/hwmon/k10temp.c @@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ static bool has_erratum_319(struct pci_d * and AM3 formats, but that's the best we can do. */ return boot_cpu_data.x86_model < 4 || - (boot_cpu_data.x86_model == 4 && boot_cpu_data.x86_mask <= 2); + (boot_cpu_data.x86_model == 4 && boot_cpu_data.x86_stepping <= 2); }

static int k10temp_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, --- a/drivers/hwmon/k8temp.c +++ b/drivers/hwmon/k8temp.c @@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ static int k8temp_probe(struct pci_dev * return -ENOMEM;

model = boot_cpu_data.x86_model; - stepping = boot_cpu_data.x86_mask; + stepping = boot_cpu_data.x86_stepping;

/* feature available since SH-C0, exclude older revisions */ if ((model == 4 && stepping == 0) || --- a/drivers/video/fbdev/geode/video_gx.c +++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/geode/video_gx.c @@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ void gx_set_dclk_frequency(struct fb_inf int timeout = 1000;

/* Rev. 1 Geode GXs use a 14 MHz reference clock instead of 48 MHz. */ - if (cpu_data(0).x86_mask == 1) { + if (cpu_data(0).x86_stepping == 1) { pll_table = gx_pll_table_14MHz; pll_table_len = ARRAY_SIZE(gx_pll_table_14MHz); } else {

3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mark Gross mgross@linux.intel.com

commit 93920f61c2ad7edb01e63323832585796af75fc9 upstream.

To make cpu_matches() reusable for other matching tables, have it take a pointer to a x86_cpu_id table as an argument.

[ bp: Flip arguments order. ]

Signed-off-by: Mark Gross mgross@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov bp@suse.de Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf jpoimboe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 23 +++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -872,9 +872,9 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_ {} };

-static bool __init cpu_matches(unsigned long which) +static bool __init cpu_matches(const struct x86_cpu_id *table, unsigned long which) { - const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(cpu_vuln_whitelist); + const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(table);

return m && !!(m->driver_data & which); } @@ -894,29 +894,32 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();

/* Set ITLB_MULTIHIT bug if cpu is not in the whitelist and not mitigated */ - if (!cpu_matches(NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO)) + if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT) && + !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO)) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT);

- if (cpu_matches(NO_SPECULATION)) + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SPECULATION)) return;

setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1); setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);

- if (!cpu_matches(NO_SSB) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) && + if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SSB) && + !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) && !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO)) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);

if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL) setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED);

- if (!cpu_matches(NO_MDS) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) { + if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MDS) && + !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) { setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MDS); - if (cpu_matches(MSBDS_ONLY)) + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, MSBDS_ONLY)) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY); }

- if (!cpu_matches(NO_SWAPGS)) + if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SWAPGS)) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SWAPGS);

/* @@ -934,7 +937,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR))) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_TAA);

- if (cpu_matches(NO_MELTDOWN)) + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN)) return;

/* Rogue Data Cache Load? No! */ @@ -943,7 +946,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru

setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);

- if (cpu_matches(NO_L1TF)) + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_L1TF)) return;

setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF);

3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mark Gross mgross@linux.intel.com

commit 7222a1b5b87417f22265c92deea76a6aecd0fb0f upstream.

Add documentation for the SRBDS vulnerability and its mitigation.

[ bp: Massage. jpoimboe: sysfs table strings. ]

Signed-off-by: Mark Gross mgross@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov bp@suse.de Reviewed-by: Tony Luck tony.luck@intel.com Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf jpoimboe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- .../special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst | 148 ++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 148 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst

--- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst @@ -0,0 +1,148 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +SRBDS - Special Register Buffer Data Sampling +============================================= + +SRBDS is a hardware vulnerability that allows MDS :doc:`mds` techniques to +infer values returned from special register accesses. Special register +accesses are accesses to off core registers. According to Intel's evaluation, +the special register reads that have a security expectation of privacy are +RDRAND, RDSEED and SGX EGETKEY. + +When RDRAND, RDSEED and EGETKEY instructions are used, the data is moved +to the core through the special register mechanism that is susceptible +to MDS attacks. + +Affected processors +-------------------- +Core models (desktop, mobile, Xeon-E3) that implement RDRAND and/or RDSEED may +be affected. + +A processor is affected by SRBDS if its Family_Model and stepping is +in the following list, with the exception of the listed processors +exporting MDS_NO while Intel TSX is available yet not enabled. The +latter class of processors are only affected when Intel TSX is enabled +by software using TSX_CTRL_MSR otherwise they are not affected. + + ============= ============ ======== + common name Family_Model Stepping + ============= ============ ======== + Haswell 06_3CH All + Haswell_L 06_45H All + Haswell_G 06_46H All + + Broadwell_G 06_47H All + Broadwell 06_3DH All + + Skylake_L 06_4EH All + Skylake 06_5EH All + + Kabylake_L 06_8EH <=0xC + + Kabylake 06_9EH <=0xD + ============= ============ ======== + +Related CVEs +------------ + +The following CVE entry is related to this SRBDS issue: + + ============== ===== ===================================== + CVE-2020-0543 SRBDS Special Register Buffer Data Sampling + ============== ===== ===================================== + +Attack scenarios +---------------- +An unprivileged user can extract values returned from RDRAND and RDSEED +executed on another core or sibling thread using MDS techniques. + + +Mitigation mechanism +------------------- +Intel will release microcode updates that modify the RDRAND, RDSEED, and +EGETKEY instructions to overwrite secret special register data in the shared +staging buffer before the secret data can be accessed by another logical +processor. + +During execution of the RDRAND, RDSEED, or EGETKEY instructions, off-core +accesses from other logical processors will be delayed until the special +register read is complete and the secret data in the shared staging buffer is +overwritten. + +This has three effects on performance: + +#. RDRAND, RDSEED, or EGETKEY instructions have higher latency. + +#. Executing RDRAND at the same time on multiple logical processors will be + serialized, resulting in an overall reduction in the maximum RDRAND + bandwidth. + +#. Executing RDRAND, RDSEED or EGETKEY will delay memory accesses from other + logical processors that miss their core caches, with an impact similar to + legacy locked cache-line-split accesses. + +The microcode updates provide an opt-out mechanism (RNGDS_MITG_DIS) to disable +the mitigation for RDRAND and RDSEED instructions executed outside of Intel +Software Guard Extensions (Intel SGX) enclaves. On logical processors that +disable the mitigation using this opt-out mechanism, RDRAND and RDSEED do not +take longer to execute and do not impact performance of sibling logical +processors memory accesses. The opt-out mechanism does not affect Intel SGX +enclaves (including execution of RDRAND or RDSEED inside an enclave, as well +as EGETKEY execution). + +IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL MSR Definition +-------------------------------- +Along with the mitigation for this issue, Intel added a new thread-scope +IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL MSR, (address 0x123). The presence of this MSR and +RNGDS_MITG_DIS (bit 0) is enumerated by CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0).EDX[SRBDS_CTRL = +9]==1. This MSR is introduced through the microcode update. + +Setting IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL[0] (RNGDS_MITG_DIS) to 1 for a logical processor +disables the mitigation for RDRAND and RDSEED executed outside of an Intel SGX +enclave on that logical processor. Opting out of the mitigation for a +particular logical processor does not affect the RDRAND and RDSEED mitigations +for other logical processors. + +Note that inside of an Intel SGX enclave, the mitigation is applied regardless +of the value of RNGDS_MITG_DS. + +Mitigation control on the kernel command line +--------------------------------------------- +The kernel command line allows control over the SRBDS mitigation at boot time +with the option "srbds=". The option for this is: + + ============= ============================================================= + off This option disables SRBDS mitigation for RDRAND and RDSEED on + affected platforms. + ============= ============================================================= + +SRBDS System Information +----------------------- +The Linux kernel provides vulnerability status information through sysfs. For +SRBDS this can be accessed by the following sysfs file: +/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds + +The possible values contained in this file are: + + ============================== ============================================= + Not affected Processor not vulnerable + Vulnerable Processor vulnerable and mitigation disabled + Vulnerable: No microcode Processor vulnerable and microcode is missing + mitigation + Mitigation: Microcode Processor is vulnerable and mitigation is in + effect. + Mitigation: TSX disabled Processor is only vulnerable when TSX is + enabled while this system was booted with TSX + disabled. + Unknown: Dependent on + hypervisor status Running on virtual guest processor that is + affected but with no way to know if host + processor is mitigated or vulnerable. + ============================== ============================================= + +SRBDS Default mitigation +------------------------ +This new microcode serializes processor access during execution of RDRAND, +RDSEED ensures that the shared buffer is overwritten before it is released for +reuse. Use the "srbds=off" kernel command line to disable the mitigation for +RDRAND and RDSEED.

3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Jason@zx2c4.com

commit 69efea712f5b0489e67d07565aad5c94e09a3e52 upstream.

It turns out that RDRAND is pretty slow. Comparing these two constructions:

for (i = 0; i < CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE; i += sizeof(ret)) arch_get_random_long(&ret);

and

long buf[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(long)]; extract_crng((u8 *)buf);

it amortizes out to 352 cycles per long for the top one and 107 cycles per long for the bottom one, on Coffee Lake Refresh, Intel Core i9-9880H.

And importantly, the top one has the drawback of not benefiting from the real rng, whereas the bottom one has all the nice benefits of using our own chacha rng. As get_random_u{32,64} gets used in more places (perhaps beyond what it was originally intended for when it was introduced as get_random_{int,long} back in the md5 monstrosity era), it seems like it might be a good thing to strengthen its posture a tiny bit. Doing this should only be stronger and not any weaker because that pool is already initialized with a bunch of rdrand data (when available). This way, we get the benefits of the hardware rng as well as our own rng.

Another benefit of this is that we no longer hit pitfalls of the recent stream of AMD bugs in RDRAND. One often used code pattern for various things is:

do { val = get_random_u32(); } while (hash_table_contains_key(val));

That recent AMD bug rendered that pattern useless, whereas we're really very certain that chacha20 output will give pretty distributed numbers, no matter what.

So, this simplification seems better both from a security perspective and from a performance perspective.

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Jason@zx2c4.com Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200221201037.30231-1-Jason@zx2c4.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o tytso@mit.edu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org [bwh: Backported to 3.16: Only get_random_int() exists here] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- drivers/char/random.c | 6 ------ 1 file changed, 6 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -1700,9 +1700,6 @@ unsigned int get_random_int(void) __u32 *hash; unsigned int ret;

- if (arch_get_random_int(&ret)) - return ret; - hash = get_cpu_var(get_random_int_hash);

hash[0] += current->pid + jiffies + random_get_entropy();